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

Global histories: a student journal

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Scope and purpose

In response to the increasing interest in the 'global' as a field of inquiry, a perspective, and an approach, Global Histories: A Student Journal aims to offer a platform for debate, discussion, and intellectual exchange for a new generation of scholars with diverse research interests. Global history can provide an opportunity to move beyond disciplinary boundaries and methodological centrisms, both in time and space. As students of global history at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, our interest lies not in prescribing what global history is and what it is not, but to encourage collaboration, cooperation, and discourse among students seeking to explore new intellectual frontiers.

This issue was published in January 2022.

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This journal provides immediate open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge. All articles which appear in this issue, with the exception of editorial content, were subject to peer review.

Contact information

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Dear reader,

One of the most contentious global issues of today—not least as a result of the pandemic situation—is that of migration. The mobility of people between national borders, across land masses and open bodies of water, continues to dominate news headlines and inspire calls to action. More than just statistics and categories, however, those who migrate from one place to another are the epitome of what scholars of the global aim to understand. Wherever they migrate, people establish communities, negotiate between identities, and maintain cross-border connections, developing diasporic bases to build upon for generations to come.

The topic of migration and its common themes—hierarchies between national and global borders, restrictions and access to movement, and the transfer of knowledge from one place to another, among the many—are highly relevant to the study of global history. As mobility tends to implicate a move beyond the national, the fixed, or the static, the conditions which make migration possible (or not) can be put into historical perspective. More than just a field of study for those of the academic elite, however, the politics of migration has serious consequences for those who choose—or are forced—to move. In the case of the European migration crisis, for example, the International Organization for Migration estimates that in 2021, 1,654 people attempting to migrate through the Mediterranean Sea have been recorded dead or missing. In order to understand how and why the narratives of migration today have turned out the way they have, it is crucial to investigate migration historically.

This issue of Global histories features two sections of research articles, including a special section on Migration and Diaspora. To this aim, this issue provides an overarching focus on a diverse curation of articles, reviews, and special topics designed to entice the reader towards global historical approaches. The articles begin with Axel Julsrud's examination of the Japanese intellectual Tsuda Mamichi, placing his writings on Confucian thought and Western influence within a broader history of the global Enlightenment. Following this is Toyin Akinkunmi's work on the role of the body in the punishment of enslaved women in the British-controlled Caribbean during the early nineteenth century. The regular article section concludes with Vanesa Medina Godoy's examination of the Black queer South African artist Zanele Muholi's photography, putting their work into the historical context of post-Apartheid South Africa, as well as the development of queer of color critique. A methodological piece by Joseph Beaden also provides an in-depth look at the spatial category of Eurasia, suggesting commonalities between Germany, Japan, and Russia which go beyond previously situated frameworks of spatial understanding.

Readers will then find the special section on Migration and Diaspora, pioneered by several of our colleagues in the Global History MA from their work in the course "Migration and Diaspora in Global History: Perspectives and Intersections" led by Dr. Frederik Schröer. These articles provide transnational glimpses at migratory policy and diasporic legacy within specific regional case studies. Felipe Caroca González, in his study of contemporary

Chilean newspapers, traces the trajectory of racialized anxieties towards migrants from their historical roots. Joseph Duffy, through close readings of speeches and declarations from the Dáil Éireann, explores how the Irish diaspora maintained connections to the Irish nation. Sophie Genske concludes with an examination of the case of Gerson Liebl, the grandchild of a German doctor who has been denied German citizenship as a result of discriminatory citizenship law towards Germany's former colonial holdings.

Finally, this issue contains several critical reviews. George Payne, Adam Dargiewicz, and Amadeus Marzai each discuss recent books in history, providing commentary on critical global moments. In addition, this issue features a museum review of the recently reopened Humboldt Forum in Berlin. Phoebe Ka Laam Ng explores the contentious legacy and global nature of one of the first exhibits to coronate the new Forum, appropriately titled Berlin Global.

For Team Global histories here in Berlin, there has been much to celebrate. The return of some in-person seminars and lectures has allowed for a sense of normalcy and community to return to our journal team. Global histories itself is celebrating more than five years of existence, with 12 journal issues published since December 2015. The future also appears bright in regards to the Global History Student Conference, which is expected to return for its sixth rendition in 2022. Even more special, the Global History MA is also celebrating its tenth year, an endeavor which initially saw a small cohort of students among its first ranks, and now sees hundreds of new applications every year. The program's success is indicative of the fact that even if global history remains a contentious, debatable sub-discipline, that there are many new scholars eager to take up the task of understanding, critiquing, and improving the historical field for generations of histories to come. We therefore hope you enjoy these browsing these pieces and considering the global alongside them.

With best regards,

Ruby Guyot

Editor-in-chief

Acknowledgements

We would like to acknowledge the interest and work of all students who submitted an article, essay, or review during the last call for papers. We are especially grateful to the authors published in this issue, for both their fruitful contributions and efforts in revision. These authors include Axel Julsrud, Toyin Akinkunmi, Vanesa Medina Godoy, Joseph Beaden, Felipe Caroca González, Joseph Duffy, Sophie Genske, George Payne, Adam Dargiewicz, Amadeus Marzai, and Phoebe Ka Laam Ng. Their dedication to their pieces and excellent work in revision shines through in this issue.

In addition, we would like to extend our immense gratitude to the students on the Global Histories journal team, particularly those who devoted extensive time and effort to reviewing and editing the published pieces. These members include Kian Riedel, Phoebe Ka Laam Ng, Simone Steadman-Gantous, Henrique Pimento Gomes, Anna Nesterova, Lukas Jung, Charlotte Bracklo, Daniel Hinchey, Joshua Rossetti, and Terri Lee Harel. The attention and dedication these members provided towards the pieces they worked on, even during highly hectic periods in our master's studies, was fundamental in the editorial process for this issue. We would like to especially thank Natasha Klimenko for her years of excellent design and layout work for Global Histories, and to thank and formally welcome Cecilia Burgos Cuevas for taking over on the design and presenting us with a beautiful issue.

