Global histories

a student journal

Global histories: a student journal

EDITOR

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SCOPE AND PURPOSE

In response to the increasing interest in the 'global' as a field of inquiry, a perspective, and an approach, Global Histories: A Student Journal aims to offer a platform for debate, discussion, and intellectual exchange for a new generation of scholars with diverse research interests. Global history can provide an opportunity to move beyond disciplinary boundaries and methodological centrisms, both in time and space. As students of global history at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, our interest lies not in prescribing what global history is and what it is not, but to encourage collaboration, cooperation, and discourse among students seeking to explore new intellectual frontiers.

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Dear reader,

Now more than ever, the world is cognizant of what it means to live in the 'global'. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has brought to the forefront questions of the benefits and drawbacks of transnational movement, be it that of people, ideas, technologies, or pathogens. Indeed, the extent of our collective globality cannot go unnoticed, as people around the planet have been forced to contend with the consequences that arise from these connections. The worldwide mandates of public health, embodied through lockdowns, face masks, and distancing guidelines have been attempted nearly everywhere, from the halls of global political organizations to the streets frequented by commuters to the refugee camps in abysmal conditions. It is impossible to completely ignore or go unaffected by the pandemic and its problems, regardless of one's nationality, class status, or health. It is truly, in some of the worst ways imaginable, a global moment.

But the pandemic has not been the only globally explosive moment this year, either. Protests from Berlin to Bogotá following the deaths of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd in the US highlighted how national racism could be connected to a larger global narrative of violence against Black communities. The recent United States presidential election drew critiques and commentary in a litany of languages, evoking anxiety and apprehension across the world as final vote counts were tallied and scrutinized. The climate crisis, too, although nearly taking a back seat to the tidal waves of current affairs, has continued to draw activists together from remote communities to larger cities, all with the shared goal of taking the world to task for a lack of effort to reverse the damage we as a species have done to our planet. Each of these moments from 2020 carry unique features and impacts, but the fact that they share the global stage points to the unavoidable hold that globality has on us.

How can we as scholars— and to a greater extent, as citizens—concur with the global, in times as challenging as these? How does the local intersect with the global, and vice versa? Moreover, what does it mean to be a member of

a global community amidst monumental instability and rapid change? The answers to these questions may still be ongoing, as is the pandemic, but we may begin to confront them from their roots in the past. The field of history can always provide insight into the conditions surrounding a contemporary moment; even the 1919 influenza pandemic served as a comparison point for our current crisis. While this issue of *Global Histories* does not address the pandemic directly, it does consider questions around global and local connections, the movement of people and ideas, and the power dynamics which inevitably shape and alter our present reality. The value of global history in a global moment can thus be continually reinforced.

This issue features three research articles, all contending with, coincidentally, questions of gender within differing historical settings. Katherine Carberry begins by looking at the global history of the Kashmiri shawl, investigating its rise within Victorian British high society and its implications for women as agents of colonization. Anna Smelova continues with her

article on the global nature of temperance movements in Russia prior to the First World War, examining how nationhood and gender roles were transmitted and translated between temperance activists. Clara Fechtner concludes with her work on women's political organizations during the Global Cold War, illustrating their attempts to connect women's rights to the socialist projects of the 'Second World' with women from the 'Third World', and the varying practices of solidarity that emerged as a result.

In addition, this issue contains three methodological pieces, presenting relevant topics of inquiry within the field of global history. Friedrich N. Ammermann begins by examining the lack of a global history of technology sub-field, solidly making the case for the integration of both studies as a truly global and non-Eurocentric endeavor. Emma Gattey then considers British imperial history and its evolution over the decades, arguing that the recent environmental turns in the field must play a larger role in future studies of empire and colonization. Finally, Dennis Kölling

interrogates capitalist realism, placing it as a genre within a global context and ultimately arguing for the incorporation of literary fiction into the historian's canon of primary sources.

The publication of this issue was many months in the making, with our team being equally affected by the pandemic. We faced numerous setbacks, with extended shutdowns and the indefinite move of our universities to an online-only format changing the nature of the journal's normally social atmosphere—and cancelling our annual Global History Student Conference for 2020 altogether. We also encountered a more expected change, as our former Editor-in-chief Alina Rodríguez finished her MA thesis and thus stepped down from the role. Although a saying oft-repeated, Alina's shoes as editor and conference organizer will be hard to fill, and I am immensely honored to have the opportunity to take over the roles she worked so hard to promote over the past two years. Therefore we have come together, across time zones and from the home office, to present you with what we hope is a thoroughly engaging and

intriguing issue. On behalf of the *Global Histories* editorial team, I invite you to continue questioning the role of the global, both in the past, as these articles and methodologies do, and in the present.

With best regards,

Ruby Guyot
Editor-in-chief

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Dressing Imperialism: The Cultural Significance of the Kashmiri Shawl in the Age of Imperialism

by

KATHERINE CARBERRY

ABSTRACT

Global histories of commodities have highlighted the interconnectedness of global trade in the nineteenth-century and have demonstrated that commodities bound people of different continents in often invisible ways. Global histories of commodities, however, continue to focus on male actors and their involvement as traders, business owners, and politicians. As a result, such histories often eclipse the experiences of women, the working classes, and the subaltern. Despite such shortcomings, global histories of commodities can reflect on the global conditions which have shaped individuals' affective and material experiences. As such, my work considers how the Kashmiri shawl, a fashionable garment of South Asian origin, came to embody the changing character of British womanhood. This process occurred not only as a result of Britain's colonial presence, but also by way of cross-cultural dialogue between Britain, India, and France. The Kashmiri shawl operated as a nexus of class, race, sex, and gender and is, therefore, well-poised to inform how metropolitan Britons understood and responded to the notion of empire and how consumers negotiated the shifting meanings of foreign commodities.

The shawl's sartorial versatility and proximity to the body render it a highly personal and suggestive item ripe for investigation. A careful examination of British and Anglo-Indian women's letters and travel journals, as well as nineteenth-century artwork, literary works, and print culture, demonstrates that the shawl became a symbolically and sexually charged item because of its connections to both the Orient and British femininity. More specifically, the shawl reveals nineteenth-century concerns surrounding female sexuality and the instability of white racial identity within an expanding British empire.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Katherine Carberry is an MA student studying at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. Her research interests include gender, sexuality, consumption, and material culture.

"If you wish to judge of an Indian shawl, shut your eyes and feel it; the touch is the test of a good one."[1] These were the words of Mah Munzel ul-Nissa, recorded in Fanny Parkes' 1835 journal. Both women were wives of men in the British army and, as a result, became inadvertent ambassadors for South Asian cultural products.[2] Mah Munzel ul-Nissa continued her explanation of Kashmiri shawls by lamenting that "such shawls as these are not made at the present day in Kashmir; the English have spoiled the market."[3] The two women extolled Kashmiri shawls' aesthetic virtues, yet also suggested that authentic Indian textile work was inaccessible to British consumers. The latter in Parkes' eyes had tainted the shawl not only by manufacturing cheap imitations of Indian craft but also because Kashmir's shawl industry had begun to design shawls expressly for British consumption.[4]

Parkes' writing declared that a shawl's quality could not be determined based on its looks. Rather, it was the more primitive and feminine sense of touch that could discern its quality and authenticity.[5]

British women's adoption of Kashmiri shawls reveals a cultural dialogue between Britain and South Asia. These accessories, like all clothing, are fraught and dynamic objects that reflect how their wearers interacted with an increasingly global world. The lenses of global history and imperial history can thus elucidate how international economic structures and individual desires became enmeshed. This article aims to utilize these approaches to commodity histories because they are well poised to explore how imperial violence and female sexuality were mutually constituted in the discursive realm of British literary culture. The Kashmiri shawl in particular became a symbolically and sexually-charged accessory in literary fiction and the Victorian cultural consciousness because of its connections to both the Orient and British femininity. These connections, in turn, were gleaned from British women's subordination to men in British society and India's subordinate position as a British

1   Fanny Parkes, *Begums, Thugs and White Mughals: The Journals of Fanny Parkes.*, ed. William Dalrymple (London: Eland,2012), 477, https://ocwms.on.worldcat.org/oclc/852756511.
2   Nupur Chaudhuri, "Shawls, Jewelry, Curry and Rice in Victorian Britain". In *Western Women and Imperialism*, ed. Nupur Chaudhuri and Margaret Strobel (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 232, https://hdl-handle-net.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/2027/heb.04617.
3   Parkes, 477.
4   Michelle Maskiell, "Consuming Kashmir: Shawls and Empires, 1500-2000" *Journal of World History* 13,

no. 1 (2002): 48, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20078943?origin=JSTOR-pdf&seq=1.
5   Constance Classen, *The Deepest Sense: A Cultural History of Touch* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2012), 125.

colony. More specifically, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the shawl revealed nineteenth-century concerns surrounding female sexuality and the instability of white racial identity within an expanding British empire. The shawl's South Asian resonances appealed to British female consumers who harnessed its symbolic and visual language to partake in imperialism and conquest for themselves.

Imperialism was a globalizing project, and, unsurprisingly, histories of empire have contributed to the global turn. Historians of British imperialism Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose have demonstrated that despite possessing varying degrees of awareness about Great Britain's imperial project, traces of imperialism permeated every aspect of British life.[6] Victorian Britain prospered at the expense of those labouring abroad. In essence, all Britons, even those marginalized by class or gender, participated in imperialism and colonization. British women came to endorse these violent practices in part because of the range of consumer goods that imperialism made available, and, as Krista Lysack has suggested,

the pleasure produced through imperialism.[7]Thus, the pleasure of amassing and wearing Kashmiri shawls helped to convince Britons of the benefits of imperialism. Chitralekha Zutshi contributes to this perspective by stating that the British public became aware of Kashmir "through its most celebrated commodity—the Kashmiri shawl—the fashion for which had reached its apogee by the 1840s."[8] In other words, Britain understood the different parts of its empire through the commodities they produced. The shawl's waxing and waning popularity throughout the first half of the nineteenth-century highlighted the inter-connectedness of competing political and territorial entities such as Britain, France, and India. As a result, British women's responses to this foreign commodity elucidate how race, class, and eroticism became inscribed upon clothing and how those connotations were intentionally mobilized for personal gain.

The years between 1780 and 1850 witnessed an increase in global migrations, international trade, and the proliferation of

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6   Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose, "Introduction: Being at Home with the Empire" in *At Home with Empire: Metropolitan Culture and The Imperial World,* ed. Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2, https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/lib/concordia-ebooks/detail.action?docID=281730.

7   Krista Lysack, *Come Buy Come Buy: Shopping and the Culture of Consumption in Victorian Women's Writing* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2008), 16.

8   Chitralekha Zutshi. "'Designed for Eternity': Kashmiri Shawls, Empire, and Cultures of Production and Consumption in Mid-Victorian Britain" *Journal of British Studies* 48, no. 2 (2009): 429, https://doi-org.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/10.1086/596107.

visual and print culture. These new experiences undoubtedly informed how Victorian Britons interpreted the world. Print and visual media are especially useful to this study as they provide glimpses into Victorians' social world. Texts such as Edward Said's *Orientalism*[9] and *Culture and Imperialism*[10] have demonstrated how cultural forms were crucial purveyors of imperial ideology, which reinforced the notion that Britain was racially, culturally, economically, and technologically superior to other nations.[11] Therefore, journals, letters, novels, and artwork will be relevant to assessing how race, class, and eroticism became inscribed upon the Kashmiri shawl. The shawl's sexual overtones and its proximity to the body establish it as a fetish object that alluded to both the imperial conquest of foreign territories as well as the sexual conquest of white European women.

Before venturing any further, it is worth clarifying what is meant by the term "Kashmiri shawl." The word "cashmere" is derived from the former spelling of "Kashmir," the South Asian region that produced these desirable commodities. Today, "cashmere" most often designates a soft and expensive type of wool. This usage was also present in the nineteenth-century, when the term "cashmere" designated the soft textile we know today.[12] Speaking to the evolution of this term, Paul Sharrad argues that Oriental mystique played a role in marketing the term "cashmere." He notes that "from a Western perspective, 'shawl' means something worn, usually by women, 'cashmere' turns the humble knitted shoulder drape into a luxury fashion item."[13] There were no consistent names for the Kashmiri shawl in the nineteenth-century. The most common names for the accessory were "cashmere shawl," "Thibet shawl," and "India shawl."[14] For the sake of clarity, this article will use "Kashmiri shawl" as an umbrella term encompassing the rarified garments from Kashmir. These terms, of course, obscure the fact that Kashmir manufactured and exported a multitude of high-quality shawls with different names and styles.[15]

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9 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), 2.

10 Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism.* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).

11 In *Orientalism*, Said argues that the Orient is a place that exists in the Western imagination. He explains that European writers represented the Middle East, India, and East Asia in ways that affirmed Western superiority.

12 John Irwin, *The Kashmir Shawl,* Victoria and Albert Museum. Museum Monograph, no. 29. (London: H.M. Stationery Office 1973), 4.

13 Paul Sharrad, "Following the Map: A Postcolonial Unpacking of a Kashmir Shawl," *Textile* 2, no. 1 (2004): 66-67, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2752/147597504778052900.

14 Suzanne Daly, "Kashmir Shawls in Mid-Victorian Novels," *Victorian Literature and Culture* 30, no. 1 (2002): 247, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25058583?seq=1.

15 John Forbes Watson, *The Textile*

All at once a lucrative commodity, a fashion item, and a symbol of Britain's growing imperial power, the Kashmiri shawl occupied a unique place in Victorian culture. Victorian society's rising middle-classes and flourishing consumer culture provided the garment with the necessary environment to endure as a luxury commodity for almost a century. This lasting popularity was not merely a whim of fashion. As Philippe Perrot asserts, "Sign or symbol, clothing affirms and reveals cleavages, hierarchies, and solidarities according to a code guaranteed and perpetuated by society and its institutions."[16] The shawl was responsive to decades of colonial expansion and grafted imperial ideology onto British bodies; therefore, its status in British imperial culture is worthy of consideration. For one, it was an article of clothing worn by women both inside and outside the home, and was appropriate in both the public and private sphere. It was also a South Asian accessory whose production, trade, and transport depended on the complex negotiations of different geopolitical entities. These elements combined to bestow the shawl with symbolic

power. In *The Social Life of Things*, anthropologist and cultural critic Arjun Appadurai argues that luxury commodities make up a "special register of consumption," whose "principal use is *rhetorical* and *social*, goods that are simply *incarnated signs*."[17][18] Luxuries such as the shawl reinforce cultural norms and regulate social relations. The shawl's cultural valence, therefore, offers insight into the construction of an imperialist white womanhood vis-à-vis the colonized Indian subject.

POMP, PRESTIGE, AND FASHIONING EMPIRES

In the first half of the nineteenth-century, shawls were emblematic of the imperial competition between Britain and France. Although the Kashmiri shawl did reach Western Europe in the eighteenth-century, it achieved widespread popularity during Napoleon's First French Empire. Initially an honorific garment worn by high profile South Asian men,[19] Kashmiri shawls became fashionable in Europe after Napoleon

Manufactures and Costumes of the People of India (London: G.E. Eyre and W. Spottiswoode, 1866), 122. https://archive.org/details/gri_33125008608495.

16 Philippe Perrot, *Fashioning the Bourgeoisie: A History of Clothing in the Nineteenth-Century.,* trans. Richard Bienvenu (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 8.

17 Arjun Appadurai "Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value," in *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*, ed. Arjun Appadurai (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 38, https://hdl-handle-net.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/2027/heb.32141.

18 Emphasis original.

19 Maskiell, 32.

and his army brought them from Egypt as spoils of war. In the British case, men returning from the Indian subcontinent acquired Kashmiri shawls for their female relations.[20]The Kashmiri shawl and the white empire gown united to create the neoclassical silhouette associated with the nineteenth century's early decades. This fashionable combination was a rejection of ancient regime dress and, according to E. Claire Cage, "affirmed rigid gender categorizing and reified femininity, but was also appropriated by women to play a role in the construction of modern subjectivities."[21] Women adopted shawls to be modern and active participants in their countries' recent territorial acquisitions. Their respective countries also used shawls as part of a display of imperial power. This dynamic was at its most obvious during the Great Exhibition of 1851, where Britain and France boasted of their imperial holdings in an ostentatious display of commodities. According to Lara Kriegel, "In 1851, the [Indian] subcontinent seemed to be a living museum which showcased 'industrial habits' preserved in their ancient forms... This continuity separated ageless India not only from the industrialized

nations of Europe, but also from ancient societies such as Egypt and Assyria that only had 'ruins' to offer modernity."[22] The displays of shawls as part of the India exhibit contrasted with the machine-made imitation Kashmiri shawls, which were part of France and Britain's exhibits. This juxtaposition made Indian craft appear technologically inferior but also exotic and alluring. To Victorian consumers, the shawl evoked the work of South Asian textile workers, which provided a contrast to the increasingly mechanized British manufacturing. Britain believed itself to be technologically superior to India and, therefore, worthy of dominating it. For Britain, ownership of India and its symbols enabled it to compete with France and incorporate India's cultural prestige into the empire. This appropriation of Indian commodities was evident in the representation of India as a shawl on Queen Victoria's body in conservative political imagery.[23]

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20 Ibid., 38-39.
21 E. Claire Cage, "The Sartorial Self: Neoclassical Fashion and Gender Identity in France, 1797-1804" *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 42, no. 2 (2009): 194, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258257.

22 Lara Kreigel, "Narrating the Subcontinent in 1851: India at the Crystal Palace.," in *The Great Exhibition of 1851: New Interdisciplinary Essays*, ed. Louise Purbrick (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001), 158.
23 In *The Pin in the Queen's Shawl, sketched in Indian ink on 'Imperial Crown,' from a Conservative stand-point,* Queen Victoria's Indian shawl represents India and the pin represents the Queen Victoria's then-new title as Empress of India. See *The Pin in the Queen's Shawl, sketched in Indian ink on 'Imperial Crown,' from a Conservative stand-point.* (London:

For both women and the nation, Kashmiri shawls enabled a process of self-fashioning. Sartorial decisions were some of the few afforded to Victorian women; therefore, the authority over one's appearance enabled women to express their desires and how they wished to interact with the world. In 1865, *Blackwoods' Magazine* even went as far as to describe clothing as one of women's only true possessions.[24] Clothing and accessories were, in essence an outward declaration of one's character. Thus, the shawl's popularity indicates not only women's sense of individuality, but also their active participation in imperialism. British women also mobilized the shawl to cultivate prestige. This accessory was metonymic of empire, conquest, and power. Wearing one, therefore, was a statement of a person's wealth, status, and, by extension, their nation's access to the Middle East and India. Along with the panache of belonging to an empire, the Kashmiri shawl also provided its wearer with social distinction, a state in which elites' tastes and consumption patterns became the benchmarks of good taste.[25] Owning such a rarified item,

therefore, suggested that a woman had wealthy and well-travelled male connections. These standards and displays of taste, in turn, allowed individuals of different classes to be distinguished from one another. Even within the same social set, shawls could establish a hierarchy between women. In her diary, the Yorkshire noblewoman Anne Lister bemoaned her friend Emma Saltmarshe's inability to procure authentic Kashmiri shawls: "Emma had a shawl on, an imitation Kashmeer [sic] & they looked rather like mercantile people…"[26] Lister's comment thus illustrates how shawls acted as potent symbols of social capital and the importance of conspicuous consumption to maintain one's social position.

The accessory's sexual connotations also made it an instrument of seduction, which women could deploy to achieve upward social mobility. For instance, Emma Hamilton's *Attitudes*, a series of Antiquity-inspired dances with shawls, famously helped her achieve fame and marry into the British gentry.[27] For women, shawls represented a worthy investment because they retained their economic value and could easily be pawned if a

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Remington and Co. 1876), 12.

24 Dress." *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* 97 (1865): 426.

25 Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (New York: Routledge Classics, 2010), 32, https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/lib/concordia-

ebooks/detail.action?docID=1433990.

26 Helena Whitbread, *The Secret Diaries of Miss Anne Lister* (London: Hachette, 2010), 22 May 1822.

27 Helen Slaney, "Pots in Performance: Emma Hamilton's Attitudes" in *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 63, no. 1 (2020): 114, https://doi.org/10.1093/bics/qbaa010.

woman fell on hard times.[28]

Shawls survived most of the nineteenth-century's fashion cycles but peaked in popularity in the middle of the decade. The records of Messrs. Kilburn, Kershaw, & Co., indicate that the company imported its largest volume of Indian shawls in 1862.[29] By the 1870s, the Kashmiri shawl began to fall out of favour due to the Franco-Prussian War,[30] which disrupted French trade routes and economic troubles in Kashmir exacerbated by the interference of the British government.[31] Nevertheless, shawls were still available for purchase in British department stores well into the 1880s.[32] The popularity of this foreign accessory is significant and, therefore, worth considering. The Kashmiri shawl was perhaps the most enduring accessory item that a British woman could possess, and for much of the century, authentic Kashmiri

shawls were a challenge to acquire.

SHAWLS, CONQUEST, AND IMPERIAL BODIES

Possession was central to the shawl's appeal, as was evident in European women's lust for them. On January 24, 1839, the French Countess de Bourke wrote to her English friend Anne Lister thanking her for the gift of an Indian shawl: "Your shawl, my dear Ms. Lister is making many conquests... I have never worn anything so warm, nor so agreeable, it is as soft as a fur, and upon first seeing it many people believed it was the skin of some newly discovered animal"[33] De Bourke described how her new accessory was a success in Parisian society, and the word "conquest" was loaded with meaning as it implied at once a triumph in mondain society, romantic seduction, as well as territorial conquest in an age of imperialism.

In this sense, the Countess de Bourke's letter is in the same spirit as the French satire *Monologue du*

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28 Chaudhuri, 235.
29 Author Unknown. *Kashmeer and its Shawls* (London: Wyman & Sons, 1875), 61. In this specific instance, "Indian shawl" refers to a range of shawls from Northern India which included those produced in Kashmir. In 1862, Messrs. Kilburn, Kershaw, & Co brought 15, 860 shawl pieces to Britain.
30 Chitralekha Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 86.
31 Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir*, 95.
32 Maskiell, 49.

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33 Letter from the Countess de Bourke to Anne Lister, January 24, 1839. Calderdale Archives, SH-7- ML-1043. Translation mine. Original text reads "Votre schalle ma chère Mme Lister fait beaucoup de conquêtes... Je n'ai rien porté de si chaud, ni de si agréable c'est doux comme une fourrure et dans le premier moment plusieurs personnes ont cru que c'était la peau de quelque animal nouvellement découvert."

Cachemire; a comic piece in which a young woman revels in the shawl she received from her intended, a soldier in Algeria.[34] Like de Bourke, the *Monologue du Cachemire*'s heroine deployed the idea of dual dominance while admiring the shawl. De Bourke mentions that the woolen shawl appeared to its admirers to be the fur of a newly discovered animal, once more establishing a connection between Kashmiri shawls and the desire to possess the novel and the exotic. Susan B. Hiner describes how this process occurs in the *Monologue du Cachemire*, stating that "when the symbol of conquest comes home to France, it is taken up by the fashion system and apparently seamlessly incorporated into a domestic economy."[35] Friendships like Lister and de Bourke's created emotional and cultural links between Britain and France, and Lister's gift of a rare Kashmiri shawl fed into the two nations' oriental fantasies. Wearing a cashmere shawl, therefore, enabled European women to feel like powerful agents in a dynamic global world.

In some instances, women's agency as consumers worried members of the public who wanted to establish clear barriers between British and South Asian culture.

In addition to the connections between colonial, sexual, and military conquest, the Kashmiri shawl's proximity to women's bodies endowed the shawl with further sexual implications. In the late eighteenth-century, Anglo-Indians—that is to say, the British in India—embraced Indian styles of dress, much to the discomfort of those living in Britain, who had a high stake in preserving hierarchies of racial and cultural difference. The assimilation of British colonizers into Indian society was a genuine concern for many members of British society, and nabobs, Britain's nouveau riches who had made their fortune in India, became the subject of ire and ridicule in Britain. Nabob women like Marian Hastings, the wife of Governor-General Warren Hastings, were construed as being greedy, un-English, corrupted by India.[36] British women who adopted Indian fashions were also perceived as having loose morals and unrestrained sexuality. They took on the visual and connotative attributes of the indigenous Indian woman, who "was exoticized and demonized in equal measure. Her sexuality was imagined to be wild and uninhibited but also ferocious."[37]

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34 "Monologue du Cachemire," *La Silhouette, journal des caricatures* 3, 1830, 12.
35 Susan Hiner, *Accessories to Modernity: Fashion and the Feminine in Nineteenth-Century France* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 80.

36 E.M. Collingham, *Imperial Bodies: The Physical Experience of the Raj c.1800-1947* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001), 37.
37 Pashmina Murthy "Tropics of Sexuality: Sexual Excess and 'Oriental Vices' in the British Raj," in *Sexual Perversions, 1670-1890* ed. Julie Peakman (New York: Palgrave

For Anglo-Indian women, "going native" meant forgoing respectability and transgressing established sexual norms. Echoing this sentiment, Elizabeth Collingham notes that "a British woman in Indian dress laid herself open to the same sexual gaze which European men cast on Indian women."[38] Restrictions surrounding the adoption of Indian clothing and customs increased throughout the 1820s, as Britain came to see its involvement in India as part of a civilizing mission.[39] Added to these restrictions was the discouragement of interracial unions between white Britons and Indians, which threatened to undermine India's colonization, as it blurred racial boundaries and made white supremacy more challenging to uphold. If Indian clothing was thought inappropriate for British women to wear, why did European fashion embrace and appropriate the Kashmiri shawl?

Not only was the Kashmiri shawl an impressive statement of wealth, but its Oriental overtones also hinted at the risqué. The prohibition on interracial relationships and the adoption of certain Indian customs located Indian dress in the realm of the lascivious. As Anjali Arondekar asserts, Britain's colonies were "imagined breeding ground[s] for a spectrum of imagined sexual vices."[40] Through the Oriental fantasy

associated with the Kashmiri shawl, British women gained access to the sexual potency of the South Asian woman, who was fetishized and maligned in equal measure. Suzanne Daly argues that in British fiction, foreign luxury commodities like shawls had exotic and transformative properties that could transmute impoverished young women into sophisticated and marriageable versions of themselves.[41] Despite the Kashmiri shawl's ability to elevate British women, those worn by Anglo-Indians suggested that the wearers had adopted too many foreign customs and posed a threat to British culture.

Kashmiri shawls and their European imitations similarly provided a window into Victorian women's desires and sexuality. Pre-Raphaelite painters employed the shawl for its allegorical purposes, particularly with regard to sexuality. William Holman Hunt's *The Awakening Conscience,* for example, depicts a young woman as she receives a divine message to break off an affair. In this scene, a Paisley shawl is loosely fitted around her waist to suggest her sexual laxity. As the mistress of a wealthy man, she is seen to be seduced by the fashionable apartment, piano, and shawl in the painting. The loosening of the shawl as she stands up to leave her old

MacMillan, 2009), 222.
38 Collingham, 40.
39 Ibid, 51.
40 Anjali R. Arondekar. *For the Record:*

On Sexuality and the Colonial Archive in India. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 105.
41 Daly, 283.

ways underscores the fact that this scene is a redemptive moment for a person that audiences would have recognized as a fallen woman. The shawl, therefore, acts as a fetish that can represent transgressive desires and behaviours. In her analysis of the piano, Laura Voracheck reminds scholars that fetish objects abounded in the nineteenth-century. Drawing on McClintock's work, Voracheck explains that "as the middle-class woman is constructed with a bodiless class-based sexuality," her sexual expression was then transposed onto objects.[42] A similar process occurred with shawls, as evidenced by the intense desire women had for them. In the early 1850s, *Punch or the London Charivari* lampooned women's obsession with shawls, even going so far as to predict which days of the year women would ruin their husbands' finances by buying them.[43] Thus, shawls were a currency that not only expressed female desire, but also enacted it.

This associative transfer of cultural attributes in relation to British women's agency was a salient element in William Makepeace Thackeray's novel *Vanity Fair.* In this novel, Thackeray explored the multivalent meanings of shawls

and their links to female virtue and sexuality through the book's heroines Becky Sharp and Amelia Sedley, who both conveyed desire and ambition through their sartorial choices. It is worth noting that Thackeray was Anglo-Indian himself, and had a half-Indian half-sister and niece that he tried to conceal from London society.[44] Thackeray's ambivalence toward the mixture of South Asian and British culture make his perspective on South Asian products and transculturation, therefore, most useful to consider.

