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‘Allah is in Fashion’: The Iranian Revolution in Non-Aligned Yugoslavia

By

George Loftus

Abstract

Despite its recent resurgence in Cold War scholarship, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) remains elusive. Outside of certain diplomatic or political-economic theatres, our understanding of the organisation is limited. This is particularly the case for the effects of the Non-Aligned Movement below the state-level and amongst individuals and groups ‘on the ground’ in its member states. This paper is an intervention into this gap in the literature, examining experiences of ‘actually-existing Non-Alignment’ in Yugoslavia through responses to the Iranian Revolution. The Iranian Revolution presented both a problem and an opportunity in the minds of many Yugoslavs. Occurring towards the end of Non-Alignment’s time as a pillar of Yugoslav society, Ruhollah Khomeini’s Islamist movement was a world-historical movement that forced groups from across Yugoslav society to reckon with its meaning. What this paper argues is that such interpretations were developed out of experiences of Non-Alignment. As such, the ‘imaginative geographies’ of the NAM and the interactions they enabled since 1961 provided the foundation for reactions to the Iranian Revolution. In turn, events in Iran would influence the development of the NAM’s role in a changing Yugoslavia, specifically as it pertained to the lives of Muslims. Depicting the clashing and shifting interpretations of the Iranian Revolution by Yugoslavia’s Muslim and state institutions, this paper advances our understanding of how Non-Alignment was lived and how this global entity founded upon anti-imperialism bled into the daily experiences of Yugoslavs as ‘Non-Aligned subjects.’

About the author

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In September 1989, Belgrade was home to Iranian revolutionaries, both real and imagined. The Summit of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) was in town, the ninth one since its establishment in 1961 in Belgrade. As part of the events, an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati sat down for an interview with the Bosnian Muslim magazine *Preporod*.[1] The magazine's editorial board, led by scholar Džemaludin Latić, were keen to understand the revolution and Iran's place in the Non-Aligned community of which Yugoslavia was a major member. Across town, sociologist S. P. Ramet recorded the views of two Serb intellectuals who imagined something much worse from Velayati's countrymen and Latić's aims. For these Serbs, Ramet records, it was clear that the Muslims of Yugoslavia wanted "to see a Khomeini in charge here."[2] With curiosity amongst the Bosnian Muslim intellectuals on the one hand and growing Islamophobia amongst Serb nationalists on the other, these views represented the prevailing interpretations of the Islamic Revolution in Yugoslavia. Such interpretations were established in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution between 1979 and 1983 and became inextricably linked with the growing sectarian domestic strife in Yugoslavia during the 1980s. More significantly, these understandings were also influenced by Yugoslavia's pre-1979 entanglements with the Islamic world through the framework of the NAM and reveal much about how global solidarity networks like the NAM were lived in multipolar societies under socialism.

Lacking many longstanding or developed connections with Iranian society, Yugoslavs relied on their existing conceptions of the world order and their place in it to interpret the events in Iran. These mental geographies were influenced by Yugoslavia's position as the European stronghold of the predominantly Asian and African NAM. This article will argue that the Yugoslav reaction to the Iranian Revolution cannot be divorced from Yugoslavia's specific position within the Non-Aligned world. For Yugoslavia's Islamic Community and its members, responses to the events in Iran were often contextualised in a larger Islamic world that they experienced through the infrastructures and networks of the NAM. In these reactions, the phenomenon of 'Islamic internationalism' which grew in prominence in the Middle East and North Africa from the 1970s looms as large as Iran's Islamist rupture. All these movements were seen as part of a new 'Islamic internationalism.' For the Yugoslav state and party, the Islamic Revolution would act as a key moment in the larger journey away from the NAM and their increasing claims of a 'European' identity. In such a process, Iran and the fear of the "Khomeini in charge here" would provide an impetus for increased scrutiny over domestic Muslims and a hardening of certain intellectual tendencies at home and affiliations abroad. Moreover, the internal responses to the revolution in Iran are significant beyond the borders of Yugoslavia, as they upend assumptions of connectivity which anchor current scholarship on the Global Cold War.

Non-Alignment and Islam in the Historiography

In recent years, there has been an explosion in scholarship on the so-called 'Third World' and the Non-Aligned Movement. The relationship between these two concepts is and

was unstable, but for this paper I understand the NAM as the institutional and diplomatic 'cousin' of the more amorphous, and more militant, Third Worldist movement. This new scholarship is part of an attempt to integrate decolonisation into the historiography of the Cold War, positioning it as one of the major, if not the major, historical processes of the twentieth century.[3] This 'new Cold War history' has revolutionised our understanding of how the Cold War was fought, with what aims, and by whom. Emerging out of this historiographical trend is a renewed focus on the Non-Aligned Movement. The NAM, although less so than the post-Bandung anti-colonial organisations, has become the focus of an increasing number of studies which seek to explore its role in both decolonisation as a process and in developments during the Cold War.[4] Given the recency of this expansion in the scholarship, the level of critical depth applied to the aims and practices of the NAM can be shallow. Such works can also slip into depicting nostalgia-tinted anti-colonial worlds populated by larger-than-life Nassers and Titos. This is clear for example in Vijay Prashad's foundational *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*, in which he frames the 1956 Brioni Declaration, the first step in the NAM's creation, as a meeting of "titans".[5] Another example comes from Nastaša Mišković, who frames Tito in particular as the "driving force" of the organisation.[6] This focus on the masculinist heroic imaginary of the summit and its aftermath belies a reality of much more complex engagements and disengagements from the NAM ideal and its institutional framework. Crucially, such views underemphasise the extent to which the NAM as an institution became the foundation for international interaction by certain social groups within the signatory states.

There have been attempts to correct some of this nostalgia in the literature. Standing in contrast to Prashad is Robert Vitalis, who argues that much more attention should be focused on the "the regional rivalries, clientelism, and log rolling" at Belgrade "lest one still imagines the moment as a time when a better, more principled form of world order might have come into being."[7] Vitalis's emphasis on the multiple stakeholders at Belgrade provides a sorely needed account of some the tensions and contradictions that populated the organisation, while also warning against romanticising specific historical figures and their supposed influence. Outside of the specific moments of 1955 and 1961, longer histories of the NAM at various scales have emerged. The most significant of these is Jürgen Dinkel's volume on the history of the NAM until 1992. For Dinkel, the NAM was only truly empowered after its institutionalisation during the 1970s, significantly later than the heyday of the Brioni 'titans'.[8] Dinkel's view cuts against some of the earlier works which portray the post-1968 NAM as a husk, left without its necessary charismatic leadership.[9]

My article is part of this developing revisionist trend in studies of the Global Cold War and decolonisation. I echo Dinkel's criticism that the existing literature is almost myopically focused on "just a few detailed accounts of individuals" and that as a result "we know nothing about" others "who may have contributed to cooperation between the non-aligned countries".[10] How various national and subnational figures beyond the 'titans' used, understood, and received the NAM is at the core of this article. The primacy of handshakes and handwritten notes between notables in the literature does not however mean that the

NAM was a shallow, purely diplomatic entity or an exercise in charismatic pageantry. The flashpoint of the 1979 Iranian Revolution presents a perfect case study in which to examine the various socio-political relationships with the NAM in its core state, Yugoslavia. Non-Alignment —its infrastructure and ideological underpinning— was the presupposition of Yugoslav reactions to the Iranian Revolution.