Finally, we are grateful for the continued support and assistance for this project by the Freie Universität Berlin, particularly the Global History faculty, chaired by Prof. Dr. Sebastian Conrad, and the Online Journal Systems team at CeDiS.

I. Research Articles

Tsuda Mamichi and the Global Enlightenment: A Confucian Liberalism

By

Axel Julsrud

Abstract

This article reassesses the political thought of the Japanese nineteenth-century scholar of "Western studies", Tsuda Mamichi, by looking at the ways in which he utilized the Confucian concept of "Principle" in his adaptation of Western political and philosophical ideas. It is argued that Confucianism has been under-appreciated as a dynamic and inventive component of the transnational intellectual transfer of the nineteenth century, termed by Sebastian Conrad the "global Enlightenment". Tsuda's use of the concept of Principle legitimized a progressivist world view which accommodated the establishment of new political institutions inspired by Western civilization, most importantly the establishment of a popularly elected national assembly. It is therefore possible to follow Kiri Paramore's lead and speak of a "Confucian liberalism" when discussing Tsuda's thought. Finally, it is suggested that Tsuda's writings provide evidence to refute the historiographical error by which the central concepts of Confucianism have been assumed to be inherently incompatible with "modernity" or "enlightenment thought", caused in part by earlier Eurocentric scholarship such as "modernization theory".

About the author

Axel Julsrud has a MA in Modern International and Transnational History from the University of Oslo. His thesis explores the role of Confucianism in the interaction between Western and Japanese political thought in the nineteenth century. From this autumn, he will be continuing his studies of the history of global society through a research scholarship by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.

Introduction

> Even though public law and civil law are man made [sic], they follow the nation's progress, vary with the enlightenment [開け, hirake] of the people, and arise from unavoidable conditions and the dictates of the times. This is almost the same as Heaven's Law [天律, J. tenritsu] that has been a compelling determinant through the ages. Human laws are invariably injurious if they do not arise from unavoidable dictates, and unchanging human laws have yet to be established since their value varies according to time and place. This is why Yao [堯] and Shun [舜][1] invariably followed the middle path.[2]
>
> -Tsuda Mamichi, June 1874.

In the above citation from the Western-oriented academic journal *meiroku zasshi* (明六雑誌, published in Tokyo from 1873 to 1874, Tsuda Mamichi (津田真道, 1829-1903) advocates for the reformation of public and civil law in accordance with "unavoidable dictates of the times", corresponding to the steady progress of what has here been translated as "enlightenment".[3] In the following issue, he uses the same logic to argue for the establishment of a popularly elected national assembly, supporting a petition which had been presented to the Meiji government to this effect in January 1874.[4] What is remarkable about this citation is the seamless combination of a belief in the unilinear progress of human society inspired by Western liberalism with a justification rooted both in Confucian metaphysics ("Heaven's Law") and ideals of governance (references to Yao and Shun), to the point that his thought might be labeled, somewhat provocatively, as "Confucian liberalism" or "Confucian progressivism".

Tsuda's role as a liberal reformer and member of the Meirokusha (明六社) society of so-called "enlightenment thinkers" in Meiji Japan has featured in most of the English-language scholarship which mentions him.[5] However, as indeed is the case with the scholarship on most Japanese intellectuals who expressed positive assessments of Western liberal political thought, his continued reference to and engagement with Confucian philosophical and political ideas has been all but ignored. More than simply omitting an interesting part of Tsuda's scholarship, this historiographical tunnel vision is argued to be both cause and effect of a conventionally Eurocentric way of narrating Japan's encounter with Western political and philosophical ideas, obscuring the dynamic and contingent processes of intellectual adaptation taking place before and after the 1868 Meiji Restoration. This article is an attempt at remedying this mistake by connecting Tsuda Mamichi's writings with the newly emerging literature on the concept of a "global Enlightenment", championed by Sebastian Conrad.[6] Conrad's framework, which will be explained in the next section, provides a useful way of contextualizing the intellectual developments in early Meiji Japan within a larger global context. This article uses Tsuda's writings as a launching pad to suggest some modifications in how Confucianism fits into the larger context of the Enlightenment – in particular arguing against the

notion that Confucianism and "modernity" are somehow mutually incompatible. Instead, Tsuda's writings exemplify how the Confucian concept of Principle (理) could be used to champion a Western-inspired political progressivism, indeed even establishing a parliament based on European models.[7]

The Global Enlightenment and Confucianism

How should we make sense of the massive social and political transformations of the nineteenth century in which Tsuda Mamichi took part? One common way has been to tell the story of two revolutions, a technical industrial revolution preceded by an intellectual revolution – the European Enlightenment.[8] The subsequent diffusion of an assumed nucleus of "modern" political theory and behavior from Europe to the rest of the world has conventionally been argued to constitute the birth of a "modern" world characterized by universality.[9] Perhaps the biggest problem with this master narrative is that historical experience does not support a general trend of convergence following the emergence of the so-called modern world in the nineteenth century, as scholars of "modernization theory" eventually were forced to recognize.[10] Divorced from its teleological ending point in "modernity", the story of the universalization of a pre-packaged European Enlightenment is also being called into question.