Vanity Fair takes place during the Napoleonic Wars, a time when India heavily influenced British identity. However, it was published in 1847, when British power in India and British national identity had coalesced. As in most of early Victorian literature, a gift of shawls was suggestive of romantic attachment. For instance, during Amelia Sedley's widowhood, she receives financial support from her friend and admirer William Dobbin while he is away in India. In one scene, Dobbin sends her family "...a pair of shawls, a white one for her and a black one with palm-leaves for her mother... The shawls were worth fifty guineas apiece at the very least, as Mrs. Sedley knew. She wore hers

42 Laura Voracheck, "'The Instrument of the Century': The Piano as an Icon of Female Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century" *George Eliot-George Henry Lewes Studies* no. 38/39 (2000): 27, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42827934?seq=1.

43 "Seeing the New Year In" *Punch or the London Charivari 4,* 1843.

44 Susan Ray, "Thackeray and India: Re-examining England's Narrative of its Indian Empire." *Victorians: A Journal of Literature and Culture*, no. 120. (2011): 36, https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A275038043/LitRC?u=concordi_main&sid=LitRC&xid=eaa14896.

in state at church at Brompton, and was congratulated by her female friends upon the splendid acquisition. Emmy's, too, became prettily her modest black gown."[45] This gift implies an impending engagement between Amelia and Dobbin, and the Sedleys immediately recognize the value of shawls sent directly from India. Amelia's parents are quick to show the shawls to their acquaintances in the chaste and controlled church space. The pairing of the dark, sober gown with the Kashmiri shawl was the accoutrement of any classic Victorian heroine, a sign of moral fortitude and sobriety.[46]

While Amelia accepts the gift of a shawl from someone she considers marrying, her counterpart Becky Sharp, however, receives shawls as gifts from the men with whom she is having extramarital affairs. The two heroines' actions reflected the shawl's dual meanings with regard to women. Thérèse Dolan has identified in nineteenth-century French culture wherein "the shawl became animated in discourse as a vexed metonym of respectability as well as venality…"[47] Amelia was

an example of how to correctly consume South Asian culture, while Becky offered a portrait of the dangers of over-acculturation. Becky, whose mother was French, receives shawls first from her new husband Rawdon and later from her lover General Tufto. The sexual and colonial connotations in this moment are salient: "Besides these, and the little mare, the General, her slave and worshipper, had made her many very handsome presents, in the shape of cashmere shawls bought at the auction of a bankrupt French general's lady, and numerous tributes from the jewelers' shops."[48] It is significant that the shawls are not brought directly from India, but are instead purchased second-hand from a newly destitute Frenchwoman. This scene mirrors the later moment when Amelia sells her shawl to pay for her son's school books.[49] To Amelia, the shawl is more than an ornament because it allows her to invest in her son's education. In other words, she uses South Asian goods to secure upward mobility for her son. Becky, by contrast, mobilizes expensive shawls to appear wealthier and secure credit to buy more items that she cannot afford. The comparison of Becky and Amelia thus complicated the relationship between shawls and marriage, but also reinforced an association with uncontrolled sexuality.

45 William Makepeace Thackeray, *Vanity Fair* (New York City: Bantam Classics, 1997), 457.
46 Suzanne Keen, "Quaker Dress, Sexuality, and the Domestication of Reform in the Victorian Novel" *Victorian Literature and Culture* 30, no. 1 (2002): 211, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25058582?seq=1.
47 Thérèse Dolan, "Fringe Benefits: Manet's Olympia and Her Shawl" *Art Bulletin* 97, no. 4 (2015):

410-411, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43947752?seq=1.
48 Thackeray, 340.
49 Thackeray, 541.

Over-acculturation was also a genuine concern surrounding women's consumer habits. Elizabeth Collingham explains the anxieties surrounding British bodies in Indian clothes by noting that "India was allowed to shape the body of the Anglo-Indian but only as long as it did not overwhelm it or make it unrecognizable as an essentially British body."[50] In the early nineteenth-century, wearing garments like Kashmiri shawls represented a dominance over India, rather than allowing Indian culture to alter Britain, despite the fact that it invariably did regardless.[51] Becky's corruption is also visible in her teenage orientalist fantasy of marrying a man in the colonial service and wearing the accompanying markers of status: "she had arrayed herself in an infinity of shawls, turbans, and diamond necklaces, and had mounted upon an elephant … in order to pay a visit of ceremony to the Grand Mogul."[52] In her daydream, Becky uses her husband's money to purchase these luxury items. However, in reality, she finds herself receiving patronage from a lover, one who has been to India, and who chooses to buy her second-hand shawls. Rather than an elephant, she has "a little mare." Most importantly, she refers to the General as her "slave" and "worshipper," which conveys a gendered power dynamic that evokes Orientalist clichés of sex

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50 Collingham, 33.
51 Ibid, 34.
52 Thackeray, 22.

and despotism. The term "tribute," in particular, positions Becky as a powerful entity who could exert power over the men that gifted her jewels and shawls. Vanity Fair contains more references to shawls than any other nineteenth-century British novel. Thackeray's use of shawls to explore women's sexual and economic agency as well as the treatment of Anglo-Indians in British society thus makes this novel a vital source for understanding the Kashmiri shawl's multiple meanings in British culture. Becky Sharp's greed and susceptibility to the shawl's oriental mystique was detrimental to her and the men she ensnares. Ultimately, Thackeray makes the point that close proximity to Indian culture could also threaten Britain's national character.

ORIENTALISM AND CONSUMING THE AUTHENTIC

Beyond the Kashmiri shawl's imperial resonances, India's geographical remoteness added another dimension to its cultural and economic value. The widening gulf between British manufactured goods and genuine Indian products thrust the shawl into the realm of the mystical and primitive. Additionally, the presence of imitations increased the perceived value of genuine Kashmiri shawls. For this reason, Walter Benjamin's concept of "aura" is helpful in understanding how Victorians ascribed value to the shawl, how it became a coveted

luxury item, and how it gained cultural valence. Benjamin describes aura as a work of art's rootedness in a particular time and place; a work of art's original context is what renders it valuable. Therefore, what is at stake when art is reproduced is the aura itself, that which makes a work of art unique. Benjamin further asserts that "the uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being embedded in the fabric of tradition."[53] The Kashmiri shawl's aura thus derived from its Indian origins and Kashmir's remoteness, both from a geographical and imperial standpoint.

Appadurai echoes this sentiment by declaring that "it is the aesthetics of decontextualization (itself driven by the quest for novelty) that is at the heart of the display, in high brow Western homes, of the tools and artifacts of the 'other'...In these objects, we see not only the equation of the authentic with the exotic object, but also the aesthetics of diversion."[54] Kashmir was a princely state and not under direct British rule, yet it produced desirable luxury items that attracted British consumers. Chitralekha Zutshi asserts that most Britons writing about shawls saw Kashmir's resources as ripe for extraction. Britons "advocated the actual opening up of British trade with regions of central Asia that yielded shawl wool, not only to gain

access to the valuable shawl raw material but quite as much to allow 'scientific geographers' to penetrate this as-yet unexplored region to gather information that could then be made available to ordinary Britons."[55] This quest to acquire the novel and the exotic not only motivated colonization, but it also shaped Britons' understanding of Kashmir.

The shawl's presence in Victorian society and culture similarly evinced imperial and sexual ideologies, which were also articulated through the oriental body. Charles C. White's adventure novel *The Cashmere Shawl: An Eastern Fiction* featured an Eastern narrator who had been transformed from a goat into a Kashmiri shawl, and later into a sheet of paper. This narrator speaks through magic and relates their adventures throughout the Middle East and Kashmir. What separated this novel from better known canonical works of the period was its lowbrow style and international setting. White's novel reached Victorian audiences in 1841, when British Orientalism was at a high point, and the First Anglo-Afghan War had begun. For

53 Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, trans. Harry John (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 220.
54 Appadurai, 28.

55 Chitralekha Zutshi, "'Designed for Eternity': Kashmiri Shawls, Empire, and Cultures of Production and Consumption in Mid-Victorian Britain," 431, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-british-studies/article/designed-for-eternity-kashmiri-shawls-empire-and-cultures-of-production-and-consumption-in-midvictorian-britain/8BC637E16F9C0009A4A8097114FC630F.

this reason, White's story provided a glimpse into Kashmiri shawls as they existed within the Victorian imagination.

The works of British writers, such as William Makepeace Thackeray or Elizabeth Gaskell, deployed shawls to hint at aspects of a person's character or even British society as a whole. *The Cashmere Shawl*, by contrast, presented the shawl as a witness to history brought to life by the authenticating touch of others. The narrative takes place almost entirely in the Middle East, which provides ample material to discern how British consumers interpreted foreign commodities as well as their nation's imperial role.

The former shawl introduces itself to the novel's narrator by detailing its origins:

> I was formerly one of the most costly shawls that ever issued from the looms of Islamabad. I have witnessed many singular adventures, both in the East and West. I have been the envied inhabitant of harems, palaces and bagnios. I have shaded the brows of Sultans, Pachas, Omrahs and Khans. I have girded the waists of Sultanas, Princesses, Khanums and Bayaderes. I have passed through many hands; enjoyed great glories, and alas— devoured infinite dirt. Until at length—O destiny! when worn out, soiled, tattered and thread bare as a half naked dervish, I

was sold to a rag merchant.[56]

The former shawl's introduction to the reader is rife with Orientalist tropes and reveals tensions between eroticism, authenticity, and power. The Kashmiri shawl had been a symbol of royal patronage and cultural capital in the Indo-Persian world through the eighteenth and early nineteenth-century, just as it was in Europe.[57] The shawl confirms its authenticity by establishing its connection to powerful Eastern individuals. For the Victorian reader, its claim of having witnessed remarkable occurrences "both in East and West," implies worldliness, a knowledge of both cultures, as well as a proximity to the Western reader. Most importantly, the shawl's worldliness and contact with foreign bodies lend credibility to its narrative. Edward Said introduced the sexualized other as a defining feature of Orientalism in literature, and White's novel is no exception—his choice of words decisively grounded the shawl's authenticity and allure in its proximity to oriental bodies.[58]

In addition, White made the shawl a witness to an imagined and inaccessible Oriental experience. The shawl claims that it was once the "envied inhabitant of harems, palaces and bagnios," private and feminized spaces that few could

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56 Charles C. White, *The Cashmere Shawl an Eastern Fiction, Vol.1.* (London: Henry Colburn, 1840), ix.
57 Sharrad, 74.
58 Said, 188.

access, but nevertheless fascinated the European imagination. The shawl "shaded brows" and "girdled waists" of Eastern nobility, thus fueling the sexualized Orientalist fantasies of nineteenth-century consumers. The interest in harems and the women who inhabited them was a common feature of nineteenth-century cultural products. Art historian Joan del Plato has argued that the need to assert control over foreign women's bodies aligned with the projects to annex territories in Asia and the Middle East, noting, "at its most fundamental, the Western erotics offered by the harem picture is both an acknowledgment and a violation of the sanctity of Muslim private life."[59] These experiences provided the narrator, and by extension, its British author, with the necessary cultural authority to depict India and the Middle East, and the shawl thus became imbued with the magical touch of foreign people.

This attention to the shawl's encounters with physical bodies continues as it "passed through many hands." Touch evoked sensuality, but it was also a possible point of contagion. Hands were, in fact, a source of great physiognomical interest to nineteenth-century audiences as

they were the conduit that allowed people to cast aspersions on a person's gentility and proximity to physical labour. For this reason, hands were sexually charged parts of the body, which Anne McClintock describes as "the organs in which Victorian sexuality and the economy literally touched."[60] The "many hands" the shawl refers to included romantic characters such as skilled Kashmiri weavers, the beautiful daughter of an exiled nobleman, princesses, Oriental despots, and Ottoman merchants. The phrase "devoured infinite dirt" referred to Adam and Eve's expulsion from the Garden of Eden and prefaces the shawl's debased status when it became "thread bare as a half-naked dervish." Nevertheless, this simile suggests a noble quality to the shawl's bedraggled state. The comparison to a Sufi suggests that its mystical elements overrode the primitivity associated with nakedness.

The corporeality and mysticism served to make the shawl more alluring and worthy of interest. In another instance, the shawl narrator describes his first owner Gulab, the daughter of an exiled Persian noble who grew up living a nomadic life in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The narrator describes her toilette as she prepares to enter a forced marriage to the Khan.

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59 Joan del Plato, "Dress and Undress: Clothing and Eroticism in Nineteenth-Century Visual Representations of the Harem" in *Harem Stories: Envisioning Places and Living in Spaces* ed. Marilyn Booth (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 283.

60 Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*. (New York: Routledge, 1995), 99, https://hdl-handle-net.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/2027/heb.02146.

She dons "a shawl, which from its delicate quality must have been woven from the wool of some of my relations, was wound round her waist; a string of pearls, fastened by a beautiful Badakshan ruby, set in diamonds, was twined several times round her neck..."[61] Here, the shawl is paired with expensive jewels to convey the luxury and splendour Britons imagined of the Orient. The adornments on Gulab's waist and neck emphasized the coerced sexual transaction that is her upcoming marriage. Contained within the pages of British fiction was the notion that proximity to oriental bodies was alluring and authenticating, rather than carrying possible contagion, which some believed South Asian goods could transmit.[62]

The link between touching and contagion was a crucial one. Concern surrounding contagion and the danger of over acculturation mirrored anxieties about female desire and Britain's shifting technological landscape. During the Industrial Revolution, large scale manufacturing supplanted Britain's cottage industry and produced consumer goods with expropriated raw materials from British colonies. This new mode of

production left many consumers wanting products that showcased skilled craftsmanship. Aviva Briefel has noted this occurrence, stating that "the talismanic power scribed to non-white hands in Victorian writings extended to their professed ability to fill in for the missing hands of British industry."[63] The touch of non-white hands was most desirable in luxury goods. By contrast, British consumers worried about foreign workers contaminating food items such as tea. This process led British marketers of empire tea to emphasize how their tea was untouched by Indian hands.[64]

Touch was, therefore, desirable only when it fulfilled orientalist fantasies rooted in an unequal relationship between British consumers and the imagined inhabitants of lands they sought to conquer. The proliferation of exotic foreign goods threatened to overwhelm the bodies of English women who were thought to be the nation's moral arbiters. Women's desire for foreign commodities like Kashmiri shawls encouraged colonial exploitation, but also threatened to alter Britain from the inside. Krista Lysack also discusses "the imperial exhibitionary complex of luxury shops that sought to decontextualize oriental goods and thus prohibit

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61 White, 307.

62 Suchitra Choudhury, "'It was an Imitashon to be Sure' The Imitation Indian Shawl in Design Reform and Imaginative Fiction" *Textile History* 46, no. 2 (2015): 205, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00404969.2015.1121666.

63 Aviva Briefel, *The Racial Hand in the Victorian Imagination* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 51.

64 Erika Rappaport, *A Thirst for Empire: How Tea Shaped the Modern World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 165.

women's identification with the forces of exploited labor by which these goods were produced."[65] As a result, capitalist consumerism sought to stabilize women's identification with foreign commodities "by constructing women as the consumers rather than the consumed."[66] Hence, shopping served the purpose of regulating female desire in a way that satisfied British women's desire to engage with a global world and reaffirmed Britain's dominance over colonized peoples.

At once a commodity, a fashion item, a sign of Britain's growing imperial power, and a symbol of women's sexual and economic agency, the Kashmiri shawl occupied a unique space in Victorian culture. The shawl's numerous imitations and role in asserting taste and status gave way to concerns about the authenticity of the accessory and the women who wore it. Likewise, India's ancient history and vast cultural output threatened to overwhelm British cultural identity, as did the possibility of miscegenation. The first half of the nineteenth-century was for Britain a moment of identity-making, colonialism, and global restructuring. This period's changes make it worthwhile to consider how the shawl's cultural construction responded to the century's developments. As British colonialism progressed, so did the interest in Oriental bodies, for the Kashmiri shawl was an Indian garment with obvious connections to South Asia and British women. Representations of the Kashmiri shawl serve as a vector for understanding Victorians' attitudes toward both women and colonial subjects. These attitudes are most evident when considering Indians' perceived ability to authenticate Kashmiri shawls, as Mah Munzel ul-Nissa did in Fanny Parkes' journal, as well as the power to corrupt British bodies and minds. The sensual associations between Kashmiri shawls and the exoticism of the East shaped how women valued shawls, in addition to how society understood the women who wore them. British women were able to wield shawls as weapons for social and sexual control, just as Britain sought to assert greater dominance in South Asia. This interplay highlights the interconnectedness of the global commodity trade, the spread of imperialism, and the discourse surrounding female and racialized bodies. At first glance, the Kashmiri shawl appears to be a beautiful and sensual object, but to Victorians, these same qualities threatened to corrupt their empire from within.

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65 Lysack, 19.
66 Ibid, 19.

Between the Nation and the Empire:
The Transmission of Texts and Ideas about Temperance in the USA and Russia in the early 20th century[1]

by

ANNA SMELOVA

ABSTRACT

During the long nineteenth century, various reform movements arose at both local and international levels, such as clean-living crusades, public health campaigns, and temperance activism. Anti-alcohol movements in particular flourished in different countries and regions, resulting in a wave of legal restrictions on the sale, production, and use of alcoholic beverages, or as political thinker Mark Schrad called it, "the global prohibition drama."The most significant temperance movements were those in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, Russia, which is traditionally represented as an "alcoholic empire" is absent from the map of "temperance cultures."This article seeks to bridge the distance between the metropolis of the anti-alcohol world — the United States, — and its imagined periphery. It will be shown how the ideas and practices of sobriety traveled across the Atlantic and found their implementation in late imperial Russia. To trace this international exchange of ideas, I will focus on the conference presentation made by the American temperance activist Cora Frances Stoddard at the 12th Anti-alcohol Congress in 1909 and its 1914 Russian translation. The proposed research addresses the "glocalization" of temperance on several levels. A comparative consideration of the report and its translation will contribute to the understanding of the national contexts in which American and Russian temperance movements were developing. Of particular interest is the invention of sobriety as an international social movement and political practice in the modern era, as well as the circulation and transfer of ideas from one continent to another. From a larger perspective, this work aims at placing Prohibition into the global context and understanding the causes and outcomes of the worldwide policy in the first quarter of the 20th century.

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1   This article is partially based on the findings and results of my research submitted as the MA thesis to the Central European University in Budapest: Anna Smelova, *The Temperance Movement: Alcohol and Politics in fin-de-siècle Russia* (MA thesis, CEU, 2018). The paper was developed significantly during the Omnibus course at Georgetown.

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Anna Smelova is a PhD student at Georgetown University in Washington, DC. Her present research focuses on the social and intellectual history of late imperial and early Bolshevik Russia, in particular the history of the temperance movement. Smelova's MA thesis defended at the Central European University in 2018 considers the temperance organizations in fin-de-siecle Russia as part of a civic initiative. Anna's academic interests also include the history of Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and history of imperial ethnography.

INTRODUCTION

During the long nineteenth century, various reform movements arose at both local and international levels, such as clean-living crusades, public health campaigns, and temperance activism. Anti-alcohol movements in particular flourished in different countries and regions, resulting in a wave of legal restrictions on the sale, production, and use of alcoholic beverages, or as political thinker Mark Schrad called it, "the global prohibition drama."[1] The most significant temperance movements were those in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Northern Europe. Nevertheless, Russia, traditionally represented as an "alcoholic empire", is absent from the map of "temperance cultures," as some scholars tend to conceptualize it.[2] Although neglected by historians, the discussion of alcohol use and abuse mobilized many social groups, from Orthodox priests to Social Democrats, and caused discontent in the Russian public sphere. As such, bringing the Russian case into conversation with these more familiar examples can deepen the understanding of global temperance activism, while illustrating the role temperance played in Russian ideas about nation-building within the imperial context.

The present work seeks to bridge the distance between the metropolis of the anti-alcohol world - the United States - and its periphery, imagined by both teetotalers and contemporary scholars. This paper demonstrates how the ideas and practices of sobriety traveled across the Atlantic and were implemented in late imperial Russia. To trace the international exchange of ideas, the current paper focuses on the conference presentation made by the American temperance activist Cora Frances Stoddard at the Twelfth International Congress on Alcoholism in 1909, which took place in London, and its 1914 Russian translation. The indicated case-study expands understanding of both the local contexts of temperance activism and its international dissemination. This piece pays special attention to the gender question: if the American temperance movement is often labeled as proto-feminist, in Russia it was a predominantly male territory.[3] The given exchange of ideas and texts is all the more captivating given that it took place between a nation and an empire.

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1   Mark Lawrence Schrad, 'Introduction' in *The Political Power of Bad Ideas: Networks, Institutions, and the Global Prohibition Wave* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)*, 3-30.*

2   The term was used in Henry G. Levine, "Temperance Cultures: Alcohol as a Problem in Nordic and English-Speaking Cultures," in Griffith Edwards, Malcom Lader, D. Colin Drummon, eds, *The Nature of Alcohol and Drug-Related Problems* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 16-36.

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3   For the American case, see Barbara Epstein, *The Politics of Domesticity. Women, Evangelism, and Temperance in Nineteenth-Century America* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1981).

This article addresses the "glocalization"[4] of temperance on several levels. With an in-depth analysis of sources, this paper examines the rhetoric and ideas of the American and Russian teetotalers in the international perspective. Comparative consideration of Stoddard's report and its translation contributes to an understanding of the national contexts in which the Russian temperance movement was developing. Of particular interest is the invention of sobriety as an international social movement and political practice in the modern era, as well as the circulation and transfer of ideas from one continent to another. Among other things, this essay argues that the global Prohibition wave during World War I was fueled by local temperance activism and the international exchange of ideas and texts.

1. THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT: STODDARD AND HER PAMPHLET

1.1 SOBRIETY AND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM: THE CASE OF THE WCTU

One of the established understandings of the American democratic tradition is the participation of voluntary organizations in public and political life. This idea was presented by French diplomat and political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville in his famous work, *Democracy in America* (1840). De Tocqueville argued, "in democratic countries the science of association is the mother of science," and that this assumption was built on the evidence of unprecedented temperance activism of its proponents: "I at last understood that 300,000 Americans, alarmed by the progress of drunkenness around them, had made up their minds to patronize temperance."[5] Therefore, during the period when drunkenness was labeled as a social problem, the civic engagement of the temperance activists was a fundamental part of the public health debates in the U.S.

In the nineteenth century, the national prohibition movement was an umbrella phenomenon which intertwined with a variety of discourses, and was nourished by many other currents such as the Second Great Awakening, concerns for public health, morality, migration, and progressivism. In the second half of the century, temperance became closely associated with the wave of proto-feminism and spawned the involvement of middle-class women in the struggle for their rights.[6]

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4   This notion is used here to describe the coexistence of various trends of globalization with the preservation of local culture and context.

5   Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Ch. 5 (1840) https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/de-tocqueville/democracy-america/ch28.htm.

6   The term "proto-feminism" is applied to the temperance movement of the early nineteenth century by the historian Barbara Epstein in *The Politics of Domesticity. Women, Evangelism, and Temperance in Nineteenth-Century*

Women compared their submission to "drunken husbands, ill health and tight corsets" to slavery, and began to publicly voice their discontent with the gender status quo. One type of anti-patriarchal activity was women's associations against the anti-saloon culture based in various American cities.[7]

One of the most influential women's temperance organizations of the time was the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), whose reformist agenda included legal prohibition and promoting suffrage. The association was founded in 1874 in Ohio, and quickly expanded its activities within the country and abroad. As the historian Ian Tyrrell argues, "the WCTU linked the religious and the secular through concerted and far-arching reform strategies based on applied Christianity."[8] The WCTU adopted its rhetoric from religious moralizing

discourse and millennialism[9] and developed it according to their needs. The activists supported total abstinence and considered alcohol to be the cause and source of many social problems and national degeneration.

In 1883, the WCTU's international branch—the World's WCTU—was established, with affiliates in Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Finland (a part of the Russian Empire at that time) and other countries. Ian Tyrrell emphasizes that the WCTU's aggressive expansion and political lobbying coincided with broader social and political processes. He argues that "the efforts of temperance women to emancipate their sisters from subordination to prevailing customs ironically enmeshed in the extension of European values and in the domination of large portions of the globe by the imperial powers."[10] According to Tyrrell, cultural imperialism and the international activities of the organization were rooted in the ideology of Anglo-American supremacy. The words of Mary Leavitt, a Boston schoolteacher and a notable member of the WCTU's international missionary, clearly demonstrated the nationalist

America (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1981). While the movements obviously did not entirely merge, they nevertheless coincided in the general striving of middle-class women to suffrage, broader independence within households, and better access to job markets. Following Epstein and Tyrrell, here and further on in this work, I use the term "feminist" in relation to female temperance practitioners to emphasize the modernizing nature of their social engagement and reformism.

7   Ruth Clifford Engs, *Clean Living Movements: American Cycles of Health Reform* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 46.

8   Ian Tyrrell, *Woman's World. Woman's Empire: The Woman's Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective 1880-1930* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 2.

9   Millennialism is a religious multi-cultural movement based on faith in the millennial reign of saints together with Christ on earth before the Last Judgment. In a broader sense, this concept can be understood as the belief of a community of people in a fundamental transformation of society that will lead the chosen to the Kingdom of Heaven.

10   Tyrrell, *Woman's World,* 4.

sentiments of the WCTU: "America should see that she is the Messiah of the nations; that she is to give other nations better that they dreamed of."[11] The close connection between alcohol and national welfare was a constant attribute of temperance discourse, and the more anti-alcohol lobbying spread in the United States, the more the ideas of national superiority grew stronger among temperance activists. The WCTU's prohibition project largely relied on national revivalism and highlighted the dominant role of the United States in the sobering up of nations, which could be viewed as a program of cultural hegemony through the international propaganda of temperance. In fact, even for secular reformers, temperance was a kind of missionary activity dressed in religious-like terms of national revivalism. The mission of sobriety thus resonated nationally while being universalistic in its agenda.

1.2 SCHOOLTEACHERS IN ACTION: ANTI-ALCOHOL INSTRUCTION AND POLITICAL LOBBYING

From the mid-1870s, the WCTU actively developed a scientific temperance campaign by creating an extensive system of committees and departments. The most important work in this area was done by the Department of Scientific Temperance Instruction, headed by a former schoolteacher, Mary

Hannah Hunt. Through this branch, female temperance activists became involved in public discussions about the fate of anti-alcohol instruction in schools and had the opportunity to shape state educational policies. Among the political and legal achievements of Hunt and her followers was the adoption of the statute that provided mandatory anti-alcohol instruction in all schools of Michigan starting in 1883. Over the course of the 1880s, similar bills were passed by local legislatures in New York and Pennsylvania, and later in Rhode Island, Alabama, Kansas, Nebraska, Oregon, Nevada, Maine, Missouri, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts.[12]

According to the scholar Norton Mezvinsky, the activities of the Department played an important role in the battle for national prohibition. Hunt's next significant political victory was the provision of a draft legalization for temperance instruction in public schools in Washington, DC. As a result of lobbying and petitions, the Senate and the House adopted the bill, and President Grover Cleveland signed it on May 20, 1886. Throughout the 1890s, however, the temperance instruction propagated by the WCTU received strong criticism for linking "the religious and the secular" from scientists and teachers, and gradually lost its popularity. As historian of

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11   As quoted in Tyrrell, *Woman's World,* 11.

12   Norton Mezvinsky, "Scientific Temperance Instruction in the Schools," *History of Education Quarterly*, no. 1 (March 1961): 49, https://www.jstor.org/stable/367201?seq=1.

science Philip J. Pauly points out, one of the reasons for the opposition of the institutionalized American physiologists to the women's organization was the desire of male professionals to preserve cultural authority in academia.[13] In the mid-1890s, Hunt moved away from the WCTU leadership to develop her own "drive for compulsory study in the physiological effects of alcohol and other narcotics" and engaged in independent activities in the United States and abroad.[14] For example, Hunt presented her project on school education at the International Congress Against Alcoholism held in Brussels in 1897, and at another event in Berlin in 1903. The international significance of Hunt's activities was marked, for example, by the translation of her textbooks and pamphlets into Japanese. Following the example of her works, local Japanese activists also wrote their own text entitled *Sake Is a Poison*.[15]

Shortly afterwards, Hunt chose another temperance activist, Cora Francis Stoddard, as her successor and first associate. For about 30 years, Stoddard headed

the Scientific Temperance Federation in Boston. Like her colleagues, Stoddard advocated total abstinence and was engaged in the political battle for national prohibition. Her life's work was to uphold compulsory anti-alcohol instruction for children and adolescents in educational institutions. After Hunt's death in 1906, Stoddard formally broke with the WCTU and established her own Scientific Temperance Federation (STF) to promote educational and outreach activities in the North.[16] Under Stoddard's guidance, the organization achieved considerable success in promoting anti-alcohol education in schools, and distributed a variety of printed materials throughout the country.