An accompanying void in the literature concerns the history of Islam in Yugoslavia. This body of work has yet to deal extensively with the relationship between domestic and global Islamic practice and belief under Yugoslav socialism. The ruptures of war and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans have contributed to an understanding which suggests that, between 1945 and 1992, Islam (and other religions) were 'frozen' institutions, only to re-emerge after the collapse of socialism.[11] Such blockages in the historiography have meant that the history of Non-Alignment has not been integrated into the history of Islam in Yugoslavia. This is the case despite the fact that the half-century under socialism saw the most sustained interaction between the Yugoslav space and the Islamic world since Ottoman rule.[12]

Some recent interventions in this area have attempted to address this absence by integrating new literature on socialist internationalism and the Islamic world in the Cold War. The events of the Islamic world and of revolutionary internationalism have often been seen as separate, yet they were in fact deeply bound together. A major intervention is for example Paul Thomas Chamberlin's *The Global Offensive*, which presents revolutionary practices in Palestine and the Middle East as part of a continuum with Algerian, Vietnamese, and Cuban struggles.[13] On the role of the NAM specifically in these connections, Piro Rexhepi, for example, has argued that the official contacts of Albania and Yugoslavia with Muslim states led to what he calls a "fermentation of solidarity" between Balkan Muslims and the rest of the Islamic world, even if such solidarities were opposed to the prevailing order of state socialism.[14] More expansive is the work of Darryl Li. His work on foreign 'jihadists' in the Bosnian War seeks to eliminate many of the boundaries between religious and political internationalisms, arguing that the NAM provided for Yugoslav Muslims "a way of identifying with both the socialist state and the *umma* at once."[15] This article builds on this emerging research of the intersection of Yugoslav socialist internationalism and global Islam. Islam's often contested place in Balkan society intensified the influence of the NAM in shaping such contestations. Through the NAM, a new Muslimness was beginning to be expressed.

I will interrogate this 'new Muslimness' first by demonstrating the 'actually-existing Non-Alignment' of Yugoslav life in the 1970s. This first section will show that the religious practice of Muslims under Yugoslav socialism was inseparable from Yugoslavia's socio-political engagements with the rest of the Muslim world. I will then explore some of the interpretations of the Iranian Revolution by Yugoslavs. The scope of this article is institutional, focused on the Yugoslav *Islamska Zajednica* (IZ), the sole legal representative body of Yugoslav Muslims, and the Yugoslav state and party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [*Savez komunista Jugoslavije*] (SKJ). The first section, using commentary from IZ

publications such as *Preporod* and *Glasnik*, will assess some of the Muslim perspectives on the events in Iran in 1979. These publications were, and are, invariably dominated by local news, but each issue during the socialist period always contained some commentary on contemporary world events, especially those occurring in the Islamic world. Whilst suffering to an extent from self-censoring on the part of the editors, events and movements of historical significance, such as conflicts over Palestine and the Iranian Revolution, were hotly debated. The events themselves would generally be covered by syndicated, or quoted, news reports from the general Yugoslav press and then become the topic of editorials, opinion articles, columns or as letters to the editors. Whilst the editorial board would often hold a specific view on some event, the Islamic press, and *Preporod* especially, was a platform for debate for Yugoslav Muslims. Due to the structure of the IZ and its centre of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this paper privileges the views of Bosnian Muslims over other Muslims in Yugoslavia. Whilst Kosovar, Macedonian, and Turkish Muslims in Yugoslavia had their own views on the Iranian Revolution, IZ publications almost entirely relied on the voices of the Bosnian Muslim intellectual elite. Establishing the changing relationship of other Islamic communities to the international Islamist movement is a vital area in need of future study but, due to the nature of the sources available, remains beyond the scope of this article. The second section of this paper will contrast these Muslim views with those of the party and governmental elites through Yugoslav state policy decisions made domestically and internationally after the breakout of the Iranian Revolution. This section will rely more on journalist accounts of the time and a reconstruction of the existing historiography of this period to re-centre the Iranian Revolution in the domestic repression of Islamic intellectuals.

Non-Alignment and Islam in Yugoslavia

When the Iranian Revolution began in 1979, Yugoslavia's links to the Muslim world, especially Arab states, were extensive. The year also coincided with a high point in the IZ's domestic revival, which had been building since the late-1960s.[16] These twin processes of state internationalism and religious revival formed the background to interpretations of the Iranian Revolution. This section will explore these processes, their role in the institutional development of the IZ and the SKJ, and how they became the basis for later perceptions of the events in Iran.

The Non-Aligned Movement was established in 1961 in Belgrade. Inspired by but crucially not directly related to the 1955 Bandung Conference, the NAM was founded as an international organisation similar in structure to the UN.[17] The coalition of states which founded the organisation saw themselves as building an international movement of post- and anti- colonial states.[18] Whilst at first something of an ad-hoc group with unclear objectives, by the 1970s the NAM had become, according to Jürgen Dinkel, an institutionalised transnational entity.[19] Whilst the revolutionary 1960s were rhetorically dominant, and remain so in the historiography, the post-1968 NAM and its associated networks only grew in importance for Yugoslav institutions and citizens. Gal Kirn has argued

that Non-Alignment, along with the anti-fascist struggle of World War II and development of a 'self-management socialism' modelled not on the Soviet Union, formed one of the three 'ruptures' which set the path for Yugoslavia after its forced break with Stalin in 1948.[20] The Yugoslav state articulated its commitment to Third World anti-colonialism as "partisan politics by other means," a position of solidarity which shifted Yugoslavia socio-politically outside of Europe.[21] Such articulations would become institutionalised domestically not just in terms of trade and diplomacy, but also socio-culturally.[22] These new "imaginative geographies" were expressed by Yugoslav party intellectuals such as Edvard Kardelj, who linked "national-liberation, anti-fascist and revolutionary struggles" as a cohesive oppositional bloc against the bipolar world order of the late twentieth century.[23] Such expressions of solidarity and their institutionalisation led to real connections between Yugoslavs and citizens of other Non-Aligned countries, which was especially the case for Yugoslavia's Muslims.

