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# Decolonization and the Question of Exclusion in Taiwanese Nationalism since 1945

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WOLFGANG THIELE

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Analyzing Taiwanese nationalist writing since 1945 and focusing on writing produced by exile Taiwanese in Japan, this article shows that the doctrine of Taiwanese nationalism was highly influenced by international decolonization discourses. It identifies Taiwan's fate with that of colonized countries and Taiwanese domestic power-relationships mirroring relationships between colonizers and colonized. This strengthened a discourse imagining Chinese and mainland Chinese in Taiwan as the antagonists of the Taiwanese nation, which entailed the symbolical exclusion of mainland Chinese into the Taiwanese nation until the late 1990s. The paper furthermore introduces the term *ad hoc colonial nationalism* in order to analytically distinguish the independence movements of 1895 and 1945 from the post-1947 movement..

## *Introduction*

In this paper, I analyze the development of the doctrine of Taiwanese nationalism between 1945 and 2000 using primary sources published by Taiwanese nationalists in Japanese exile. Concentrating on the question of in- or exclusion of post-1945 immigrants from mainland China into Taiwanese nationalism, I argue that global decolonization discourses, for example concerning the question of Apartheid, visibly informed the imagined nation constructed by Taiwanese nationalists.<sup>1</sup> The paper is structured as follows: In this introduction, I will criticize Jürgen Osterhammel's and Jan Jansen's portrayal of Taiwanese history in their global history of decolonization. In the first chapter, I then discuss how Osterhammel's and Jansen's very helpful categorizations of decolonization movements apply to the Taiwanese case and introduce the term *ad hoc colonial independence*, in order to analytically distinguish pre-1947 Taiwan independence movements and the post-1947 independence movement. In the second and third chapters, I use pri-

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<sup>1</sup> The essay is the product of research I conducted during a stay at the University of Tokyo, 2016/17, and part of larger research project.

mary sources to analyze the question of in- and exclusion of *waishengren*<sup>2</sup> in the imagined Taiwanese nation, and the role of the global decolonization discourse in shaping this image.

Jürgen Osterhammel is probably Germany's most renowned author in the field of Global History. Two books that he co-authored with Jan Jansen largely inspired me to start this research; *Colonialism. History, Forms, Outcomes*<sup>3</sup> (German 1995<sup>4</sup>, English 1997) and *Decolonization. The End of Empires* (German 2013<sup>5</sup>), which was published in an English translation this year. While these were inspiring readings, I did not agree with a number of claims made in these books regarding my field of specialization, Taiwanese history.

Osterhammel's and Jansen's categorizations of forms of colonialism and de-colonial movements – for me – shed a revealing spotlight on Taiwanese history. Using their definitions, I will discuss the Taiwanese case in this paper, even though the authors do not consider KMT<sup>6</sup> dictatorship on Taiwan and the anti-KMT independence movement a case of colonialism and/or decolonization movements. Their claim that Taiwan was decolonized by the end of World War Two in 1945, in my view, presents one of the major flaws of their book *Decolonization*<sup>7</sup>. The bibliography cited in their work reveals that they almost exclusively worked with Western literature produced by authors from Europe and North America, apparently ignoring the local or national historiographies of most formerly colonized nations they are writing about.

First, Jansen's and Osterhammel's very own definition of decolonization requires a local government in power and the entry into the U.N for the decolonized territory.<sup>8</sup> One can only really speak of a local government in power in Taiwan since 1992<sup>9</sup>, and up to this day Taiwan is not member of the United Nations<sup>10</sup>. Second, the question whether or not Taiwan was decolonized in 1945 is one of the most controversial questions of modern Taiwanese historiography. In the introduction of his *Modern History of Taiwan*, published in Japanese in 2014 Ho I-lin<sup>11</sup> writes:

<sup>2</sup> 外省人, lit. "foreign province people", referring to post-1945 immigrants from mainland China and their descendants.

<sup>3</sup> This is a literal translation of the German title, the title of the published English translation of the book is *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*

<sup>4</sup> Jürgen Osterhammel and Jan C. Jansen. 1995. *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen*. München: C.H. Beck.

<sup>5</sup> Jan C. Jansen. and Jürgen Osterhammel. 2013. *Dekolonisation: Das Ende der Imperien*. München: C.H. Beck.

<sup>6</sup> KMT is short for Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party.

<sup>7</sup> Jansen and Osterhammel, *Dekolonisation*, 51-52.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-8.

<sup>9</sup> Following the elections of the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, more on this later.

<sup>10</sup> The KMT government residing in Taipei represented China in the United Nations until 1972.

<sup>11</sup> 何義麟 (He Yilin).

From the very beginning, the Kuomintang regime referred to Taiwan's secession from the Japanese colonies as 'guangfu'<sup>12</sup>. Guangfu is a Chinese expression signifying irredentism, and – generally speaking – means 'returning to the shining age of rule by the fatherland from a dark age of foreign rule'. But, considering the post-war misgovernment, received a negative meaning as recurrence of pestilence or 'surrender' and is now used sarcastically. [...] Instead of calling what Taiwan experienced in 1945 the return to the fatherland, guangfu, or post-war colonial independence, should it not be considered 'recolonization'?<sup>13</sup>

Using Ho's terminology, the version of Taiwanese history that Jansen and Osterhammel present is Chinese irredentist history. One would expect Osterhammel, a renowned scholar of Chinese history, to hold a rather critical opinion of Chinese nationalism, yet he presents a one-sided view of Taiwanese history that contradicts the views of the vast majority of Taiwanese history scholars. Since democratization, these local scholars have argued that the KMT regime on Taiwan was either colonial or at least had many characteristics of a colonial regime. If Jansen and Osterhammel had read any recent work by a Taiwanese author on colonialism and post-45 history, one would expect them to be aware of this highly sensitive question and mention other historical narratives than the Chinese nationalist perspective. Unfortunately, they have not cited a single Taiwanese scholar in their most recent work.

Nonetheless, *Decolonization* introduces very useful thoughts on the process of decolonization. Their generalization and categorization of anti-colonial movements and actions according to characteristics and period is indeed very fitting to the case of Taiwanese anti-Japanese and anti-KMT movements. The parallels in character and time frame of these movements are very intriguing: Connections to other movements in the decolonizing world seem likely. For instance: Was it just a coincidence that the KMT dictatorship in Taiwan unraveled almost at the same time as the Apartheid regime in South Africa and the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe?

<sup>12</sup> 光復.

<sup>13</sup> 『国民政府は、最初から台湾の日本植民地からの離脱を「光復」と称した。「光復」はイレデンティズム [...] を表す中国語の表現であり、敷衍すれば、「異民族統治の暗い時代から祖国統治の明るい時代へ戻った」という意味である。しかし、戦後の悪政により、マイナス的な意味合いになる疫病の再発や同音意義の「降伏」を示すものとして、皮肉めいて使われるようになった。[...] 一九四五年に台湾は日本の植民地支配から解放されたが、二・二八事件を経て、国民党に失望した一般住民の間には、「再び植民地支配体制下に置かれた」という意識が生まれた。特に、民主化の台湾社会において、国民党独裁政権下の恐怖政治は日本植民地支配よりひどいという言説が定着した。[...] 一九四五年に台湾が経験したのは、祖国復帰の「光復」や植民地独立の「戦後」というよりも、「再植民地化」の始まりであったとは言えないだろうか。この問題こそが、戦後の台湾社会の歴史認識をめぐる対立の原点である。』, Ho I-lin. *Taiwan gendaishi: Ni ni hachi jiken wo meguru rekishi no sai kioku* (Modern History of Taiwan: Revisiting the History Surrounding the 228 Incident). (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2014), 10-11, Emphases by me.

Inspired by these parallels, I decided to do research on the participation of Taiwanese nationalists<sup>14</sup> in the global decolonization discourse after 1945 and the adaptation of a decolonization discourse into the Taiwanese *doctrine of nationalism*. In an influential work, John Breuilly has identified three approaches to the study of nationalism: the study of the doctrine, politics or sentiments of nationalism. Research on the doctrine of nationalism is concerned with ideas and those who produced these ideas,<sup>15</sup> in most cases intellectuals. In this paper, I look at persons writing in the pro-independence journal *Taiwan Chinglian*, most of which were academics living in exile in Japan and North America. Since Taiwanese nationalism was suppressed by the Chinese nationalist KMT regime in Taiwan, Taiwanese nationalists living in Taiwan were not able to advocate Taiwanese independence or nationalism as openly as writers in exile. Even though exiled academic writers are surely not representative for the whole community of Taiwanese nationalists, they constituted one very important and certainly the most visible part of the Taiwanese nationalist movement until the late 1980s.