While working in the Federation, Stoddard was involved in various printing activities. For a long time she headed the Federation's press organ, the *Scientific Temperance Journal,* which was issued monthly. Additionally, from 1913 until her death in 1936, Stoddard published more than 50 pamphlets and brochures on the topics of compulsory temperance education in schools, the harm of alcohol to health, and the fate of the American Prohibition. Some of Stoddard's works discussed   total abstinence and if moderation could be considered appropriate (i.e. "State Experience with Exempting Beer from Prohibition," 1926; "Shall We Teach Moderation?", 1936). A number of

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13   Philip J. Pauly, "The Struggle for Ignorance about Alcohol: American Physiologists, Wilbur Olin Atwater, and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine,* 64, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 367, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44442546?seq=1.

14   Jonathan Zimmerman, "The Dilemma of Miss Jolly: Scientific Temperance and Teacher Professionalism,1882-1904," *History of Education Quarterly*, 34, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 414, .https://www.jstor.org/stable/369265?seq=1

15   Tyrrell, *Woman's World,* 51.

16   Tyrrell, *Woman's World,* 53.

her texts raised the question of child drunkenness and how to prevent the spread of these ideas and practices in minors ("The Developing Children of the Nation," "The Appeal to Youth," "The Teacher's Part in the Anti-Alcohol Movement," "Drink and the Delinquent Child," "Prohibition and Youth," etc.). Most of all, Stoddard was interested in preventive measures that would avert the passion for alcohol among juveniles. Being a teacher herself, Stoddard recognized anti-alcohol courses as the most effective remedy against the alcoholization of youth.

For its time, the activities of the Department of Scientific Temperance Instruction and the Scientific Temperance Federation played an important role in sobriety activism and lobbying for national prohibition. Mary Hunt and Cora Stoddard, along with other female activists, participated in the anti-alcohol congresses and, therefore, contributed to global temperance networking.

2. GLOBAL TEMPERANCE OR THE PAMPHLET CROSSES THE OCEAN

2.1 THE TWELFTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON ALCOHOLISM: IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS

During the nineteenth century, the success and influence of national temperance movements kept growing, which led to the rise of international activism, and the

world-wide circulation of anti-alcohol ideas, texts, and the movement of activists across national borders. The turn of the century marked the era of international anti-alcohol conferences, which identified alcoholism as an important social and political problem. Before World War I, 14 international anti-alcohol conferences took place in fin de siècle Europe, raising various questions on national degeneration, morality, family, and political rights.[17]

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the invention of alcoholism as a social problem was linked to the individual awareness for health and the collective concern for the well-being of the nation. In this light, women were often viewed as the main tool to produce a healthy population. According to the historian Johan Edman, the topic of the family and the role of women in reproduction attracted the special attention of delegates to anti-alcohol conferences. Since temperance alarmism for the most part remained a middle-class agenda, family-oriented rhetoric occupied a special place in participants' discussions. As Edman points out, "[t]he consequences of the misuse of alcohol were often felt at home, and in accordance with the familistic ideology common among the middle class, the home was seen as the

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17   Johan Edman, "Temperance and Modernity: Alcohol Consumption as a Collective Problem, 1885-1913," *Journal of Social History* 49, no. 1 (2015): 20-52, https://academic.oup.com/jsh/article/49/1/20/948316.

woman's domain."[18] Notably, while American temperance feminists struggled for their rights, many male teetotalers across the ocean viewed women as silent housewives and emphasized their role as mothers of the rising generation. Edman notes that the role of women at the conferences "had many facets: women were role models, mothers and housekeepers—albeit not yet partners in legislative work."[19] Despite the legislative successes of the WCTU activists, women still remained outside the public sphere from an international perspective and were marginalized in their fight against alcoholism. In this context, Stoddard's participation in the Twelfth International Conference was critically important, because it forced other temperance activists to reconsider their attitude towards women and recognize women's significance in social and legal matters.

The Twelfth International Congress on Alcoholism opened on July 19, 1909 in London, bringing together delegates from eighteen different countries, as well as representatives from various colonies and protectorates. Lord Weardale, the acting President of the Congress, delivered a speech in which he denounced the negative effect of alcoholism on children's upbringing and well-being. This topic took a special place in the further work of the delegates.

For example, the first half of the second part of the conference (featuring 10 presentations in three languages) was devoted to anti-alcohol instruction for the youth.[20] A significant number of speakers recognized the importance of preventing drunkenness among children and found anti-alcohol instruction as a mandatory part of the school curricular to be an efficient measure. One Dr. Hercod from Lausanne, who presented his report in French, even called for legal measures to protect children from the influence of drinking parents. He argued that the nineteenth century was rightly called "le siècle de l'enfant," which meant that the state and society would stand up to protect the child from the risks of drinking. Thus, the rapporteur proclaimed the rule of law and the state in protecting the younger generation, and therefore the nation, from the harm of alcohol.[21] According to another speaker of this section, I. Gonser from Berlin, it was more fruitful and promising to invest in anti-alcohol training than to deal with the excessive alcohol consumption among adults later on. He postulated the question "Was muss und was kann gegenüber der Jugend

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18 Edman, *Temperance and Modernity*, 26.
19 Edman, *Temperance and Modernity*, 26.

20 "The Twelfth International Congress on Alcoholism," *The Lancet*, Vol. 174, No 4482 (24 July 1909): 250-251, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673601993134?via%3Dihub.
21 R. Hercod, "La Protection Légale de l'Enfant dans la lutte contre l'Alcoolisme," in *The Proceedings of Twelfth International Congress on Alcoholism* (London, 1909), 130.

geschehen?"[22] and opinionated that rather than expecting the problems of population degradation from drinking, it would be better to introduce compulsory anti-alcohol education in schools.[23] As such, the idea of youth anti-alcohol education constituted the core of the conference, and many delegates spoke in its favor.

2.2 IN THE NAME OF "SOCIETY AND RACE": STODDARD DELIVERS A SPEECH

Cora Stoddard's speech, *The Relation of Juvenile Temperance Teaching to National Progress,* opened the second section of the conference. In this work, Stoddard stressed the importance of anti-alcohol education for the prosperity of the nation and for national progress. Her message contained both moral and medical arguments. Social Darwinism noticeably shaped her thinking on many aspects of the temperance work, and the speech consisted of such expressions as "national progress" versus "national decline," "nation," and "race." Edman notes that the nation was a frequent reference in the speeches of conference participants. They considered alcoholism both a disease and a demoralizing symptom that led to the degeneration and

degradation of the nation. In addition, the participants used the term "national character" to describe the predilection of a certain ethnicity to alcoholism. Temperance crusaders appealed to youth as the vanguard of the nation and strived to raise their awareness of the dangers of alcohol consumption. The ideologists of modern nation-states viewed the rising generation as bearers of national well-being and prosperity.

Stoddard's printed pamphlet had nine thematic sections. The first section after the introduction was entitled "Raising the Level of Sobriety" and intended to demonstrate the positive results of lectures on the dangers of alcohol and how they helped increase the level of sobriety. The second section, "Practical Results of Sobriety," focused on the role of the US and the achievements of its activists. Stoddard referred to the activities of Mary Hunt, "the honored apostle of public school scientific Temperance instruction," and quoted her words on the adoption of the Federal Temperance Education law of 1886: "The day is surely coming in America when from the school-houses on the hilltops and in the valleys all over the land will come the trained haters of alcohol to pour a whole Niagara of ballots upon the saloon."[24] This type of propaganda, although it received a

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22 "What should and can be done with youth?"

23 I. Gonser, "Alkoholgegnerische Unterweisung in den Schulen der verschiedenen Länder," in *The Proceedings of Twelfth International Congress on Alcoholism* (London, 1909), 43-44.

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24 Cora F. Stoddard, "The Relation of Juvenile Temperance Teaching to National Progress," in *The Proceedings of Twelfth International Congress on Alcoholism* (London, 1909), 39.

lot of criticism from outside, remained exemplary for Stoddard.

In the third and shortest section of the speech, Stoddard appealed to the "patriotic sons and daughters" who should strive to live in an ideal state, the main value of which would be the health and morality of its citizens. This section demonstrates vividly why Stoddard's pamphlet was the very first in the conference thematic section on anti-alcohol education. First, this work most clearly represented the duties of an activist to his nation and state, and also made correlations between youth development and national degeneration. Indeed, the importance of instructing a healthy lifestyle was a prime topic at that time, and many conference delegates commented on it. However, the Stoddard text stood out from all the other reports of the second part of the volume, as it directly indicated the importance of patriotic education and the role of a female teacher in the nation-building process.

The next part, "Health and Efficiency," stated that work efficiency was the basis of national progress and prosperity, and alcohol had a detrimental effect on economic life. In the following small section, "Productivity," Stoddard emphasized that a person brought up in sobriety contributed to the development of "national resources" and also reduced "a wasteful loss in national productivity." Here, it was a non-drinker who was the human resource and contributed to national prosperity. In the section

entitled "Relation of Alcohol to Social Service," Stoddard stated that "the welfare of the society and the race" is foremost to an individual, and that avoiding alcohol would lead to "human betterment." In the following part, "Influence of Temperance Education on General Morality," Stoddard argued that alcohol led to the demoralization of an individual, while education forestalled a national regression. The eighth piece, "Importance of Early Instruction," once again raised the topic of patriotic duty and the danger of national degeneration. In the final section, Stoddard summed up the prospects of her educational project: "Temperance education of youth cannot do all in solving the alcohol problem, but the alcohol problem cannot be solved without that education."[25]

The international temperance movement intertwined topics of nationalism, youth education, and the family. Family-oriented reasoning was an ideological tool for middle-class representatives and government officials. The propagation of juvenile education by Stoddard also fit well into the popular nationalist overtones of the conference. However, it appears that Stoddard's report was initially aimed at achieving a different goal: as in her homeland, the activist sought to raise the prestige and socio-political significance of women in the legislative process, and sobriety was a convenient

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25 Stoddard, *The Relation...*, 42.

means to convey this message to the European audience. Taking into account Stoddard's background in the struggle for mandatory anti-alcohol instruction in the American states as part of the WCTU, her rich experience in political lobbying, and the legacy taken from her teacher and ideological mentor Mary Hunt, it can be argued that her presence at the international conference was to increase Europeans' awareness of women's participation in the temperance movement.[26]

The politicization of the discourse on sobriety and the global recognition of drunkenness as a collective problem was related to the fact that it could, as an umbrella phenomenon, embrace many currents and concerns, and become a universal means for the pursuit of one's interests. Thus, juvenile temperance training was an ideological pillar of an emerging nation-state that sought economic efficiency and the well-being of its citizens. It was also an essential part of the feminist project, to expand women's rights and freedoms and to increase their role in the social and political sphere.

3. ALCOHOL AND TEMPERANCE IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA: STODDARD'S PAMPHLET FINDS A NEW HOME

3.1 FATHERS AGAINST DRUNKENNESS: THE ROLE OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE TEMPERANCE PROJECT

As discussed in previous sections, Stoddard's participation in the international conference was due to a number of pragmatic reasons, including increasing the recognition of women as important actors in the global temperance movement, and therefore in the public sphere, politics, and law-making. However, while crossing the ocean to attend the conference, the teacher from Boston hardly knew that the speech she was going to deliver would go a longer way than she herself would. Five years after its initial utterance, the pamphlet of the speech resonated in an unexpected context – Russia, on the eve of the First World War, under curious conditions and circumstances. The call of the female temperance worker from Massachusetts who passionately advocated for national progress and prosperity was reflected in distant tsarist Russia, where sobriety was mainly the mission of village priests who dreamed that the local peasantry would drink less and work more.

Anti-alcohol movements

26 It is a curious fact that of all the speakers of the conference, only three or four of them were women. Since occasionally their names are indicated only by initials, it is difficult to determine exactly.

in the United States and Europe influenced "the invention" of alcoholism as a social problem in the Russian Empire. The Great Reforms of the 1860s galvanized industrialization and modernization, and the shaken traditional way of life was perceived by many as a cause of social deviations. Alcohol became one of the brightest symbols of national degeneration; a wide variety of social groups from parish priests to doctors and even government officials tended to conceptualize drunkenness as a threat to the health of the social organism.

The leading role in a new crusade belonged to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), and its individual activists, parish societies, and institutions. According to Arthur McKee, the Church's temperance campaign began in 1889, when the Chief Procurator Konstantin Pobedonostsev called upon the parish priesthood "to enter into an unceasing struggle with drunkenness."[27] By 1911, 1,873 temperance organizations functioned in the Russian Empire (without Poland and Finland), with more than half a million members. Of these, 95% were religious.[28]

It was critical for the Church to lead the crusade against alcoholism and to win the battle ideologically. In the late imperial period, the influence of the ROC gradually fell, especially in cities where the number of atheist-minded workers grew while the influence and degree of socialist propaganda increased. In these circumstances, religious activists sought to increase the moral authority and prestige of the parish priesthood through the expansion of its educational programs. At the end of the nineteenth century, religious temperance figures were concerned about the institutionalization of anti-alcohol education in Russian schools. Church advocates of sobriety emphasized that education should be religious and provide a moral message. Orthodox priests also argued that even if anti-alcohol courses were taught outside of the Sunday School, only clerics should teach them. For the estate of priests, the discourse on anti-alcohol education served as a means to influence the opinion of the rising generation and strengthen the authority of the church.

The St. Alexander Nevsky Temperance Society (ANTS) in St. Petersburg was one of the largest and most influential temperance organizations of the era. In its heyday in 1906, the ANTS numbered about 80,000 members and collected at least 75,000 rubles from admission

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27 Arthur W. McKee, "Sobering up the Soul of the People: The Politics of Popular Temperance in Late Imperial Russia," *Russian Review*, No. 58 (1999): 223, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2679576?seq=1.

28 Alexander Afanasyev, *Trezvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v period mirnogo razvitiya. 1907—1914 gody: opyit ozdorovleniya obschestva* [The temperance movement in Russia during

the period of peaceful development. 1907 - 1914: the experience of improving the society] (Tomsk, 2007), 41-42.

fees.[29] Its founder, priest Alexander Rozhdestvensky (1872-1905) saw his calling in preaching a rigorous and conservative way of life. The society was located in the industrial outskirts where it aimed at "affirming and spreading in all layers of the Russian people the true concepts of Orthodox faith and piety through spiritual conversations, reading and publishing of literature."[30] In reality, the main target was obviously the industrial workers whom the ANTS members considered to be the most distant from the virtuous life. Additionally, leading this crusade, Rozhdestvensky's followers hoped to restore the prestige and authority of the Orthodox Church. As the historian Kate Transchel argues, "viewing drunkenness as a vice that separated the individual from God, Rozhdestvensky saw the creation of the temperance society as a way to strengthen the Church's social role and to reinvigorate pastoral practice".[31]

An important instrument of the ANTS proselytism was its printing house. During the period from 1900 to 1917, the organization published a wide range of books and brochures, as well as three magazines, the total circulation of which was about three million copies.[32] Remarkably, Russian nondrinkers were familiar with the activities and ideas of their American colleagues and even translated some of their works. Although many radical theses of female activists from the WCTU did not take root in Russian soil, traces of their influence can be found on the pages of multiple publications. In 1908, the editors of the journal *Trezvaya Zhizn'* (Sober Life) vividly made an example out of American activists while urging Russian women to stop being the silent victims of their drunken husbands and start to fight against drunkenness: "Only the Russian land did not present women as fighters for sobriety. Meanwhile, a Russian woman is a great woman with a mighty spirit, magnanimous heart and strong will."[33]

3.2 TRANSLATING STODDARD'S TEXT: ADOPTION AND ADAPTATION

The next ANTS publishing project was the translation of Stoddard's speech into Russian. The initial publication of Stoddard's speech appeared in *Trezvaya*

29 *Chislo chlenov, vstupivshih v obshhestvo s denezhnym vznosom i bez vznosa, 1899-1910 gg.* [The number of members who joined the society with a monetary contribution and without a contribution, 1899-1910], Rossiyskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv [Russian State Historical Archive, coll.. 575, aids 12, fol. 69.

30 *Otchet o dejatel'nosti Obshhestva rasprostranenija religiozno-nravstvennogo prosveshhenija za 1915 god* [Report on the activities of the Society for the Propagation of Religious and Moral Enlightenment in 1915] (Prague, 1916), 3.

31 Kate Transchel, *Under the Influence: Working-class Drinking, Temperance, and Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1895–1932* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press),

53-54.
32 *K istorii*, 11-13.
33 "Rol' zhenshchiny v bor'be s p'janstvom," in *Trezvaja Zhizn'*, No 4 (1908): 41.

Zhizn' in 1913. A year later, the Society's printing house issued a separate edition of this speech in the translation of an anonymous activist under the caption "Tr.: A. P-va" *(Пер.: А. П-ва)*. Most likely, the translator was a woman (the name with the ending *-va* is given in the nominative case after the colon) and a member of the Society, since the translations were usually written by the activists-insiders who knew foreign languages.

The text in Russian was a complete and high-quality translation of the primary speech, with some rhetorical and terminological peculiarities. If the original text was divided into nine short thematic sections, the translation was presented as a solid text without sections and subdivisions. The Russian version also contained some cultural, linguistic, and contextual adaptations, changes, and sometimes inaccuracies. For example, the translator and publishers imposed their own paragraph structures—the ones of the original text were not preserved anywhere, but were interconnected or broken in other parts.

Table 1 indicates that the Russian translation included some linguistic discrepancies and interesting peculiarities compared to the original text. To begin, the table shows that the Russian practitioners were very selective in the vocabulary they used. Although in general translators were not afraid to use words that were unusual for the imperial context, such as nation and race, in some cases they still avoided utilizing them (such as in lines four and six of the table). At the same time, the translation sought to generalize the nationalist vocabulary and to make it more abstract. For example, the expression "the welfare of the race" was transformed into something as holistic as "the well-being of all the people," and the simple phrase "the use of intoxicants" became "alcohol poisoning of the (popular) masses."[34] Additionally, terms like "Motherland (Homeland)" and "the people" were more characteristic of imperial space than one of a *nation,* demonstrating why they occasionally made the substitution. The most interesting transformation was noticeable in the free translation of the phrase "patriotic sons and daughters of the nations." The Russian version refused to include "daughters" in patriotism and mentioned only sons, who instead of "patriotic" became faithful, which had stronger emotional connotations and referred to loyalty and betrayal. In general, the Russian translation retained the patriotic spirit and civic pathos of the original speech but utilized it for its own purposes. As argued in this paper, patriotic vocabulary used by teetotalers resonated in Russia and was used for mobilization to the front in 1914.

Especially curious is the

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34 *Antialkogol'noe obrazovanie junoshestva i ego otnoshenie k nacional'nomu progressu G-zhi Stoddard (Boston)* [The Relation Juvenile Temperance Teaching to National Progress] (St. Petersburg, 1914), 1-7.

THE WORD/PHRASE IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT	TRANSLATION	THE LITERAL MEANING OF THE TRANSLATION
human race (37)	человеческий род (1)	The phrase in Russian means almost the same, but 'humankind' would be a closer translation to *chelovecheskii rod*
the use of intoxicants (38)	Отравление спиртом народных масс (3)	alcohol poisoning *of the (popular) masses*
the honoured apostle (39)	великая пионерка (4)	the great pioneer
nation (39)	Родина (5)	Motherland
patriotic sons and daughters of the nations (39)	верных сынов Родины (5)	faithful sons of the Motherland
the welfare of the race (40)	благополучие всего народа (7)	well-being of all the people

TABLE 1: The discrepancy between words and phrases in the original text and translation with indication of pages.

use of the concept of *nation* in a late imperial Russia. According to historian Alexei Miller, the term penetrated Russia from European languages as late as the end of the eighteenth century with the reforms of Peter the Great. Until the mid-1820s, the concept remained relevant in the discourse of Russian elites and was present in the drafts of constitutional reforms.[35]

The accession of Nicholas I, the Decembrist uprising, and the Polish uprising of 1830-31 changed the agenda dramatically. Throughout the next decade, "*nation*" was almost entirely supplanted and censored from official rhetoric as well as the public discourse and replaced with the ideologically neutral "narod" (people, population) and "narodnost" (nationality). Having begun to gradually reemerge in the public

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35 Alexei Miller, *Azbuka ponyatii. Natsiya* [The Alphabet of Concepts. Nation] (St. Petersburg: European University Publisher, 2016), 44-56.

discourse after the liberal reforms of Alexander II, the nation remained marginal to describe imperial ethnic diversity. With the Russification under Alexander III and Nicholas II, a new form of official nationalism arose in Russia, labeled by Alexei Miller as the nationalization of the empire.[36] It is in this generalizing imperial meaning that this term reappears in the translations of the ANTS, completely changing its original liberal meaning.

The translation of Stoddard's work into Russian was possible due to several reasons. Firstly, international connections between propagandists from different countries influenced the circulation of temperance ideas and practices around the globe. Indeed, the anti-alcohol movement in Russia was different from ones in the United States and Europe, but Russian abstainers largely shared the alarmist agenda of their foreign counterparts and in many ways borrowed their rhetoric and practices, adopting them for their own purposes. Following *Zeitgeist*,[37] Russian teetotalers participated in many international conferences and hygienic exhibitions and brought new ideas home. For example, 16 delegates from the Russian Empire took part in the Twelfth International Congress on Alcoholism, the majority of whom came from its western borderlands— five delegates from Latvia, two from Estonia and one from Russian

Poland.[38] These delegates could have been inspired by the project of juvenile education in sobriety and interested in translating the work into Russian.

Secondly, the translation appeared on the eve of the First World War and the introduction of Prohibition in Russia for a certain reason. Social Darwinism and the patriotic message of Stoddard's speech echoed and correlated with the political and social landscape of late-imperial Russia. The patriotic-oriented rhetoric of the translation and discourse on national progress and well-being were aimed at promoting governmental anti-alcohol measures and influencing the patriotic feelings of the audience. However, the literal translation of such words and phrases as *citizen*, *nation*, *national progress,* and *degeneration* was a rather unusual choice for the Russian editor and resonated with the conservative agenda of the imperial printing culture.

CONCLUSION

For centuries, Russia has been perceived as one of the most alcoholic nations in the world. Indeed, the vodka policy of tsarism was essentially based on a consistent and deliberate alcoholization of their own population by selling more and more vodka. The popular term "drunken

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36 Miller, *Azbuka ponyatii,* 50-56.
37 This is the common German term denoting 'Spirit of Time'.

38 *The Proceedings*, 415-416.

budget" critically described the fact that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, about a third of government revenue came from alcohol sales.[39] How, then, can it be explained that in 1914 Russia became the first country in the world to introduce a nationwide prohibition?

Many scholars of the period agree that the main reason for this was the overall mobilization to the front during the First World War.[40] As learned from the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, the abuse of moonshine and vodka among the soldiers had a detrimental effect on military discipline and the combat capability of the army. However, resources were needed for an extensive anti-alcohol campaign, and the imperial government took advantage of the already prepared springboard of the popular temperance movement. In the same year, the imperial decree transformed the ANTS into the All-Russian Alexander Nevsky Temperance Brotherhood, which signaled its end as a voluntary organization.[41]

The gender question occupies a special place in this paper: it can be used to illustrate how great the gap was between American anti-saloon activists and Russian teetotalers. Whereas the former set aside their negative attitude towards male "drunken culture" and strove to raise their status in the public sphere, the sobriety discourse in Russia belonged mainly to men. Russian religious teetotalers recalled the role of a woman oppressed by their husbands only when it was necessary to ideologically win them over to their side, and no serious attempts were ever made to engage the female audience in the struggle.

As such, this work aimed to refute the persistent view that the public anti-alcohol movement in Russia was insignificant and weak. On the contrary, the temperance reformers in Russia were not isolated from global trends, but rather tried to follow them, through participation in international conferences or making translations of foreign temperance materials. At the same time, adopting ideas and practices, the Russian temperance workers adapted them to the local context and customized some of the vocabulary to be understood in a given situation. Although using the example of one translation is difficult to prove that such exchanges were long-term and stable, this work seeks to take a step in the direction of replenishing historiography about the international contacts of the Russian temperance activists.

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39 David Christian, *Living Water: Vodka and Russian Society on the Eve of Emancipation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 386-387.
40 Schrad, *The Political Power of Bad Ideas,* 130.
41 *K istorii Vserossiiskogo Aleksandro-Nevskogo Bratstva trezvosti* [To the history of the All-Russian Alexander Nevsky Temperance Brotherhood] (Petrograd, 1916), 19-20.

East-South Women's Encounters in the Global History of the Cold War: The Anti-Imperialism of Women's Activism(s)

by

CLARA FECHTNER

ABSTRACT

This article investigates East-South women's solidarity networks during the second half of the twentieth century. The paper focuses on the communist East German Democratic Women's League and its transnational relationships with women's organizations from the decolonizing world within and beyond the Women's International Democratic Federation, the largest transnational women's organization in the post-1945 period. In so doing, this article reveals not only how women's rights became an important marker in the broader interactions between the socialist camp and the 'Third World', but it also exposes how the concept of women's rights and its translation into practices at different socio-spatial levels gave rise to a transnational configuration of social practices, common symbols, and artefacts.

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SETTING THE SCENE: EAST-SOUTH WOMEN'S ENCOUNTERS IN THE GLOBAL HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

In its 1959 yearbook, the East German women's organization, known as the Democratic Women's League (DFD) listed its "demonstrations of solidarity" with women in the decolonizing world. By providing financial aid, material donations, and exchanging delegations with women's organizations from Southern countries, the DFD claimed to support materially and morally the "just struggle for freedom of all oppressed peoples".[1] Indeed, by 1963 the DFD had established contacts with no less than 22 African, 15 Asian, and 11 South American women's organizations.[2] Fourteen years later these numbers had almost doubled with regard to African and Asian organizations.[3] Under the banner of *anti-imperialist solidarity*, the DFD embarked on a journey to "make young nation states, national liberation movements, and women

of the whole world aware of the situation of women under state socialism"[4], turning the GDR into an international showcase for gender equality and cultural advancement.

Forging links with organizations in the (post-)colonial world, the transnational activism of the DFD forms part of the academic debate on the Global History of the Cold War, namely that of East-South connections following Stalin's death in 1953.[5] Scrutinizing historical accounts that divide the global landscape of the Cold War into *superpowers* and *proxies*, actors from the decolonizing world are increasingly brought to the scene as agents within the global

1 Foundation Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR in the Federal Archives (Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, henceforth SAPMO-BArch), DY31/1358, "Zur Vorbereitung des Jahrbuches 1959 (Inhalt 1958) kurze Angaben über unsere Arbeit", 08.01.1959, fol. 36.
2 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1358, Kontakte des DFD zu Organisationen und Frauen in der ganzen Welt, 27.5.1963, fol. 48 ff.
3 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1358, Beziehungen des DFD zu Frauenorganisationenm Anfang 1977, fol. 178.