Extensive diplomatic and economic interactions between Yugoslavia and Muslim-majority postcolonial states formed the basis for transregional interactions between Muslim Yugoslavs and their co-religionists in the Middle East and North Africa.[24] Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito cultivated strong relationships with the Arab republics of Egypt, Libya, and Iraq, which led to an increasing presence of Arab Muslim students in urban centres and, reciprocally, Yugoslav technical workers in Arab states.[25] The Yugoslav diplomatic service was also a common home for Muslim party members, as the expanding ties with Muslim-majority states increased the need for Muslim diplomats.[26] This kind of official work also extended to the IZ itself, as it often sent delegations of *ulema* to Muslim nations at the behest of the Yugoslav state.[27] The interactions brought forth by these networks became central to how Yugoslav Muslims understood themselves; that is to say, as part of a wider anti-colonial network of Muslims extending from Algeria to Indonesia.

Islam, as a belief and practice, existed awkwardly amongst these expanding ties. Until Iran's entry into the organisation in 1979, Muslim states that participated in NAM often did so in entirely secular capacities. This was not only the case for nationalist regimes, such as Egypt and Iraq, but also avowedly 'Islamic' governments such as Mauritania or even Saudi Arabia.[28] From the Yugoslav perspective, the ideology of Non-Alignment was concerned only with anti-colonialism and economic justice, with bonds of race or religion excluded, often explicitly.[29] As Catherine Baker argues, such attitudes were voiced by Tito himself, who espoused a "race-blind" solidarity during the Algerian War.[30] The incorporation of Islam into Yugoslav claims to solidarity was avoided with the IZ acting more as an example of Yugoslavia's brand of "tolerant socialism" vis-à-vis Soviet religious policy.[31] Hostility to pan-Islamic politics in the movement from Yugoslavia and others meant that such tendencies, whilst present, were never part of official networks.[32] Rather, these tendencies, particularly amongst Yugoslav Muslims, were ideological stowaways, using the established infrastructure of the NAM to form their own transnational connections and systems of knowledge transfer. Such sub-networks, alongside certain kinds of official patronage, fed into Yugoslavia's domestic Islamic 'revival' in the 1970s.

The causes of Yugoslavia's Islamic intellectual revival and the subsequent expansion of the IZ's institutional capacity were twofold. They were, on the one hand, a rapid mosque building programme and, on the other, an influx of a new generation of local Muslim intellectuals, many of whom studied abroad. Both causes were a direct result of the official networks established through the NAM, which were made use of in unofficial ways. From the mid-1960s, mosques were rapidly built and rebuilt across Yugoslavia, primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Often, these projects were funded by Middle Eastern NAM countries and contributed to the expansion of IZ's reach and institutional role in Muslim lives in Yugoslavia.[33] Such expansion also provided space for new Muslim intellectuals to assume roles in the IZ hierarchy. Yugoslav graduates from Al-Azhar in Cairo and the Universities of Baghdad and Kuwait provided the foundation of a new generation of Islamic scholars in Yugoslavia.[34] Inspired by their experiences in the MENA states and enabled by a more muscular IZ, these new intellectuals, alongside older *ulema* members, pursued an Islamic revival movement in Yugoslavia. In engaging in this revival movement, Yugoslav Muslim intellectuals took part in the contemporaneous global Islamist phenomenon which was taking hold in the Muslim world. The most visible result of the local movement was the proliferation of publications under the IZ banner. These included *Preporod* (Renaissance), established in Sarajevo, *El-Hilal* (Crescent), in Skopje, and *Edukata Islam* in Prishtina.[35] For Bosnian Muslims this moment also coincided with the wider process of Muslim national affirmation which started around 1961 and culminated in the inclusion of the '*Muslimani*' nationality in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution.[36] This process, which was spearheaded by secular elites, granted Bosnian Muslims the same national autonomy as Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and contributed to an increased identification with Islam, particularly as the IZ took on the role of a dual national-religious institution.[37]

This revival was never political, but this is not to say that Yugoslav Islamic intellectuals were ignorant of Islamism as an ideology. As I will show, state censorship certainly would have reacted harshly to any support for Islamist politics.[38] Islamism also remained unpopular within Muslim intellectual circles in Yugoslavia due to a long tradition of Islamic Modernism. This theological approach promoted cooperation with the secular state and was popular amongst the intellectual core of the IZ.[39] Yet, through the connections of Non-Alignment, pan-Islamist politics passed through Yugoslav Islamic intellectual circles. Li has highlighted the example of Elfatih Ali Hassanein, a Sudanese medical student who arrived in Belgrade in 1964.[40] Hassanein, as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was one of many foreign students who helped make Yugoslav Muslims aware of Islamist politics in the Muslim world. Hassanein was also a friend of future Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović, who would later claim that his knowledge of the Muslim Brotherhood came from his contacts with his Arab peers as a student.[41] Outside of these interpersonal connections, publications such as *Preporod* and the IZ's official journal *Glasnik Islamske Zajednice* (Bulletin of the Islamic Community) published frequent commentary and reporting on events in the Islamic world, including on the implementation of Islamist policies and the successes of Islamist parties. These dynamics of Non-Alignment and Islamic revival influenced how the Iranian Revolution was interpreted in Yugoslavia. Acting as both

the progenitor of 'bottom-up' networks and as a 'top-down' geopolitical institution, the NAM was the mechanism by which 'Iran' and its revolution, in its real and imagined capacities, came to Yugoslavia.

The Islamic Community and the Iranian Revolution

The Iranian Revolution was largely poorly understood inside of Yugoslavia's Islamic Community. Due to Iran's place outside of the NAM sphere before 1979, IZ members experienced few interactions with Iranians.[42] Instead, the Yugoslav *ulema* and associated IZ members relied on both Yugoslav foreign reporting from Belgrade and their connections with Arab states and people to understand the events of 1978 and 1979. In this process the Iranian Revolution lost its place as a definitive 'rupture' in geopolitics that it had gained in the West. It was for Yugoslav Muslims a part of a wider shift in global Islamic politics which privileged the well-known Sudanese, Libyan, and Egyptian contexts over Iran. Nevertheless, whilst IZ members never openly supported the strategies of Khomeini, they received the revolution warmly and viewed it in anti-imperialist terms, attaching it to their own experiences and understandings of revolution and the world order.[43] Moreover, the Iranian Revolution gave some impetus to homegrown 'Islamist' tendencies. Such tendencies were limited, but within some of the more full-throated support for the Iranian revolutionaries we can observe sympathies for a pan-Islamic political project for Yugoslav Muslims.