Sebastian Conrad has argued for a global, decentered story of the Enlightenment, a "global circulation, translation, and transnational co-production" of enlightenment knowledge.[11] Conrad criticizes the tendency to write about the Enlightenment as something pre-produced in Europe and subsequently spread elsewhere in an inevitable forward march of "progress". Instead of defining enlightenment on European premises and subsequently searching for traces of it outside of Europe, Conrad looks at which actors were talking about it, and for what purpose. This results in a longer history of a global Enlightenment, co-created by actors not just in eighteenth century Europe, but also in places all over the globe during the following century.[12]

Although Sebastian Conrad's article succeeds in disentangling "enlightenment" from Eurocentric conventions of writing world history and should serve as an inspiration, it also inadvertently exemplifies the degree to which scholars of East Asian intellectual history are faced with the challenge posed by the enduring legacy of such Eurocentric conventions. In a brief comment in his article, Conrad makes passing mention of the "somewhat paradoxical" nature of Confucianism's contribution to the "mixing and hybridization" of enlightenment in East Asia.[13] This runs counter to Conrad's own argument – if the Enlightenment was not passively received outside Europe, but constantly re-invented to fit disparate local contexts, why should Confucianism not play a part in this process in East Asia? The explanation for Conrad's quip lies in a long tradition of scholarship which has tended to portray Confucianism as inherently opposed to Western "modernity", already present during Tsuda's time.[14]

The idea of the binary opposition between Confucianism on the one hand and "modernity" or "enlightenment" on the other can be traced back to vehement attacks on Confucianism and Confucian scholars by certain influential Meiji intellectuals, Fukuzawa Yukichi (福澤諭吉, 1835-1901) chief among them. Although he was himself a Meirokusha member, Fukuzawa had personal and political interests in situating himself as a new kind of scholar by publicly denouncing the established Confucian intellectual elite, in turn securing his vocational prospects.[15] Fukuzawa's portrayal of Confucianism as hopelessly outdated and inferior to Western science and philosophy was likely appealing to both his contemporary readership and scholars of later ages for multiple reasons: for his readers, it provided both a diagnosis (Confucianism) and prescription (learning from Western "civilization") for the security challenges facing Meiji Japan. This simplified narrative could subsequently be effortlessly repurposed by modernization theorists of the post-war era, dueo how it conveniently corroborated a view of "tradition" making way for "modernity".

This portrayal of the relationship between "modernity" and Confucianism found further support in the negative assessment of Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism as "stagnant" found in Maruyama Masao's (丸山眞男) highly influential war-time work Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan.[16] Starting in the 1950s and continuing well into the 1970s, modernization theory provided perhaps the most important lens through which the nineteenth and twentieth century history of Japan was studied by Western scholars.[17] Although Confucianism was not always outright rejected as having played a part in this modernization process, however defined, the roles assumed to have been played by Confucianism were highly constricted. An example of such a constricted view is the focus on the similarity between Confucian hierarchical loyalties and the rationalization of political authority leading to the establishment of bureaucracies, also hierarchical in organization.[18]

As newer scholarship sheds light on the variety of philosophical and political views which historically were combined with or even emerged from Confucian concepts, the reductionist view of Confucianism employed by modernization theorists has increasingly come under criticism.[19] In fact, among his colleagues in the Meirokusha, Fukuzawa's staunchly anti-Confucian views were rather exceptional. There were those, like Nishi Amane (西周, 1829-1897), who were critical yet included or referenced Confucian concepts even when discussing Western ideas. And there were also contributors who discussed Western ideas from what could safely be characterized as a Confucian point of view, such as Sakatani Shiroshi (阪谷素, 1822-1881) and Nishimura Shigeki (西村茂樹, 1828-1902). The result was a body of intellectual writings displaying a highly interesting mix between components sometimes erroneously assumed to be mutually incompatible. Tsuda Mamichi's Confucian progressivism is perhaps one of the most striking examples of this. Yet, it has received virtually no attention in English-language historiography.

What follows is a brief outline of the role of one important Confucian concept, "Principle", in a selection of Tsuda's political writings in the meiroku zasshi. The way Tsuda made use of this concept is argued to suggest not merely a Confucian-facilitated adoption of Western political concepts such as progressivism and parliamentarianism, but more

importantly a Confucian adaption of these ideas, creating a distinct, Japanese "co-created" variety of Enlightenment thought.

Tsuda Mamichi and the Interaction between Confucianism and Enlightenment Thought

Figure 1: Japanese students in the Netherlands, 1865. Tsuda Mamichi is at the far right, top row. To the far right in the bottom row is Nishi Amane, another founding member of the *Meirokusha*. Together they studied natural law, national law, international law, statistics, and economics at Leiden University under Simon Vissering, later finance minister of the Netherlands. Courtesy of the National Diet Library Digital Collection, https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3851065/1

Tsuda Mamichi, scholar of "Western studies", and later government official in the Meiji state, was the most prolific contributor to the meiroku zasshi, the popularly read magazine published by the Meirokusha. Although David Huish has contested the actual outreach of the magazine, Japanese and Western scholars alike usually consider the Meirokusha and their publication to be at the forefront of intellectual discussion in early Meiji Japan.[20] Tsuda's central role in this academic society is enough to warrant closer study. Although he is not necessarily representative of a larger Japanese "reaction" to Enlightenment thought, he is far from being an obscure or irrelevant part of the public discussion during this time. Tsuda's particular interpretations of Western political concepts were perhaps not as hugely influential as those of Fukuzawa Yukichi, the most well-known of the Meirokusha members. However, his case is of particular historical interest for the striking way in which the creative interaction between Western political thought and

Confucianism in his writings, present also in the writings of his colleagues and other intellectuals of the age, exemplify the contingency of the introduction of "enlightenment thought" to Japan. As such, Tsuda poses a challenge to the simplistic yet resilient narrative of the unilinear "modernization" of Japanese political thought.