4 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/392 Dokumentarische Darstellung, fol. 4.
5 James Mark, Artemy M. Kalinovsky, and Steffi Marung, *Alternative Globalizations. Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2020), 3; James Mark and Quinn Slobodian, "Eastern Europe in the Global History of Decolonization", in *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, ed. Martin Thomas and Andrew S. Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). The term 'Third World' is used following Vijay Prashad and Laura Bier, defining it "not as a place on a map but as a project, as a political imaginary" (Laura Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood. Feminisms, modernity, and the state in Nasser's Egypt* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 156)) that linked colonized and formerly colonized countries in a common struggle for freedom and anti-imperialism. As a political project, the 'Third World' encompasses "the hopes and institutions created to carry them [peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America] forward" (Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: The New Press, 2007), xv)).

configuration now recognized as a multipolar conflict.[6] Scholars, for one, explore transnational circulations across the 'Iron Curtain' and the 'First', 'Second', and 'Third' world – spatial constructs of dividedness that conventionally prevailed in Cold War historiography. For another, by building upon concrete cases of exchange between actors from the socialist camp and countries of the Global South, scholars bring to the fore the multifaceted entanglements between the Cold War and decolonization processes. In doing so, they also identify particular ideas of modernization and affiliated programs of development assistance provided by countries of the socialist camp and the 'West' to newly independent countries.[7]

Yet what remains fairly understudied in this vibrant field of research – as is so often the case – is the role of women and their transnational interactions.[8] While

educational or military sojourns of actors from the (post-)colonial world in countries of the socialist camp are nothing new to scholarship, these exchanges are usually not brought into context with transnational women's rights activism. An in-depth analysis of interactions between 'Second' and 'Third World' women's organizations, however, reveals their significance in shaping and contributing to a globalizing women's rights discourse in the post-1945 period.[9] What is more, this paper argues, from the mid-1950s onwards when the countries of the socialist camp increasingly turned towards the decolonizing world, interactions between respective women's organizations transformed into an important marker in these emerging relationships.

CROSSING BORDERS AND BLURRING LINES

Building off of previous studies, this research aims at contributing to the historiography of East-South encounters by integrating into the global history of the Cold War what Kristen Ghodsee labels "Second World-Third World alliances in the international women's movement".[10]

6   David Engerman, "The Second World's Third World", *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12, no. 1 (2011), 183, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/411667; Mark, Kalinovsky, and Marung, *Alternative Globalizations*, 3.

7   See most prominently Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200); see also Young-Sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

8   Except for the work by Kristen Ghodsee. See Kristen Ghodsee, *Second World, Second Sex: Socialist Women's Activism and Global Solidarity during the Cold War* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2019).

9   Celia Donert, "Women's Rights in Cold War Europe: Disentangling Feminist Histories", *Past and Present*, 218 (supplement 8), (2013), https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gts040.

10   Kristen Ghodsee, "Research note: The historiographical challenges of exploring Second World-Third World alliances in international women's movement", *Global*

By empirically focusing on the DFD and its foreign relationships with what were considered to be 'peace-loving' women's organizations from the decolonizing world, the aim of this paper is to investigate whether these interactions gave rise to a new *anti-imperialist transnational space*. Examining the extent to which this space not only enabled women's mobility across Cold War oppositions but also entailed a circulation of women's rights discourses, the transnational perspective in this paper is to be understood as both methodological tool and spatial approach in the broader framework of global history, rather than juxtaposing the latter with transnational history.[11] The perspective of *transnational spaces* complicates dominant spatial imaginaries informing our historical understanding of the period. Built upon notions of bipolarity, separated 'blocs' with contrasting ideologies, and 'worlds' beyond these blocs, the narrative of dividedness and rivalry has been materialized and (re-)produced through forms as diverse as mapping, media, and scholarship.[12] To be sure, concrete spatialization

processes such as the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact in 1955 informed these perceptions. These new understandings also do not argue that bipolar representations of the period are incorrect, nor that rivalries between the USA and the Soviet Union were of minor importance. Rather, their aim is to bring to the fore other spatial formats that existed next to or emerged in reaction to bipolar formations. In this sense, this research adds to alternative readings of the Cold War by highlighting the constructed character of conceptualizations of space. Through the exchange of delegations and common political initiatives, transnational women's interactions crossed and blurred boundaries, making it worthwhile to consider the existence and relevance of 'Cold War spatialities' other than nation states, 'blocs', and 'worlds'.

A significant part of the DFD's international history was, as we will see, closely linked with the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), the largest transnational women's organization in the post-1945 period. Embracing leftist and socialist women's organizations from all over the world, the DFD became one of the WIDF's communist affiliates in 1948. The transnational activism of the DFD within and beyond the WIDF is unquestionably only one among many (hi-)stories

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Social Policy 14, no. 2 (2014), 244-264, https://doi.org/10.1177/1468018114527100.

11   Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Volgek, *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, networks, and issues from the 1840s to the 1930s* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 574.

12   Steffi Marung, "Emerging Topics – Insights from "Behind the Scenes"", Interview, Collaborative Research Centre 1199 Processes of Spatialization under the Global Condition, May 2018, https://

research.uni-leipzig.de/~sfb1199/publications/247-sfb_blog_marung/.

of women's encounters throughout the period. As this article is based on archival sources from the DFD section in the Foundation Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR in the German Federal Archives, the Feminist Documentation and Information Centre in Berlin, and the WIDF section in the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, it must be taken into account that it tells the story from the 'European' perspective rather than from women in India, Mozambique, or Egypt. By shedding light on the foreign activities of the East German women's committee, this paper is thus intended to contribute to a broader and more systematic research on East-South women's interactions during the era of decolonization and the Global Cold War.

ORIGINS AND DYNAMICS OF EAST-SOUTH WOMEN'S INTERACTIONS

Historically, the end of the Second World War heralded a watershed moment in transnational women's activism, with the established 'Western'-dominated organizations becoming increasingly challenged by anti-colonial solidarity projects among women from the decolonizing world.[13] Not only was

the UN Charter the first international document to interpret gender equality as an universal right, the historical moment also signaled a turn in transnational women's organizing in that it gave rise to what can be described as a new form of "feminist internationalism whose roots lay in opposition to fascism in Europe and colonialism abroad".[14] This feminist internationalist project united left wing, socialist, anti-fascist, and anti-imperialist women from all over the world in a struggle that presumed women's rights as inextricably linked with broader political, economic, and cultural dimensions. Such a movement found its most drastic expression in the 1945 creation of the WIDF in the presence of some 850 representatives from 41 countries in Paris.[15] In contrast to older organizations, characterized

13 See Elisabeth Armstrong, "Before Bandung: The Anti-Imperialist Women's Movement in Asia and the Women's International Democratic Federation",

Study of Women and Gender: Faculty Publications. 1. (2016), 305-331, https://doi.org/10.1086/682921; For information on older transnational women's organizations and their (orientalist) boundaries, see Leila Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), i.e. the chapter 'Who's in, Who's Out'.

14 Rashmi Varma, "Anti-Imperialism", in *The Bloomsbury Handbook of 21st-Century Feminist Theory*, ed. Robin Truth Goodman (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 464.

15 Francisca de Haan, "The Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF): History, Main Agenda, and Contributions, 1945-1991, *Women and Social Movements (WASI) Online Archive,* ed. Thomas Dublin and Kathryn Kish Sklar, http://alexanderstreet.com/products/women-and-social-movements-international.

by a predominantly Euro-American member- and leadership, the WIDF was marked by a firm participation of non-'Western' women.[16] By 1953, 23% of all member organizations were from countries of the Global South, counting a total of 68 national affiliates among which included organizations from 16 Asian, 14 Latin American, and six African countries.[17] By 1987, numbers had shifted in favor of 73 % non-'Western' members, embracing 27 Asian, 28 Latin American and Caribbean, and 35 African organizations among member organizations from a total of 123 countries.[18] Concurrently, the WIDF represented the "primary international voice for women in Eastern Europe since 1945"[19], counting some 14 members from the socialist camp by 1987, including

women's committees from eight Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union, and organizations from China, Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, and Cuba.[20]

The WIDF's principle aim was to fight for "equal rights of women at all levels of political, economic, legal, cultural and social life".[21] Its statutes set forth as main objectives (1) the active participation in the fight for the ultimate annihilation of fascism to secure lasting peace; (2) the collective mobilization of women from all over to world to defend their rights; (3) the protection of public health i.e. concerning children; and (4) strengthening friendship and unity among all women in the world.[22] In doing so, the WIDF acknowledged that equal rights of women required more than legal concessions, advocating for the creation of socio-political and economic circumstances that would allow "all women in all continents to gracefully master their three main tasks: to be mothers, workers and citizens".[23] To this end, the WIDF

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16 Rupp, "Worlds of Women", 63; Fransica de Haan, "Eugénie Cotton, Pak Chong-ae, and Claudia Jones: Rethinking Transnational Feminism and International Politics", *Journal of Women's History* 25 no. 4 (2013), 179-180, http://doi.org/10.1353/jowh.2013.0055.

17 IISH Int 1994/156, Ein geeinter Wille nach Gleichbereichtigung, p. 261 ff.; Countries from the Middle East were counted as Asian. It further embraced members from 26 European countries, and the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

18 Frauenforschungs-, Bildungs-, und Dokumentationszentrum Berlin (FFBIZ) SOZ Int 48, Dokumentation und Information: IX. Kongress der Internationalen Demokratischen Frauenföderarion, Moskau, UdSSR, 28-39 Juni 1987, p. 35-40.

19 Deborah Stienstra, *Women's Movements and International Organizations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), 87; other transnational women's organizations had little or no membership from Eastern European countries.

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20 FFBIZ SOZ Int 48, Dokumentation und Information: IX. Kongress der Internationalen Demokratischen Frauenföderarion, Moskau, UdSSR, 28-39 Juni 1987, p. 35-40.

21 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1351, Resolution über die wirtschaftliche, rechtliche, und soziale Lage der Frauen, fol. 18.

22 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1351, Statuten der Internationalen Demokratischen Frauenföderation, fol. 1.

23 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1353, Presse Kommuniqué , 1 June 1958, Nr. 4, fol. 5; See also Melanie Ilic, "Contesting Inequality. Khrushchev and the Revival of the 'Woman Question", in *De-Stalinization*

considered nuclear disarmament and national self-determination as prerequisites for world peace and women's emancipation.[24] Colonialism was principally seen as an impediment to women's rights, as it structurally restricted women's political, social, and economic status.[25] Acknowledging links between colonial oppression and women's oppression, the WIDF became the first transnational women's organization outspokenly condemning colonialism and launching anti-colonial campaigns.[26] Older established women's organizations, for their part, kept on declaring political neutrality towards anti-colonialism, not only preserving a detachedness of the international women's movement from anti-colonial struggles, but at times even actively fostering imperialist and Orientalist logics of 'Western' superiority vis-à-vis 'the backward colonial woman' whom to offer a helping hand.[27]

After a conflict with the French government sparked by a campaign denouncing French aggression in Vietnam, the WIDF was forced to relocate its headquarters from Paris to East Berlin in 1951.[28] As the first international organization based in the GDR, the WIDF helped to increase the political significance of its host organization, the DFD, vis-à-vis the SED-regime. On the part of the DFD, the relocation to Berlin was presented as a great success whose political weight was particularly due to the fact that the WIDF publicly supported the GDR's claim for a unified socialist Germany[29]. While the DFD had been founded in 1947 first and foremost as a means to win women as workforce in an economy shattered by war[30], it gradually

Reconsidered: Persistence and Change in the Soviet Union, ed. Thomas M. Bohn, Rayk Einax and Michel Abeßer (Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 2014), 157-174.

24 Melanie Ilic, "Soviet Women, cultural exchange and the Women's International Democratic Federation", in *Reassessing Cold War Europe,* ed. Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssi (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 161.

25 Katharine McGregor, "Opposing Colonialism: The Women's International Democratic Federation and decolonisation struggles in Vietnam and Algeria 1945–1965", *Women's History Review* (2016), 6, 14, https://doi.org/10.1080/09612025.2015.1083246.

26 McGregor, "Opposing Colonialism", 2.

27 Leila Rupp, " Challenging Imperialism in

International Women's Organizations, 1888-1945", *NWSA Journal* 8, no.1 (1996), 8, 10, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4316421; Leila Rupp, "Worlds of Women"; Francisca de Haan, "Continuing Cold War Paradigms in Western Historiography of Transnational Women's Organisations: the case of the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)", *Women's History Review* 19, no. 4 (2010), 549-551, https://doi.org/10.1080/09612025.2010.502399.

28 Francisca de Haan, "Hoffnungen auf eine bessere Welt: Die frühen Jahre der Internationalen Demokratischen Frauenföderation (IDFF/WIDF) (1945-1950)", *Feministisch Studien* (2009), 254-255, https://doi.org/10.1515/fs-2009-0207; SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1351, Berliner Zeitung, „Die Deutsche Hauptstadt – neuer Sitz der IDFF", 8 March 1951.

29 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1376, Bericht des DFD an die Exekutive der IDFF vom 1.12.1948-1.7.1949, fol. 61.

30 Donna Harsch, "Approach/avoidance: Communists and women in East Germany, 1945-1949", *Social History* 25, no. 2 (2000), 158, https://doi.

transformed into a valuable means for the GDR's foreign policies. The latter were curtailed by the Hallstein Doctrine, proclaimed by the West German government shortly after the GDR had joined the Warsaw Pact in 1955. The doctrine stipulated that the Federal Republic represented the sole legitimate German state and determined that the they would end diplomatic relations with any state, except for the Soviet Union, that recognized the GDR's sovereignty.[31] Caught in diplomatic isolation, the SED-regime thus had to find ways to "build bridges to the newly independent countries of the Third World"[32] and the DFD certainly became such a bridge, using its WIDF membership and its bilateral relationships for promoting the diplomatic recognition of the GDR, at times even articulating it as an 'objective criterion' for the relationships themselves.[33]

Even though the WIDF had a strong affinity with Soviet politics and was characterized by a broad membership of party-affiliated or otherwise socialist groups, it always included non-communist and independent women's organizations from African, Asian, and Latin American countries.[34] Drawing upon

its anti-colonial stance and broad membership, some scholars consider the WIDF as reversing "Western enlightened charity models"[35], arguing that members from countries of the Global South had the capacity to actively shape the political agenda and structural conditions.[36] A somewhat different picture, however, is drawn by Yulia Gradskova, who claims that Southern representatives rarely obtained leading positions in the central bodies and were therefore faced with constraints when it came to asserting their interests.[37]

Investigating WIDF and DFD documents, this research found that – despite all claims of equity – they not uncommonly revealed patronizing positions when it came to conceptualizations of women's rights. For one thing, they included recurring representations of religion, most notably that of Islam, as 'backward traditions'. For example, the liberation narrative spun around the Soviet-run unveiling campaigns in Central Asia served as one expression of the inequitable nature of representations. According to DFD chairwoman Ilse Thiele, these campaigns were emancipating women from being

org/10.1080/030710200363186.

31 Young-Sun Hong, "Cold War Germany", 36.

32 Ibid.

33 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1573, SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1573, Bericht über die Delegationsreise zur Teilnahme am 7. Kongress der Nationalen Föderation der Indischen Frauen, 1970/1971, fol. 5.

34 de Haan, "Continuing Cold War

Paradigms", 555.

35 Armstrong, "Before Bandung", 328.

36 See e.g. de Haan, "Eugénie Cotton, Pak Chong-ae, and Claudia Jones"; Armstrong, "Before Bandung", McGregor, "Opposing Colonialism".

37 Yulia Gradskova, "Women's intenational Democratic Federation, the 'Third World' and the Global Cold War from the late-1950s to the mid-1960s", *Women's History Review* 29, no. 2 (2020), 270-288, https://doi.org/10.1080/09612025.2019.1652440.

"nothing more than illiterate slaves who were forced to veil their bodies and remained excluded from public life".[38] In addition, the vast majority of the sources disclosed a supposed preeminence and pioneering role of socialist states when it came to advancing the status of women. Even though the recurring notion of 'progress' was never explicitly defined, it constituted one of the WIDF's founding and repeatedly occurring principles, and was clearly informed by socialist perspectives on development. Capitalist states and 'developing countries' were for differing reasons considered restrictive for women's rights. By contrast, WIDF accounts repeatedly claimed that socialist states recognized equal rights of men and women in legislation as well as in practice. According to the brochures, this fact was empirically evidenced by women's employment rates, their professional training, and their participation in political, social, and cultural life.[39] Consequently, despite the WIDF's objective to unite women irrespective of their political worldview, socialist conceptualizations of modernity and 'progress' clearly not only informed its political agenda but also impaired its ideal of ideological inclusiveness.

At a meeting of the WIDF bureau in 1988, just to name one example, the Soviet delegate Alewtina Fedulowa conceded that one had to 'critically and self-critically admit' that the principle of ideological openness was not consistently realized, considering that the acceptance of new organizations was often predicated on their ideological foundations.[40]

Notwithstanding the need for further research on the WIDF's internal power structures, the key point here is that the WIDF was the only organization that *did* open up a space for East-South women's encounters already in the direct aftermath of the Second World War. For the political leaders in the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Eastern European countries, the post-1945 years constituted a period in which the concern of domestic reconstruction exceeded the significance of the vast transformations proceeding in the colonial empires.[41] It was only eleven years after the foundational congress of the WIDF that Khrushchev's *Secret Speech* at the 20th congress of the

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38 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1484, Vorbereitungen des Weltkongresses der Frauen im Jahr 1953 in Kopenhagen, Rede Ilse Thiele, fol. 32.

39 IISH, WIDF Collection, Folder 2, Women's International Democratic Federation: Published for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the WIDF, p. 17.

40 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/906, Alewtina Fedulowa am 15.4.1988 auf der Bürotagung der IDFF, fol.14 ff; IISH, WIDF Collection, Folder 2, Women's International Democratic Federation: Published for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the WIDF, p. 14-17.

41 Constantin Katsakioris, "The Soviet-South Encounter: Tensions in the Friendship with Afro-Asian Partners, 1945-1965", in *Cold War Crossings: International Travel and Exchange across the Soviet Bloc, 1940s-1960s*, ed. Patryk Babiracki and Kenyon Zimmer (Arlington, TX: Texas University Press, 2014), 136.

Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 heralded a turning point in the socialist camp's policies towards the decolonizing world. Breaking with Stalinist Eurocentrism and integrating the 'Third World' into a globalized vision of socialism, the Soviet Union and Eastern European states began to act and portray themselves as "champions of Third World aspirations".[42] With delegates from both the socialist camp and the decolonizing world, however, WIDF events had been fostering transnational interactions between actors from both 'worlds' already years before this political shift. Likewise, the WIDF's foundation had given birth to the only transnational women's organization outspokenly condemning colonialism and acknowledging imperialism as a 'women's issue'.[43]

ANTI-IMPERIALIST WOMEN'S ACTIVISM: ENGENDERING A 'TRANS-NATIONAL SPACE'?

In order to investigate whether relationships between the DFD and 'Southern' women both under the auspices of the WIDF and on a bilateral level gave rise to the

emergence of an *anti-imperialist transnational space*, Ludger Pries' definition of transnational spaces will be utilized. Pries desfines these spaces as "dense and durable configurations of transnational social practices, symbols and artefacts".[44] Here, space is considered to be constructed through interactions between actors. In other words, the concept relies on the assumption that all social interactions go hand in hand with processes of spatialization.[45] Transnational spaces thus arise from entanglements across bounded geographical spaces and can be thought of as "dense economic, political and cultural relationships between individuals and collectives that transcend the borders of sovereign states [and] connect people, networks and organizations in several places across national borders".[46]

I. INTENSIVE AND STABLE SOCIAL PRACTICES

According to Pries' definition, the dimension of *social practice* relates to the "active and intervening

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42 Constantin Katsakioris, "Burden or Allies? Third World Students and Internationalist Duty through Soviet Eyes", *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 18, no. 3 (2017), 540, http://doi.org/10.1353/kri.2017.0035; Westad, "The Global Cold War", 68.

43 Armstrong, "Before Bandung", 320; Varma, "Anti-Imperialism", 46.

44 Ludger Pries, "Transnational Societal Spaces: Which Units of Analysis, Reference, and Measurement?", in *Rethinking Transnationalism. The Meso-link of organizations,* ed. Ludger Pries (London: Routledge, 2008), 3.

45 Matthias Middell, "Raumformate – Bausteine in Prozesse der Neuverräumlichung", *Working Paper Series SFB 1199*, no. 14, (2019), 3-4.

46 Thomas Faist, *Transstaatliche Räume: Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur in und zwischen Deutschland und der Türkei* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2000), 10.

side of human life entanglements".[47] Regarding the interactions under investigation, this dimension becomes visible not only with respect to the circulation of actors, knowledge, and ideas, but also finds expression in congresses, donations, solidarity campaigns, and personal friendships.

WORLD CONGRESSES

When examining the transnational social practices of the WIDF, its World Congresses certainly played a crucial role. In the period between 1945 and 1991, it organized a total of seven World Congresses, which all lasted three to five days.[48] These were preceded by intensive preparations of the national member organizations, transforming the former into frameworks for local practices. Upcoming congresses were often used as inducement for local campaigns to raise awareness for international women's rights issues. Likewise, as in the case of the DFD, international women's congresses could figure in domestic politics as a means to propagate the merits of socialism for women. In preparation for the 1953 World Congress in Copenhagen, the DFD established an initiative committee, charged with 'educational work' among German women. As a mass-based organization strongly corresponding to the party line of

the SED, the educational mandate of the initiative committee consisted in reaching out to the largest possible number of women, conveying that gender equality in the GDR was already guaranteed by the Constitution and contrasting the situation of East German women with the devastating situation of women in 'capitalist, colonial, and oppressed countries'.[49]

In 1972, WIDF delegates successfully suggested to make 1975 an 'International Women's Year' at a meeting of the UN Commission on the Status of Women.[50] In her revealing work, Ghodsee provides insights into how "Second World-Third World coalitions"[51], existing throughout the Women's Decade following the International Women's Year, were able to "isolate and antagonize Western feminists"[52] on the basis of shared political perspectives i.e. when it comes to anti-imperialism.[53] Accordingly, the East German Foreign Ministry

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47 Pries, "Transnational Societal Spaces", 13.
48 FFBIZ, Sammlung DFB, Soz Int 50, IDFF: Gegründet am 1. Dezember 1945, p. 4 ff.

49 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1484, Plan des Demokratischen Frauenbundes Deutschlands Zur Vorbereitung des Weltkongresses der Frauen, 2 March 1953, fol. 1-2.
50 Celia Donert, "Whose Utopia? Gender, Ideology, and Human Rights at the 1975 World Congress of Women", in *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s*, ed. Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 74; At the first conference of the International Women's Year held Mexico City, the 'United Nations Decade for Women' was decided upon, lasting until 1985.
51 Ghodsee, "Research Note", 244.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid, 256.

promoted the final declaration adopted at the first Women's Conference in Mexico in 1975 as the outcome of close cooperation between non-aligned and socialist countries.[54] Following this, Thiele claimed that any positive results of the upcoming conference in Nairobi were dependent on a "consistent and coordinated demeanor of the delegation from the socialist states in joint action with the progressive non-aligned countries".[55] These coalitions, however, were not always running smoothly. A DFD report on a consultative committee meeting prior to the Mexico Conference, composed by representatives from 36 countries from all continents and devoted to revising the draft Action Plan of the conference, bemoaned that "representatives of the USSR, the GDR, and Romania were the only ones [...] to call for the [...] principle of maintaining and safeguarding peace and détente as a precondition for the equality of women and the close links between social and economic changes and the equality of women".[56] Representatives of the 'developing countries', by contrast, supposedly "showed little interest in a stronger political discussion", aiming at preventing any 'ideologization' of the Action

Plan. The report, however, positively emphasized that some of the non-aligned countries were showing a firm interest in the historical experiences of socialist states.[57] In addition to the Mexico Conference under the auspices of the UN, the WIDF had already in 1974 decided to organize a second congress in East Berlin in October 1975. This decision was based upon the claim that the International Year of Women should not remain an exclusive affair of the UN.[58] As the World Congress in East Berlin has already extensively been studied by Celia Donert[59], this article will thus focus only on some interesting points with respect to East-South women's relationships.

Welcoming delegations from over 139 countries, the World Congress constituted a major platform for transnational encounters.[60] Hosting an event of this size not only represented a great success for the DFD, but certainly also carried political weight for the SED-regime, taking place three years after the latter had gained its long-awaited diplomatic recognition and several months after the conclusion of the Helsinki Accords.[61] The official objectives of the World

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54 Donert, "Whose Utopia", 76.

55 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1513, Einleitung der Schulungsveranstaltung zur Vorbereitung Nairobi, 28 June 1985, fol. 8.

56 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/637, Bericht über die Tagung des Konsultativkommittees zur Weltkonferenz der UNO zum Internationalen Jahr der Frau, fol. 3.

57 Ibid. 4.

58 SAPMO-BArch DY 311392 Dokumentarische Darstellung der Entwicklung des Gedankens zur Durchführung des Internationalen Jahres der Frau und des Weltkongresses der Frauen im Jahr 1975, fol. 2-4.

59 Donert, "Whose Utopia".

60 SAPMO-BArch Dy 31/1405, Teilnehmerlisten, fol. 83 ff.

61 Donert, "Whose Utopia", 70.

Congress were to discuss "openly and frankly all questions concerning the implementation of the equality of women, their active participation in the economic, social, and cultural development of their countries, the establishment of friendly relations between all peoples, and the consolidation of world peace".[62] Characterized by one of the highest rates of female employment in the world, the GDR portrayed itself as a role model for gender in this respect.[63] At the congress opening, the chairman of the Council of Ministers promised the visitors that the insights they would gain during their stay would demonstrate to them that the realization of gender equality was 'one of the greatest and noblest achievements in the development of the socialist state'.[64]

Between the plenary sessions, the congress consisted of thematic commissions, each attended by some 200 delegates and devoted to themes such as women's access to education and their role in industry and agriculture. As described by a British delegate, similar to what has been reported on the Mexico conference, unanimity between communist women and delegates from (post-)colonial countries was especially reached over the condemnation of 'Zionism', racism,

imperialism, and (neo-)colonialism.[65] However, the congress also opened up space for friction. Women's organizations from the socialist camp took a more quantitative approach to women's emancipation, assessing the latter on the basis of employment rates, numbers of educational degrees, and mothers' protection as workers. However, this perspective was challenged by African representatives, who claimed that women's rights should not be 'alms' legally provided by male authorities. Rather, claims for dignity and liberty were women's fundamental rights and had to be defended against their 'selfish brothers'.[66] Suggesting that women were subject to a qualitatively different kind of exploitation than their male counterparts, the delegates from Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, and Congo hence implicitly questioned the kind of women's rights endorsed by communist women's organizations.[67]

PHYSICAL MOBILITY AND THE COMPLEXITY OF NARRATIVES

From its foundation onward, the WIDF not only organized congresses and study trips but also fostered bilateral exchanges between its national affiliates, enabling actors

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62 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1405, Tel. 2109161, fol. 48.

63 Donert, "Whose Utopia", 77.

64 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1405, Ministerrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, der Vorsitzende, 20.10.1975, fol. 75.

65 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/645, Feministische Fragen fehlten auf der Berliner Frauenkonferenz, Sarah Benton, fol. 233.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid. Sarah Benton describes the speeches of the African delegates therefore as yielding an "unspoken feminism".

to become – albeit in a politically regulated setting – acquainted with the local circumstances in the countries of sojourn.[68] De-Stalinization also helped to ease these exchanges of delegations. Following the 1953 World Congress of Women in Copenhagen, representatives from Indonesia, Burma, China, Vietnam, Korea, and Southern American countries visited Berlin, representing the first women's delegations from Asia and Latin America in the GDR.[69] Between its foundation in 1947 and March 1972, the DFD hosted a total number of 382 women from African, Asian, and Latin American countries while dispatching 56 representatives to these countries in the same period.[70] Delegations were likewise exchanged between women's organizations from 'Southern' countries and Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and other countries of Eastern Europe.

In her research on the Committee of the Bulgarian Women's Movement (CBWM), Ghodsee found that its activism among women's organizations in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia "fit in well with Bulgaria's foreign policy and its vision of itself as a postcolonial country [...] play[ing] up its own colonial past and how socialism [...] had transformed the country from a rural, agricultural backwater to a modern, industrialized nation-state".[71] While the end of empire in Eastern Europe after the First World War served as a basis for these regimes to foster a narrative of historical analogies between their own trajectories and the transition from colonialism to independence in the colonial empires[72], the promotion of this narrative proved to be more difficult for the SED-regime and the DFD, citizens of a country with a colonial and fascist past. Notwithstanding the DFD's constant emphasis on international friendship, the historical context of its foundation in the aftermath of the Second World War should not be forgotten. In fact, its very accession to the WIDF in 1948 at the Second World Conference in Budapest was followed by debates and opposition from women who had suffered from the atrocities committed by Germany during the Second World War. As reported by the German delegate Maria Rentmeister, "the representative of Israel pointed out in very bitter words that all her relatives had gone to the gas chambers, asking whether all this should be forgotten" by the act of accepting the DFD to the WIDF.[73]

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68 IISH, WIDF Collection, Folder 2, Published for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the WIDF, p. 23 ff.