In the IZ's press, the Iranian Revolution received two major features in *Preporod* and a handful of coverage in other publications such as the *Glasnik*. There were also translations of books and articles by Iranian intellectuals such as Ali Shariati and Ruhollah Khomeini into BCMS.[44] None of the coverage was concerned with specific events in the revolution, nor did it feature original reporting. All these pieces were published between 1979 and 1981, with the 1989 Ali Velayati interview quoted above being the only major exception. This cut-off in coverage coincides with the onset of the Iran-Iraq War and was connected to the parallel response of the Yugoslav state to the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution explored in the final section of this article.

The first major coverage of the Iranian Revolution by IZ publications came in April 1979 in *Preporod* in a centrefold feature entitled "Iran and Islam". The articles in this feature are orientated around what is referred to as "the Iranian miracle of Islam [*Iransko čudo Islam*a]" which is said to have been "a phenomenon of modern history on a global scale."[45] It is also understood as the "natural progression" of a "much broader process of modern revival" in the Islamic world.[46] This contextualised understanding forms the basis of *Preporod*'s coverage in this feature. The Iranian Revolution is presented as one part of a wider trend in the Islamic world with another article stating that "at the end of the 20th century" there appears to be "a great deal of possibility for political power in large parts of the Muslim world."[47] Also clear is that knowledge about the revolution was limited. The latter article used the first *Fitna*, the civil war initiating the Sunni/Shia break in the early

Islamic caliphate, as a means of explaining the political nature of the divisions in Islam. Such an explanatory device speaks to a lack of detailed knowledge of the ongoing events in Iran and a reliance on commonly understood tropes of Islamic history.

Understood more deeply were the possible geopolitical implications of the Iranian Revolution. This forms the basis upon which *Preporod* found common cause with Iran. A major example of this was a dispute over an article by Jelena Marinčić titled "Allah is in Fashion [*U Modi je Allah*]". Originally published in the Belgrade *Nedeljne Novosti* (Weekly News) and syndicated by Preporod in April 1979, the article suggested the possibility of a "worldwide geopolitical reversal."[48] Marinčić argued that, in the aftermath of the revolution, "Muslims are united" and that an "Islamic internationalism transcends national borders."[49] Marinčić saw the pan-Islamic trend, which was given new life by Iran, as a new opposition against the bipolar world order, or a rebellion against the "developed world [*razvijeni svet*]."[50] Three issues later, an author cited only as 'J.M.' took issue with Marinčić's conclusions about the supposed 'threat' of the Islamic Revolution. Questioning primarily the use of 'fashion [*moda*]' to describe Islamic belief, J.M. argued that "such an article" presents the "Iranian constellation" as "a flash", as part of a wider "stage of fashion events [*na pozornici modnih zbivanja*]."[51] Whilst agreeing with the "wisdom" of Marinčić's conclusion on the potential upending of the world order, J.M. argued for a recentring of Islam within interpretations of the events in Iran.[52] They argued that what is often ignored by the non-Muslim press is that Islam, "which surrounds the thoughts of those most concerned Iranian revolutionaries", is "a spiritual refreshment and a driver for the transformation of man."[53] What J.M.'s retort to the non-Muslim Marinčić reveals is that the Iranian Revolution was, for many Yugoslav Muslim intellectuals, an event defined by both its anti-imperialist meaning and its Islamic meaning. This debate thus shows a synthesis on the part of these Islamic intellectuals, a unity of Islam and Non-Alignment which was forged, vitally, through their engagement with the Islamic Revolution.

This was also clear in a 1981 *Glasnik* article on the practice of sharia, written by scholar Hasan Čengić. Čengić surveyed the implementation of sharia law across the Muslim world, with Iran being one of a number of countries which exhibit "a growing tendency to break with Western models and a determination to return to their own the laws, culture and civilisation."[54] Alongside Nimeiry in Sudan and Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan, Khomeini is quoted extensively in the article. The proclamation of the Islamic Republic is seen as the most representative moment of the strength of the new Muslim coalition alongside the 1973 oil embargo.[55] For Čengić, "Muslims have the space, population, dynamism, strength, energy and money," meaning there is no reason why they cannot become the "the master of tomorrow's world."[56] Like Marinčić and J.M.'s response, this piece connected the economic struggles of the North-South conflict against the developed world with global Islamic revival. In such a narrative, Iran was an anti-Western bulwark both economically and culturally. It additionally highlighted the potential strength of a unified Islamic bloc led by Islamic law. In Čengić's article, Yugoslav Muslims remain absent, but his full-throated support for a potential coalition of Islamic 'masters of tomorrow' implicitly made space for

his own community. This celebration drew on the experiences of Non-Alignment and transregional communication with the Muslim world, as well as an emerging 'Islamic consciousness' amongst some post-war Islamic intellectuals.

The most significant example of this synthesis came from prominent *ulema* member and editor of *Preporod*, Husein Đozo. Đozo is one of the most well-known Islamic intellectuals in Yugoslav history and is credited with developing a distinctive 'Yugoslav' approach to Islamic thought.[57] Educated in Egypt in the 1930s and a deeply influential figure in post-war Yugoslavia, Đozo helped establish the Modernist trend in Bosnian and then Yugoslav Islam. He also helped found *Preporod* and was a consistent member of its editorial staff from 1971 to 1979, with regular columns in a number of other Islamic publications.[58] In one such column in August 1979, 'Ramadan Reflections,' Đozo offered his position on the Iranian Revolution. Đozo was polemical in his column, making the claim that:

> The uniqueness of the Islamic Revolution is made clear, amongst other things, in the small number of victims. It is surely the "cheapest" revolution ["*najjeftinija" revolucija*]. No revolution in the world has had less executions of the opposition than this Islamic [one] in Iran.[59]

Regardless of the truth in Đozo's claim, it clearly indicates his support for Khomeini's cause. He went on, reflecting J.M. and admonishing what he called "European secularist-laïcité and materialistic thought" which could not hope to understand the revolution without a firm grounding in Islam.[60] The European public are also portrayed as hypocrites who "demand from Khomeini that he… pardon the Shah's regime and forgive the criminals who… tortured the Iranian people."[61] Đozo also highlighted his links with Iran, limited as they are, through his connections with foreign Shia *ulema*, including the Lebanese Musa al-Sadr.[62] Đozo's article is the closest IZ publications were to unconditional support for the Iranian Revolution as a political project. Yet the image it conjures up of a Western materialist culture, unable to comprehend the bloc Khomeini is helping to build, mirrors those in the other articles. From his supportive rhetoric, it is clear that Đozo imagined such a bloc could become home to Yugoslav Muslims.