*Taiwan Chinglian*<sup>16</sup> was published by *Taiwan seinensha*<sup>17</sup> (lit.: Association of Young Taiwanese) in 500 monthly issues from 1960 to 2002 in Japan, an organization founded by a number of Taiwanese students in Tokyo led by Ong Iok-tek<sup>18</sup> (1924-1985). Because these students participated in the independence movement, they were not allowed to return to Taiwan. Up until 1973, *Taiwan Chinglian* was the most important pro-independence publication among Taiwanese worldwide – it was distributed in Japan, but also in the Americas, Europe, and, illegally, in Taiwan. In one section, the editors published Chinese or Japanese translations of newspaper articles written in English, Spanish, Italian, German, French, Swedish etc., demonstrating the impressive circulation of *Taiwan Chinglian*. Later, *Taiwan seinensha* would inspire the creation of similar associations among the Taiwanese diasporas in the United States, Canada and Europe, which, in 1970, united as the *World United Formosans for Independence* (WUFI)<sup>19</sup> with *Taiwan Chinglian* as its central organ. Following 1973, the American and Japanese chapters of WUFI divided their publication work: The American Taiwanese would now publish a Chinese language journal, while the Japanese Taiwanese would publish a Japanese language journal. As a result, the length of the journal was cut in half from 60 to 30 pages. While most articles in *Taiwan Chinglian* were published in Japanese and Chinese, many were published in Hokkien and a few in English.

<sup>14</sup> In this essay, advocates of the Taiwan Independence Movement are considered Taiwanese nationalists.

<sup>15</sup> John Breuilly, “Approaches to Nationalism,” in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan, (London: Verso, 1996), 146-174.

<sup>16</sup> 台湾青年 (chn.: *taiwan qingnian*, jpn.: *taiwan seinen*, lit.: Youth of Taiwan).

<sup>17</sup> 台湾青年社 (chn.: *taiwan qingnianshe*).

<sup>18</sup> 王育德 (Wang Yude), I decided to use the Hokkien based transliteration of Ong’s name, since he himself preferred it.

<sup>19</sup> 臺灣獨立建國聯盟 (*Taiwan duli jianguo lianmeng*).



Many of the writers mentioned in this essay later became prominent Taiwanese politicians following democratization. A deeper understanding of Taiwanese nationalism and its historical roots is important not just for historians. After the emergence of the 2014 sunflower movements and the attempt of the KMT party to introduce China-centric history curriculum reforms in 2015, a new generation of young Taiwanese nationalists appeared and quickly entered parliament, while the older Taiwanese nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won landslide victories in both the Taiwanese presidential and legislative elections of 2016.<sup>20</sup>

Through a reading of *Taiwan Chinglian*, I show that Taiwanese nationalists were inspired by decolonization movements in other parts of the world; they used those as a model to analyze power relationships in Taiwan. Moreover, this analysis formed the framework in which they imagined their own “nation”. As John Armstrong<sup>21</sup> has argued, both ethnicities and nations define themselves through boundary-making, often by excluding certain groups of people. Therefore, I was especially interested in whether Chinese immigrants after 1945 and their descendants are considered part of the Taiwanese nation. My findings suggest that Taiwanese nationalism is as much a product of the global decolonization discourse as it is a product of the domestic power relationships in Taiwan.

*Decolonization, Nationalisms, and Independence Movements in Taiwan since 1985 through the Lens of Osterhammel’s Periodization*

In this chapter, I will take a closer look at different Taiwanese anti-colonial and independence movements since the beginning of Japanese colonization in 1895, as well as their historical context and the global aspect of Taiwanese nationalist discourse. In doing so, I will rely on Osterhammel’s concepts to establish a periodization of Taiwanese decolonization movements, and introduce the term *ad hoc colonial nationalism*.

Taiwan’s independence and decolonization movements fit perfectly into the three types of anti-colonial resistance Osterhammel and Jansen identify: (1) primary resistance, meaning traditionalist, mostly violent resistance to protect the pre-colonial state of society; (2) resistance of a new elite inside the framework of and based on the colonial ruling system – seeking the emancipation and equal treatment inside the empire and thereby fundamentally exposing the bigotry of colonialism and threatening colonial power-relationships – and (3) nationalist independence movements.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, adding urgency to this topic, US President Donald Trump has recently challenged the US One-China policy.

<sup>21</sup> John Armstrong, “Nations before Nationalism,” in *Nationalism: Oxford Readers*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 140-146 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 140-146; originally published in John Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism*. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

<sup>22</sup> Armstrong, “Nations before Nationalism,” 53-55.

Based on these categories, one can chronologically divide anti-colonial resistance into four periods: (1) the period of primary resistance between 1895 and 1915, which ended with the Xilai temple incident of 1915;<sup>23</sup> (2) the period of autonomy movements beginning with the establishment of Taiwan's first political mass movement *taiwan dōkakai*<sup>24</sup> in 1914 and ending with the 2-28-incident in 1947;<sup>25</sup> (3) the period of the revolutionary nationalism and self-rule movements between 1947 and 1988,<sup>26</sup> and finally, (4) the period of democratic reform and *Taiwanization* starting in 1988. While Osterhammel and Jansen claim that Taiwan was decolonized in 1945, I would argue that their model is perfectly applicable to the Taiwan independence movement even after 1945. Furthermore, these indicated time periods roughly align with similar periods in other colonized territories<sup>27</sup> which generally transitioned from the first to the second period in the 1910s and from the second to the third period in the 1940s and 50s.

*Osterhammel's first two categories: Primary resistance and emancipation movements*

Taiwan has repeatedly been colonized by several foreign peoples, including the Dutch, Spaniards, the Ming-loyalist warlord Koxinga<sup>28</sup>, the Qing Empire, and Japan. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the Dutch began to systematically populate the island with immigrants from China, a process that continued until Japanese colonization in 1895. These immigrants mainly came from the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, speaking Hokkien (nowadays often called Taiwanese) and Hakka, two Sinitic languages that are not mutually intelligible with each other or with Mandarin Chinese. Speakers of Austronesian languages, i.e. the aboriginal population of Taiwan, were assimilated or pushed into the mountainous areas in the east of the island and nowadays merely represent 2.5 percent of the population.

Following the First Sino-Japanese War (1894/95), the Qing Empire ceded Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan in 1895. Japanese troops managed to occupy the richly populated Western plains in 1895, albeit fighting with guerrilla troops lacking central organization or shared ideology continued until 1903. A

<sup>23</sup> 西來庵事件 (*xilai'an shijian*). I exclude the Wushe incident of 1931, although it fits the description of primary resistance. But, differently than the Xilai temple incident, it did only involve the Seediq tribe that received little appreciation by Sino-Taiwanese and other aboriginal people at the time.

<sup>24</sup> 台湾同化会.

<sup>25</sup> Although one can plausibly argue that the Free China incident of 1960 belongs to this category.

<sup>26</sup> The pro-communist Taiwan self-rule movement in the PRC belongs to this category, since it originally aimed at liberating Taiwan from KMT rule and establishing local self-government in a revolutionary manner, even if it did not aim at establishing a fully independent Taiwanese nation state. Although their organization still exists, it is now nothing more than a *bloc party* and not an independent political movement.

<sup>27</sup> Jansen and Osterhammel, *Dekolonisation* 2013, 28-85.