69 SAPMPO-BArch DY 31/1358, Delegationen aus dem Ausland, die während des Weltkongresses der Frauen in Kopenhagen im Juni 1953 in Berlin weilten, fol. 15-17.

70 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1358, Dokumentation über die wichtigsten internationalen Beziehungen und Aktionen des DFD seit der Gründung des DFD am 8.3.1947 bis 8.3.1972, fol. 134.

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71 Ghodsee, "Research Note", 255-256.

72 Mark and Slobodian, "Eastern Europe in the Global History of Decolonization", 351.

73 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1566, Bericht über

In October 1970, DFD delegates attended the second national women's congress in Sierra Leone. In her speech, the German representative drew parallels between the historical experiences of both countries, comparing the 'possibilities' that arose through the 'defeat of Hitler-Fascism' with the opportunities opened up by the end of colonialism and advocating socialism as the only way to 'ultimately break the rule of Imperialism'.[74] Even though we do not know the reactions of the Sierra Leonean comrades, this poor comparison is particularly revealing. For one thing, it illustrates the tightrope act the German representatives had to perform against the backdrop of their fascist and colonial past when trying to champion an anti-colonial self-conception. On the other hand, it also reveals the contradictory dynamics at play when advocating 'international solidarity' on the basis of patronizing attitudes and by educational means, which for their part strongly resembled imperialist structures.

THE CIRCULATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND CULTURAL PERFORMANCE

Fostered by the physical mobility of its members, the WIDF concurrently entailed a circulation of ideas and served as a platform of knowledge production when it comes to women's rights and women's lived realities all over the world. At international and regional meetings, representatives gave speeches and submitted reports on socio-political and economic circumstances in their countries and the position of women therein. Moreover, the WIDF released a broad range of educational materials such as its widely distributed brochure entitled *Meeting with Egyptian Women*, published after a study trip to Egypt in 1957 which had investigated the situation of women and children following the Suez Crisis.[75]

Likewise, WIDF congresses opened up a space for performative encounters, with representatives engaging in song and dance inspired by their respective cultural contexts.[76] Returning from the World Congress of women in Budapest in 1948, the DFD delegate portrayed the congress as "the face of the world", raving about the "picturesque picture of the women of India, China, Indonesia, and Korea".[77] Claiming to come

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die Pressekonferenz am 10 Dezember 1958, fol. 11.

74 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1426, Teilnahme einer Delegation des DFD am 2. Kongress des Nationalkongresses der Frauen von Sierra Leone am 7 Oktober 1970 in Freetown, Ansprache, fol. 6 ff.

75 IISH Int 1546/40 fol, Zusammenkunft mit ägyptischen Frauen.

76 IISH Int 1534/33 fol, The fourth congress in pictures, WIDF, 1.-5.6.1958, p. 18.

77 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1566, Bericht über die Pressekonferenz am 10. Dezember 1948, fol. 9.

from a "monotonous Europe", the congress thus offered the German representatives the opportunity to discover "the strength of the peace forces in the world"[78] only three years after the end of the Second World War. For them, like many others, WIDF events provided a way to evade travel restrictions imposed by their regimes and contributed to increasing their usually curtailed contacts with foreigners.[79] Even though the GDR, just as the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, was characterized by the presence of foreign contract workers and international students, scholars have exposed how personal contacts were regulated or even suppressed by political authorities.[80] In the same vein, scholars have not only accounted for discrimination and xenophobia faced by foreign actors in countries of the socialist camp, but also for paternalistic and at times even Orientalist discourses in the East-South friendship campaigns.[81] A similar dynamic played out - perhaps somewhat less clearly - in the context of relationships between the DFD and 'Third World' organizations. While DFD representatives expressed admiration for the beauty and strength of women fighting in anti-colonial struggles, they were similarly convinced that these women were in need of their advice when it comes to structuring their organizations and overcoming 'backward traditions' – most notably 'Islamic belief' – in favor of 'more progressive' social structures.[82]

SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGNS

WIDF's social practices further included broad solidarity campaigns, channeled through publications, requests at the UN, solidarity letters to individual women's organizations, and local events. Solidarity expressions are abundant in WIDF and DFD archival sources and were mostly directed towards women suffering from armed conflict. A considerable part of solidarity manifestations consisted of letters expressing German women's solidarity in light of the hardships women in countries of the Global South were experiencing as mothers and workers, or sending congratulations on the occasions of anniversaries of independence.[83] Likewise, the DFD, like other mass

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78 Ibid.

79 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/825, Bd. 7, Berichte über die Arbeit des DFD, fol. 29.

80 Damian Man Con Uladh, "Studium bei Freunden. Ausländische Studierende in der DDR bis 1970", in *Ankunft – Alltag – Ausreise. Migration und interkulturelle Begegnung in der DDR Gesellschaft*, ed. Christian Müller and Patrice Poutrus (Potsdam: Zentrum für zeithistorische Forschung, 2005), 202.

81 Nikolay R. Karkov and Zhivka Valiavicharska, "Rethinking East-European Socialism: Notes Toward an Anti-Capitalist Decolonial Methodology", *Interventions* 20, no. 6 (2018), 807, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2018.1515647; Katsakioris, "The Soviet-South Encounter", 148-149.

82 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1573 Bericht über die Reise einer Delegation des DFD vom 19.-31.3.1972 nach Bangladesch und Indien, fol. 22.

83 SAPMO-BArch 31/1358, Zur Vorbereitung des Jahrbuches 1959, 8.1.1959, fol. 38.

socialist organizations, organized solidarity initiatives including material donations and recreational stays of leading women activists or politicians from the (post-)colonial world. Material consignments ranged, just to name a few examples, from sewing machines to Guinea-Bissau for an orphanage run by the women's section of the national liberation movement PAIGC, to less typical objects such as fashion magazines to Cuba.[84] In 1965, the total sum of the DFD's 'solidarity budget' amounted to 173,000 German mark, of which around a quarter was used for material donations to women's organizations in Vietnam and several African countries.[85] These campaigns fit into the wider institutionalized practice of *international solidarity* in the GDR, which was since 1960 channeled through the Solidarity Committee, structurally resembling committees in other socialist countries.[86]

Besides a range of other activities, the Solidarity Committee was responsible for the provision of scholarships for educational training in the GDR, constituting one of its

most important manifestations of solidarity with the 'Third World'.[87] As educational training evolved into a highly politicized tenet in the relationships between socialist states and newly independent countries, the socialist camp began not only to provide scholarships, but they also established new institutions for this purpose.[88] For the SED-regime, the training of foreign students and contacts with governments of the sending countries represented another means by which to counteract diplomatic isolation. In March 1955, the State Secretariat for Higher Education sent a letter to all higher education institutions, emphasizing the enhancement of the GDR's scientific reputation as important aspect in strengthening friendly relations with other countries and in achieving political and diplomatic recognition of the GDR.[89] According to the DFD, between 1965 and 1975 more than 10,000 students from developing countries had spent an educational sojourn in the GDR, among whom were reportedly "numerous women".[90] While women's

84 For Guinea-Bissau: SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1432, Schreiben an den Bundesvorstand des DFD, 26.3.1968, fol. 2; For Cuba: SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1331, Brief an Federaçion Mujeres Cubanas, 7.2.1974, fol. 135.

85 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1592, Plansumme für die Soli-Aktionen des DFD 1965, fol. 86.

86 Ulrich van der Heyden, *GDR International Development Policy Involvement: Doctrine and Strategies between Illusions and Reality, 1960-1990, The example (South) Africa* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2013), 72.

87 van der Heyden, "GDR International Development Policy Involvement", 73.

88 Constantin Katsakioris, "The Lumumba University in Moscow: higher education for a Soviet-Third World alliance, 1960-1991", *Journal of Global History* 14, no. 2 (2019), 281-282, https://doi.org/10.1017/S174002281900007X.

89 SAPMO-BArch DR 3/986, Statistische Übersicht über das Studium von ausländischen Bürgern an den Hochschulen von 1951-1963, An die Herren Rektoren der Universitäten und Hochschulen, 16 März 1955.

90 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/638, Arbeitsmaterial

organizations in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Cuba provided scholarships for female students from newly independent countries, the DFD was not authorized to do so.[91] Although repeatedly receiving requests for educational scholarships, the DFD had to reject them in all cases.[92] Apart from that, although educational cooperation did include female students, this part of East-South relationships remained a predominantly male story. While statistics of the GDR Ministry of Higher Education do not specify the gender distribution of study places, it can be assumed that a vast majority were male students, given the fact that in 1969-1970 only 11.3% of all 'Third World' students in the Soviet Union were female.[93]

WOMEN'S RELATIONSHIPS AT THE INTERFACE OF COLD WAR AND DECOLONIZATION

While interactions between women's organizations from the 'Second' and the 'Third World' had initially been taking place almost exclusively under the umbrella of the WIDF, the mid-1950s not only

signaled the beginning of growing bilateral relationships, but also became increasingly informed by diplomatic relations and foreign policy agendas of their national governments. Social practices of 'international friendship' among women thus often served political purposes with women's organizations from both the socialist camp and the (post-)colonial world conveying messages and transporting policies from their governments into the area of women's activism. For more than a decade, the Soviet Union, Eastern European regimes (including the GDR), China, and Cuba provided military and logistical support to national liberation movements in southern Africa while the US, despite a rhetorical endorsement of national self-determination, remained allies with the colonial powers and the South-African regime.[94] Against this backdrop, the DFD, like other socialist women's organizations, forged links with women's sections of national liberation movements in the Lusophone colonies in Africa, most notably the PAICG in Guinea-Bissau and the women's section of the FRELIMO in Mozambique. In 1971, the All-African Women's Conference had organized a seminar in Dar-es-Salaam in cooperation with the WIDF, bringing together African women activists and members of socialist

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für die Kommission III, fol. 111.

91 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1458, Brief an Botschafler Schulze in der VR Angola, 20.02.1986, fol. 3; for Bulgaria, see Ghodsee (2014), 257; for Soviet women, see IISH 198/92, Frauen in Aktion, 26.

92 See e.g. SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1637, Aktenvermerk über eine Besprechung mit Vorsitzendem der K.A.N.U. am 6.8.1972, fol. 1.

93 Katsakioris, "The Lumumba University in Moscow", 287.

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94 Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow, "The Cold War and southern Africa, 1976-1998", in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Volume 3, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 222.

women's committees.[95] The DFD was represented by two delegates who had received a list with precise instructions by its federal board, determining their appearance and political stance to be presented at the congress. The directive set forth that they should convey the African delegates an 'understanding of the foreign policy of the SED-regime' and describe the 'successful experiences of the GDR in the implementation of equal rights for women'[96], revealing how the propagation of socialist gender models were used as instruments of cultural diplomacy, intended at "wooing women from postcolonial countries with information about the apparent success of the communist model".[97]

At times, the dispatch of delegations openly served political ends. On the occasion of the first anniversary of Bangladesh in 1972, a DFD delegation was received by the Bangladeshi president, several ministers, and representatives of the women's section of the Awami League. Prior to the meeting, Thiele had been commissioned to 'pave the way' for diplomatic relations between the GDR and the young nation state, which she described as 'extraordinary political success' upon her return.[98]

In July 1974, only some months after the Carnation Revolution that had laid the basis for Mozambican independence in 1975, DFD representatives were received by the FRELIMO leadership and officials of the 'Organization of Mozambican Women' (OMM), the movement's women's section. Propagated as an act of anti-imperialist solidarity, the SED-regime had been providing military assistance to FRELIMO since 1967 while contacts between the DFD and Mozambican women were firstly instigated in 1972.[99] In 1973, the two organizations had concluded a friendship treaty that stipulated solidarity donations of 10,000 German marks to the OMM. As high-ranking officials, including Samora Machel, president of the FRELIMO and later president of the country attended the 1974 meeting, it was of great symbolic and political significance not only for the DFD but, in view of Mozambique's expected independence, also with regard to future diplomatic relations between the two countries.

95 Ghodsee, "Second World, Second Sex", 126.

96 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1579, Politische Direktive für die Reise der Delegation des Bundesvorstandes des DFD nach Dar-es-Salaam, 19. Juli bis 6. August 1972, fol. 18-19.

97 Donert, "Whose Utopia", 72.

98 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1573 Bericht über die Reise der Delegation, fol. 16-17.

99 Klaus Storkmann, "Fighting the Cold War in Southern Africa? East German military support to FRELIMO", *Portuguese Journal of Social Science* 9, no. 2 (2010), 154-155, https://doi.org/10.1386/pjss.9.2.151_1; SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1460, Programm für den Studienaufenthalt einer Delegation der Frauenabteilung der FRELIMO in der DDR, Juli 1972, fol. 1.

II. SYSTEMS OF SYMBOLS

Together with social practices, transnational spaces are created through 'systems of symbols', understood as "complex sign[s] [...] represent[ing] a mode of giving sense to social practice and of structuring social practice by meaningful behavior".[100] In the context of this research, symbols gain importance especially when it comes to a common peace rhetoric, figurative representations of women, and the International Women's Day. Moreover, logos used by the WIDF in its publications, its invitations, and on its conference banners were always symbols of peace. Its official logo was a dove with an olive branch that was flying in front of a globe represented through latitudes and longitudes[101], embodying the sought-for world peace and friendship among nations. Logos with a similar message were also employed by its national affiliates, with the DFD using the symbol of a globe with three women from different continents holding hands.[102] Yet, a symbolism of peace was not only imparted through images, but also by the means of emotionally charged motives and a certain rhetoric, recurrently referring to Khrushchev's *peaceful coexistence*

and nuclear disarmament of which the Soviet Union was considered a driving force.[103] These motives were embedded within discursively created 'universalist bonds' between women all over the world, such as equating womanhood with motherhood, thus framing the political agenda of the WIDF as representing the interests of all mothers alias every woman,[104]

Symbolic mobilization also found expression in the annual celebration of the International Women's Day by WIDF affiliates all over the world. In 1922 Lenin had, supported by Clara Zetkin, established the International Women's Day as a communist holiday.[105] Advocated by the WIDF and celebrated by leftist and communist women's organizations all over the world, it thus represented an important marker in the globalization of socialist claims of women's rights while, concurrently, being translated into varying local contexts. Descriptions of the latter were again circulated through WIDF publications, depicting how celebrations took shape in different local-cultural

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100 Pries, "Transnational Societal Spaces", 13.
101 Vera Mackie, "From Hiroshima to Lausanne: the World Congress of Mothers and the Hahaoya Taikai in the 1950s", *Women's History Review* (2016), 4, https://doi.org/10.1080/09612025.2015.1114317.
102 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1351, Freie Pressee Zwickau, 1949, Vier Jahre IDFF, fol. 167.

103 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1352, Bericht Mme. Cotton, fol. 42.
104 Jadwiga Pieper Mooney, "Fighting fascism and forging new political activism: The Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) in the Cold War", in *De-Centering Cold War History: Local and Global Change*, ed. Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney and Fabio Lanza (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 62.
105 Temma Kaplan, "On the Socialist Origins of the International Women's Day", *Feminist Studies* 11, no. 1 (1985), 170, www.jstor.org/stable/3180144.

settings.[106] Likewise, 8th March was framed as an occasion for delegation visits. In 1971, DFD delegates traveled to Cuba to attend the festivities. Visiting a cultural event reserved only for women from socialist countries, the East German delegate found, presumably with some surprise, that African representatives were counted among the socialist delegations,[107]

This small example is interesting with regard to the puzzling character of spatial conceptualizations, or notions such as the *socialist world system*. For example, Cuba had been playing an important role in the formation of the 'Third World' project, not least since hosting the 1966 Tricontinental Conference. Representing an important actor in the advancement of anti-imperialist claims on behalf of the Non-Aligned-Movement while at the same time sustaining close ties with the socialist camp, Cuba constituted a "trans-continental hub"[108] between Eastern Europe and the 'Third World'. This perspective was also reflected in DFD representations, emphasizing the 'friendly relationships' between the Federation of Cuban Women

(FMC) with the 'socialist states' while stressing its good relations with African countries.[109] The FMC thus constituted one of the WIDF's 'orthodox' communist affiliates while it concurrently incorporated other 'Third World' women's organizations into the spatial concept of the 'socialist system of countries'. Including newly independent countries into the socialist camp by acknowledging the existence of varying models of state socialism, it was therefore women's organizations like the FMC blurring the lines between the supposed 'worlds' – the socialist, capitalist, and the young nation states – which representatives of the DFD were holding on to in their conceptualizations of 'socialist global space'.

III. ARTEFACTS

The third element in the generation of transnational spaces is "the production and use of artefacts" including all "objectified results stemming from human action".[110] Regarding women's transnational relationships, the most significant artefacts were certainly a range of publications which can be seen as "materializations of the transnational"[111] serving as a means of transnational communication. The WIDF's farthest reaching publication

106 SAPMO-Barch DY 31/1354, Anhang zum Bulletin Nr. 8, 3 Juni 1957, Information über die Feiern zum 8 März, fol. 152-154.
107 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1331, Einschätzung der Delegation anlässlich ihres Besuches nach Kuba vom 26.2.-17.3.1971, fol. 38.
108 Berthold Unfried, "A Cuban Cycle of Developmental Socialism? Cubans and East Germans in the Socialist World System", *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik,* XXXIII (2017), 69, https://doi.org/10.20446/JEP-2414-3197-33-3-69.

109 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1331, Einschätzung der Delegation anlässlich ihres Besuches nach Kuba vom 26.2.-17.3.1971, fol. 36.
110 Pries, "Transnational Societal Spaces", 13.
111 Rodogno et.al., "Shaping the Transnational Sphere", 2.

was a magazine called *Women of the Whole World*, appearing in six languages.[112] According to de Haan, the journal served to create an "imagined community of progressive women worldwide"[113], constituting not only a source of information about the organization but also about broader political developments and women's issues in the whole world. Moreover, the Federation frequently issued the 'Information Bulletin' with news about the organization and studies on different topics. Besides these two, there were many other forms of publications such as topic-specific brochures, special bulletins, conventions, recommendations, and resolutions to the UN.[114] Artefacts resulting from the DFD's international relationships were manifold and could have different shapes, often with several actors involved. In 1965, to name only one example, the Ghanaian women's organization in joint action with the DFD and the Free German Youth, the official youth organization of the GDR, established a public sewing room, which was supposed to serve as a culture center.[115]

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

From the following study, it can be concluded that encounters between the DFD and women's organizations from the (post-)colonial world both under the umbrella of the WIDF and beyond can be interpreted as giving rise to a *transnational space* of cross-border relationships. These connections generated a complex configuration of intensive and stable social practices, systems of symbols, and artefacts and evolved into a "social-spatial reference of the everyday life world"[116] for the actors involved. Through frequent interactions, at times characterized by disagreement, these women developed, invoked, and negotiated a political agenda that tied together women's rights, global peace, and national liberation in a broader framework of *anti-imperialism*. This agenda was translated into forms of activism at different socio-spatial levels, transforming ideas of women's rights into particular political and cultural programs. The extent to which *imperialism*, however, referred to mechanisms of colonial suppression or rather to attempts by 'Western' powers to exercise global hegemony remained fluid. Speeches given by representatives revealed the often blurred lines and diverging understandings between notions

112 de Haan, "The Women's International Democratic Federation", 14.

113 Ibid.

114 FFBIZ, Sammlung DFB, Soz Int 50, IDFF: Gegründet am 1. Dezember 1945, 21

115 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1636 Maßnahmenplan für die Entwicklung der Beziehungen des DFD mit der Frauenorganisation Ghanas, 15.7.1965, fol. 3.

116 Ludger Pries, *Transnationalisierung: Theorie und Empirie grenzüberschreitender Vergesellschaftung* (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), 30.

of imperialism, colonialism, and fascism.[117]

While the WIDF at times proved to be a space of contention when it came to challenging attempts by communist women to universalize socialist conceptualizations of women's rights, this seems less the case - at least from what is reported in DFD accounts - in the context of bilateral relationships of the DFD. Part of these imbalances was certainly owed to the fact that material transfers were exclusively flowing from the GDR to 'Third World' organizations. Under the flagship of international solidarity, German representatives portrayed themselves as being in a further stage of a path that women in newly independent countries were just about to take. A significant part of the DFD's communication in fact consisted in pushing assertions that socialism had not only eradicated inequalities between the sexes, but any forms of racial discrimination.[118] Its claim to be different from 'Western imperialists' when it came to oppressive relationships,

national self-determination, and economic dependencies, however, was rooted in educational attitudes and narratives of 'advice' and 'help' which, paradoxically enough, structurally resembled the patronizing and imperialist boundaries they were actually directed against.

This latter dynamic is related to the recurring notion of 'progress', considered as contrasting with the 'barbarity of war'.[119] Even though 'progress' was never explicitly defined and certainly meant different things to members, WIDF and DFD documents however suggest that its substance ties in with what Nikolay R. Karkov and Zhivka Valiavicharska describe as "evolutionary developmentalism" characterized by 'socialist frameworks of modernization, social progress, and liberation'.[120] Principles of women's rights, embracing dimensions of peace, nuclear disarmament, and economic modernization, and their advocacy in the context of transnational congresses, local campaigns, and at the UN were thus framed in a universalist model of socialist development; forming part of what has recently entered the scholarly debate as *alternative globalizations* during the Cold War.[121] Consequently, even though women from the (post-)colonial world were actively involved in shaping the

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117 See e.g. SAPMO-BArch DY 31/1352 Diskussionsbeitrag von Mamia Chentouf, Delegierte der Nationalen Befreiungsfront Algeriens in Vertretung der algerischen Frauen, IV Kongress der IDFF in Wien, 1-5.6.1958, fol. 122-123. In her speech, the Algerian women's rights activist Mamia Chentouf linked colonial oppression with fascism, framing the war in Algeria as waged by 'the fascists of the world' who were 'posing a threat to world peace'.

118 SAPMO-BArch DY 31/905, Information der DDR: zur Verwirklichung der Konvention über die Beseitigung aller Formen der Diskriminierung der Frauen, 2.3.1982, fol. 1.

119 FFBIZ, Sammlung DFB, Soz Int 50, IDFF: Gegründet am 1. Dezember 1945, p. 1.

120 Karkov and Valiavicharska, "Rethinking East-European Socialism", 804.

121 Mark, Kalinovsky, and Marung, "Alternative Globalizations", Introduction.

women's rights agenda underlying the relationships, the latter was rooted in a development paradigm that automatically placed women from the socialist camp in a position of 'further' development. Women's organizations, their transnational relationships, and gender structures more broadly should therefore not be excluded from scholarship on global modernization projects throughout the Global Cold War.

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Methods

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What is Global History of Technology (good for)?

by

FRIEDRICH N. AMMERMANN

ABSTRACT

Despite the large role that technology plays in many Global History studies, a self-styled 'Global History of Technology' has been emerging only recently. Given that technology is not easily contained in national frameworks, global history lends itself easily to histories of technology. What is still largely missing, however, is a conceptualisation of what a 'Global History of Technology' which brings both strands together could contribute, to either discipline and as a whole. This gap is at the centre of this essay. After sketching the key ideas and development in Global History and the History of Technology, this essay outlines how a Global History of Technology could look, what it might ask, and which terms it might use. Finally, it is argued that Global History and History of Technology complement each other in many ways, and that new terms can help to sharpen Global History arguments and to provide (non-Eurocentric) 'fresh perspectives' on technology in the Global South as well as the Western world.

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INTRODUCTION

The discipline – or rather perspective – of Global History has had a remarkable career in the last two decades. Following a renewed interest in the history of globalisation, Global History has been firmly established in the field of historical research since 2000.[1] Global History soon transcended the restricted field of 'history of globalisation' and the label 'global' has subsequently been attached to a variety of sub-disciplines of historical enquiry (e.g. Global Intellectual History). Arguably, this transfer of 'global lenses' to developing new perspectives in established fields was and is the biggest success of Global History as an approach. It is surprising, therefore, that despite the large role different technologies play in a plethora of global history studies, a self-styled 'Global History of Technology' is only recently emerging. What is still largely missing, however, is a conceptualisation of what a 'Global History of Technology' that brings together Global History and the History of Technology could contribute to either discipline and as a whole.

In order to add to this discussion, I will first outline key ideas and concepts of Global History as it stands today, highlighting aspects which might be fruitful for the History of Technology. Second, I will give a brief overview over the field of the History of Technology as it developed until the 2000s, with a particular focus on the role of the '(inter)national' in those accounts. In a third step, I will describe what efforts have been made to combine both historical strands by discussing David Edgerton's *The Shock of the Old* as an example that has been published under the label 'Global History of Technology' as early as 2006. Finally, I will outline how a Global History of Technology could look, which questions it might ask, and which terms it might use. The conclusion reflects on the question of what good a Global History of Technology can or cannot contribute, to answer questions in a world increasingly dominated by technology.

GLOBAL HISTORY

Global History has attracted considerable attention since the turn of the millennium, and various attempts to define the approach have been discussed at length.[2]

1   Richard Drayton and David Motadel, "Discussion: The Futures of Global History," *Journal of Global History* 13, no. 1 (March 2018): 6, http://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-global-history/article/discussion-the-futures-of-global-history/36C53116D551E0B47E42865EC8DE0C41.

2   For instance, see Sebastian Conrad, *What Is Global History?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); Roland Wenzlhuemer, *Doing Global History : An Introduction in 6 Concepts* (London: Bloomsbury, 2020) whose monographs are the main references for this essay. Other influential discussions on Global History include: Jeremy Adelman, "What Is Global History Now," *Aeon* 2 (2 March

It seems, however, that pioneers of the field deliberately keep the definition open.[3] The minimal consensus among global historians therefore remains that connections, entanglements, and cross-border flows of goods, people, and ideas form the field's core.[4] In the following, I will sketch some of the key ideas of Global History by discussing Sebastian Conrad's emphasis on 'integration' in his influential book

What is Global History and Roland Wenzlhuemer's concept of 'transit' in his recent monograph on *Doing Global History*.

To begin with, 'connections' remain at the heart of Global History, and both Conrad and Wenzlhuemer state that it is crucial to qualify them.[5] Detecting some obscure relationship is not sufficient, unless a certain 'impact' or 'transformation' of that connection, i.e. causality, can be established.[6] Conrad calls this the 'degree of integration,'[7] which can be measured by whether changes on one end have an impact on the other.[8] The notion of 'integration' assumes a crucial position in Conrad's book; he calls integration the "methodological choice that distinguishes global history from other approaches that operate on large scales."[9] Rather than only investigating connectivity, evaluating integration can bring power relations back into the discussion, as not all ends of a connection are similarly influential, and takes arguments about causation to a global level.[10]

Wenzlhuemer argues against this focus on globally integrated phenomena and instead calls for a global-history-as-perspective approach. While agreeing that 'transregional connections' are the centrepiece of Global History and should be weighed and qualified,

2017), https://aeon.co/essays/is-global-history-still-possible-or-has-it-had-its-moment; Pamela Kyle Crossley, *What Is Global History?* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2008); Patrick O'Brien, "Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restoration of Global History," *Journal of Global History* 1, no. 1 (March 2006): 3–39, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/26471/; Dominic Sachsenmaier, *Global Perspectives on Global History: Theories and Approaches in a Connected World* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

3   As Jürgen Osterhammel emphasised in a recent discussion with researchers at the EUI (Jürgen Osterhammel, "Conversation with Jürgen Osterhammel" (Core Seminar, Department of History and Civilization, European University Institute, Fiesole, 31 October 2019). See also Roland Wenzlhuemer's closing remarks that 'openness [reflected in the concepts and analytical tools] is indeed the highest value' in Wenzlhuemer, *Doing Global History*, 176.

4   In a rather radical manner, Osterhammel defined a limit of global history in the same discussion (Osterhammel, "Conversation with Jürgen Osterhammel".): Asked how historians should include the people/things that do not move, Osterhammel advised not to call it 'global history', but to research it anyway. Drayton and Motadel instead emphasise that disintegration, interruption, and 'things which do not flow' have always been on the research agenda for global historians (Drayton and Motadel, "Discussion", 9.).

5   Conrad, *What Is Global History?*, 64–65.
6   Conrad, 72.
7   Conrad, 68.
8   Conrad, 91.
9   Conrad, 67.
10 Conrad, 72.