There is no doubt that figures such as Čengić and Đozo extended their sympathy to the Iranian revolutionaries, and certainly they perceived a great deal of potential in a new internationalism. This support was based in understandings cultivated amongst Yugoslav Muslims by Non-Alignment and the interactions it engendered with the Muslim world. Such pre-existing understandings were intensified by the lack of on-the-ground knowledge of the fast-moving and far-away Iranian situation, forcing Yugoslav Muslim intellectuals to draw on their connections and prevailing ideologies. As is clear, however, such limitations did not prevent complex understandings of the Iranian Revolution. As the first section demonstrated, Muslimness was transformed under Yugoslavia's embrace of the Non-Aligned philosophy. These new experiences of Muslim subjectivity under the NAM therefore shaped responses to the Iranian Revolution. Notions of North-South conflict, anti-colonialism, and networks of knowledge sharing animated Yugoslav Muslim interpretations of the Iranian Revolution. The responses to the Iranian Revolution are also indicative of how the networks of interaction under the NAM served domestic politics as the revolution worked like a spark

for Čengić and Đozo, leading them to advocate a more pan-Islamic course for their own community. These local political ramifications could be supported by a potential new Islamic global coalition which could commandeer the institutions of the NAM. This project may have been extremely limited, yet this did not stop the Yugoslav state and party from over-interpreting these IZ-affiliated responses to the Islamic Revolution.

The Yugoslav State and Party and the Iranian Revolution

Like the IZ and its members, the Yugoslav state and party members also ascribed great power to the Iranian Revolution in the context of an emerging Islamic internationalism. Unlike the IZ, however, such visions were almost wholly negative. Whilst the Yugoslav state had supported secular and religious Muslim elites in their process of national 'affirmation', the responses to the Iranian Revolution contributed to renewed fears of 'Muslim nationalism' seeking an Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[63] The potential for a new Islamic 'international' empowering nationalist secessionism amongst Yugoslav Muslims became deeply integrated into how the Yugoslav state responded to the Iranian Revolution. Such interpretations and responses were characterised also by their basis in the changing nature of Yugoslav Non-Alignment. As NAM's network in the Balkans began to collapse in the 1980s, so did the Yugoslav state's identification with the anti-colonial struggles which previously formed a pillar in its national mythos. Yugoslavia's connections to the Middle East and foreign Muslims would become a source of fear. Despite Iran's limited role in such networks, even after the revolution, such fears were propelled by specific anxieties of an Iran-led Islamic 'International' that that could enable secessionist and 'extremist' attitudes at home. It was a period of 'counter-revolutionary' discourses which actively challenged the assumptions of the NAM's place in Yugoslavia. The specific responses to the Iranian Revolution were more about the place of Yugoslavia in the world and its place in the weakening NAM.

Despite a certain instrumentalization of Muslims in the diplomacy of the NAM, the Yugoslav state always expressed an ambivalent attitude to Islam. Whilst the orthodox post-socialist historiographical position emphasises religious persecution as built into the Yugoslav system, it is generally agreed that religion had a role to play in 'Titoism' greater than that of other Eastern Bloc states.[64] With organisations such as the IZ, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia exhibited oversight, but religious bodies were generally autonomous with the *ulema* and priests operating their own systems of hierarchy and administration.[65] However, just like in the networks of the NAM, Islam as a belief system existed uneasily in Yugoslav society. Much of this was due to Yugoslavia's socialist position which emphasised modernity over all else. Returning to Gal Kirn's framing of Yugoslavia's three 'ruptures' – the partisan struggle, self-management, and Non-Alignment —one can see an overarching ideology of modernisation.[66] Because of this, Yugoslavia under Tito embraced anti-traditionalism, fearing the resurgence of ethnic alignments that relied on mythical ethnogeneses. Such modernity was therefore sceptical of the place of Islam, or religion generally, in contemporary society. Muhamed Filipović, for example, an ethnic

Muslim and member of the SKJ, argued that "in order for Muslims to become what they shouldn't become" that the Party should take the lead in resisting the "conservative elements" of the *ulema*.[67] Islam, whilst tolerated and widely practiced, could not entirely shake its place in the 'past,' opposed to Yugoslavia's triumphant socialist modernity.

This suspicion was also combined with latent European Orientalist views on Islam. Despite Yugoslavia's claims to exist outside of 'Europe' and the colonial Western space, such attitudes were never eradicated. As Catherine Baker has described with reference to the place of race in socialist Yugoslavia, the state and societies' closer identifications with the Third World did not mean that "whiteness had not been displaced from identity construction."[68] The European civilisationist ideal had not been completely overturned despite socialism's breaches with this cultural legacy. This form of identity construction applied equally to Islam, despite its long-term presence in the region. The idea of a dual or false national loyalty amongst Muslims, developed in the post-Ottoman Balkans, persisted through socialism.[69] The 1981 Kosovo Crisis, which saw Kosovar students protest against anti-Albanian discrimination, energised an anti-Muslim intellectual bloc who picked up the banner of old prejudices.[70] A new contingent of Serb "critical intellectuals" began to develop conspiratorial views of not just the *ulema* but all Yugoslav Muslims, including those in the SKJ.[71] The Iranian Revolution, however, was the key instrument by which these resurrected prejudices escaped the minds of Serb nationalist fantasists and entered the halls of the League of Communists. This is because they were resurrected within a new context shaped by the party-state's commitment to Non-Alignment.

On 25th November 1979, Tito condemned in a speech what he called "the undermining activity in some clericalist circles," referring to the IZ *ulema*.[72] In the same month, at a conference in Banja Luka, Bosnian Muslim and party member Hamdija Pozderac accused the IZ's leadership of "their failure to condemn" a growing tendency of "pan-Islamic nationalism."[73] These comments followed a growing trend on the part of the party to criticise an apparent 'Muslim nationalist' tendency amongst the *ulema*. This criticism had been developing against the IZ throughout the 1970s, but 1979 was the beginning of a new series of attacks on Islam in Yugoslavia. For Pozderac and other Muslim Communists this became as much about diverting attention away from themselves to the *ulema* as a target for anti-Muslim sympathies in Yugoslavia.[74] Tito's comments especially spoke to a new state-sponsored attitude of hostility to domestic Islamic institutions. *Preporod* was specifically targeted as a supposed hotbed of "Muslim nationalism" after a dispute over the historical legacies of Muslim collaboration with the wartime Nazi-puppet regime of the Croat Ustaša.[75] After defending the wartime conduct of some of its editorial staff, including the aforementioned Husein Đozo, a former SS member, *Preporod* was forced to purge itself of supposed 'pan-Islamic clerics' by the IZ, under pressure from the SKJ.[76] Iran, as a supposed reference point for these clerics, was brought into these disputes on numerous occasions. One such instance was in the Zagreb based magazine *Stuart*, where Fuad Muhić, a Muslim party member, accused certain *ulema* of falling for "a form of Khomeini-style fundamentalism."[17] It is clear from such statements that the Iranian

Revolution was acting as an animating cause in this authoritarian episode. This was not because of its actual presence in the IZ, which was minimal, but because of the fear the Islamic Revolution generated of possible seditious international alliances which would empower the supposed underlying 'Muslim nationalist' secessionist tendencies in Yugoslavia.