The following analysis of Tsuda's work is limited, and one should be careful in drawing conclusions about the entirety of his political thought based on his meiroku zasshi contributions alone. Nonetheless, it will hopefully become clear how it is highly misleading to write about Tsuda Mamichi, the "enlightenment thinker", without considering his Confucian intellectual heritage. The few biographical accounts of Tsuda in English understandably emphasize his and Nishi Amane's period of study at Leiden University from 1862 to 1865 and subsequent role in introducing Western law, economics, and statistics to Japan. It is a remarkable story, and representative of the two men's roles as pioneering students of "Western studies".[21] However, if one does not include the ways in which Tsuda carefully balanced and combined Confucian and Western concepts, one runs the risk of reducing him to a mere vessel of European ideas. Prior to commencing an outline of Tsuda's thought, it is necessary to introduce one fundamental concept which structured and bestowed meaning upon large parts of his intellectual perspective: the concept of Principle (理, C. lǐ, J. ri).[22]

Principle and its Historical Origins

The Chinese character 理 originally meant "the lines running through a piece of jade" but has been used as a philosophical term at least since the Chinese Warring States Period (fifth century BCE to 221 BCE). Most early uses of the term convey a sense of an underlying "pattern", such as the story in the Daoist classic Zhuangzi (莊子) which tells of the cook who can butcher an ox so smoothly he never has to sharpen his axe, due to his intuitive understanding of the "patterns of tendons and bones, or 'principles', that heaven has put in the beast".[23] The term subsequently evolved to take on a metaphysical character. In third century CE, Wang Bi (王弼, 226-249) explained that "just as one recognizes the movement of things so too the principle by which x is x can also be known".[24] The fact that these early descriptions of Principle are attributed to Daoist thinkers illustrate the shared historical context between Confucianism and other intellectual traditions, expressed in the concept of a time of "Hundred Schools of Thought" during the Warring States period. Nonetheless, it should be noted that despite significant thematic and lexicographic overlap, the relation between Confucianism and Daoism has been characterized for large periods by competition and that much effort has been expended toward maintaining Confucianism's denominational boundaries.

It was not until the Song Dynasty (宋, 960-1279) that the concept of Principle came to occupy a central position in Confucian thought. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Zhou Dunyi (周敦頤, 1017-1073) and Cheng Yi (程頤, 1033-1107), Zhu Xi's (朱熹, 1130-1200)

interpretation of the term became highly influential. For Zhu, all things in the world were created through an interaction of Principle and qì (気, J. ki), the former guiding and patterning the latter, which was the physical and spiritual makeup of all things. In this function, Principle was a "cosmic blueprint" which made all things as they were.[25] This cosmological understanding of Principle was highly influenced by both Daoism and Chen (禪, J. zen) Buddhism. The latter found a devoted base of adherents in the ruling samurai class in Kamakura period Japan (鎌倉, 1185-1333). This played a part in facilitating the introduction of Neo-Confucianism derived from the work of Zhu Xi and other thinkers to Tokugawa Japan (徳川, 1603-1868) starting in the seventeenth century, and also meant that by Tsuda Mamichi's time, the concept of Principle had played a significant role in Japanese philosophy for several centuries.[26]

More than providing answers to ontological questions of the components and structure of the physical world, Principle also provided a link between Confucian metaphysics and practical morality. Since there was an observable and coherent principle in all things, the same was logically also true of the human mind. Through a process of introspection, therefore, it was possible to grasp the appropriate ethical behavior in accordance with the universal Principle.[27] Importantly, this led the concept of Principle to also take on a normative character: it was not merely that by which x was x, but also that by which x ought to be x.[28] For Zhu Xi and his followers, whose highly influential variety of Confucianism is normally termed "Neo-Confucianism" in English, Principle governed not merely the natural order, but also the moral order.

It is also significant to note the political dimension latent in the concept of Principle as it supported the Confucian concept of rites (禮, C. lǐ, J. rei). Rites or rituals were an essential part of the governing function of classical Chinese states, a way of inducing a shared set of behaviors or moral ideas often contrasted with the coercion associated with Legalism, a competing approach to governance. Confucius taught that despite the changing form of rites throughout history, they were based on a core of knowledge handed down from the sage kings of antiquity.[29] As long as they were in accordance with the universal Principle of human affairs, as went the argument of later Confucianists, changes to the particular rites in society were permissible. Although it might seem like a trifling matter taken out of its context, Confucius' approval of substituting the more expensive (at the time) ceremonial linen hat for one made of silk could be cited to support this general idea.[30] This goes to show that there was a seed for the legitimization of political change inherent in the Confucian tradition: changing concrete aspects of society were legitimized through the dynamic relationship between rites and normative concepts such as Principle. Accordingly, Principle was a complex concept with a history of clearly discernible cosmological, moral, and political aspects. There is good reason to argue, then, that what was truly pioneering about Tsuda Mamichi and his contemporaries in Meiji Japan, who will be considered in the following section, was the scale and extent of change they reconciled with Confucian concepts rather than their application to this end per se.

Principle and the Encounter with the West

When the concept of scientific laws was first introduced to Japanese scholars of Western studies during the Tokugawa period, it was equated to the concept of Principle as the observable intrinsic pattern of the natural world. For scholars such as Satō Issai (佐藤一斎, 1772-1859) and, Sakuma Shōzan (佐久間象山, 1811-64), Western science was entirely reconcilable with a Confucian worldview since the moral authority of Principle remained untouched by the idea of scientific laws.[31] Sakuma's ideas are especially interesting as several of the Meirokusha thinkers studied at his school in Edo. For him, the scientific experimentation of the West embodied the concept of 窮理 (kyūri), or "exhausting principle", which had been advocated as the correct way to acquire knowledge about the world in the Neo-Confucian tradition for centuries.[32] This can be seen in his translation of "physics" as 窮理学 (kyūrigaku), "the study of exhausting principle".[33]

The concept of Principle, then, was reimagined by several Confucian thinkers during the end of the Tokugawa shogunate as identical to, or above yet in perfect correspondence with, the Western concept of "natural laws". As attention now will be shifted to Tsuda Mamichi's writings, it will be seen how this interpretation influenced Tsuda, who was one of Sakuma's students.