<sup>28</sup> 鄭成功 (Zheng Chenggong, 1624-1662).

short-lived “Republic of Taiwan”<sup>29</sup> was proclaimed by the local Qing governor Tang Jingsong<sup>30</sup>, a native of Guangxi province, who declared himself president, but then fled to the Chinese mainland just a few days after the Japanese landing. Occasional uprisings by the Hakka and Hokkien population of Taiwan continued until 1915. Since the goals of this guerilla warfare and uprisings were the preservation of pre-colonial power-relationships and society, they fit into what Osterhammel and Jansen described as primary resistance.<sup>31</sup>

In colonizing Taiwan, the Meiji elites used the knowledge they had acquired by modernizing Japan to establish a centralized educational<sup>32</sup> dictatorship. Until the end of colonial rule, the majority of Taiwanese, especially young people, were able to speak, read and write Japanese while the local economy modernized to such a degree that Taiwan was considered to be the second wealthiest territory in Asia after Japan. After primary resistance against Japanese colonialism failed, Hakka and Hokkien intellectuals resisted Japanese colonialism via several non-violent movements demanding equal rights, representation in the Japanese Diet, and protection of Sino-Taiwanese culture starting in 1914 with the establishment of *taiwan dōkakai*.

Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, Taiwan was occupied by the Republic of China, then ruled by the Kuomintang who were fighting a civil war with the Communist Party of China (CPC). Although originally welcomed by the Taiwanese population, the KMT government provoked an island-wide uprising in early 1947 known in historiography as the 2-28 incident. The KMT’s misgovernment, corruption, violence, arrogance and discrimination were underlying this conflict. Examples of said discrimination were laws aimed at expropriating local entrepreneurs in favor of immigrants from the Chinese mainland and excluding Taiwanese from local government and administration. Another grievance concerned the attempt to introduce compulsory military service to recruit Taiwanese for the Chinese Civil War. All of these factors contributed to a collapse of the Taiwanese economy and public health within just a few months. The mostly unarmed revolt

<sup>29</sup> 台灣民主國 (*taiwan minzhuguo*).

<sup>30</sup> 唐景崧 (1841-1903).

<sup>31</sup> The last uprising of this kind was the 1930/31 uprising by the Taiwanese aboriginal Seediq tribe, that was brutally crushed with the help of other aborigines. Since the Japanese colonial administration penetrated the mountainous areas where aborigines lived later and rather more cautiously than the plains inhabited by Sino-Taiwanese, aborigines lived under a very different and belated colonial regime than other Taiwanese.

<sup>32</sup> Youth and adult education, as well as distribution of propaganda through the education system, was one of the main concerns of Japanese colonial rule, leaving behind a highly-educated populace in 1945, which was possibly one of the reasons of the 1947 uprising. For further information see Patricia Tsurumi, 1977. *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), and Wu Zhuoliu. 1994, *The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot 1900-1947*, trans. Duncan B. Hunter (Dortmund: Projekt Verlag, 1994).



was crushed in March 1947 by the Chinese Army<sup>33</sup>, and the period since then up until the lift of martial law in 1987 is known as the period of white terror in post-1987 historiography.

Although a certain anti-Chinese sentiment was visible among the Taiwanese populace before 1947,<sup>34</sup> the 22 demands published by Taiwanese leaders during the 2-28 incident merely demanded increased self-government of Taiwan. These demands were rejected by the Chinese authorities, who deemed the authors to be traitors.<sup>35</sup> Following the incident, the KMT purged the participants of the uprisings and the native Taiwanese elite, partly through public executions,<sup>36</sup> and later expropriated the rest of the Taiwanese elite through land reform in the 1950s.

In 1949, the KMT government of Chiang Kai-shek<sup>37</sup> relocated to Taipei, claiming to be the only legitimate government for all of China and preparing to reconquer the mainland. Together with the Chinese government, around two million mainland Chinese resettled in Taiwan, many of whom were conscripted soldiers. In Taiwan, these people and their descendants are commonly known as *waishengren*<sup>38</sup>, literally translating into foreign province people, while natives of Taiwan are called *benshengren*<sup>39</sup>, people from this province. The vast majority of *waishengren* neither spoke Japanese nor one of the local languages, and the KMT aggressively promoted what it considered to be proper Chinese culture and language. The KMT excluded *benshengren* from leading positions in almost all state-controlled and party-controlled institutions, including state companies, the military, educational, administrative and political bodies. This exacerbated the ethnic tensions still present since the bloody events of 1947. Although *benshengren* were gradually emancipated towards the end of martial law, a certain level of *waishengren* privilege existed until democratization in the 1990s.

Until the death of Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo<sup>40</sup>, the R.O.C.<sup>41</sup> on Taiwan had three presidents, all of whom were born and raised on the Chinese mainland and relocated to Taiwan as refugees during the Chinese Civil War. The first president, Chiang Kai-shek, was *de facto* supreme leader of the KMT since 1926. After his death in 1975, his son Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded him as chairman of the Kuomintang. Between 1975 and 1978, Yen Chia-kan<sup>42</sup> shortly served

<sup>33</sup> Several accounts also speak of Chinese soldiers occasionally aiming machine gun fire at passers-by and artillery fire in urban areas, e.g. Kerr, George H. Kerr 1965, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965) and Wu, *The Fig Tree* 1994.

<sup>34</sup> Chen Fupian, *Taiwan duli yundong shi* (History of the Taiwan Independence Movement) (Taipei: Yushanshe, 2006), 66-81.

<sup>35</sup> Ho, *Modern History of Taiwan* 2014, 96-100.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 101-104.

<sup>37</sup> 蔣介石 (Jiang Jieshi, 1887-1975).

<sup>38</sup> 外省人.

<sup>39</sup> 本省人.

<sup>40</sup> 蔣經國 (Jiang Jingguo, 1910-1988, r. 1978-1988).

<sup>41</sup> Short for Republic of China 中華民國 (*zhonghua minguo*).

<sup>42</sup> 嚴家淦 (Yan Jiagan, 1905-1993).

as interim president. The members of the 1<sup>st</sup> National Assembly and 1<sup>st</sup> Legislative Yuan (parliament) of the R.O.C., elected in 1947 and 1948 respectively, served until Taiwan's first democratic national legislative elections in 1992, with only a minority of lawmakers representing constituencies in Taiwan.<sup>43</sup>

Following the relocation of Chiang Kai-shek's government, a pro-democratic clique consisting of both *waishengren* and *benshenreng* formed during the 1950s around the journal *Free China*<sup>44</sup>, both under the leadership of Lei Chen<sup>45</sup>, a Zhejiang native and former high ranking KMT official. This group attempted to establish an opposition party called the *Democratic Party of China*<sup>46</sup> taking an ambiguous stance towards the question of Taiwan independence.<sup>47</sup> However, Lei Chen and his followers were incarcerated by the KMT as alleged communists in 1960.<sup>48</sup>

Osterhammel's second type and period of anti-colonial resistance is marked by peaceful resistance led by a Western educated elite advocating emancipation within the framework of colonialism. The previously mentioned incidents, peaceful anti-Japanese resistance since 1914, the quest for autonomy during the 1947 uprising, as well as the attempt to found an opposition party by Lei Chen in the 1950s, all fit into this category. While the 1947 uprising and the Lei Chen incident both share some characteristics with Osterhammel's third category – the revolutionary struggle for national independence – they were still very moderate in comparison to later movements in and outside of Taiwan, which primarily emphasized the question of national independence and saw very little cooperation between *waishengren* and *benshengren*.

### *Independence movements before 1947: Introducing the term 'ad-hoc colonial nationalism'*

Osterhammel's third category comprises revolutionary and nationalist independence movements which, according to him, usually began in 1940s. At a first glance, Taiwan seems to be an exception from this rule: The first attempt to establish an independent Taiwanese state took place in 1895, the second in 1945. Nevertheless, I would argue that these incidents were profoundly different from the post-1947 independence movement.

In 1895, the Chinese governor of Taiwan province, Tang Jingsong, proclaimed The Republic of Taiwan, stating in its declaration of independence that it would eternally continue being part of the Qing Empire. Is there any other example in

<sup>43</sup> The 1960s elections were held for the seats of those members who had died, but the number of re-elected seats was too small to give *benshengren* any significant influence on law-making.

<sup>44</sup> 自由中國 (*ziyou zhongguo*).

<sup>45</sup> 雷震 (Lei Zhen, 1897-1979).

<sup>46</sup> 中國民主黨 (*zhongguo minzhu dang*).