Wenzlhuemer asks more about the particularities of a specific connection and less about its 'integration'.[11] As opposed to Conrad, who gives little advice on where or whom to look at, Wenzlhuemer specifically emphasises the centrality of actors as *they*, in his opinion, lend substance to connections and are the points in time and space where these contacts converge and play out.[12] This actor-centrism makes connections visible and narrates entertaining stories—and can bear the danger of overloading individual actors with global connections and meanings.[13] Apart from his actor-centrism, Wenzlhuemer introduces 'transit' as another, and arguably his most original, contribution to making Global History feasible. The idea behind 'transits' is to closely examine the *connection*, taking it seriously as a mediator in and of itself, rather than thinking of the connection only from its ends.[14]

This fundamental interest in connections—and the assessment of their impact—is based on the conviction of global historians that 'historical units', whether they be societies, nations, or kinship-groups, can only be understood by looking at their interactions with each other.[15] The 'nation', for instance, is therefore only one level of analysis among many for global historians; indeed, overcoming the 'national container' as the exclusive unit of historical analysis is a key concern within Global History. Another key concern is to avoid the methodological privileging of one world region over others, as is the case with Eurocentrism.[16] Europe is therefore neither the centre of the world nor—and this is a crucial point for the history of technology—the exclusive 'locus of innovation.'[17]

Global History as a distinct approach therefore has a specific focus on connections (and integration) beyond the nation-state and a decidedly non-Eurocentric agenda. As we will see in the following sections, both lend themselves easily to a combination with the History of Technology.

HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY

It is interesting to note that Conrad and Wenzlhuemer both acknowledge the crucial role (European) technology has played in integrating the globe. Conrad identified technology as "one of the most powerful narratives explaining the emergence of global cohesion,"[18]

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11 Wenzlhuemer, *Doing Global History*, 5, 20.
12 Wenzlhuemer, 93.
13 See for instance Wenzlhuemer's story of the mutiny on the *Bounty* (Wenzlhuemer, chap. 5.), which he embeds in global developments that reminds us of an 'everything is connected'-approach, while struggling to prove convincingly how far those caused the mutiny.
14 Wenzlhuemer, 163.

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15 Conrad, *What Is Global History?*, 65.
16 Conrad, 3–4 and Wenzlhuemer, *Doing Global History*, 1.
17 Conrad, *What Is Global History?*, 74.
18 Conrad, 103.

although he remains skeptical of its explanatory potential. On the other hand, Wenzlhuemer's book is deeply technological, with telegraphs and steamers playing prominent roles.[19] Neither one, however, discusses the history of technology, and both only touch upon the potentials of a global history of technology without calling it such.

This lack of attention to technology in global history may be related to the fact that speaking of the 'history of technology' is not as straightforward as it sounds. The trouble with defining History of Technology starts exactly with the term 'technology'. Scholars criticise that the term is used simultaneously to describe very specific technical solutions as well as the entirety of human tools to accomplish objectives, often entailing the perception that it is technology that drives the history of man (and quite literally so for a long time, as the history of technology had an immense gender bias).[20] Historian of technology David Edgerton, for instance, called the term 'a brain macerating concept' and decided

at some point in his scholarly career to abandon it altogether in his publications. He now speaks of concrete objects, or if he needs a more open term, of 'things'.[21] For the purpose of this article, I shall keep to a broad definition of 'technology' which describes a multitude of practical, often physical, and purposeful applications of knowledge.

The field of 'history of technology' itself dates back to at least 1900 and mainly introduced readers to important inventions in human history, alongside their genius creators.[22] The stories became less optimistic, emphasising the potentially negative, deterministic role of large technologies in the 1930s and 1940s, foreshadowing a social history approach to the history of technology.[23] The field further solidified (and Americanised) with the founding of the Society for the History of Technology (SHOT) in 1958, but was mostly confined to Cold War narratives of free technological development inherently leading to a Western-style

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19 Wenzlhuemer, *Doing Global History*, 13.
20 For a discussion of the term 'technology' see: Leo Marx, "The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept," *Technology and Culture* 51, no. 3 (July 2010): 561–77, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40927986; Eric Schatzberg, *Technology: Critical History of a Concept* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2018). For an account of technology's role in world's history see for instance: Arnulf Grübler, *Technology and Global Change* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

21 David L. Edgerton, *The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900*, 2nd ed. (London: Profile Books, 2019), xi–xii.
22 T.P. Hughes, "History of Technology," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, ed. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (Philadelphia, PA: Elsevier, 2001), 6852. One example: Samuel Smiles, *Lives of the Engineers* (New York: Scribner, 1905).
23 See for instance: Siegfried Giedion, *Mechanization Takes Command.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948).

democratisation.[24] Nevertheless, the scope of approaches diversified during this period, and in particular the social and cultural conditions under which innovators invented technology moved to the centre of many studies.[25] Historians of technology reached a breaking point in their field in the 1980s, when they moved away from teleological stories of (inherent) progress and techno-determinism.[26] New approaches paid attention to the 'social construction of technology',[27] and Michael Adas famously showed how technology became the prime measure for the West to assert its supremacy.[28] Other historians uncovered stories of (active) users and consumers, with a distinct interest in marginalised actors such as women or non-Westerners.[29]

Taking these actors seriously, a subsequent shift from innovation to use and repair has taken place in recent years.[30] In a 2003 study, for instance, Dale Rose and Stuart Blume showed how citizens assumed an active role as (non) users of vaccinations, thus complicating state-led top-down vaccination initiatives.[31]

Countless studies that were produced during the different periods outlined above were told within national borders, often making claim to the singularity of (or the development in) one particular nation. The arguments for national singularity based on a history of technology can roughly be divided into two groups. The first group emphasises invention, attempting to show how a specific national feature

24 John M. Staudenmaier, "Rationality, Agency, Contingency: Recent Trends in the History of Technology," *Reviews in American History* 30, no. 1 (2002): 168, https://www.jstor.org/stable/30031729.

25 Staudenmaier, 168. This emphasis on social and cultural approaches was reflected in the name of SHOT's journal ˮTechnology and Culture", which was launched in 1959.

26 Staudenmaier, 170.

27 Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker, "The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other," *Social Studies of Science* 14, no. 3 (1984): 399–441, https:doi.org/10.1177/030631284014003004.

28 Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men : Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

29 See for instance: Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch, "Users as Agents of Technological Change: The Social Construction of the Automobile in the Rural United States," *Technology and Culture* 37, no.

4 (1996): 763–95, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3107097; Ruth Oldenziel, "Man the Maker, Woman the Consumer : The Consumption Junction Revisited," in *Feminism in Twentieth Century Science, Technology, and Medicine*, ed. A.N.H. Creager, E. Lunbeck, and L. Schiebinger, Women in Culture and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 128–48, https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/man-the-maker-woman-the-consumer-the-consumption-junction-revisit.

30 See for instance: Stefan Krebs and Heike Weber, eds., *Histories of Technology's Persistence: Repair, Reuse and Disposal.* (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2020). And the following discussion of David Edgerton's pledge for use-based history and maintenance.

31 Dale Rose and Stuart Blume, "Citizens as Users of Technology: An Exploratory Study of Vaccines and Vaccination," in *How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of Users and Technologies*, ed. Nelly Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch, Inside Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 103–31.

made a nation specifically innovative and thus successful.[32] A second, less innovation-centered strand tries to demonstrate how a technology in one country developed in a particular way.[33] It is noteworthy, however, that studies in technology were not necessarily confined to national borders. While having a strong bias towards 'Western' technology, the History of Technology never became a field of exclusively national stories and explanations, but throughout remained open for regional and world historical accounts of technological development.[34] The genre of a 'History of Technology' (i.e. a story of inventions in human history) made it necessary to look at various places of invention around the globe, often in timeframes that complicated national story-telling (which modern nation could plausibly claim descent from the inventors of the fist axe or the wheel?) A focus on 'modern' technology (starting with the invention of the printing press or the steam engine) made such claims much more feasible, but the fact that technology continued to be developed, diffused, and used in different places makes it difficult to confine nationally.[35] Most people will agree that the steam engine was developed in Britain—but how long can one convincingly speak of a solely British technology? The effects of such technology are even more ambiguous: for example, the railway, powered by steam engines, has been credited with fostering the national,[36] as well as the transnational.[37] Somewhere between these discourses, but in no way contradictory, different technologies played a crucial role in colonialism, imperialism, and globalisation.[38] But does that make the History of Technology global, and what could a Global History of Technology look like?

32 David Edgerton, "From Innovation to Use: Ten Eclectic Theses on the Historiography of Technology," *History and Technology* 16, no. 2 (January 1999): 117, https://doi.org/10.1080/07341519908581961. See for instance: Richard Nelson, *National Innovation Systems : A Comparative Analysis* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1993).

33 One example regarding aviation history is Tunde Decker, *A History of Aviation in Nigeria, 1925-2005* (Lagos: Dele-Davis, 2008).

34 A survey of the various editions of Bloomsbury Academic's book series *"A History of Technology"* (33 volumes since 1976) for instance shows a fairly equal distribution between issues on regional, national, or topical themes. For an example of a world historical approach on the social conditions of innovation see: George Basalla, *The Evolution of Technology* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

35 Edgerton, *The Shock of the Old*, 122.

36 See Ian J. Kerr, *Engines of Change: The Railroads That Made India*, Moving through History: Transportation and Society Series (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007).

37 See Irene Anastasiadou, *Constructing Iron Europe. Transnationalism and Railways in the Interbellum* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016).

38 See Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

TOWARDS A GLOBAL HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY

The methodological exchange between the disciplines has been scarce and was mainly initiated by historians of technology recently, who felt the need to respond to some approaches and claims of global history.[39] Overall, the History of Technology was comparably late and cautious to incorporate approaches of Global History. In 2013, Matthias Heymann noted in an extensive review of new German and English language publications within the History of Technology that the field of a transnational or global history of technology remains largely open and to be explored in the future.[40] In the same year, Dagmar Schäfer and Marcus Popplow came forward with a more pronounced critique of global history approaches, arguing that Global History employs an overly functionalist understanding of technology merely as a catalyst of globalisation.[41] They instead emphasise that objects are also being altered by processes of globalisation and call for a closer investigation of them in specific contexts.[42] Schäfer and Popplow warn that the application of Western standards of technology globally will result in stories of deficits, but they express the hope that a more local, non-Western history of technology might also open up fresh perspectives on Western technology.[43] Eike-Christian Heine and Christian Zumbrägel stay back behind that research agenda in their 2018 contribution, but emphasise the need for a global history of technology to develop new, meaningful terms to explain specific and local technological solutions.[44] The most comprehensive and recent discussion of 'global histories of technology' was presented by Ute Hasenöhrl, who identified three main topics for further inquiry: global history as a history of connections; new histories of infrastructures and Large Technological Systems; and bottom-up, user-based global microhistories.[45] Her emphasis on

39 Ute Hasenöhrl, "Globalgeschichten Der Technik", in *Provokationen Der Technikgeschichte. Zum Reflexionszwang Historischer Forschung*, ed. Martina Heßler and Heike Weber (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2019), 158.

40 Matthias Heymann, "Konsolidierung, Aufbruch Oder Niedergang? Ein Review-Essay Zum Stand Der Technikgeschichte," *NTM Zeitschrift Für Geschichte Der Wissenschaften, Technik Und Medizin* 21, no. 4 (2013): 422, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00048-014-0110-z.

41 Dagmar Schäfer and Marcus Popplow, "Einleitung. Globalisierung, Kulturvergleich und transnationaler Techniktransfer

als Herausforderung für die Technikgeschichte," *TG Technikgeschichte* 80, no. 1 (2013): 4, https://doi.org/10.5771/0040-117X-2013-1-3.

42 Schäfer and Popplow, 10.

43 Schäfer and Popplow, 11.

44 Eike-Christian Heine and Christian Zumbrägel, "Technikgeschichte," 20 December 2018, 24–25, https://zeitgeschichte-digital.de/doks/frontdoor/index/index/docId/1319. For a discussion of 'creole technologies', see later in this chapter.

45 See Hasenöhrl, "Globalgeschichten Der Technik".

infrastructures (an old field within the History of Technology) is convincing, as infrastructures form the often unnoticed basis of modern life. Shedding light on the workings and rationales of infrastructures (and its planners, builders, and maintainers) allows for a better understanding of top–down channeling attempts and the evolving practices of its users. Particularly conclusive is Hasenöhrl´s call for a commodity chain analysis 'from cradle to grave', as it fosters a combined discussion on the intersecting histories of technology, business, and the environment.[46] This not only brings environmental impacts back into the picture, but also emphasises the power relations of production and distribution of excess profits.

In order to move beyond these general outlooks on a Global History of Technology, I am now turning to a more practical example. As mentioned previously, technology features prominently in a plethora of Global History studies, and the History of Technology has taken a global perspective ever since. Few studies, however, explicitly define themselves as Global Histories of Technology. I identified only one book which carries both approaches in its title: David Edgerton's *The Shock of the Old: Technology and*

Global History Since 1900.[47] Although it was published some years ago in 2006, it provides approaches and food for thought on how such a history could look. I will therefore briefly outline some key ideas from *The Shock of the Old* before discussing where a Global History of Technology might go.

The Shock of the Old may not have "shocked" academia, but it nevertheless received considerable attention.[48] In this monograph, Edgerton makes a very straightforward point: the impact of a piece of technology does not usually reach its zenith immediately after its innovation, but (much) later. It therefore overlaps with older and newer technologies, often creating a contemporaneity—sometimes interdependence—of them.[49] In order to produce more insightful histories of technology and the world, Edgerton therefore pledges for two shifts of perspective: first, from invention/innovation to use, and second, from the Global North to the

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46 Hasenöhrl, 153, 171. Investigating the relationship of technology and the environment is not new (for a classic, see: William Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997)), but can be potentially very rewarding from a global perspective.

47 Edgerton, *The Shock of the Old*. Further, a research project with the promising title: "A Global History of Technology, 1850 – 2000 (GLOBAL-HOT)" is currently going on at Technische Universität Darmstadt, led by Mikael Hård.

48 Besides attracting a good number of reviews by peers, his book also gained attention in non-academic publications (see for instance: David Goldblatt, "The Shock of the Old, by David Edgerton. The Past in the Saddle," *The Independent*, 26 January 2007, https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/the-shock-of-the-old-by-david-edgerton-433628.html).

49 Edgerton, *The Shock of the Old*, 34..

Global South.[50] The first shift to a use-based history, Edgerton claims, will produce radically different accounts of technologies and their impacts in space and time.[51] His example that an invention-based history would claim 1965 as the year of the internet illustrates this point well.[52] The shift from the Global North to the Global South then is to be understood as the establishment of a non-Eurocentric agenda upon which he would build in the following years. It is based on the conviction that current narratives about the Global South are not only inaccurate, but that models from the South can help to rewrite the history of modernity in the North.[53]

Despite its subheading "Technology and Global History since 1900", Edgerton did not engage with the emerging literature on Global History in 2006, as he openly admits in the preface to the second edition in 2019. Neither does he do so in the second edition, besides his remark that he has now read the literature on Global History with a 'certain disappointment.' To him, Global History seems to reiterate "techno-globalist clichés about a shrinking interconnected world" with an overemphasis on circulation and networks, as well as transportation and communication.[54] Unfortunately,

Edgerton does not elaborate on which direction Global History should take instead, and presents a rather simple perspective on the global. The central part of Edgerton's idea of the global is that technology is used everywhere around the globe and a use-based history would uncover these global histories.[55] Together with Edgerton's concept of 'creole technologies'[56]—essentially locally adapted foreign technologies—the potential of such a history on a global scale is almost without limits. In his arguably most interesting chapter, Edgerton points further to another potential avenue within histories of technology: the fact that what is being used has to be maintained. Edgerton reminds us that the majority of scientists and engineers are concerned with maintenance and operation of 'things' rather than their invention.[57] He therefore claims that 'maintenance and repair are the most widespread forms of technical expertise,'[58] often left to marginal groups operating outside the formal economy.[59] Whether formal or informal, maintenance is also a business, involving independent mechanics as well as large companies. In that sense, a use-based (maintenance) history of

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50 Although Edgerton uses the expression "rich and poor countries," I decided to use the less dated terminology of "Global North and South."
51 Edgerton, *The Shock of the Old*, xxi.
52 Edgerton, xix.
53 Edgerton, xv.
54 Edgerton, xv.

55 Edgerton, xxiii.
56 David Edgerton, "Creole Technologies and Global Histories: Rethinking How Things Travel in Space and Time." *History of Science and Technology* 1, no. 1 (2007): 75–112, http://www.johost.eu/vol1_summer_2007/vol1_de.htm.
57 Edgerton, *The Shock of the Old*, xxv.
58 Edgerton, 80.
59 Edgerton, 77, 80.

technology has the potential to tell stories about people and their interaction with technology on all social levels around the globe.

Overall, Edgerton points towards a local, use-based history of the appropriation of technology with particular attention to the Global South. He seems less concerned with the identification of global connections besides the fact that a certain technology at some point diffuses into a region where it had not 'originally' been invented. A Conradian integration of appropriated technologies in a global network is no requirement to call a history 'global'. This is both a strength and a weakness of this approach. It can be a strength because it allows for stories of disconnection to be told (for instance, in the case of a technology that is so profoundly appropriated locally that it barely resembles the 'original' technology anymore) or of similar, yet unconnected processes of appropriation. It can also be a weakness, as existing global ties and their impacts might be overlooked.[60] This even raises the question of whether such a history without connections should be called Global History.[61] One way to mediate between the disconnected and the

integrated can be the study of maintenance. A closer look at groups of actors such as maintenance experts or spare parts traders could unearth fascinating stories, reconnecting the local with the global. Following these stories can (and should) also bring the question of power back into the History of Technology. Questions such as who finances maintenance, who owns the technology, who has the patents and the operational knowledge, and who defines the terms of use and regulation need answering.

From that angle, a Global History of Technology seems to pave a clear path into the future inquiry of the local and specific on a global scale. Actors of local appropriation, maintenance, and repair in the Global South could therefore become the new protagonists of the history of technology. The findings of these bottom-up approaches can then be applied to the Global North to possibly identify similar processes of appropriation, or 'migrated' technology, there.

Although this seems to neatly lead into a local history of the global, I would like to raise four dimensions of a Global History of Technology that should not be forgotten (and have been worked on previously). First, at least since the 20th century most goods, among them machines, were produced transnationally and at times globally. One example is the Volkswagen Beetle that was physically and culturally a global

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60 Edgerton provides the example of the rickshaw which, after being developed in Japan in the 1870s, spread to China, India, and every other country in south and east Asia, eventually finding its way onto the streets of London. See Edgerton, 46–47.

61 See Osterhammel's remark on disconnection and immobility in footnote 4.

product.[62] A Global History of Technology should "follow the thing"[63] with an eye on the power relations of its production. Second, despite going into the local, the dimension of Conradian integration should still be kept in mind. For example, by doing a microhistory of one harbour, the story of the container that changed entire flows of goods can hardly be uncovered.[64] Third, we must avoid falling into the pitfalls of teleological narratives, especially ones that overemphasise connectedness within global history. Instead, we must pay attention to the creation of disconnections as well. The telegraph is one example where the connectedness of one place can easily become the disadvantage of another. Weapons are another hitherto underrepresented technological player in the (dis-) connection of the globe.[65] It is this disconnection that leads to the fourth and final point I want to raise here: to reiterate Wenzlhuemer's concept of 'transit', we should take the connections themselves seriously. Both how a technology establishes and influences a connection (be it the steamship or the telegraph) *and* how technologies themselves travel

and evolve in the process need to be studied.

In order to move towards such a Global History of Technology, it is useful to reflect on the analytical terms we use. 'Appropriation' and 'circulation', for instance, emphasise the understanding that technologies are being changed by their users in different spatial and temporal contexts. David Arnold showed how the sewing machine was locally appropriated in India, while Christiane Reichart-Burikukiye provided the example of how Muslim preachers readily used new railway stations to spread Islam in German East Africa.[66] Kapil Raj specifically emphasised the transformative conception of the term 'circulation' in his 2013 piece.[67] Furthermore, employing the term 'circulation' is an attempt to avoid essentialised notions of 'pure' technologies that are inherent to terms such as Edgerton`s aforementioned 'creole technologies'.[68] Terms like

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62 See Bernhard Rieger, *The People's Car : A Global History of the Volkswagen Beetle* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

63 Conrad, *What Is Global History?*, 121.

64 See Marc Levinson, *The Box : How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

65 Edgerton, *The Shock of the Old*, 116.

66 David Arnold, "Global Goods and Local Usages: The Small World of the Indian Sewing Machine, 1875–1952," *Journal of Global History* 6, no. 3 (November 2011): 407–29, https://www.doi.org/10.1017/S1740022811000398; Christiane Reichart, "The Railway in Colonial East Africa : Colonial Iconography and African Appropriation of a New Technology," in *Landscape, Environment and Technology in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa*, ed. Toyin Falola and Emily Brownell (New York: Routledge, 2012), 62–86.

67 Kapil Raj, "Beyond Postcolonialism … and Postpositivism: Circulation and the Global History of Science," *Isis* 104, no. 2 (1 June 2013): 343, https://www.doi.org/10.1086/670951.

68 For a critique of the term see Hasenöhrl,

'appropriation' and 'circulation' are thus a good start to developing a new and meaningful semantic arsenal for writing a Global History of Technology.

A transformation in analytical terminology not only enables us to shift the focus of histories of technology, but it also helps to prevent Eurocentric analyses—one of the two main concerns of Global History according to Sebastian Conrad. Popularising concepts such as 'circulation' and 'appropriation' is a move against Eurocentric historiographies, acknowledging definitions of technology according to non-Western standards. This broader understanding of technology, engineering, and innovation (e.g. 'creative repairing') can then provide 'fresh perspectives' on local histories of the Global South.[69]

CONCLUSION

How then can the fields of Global History and History of Technology profit from each other and what are the potentials of a

Global History of Technology? Overall, it seems that the two approaches complement each other in many ways. On the one hand, Global History concepts such as 'integration' can help historians of technology uncover the large links and networks in which local phenomena are entangled. Wenzlhuemer's concept of 'transit' can help historians analyse these links better and take them seriously as factors in their own right. This emphasis on (long-distance) connections enables historians of technology to make claims outside of the local and specific and indeed, constitutes a *global* history of technology, as opposed to histories of technology around the world.

On the other hand, more nuanced analyses of technologies can be a helpful tool for global historians. The diffusion and local appropriation of technologies, as well as their role in establishing 'long distance' connections, make them ideal objects of studies outside the 'national container'. A history of engineering, maintenance, and repair further provides Global History with a most diverse set of elite and non-elite actors on global, national, and local levels. The inquiry into those local actors and their embedding in larger networks can also shed light on an additional path of doing small scale global histories. However, when following these actors, Global History should also take note of histories of disconnection, decay, and the return of older technologies that so far are rarely on its research agenda. There

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"Globalgeschichten Der Technik," 179. For a discussion on terms, knowledge, and colonialism see Harald Fischer-Tiné, *Pidgin-Knowledge : Wissen Und Kolonialismus* (Diaphanes, 2013).

69 For instance, Gabrielle Hecht highlighted the potential of science and technology studies for African history (David Serlin, "Confronting African Histories of Technology: A Conversation with Keith Breckenridge and Gabrielle Hecht," *Radical History Review* 2017, no. 127 (January 2017): 100, https://www.doi.org/10.1215/01636545-3690870.

could also potentially be a global history of disconnection to be written in the future; weapons or border technologies, for example, could be a starting point in that direction. Stories of that type counter David Edgerton´s concern that Global History only produces "techno-globalist clichés about a shrinking interconnected world."[70] When considering the points mentioned above, I argue that a Global History of Technology can help find answers in a time when globalisation is perceived in an increasingly critical light, while dependence on global technology networks only continues to grow.

70 Edgerton, *The Shock of the Old*, xv.

From Imperial Science to Post-Patriotism: The Polemics and Ethics of British Imperial History

by

EMMA GATTEY

ABSTRACT

Through a brief intellectual biography of British imperial history, this article examines and expands upon recent academic demands for a renovated 'professional ethics' of history. It also tracks new developments in global environmental historiography, and asks how global and imperial historians can best acquit themselves of their professional and ethical responsibilities in the Anthropocene. The ideological operation of imperial history was manifest in the racist self-justification of imperialism and its associated policies of dispossession, exploitation, genocide, and assimilation, as disseminated through British imperial history taught at Oxbridge in the nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. But it is also present, if less obvious, in the transnational histories of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries, which tend to ignore climate change. The latter strand of imperial history thus functions to disguise or vindicate the political and economic interests of the Global North in failing to mitigate and adapt to further climate change, and the resulting crises which will be disproportionately borne by the states and citizens of the Global South. This article argues that in order to identify the harms of empire—both epistemic and physical, past and ongoing—imperial history must address the role of empire-building in the origins and trajectory of the climate crisis.

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From its inception in the late nineteenth century, the field of British imperial history was intended to provide ideological and practical support for empire. Although this sub-discipline has evolved through multiple theoretical 'turns' in recent decades, inevitably affected by the methodological developments in global history, imperial history is still used to naturalise global power structures as well as geopolitical and economic imparities. It is also used to criticize these same hierarchies, but as several global and imperial historians have remarked, there are serious ethical challenges associated with tethering history to policy, and to public understandings of the past. To meet these challenges, Richard Drayton and Dane Kennedy have urged academics to adopt a 'post-patriotic', self-reflective imperial history, one which transcends ideology.[1] Well-known scholars within the burgeoning sub-discipline of global and imperial history, and with extensive publications on the history of science, race, and British imperialism, both Drayton and Kennedy have cast a keen methodological eye towards global history's longevity, morality and impact. This is no doubt meaningful

work. However, these historians' entreaties are marked by their own positionality, one which focuses on ideological and political battlegrounds between polities and empires, at the expense of a truly global focus on the most pressing planetary conjuncture of our time: the climate crisis, and its enduring connections with empire. This essay summarises these debates, which have long tended to sidestep environmental and climatic concerns, before surveying recent global histories which have closely analysed the interconnections between empire and climate change. Paying closer attention to the dialectics of world-ecology,[2] these new works of scholarship signal a tipping point in global environmental historiography.

Taking Drayton and Kennedy's demands for a 'professional ethics' of history as a springboard, this essay argues that historians must expand our professional ethical agenda to a fully global, or planetary, scale. This essay recognises the 'special responsibilities' of global and imperial historians to spur a post-imperial 'global studies' movement.[3] It highlights our related obligations to be self-reflexive about our practices and positionality, and to expose presentist, ideological claims about the past.[4] But it also takes these arguments further, in order to

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1   Richard Drayton, "Where Does the World Historian Write From? Objectivity, Moral Conscience and the Past and Present of Imperialism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 3 (July 2011): 684, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41305352; Dane Kennedy, "The Imperial History Wars," *Journal of British Studies* 54 (January 2015): 5–22, https://doi.org/10.1017/jbr.2014.166.

2   See Jason W. Moore, *Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital* (London: Verso, 2015).

3   Drayton, "Human Future," 158, 166-9.

4   Kennedy, "Imperial History Wars," 5-6, 22.

augment both the discipline itself and the public response to anthropogenic climate change. In short, to identify the harms of empire, imperial history must address the role of empire-building in the origins and trajectory of the climate crisis. The twenty-first century 'professional ethics' of history demands nothing less.

AN 'IMPERIAL SCIENCE'?

Assuming 'specifically imperial roles' by training colonial administrators in both theory and praxis, select British universities became 'stakeholders in Empire' and an integral part of 'the apparatus of Britain's imperial system'.[5] Within this apparatus, imperial history served as both ideological justification for empire and colonization, and as an integral part in the training programme for colonial administrators.[6] The twentieth-century consolidation of colonial rule in Britain's newer colonies in Africa led to, amongst other things, the inauguration of Colonial Service training at Oxford and Cambridge in 1926.[7] Both universities developed particular expertise in the emergent subfield of imperial and Commonwealth history.[8] Although anthropology became the social science most intimately

associated with imperialism during the interwar period,[9] imperial history, too, was a crucial weapon in the pedagogical arsenal of empire.[10] From the late twentieth century, in the wake of postcolonial studies, deconstructionism and structuralism, anticolonial critiques have spread to encompass anthropology and ethnography. Both disciplines have grappled with issues of appropriation, decolonisation and representation, often being equated with colonial ideology.[11] Imperial history, however, has not faced the same degree of external critique and disciplinary soul-searching. Since each of these disciplines had such a formative position in shaping racist knowledge, their practitioners bear a special responsibility to acknowledge past wrongs and to reorient and decolonise methodologies for the present and future.[12]

Against this evolving background of intra-disciplinary politics, several leading historians have stepped into the breach. Drayton has repeatedly traced the intellectual genealogy of British imperial history as a 'patriotic

5   Sarah E. Stockwell, *The British End of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 7-8, 23.
6   Stockwell, *British End,* 26-7.
7   Stockwell, *British End,* 23.
8   Stockwell, *British End,* 27, 30.