This increased scrutiny and surveillance culminated in the 'Sarajevo Process', a 1983 trial of accused members of the *Mladi Muslimani* (Young Muslims) Islamist organisation. Pozderac identified this group as working toward a "pan-Islamism" which would lead to an "ethnically cleansed Bosnia and Herzegovina."[78] He also argued that the accused would pursue relationships "with the Muslim world" and, specifically, "the Islamic Republic of Iran."[79] Whilst the indictment listed then-Islamist dissident and future president Alija Izetbegović as the leader, the accused group included many prominent IZ members, such as Hasan Čengić and Džemaludin Latić.[80] The prosecution argued that the 'members' identified with the Islamic Revolution and that some had travelled secretly to attend the anniversary of the revolution in Tehran.[81] These supposed international connections with the increasingly demonised Iranian regime were underlined by the writings of the accused, including most significantly Izetbegović's 'Islamic Declaration.'[82] The threat of this latter document, an undeniably 'pan-Islamic' text produced in 1970, was made real by its potential empowerment through the Iranian assistance which he was accused of soliciting. At the end of the trial the accused were sentenced to fourteen years each.[83] By the time these sentences had been handed down, the Process had established a relationship between an idea of the Iranian Revolution and the Islamophobic panics of Yugoslavia in the 1980s.

These ideas of the Iranian Revolution had potency for the Yugoslav state not simply because of latent prejudices. Yugoslavia's specific international relationships, both in and out of the NAM, led to a deeper fear of the Islamic Revolution and its threat to Yugoslavia. A major issue within the NAM during the early 1980s was the Iran-Iraq War. As a conflict between two Non-Aligned states, it represented a crisis of legitimacy for the organisation which was increasingly weak on the world stage.[84] Iraq was a close ally of Yugoslavia and its biggest trading partner in the NAM bloc.[85] Iraq also served as an idealised NAM state: officially secular, nominally 'socialist' and with a 'Great Man' leader ensuring stability and modernisation. Whilst Belgrade remained officially neutral in the conflict, it did supply some $2 billion worth of arms to Iraq during the course of the war.[86] Iran's increasingly aggressive foreign policy under Khomeini, often voiced within NAM forums, coupled with Yugoslavia's commitment to Saddam Hussein's rule meant that domestic fears of Iran-inspired 'pan-Islamism' were fed through a new threat to the state's global strategic interests.[87] Such threats to economic interests abroad exacerbated the state pressure on Muslims and linked those suspected dissidents to Iran and Iranian interests.

These threats to Yugoslavia's global position also came at a time of profound change in Yugoslav foreign policy. As Konstantin Kilibarda has argued, Yugoslavia began a transition toward 'Europe' as its diplomatic and political focus during the 1980s.[88] Deeper integration into the European economy, through guest workers and trade, contributed to a "more open

tendency to explicitly privilege Yugoslavia's 'European' locality (and 'future')."[89] The 'worlding' Yugoslavia had undergone through the NAM was beginning to unravel and the Yugoslav leadership attached themselves to the reformist Communist project on the continent, voiced by Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev as "a common European home."[90] New strategic and economic relationships pushed the post-Tito Yugoslav leadership to 'cash in' on their white Europeanness and enact "a 'European' subject position that was defined against the 'Balkan' and 'oriental' locally and against the 'Non-Aligned' internationally."[91] This was voiced by S. P. Ramet's subjects, whom I discussed in the introduction, who framed the NAM as a *Dolchstoßlegende* (stab in the back) by Muslim Yugoslavs, highlighting the "on-going contacts between Islamic clerics and believers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their co-religionists in the Middle East."[92] Yugoslavia soon became the gates of Europe, rather than a comrade nation of Africa and Asia. Reactions to the Iranian Revolution amongst the party-state elites formed a crucial discursive bridge in this process. Geopolitical realignment and latent Orientalist fears of Islam would feed into the rhetoric and action of Slobodan Milošević, who capitalised on white European ideas of Islamic threat, often symbolised by Iran and Khomeini, to assert his dominance over a collapsing state.[93]

Rather than cautious support or even recognition for the new Iran, the Yugoslav state and the SKJ developed a fearful stance to the Islamic Revolution. Yugoslavia was of course not unique in this; the Iranian Revolution was a cause of worldwide panic. Yet the SKJ's specific reactions were drawn from the constellation of local nationalist anxieties and the breakdown of true anti-colonial international solidarity, which could have cushioned the influence of the Islamic Revolution on local fears. Like those in the IZ, they also knew little of the revolution itself. Rather, the NAM, and Yugoslavia's engagement and subsequent retreat from it, which coincided with the Islamic Revolution, provided the basis for the state's reaction. Persistent Orientalist ideals, the development of homegrown Islamic revivalism, and geopolitical threats all contributed to a state response which saw Iran, or the potential of it, as a threat to both Yugoslavia's place in the world and the integrity of its national borders. Iran was not the only animating cause of the anti-Muslim actions of the 1980s, but it did provide a crucial and seemingly credible threat, pushing forward ideas of a possible 'Islamic international' ready to take over Yugoslavia, or at least break it up. Just like the responses from among the IZ, state interpretations of the Iranian Revolution demonstrate how the NAM and its networks formed the basis of Yugoslav global identities.

Conclusion

Existing at the intersection of Non-Alignment and domestic Islamic revival, the spectre of the Iranian Revolution, rather than the presence of it, became inseparable from ongoing processes in Yugoslavia's final decade. For the IZ and the Yugoslav state, the idea of Iran became inextricable from twenty-five years of interaction with the Islamic world. Whilst the Iranian Revolution seemed thought-provoking to the IZ and Yugoslav *ulema*, for the state and party it became part of an existential threat from within. With both sides operating from behind the veil of ignorance, Non-Alignment, and each institution's

distinctive and changing relationship to it, generated the preconditions for how the Iranian Revolution was understood. With state power and increasingly aggressive persecution, the SKJ managed to stop the IZ from exploring its position on Iran in more depth, preventing any real connections between the two Islamic communities during the socialist period. Whilst their immediate concerns were over the presence of 'Muslim nationalist secessionism', the Iranian Revolution became discursively tied to this local threat because of the state's changing relationship to Non-Alignment and the Islamic world.