<sup>47</sup> Lei Chen would later openly support Taiwanese independence in the form of reforming the R.O.C. into a state called *Chinese Democratic State of Taiwan* 中華台灣民主國 (*zhonghua taiwan minzhu guo*).

<sup>48</sup> Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi*, 107-115.

world history of a declaration of independence where the seceding state vows to remain part of the state it is seceding from? The declaration was created by people foreign to Taiwan.<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, according to the records of the American journalist James W. Davidson who was present at the time, it received no public support<sup>50</sup>. Moreover, the “President” apparently did not take his self-created office serious enough to remain on the island after the Japanese landed. These circumstances lead me to consider this short-lived creation not a product of any Taiwanese nationalist agenda. Instead, I agree with the academic consensus, which considers the declaration of independence an *ad hoc* attempt to prevent a Japanese takeover by ideologically appealing to France and the USA and thereby provoking their intervention on behalf of the Chinese.<sup>51</sup>

Less is certain regarding the 8-15 independence movement<sup>52</sup>. Following the radio broadcast of the Japanese Shōwa emperor declaring Japan’s unconditional surrender to the allied forces on August 15, 1945, a number of Japanese officers were willing to continue the war. Led by Makisawa Yoshio<sup>53</sup>, they allegedly met with a number of respected representatives of the people of Taiwan, led by Lim Hian-tong<sup>54</sup>, a leader of the anti-colonialist Taiwan Culture Movement. They agreed to declare Taiwan independent but were stopped by the Japanese General Governor Andō Rikichi<sup>55</sup>. It is still being debated whether this event actually took place or was made up *post factum* to denunciate members of the Taiwanese elite as traitors. Assuming that it did happen, it is not clear whether the participants actually declared independence or merely organized a provisional administration to govern Taiwan until the Chinese authorities would arrive.<sup>56</sup>

If we assume that the story of the 8-15 independence movement is accurate, both independence declarations of 1895 and 1945 share characteristics with the declaration of independence by the Republic of Ezo in 1869, a short-lived “state” located in what is now known as Hokkaido, proclaimed by supporters of the Tokugawa Shogunate during the Boshin War (1868-1869).<sup>57</sup>

Osterhammel and Jansen group nationalist movements in the colonized world into two categories: *colonial nationalist* movements struggling for autonomy that are formed by ruling colonial elites, as it is the case for the American revolution,

<sup>49</sup> Tang Jingsong, as well as other bureaucrats participating in the declaration of independence, all came from other provinces. Tang himself was a native of Guangxi province.

<sup>50</sup> James Wheeler Davidson, *The Island of Formosa, Past and Present. History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical plants, and other Productions* (London, New York: Macmillan & co, 1903), 275-290.

<sup>51</sup> For further discussion of the topic, see Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi*, 46-48.

<sup>52</sup> 八一五台獨 (*ba yi wu taidu*).

<sup>53</sup> 牧沢義夫.

<sup>54</sup> 林獻堂 (Lin Xiantang).

<sup>55</sup> 安藤利吉.

<sup>56</sup> Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi* 2006, 67-70.

<sup>57</sup> Ann B. Irish. *Hokkaido: A History of Ethnic Transition and Development on Japan’s Northern Island* (Jefferson, NC; McFarland & Company, 2009), 100-103.

and *anti-colonial national struggles for liberation* led by members of the colonized native population.<sup>58</sup>

I would slightly enlarge this framework to fit in the three aforementioned cases, categorizing them as cases of *ad hoc colonial nationalism*, as they were attempts by *foreign* elites to use the symbolism of nationalism and republicanism to secure traditional power-relationships in the face of military defeat. Unlike, for instance, the American Revolution, these struggles were not preceded by the creation of a nationalist doctrine or nationalist mobilization against the ruling state. Instead, they were created hastily by a few men at the top of colonial administration who tried to secure the colonial dependency towards the motherland.<sup>59</sup>

### *Osterhammel's third category: Anti-colonial struggle for national liberation*

In character, these relatively improvisational attempts were very different from the post-1947 Taiwan Independence Movement and its nationalism, which aimed at a revolutionary overturn of power-relationships to emancipate a subaltern majority. The post-1947 Taiwanese struggle therefore squarely falls into Osterhammel and Jansen's category of the *anti-colonial struggle for liberation*.

Some members of the Taiwanese educational elite had successfully escaped Taiwan during the 1947 purge and organized under the leadership of Thomas Wen-I Liao<sup>60</sup> in Shanghai and Hong Kong<sup>61</sup>, but later split among supporters and enemies of the Communist Party of China (CPC). While supporters of the CPC reorganized under the leadership of Xie Xuehong<sup>62</sup> and founded the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League<sup>63</sup>, an organization that still exists in the People's Republic of China, supporters of Liao relocated to Japan and organized the *Provisional Government of the Republic of China*<sup>64</sup> with Liao as its president. Liao was an American-educated former professor of Zhejiang University in China and scion of a wealthy Taiwanese land-owning family with a history of anti-Japanese resistance. After initial successes, e.g. receiving an invitation to participate at the Bandung conference of 1955, Liao's strategy eventually proved unsuccessful in gathering support for Taiwanese independence, and his government in exile developed a negative reputation, partly due to infiltration by KMT spies.<sup>65</sup> After Liao's family came under increasing pressure from the KMT, he eventually returned to Taiwan in 1965, receiving a government post and producing anti-independence propaganda. Simultaneously, growing numbers of Taiwanese students educated

<sup>58</sup> Osterhammel and Jansen, *Kolonialismus*, 55-56.

<sup>59</sup> As another example, the pseudo-independent nation state of *Manchukuo* was a *de facto* colony of Japan.

<sup>60</sup> 廖文毅 (Liao Wenyi, 1910-1986).

<sup>61</sup> Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi*, 168-171.

<sup>62</sup> 謝雪紅 (1901-1970).

<sup>63</sup> 臺灣民主自治同盟 (*taiwan minzhu zizhi tongmeng*).

<sup>64</sup> 台灣共和國臨時政府 (*taiwan gongheguo linshi zhengfu*).

<sup>65</sup> Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi* 2006, 171-174.



in Japan, the USA, Canada and Europe, rejuvenated the Taiwan independence movement in the late 1960s. This development was spurred by intensified Taiwanese emigration, the incarceration of Prof. Peng Ming-min<sup>66</sup> of the National Taiwan University in 1964, who would become the most influential advocate of Taiwanese independence, and the publication of George Kerr's *Formosa Betrayed* in 1966. Advocating Taiwanese independence, this book looked back at the 2-28 incident and became popular among Taiwanese students overseas, whom it often introduced for the first time to the massacres of 1947.<sup>67</sup>

In 1964, Peng Ming-min, a native Taiwanese academic educated in Japan, Taiwan, Canada and Paris and the first native Taiwanese to head the Political Science Department of National Taiwan University<sup>68</sup>, and two of his students printed pamphlets calling for a revolutionary overturn of Chiang's government and the establishment of an independent Taiwanese state. Although Peng and his associates were imprisoned just before distributing their pamphlets, a number of these somehow found their way to Japan and were published by *Taiwan Chinglian* as a "Declaration of Formosan Independence".<sup>69</sup> Since Peng was an internationally renowned scholar of international law at the time and had connections to influential people in the United States, Canada and Europe, his incarceration sparked an international outcry. American diplomats and journalists observed his trial closely, and although he was sentenced to eight years in prison, it was transformed into house detention following international pressure (his students were not as lucky). An English translation of his pamphlet would later be published by the New York Times. In 1969/70, Amnesty International successfully organized Peng Ming-min's escape from detention using a forged Japanese passport and brought him to Sweden, again producing international headlines.<sup>70</sup> He took up a post at Michigan University the same year and later headed the organization World United Formosans for Independence for a short period of time.

During the 1970s and 1980s, democratic and nationalist minded Taiwanese (*benshengren*) in Taiwan reorganized in the *Tangwai movement*<sup>71</sup>, literally translating into "movement outside the party", organizing campaigns for its members to run as independent candidates in local elections. The movement climaxed in a

<sup>66</sup> 彭明敏 (born 1923).

<sup>67</sup> Ho, *Modern History of Taiwan*, 214-216.