Of Principle and Parliaments: Tsuda Mamichi's Confucian Progressivism

In an essay published in one of the earliest volumes of the meiroku zasshi, Tsuda outlines his understanding of the relationship between Principle and the natural – including the human – world:

> […] physical and human affairs are invariably governed by laws. And these laws, being natural laws, are absolutely never controlled by man. They are called Heaven's Law [天律, tenritsu] by Westerners and Heaven's Principle [理, ri] by the Chinese.[34]

In equating Western scientific laws with Principle, Tsuda thus reiterated an idea which he probably had been exposed to via his teacher, Sakuma Shōzan. Furthermore, a much longer tradition of "exhausting principle" allowed him quite naturally to put the Western scientific method in a Confucian context, as they were both perceived to have the same goal of recognizing "principles" in the world, as evident in the following citation:

> Heaven's Law, or Heaven's Principle refers to the systematic order in all things, as it is nothing more than the cause that determines the nature of things. A principle [理] most easy to recognize is that, once a ball is thrown into the air, it will invariably fall toward the earth.[35]

This has implications for Tsuda's thoughts beyond just utilizing a traditional principle in order to make room for a new one. Because "Principle" is a concept with not just cosmological, but also moral and political connotations, Tsuda is able to utilize

argumentation based on Western science, particularly ideas of natural laws, in spheres other than the natural sciences. He continues:

> The law of gravity is somewhat difficult to understand, but still more difficult to fathom are the principles governing the flowering of plants, the formation of fruits, and the minds and movements of animals. Then when we observe the phenomenon of man, investigate his reason [理], penetrate the causes of this life and the hereafter, search for the secrets of man's creation, and inquire into the principle governing his conscience, we have reached the principles most difficult to understand. Yet this is also no more than discovering Heaven's Law. [36]

The logical implication, which Tsuda does not explicitly state, is a view of human morality almost entirely in line with orthodox Neo-Confucian thought: there exist certain principles observable in nature which are particular manifestations of a universal principle upon which human conduct also ought to be based. However, unlike many Neo-Confucian thinkers (but like his teacher Sakuma) Tsuda is not preoccupied primarily with questions of morality. Instead, sharing with his colleagues in the Meirokusha concerns about the political issues facing Japan in their time, he steers the discussion toward the issue of government.

Principle and Political Gradualism

On the topic of the administrative reforms which had been enacted since the Meiji restoration, the concept of "Heaven's Law" looms in the background of Tsuda's discussion. Tsuda takes up the issue of the wider responsibilities of the centralized Meiji state as evidence of societal "progress": "Institutions are simple and laws rough in uncivilized societies. As nations gradually advance, their laws become more detailed and their institutions more complex, and there are numerous reforms in which the old is thrown out and the new introduced".[37] Yet, he cautions both against clinging to "old customs[…] despite unavoidable conditions and the dictates of the times" as well as against hasty change, warning that "those who, yearning for foreign institutions and culture, destroy old customs suited to the people of the time will themselves be destroyed".[38] This moderate position is justified ultimately through what Tsuda refers to as "Heaven's Law":

> Even though public and civil law are man made [sic], they follow the nation's progress, vary with the enlightenment [hirake] of the people, and arise from unavoidable conditions and the dictates of the times. This is almost in the same category as Heaven's Law that has been a compelling determinant through the ages.[39]

Tsuda claims that the gradual refinement of laws and administration is tied to the "nation's progress" and "the enlightenment of the people", a gradualist argument which does not originate from Confucian political thought. Interestingly, this is said to be "almost in the same category as Heaven's Law", implying that the gradual tendency for administration to become more complex in line with the "progress" of society is a sort of principle in the Confucian sense of the word. In combining these concepts, Tsuda's worldview acquires a character distinct both from the Neo-Confucian cosmology of his predecessors, as well as from a Western scientific worldview. In the latter, there is no

connection between the scientific laws governing natural phenomena (such as gravity causing a ball to fall to the ground) and human affairs (such as psychology). On the other hand, Tsuda's view was not simply "Confucian" either. For an orthodox Neo-Confucian, the cosmology of Principle often legitimized the status quo, rather than the progressivist outlook demonstrated by Tsuda. For Tsuda, the force causing a ball to fall to the ground is the same (or almost the same) force necessitating gradual reform as opposed to complacency or abrupt change in a modern state. It is Principle reinterpreted to fit the highly volatile times through which Tsuda lived. What is more, the rapid changes Tsuda witnessed in the world during his life were themselves made sense of partly by employing the concept of Principle. Attention will now be turned toward how Tsuda used this concept to explain the Western notion of a steady progress toward "civilization" led by scientific developments, and, crucially, how Principle allowed him to furthermore support that notion on a Confucian moral base.

Principle and Progressivism

The relationship Tsuda assumed between Principle and the progress of society is visible in his article titled "Imagination". Here Tsuda once again mentions "Heaven's Law" (which, as shown above, was equivalent to "Principle" for Tsuda). The essay is a discussion of the role of imagination, or perhaps better understood as intuition, in acquiring knowledge about the world.[40] He writes:

> The empiricism of the Ch'ing [清, Qing] scholars and modern scientific research in the West employ only a minimum of imagination. Yet in such matters as appreciating that the earth is oval or discovering new stars, scientific research generally only establishes Heaven's Laws after verification of what originally had been imagined.[41]