The institutional reactions to the Iranian Revolution also reveal how Yugoslavia was connected to the Islamic world through the Cold War. Rather than being separated from either their belief or their global co-religionists, Yugoslav Muslims were part of a wider network of inter-Islamic dialogue which often worked because of, but not through, the infrastructure of Non-Alignment. The idea of the 'demonic' Iranian influence in Yugoslavia, acting through the ulema, was a product on the one hand of a collapsing diplomatic network in the NAM and a return to 'European normality' on the other. Returning to Belgrade in 1989, we can see a crystallisation of the views that had developed over the course of the 1980s. For Ramet's Serb psychologists, there was no doubt in the threat posed by Muslims, now uniformly identified with Khomeini. For Latić, Non-Alignment and Islam still made sense together, as did the potential of Iran as an anti-colonial actor. Such interpretations would not have been possible without the influence of Non-Alignment in shaping everyday Yugoslav experiences. Even as nationalism took hold, its forms were developed through reactions to the socio-political and economic networks established in 1961.

Finally, it is perhaps even more important to note briefly the 'afterlives' of this initial interaction between Iranian political Islam and Bosnian intellectuals. Whilst Husein Đozo died in 1982, Hasan Čengić's initial forays into the Iranian Revolution would spring into a sustained engagement with Iran and the Islamic Republic's ideology.[94] He was even widely seen in early post-Yugoslav Bosnia and Herzegovina as 'Iran's man' in the Bosniak-nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA).[95] Although many of these real, material relationships came about through a sustained diplomatic offensive by Iran, it was no accident that its biggest client in Bosnia and Herzegovina had previously engaged positively from afar with the ideas of the Islamic Revolution.[96] Whilst the wars in the formerly Yugoslav space constituted their own political revolution amongst the various national groups, the legacies of the NAM were not so easily swept away. The Iranian Revolution, whilst hardly the cause of the anti-Muslim sentiment and violence of 1980s and 1990s, served to further stress the fraying bonds of Yugoslavia's ethno-religious communities. All of this was crucially taking place in the context of a collapsing NAM network, the ideological underpinning of which had been so vital to Yugoslav national identity. The results of this breakdown were both a repurposed internationalist infrastructure for Muslims and an imagined betrayal of a deserved White destiny for Serb xenophobes. What remained of the network was being slowly and disastrously cannibalised by new and emergent nationalist entrepreneurs.

Notes

[1] Džemaludin Latić, "Ekskluzivno: Za Preporod Govori Ali Akbar Velajati, Ministar Inostranih Poslova Islamske Republike Irana," *Preporod*, 15 October 1989, 4.

[2] S. P. Ramet, "Islam in Yugoslavia Today," *Religion in Communist Lands* 18, no. 3 (1 September 1990): 226.

[3] By far the most significant early work in this trend is Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Other major examples include Quỳnh N. Phạm and Robbie Shilliam, *Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); Christopher J. Lee, ed., *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Afterlives* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010).

[4] Despite recent developments, scholarship on NAM is still lacking. This is especially the case for the period after 1968. For a recent volume on the NAM's antecedents and the organization's Cold War history see Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992)* (Leiden: Brill, 2018). Two notable edited volumes are Sandra Bott et al., eds., *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: The Non-Aligned Movement in the East-West Conflict* (London: Routledge, 2015) and Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska, eds., *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung - Belgrade* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).

[5] Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2008), 277.

[6] Nataša Mišković, "Introduction," in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War*, 8. Whilst not exclusive to Mišković, this focus on Yugoslavia's undeniably huge role in the creation of NAM can often tip into the territory of 'Yugonostalgia'. This desire to resurrect a history of internationalism makes sense given the region's re-peripheralization via nationalism, war, and neoliberalism.

[7] Robert Vitalis, "The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-Doong)," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 4, no. 2 (2013): 27.

[8] Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992)*, 14.

[9] Lorenz M. Lüthi, "Non-Alignment, 1961–74," in *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: The Non-Aligned Movement in the East-West Conflict*, ed. Sandra Bott et al. (London: Routledge, 2015), 101–102.

[10] Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 12.

[11] For this view see: Harun Karčić, "Islamic Revival in Post-Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina: International Actors and Activities," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 30, no. 4 (2010): 519–534; Xavier Bougarel and Asma Rashid, "From Young Muslims to Party of Democratic Action: The Emergence of a Pan-Islamist Trend in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Islamic Studies* 36, no. 2/3 (1997): 533–549.

[12] Xavier Bougarel, *Islam and Nationhood in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Surviving Empires* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018), 94.

[13] Paul Thomas Chamberlin, *The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[14] Piro Rexhepi, "Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the

Balkans," in *Eastern Europe Unmapped: Beyond Borders and Peripheries*, ed. Irene Kacandes and Yuliya Komska (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 63.

[15] Darryl Li, *The Universal Enemy: Jihad, Empire, and the Challenge of Solidarity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019), 158.

[16] Hazim Fazlic, "The Elements That Contributed to the Survival of Islam In Tito's Yugoslavia," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 26, no. 3 (2015): 292.

[17] Vitalis, "The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-Doong)," 26.

[18] Mišković, "Introduction," 7–8.

[19] Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement,* 6.

[20] Gal Kirn, *Partisan Ruptures: Self-Management, Market Reform and the Spectre of Socialist Yugoslavia* (London: Pluto Press, 2019), 85.

[21] Kirn, 88.

[22] Kirn, 93.

[23] Konstantin Kilibarda, "Non-Aligned Geographies in the Balkans: Space, Race and Image in the Construction of New "European" Foreign Policies," in *Security Beyond the Discipline: Emerging Dialogues on Global Politics*, ed. Abhinava Kumar and Derek Maisonville (Toronto: York Centre for International and Security Studies, 2010), 27.

[24] Li, *The Universal Enemy*, 151.

[25] Li, 154–155.

[26] Fazlic, "The Elements That Contributed to the Survival of Islam In Tito's Yugoslavia," 295.

[27] *Ulema* being a generic term for the religious hierarchy of the IZ; see Fazlic, 295.

[28] Houman A. Sadri, "An Islamic Perspective on Non-Alignment: Iranian Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice," *Journal of Third World Studies* 16, no. 2 (1999): 30.

[29] This rigid set of focuses would exacerbate the collapse of the NAM when it confronted crises which seemed to question to immortal role of economic exploitation, such as in the cases of Lebanon and especially the Third Indochina War.

[30] Catherine Baker, *Race and the Yugoslav Region: Postsocialist, Post-Conflict, Postcolonial?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), 111.

[31] Li, *The Universal Enemy*, 158.

[32] Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 263.

[33] Rexhepi, "Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the Balkans," 61.

[34] Fikret Karčić, "Islamic Revival in the Balkans, 1970-1992," *Islamic Studies* 36, no. 2/3 (1997): 568.

[35] Fikret Karčić, "PREPOROD Newspaper: An Agent of and a Witness to Islamic Revival in Bosnia," *Intellectual Discourse* 7, no. 1 (1999): 92.

[36] Husnija Kamberović, "Between Muslimdom, Bosniandom, Yugoslavdom and Bosniakdom: The Political Elite in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Late 1960s and Early 1970s," in *The Ambiguous Nation: Case Studies from Southeastern Europe in the 20th Century*, eds. Ulf Brunnbauer and Hannes Grandits (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013), 69–73.