<sup>68</sup> In 1961 Peng served as adviser to the R.O.C.'s U. N. delegation, this was the highest government position held by a native Taiwanese at the time.

<sup>69</sup> 台湾独立宣言 (*taiwan dokuritsu sengen*). In his memoirs, Peng claimed the original title was supposed to be "Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation" 台湾人民自救宣言 (*taiwan renmin ziji xuanyan*), Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom; Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston: 1972), accessed January 14, 2017, <http://www.romanization.com/books/peng/>.

<sup>70</sup> The conservative Japanese government warned him that it would immediately deport him to Taiwan if he dared to set foot on Japanese soil. This exemplifies how sensitive the issue of the Taiwan Independence movement was in bilateral Japan-Taiwan relations.

<sup>71</sup> 黨外運動 (*dangwai yundong*).



large-scale demonstration in Kaohsiung in December 1979, which was cracked down by the police. As a response, the government incarcerated leading *Tangwai* movement members and murdered imprisoned Lin Yi-hsiung's<sup>72</sup> family.<sup>73</sup> Even though the KMT regime used cruel methods to destroy the *Tangwai* movement, the organization persisted. In 1986, under pressure from Taiwanese in exile, the *Tangwai* movement reorganized and illegally established the *Democratic Progressive Party* (DPP)<sup>74</sup>, which openly adopted a pro-independence stance. The establishment of new political parties was legalized in the following year through the abolition of martial law.

Following Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988, Lee Teng-hui<sup>75</sup> became the first *benshengren* to lead Taiwan as president and chairman of the KMT. Lee Teng-hui is a doctor of agriculture who has studied in Taiwan, the United States and Japan.<sup>76</sup> Lee successfully introduced reforms to democratize and *taiwanize*<sup>77</sup> the R.O.C. and its institutions. He thereby *de facto* made Taiwanese nationalism government policy and fulfilled the demands of the Taiwan independence movement, stopping just short of declaring formal independence<sup>78</sup> or replacing Mandarin Chinese's dominating role as the "national language"<sup>79</sup>. In 1996, the Republic of China/Taiwan held its first democratic presidential elections with Lee defeating Peng Ming-min of the DPP. In 2000, Lee stepped down from the presidency, enabling the first democratic transfer of power in Taiwanese history. After Kuomintang members blamed Lee for the success of DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian<sup>80</sup> in the election of 2000,<sup>81</sup> he resigned as chairman of the party before being expelled from it in 2001. Since then, he is openly supporting the Taiwan independence movement and is especially popular in Japan as an advocate of increased partnership between the

<sup>72</sup> 林義雄 (Lin Yixiong, born 1941).

<sup>73</sup> This happened after his wife had contacted Amnesty International in Japan. Lin's mother and two of his daughters lost their lives; only one of his daughters survived the attack. Upon being released from prison in 1984, Lin moved to America to study at Harvard University and returned to Taiwan in 1989.

<sup>74</sup> 民主進步黨 (*minzhu jinbu dang*).

<sup>75</sup> 李登輝 (Li Denghui, born 1923).

<sup>76</sup> He also served in the Japanese army in 1944/45. Even though compulsory military service was not introduced for Taiwanese before September 1944, Japanese universities heavily pressurized Taiwanese students to register for voluntary military service. Peng, according to his memoirs, successfully avoided military draft by hiding in the countryside, Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom. Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972). accessed January 14, 2017, <http://www.romanization.com/books/peng/>.

<sup>77</sup> *bentuhua* 本土化 (lit.: localization).

<sup>78</sup> He probably avoided this due to the fact that a formal declaration of independence would likely lead to war with the People's Republic of China. Further, U.S. governments repeatedly expressed they would not support Taiwan if it provoked a war with China. Every government since democratization has exercised similar caution.

<sup>79</sup> *Guoyu* 國語.

<sup>80</sup> 陳水扁.

<sup>81</sup> KMT candidate Lien Chan 連戰 (Lian Zhan) came in third behind independent candidate James Soong 宋楚瑜 (Song Chuyu).

two countries. The KMT has returned to strongly opposing independence and advocating stronger ties with mainland China as well as – under certain conditions – peaceful reunification, ergo Chinese nationalism.

To this day, the antagonism between Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms constitutes the main ideological divide in Taiwanese politics. The following chapters will use primary sources to discuss the nationalist discourse that developed in Taiwan after 1947 and show that it emerged in the context of a global decolonization movement.

### *Waishengren and the Doctrine of Taiwanese nationalism*

The doctrine of Taiwanese nationalism that developed after 1947 was centered around distinguishing the Taiwanese nation from other nations. Was this nation unique through the blood-relations of members or a particular shared culture, or was it instead held together by a shared and unique (geo-)political fate? These questions were deeply linked to the question of whether immigrants from mainland China could be integrated into Taiwanese society or if they were essentially alien. In this chapter, I will explore how Taiwanese nationalists answered these questions.

Although minor political groups had demanded Taiwan independence well before 1945<sup>82</sup>, they never developed a doctrine of nationalism.<sup>83</sup> Instead, the first doctrine was formulated by Thomas Wen-I Liao in his Japanese language manifesto *Formosanism*<sup>84</sup>. Liao argued that Chinese (Han people) and Taiwanese were two different races, Taiwan being home to a race that emerged through the mix of Indonesians<sup>85</sup>, Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutchmen, Fujianese, Cantonese<sup>86</sup> and Japanese. Therefore, according to Liao, Taiwan deserved its own nation state.<sup>87</sup> This view is called *taiwan minzu hunxue lun*<sup>88</sup> in Chinese, roughly translating as “mixed blood Taiwan nation theory”, and still enjoys some support. For instance, Japanese author Aoki Tatsuo<sup>89</sup> argued in a 1999 essay that Taiwanese, Japanese and South East Asians actually belonged to one race distinct from Han people.<sup>90</sup> In a general sense, the Taiwanese nationalism advocated by Liao was racist/*völkisch*,

<sup>82</sup> Chen *Taiwan duli yundong shi* 2006, 49-65.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 493-494.

<sup>84</sup> This is the English title on the book cover, but *Taiwanese Democratism* is a more literal and easily understandable translation of the Japanese title *taiwan minpon shugi*.

<sup>85</sup> Sic! He means Taiwanese aborigines.

<sup>86</sup> Sic! He means Cantonese Hakka.

<sup>87</sup> Thomas Wen-I Liao, *Taiwan minpon shugi* (Formosanism) (Tokyo: Taiwan minpōsha: 1956).

<sup>88</sup> 臺灣民族混血論.

<sup>89</sup> 青木達雄.

<sup>90</sup> Aoki Tatsuo, 1999. “Tōnan-a-jin, taiwanjin, nihonjin wa minna kyōdai: Taiwanjin wa kan-minzoku dewa nai” (South East Asians, Taiwanese and Japanese are all Brothers: Taiwanese are not of Han race), *Taiwan Chinglian* 462 (1999): 27-28.

meaning that he strongly rejected including *waishengren* into the Taiwanese nation on racial grounds.

In a 1968 essay, Liao Kianlong strongly rejected the idea of defining nations only by race or language, arguing that race-based nationalism had led to the mass murder of the Nazis. Instead, he affirmed, nations and *volk* are based on communities (*gongtongxing*<sup>91</sup>) of natural (race, geography) and social character (economy, politics, language, culture) and that the shared social identity is actually more important in defining a nation. He criticized translating the Western term *nationalism* into *minzu zhuyi*<sup>92</sup>, since this concept implies a nation with shared blood-relations, as well as the use of the terms *guomin zhuyi*<sup>93</sup> and *guojia zhuyi*<sup>94</sup>, to refer to state, i.e. not *volk*-centered, nationalisms. Instead, he preferred to use the English term without any translation.<sup>95</sup> While he did not elaborate upon whether *waishengren* are part of the Taiwanese nation in that work, in later essays he clarified his view that they are not. In a 1971 essay, he wrote that the ruling KMT regime was “the Chinese people’s colonial rule of Taiwan – the inevitable outcome of which is preferred treatment of the two million Chinese in Taiwan that self-evidently exists in politics, economy and society.”<sup>96</sup> Through statements like this, he not only constructed an ethnic/national antagonism between Taiwanese and “Chinese”, i.e. *waishengren*, but also identified the fate of the Taiwanese nation as that of a colonized people.