9   Stockwell, *British End,* 27.
10   Dane Kennedy, "Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 24, no. 3 (September 1996): 345, https://doi.org/10.1080/03086539608582983.
11   Nicholas Thomas, *The Return of Curiosity: What Museums are Good for in the Twenty-first Century* (London: Reaktion Books, 2016), 12, 20.
12   See Gurminder K Bhambra, Dalia Gebrial and Kerem Nişancioğlu (eds.), *Decolonising the University* (London: Pluto Press, 2018).

enterprise' which inflicts both epistemic and physical violence by obscuring the role of coercion and violence in the expansion of empire.[13] Writing most recently as Rhodes Professor of Imperial History at King's College London, Drayton's self-described polemics are animated by a sense of professional responsibility to interrogate this historiographical past.[14] Drawing a direct line between the 'national chauvinism and pro-imperial sentiment' of John Seeley's *The Expansion of England* and the twenty-first century imperialist hagiography of the Scottish-American popular historian Niall Ferguson,[15] Drayton also examines the earliest incumbents of the endowed chairs at Oxford, who adopted and preached a 'uniformly benign view of British imperium'.[16]

While conceding that the Oxford programme was attractive in its chronological and geographic scope (the centuries-long timeframe and worldwide focus of colonial history), Drayton argues that this history was 'wholly subordinated to the psychological needs of the

British polity.'[17] The scholarship of Sir Reginald Coupland, Beit Professor of Colonial History at Oxford (1920-1948), epitomises the ideological defence of empire. Coupland spoke and wrote of the British Empire as an honourable trustee: a benevolent force in the world, operating according to 'the doctrine of trusteeship'.[18] In this view, he was no outlier. In 1942, Oxford's Registrar Sir Douglas Veale wrote to Sir Ralph Furse, Director of Service Recruitment at the Colonial Office, assuring him that at Oxford, cadets would be exposed to 'objective' scholarly assessments of Britain's imperial record, but would still believe in 'the value of what they are doing … that on the whole the British Empire has been a beneficent Institution'.[19] Clearly, this training involved the very antithesis of 'objective' historical scholarship. Imperial history was an extension of, and even a monument to, the benevolent spread of British cultural, socio-political, and economic systems.

13 Drayton, 'Where Does the World Historian Write From?," 675. See also Richard Drayton, "Imperial History and the Human Future," *History Workshop Journal* 74, no. 1 (Autumn 2012): 156-172, https://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbr074.

14 Drayton, "Human Future," 158.

15 Drayton, "Where Does the World Historian Write From?," 672, 675. For an account of Ferguson's neo-imperialist history, see Pankaj Mishra, 'Watch This Man', *London Review of Books*, 33/21 (3 November 2011) https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v33/n21/pankaj-mishra/watch-this-man.

16 Drayton, "Human Future," 157.

17 Richard Drayton, "Imperial and Commonwealth History: A Genealogy" (address to Modern History Faculty, Oxford, 29 October 1997): 7-8.

18 See Reginald C. Coupland, *The Empire in These Days: An Interpretation* (London: Macmillan, 1935). For a critique of the mandate system of the League of Nations and its successor, the trusteeship system under the United Nations, see Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), ch 3.

19 Bodleian Library, Oxford University Archives, UR 6/Col/6, Sir Douglas Veale to Sir Ralph Furse, 11 September 1942, cited in Stockwell, *British End,* 34.

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL EVOLUTION

Predictably, the historiographical pendulum swung on. Co-authors and leading Oxbridge historians of imperial and commonwealth history, Jack Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, challenged this patriotic orthodoxy from the 1950s. Through their work, they extended the scope of imperial history beyond formal empire and recognised the colonized as agents of historical change.[20] Not needing the subject-recognition of academic observers, Indigenous and other colonized peoples had long recognised themselves as agents of historical change and creators of historical meaning.[21]

Still, this ostensibly 'anti-ideological turn' could not, of course, transcend ideology.[22] By refocusing attention on indigenous agents and the 'submerged' histories of specific peripheries,[23] Gallagher and Robinson's thesis insulated the imperial core and 'the national story' from association with overseas violence.[24]

In 1984, David Fieldhouse (arguably once the world's 'leading imperial economic historian')[25] and the American historian Robin Winks separately diagnosed the fragmentation—presumably irreparable—of imperial history in the aftermath of decolonization.[26] Both historians saw the field dissolving into nationalist histories in service of the new nation-states. However,

20 Jack Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review* 6, no. 1 (August 1953): 1-15, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0289.1953.tb01482.x; Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London: Macmillan, 1957). Gallagher (1963-70) and Robinson (1971-87) were successive Beit Professors of Commonwealth History at Oxford. Gallagher went on to become Vere Harmsworth Professor of Imperial and Naval History at the University of Cambridge (1971-80).

21 See, for scant but significant examples, Makereti, *The Old-Time Maori* (London, 1938; repr. Auckland, 1986); Te Rangihiroa, 'The Coming of the Maori', in *Cawthron Lectures: Volume II* (Nelson, 1925), pp. 17-57. For analysis, see Jane Carey, 'A "Happy Blending"? Māori Networks, Anthropology and "Native" Policy in New Zealand, the Pacific and Beyond', in Jane Carey and Jane Lydon (eds.), *Indigenous Networks: Mobility, Connections and Exchange* (New York, 2014), pp. 184-215; Ned Blackhawk and Isaiah Lorado Wilner

(eds.), *Indigenous Visions: Rediscovering the World of Franz Boas* (New Haven, 2018), pp. 3-41.

22 Drayton, "Where Does the World Historian Write From?," 677-8.

23 Gallagher and Robinson, "Imperialism of Free Trade," 1.

24 Drayton, "Where Does the World Historian Write From?," 678.

25 Peter Burroughs, 'David Fieldhouse and the Business of Empire', in Peter Burroughs and A.J. Stockwell (eds.), *Managing the Business of Empire: Essays in Honour of David Fieldhouse* (London: Routledge, 1998), 7.

26 David Fieldhouse, "Can Humpty-Dumpty Be Put Together Again? Imperial History in the 1980s," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 12, no. 2 (January 1984): 9–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/03086538408582657; Robin W. Winks, "Problem Child of British History: The British Empire-Commonwealth," in *Recent Views on British History: Essays on Historical Writing Since 1966*, ed. R. Schlatter (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984): 451–92.

these have proved premature eulogies. From the 1980s onwards, subjecting itself to turn after turn, imperial history has constantly regenerated its field of inquiry and methodology through interaction with other disciplines.[27] As part of the social and cultural turns of the 1980s, imperial history has extended its sphere of concern and methodology by borrowing from comparative literature, historical anthropology, feminist history and gender history.[28]

This brings us to the font of postcolonial studies: the influential literary and cultural critic, Edward Said. Flowing from Said's seminal text, *Orientalism*, postcolonial theory revealed that imperial power is not reducible to material phenomena, but endures as an epistemological system sustaining relations of power which have far outlasted political decolonization.[29] Racist power relations remain one of the most salient, violent vectors of the intersectional harms of imperial legacies. Although initially hostile to the perceived encroachment (or

'colonization') of postcolonial theory,[30] imperial historians have increasingly adopted its innovations and dialectics to assess the cultural, discursive, and racist dimensions of imperial power.[31] Drawing on structuralist, deconstructivist and postmodernist strands of literary theory, Said's critical analysis revealed the imperial sciences of Orientalism as disciplines yoked to the imperial project of constructing an Oriental 'Other' and thus, in opposition, constructing the Occidental 'Self'.[32] This analysis has helped imperial historians to understand the creation and preservation of cultural hegemony. In another foundational postcolonial text, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', the literary scholar and critical feminist theorist Gayatri Spivak similarly argued that the geopolitical and economic hegemony of 'the West' is not a miracle of parthenogenesis. Indeed, 'to buy a self-contained version of the West is to ignore its production by the imperialist project'.[33] As a corrective to this epistemic violence, Spivak advocated for 'counterhegemonic ideological production', to be achieved through rigorous ideological analysis of forms of representation.[34]

27 See Christopher Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830* (London: Longman, 1989); Peter J. Cain and Antony G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688-2000* (Harlow: Longman, 2002); Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1820* (London: Pimlico, 2003).

28 See, for example, Philippa Levine, ed., *Gender and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

29 Kennedy, "Imperial History," 347.

30 Kennedy, "Imperial History," 346.

31 Kennedy, "Imperial History Wars," 9.

32 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 21, 27.

33 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 86.

34 Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," 69, 75.

The discipline continued to evolve, with a fresh turn in the 1990s to 'new imperial history', marked by a theoretical shift from the notion of unilateral subjugation to concepts of networks and connections. Historians working under this novel approach challenge the metropolitan/colonial binary and maintain that both colonizer and colonized must be studied, because 'Britain's relationship with its empire was mutually constitutive'.[35]

Drayton argues, however, that although these successive 'turns' are not sanguine accounts of empire, nor are they sufficiently sanguinary. In their metaphysical focus on 'epistemic violence', historians have ignored the reality of physical violence throughout imperial history.[36] The ethical implications of writing post-colonial global and imperial history are significant, because while academic historians remain silent on violence, the ideological project of imperialism is ongoing in both explicit and more insidious, discursive ways. Pro-imperial views of the past, Drayton suggests, have obvious political valence in the contemporary era of imperial violence and terror.[37]

Popular historical texts reverberate in public and political attitudes to the past and therefore influence opinions on the use of coercion and power abroad.[38]

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Instead of passive or active collusion with the imperial project, Drayton calls for 'post-patriotism' in imperial history, one which rejects false 'nostalgia and teleology'.[39] Setting a professional ethical agenda, Drayton suggests that historians have 'special responsibilities' to galvanize a post-imperial 'global studies' movement, which is both interdisciplinary and collaborative across universities.[40] Within this project, world (or global) history ought to lead the way. All historians ought to recognise the constitutive power of how they narrate the story of the past, which shapes the very form of the present.[41]

Kennedy similarly emphasizes the global historian's two-pronged obligations: (i) to be self-reflexive about our practices, or 'self-aware of our own subject positions', recognising how our specific

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35 Kennedy, "Imperial History Wars," 9; see Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 1.

36 Drayton, "Where Does the World Historian Write From?," 680.

37 Drayton, "Where Does the World Historian Write From?," 676.

38 Drayton, "Where Does the World Historian Write From?," 680.

39 Drayton, "Where Does the World Historian Write From?," 684.

40 Drayton, "Human Future," 158, 166-9. An ethical scholarly agenda remarkably fulfilled in Catherine Hall's 'Legacies of British Slave-Ownership' Project: "The Database", https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/project/details/.

41 Drayton, "Human Future," 166-7.

temporal and spatial settings inform our scholarship; and (ii) to expose presentist, ideologically weighted claims about the past *and* to illuminate the agendas such claims are intended to serve.[42] These dual professional ethics will improve the discipline itself, by revealing 'the forces that have helped to ensure that British imperial history retains its relevance today'.[43]

A PLANET-SIZED BLINDSPOT?

And yet, these clarion calls for a professional ethics of global and imperial history are incomplete. Oddly, their blind spot is the globe itself.[44] In their self-avowedly polemical and provocative works, Kennedy and Drayton show no consciousness of *physical* space. With their focus being political—specifically, with the 'Military Intellectual Complex'[45]—they neglect to engage with the interrelated history of climate, colonization and empire. In so doing, they forgo the role of imperialism in critically endangering the biosphere, geosphere, atmosphere, in the blink of a geological eye.[46]

This focus on ideology ignores the longer-term violence humankind has inflicted on the planet through greenhouse gas emissions, a process inextricably connected with the British empire, the primary causes of industrialization, the rise of manufacturing, and the global extraction and exploitation of natural resources.[47] This position ignores the interconnections between exploitation of the environment, labour, social reproductive capacity, women and children, and the violence inflicted on various constructed categories of 'Other'. This is grimly similar to the denunciation of the 'planetary analytic' of the Anthropocene for its erasure of histories of racism, slavery, and violent dispossession.[48] Too much is omitted; too many are omitted. This position also ignores the global carbon imbalance, whereby developing countries of the Global South have contributed far less to human-induced climate change (with certain areas even acting as carbon sinks at various periods) than developed countries, and yet are far more likely to experience the worst of the climate crisis, and sooner.[49] One would

42 Kennedy, "Imperial History Wars," 5-6, 22.
43 Kennedy, "Imperial History Wars," 22.
44 Julia Adeney Thomas, "The Present Climate of Economic History," in *Economic Development and Environmental History in the Anthropocene: Perspectives on Asia and Africa*, ed. Gareth Austin (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 294-8.
45 Drayton, "Where Does the World Historian Write From?," 674.
46 John L. Brooke, *Climate Change and*

the Course of Global History: A Rough Journey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 452.
47 Brooke, *Climate Change*, 470.
48 Kathryn Yusoff, *A Billion Black Anthropocenes or None* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018), 2-8.
49 Brooke, *Climate Change*, 487-8. See also J.R. McNeill and Peter Engelke, *The Great Acceleration. An Environmental History of the Anthropocene Since 1945* (Cambridge,

assume that the scientific consensus on climate change would be salient to practitioners of global and imperial history,[50] particularly given the parallels with other metanarratives and concepts within the field. For example, these inequities mirror the self-perpetuating, inequitable and racist international division of labour that was consolidated following the Great Divergence.[51] However, most imperial historians are silent about the Anthropocene and the connections of empire to the current climate crisis. Even when anthropogenic climate change is the subject of historical analysis, racist global power hierarchies are paid insufficient attention. Indeed, Pasifika scholars have described this inattention to differentiated climate burdens and historical responsibility as a 'feeling of helplessness' comparable to 'former colonies in Oceania being colonised a second time'.[52] To study a topic

of this magnitude, amongst other methodological shifts, we need to forge a decolonized, egalitarian global and imperial history. Such a history would examine climate change 'from below the elite level', include perspectives from the Global South, and chart diverse 'experiences of climate against a human history that is built on a scaffolding of inequality'.[53]

Increasingly, global historians are addressing the nexus between empire, colonialism and climate change. One of the leading voices is the postcolonial historian Dipesh Chakrabarty.[54] In his influential article, 'The Climate of History', Chakrabarty observes that historians must revise many of their fundamental assumptions and procedures in this era of the Anthropocene, in which 'humans have become geological agents, changing the most basic physical

Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 1-6, 155-205; and Rob Nixon, *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

50 Spencer R. Weart, *The Discovery of Global Warming* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 142-192; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), *Global Warming of 1.5℃. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5℃ Above Pre-industrial Levels* (2018).

51 See Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 11, 21-4.

52 Vilsoni Hereniko, "The Human Face of Climate Change: Notes from Rotuma

and Tuvalu," in *Pacific Futures: Projects, Politics, and Interests*, ed. Will Rollason (New York: Berghahn, 2014), 228. Pasifika is a collective term used to refer to individuals/communities of Cook Island, Māori, Niuean, Fijian, Tongan, Samoan and other South Pacific nations. It includes Island-born, New Zealand-raised or New Zealand-born and Island-raised people.

53 Nancy J Jacobs, Danielle Johnstone and Christopher S Kelly, 'The Anthropocene from Below', in Antoinette Burton and Tony Ballantyne (eds.), *World Histories From Below: Disruption and Dissent, 1750 to the Present* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 197.

54 Most recently, in Dipesh Chakrabarty, *The Crises of Civilization: Exploring Global and Planetary Histories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

processes of the Earth'.[55] However, Chakrabarty's advocacy of an undifferentiated 'species history' has both obscured global asymmetries in responsibility for climate change and deflected attention from the intersections of imperialism and environmental degradation.[56] Through the lenses of the Great Divergence, postcolonial theory, and 'climatic orientalism',[57] along with other concepts and themes of global history, John Brooke, Andreas Malm, Corey Ross and other historians have shown that the two dovetailing forms of violence—epistemic and physical—are mutually reinforcing within the history of empire and climate change.[58] These

studies reveal intimate, necessarily *longue durée* linkages between the industrialisation, fossil-fuel combustion, and exploitative socio-political structures underpinning both imperialism and climate change.

To master the empirical data and multi-scalar nature of climate change, many academics have argued that historians need renewed concepts and methodologies.[59] Within existing analytical frameworks, however, global historians have demonstrated that the discipline is well-equipped to assess the complex role of imperialism in causing and intensifying climate change. Thus, global historians ought to continue contributing to this inherently interdisciplinary, transnational field. The focus of 'new imperial history' on circuits of material, economic and scientific exchange between—as well as within—empires is a promising lens for examining the histories of atmospheric science and change beyond national frames of reference.[60] More scholarship is

55 Dipesh Chakrabarty, "The Climate of History: Four Theses," *Critical Inquiry*, 35, no. 2 (2009): 197-222, https://doi.org/10.1086/596640.

56 Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg, "The Geology of Mankind? A Critique of the Anthropocene Narrative," *The Anthropocene Review* 1, no. 1 (January 2014): 64, https://doi.org/10.1177/2053019613516291.

57 Fabien Locher and Jean-Baptise Fressoz, "Modernity's Frail Climate: A Climate History of Environmental Reflexivity," *Critical Inquiry* 38, no. 3 (Spring 2012): 587, https://doi.org/10.1086/664552.

58 Brooke, *Climate Change*; Jason W Moore, *Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital* (London: Verso, 2015); Jason W Moore (ed.), *Anthropocene or Capitalocene: Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2016); Andreas Malm, *Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming* (London: Verso, 2016); Andreas Malm, *The Progress of This Storm* (London: Verso, 2018); Corey Ross, *Ecology and Power in the Age of Empire: Europe and the Transformation of the Tropical World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017);

Joachim Radkau, *Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 152; Naomi Klein, *This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs The Climate* (London: Penguin Books, 2015); Naomi Klein, *On Fire: The Burning Case for a Green New Deal* (London: Allen Lane, 2019).

59 Chakrabarty, "Climate of History"; Jorge E. Viñuales, *The Organisation of the Anthropocene: In Our Hands?* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 24; Thomas, "Present Climate," 297-8.

60 See Alan Lester, "Imperial Circuits and Networks: Geographies of the British Empire," *History Compass* 4, no. 1, (January 2006): 124–41, https://doi.

required on intra- and inter-imperial forces and processes of exchange which stimulated and exacerbated global warming, work which transcends dyadic core-periphery models of imperial relationships in order to understand the interrelation of climate and empire.

In order to identify the harms of empire—both epistemic and physical, past and ongoing—imperial history must address the role of empire-building in the origins and trajectory of the climate crisis. Much of British imperial history has been directly involved in the ideological defence and perpetuation of slavery, empire, and the colonial project. While imperial history has grappled with its ideological underpinnings insofar as they relate to international geopolitical and economic inequities and contemporary violence, it has yet to engage fully with the intersections of empire and climate change. To resolve the seemingly internecine 'family quarrel' of imperial history, 'self-reflection' is a recurring prescription.[61] But the current global moment requires a rallying point beyond the self, beyond party politics, beyond arbitrary national borders, and beyond clashes of civilization. To 'speak truth unto power—power in the present and not simply in the past',[62] historians must

examine all forms of empire as they are connected to global warming and the present climate crisis.

org/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2005.00189.x.

61 Durba Ghosh, "Another Set of Imperial Turns?," *The American Historical Review* 117, no. 3 (June 2012): 774, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.117.3.772.

62 Linda Colley, "The Difficulties of Empire: Present, Past and Future," *Historical*

Research 79, no. 205 (2006): 382, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2281.2006.00395.x.

Capitalist Realism, Disappointment, and the History of Sensibilities: A Case for Fiction as Historical Source

by

DENNIS KOELLING

ABSTRACT

Blending a reflection on the historiography of sensibilities in the study of the recent past with a discussion on the relationship between literary criticism and the field of history proper, this paper makes a case for a further engagement with fiction as a historical source by cultural historians. Briefly engaging with the evolution of Raymond Williams' concept of a "structure of feeling" and tracing it to Daniel Wickberg's call for a new history of sensibilities, the article then engages with the field of what Mark Fisher called "capitalist realism" as an object of study that can serve as an example on how to apply the study of fiction in recent history.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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'Being realistic' may once have meant coming to terms with of a reality experienced as solid and immovable. Capitalist realism, however, entails subordinating oneself to a reality that is infinitely plastic, capable of reconfiguring itself at any moment.[1]

Mark Fisher – *Capitalist Realism*

Compte tenu des caractéristiques de l'époque moderne, l'amour ne peut plus guère se manifester; mais l'idéal de l'Amour n'a pas diminué. Étant, comme tout idéal, fondamentalement situé hors du temps, il ne saurait ni diminuer ni disparaître. D'où une discordance idéal-réel particulièrement criante, source de souffrances particulièrement riche.[2]

Michel Houellebecq – *Rester Vivant*

INTRODUCTION

Just like 'modern love' in Michel Houellebecq's poetical manifesto *Rester Vivant*, laying the

groundwork for the controversial French author's oeuvre, modern capitalism succeeds in creating a strong cognitive dissonance between *ideal* and *real,* between what *could be* and what *is*. Put differently, capitalism rests on the paradoxical (re-)invention of infinite forms of desire, limiting at the same time the potentiality of possible satisfaction. This dynamic, ultimately erasing the temporal dimension of historical past and privileging recentness in pursuit of ever-contingent futures, marks the center of the study of a cultural malaise, inherent to the sensibilities of life after the 'end of history.'[3] The incommensurability of this dynamic has led to a sensibility of constant disappointment in denial, a state that cultural theorist Mark Fisher has called "nihilistic hedonism" or "hedonic depression."[4]

While so far widely under-researched by historians of emotions and cultural historians of the recent past, a number of authors from varying disciplines have taken

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1 Mark Fisher, *Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?* (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2009), 54.
2 Michel Houellebecq, *Rester vivant* (Paris: Flammarion, 2001), 13.

3 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest*, no. 16 (1989): 3–18; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York : Toronto : New York: The Free Press, 1992); For the temporal dimension of financial capitalism see for example Jens Beckert, *Imagined Futures: Fictional Expectations and Capitalist Dynamics*, 1st ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Joseph Vogl, *Das Gespenst des Kapitals*, 3. (Zürich: Diaphanes, 2010); For the purpose of this paper, I have worked with the German original of Vogl's text, for the English translation see Joseph Vogl, *The Specter of Capital* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).
4 Fisher, *Capitalist Realism*, 1, 36.

up the destructive circulatory movements inherent in capitalist ontology. Mark Fisher has pointed out in his groundbreaking essay *Capitalist Realism* that capitalism has succeeded in creating an integrative 'realist' ontology and that its subjects are involved in a Lacanian struggle of dissonance between this realism and the underlying Real(s) of capitalist exploitation.[5] In a similar direction, literature theorist and economist Joseph Vogl has theorized an 'oikodicy,' questioning how capitalism succeeds in portraying itself as the best possible of all worlds, while at the same time suffering from inherent contradictions and outraging levels of inequality.[6] German-Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han has throughout his work engaged with the intverrelationship between capitalist expectations and rising rates in mental illnesses in capitalist societies around the world.[7] Critical theorist Wendy Brown has, furthermore, argued that the ontological dimension of capitalism has brought along an emptying of political space, "transmogrif[ying] every human domain and endeavor, along with humans themselves, according to a specific image of

the economic."[8] Lastly, economist Philip Mirowski has elaborated on the cognitive grip that neoliberal ideology has manifested in an ontological dimension, enabling its epistemological edifice to survive and thrive even throughout the 2008 global financial crisis.[9]

Surveying the treatment of psychocapitalist dimensions in the realm of history proper, however, reveals scarce scholarly engagement. Notable exceptions here include the inquiries conducted by the DFG-research cluster "Nach dem Boom" led by German historians Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael. In their eponymous essay, Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael have introduced a way of reforming recent Western European histories of ideas to acknowledge the emergence of a neoliberal "structural fracture," reshaping the way historians engage with the history of subjectivity after the end of Keynesianism and political consensus-culture.[10] In the United States, intellectual historian Daniel T. Rodgers has worked on a comparable hypothesis in his book *Age of Fracture*, emphasizing the fluidification of identities and the

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5   Fisher, *Capitalist Realism*.
6   Vogl, *Das Gespenst des Kapitals*.
7   See for example Byung-Chul Han, *Müdigkeitsgesellschaft*, 1st ed. (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz Berlin, 2010); Building upon Michel Foucault's concept of *biopolitics*, Han has coined the term of neoliberal *psychopolitics*, see Byung-Chul Han, *Psychopolitik: Neoliberalismus und die neuen Machttechniken*, 5th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: S. FISCHER, 2014).

8   Wendy Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (New York: MIT Press, 2015), 9–10.
9   Philip Mirowski, *Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown* (London ; New York: Verso, 2013).
10   Lutz Raphael and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008).

fracturing of consensus as part of the neoliberal order.[11] Exploring a broader idea of liberal psychopolitics and the construction of a liberal realism, Amanda Anderson has made a related case for the history of modernity (centered mostly in the nineteenth and twentieth century) in her monograph *Bleak Liberalism.*[12] While Anderson's book provides an important insight into the mental mapping of liberal capitalist society, a comparable study for recent history is still missing.

Why then have historians of the recent past largely shied away from interacting with a form of psychological and emotional capitalism, that seems so prevalent in other academic disciplines?[13] One apparent obstacle seems to be the limited availability of sources necessary to get to the cognitive structures of (neo-)liberal capitalism, underlying the psychopolitical dynamics of 'capitalist realism' and the emotion of disappointment they produce. My argument in this essay is that Anderson's approach of mapping the discontent with liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth century, by engaging mostly with fictional literature, can and indeed should

be applied by recent historians, as it provides an invaluable archive to contextualize recent economic and social developments. The struggle between realism and the Real as proclaimed by Mark Fisher, manifests nowhere as explicit as in the literature of disappointment, in the genre cultural theorist Ben Jeffery has described as "depressive realism."[14] Michel Houellebecq, who has structured his oeuvre around the idea of 'writing to stay alive (*rester vivant*)' in the 'life as supermarket and derision (*le monde comme supermarché et comme derision*)' serves as the most prominent example here.[15] While Houellebecq has most clearly elaborated on the capitalist dynamic of unfulfillable desires by mapping his poetical theory on Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, numerous other authors have engaged with similar dynamics of desire and disappointment in recent literature. Comparable motifs can be found in the ultra-violent feminist gore of Virginie Despentes in France, the post-Soviet fantasies in writers such as Juli Zeh or Olga Tokarczuk, hyperreal consumer fiction by Bret Easton Ellis or David Foster Wallace in the US, and the Japanese strand of Freeter-literature represented by writers such as Kanehara Hitomi or Ryū Murakami.

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11   Daniel T. Rodgers, *Age of Fracture* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010).

12   Amanda Anderson, *Bleak Liberalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

13   For the term "Emotional Capitalism" see sociologist Eva Illouz's monograph on online dating: Eva Illouz, *Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism* (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2006).

14   Ben Jeffery, *Anti-Matter: Michel Houellebecq and Depressive Realism* (Winchester, UK: John Hunt, 2011).

15   Michel Houellebecq, *Rester vivant et autres textes* (Paris: J'ai lu, 2015).

A serious engagement with fictional sources then can help cultural historians to construct a history of sensibilities of the neoliberal order, questioning the cognitive structure at work as described by theorists like Mark Fisher. Cultural historian Daniel Wickberg has long called for a readjustment of how to write the history of sensibilities after the emotional turn in his groundbreaking essay "What is the History of Sensibilities? On Cultural Histories, Old and New."[16] It is no coincidence that his essay interacts with the concept of *structure of feeling,* devised by cultural and literary theorist Raymond Williams, largely built around fiction. Williams understood that fictional sources could be at the core of exploring the mental state of a given historical period. Wickberg, however, cautions the cultural historian to take Williams' concept at face value as it still plays 'formal' or 'intellectual' thought against 'lived' experience. Wickberg's theory of sensibilities, on the other hand, is constructed without "respect of invidious distinctions between practice and theory, low and high, informal and formal, art and philosophy; all embody sensibilities."[17] While Williams' theory serves as a great entrance point for cultural historians to work with fictional sources, it is within the framework of Wickberg's History of Sensibilities as a holistic approach that fiction can flourish as an innovative source for the historian of neoliberalism concerned with the (de-)construction of a capitalist realism.