[37] Bougarel, *Islam and Nationhood in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 93.

[38] Karčić, "Islamic Revival in the Balkans, 1970-1992," 567.

[39] Sejad Mekić, *A Muslim Reformist in Communist Yugoslavia: The Life and Thought of Husein Đozo* (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 4–7

[40] Li, *The Universal Enemy*, 160.

[41] Rexhepi, "Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the Balkans," 71, note 33.

[42] Sadri, "An Islamic Perspective on Non-Alignment," 30.

[43] Hasan Čengić, "Uloga i Značaj Šeriata u Nekim Muslimanskim Zemljama," *Glasnik Islamske Zajednice* 1, no. 1 (1981): 182; J.M., "Aktuelnost Allaha," *Preporod*, 15 May 1979.

[44] BCMS being an abbreviation for the Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian, the *lingua franca* and majority language of Yugoslavia.

[45] "Irankso Čudo Islama," *Preporod*, 15 April 1979, 10.

[46] "Irankso Čudo Islama," 10.

[47] "Iran i Islam," *Preporod*, 15 April 1979, 10.

[48] Jelena Marinčić, "U Modi Je Allah," *Preporod*, 15 April 1979, 11.

[49] Marinčić, 11.

[50] Marinčić, 11; Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 137.

[51] J.M., "Aktuelnost Allaha," 4; 'J.M.' is likely a pseudonym which was commonly used by certain *Preporod* writers wary of state censorship. This would have been particularly the case for an article praising the Iranian Revolution. See Karčić, "PREPOROD Newspaper: An Agent of and a Witness to Islamic Revival in Bosnia," 93.

[52] J.M., 4.

[53] J.M., 4.

[54] Čengić, "Uloga i Značaj Šeriata u Nekim Muslimanskim Zemljama," 180.

[55] Čengić, 181.

[56] Čengić, 182.

[57] Mekić, *A Muslim Reformist in Communist Yugoslavia*, 4.

[58] Mekić, 57.

[59] Husein Đozo, "Ramazanska Razmišljanja: Homeini," *Preporod*, 15 August 1979, 8.

[60] Đozo, 8.

[61] Đozo, 9.

[62] Đozo, 8.

[63] Dženita Sarač Rujanac, "Constructing the Nationalist Image and Confronting "Muslim Nationalists": The Lawsuit Against Muslim Intellectuals in Sarajevo in 1983," in *The Ambiguous Nation,* 167.

[64] Fazlic, "The Elements That Contributed to the Survival of Islam In Tito's Yugoslavia," 292–293.

[65] Fazlic, 297.

[66] Kirn, *Partisan Ruptures*, 216.

[67] Kamberović, "Between Muslimdom, Bosniandom, Yugoslavdom and Bosniakdom: The Political Elite in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Late 1960s and Early 1970s," 72.

[68] Baker, *Race and the Yugoslav Region*, 116.

[69] Rexhepi, "Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the Balkans," 55, 58.

[70] Rujanac, "Constructing the Nationalist Image and Confronting "Muslim Nationalists": The Lawsuit Against Muslim Intellectuals in Sarajevo in 1983," 154–55.

[71] Rujanac, 157.

[72] K. F. Cviic, "Yugoslavia's Moslem Problem," *The World Today* 36, no. 3 (1980): 108.

[73] Cviic, 108.

[74] Rujanac, "Constructing the Nationalist Image and Confronting "Muslim Nationalists": The Lawsuit Against Muslim Intellectuals in Sarajevo in 1983," 159.

[75] Karčić, "PREPOROD Newspaper: An Agent of and a Witness to Islamic Revival in Bosnia," 94.

[76] Karčić, 94–95; Đozo's SS record is, understandably, highly controversial given his later high-status in the IZ. He was undeniably a member of the SS 'Handžar' Division, which was Himmler's attempt to create an entirely Muslim unit during the war. Whilst largely a failure and made up of conscripts who immediately deserted upon contact with the enemy, Đozo did, notably, volunteer for the unit. His motives seem to have been mostly anti-Chetnik (Monarchist, anti-Muslim and Serb nationalist forces) rather than pro-Nazi and his relationship with the collaborationist Grand Mufti Al-Husayni of Jerusalem also played into the decision. He was punished for his wartime activity, first with jail time, between 1945 and 1950, and then a ban of Islamic intellectual activity (such as writing for the *Glasnik* or being a member of the IZ) until 1958. As a lifelong Islamic Modernist, Đozo eventually found himself willing to accommodate his beliefs and practice with state socialism and the restrictions on his activities were lifted in the late 1950s. He joined the reconstituted IZ in 1960. For more on his wartime activity see Mekić, *A Muslim Reformist in Communist Yugoslavia*, 51-54.

[77] Cviic, "Yugoslavia's Moslem Problem," 111.

[78] Rujanac, "Constructing the Nationalist Image and Confronting "Muslim Nationalists": The Lawsuit Against Muslim Intellectuals in Sarajevo in 1983," 1677.

[79] Rujanac, 167.

[80] Rujanac, 167; Husein Đozo died in 1982 and, therefore, escaped indictment.

[81] Rexhepi, "Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the Balkans," 62. It is disputed how legitimate the charges were in the Process. Whilst Izetbegović was at the time a committed Islamist, it was not clearly the case for all accused. It is also not clear to what extent the revived *Mladi Musliman* existed. Regardless, links to Iran were at the very least overstated. For more on the *Mladi Musliman* organisation and its activity see: Bougarel and Rashid, "From Young Muslims to Party of Democratic Action".

[82] Rujanac, "Constructing the Nationalist Image and Confronting “Muslim Nationalists”: The Lawsuit Against Muslim Intellectuals in Sarajevo in 1983," 168.

[83] The collapse of SKJ’s power in the late 1980s, leading to a general clemency for ‘political’ prisoners, meant they only served five years each of the fourteen-year sentences.

[84] Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 233–234.

[85] Glenn E Curtis, *Yugoslavia: A Country Study* (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1992), 273, 300.

[86] Curtis, 273.

[87] Sadri, "An Islamic Perspective on Non-Alignment," 37.

[88] Kilibarda, "Non-Aligned Geographies in the Balkans: Space, Race and Image in the Construction of New “European” Foreign Policies," 38.

[89] Kilibarda, 38.

[90] Kilibarda, 39–4.

[91] Kilibarda, 40.

[92] Ramet, "Islam in Yugoslavia Today," 226.

[93] Rexhepi, "Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the Balkans," 62.

[94] Gordon N. Bardos, "IRAN IN THE BALKANS: A History and a Forecast," *World Affairs* 175, no. 5 (2013): 62.

[95] Bardos, 62.

[96] Bardos, 62.