Peng Ming-min and his students opposed this view. In the aforementioned pamphlet of 1964, they argued that *waishengren* and *benshengren* needed to work together to overthrow the Chiang regime, and that *waishengren* were victims of the dictatorship as well. They furthermore stated that the antagonism between *waishengren* and *benshengren* was constructed by the government through its *divide et impera* policy.<sup>97</sup> Peng later labeled this type of nationalism, which includes *waishengren* and *benshengren* equally into the Taiwanese nation, *Taiwan guomin zhuyi*.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>91</sup> 共同性.

<sup>92</sup> 民族主義.

<sup>93</sup> 國民主義. Since all essays in *Taiwan Chinglian* were written using Japanese *shinjitai* characters, in order to keep my translations as close to the original as possible, I will use these characters when quoting from *Taiwan Chinglian*. in order to keep my translations as close to the original as possible.

<sup>94</sup> 國家主義.

<sup>95</sup> Although he still used the term *minzu zhuyi* in later writings; Liao Kianlong, “Gua-e kik-bing su-siong(4) Kuan-i NATION (bin-tsok)-e kho-tshat (tiong)” (My Revolutionary Thoughts(4) Thoughts Concerning the Nation (Part 2)), *Taiwan Chinglian* 87 1968: 13-22, 33.

<sup>96</sup> 『蔣政權的此一政治體制，必然地造成對200萬在台中國人優先——不論在政治上、經濟上、或社會上——的結果，這就是中國人的台灣殖民地統治。』, Liao Kianlong, “Mianlin xin jumian de taiwan duli yundong” (The Taiwan Independence Movement Facing a New Situation), *Taiwan Chinglian* 130 (1971): 11-20.

<sup>97</sup> Peng Ming-min et al., *Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation*, trans. Li Ming-Juinn et al. (1964), accessed January 14, 2017, [http://www.hi-on.org.tw/ad/peng\\_0707\\_z05.html](http://www.hi-on.org.tw/ad/peng_0707_z05.html).

<sup>98</sup> 台灣國民主義; Peng Ming-min wenjiao jijinhui, (ed.), *Peng Ming-min kan taiwan* (Peng Ming-min Looking at Taiwan) (Taipei: Yuanliu chuban gongsi: 1994), 23.

Since the group's pamphlet was produced in 1964, it received wide circulation among exiled Taiwanese nationalists. However, one of its major points, the need for cooperation between *waishengren* and *benshengren*, apparently did not receive the same level of attention. In *Taiwan Chinglian*, the narrative portraying *waishengren* as antagonists and colonizers was still dominant. Nevertheless, after the foundation of World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) in New York, its first president, Chai Trong-rong<sup>99</sup> stated:

The Taiwan independence and state foundation movement opposes the dictatorships of the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang, it aims to build one sovereign, democratic and free state encompassing all of Taiwan's inhabitants. Each and every one endorsing Taiwan to become one free, democratic and independent state is one of our friends, and all those Chinese inhabitants of Taiwan, who join our comrades on the island fighting to resist communism and overthrow the Chiang regime, are our comrades as well.<sup>100</sup>

Chai positioned the movement against both the Communist regime on mainland China, while simultaneously condemning the rule of the Kuomintang on Taiwan. He further elaborated on the political goals of the movement and rights of future Taiwanese citizens:

On the victory day of the revolution, except for those receiving punishment, all inhabitants of Taiwan regardless of place of birth, religion or gender shall equally receive the fruits of the revolution, liberation of political rights, and seek benefit for the masses. Chinese inhabitants of Taiwan and Taiwanese shall both automatically become citizens of the Republic of Taiwan in the same manner and receive the same rights and duties. Their lives, wealth and other rights shall receive protection under the law of the Republic of Taiwan.<sup>101</sup>

This statement might seem to include both *benshengren* and *waishengren* equally in the Taiwanese nation. Upon closer inspection, the author only acknowledges *benshengren* to be *Taiwanese (taiwanren)*<sup>102</sup> but uses the rather inapt term *Chinese*

<sup>99</sup> 蔡同榮 (Cai Tongrong, 1935-2014).

<sup>100</sup> 『台湾独立建国運動反对中共与国民党的独裁，為建立一個主權屬於全体台湾住民的民主自由国家。凡是贊成台湾成為一個自由民主的独立国家者都是我們的朋友，那些為反共倒蔣与島内同志并肩奮鬥的在台中国系住民都是我們的同志。[...] 革命成功之日，除這些人应受制裁外，其他台湾住民不分出生地，宗教，及性別，都將平等地享受革命的成果，開放政權，並為大衆謀福利。在台中国系住民应与台湾人同樣地自動成為台湾共和国々民，且享受同樣的權利義務。他們的生命，財產，及其他的權利將受到台湾共和国法律的保障。』，Chai Trong-rong, “Taiwan duli jianguo yu zaitai zhongguoxi zhumin” (Founding an Independent Taiwan and the Chinese Inhabitants of Taiwan), *Taiwan Chinglian* 122 (1971): 23-24.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid. Chai Trong-rong, “Taiwan duli jianguo yu zaitai zhongguoxi zhumin”.

<sup>102</sup> 台湾人。



*inhabitants of Taiwan (zитай zhongguoxi zhumin)*<sup>103</sup> instead of *waishengren*. In other words, while these inhabitants may be equal citizens of a Taiwanese nation state in the future, they are *not* part of the Taiwanese *volk*. The wording also implies that he denies that Taiwanese people are historically linked to China.

Chai's statement is ambiguous about how *waishengren* are part of the Taiwanese nation, placing them vaguely within Peng Ming-min's *guomin* nationalism category. Chen Fupian<sup>104</sup>, citing Huang Yingzhe<sup>105</sup>, claims in his 2006 Chinese published work *History of the Taiwan Independence Movement*, published in Chinese in 2006, that this branch of nationalism became generally accepted by Taiwanese nationalists during the 1980s.<sup>106</sup> But the sources show that the nationalist discourse excluding *waishengren* actually intensified during the 1980s. For example, in 1981, Koh Se-kai argued that Taiwanese and Chinese were culturally vastly different while the Taiwanese Hokkien language lay closer to Vietnamese than Mandarin. He further asserted that the Taiwanese developed a national consciousness during the period of Japanese rule which was explicitly opposed to both the Chinese and Japanese. According to Koh Se-kai, recent Taiwanese intellectuals had been "poisoned" by *Chinese thought (chūka shisō)*<sup>107</sup> and this poisoned identity needed to be replaced by a new, distinctively non-Chinese Taiwanese national identity.<sup>108</sup> The same year, Japan-born Song Zhongyang<sup>109</sup> explicitly criticized Ming-min's idea of *guomin zhuyi*, civic nationalism, and instead advocated ethnic nationalism.<sup>110</sup> In a similar vein, during a speech commemorating the 2-28 incident in 1985, Lin Zhexu<sup>111</sup> said, "the character of the 228-incident was definitely a fight of Taiwanese against Chinese. [...] Today, we Taiwanese have no other choice but to arm ourselves with Taiwanese nationalism to resist our two million Chinese overlords armed with Chinese thought."<sup>112</sup> Lin used martial vocabulary highlighting the antagonism between *waishengren* and *benshengren*. As late as 1991, Ke Qihua<sup>113</sup> argued that political disputes in Taiwan were not based on ideological differences, but ethnicity. Taiwanese were not Han and culturally very different from Chinese.<sup>114</sup>

<sup>103</sup> 在台中国系住民.

<sup>104</sup> 陳佳宏 (Chen Jiahong).

<sup>105</sup> 黃英哲.

<sup>106</sup> Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi*, 494.

<sup>107</sup> 中華思想.

<sup>108</sup> Koh Se-kai, "Motto Taiwan minzoku no riron wo" (More on the Theory of the Nation of Taiwan), *Taiwan Chinglian* 249 (1981): 9-13.

<sup>109</sup> 宋重陽.

<sup>110</sup> Song Zhongyang, "Minzokushugi to kokka" (Nationalism and State), *Taiwan Chinglian* 250 (1981): 9-18.