Tsuda's argument can be interpreted in two similar but distinct ways. The first way is to interpret "what originally had been imagined" as the teachings of Confucius or other "ancient sages", which makes the entire passage read a lot like the "natural-laws-as-principle" argument put forth by his teacher Sakuma Shōzan and others. It seems more probable, however, that "what originally had been imagined" is to be understood as the action of putting forth a hypothesis and employing the methodology of scientific research as a way to verify or disprove intuitions about the world. Following this interpretation, the implication is that modern scholars, in putting forth hypotheses and testing them, are capable of intuitive or "imaginative" insight into the "Laws of Heaven" just as valid as that of Confucius, although unlike Confucius' intuition, a scientific methodology is needed to verify or disprove their intuition. In Tsuda's words, "If conjectures on things are verified by experiment, these principles are then regarded as unchanging Laws of Heaven".[42]

Just as in his earlier essay on government, Tsuda is not satisfied with simply linking Principle or Heaven's Law with natural laws, however. He writes:

> Verification, however, is easy in the natural sciences and difficult in the humanities. This is why metaphysical disciplines are so divided that they cannot reach conclusions. Even the self-evident principles governing such phenomena as comets and eclipses do not escape from unsupported hypotheses. How much more difficult it is to understand the humanities![43]

It is clear from this passage that for Tsuda, the Confucian idea of Heaven's Principle or Heaven's Law allows for a worldview in which there are constant, unchanging "laws" in human society, differing only from natural laws in their difficulty of verification. This is not too different from orthodox Neo-Confucianism. However, in orthodox Neo-Confucianism, the principles of human society were said to have been perfected by the sage kings of antiquity, causing societal ideals largely to be locked to the past, and to China. For Tsuda, the principles of human society had not yet been perfected, and moreover they were discoverable through scientific methodology.

If there exists unchangeable truths about the ideal way to govern human societies which are possible to arrive at through scientific methodology, the implications are at least threefold: First, society can progress; second, the "ideal" is not to be found in the past; and third, since the West was broadly acknowledged for their superior "techniques" or scientific methodology, the West can be a model, not just China. Note that Tsuda arrives at all of the above implications, none of which are commonly associated with Confucianism, by adapting the Confucian explanatory concept of Principle already present in the intellectual context of Meiji Japan.

It is important to note that allowing for the West as embodying "Confucian" principles in their social organization does not force Tsuda to depart with Confucianism in favor of "modernization" or "Westernization". He warns against too enthusiastically adopting Western customs or law based on the view that it is difficult to "verify principles" in the humanities:

> Our people [...] cannot easily investigate and understand the institutions of civilization that have been derived from [...] countless centuries of learning and experience. [...] Today's so-called enlightened scholars imagine liberty without knowing the price of liberty, and they freely discuss French codes, English law, and American government without studying law and political economy.[44]

This situation, Tsuda argues, is similar to "the blind men who imagined the elephant", bringing the essay to a conclusion with a reference to its beginning, namely the role of imagination.[45] Having been exposed to only parts of "enlightened society", Japanese intellectuals are not yet able to distinguish which Western customs are in accordance with a higher, universal principle, and which are not, lacking the "superior imagination" of a man like Confucius.

While clearly heavily influenced by Western thinkers, Tsuda's progressivist world view is not a wholesale importation of Western thought, nor is Confucianism relegated to the role of nothing more than a linguistic means to that end. As will now be considered, Tsuda found ways to incorporate Confucian political ideas of governance within his world view.

Principle and the Link Between Western Progressivism and Confucian Government

The final example of the way Principle shaped Tsuda's adaptation of Western concepts is found in his essay entitled "Mysteries" (怪, kai). Beginning with the rationalist assertion that, just as an eclipse was a mystery prior to the obtaining of astronomical knowledge which could explain it, the phenomena which up until that point had been regarded as "mysteries", such as fables of "goblins and ghosts", were in reality nothing but the unexplained workings of the human mind. For Tsuda, understanding the Principles of the world was the way to dispel with "mysteries", but as material science had not progressed far enough to understand the human brain, belief in certain "mysteries" was still prevalent. He goes on to state that belief in mysteries could perhaps be explained by a "momentary derangement", a temporary impairment in the "normal functioning and rapport between [the brain] and nerves".[46]

Dubious as Tsuda's explanation might be, there are several important points to take away from this essay. Firstly, note the equation of scientific knowledge with Principle as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. As explained above, however, Principle was a broader concept for Tsuda than just scientific laws, which likely explains why he then goes on to add a normative political layer to his discussion, which up until that point had been concerned only with material science:

> If a nation is compared to a person, the ruler is the brain, and the hundreds of officials are the five nerve senses and one hundred organs. Once the rapport between the brain and the nerves is disturbed, the five senses and hundred organs mistake their functions. This is called insanity. When women, priests, and eunuchs make light of official power or when government orders are inappropriate and the hundreds of officials mistake their functions, the great ministers being domineering and the military oppressive, how does the disturbance to the national structure [國體, kokutai] and the national illness differ from the diseases of insanity and sleep-walking? Such a country should be called a nation bewitched [怪國, kaikoku].[47]

This citation is a remarkable example of how an outlook on the world clearly reminiscent of the rationalist belief in the progression of material science characteristic of the European Enlightenment can be combined with a Confucian political morality. In essence, Tsuda is employing a metaphor inspired by Western science in order to argue for Confucian "good government" – the proper relationships between different status groups and their mutual obligations and responsibilities. Tsuda's association between expanding knowledge (investigation of Principle) of the physical world and the "enlightenment" of society might be said to be in line with Western progressivist thinking, but his subsequent associations to what he evidently considers an ideal or "correctly functioning" government seems to be best explained by the idea of a correct "Principle" of government. Accordingly, it seems that for Tsuda, Enlightenment ideas such as rationalism and progressivism were not just accepted as they were, but merged with the idea of Principle, giving them an underpinning of Confucian morality and political thought.