In this essay, I make the case for a serious integration of fiction into the study of the recent past and point out the relationship between 'depressive realism' and 'capitalist realism,' which, as I will show, function as quasi-opposed iconographies. I begin by briefly elaborating on Mark Fisher's important essay, sketching the outline for 'capitalist realism' and its cognitive implications in recent history. Following this, I show how the paradox of desire and non-fulfilment has been approached across various disciplines concerned with post-modern fiction and how this aspect has appeared in the study of what Ben Jeffery has called 'depressive realism.' Then I briefly discuss how literary studies have made an attempt to integrate the study of fiction with recent economic history, exemplified in my essay by the treatment of Japanese *Freeter*-literature and the discourse on precarity. Finally, I argue how literature should become an important cornerstone of building a history of sensibilities of the recent neoliberal order.

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16   Daniel Wickberg, "What Is the History of Sensibilities? On Cultural Histories, Old and New," *The American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (2007): 661–84, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.112.3.661.

17   Wickberg, 671–72.

CAPITALIST REALISM

Since its publication in 2009, Mark Fisher's essay *Capitalist Realism – Is There no Alternative?* has become a widely influential text read across academic disciplines and the blogosphere, pushing readers to critically engage with issues of popular culture and neoliberalism. Fisher's innovative merger of economic theory, Lacanian psychology, and cultural criticism provides a unique theoretical framework to study recent cultural history through an economic lens. Engaging with critical theorists such as Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Žižek, Fisher explores how neoliberal capitalism has developed a pervasive worldview, which suppresses the possibility of change or even the conceptualization of any other system of thought. He begins his argumentation with the statement, attributed to both Žižek and Jameson, that "it is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism."[18] Partially leaving the dystopian/utopian-dichotomy of that statement behind, Fisher goes on to define his concept of 'capitalist realism' as "the widespread sense that not

only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it."[19] In other words, "[c]apitalism seamlessly occupies the horizons of the thinkable."[20]

His general argument then first and foremost is of cognitive ergo psychological nature: "Capitalist realism as I understand it cannot be confined to art or to the quasi-propagandistic way in which advertising functions. It is more like a pervasive atmosphere, conditioning not only the production of culture but also the regulation of work and education, and acting as a kind of invisible barrier constraining thought and action."[21] Later in his essay, he frames his claim in explicitly Lacanian terms, posing capitalist 'reality' against an underlying 'Real': "For Lacan, the Real is what any 'reality' must suppress; indeed, reality constitutes itself through just this repression. The Real is an unrepresentable X, a traumatic void that can only be glimpsed in the fractures and inconsistencies in the field of apparent reality."[22]

While Fisher structures a lot of his initial argument around fictional sources and cultural products, he largely neglects the possibility that these artifacts can play a substantive role in subverting capitalist realism:

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18 Fisher, *Capitalist Realism*, 2; It's unclear where the phrase actually originates from. In 2003 Jameson attributes it to "someone," while Žižek indeed referred to Jameson when he used it in 1994. See Fredric Jameson, "Future City," *New Left Review* no. 21, May-June (2003): 65–79; Slavoj Žižek, ed., *Mapping Ideology* (London: Verso, 1994).

19 Fisher, *Capitalist Realism*, 2.
20 Fisher, 8.
21 Fisher, 16.
22 Fisher, 18 Fisher is paraphrasing arguments from both Žižek and Lacanian theorist Alenka Zupancic here.

"What we are dealing with now is not the incorporation of materials that previously seemed to possess subversive potentials, but instead, their precorporation: the pre-emptive formatting and shaping of desires, aspirations and hopes by capitalist culture."[23] In fact, he sees it as an inherent feature of capitalist realism to integrate materials that might be considered "anti-capitalist" or have historically carried revolutionary potential. He claims this is "one effect of [capitalism's] 'system of equivalence' which can assign all cultural objects, whether they are religious iconography, pornography, or *Das Kapital*, a monetary value."[24] Seemingly subversive works of popular culture can then become a quasi-outsourced performance of anti-capitalism, allowing consumers to feel righteous and keep consuming in the same fashion as usual.[25]

If Mark Fisher neglects the subversive potential of all popular culture (or more generally fiction), how can recent cultural historians still integrate his widely useful framework in the study of the recent past, and specifically the rise of neoliberalism? Again, the answer can be found in Fisher's Lacanian framing of his theory: any possible critique of capitalist realism, must necessarily begin with the destabilizing of the

reality it produces. As Fisher put it, "on strategy against capitalist realism could involve invoking the Real(s) underlying the reality that capitalism presents to us."[26] It is the task of critical historians, then, to historicize these Real(s) and connect them to the history of capitalism, be it in the form of climate change, workers' exploitation, or patriarchal gender relations. Cultural historians can contribute by uncovering ways in which the representations of capitalist reality are challenged by representing the underlying Real(s). Fisher hints at one way cultural history can critique capitalist realism, by exposing the way the contemporary historical sensibility is related to the development of a neoliberal form of capitalism: "To reclaim a real political agency means first of all accepting our insertion *at the level of desire* in the remorseless meat-grinder of Capital."[27] Here he points at the necessity to mapping out what Raymond Williams calls a 'structure of feeling' of capitalism, a task destined for cultural historians concerned with fiction and emotions.[28]

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23 Fisher, 9.
24 Fisher, 4.
25 Cf. Fisher's discussion of ecological critique in the Disney movie *Wall-E*. See Fisher, 12.

26 Fisher, 18.
27 Fisher, 15.
28 For Raymond Williams' definition of "Structure of Feeling" see Raymond Williams, *The Long Revolution* (Cardigan, UK: Parthian Books, 2011); Eva Illouz also elaborates on the concept and its use for a sociology of emotional capitalism; see Illouz, *Cold Intimacies*, 50. In addition, Daniel Wickberg has argued for a history of sensibilities, basically evolving from Williams' concept; see Wickberg, "What Is the History of Sensibilities?"

A second challenge to capitalist realism comes from appeals to its (in)coherence as a system of thought and more important belief. As Fisher argues, "[c]apitalist realism can only be threatened if it is shown to be in some way inconsistent or untenable; if, that is to say, capitalism's ostensible 'realism' turns out to be nothing of the sort."[29] Here, Fisher's argument is very close to that of literary theorist and economist Joseph Vogl, who coined the question of a post-modern 'oikodicy.' In his monograph *Das Gespenst des Kapitals*, Vogl has elaborately transferred Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's 'theodicy' to the realm of capitalist realism:

> Given that the capitalist economy has become our fate, given too our propensity to look to profit and economic growth to satisfy some remnant of the old hope for an earthly Providence, modern financial theory also cannot avoid confronting the baffling question of how, if at all, apparent irregularities and anomalies can exist in a system supposedly based on reason. In Leibniz's terms: Which events appear to be compatible (and hence 'compossible') with which other events? Are relations between these events law-governed and if so, by which laws? And how can the existing

economic world be 'the best of all possible worlds'?.[30]

Vogl's analogy to the theodicy makes clear that one challenge to capitalist realism can come from the uncovering of its inherent contradictoriness and the destabilization of capitalism as a system of belief.

In the remainder of this essay, I describe how competing forms of realism(s) have been claimed by various scholars engaged with popular literature, challenging the ontological hegemony of neoliberal capitalist worldmaking as proposed by Fisher. I briefly discuss the works of controversial French author Michel Houellebecq, embodying what Ben Jeffery has termed 'depressive realism,' toppling the neoliberal belief-system by claiming visibility for the Real(s) of mental health and social isolation obscured by the capitalist narrative.

DEPRESSIVE REALISM

One of the Real(s) of underlying capitalist realism that Mark Fisher identifies in his essay is the rising rates of psychological illnesses and their depoliticization in capitalist societies. He argues — echoing Foucault's theory of modernity — that under capitalism, mental health is

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29 Fisher, *Capitalist Realism*, 16.

30 Joseph Vogl, *The Specter of Capital,* trans. Joachim Redner and Robert Savage (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 44.

being individualized, making every person to blame for their condition and foreclosing any systematic approach to the problem at hand. Fisher sees this as symptomatic for the inherent inconsistency of the system:

> Instead of treating it as incumbent on individuals to resolve their own psychological distress, instead, that is, of accepting the vast *privatization of stress* that has taken place over the last thirty years, we need to ask: how has it become acceptable that so many people, and especially so many young people, are ill? The 'mental health plague' in capitalist societies would suggest that, instead of being the only social system that works, capitalism is inherently dysfunctional, and the cost of it appearing to work is very high.[31]

Following Fisher's approach, cultural historians aimed at destabilizing the narrative of capitalist realism should then occupy themselves with researching the representations of this underlying common structure of feeling, uncovering how and where depression, mental health, and other related phenomena are narrated in contemporary history. One innovative concept from cultural criticism that aims in this direction,

was introduced by Ben Jeffery in his study on the French bestselling (yet highly controversial) writer Michel Houllebecq. In his essay *Anti-Matter,* Jeffery claims that the late 1980s and early 1990s saw the emergence of a 'depressive realism,' channeling the mental *disenchantment* or *Entzauberung* (to borrow a term from Max Weber) with neoliberal capitalism. His text is concerned primarily with the pessimism of Houellebecq's literature of the 'world as supermarket.' This pessimism he connects directly with a loss of belief in the value of a ruling system of thought: "What all varieties of pessimism have in common is the principle that the truth is undesirable – that unhappiness coincides with the loss of illusions, and that, conversely, happiness is a type of fantasy or ignorance."[32]

While he treats Houllebecq's writing first and foremost as philosophical pamphlets, he does acknowledge that this unsilencing of an underlying depressive current in contemporary society produces a large part of the appeal that Houellebecq's novels have for readers across the world. For Jeffery, "it's hard, finally, to evade the conclusion that one big reason for Houellebecq's success is that enough people really do identify with these books; that they put into words things that people think and want to hear, but are either unable to articulate or unwilling to admit to. It's not a

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31 Fisher, *Capitalist Realism*, 19.

32 Jeffery, *Anti-Matter*, 1.

pleasant thought." [33] It should be noted that Jeffery's essay appeared eight years before Houellebecq's latest novel *Sérotonine* (2019), which most explicitly describes the struggle with depression, following an administrative employee addicted to anti-depressant medication.

Just like Mark Fisher, Ben Jeffery sees the roots of the depressive struggle of Houellebecq's characters mostly in their embeddedness in a world of individual responsibility and privatized pressure. It is a toxic form of individualism, the pressure to act as 'entrepreneurs of the self' that drive those characters to the brink of madness.[34] Jeffery alleges that, "[d]epression is the pathological frontier of individualism – the point at which the whole world is eaten up by the self."[35] He then contrasts this over-individualistic point of view with the vastness of globalization, inherent to capitalism as a polar opposite:

> A well-known irony of globalization is that the incredible expanse of activity and interconnection it reveals to us inspires nothing, on a personal level, so much as feelings of isolation, impotence and insignificance. But then again, in another way, it also makes everyday problems feel like the only real problems there are, being the only issues we experience directly or exercise any real degree of control over. You end up with the weird feeling that your own private concerns are both the most important things and not important at all – an echo of the clinical depressive paradox.[36]

Accordingly, it is the inconsistent pressure of total individualism and vast overconnectedness existing in global financial capitalism that drive the depressive ontology of the characters under discussion here.

It is important to note that when talking about representations of concepts from the perspective of cultural historians, Jeffery's essay misses a number of important aspects of Michel Houellebecq's oeuvre. Most importantly, he completely ignores Houellebecq's religious dimension and the way his interaction with texts by religious thinkers such as Blaise Pascal or Joris-Karl Huysmans directly engages the question of a contemporary 'oikodicy.' An important corrective to this blindspot is provided by Louis Betty's monograph *Without God. Michel Houellebecq and Materialist Horror*, who reads Houellebecq basically as a religious writer.[37] Jeffery

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33 Jeffery, 11.
34 Cf. Ulrich Bröckling, *Das unternehmerische Selbst: Soziologie einer Subjektivierungsform* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2007).
35 Jeffery, *Anti-Matter*, 54.

36 Jeffery, 56.
37 Louis Betty, *Without God: Michel Houellebecq and Materialist Horror* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2016).

also largely forgoes interacting with the actual depictions of clinical depression, found in many characters across all of Houellebecq's novels. Lastly, he neglects to elaborate on the fact that Houellebecq openly stylized himself as a successor of nineteenth century realism, by interacting to a large degree with motifs and texts from writers such as Balzac, Zola, Mann, and Dostoyevsky.[38]

While Jeffery might be adding little to the literary scholarship on Michel Houellebecq, his essay can nevertheless provide an important starting point for the contemporary cultural historian. Reading depressive realism as an iconoclastic challenge to capitalist realism, the essay acknowledges that there are representations in post-modern literature which go beyond the constant ironizing derided by many critics and actually aim at constructing a different form of 'realism' primarily occupied with exposing the depressive structures capitalist ontology fosters. The challenge for historians then is to connect the dots and trace the concepts discussed by Jeffery

beyond the work of a single author, and at the same time examine if a structure of feeling exists in a wider corpus of texts. Jeffery already hints at further subjects of investigation, when he claims that "[f]rom the 1950s onwards a family of American authors – including William Burroughs, Robert Coover and Thomas Pynchon, among others were united [...] by the use of cynicism, irony and irreverence as tools to expose the distance they perceived between the myths of the American Dream and the realities of consumer capitalism."[39] Ultimately, this dissonance between *ideal* and *real* is also what drives the depression of Houellebecq's novels, exhibiting "the gap between real life and life-as-advertised, and how the sense of disappointment it generates has perversely become a bit of a cultural norm."[40] To show how pervasive this feeling of disappointment has become in the recent history of capitalist realism, I turn now to a group of writers on the opposite side of the globe, interacting with the lost promises of a post-boom Japan and the culture of precarity it generated.

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38 Houellebecq's intertextual relationship to Zola has been researched fairly well, see for example Rita Schober and Winfried Engler, *Auf dem Prüfstand: Zola - Houellebecq - Klemperer* (Berlin: Frey, Walter, 2003); Houellebecq's fascination with Thomas Mann and Fyodor Dostoyevsky plays a large role in Denis Demonpion's unauthorized biography, see Denis Demonpion, *Houellebecq non autorisé : Enquête sur un phénomène* (Paris: Libella Maren Sell, 2005).

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39 Jeffery, *Anti-Matter*, 47.
40 Jeffery, 28.

DISAPPOINTMENT AND PRECARITY IN JAPANESE FREETER LITERATURE

Far from being a phenomenon strictly related to the transatlantic realm, the Western European post-war economic recovery, and the capitalist revival of the American Dream, the disenchantment with capitalist realist expectations also took a prominent place in Japanese popular culture from the 1990s onwards. The second half of the twentieth century in Japan has been characterized by an unprecedented degree of economic growth, leading to a wide expansion of the Japanese middle-class and the introduction of a 'western'-style consumer culture, centered around prosperity and individualism.[41] Not unlike the description of post-war Western Europe until the 1970s as a society 'Nach dem Boom' mentioned above, Japanese society was in large parts signified by a culture of 'boom' and social consensus. However, many authors have argued that this culture largely fell apart with the "reorganization of the industrial structure and the evolution of the information society, amidst the deepening of the recession that resulted from the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s[.]"[42]

One of the results of the bursting of this economic bubble was a turn in cultural representations towards a new sensibility focusing on the "feeling of entrapment experienced by Japan's youth" and the "extremely emotional" narration of a "gap-widening society" in popular culture, and especially the post-modern Japanese novel.[43]

Numerous popular authors—at the forefront Ryū Murakami, Kanehara Hitomi, and Haruki Murakami—have interacted in recent works with the resulting phenomena of a flexibilization of the workforce, the precarity of means of living, and feelings of social isolation and withdrawal in the newly emerging competitive neoliberal mindset. Most prominent among 'Western' readers are the concepts of *Freeter-*authors, describing the precarity of especially the female workforce in Japan, and of *hikikomori,* teenagers and young adults who choose to withdraw from social interaction altogether.[44] For cultural historians, the field of Japanese post-modern literature presents an ideal entrance point to the study of capitalist

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41 Mark Driscoll, "Debt and Denunciation in Post-Bubble Japan," *Cultural Critique* 65 (December 1, 2007): 164–87, https://doi.org/10.1353/cul.2007.0004.

42 Kristina Iwata-Weickgenannt and Roman Rosenbaum, eds., *Visions of Precarity in Japanese Popular Culture and Literature*,

Routledge Contemporary Japan Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 2015), xv.

43 Iwata-Weickgenannt and Rosenbaum, xii.

44 Iwata-Weickgenannt and Rosenbaum, 4–5; See also Lisette Gebhardt, *Nach Einbruch der Dunkelheit: Zeitgenössische japanische Literatur im Zeichen des Prekären*, 1st ed. (Berlin: EB-Verlag, 2010); William Kremer and Claudia Hammond, "Why Are so Many Japanese Men Refusing to Leave Their Rooms?," *BBC News*, July 5, 2013, sec. Magazine, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-23182523.

realism, and the underlying Real(s) of disappointment resulting from unstable living conditions, a culture of hyperindividualism, and the constant dialectic between the creation of desires and the impossibility of their fulfilment.

While the field of *Freeter*-literature has been widely researched by literary studies scholars and critical theorist — the edited volume *Visions of Precarity in Japanese Popular Culture and Literature* by Kristina Iwata-Weickgennant and Roman Rosenbaum presents a comprehensive overview — for reasons of scope, I concentrate on one particular case in this paper. In an extensive analysis of two novels of author and pop-cultural icon Kanehara Hitomi, literary scholar David Holloway has examined the representations of both economic precarity and performative gender in recent Japanese fiction.

Mirroring Jeffery's 'depressive realism,' Holloway explains that "Kanehara has used fiction to engage with issues of crisis, self-harm, and the inequity in contemporary gender roles."[45] Importantly, Holloway detects a "discourse of disappointment, a teleology lamenting the necessity for and persistence of, a *gendered* means of sustaining; in other words, a kind of passive-aggressive acceptance of the status quo and women's place

within it."[46] Disappointment as a sensibility of post-modern Japanese literature is here read with a double meaning: first, as a reaction to the distance between economic *ideal* and *real*, and second, as reflecting the reactionary regression of gender roles under the neoliberal order.

Holloway claims that traditional gender roles are reintroduced into contemporary Japanese society as a reaction to the country's falling birthrates, while at the same time an economic culture of self-expression and flexibility puts further pressure on women. He asserts that

> [t]oday, in light of Japan's falling birthrate, childbearing and motherhood are once again important political slogans reminding women of the proper shape of femininity, citizenship, and morality. Terms such as 'parasite single' have been used by the political right to pathologize those who choose not to marry, for example. At the same time, however, 'state policies since the 1980s have also encourage the trend toward self-realization […] and diverse lifestyles […].' Women's fiction and women's magazines, too, regularly disavow the old orthodoxies in the name of freedom of expression and individuality.[47]

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45 David Holloway, "Gender, Body, and Disappointment in Kanehara Hitomi's Fiction," *Japanese Language and Literature* 50, no. 1 (2016): 75.

46 Holloway, 75–76.
47 Holloway, 75–76.

His essay analyzes Kanehara's debut novel *Hebi ni piasu* (2003, trans. Snakes and Earrings, 2005) and *Haidora* (2007, Hydra; untranslated), both of which deal with female characters trying to escape oppressive gender roles by engaging in various practices of body modification and flight to the fringes of society. In both cases, however, the protagonists find themselves in a depressive cycle of precarity, loss of social interaction, and violence. In the end, Lui, the protagonist of *Hebi ni piasu,* even retreats to marry the tattoo artist who has practically raped her in the first part of the book, in search of sense and stability. Holloway explains,

> [t]he prominence of disappointment in these texts agitates our understanding of contemporary feminist and sexual politics. Judith Butler has taught us that causing trouble affords an opportunity to trouble convention. But, at least for Kanehara's protagonists, trouble might also remind us of the troubling state of contemporary life for women caught in a confusing moment in which new freedoms clash with the persistence of old expectations.[48]

Holloway brilliantly manages to untangle the gender relations of Kanehara's novels and map them

onto the development of a neoliberal realism, at the core of Japan's contemporary cultural malaise. Cultural scholar Marc Driscoll goes a bit further in his reading of Kanehara, linking it directly to a culture of precarity so prominent in recent Japanese history. In his article "Debt and Denunciation in Post-Bubble Japan," he engages with cultural representations of un- and underemployed Japanese youth, linking this phenomenon directly to the bursting of the economic bubble in the 1990s. However, he ultimately fails to acknowledge Kanehara's fiction as a sort-of competitive realism to capitalist reality, deriding her debut novel as a covert "neoliberal utopia" finally reaffirming nationalist values.[49] While only providing a brief insight into the possibilities of using fiction as a source to further contextualize cultural history, the studies on Kanehara show how fictional narratives interact with economic structures, providing a base for a much broader study of the sensibilities of neoliberal capitalism.

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48 Holloway, 93. Emphasis added.

49 Mark Driscoll, "Debt and Denunciation in Post-Bubble Japan," *Cultural Critique* 65 (December 1, 2007): 164–87.

CONCLUSION – TOWARDS A HISTORY OF SENSIBILITIES OF NEOLIBERALISM

The examples of the treatment of Japanese *Freeter*-literature and the 'depressive realism' in the works of Michel Houellebecq saliently show off the gap that should be addressed by recent cultural and intellectual historians in writing the history of capitalist realism and challenging the dominant narrative imposed by it. To write a true history of sensibilities, as advocated by Daniel Wickberg in his influential essay on the future of the history of emotions, historians need not shy away from engaging in a far broader, more structural way with fictional sources and the representations they carry. Wickberg advocates moving beyond extracting just a structure of feeling from fictional sources, towards a broader understanding of "the primacy of [...] various modes of perception and feeling, the terms and forms in which objects were conceived, experienced, and represented in the past."[50] Fiction can provide an extensive archive for historians to engage with the way different realisms are narrated, and can thereby truly help cultural historians to shift the focus from "the content of thought, [to] the forms in which that content is perceived, given, and expressed."[51]

My largely historiographical engagement with various scholars from cultural and literature studies throughout this essay has shown the importance of adopting a truly interdisciplinary stance for approaching these various modes of perception and the methodological shift from content to form by way of fiction. In these concluding paragraphs, I look more closely at how the methods proposed by Wickberg can be concretely applied by cultural historians and give a few examples of areas of study that would benefit from such an approach. In practical terms then, historians of neoliberalism (and, more broadly speaking, capitalism) wishing to further engage with fictional sources could do so by critically interacting with three different stages of 'capitalist realism', on which I elaborate further below: first, its creation; second, the repressed Real(s) underlying its existence; and third, its challenge through other forms of realism.

Neoliberal ideology and the capitalist realism it propagates consist of discourses that were created intentionally in a historical process, as opaque as this process might seem when looking at it with more than half a century of hindsight. The first field to benefit widely from an engagement with fictional sources then is that concerned with neoliberalism's birthplace. Controversially debated by intellectual and cultural historians alike, the birth of neoliberalism now is often located in the founding of

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50 Wickberg, "What Is the History of Sensibilities?," 662.
51 Wickberg, 664.

the 'neoliberal thought collective,' institutionalized in such organizations as the Colloque Walter Lippmann and later the Mont Pelerin Society.[52] While these histories brilliantly lay out neoliberalism's long ascendency through institutional structures towards being the hegemonic politico-economic model of the post-boom era, they say relatively little about the simultaneous construction of a neoliberal culture, a capitalist realism structured around hardcore individualism and the spread of market liberalism as an aspirational ideal for everyone and everything. Here, a critical study of fiction can provide fruitful insight into how this cultural hegemony was constructed. Historians of culture can look into how fictional narratives transport this new culture of competition in the market and how characters embody a form of neoliberal individualism.

An interesting object of study for historians of early neoliberal culture can be found in the novels of Russian-American philosopher Ayn Rand. Rand, publishing various rather unknown science fiction novels and plays in the 1930s and 1940s, reached widespread fame with her novel *The Fountainhead* (1943) and *Atlas Shrugged* (1957), preaching

individual entrepreneurialism as the highest possible value and making her up until today the patron saint of the American right.[53] In her correspondence, Rand was very vocal about not wanting to be considered an economist, but rather choosing the method of narration as a way to reach the hearts and minds of the common people and instill them with a faith in a truly capitalist culture. Critically assessing Rand's fiction, historians can trace how she uses narration and certain characterologies—especially in her quest to write "the ideal man"—to propagate a new capitalist realism, often constructed directly in opposition to the Soviet socialist realism she fled from in her youth.[54] A more extended study could then read these narratological examinations in the wider context of 1940s and 1950s anti-totalitarian discourses and popular literature, to interrogate the existence of a certain anti-totalitarian, pro-capitalist structure of feeling.

For more recent historians of neoliberalism, an engagement with the fictional representations of the repressed Real(s) of capitalist realism seems most fruitful. For this, a reading of fictional sources informed by the concept of 'visibility' as theorized in visual culture studies serves as a useful approach. Visual

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52 See for example Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds., *The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Mirowski, *Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste*; Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).

53 See for example Jennifer Burns, *Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American Right* (Oxford, UK ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

54 Ayn Rand, *The Fountainhead*, ed. Leonard Peikoff, Centennial Edition (New York: Signet, 1996), vii.

culture scholar Erin Y. Huang has demonstrated the usefulness of this approach in her monograph *Urban Horror: Neoliberal Post-Socialism and the Limits of Visibility* by showing the emergence of 'urban horror'—a feeling of discomfort exceeding comprehension, analogue to Engels' 'industrial horror'—as a sociopolitical affect in the works of Sinospheric filmmakers between the 1990s and the present.[55] While Huang's work is largely theoretical and aimed more at film studies readers, historians can gain from this focus on visibility by asking how fictional sources attempt to make visible what neoliberal ideology tries to render invisible. More concretely, historians can look at fiction and explain how phenomena of workplace culture, gender roles, and psychocapitalist aspects such as the invisibility of depression are taking the center stage in fictional narratives.

Ultimately, a focus on visibility does not only benefit the relationship between the hegemonic realism and the underlying Real(s), but also can interrogate the multiplicity of the *ideal*, the construction of a differing *could-be* as the site of resistance to neoliberal capitalist realism. As Nicholas Mirzoeff has shown in his influential book *The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality,* modernity presents an continued contest between visuality

and countervisuality, and claiming the right to look in this context becomes a potentially revolutionary act.[56] Starting from this premise, historians interested in the resistance to neoliberal hegemony can interrogate fiction as a field of the emergence of 'countervisualities', of different forms of realisms that are in competition with the dominant capitalist realism. Ben Jeffery's 'depressive realism' described below is an attempt at such a competing realism. Certain forms of an 'eco-futurism,' described as early as in Frank Herbert's *Dune-Saga* in the 1960s and more recently in Olga Tokarczuk's post-anthropocentric novels, might provide fertile ground for study here. The task for cultural historians then is to contextualize these speculative fictions in the intellectual contexts of their authors and their time, while at the same time interrogating the form of their object of studies to uncover how narrative and characerology is used to construct realisms differing to that of neoliberal capitalism.

In this essay, I have provided an overview of the current research in various disciplines of the pervasive belief-system that has been formed as an ontological aspect of the neoliberal order. Furthermore, I have shown how competing realisms have aimed to destabilize this 'reality' in various forms of fictional sources. It is up to cultural historians of neoliberalism

55 Erin Y. Huang, *Urban Horror: Neoliberal Post-Socialism and the Limits of Visibility*, Sinotheory (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2020).

56 Nicholas Mirzoeff, *The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).

to critically analyze these structures of consciousness and to provide the necessary nuances. Their task is to show that indeed an alternative to neoliberal capitalism can and has been imagined, and moreover that the underlying Real(s) of exploitation, depression, and more general incoherence, deserves to be studied by scholars across disciplines. Only history as a discipline, however, allows academics to approach these processes from the dispassionate perspective of an outside observer, mapping streams of consciousness and structures of feeling that should be at the center of any true history of sensibilities. In other words, historians of culture could and should gain solid insights from engaging with fictional sources across disciplinary boarders, to detect possible structures of thought and nuance the often-particular studies conducted by cultural theorists and literary scholars as presented in this essay do.