<sup>111</sup> 林哲旭.

<sup>112</sup> Lin Zhexu, "Taiwan minzokushugi no shita ni danketsu wo!" (Let's Unite under Taiwanese Nationalism!), *Taiwan Chinglian* 294 (1985): 4-7.

<sup>113</sup> 柯旗化.

<sup>114</sup> Ke Qihua, "Taiwan kokunai no kihonteki na tairitsu" (Taiwan's Fundamental Domestic Antagonism), *Taiwan Chinglian* 363 (1991): 18-20.



Nonetheless, there is no doubt that it was generally accepted that *waishengren* could become Taiwanese, albeit it was not clearly stated *how*. In a 1979 article, Wang Zufu<sup>115</sup> complained that the state had registered him, his Taiwanese wife (through marrying him) and his children as Zhejiangese, as this was the province he came from, despite the fact that he had lived in Taiwan for 30 years, spoke Hokkien with his children and now fully identified as Taiwanese. He wondered how many generations it would take for the state to accept his family as Taiwanese.<sup>116</sup> It seems the nationalists of *Taiwan Chinglian* expected *waishengren* to fully assimilate into local Taiwanese culture, in order to become Taiwanese.

To maximize the distance between the Taiwanese and the Chinese *völker*, contributors to *Taiwan Chinglian* repeatedly argued against the idea that Taiwanese were Han people, *hanren*<sup>117</sup>, or Chinese in the sense of *zhongguoren*, a term that implies affiliation to the state of China.<sup>118</sup> The term *huaren*<sup>119</sup>, which implies a cultural and ancestral belonging to the Chinese people, was not even discussed. It took the development of a *New Taiwanese*<sup>120</sup> discourse around the presidential election in 2000 to acknowledge that *waishengren* were indeed *New Taiwanese* and not Chinese, regardless of their political affiliations or how much their everyday language, culture or thought resembled that of the “old” Taiwanese.<sup>121</sup>

Summing up, one can divide Taiwanese nationalist imaginations of the Taiwanese nation into two categories. On the one hand, a *völkisch* nationalism emphasized that *waishengren* were not part of the Taiwanese nation and culturally, linguistically and racially different from *waishengren*. On the other hand, a *guomin*, civic nationalism emphasized that *waishengren* would become equal citizens in a new Taiwanese nation state. Nonetheless, followers of this *guomin* nationalism apparently still considered *waishengren* not to be fully part of the Taiwanese nation or *volk* until the late 1990s. In other words, by including *waishengren* into its political project, the Taiwanese nationalism of Li Teng-hui’s presidency deviated from the traditional doctrine of Taiwanese nationalism. Quite possibly, the emergence of this mainstream civic nationalism in Taiwan was the product of domestic political pragmatism rather than nationalist theory. In the following section, I will explore how Taiwanese nationalism was affected and strengthened by global decolonization.

<sup>115</sup> 王祖福.

<sup>116</sup> Wang Zufu, 1979. “Taiwan ni sumu koto sanjūnen, watakushi mo taiwanjin desu. Aru tairiku shusshinsha no sakebi” (After Living in Taiwan for Thirty Years, I am Taiwanese, too. Call of a Person Born on the Chinese Mainland), *Taiwan Chinglian* 221 (1979): 23-24.

<sup>117</sup> 漢人.

<sup>118</sup> 中國人. This term implies that these people belong to the state of China.

<sup>119</sup> 華人.

<sup>120</sup> 新台灣人 (*xin taiwanren*).

<sup>121</sup> Chai Trong-rong, “Shin-taiwanjin wa chūgokujin dewa nai” (New Taiwanese are not Chinese). translated by Kang Wenhua. *Taiwan Chinglian* 462 (1999): 25-26, originally published in *Minzhong Ribao*, March 15 1999.

*The Doctrine of Taiwanese Nationalism and the Moment of Global Decolonization*

In my opinion, one can assume that Taiwanese nationalists viewed their work as part of the global moment of decolonization. In a 1967 essay, Liao Kianlong came to the following conclusion as he compared the situation of Taiwan with that of Algeria under French rule:

Our independence movement is one kind of human liberation movement. Its fundamental character is absolutely identical to the colonial liberation and nationalist movements of Asia and Africa that have been successively rising up since the end of World War II.<sup>122</sup>

Similar sentiments were expressed by the Japanese nationalist supporter of the Taiwan independence movement<sup>123</sup> Tōyama Kagehisa<sup>124</sup>, a former communist who grew up in Taiwan during Japanese rule. In 1965, he argued in an article, he argued that the Taiwan independence movement and similar nationalist movements in the ‘Third World’<sup>125</sup> (and Japan) were part of one large historic movement to liberate themselves from white people’s rule and American economic domination:

For centuries, the countries of Asia have been ruled by white people. If the masses struggle heroically for national liberation and to expel the white people, then let us not spare with praise, no matter if they are communists, Viet Minh or Vietcong, or liberals.<sup>126</sup>

Without adopting Tōyama’s racialized language, Liao, in a more thought-through essay, basically agreed, arguing that the colonial powers, including Japan, USA and the Soviet Union, were responsible for Asia’s *backward character*<sup>127</sup> and built their wealth upon exploitation of the peoples of Asia. According to Liao,

<sup>122</sup> 『Lan e独立運動[...]就是一種e人類解放運動。ce[...]ka第二次世界大戰後陸續興起e Asia Africa地域e植民地解放運動，民族運動在基本性質上是完全相同。』, Liao Kianlong, “Gua--e kik-bing su-siong(2) Tai-uan tok-lip un-tong si tsit-tshing-tsit-pah-ban tai-uan-lang--e bin-tsok un-tong” (My Revolutionary Thoughts(2) The Taiwan Independence Movement is the Nationalist Movement of 11 Million Taiwanese). *Taiwan Chinglian* 78 (1967): 6-10.

<sup>123</sup> At the time, Japanese conservatives, like American conservatives, largely supported the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Tōyama was an exception.

<sup>124</sup> 遠山景久 (1918-1999).

<sup>125</sup> He explicitly mentions Castro, Nasser, and the Vietnamese Vietcong and Viet Minh, despite the fact that the Viet Minh was originally founded as an anti-Japanese group.

<sup>126</sup> 「アジアの国々は数世紀に亘って白人に支配されてきた。民衆は、白人を追放してくれる民族解放闘争の英雄でさえあれば、それが共産主義者であろうと、ベトナム、ベトコンであろうと、自由主義者であろうと、喝采を惜しまないのである。」, Tōyama Kagehisa, “Nashonarizumu” (Nationalism), *Taiwan Chinglian* 51 (1965): 29-30.

<sup>127</sup> 後進性 (*houjinxing*), the translation as “backward character” is his own.

the reason for Asia's nationalist awakening was the experience of World War II and the relatively easy defeat of the Western colonial powers by Japan, giving the peoples of Asia the necessary self-confidence to free themselves. He wrote that the reason the peoples of Asia were fighting against America was the USA's neo-colonialist behavior, which consisted of the installation of corrupt satraps and did not grant the Asian countries full independence. In this line of thought, Taiwan, like other Asian countries, was a victim of American and Chinese great power politics - China's claim to Taiwan was an imperialist one. Furthermore, according to Liao, Vietnam's fight for independence was an inspiration for many peoples of Asia.<sup>128</sup>

In fact, Taiwanese nationalists' deep identification with colonial liberation movements seems to be one of the reasons why they emphasized the antagonism between *benshengren* and *waishengren* so strongly, while they were unwilling to include *waishengren* in the Taiwanese nation. They considered power-relationships in Taiwan to mirror power-relationships between European immigrants and native peoples in other colonies, which were often legitimized by racism. In a 1965 essay comparing KMT rule on Taiwan to the Apartheid regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Dai Zhihai<sup>129</sup> for example wrote:

Rhodesia is being attacked by the whole world for becoming a "Second South Africa", it is swimming in criticism calling it a "zone of darkness", "gunpowder magazine" and "fossil of colonialism", but while the international public opinion is raising its denouncing voice, we Taiwanese can not help but look at ourselves and sigh deeply. Where on earth is the difference between Rhodesia and Taiwan? There is no difference between Rhodesia and Taiwan! Just the opposite, the reality in Taiwan is far worse than in Rhodesia!<sup>130</sup>

He furthermore contended that the reason why the Chiang regime was able to avoid international criticism for its colonial regime was its claim to represent all of China. Therefore, it had no incentive to declare Taiwan independent the way many Western intellectuals, diplomats, politicians and, albeit unofficially, governments demanded in order to solve the *Two-Chinas question*<sup>131</sup>:

<sup>128</sup> Liao Kianlong, "Xin taiwan de jinlu. Xunqiu shijie ji yazhou de heping, anding ji fanrong" (An Approach for the New Taiwan. Seeking Peace, Stability and Prosperity for Asia and the World), *Taiwan Chinglian* 101 (1969): 2-23.