There is a final symbolic aspect of this essay which must not be overlooked. It is famously stated in the Analects, the chief source of Confucius' philosophy, that Confucius "did not discuss [...] the supernatural".[48] When asked about "serving ghosts and spirits", Confucius replied rhetorically: "You do not yet understand life – how could you possibly understand death?"[49] These quotes have often been interpreted to the effect that Confucius' concern was on the here and now, on the moral cultivation and the interpersonal relationships of the present, rather than on esoteric teachings on the afterlife. For Tsuda, the fact that "recent generations [were] finally moving toward civilization", dispersing mysteries along the way, caused even the "ghosts and spirits" of his time to gradually become within reach of human knowledge.[50] The symbolism of the choice of topic is clear: the progression of human knowledge allows Tsuda to examine even those topics deemed "unknowable" by Confucius, all the while keeping his bridges to the Confucian legacy unburnt.

Although Tsuda draws on thousands of years of Confucian statecraft in his admonitions on the importance of fulfilling the correct duties in accordance with one's societal role and obligations, his idea of a suitable government for Japan was radically different from that outlined in the Confucian classics. In the following final section, Tsuda's use of the concept of Principle to argue for the suitability – or even the necessity – of establishing a popularly elected assembly will be examined. Here, too, the concept serves not just a political function, but a moral one as well, displaying the continued influence of a Confucian logic in Tsuda's writings.

Principle and Parliamentarianism

So far, it has been shown how Tsuda employs the concept of "principle" in a way which undermines some common imaginations of Confucianism: that it is "premodern", "Chinese", and static.[51] He is able to take a concept which is central to Confucian cosmology and refashion it as being compatible with a gradual reform of society toward "civilization and enlightenment". For this purpose, Tsuda looks to the West, but not uncritically. It is also a central characteristic of his writings that they not only legitimize, but also call for this reform, as moving toward "civilization" is equated with getting closer to Heaven's principles in human society. Essentially, Tsuda's essays exemplify how a Western progressivist worldview could be reconciled with and legitimated by Confucian philosophical concepts.[52]

The upshot of this "Confucian progressivism" found in Tsuda's writings is the possibility of accommodating many political ideas and institutions more orthodox Confucians would have rejected as irreconcilable with the idea of the ideal society under the rule of the Confucian sages of Chinese antiquity. The most striking example of this is Tsuda's advocacy for establishing a popularly elected assembly, in support of a memorial submitted to the Meiji government in January 1874 by certain activists and former ministers

petitioning for such an institution based upon a Western model.[53] Tsuda accepted a general assembly because he saw it as an "unavoidable dictate of the times".[54] His view of the inherent Principle of government, inspired by European progressivism, saw the proliferation of knowledge and subsequent advance of "civilization" (開化, kaika) take on a central role. There is no better way to spread knowledge among the people in accordance with this Principle, he concludes, than establishing a popularly elected assembly.[55] His inclusion of the Confucian concept of Principle into his progressivist worldview additionally gives it a moral sprinkling rooted in a familiar concept of right and wrong. He writes:

> [...] it seems that we must acknowledge that this reform [introducing a popularly elected assembly] assuredly arises from unavoidable circumstances and the dictates of the times. After all, where else is public discussion and public opinion leading [than to participation by the people in national affairs through a popularly elected assembly]?

In this passage, one discerns the contours of an implicit reference to the Mencian idea of the mandate of heaven - "public discussion" and "public opinion" are cited not for their own legitimizing force, but for being symbols of the changing "unavoidable circumstances and dictates of the times", much like peasant revolts in Chinese history were perceived to signal that Heaven had revoked the mandate bestowed upon the imperial house.[56] One may assume that for Tsuda, attempting to delay or suppress the spread of "civilization" to the people by failing to establish suitable institutions would not only be politically misguided, but morally wrong, as it was in conflict with the Principle of progression of human societies – one of the myriad manifestations of the underlying cosmic Principle which humans ought to strive to act in accordance with.

Conclusion

In an earlier issue of the meiroku zasshi, Tsuda Mamichi's friend and colleague, Nishi Amane, argued against the establishment of a national assembly on the grounds that whereas physical principle [物理, butsuri] was universal, and technologies based upon them could be easily transferred from the West to Japan, human principle [心理, shinri], which underlay social and political organization, differed with time and place. This in turn meant that while a popularly elected assembly might be in accordance with Principle in 1870s England, it would not necessarily be so in Japan at the same time.[57] This bifurcation of Principle should be seen in relation with Nishi's tendency to dismiss Confucianism in favor of Western philosophical concepts, as it separated the Confucian cosmology from questions of morality. Despite this, Nishi most likely found inspiration for this bifurcation in the work of a Tokugawa period Confucian scholar, Ogyū Sorai (荻生徂徠, 1666-1728).[58]

Although Tsuda and Nishi disagreed about the extent to which Principle was a suitable philosophical concept with which to make sense of the world, neither of them rejected it altogether. The fact that they both, despite differing in their judgment, continued to refer to it seems to point to the role played by this, and perhaps other Confucian concepts, as

part of an intellectual "compass", without which navigating the new torrent of intellectual impulses from the West would have been much more difficult. The preoccupation with fundamental metaphysical and moral questions had created a wide Confucian vocabulary of which "Principle" represented only the tip of the iceberg. Any serious engagement with Western philosophical and political ideas would seem to require the inclusion of these terms and concepts, at least initially, to properly situate new ideas in a Japanese context. If this indeed is a more accurate characterization of Confucianism's interaction with Western thought, the correct observation but mistaken interpretation of Sebastian Conrad's quip that Confucianism was "somewhat paradoxically" a part of the "global Enlightenment" in East Asia should become clear.[59] It should also serve to illustrate how certain reductionist and stereotypical conceptions of the Confucian tradition have become entrenched – for various reasons which are not singly reducible to, but undeniably sustained by Eurocentrism in different forms. A closer look at the scholarship of Tsuda Mamichi, and indeed many of his colleagues in the Meirokusha, should compel scholars to move away from the tendency to gloss over or "rationalize" Confucian connections in Japan's "global Enlightenment".