<sup>129</sup> 戴志海.

<sup>130</sup> 『ローデシアは全世界から「第二の南アフリカ」になると非難され、「暗黒地帯」「火薬庫」「植民地の化石」と批判を浴びているのだが、このような国際世論の糾弾の声が高いとき、台湾人はわが身をふりかえり深いため息をつかざるをえないのである。一体台湾はローデシアとどれだけの違いあるのでしょうか。台湾とローデシアの違いは全くない。それどころか、台湾の実情はローデシアよりもさらに悪いのである。』, Dai Zhihai, "Rōdeshia to tasuu shihai no gensoku" (Rhodesia and the Principle of Majority Rule), *Taiwan Chinglian* 60 (1965): 53-59.

<sup>131</sup> Chen, *Taiwan duli yundong shi* 2006, 133-166 and 423-434.

In order to maintain refugee rule in Taiwan, a constitution for refugees is displayed and abused, proclaiming that they would conquer Mainland China and supporting the refugee government. Even if minority rule is continuing in Rhodesia for a while, it will not continue in Taiwan. When they cannot misrepresent Taiwan as “China” any longer, the truth about the minority refugee dictatorship in Taiwan will become clear to the whole world and the refugees will realize, that they are just refugees waiting for the day to return home.<sup>132</sup>

Although the claim that KMT rule in Taiwan was worse than Apartheid seems very exaggerated, Taiwanese nationalists continued to identify themselves with the fate of South Africans living under Apartheid.<sup>133</sup> Since the KMT strongly supported the Apartheid regime and tens of thousands of Taiwanese were living in South Africa during Apartheid<sup>134</sup>, South African anti-Apartheid activists and Taiwanese nationalists had a common enemy. Indeed, Nelson Mandela’s early policy on Taiwan suggests that the ANC supported Taiwanese independence at least until the late 1990s. Some examples illustrate said support: During his visit to Taipei in 1993, Nelson Mandela met with the DPP leadership for a long discussion, ignoring KMT diplomats’ attempts to prevent a meeting.<sup>135</sup> Furthermore, Mandela not only invited a delegation of Li Teng-hui’s government to his presidential inauguration in 1994, but also a delegation of WUFI and its chairman George Chang<sup>136</sup>, despite the strong discontent expressed by the government of the People’s Republic of China, which traditionally supported anti-Apartheid movements.<sup>137</sup> These incidents and the contacts between Thomas Wen-I Liao and other independence movements mentioned in Chapter 2 seem to indicate that Taiwanese activists cooperated with anti-colonial independence movements in the rest of the world. Since no work on this specific topic has been published, further research is needed

<sup>132</sup> 『台湾では難民の支配を維持するために難民の憲法をふりまわし、中国大陸を征服するのだと出張して、難民政権の支えにしている。ローデシアで少数者のしばらくつづくことがあっても、台湾で難民の支配がつづくことがあっても、台湾で難民の支配がつづくことはない。台湾を「中国」だとかまかすことができなくなれば、少数の難民独裁の事実は全世界に明らかとなり、難民は彼ら自身故郷に帰る日を待つだけの難民だとはっきり自覚するようになるのである。』, Dai, “Rōdeshia to tasuu shihai no gensoku”.

<sup>133</sup> For example, in 1988, Taiwanese nationalists sent a delegation to the international Anti-Apartheid Conference at Waseda University, Tokyo. They reported on the situation in Taiwan and the 2-28 incident and claimed to have received sympathetic reactions from the African delegates, Lian Genteng, “Han aparutoheito kokusai kaigi wo sanko shite” (Participating in the International Anti-Apartheid Conference), *Taiwan Chinglian* 336 (1988): 29-31.

<sup>134</sup> Sven Grimm, Yejo Kim, Ross Anthony, Robert Attwell and Xin Xiao, 2014. *South African Relations with China and Taiwan. Economic Realism and the ‘One-China’ doctrine* (Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University, 2014), 29-31.

<sup>135</sup> *Taiwan Communiqué*, September 1993, 16-18.

<sup>136</sup> 張燦鑒 (Zhang Canhong, born 1936), later was mayor of Tainan.

<sup>137</sup> Song Zhongyang, “Minami afurika, taiwan konekushon: nan-a, soshite PLO mo taiwan dokuritu wo shiji” (The Connection of South Africa and Taiwan. South Africa and the PLO, too, Support Taiwan Independence). *Taiwan Chinglian* 405 (1994): 14-17.



on the relationship between the Taiwan Independence Movement and the ANC and other anti-Apartheid movements.<sup>138</sup>

### Conclusions

In this paper, I tried to show how Osterhammel's and Jansen's categorizations of anti-colonial movements applies to the Taiwanese case and far into the post-war era, much different from these authors' assertion that Taiwan was decolonized in 1945. Moreover, I introduced a periodization of Taiwanese anti-colonial movements and the concept of *ad hoc colonial nationalism*, in order to distinguish the post-1947 Taiwan independence movement from the proclamation of the Republic of Taiwan in 1895 and the 8-15 independence movement of 1945.

I have also argued that, until the late 1990s, the doctrine of Taiwanese nationalism did not consider the Taiwanese as *Chinese* in the sense of *hanren*<sup>139</sup> or *hua-ren*<sup>140</sup>, and especially not as *zhongguoren*.<sup>141</sup> Nor did it consider *waishengren* as *Taiwanese*<sup>142</sup>, but rather as *Chinese (zhongguoren)*, which in this context means foreigners, or *Chinese inhabitants of Taiwan*.<sup>143</sup> The Taiwanese nationalist discourse portrayed *waishengren* as antagonists until the late 1990s.

Furthermore, I have shown that this discourse of antagonism was not only fueled by a Taiwan-centered discourse but also by an outward looking discourse that identified the KMT regime with colonial regimes in Asia and Africa. This discourse viewed the power-relationships in Taiwan as colonial, mirroring those of European colonies and African Apartheid regimes. The point of these global identifications was to strengthen a discourse that identified the struggle of the Taiwan Independence Movement as one between two very different cultures, nations or even races.

Thus, Taiwanese nationalists saw their movement as part of a global moment of decolonization and the awakening of nationalism of the peoples of Asia and Africa. As indicated by the support granted to the Taiwan Independence Movement by the South African ANC, as well as the invitations Thomas Wen-I Liao received to attend the Bandung conference and the ceremony of the Malayan Declaration of Independence in 1957, this view was shared among at least some nationalist and anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa.

With regards to Jansen's and Osterhammel's *Decolonization*, I think the Taiwanese example shows what mistakes we as *global historians* can do if we are deliberately or unwillingly unaware of our own *ethnocentric* (in this case *Euro-*

<sup>138</sup> This also applies to the involvement of Taiwanese in South Africa in the Taiwan Independence Movement.

<sup>139</sup> 漢人.

<sup>140</sup> 華人.

<sup>141</sup> 中國人.

<sup>142</sup> 台灣人.

<sup>143</sup> 中國系台灣住民 (*zhongguoxi taiwan zhumin*).



*centric*) perceptions. In my opinion, over-relying on academic literature produced in Europe and North America and ignoring global imbalances in academic prestige and resources will throw us back into a time before Edward Said. The fact that none of *country x's* universities made it into the top 100 of THE ranking does not imply that locally produced knowledge about the history of said country is less legitimate or reliable than knowledge produced at Harvard. When we write about global affairs, it is imperative that we at least *try* to engage and consult local or national discourses of history, or else we will undoubtedly get a distorted view.