Although shaped by contingencies of time and place, East Asia's nineteenth-century encounter with Western political thought constitutes a watershed in world history. The case of Japan is invaluable for understanding this milestone, both because of Japanese actors' pioneering role in adapting Western "civilization" to their society, as well as the diversity of opinions and reactions to this process. One should be careful not to focus excessively on the novelty of the "encounter" to the detriment of those actors' particular intellectual context, however, which necessarily gave them a different understanding of the very nature of that same encounter scholars attempt to make sense of today. Despite the singularity of the Meiji Restoration and the subsequent transformations of Japanese society, the evolution of Japanese political and philosophical thought from around the start of the seventeenth century is an essential part of that story.[60] Attention should be directed toward the fact that actors operated within pre-existing intellectual circumstances, even when their interests lay outside of them, as was the case with scholars of "Western studies" who nonetheless were influenced by Confucianism. Accepting this should hint toward a general peril of assuming unilinear causal relationships in talking about global phenomena – did "enlightenment thought", or "modernity" come from outside to Japan? Of course, the impetus from the Western philosophical and political traditions was undeniable, but significantly, "enlightenment thought" as it was experienced in Japan, was in Conrad's words "co-created", not imported. It also points to the widespread misinterpretation of "Confucianism" as something which can be reduced to a set of conceptions which are usually thought to be incompatible with "modernity". As illustrated in this article by looking closer at Tsuda Mamichi's writings, Confucian concepts could be manifested in a wide array of ways, some of which were highly harmonious with characteristic ideas of the European Enlightenment. The view of Confucianism as stagnant or essentially anathema to "modern" politics belongs to the same Eurocentric worldview, now widely discredited, which saw the "modernization" of Japanese society as something only possible by the impetus of the West.

Understanding the transnational dynamics of large international processes is a highly relevant task for scholars of the twenty-first century. Acknowledging the inherent dynamism and role of intellectual traditions in the encounter between Japanese and Western thought in the nineteenth century allows also for reexamining the similar but divergent experiences of the encounter between the West and other Confucian societies such as Korea and China – not to mention the subsequent role of Confucian rhetoric in the service of Japanese imperialism. Methodologically, this case might also be of relevance for the analysis of other global, transnational forces which shape our world today. While the interest in forces on the global level invite a top-down, or "outside-in" understanding of the world, it is crucial to remain conscious of the circumstances and terms on which those forces were identified and described, and not to ignore the experiences "on the ground" in other contexts, which may challenge some of those very constitutive assumptions.

Notes

[1] Yao and Shun are mythical rulers of Ancient China who symbolize perfect governance in accordance with Confucian conceptions of benevolent rule.

[2] Tsuda Mamichi, "On Government: Part Two," in William Reynolds Braisted, trans., *Meiroku zasshi: Journal of the Japanese Enlightenment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 140. Henceforth abbreviated as MZ with the relevant issue number. Citations from the original Japanese are taken from Nihon goshi kenky¹shiry¶, <<Meiroku zasshi>>, accessed July 21, 2021, https://dglb01.ninjal.ac.jp/ninjaldl/bunken.php?title=meirokuzassi.

[3] The word Tsuda uses, *hirake* (開け), should not be perceived as related to the European Enlightenment or "enlightenment thought" necessarily. See Tadashi Karube, *Toward the Meiji Revolution: The Search for "Civilization" in Nineteenth-Century Japan,* trans. David Noble (Tokyo: Japan Publishing Industry for Culture, 2020), 183.

[4] MZ12, 159.

[5] Braisted, *Meiroku zasshi*, xxvi-xxviii; Alistair Swale, *The Meiji Restoration: Monarchism, Mass Communication and Conservative Revolution* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 103-105; Thomas R. H. Havens, *Nishi Amane: and Modern Japanese Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), passim.

[6] Sebastian Conrad, "Enlightenment in Global History: A Historiographical Critique," *The American Historical Review* 117, no. 4 (October 2012): 999–1027, https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/117.4.999. See also the reworked version of the article in Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., *An Emerging Modern World: 1750-1870* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 485-526.

[7] See page 6 in this article for an explanation of Principle.

[8] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962).

[9] William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963), 599.

[10] Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15, no. 2 (1973): 199-226, https://

www.jstor.org/stable/178351.

[11] Conrad, "Enlightenment in Global History," 1027.

[12] Ibid, 1014-1022.

[13] Ibid, 1023.

[14] Kiri Paramore, "Liberalism, Cultural Particularism, and the Rule of Law in Modern East Asia: The Anti-Confucian Essentialisms of Chen Duxiu and Fukuzawa Yukichi Compared," *Modern Intellectual History* 17, no. 2 (June 2020): 529, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479244318000240.

[15] Paramore, "Liberalism," 538-542.

[16] Masao Maruyama, *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*, trans. Mikiso Hane (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), xv-xxxvii. It should be noted that Maruyama's opinion on this and a handful of other topics changed quite drastically over the years, which is evident by the extent he goes to distance himself from the ideas of the original Japanese work in a preface to the 1974 English translation.

[17] Sheldon Garon, "Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus on State-Society Relations," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no. 2 (May 1994): 346-366, https://doi.org/10.2307/2059838.

[18] Perhaps exemplified best by the six-part conference on "Studies on the Modernization of Japan" in the late 1950s and 1960s which produced five volumes (1965-71), among which an explicit description of some assumptions regarding Confucianism is found in Marius B Jansen, ed., *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 40-41.

[19] Kiri Paramore, *Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), especially 1-12.

[20] David J. Huish, "The Meirokusha: Some Grounds for Reassessment," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 32, no. 3-4 (January 1972): 208-229, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2718872; David J. Huish, "Aims and Achievements of the Meirokusha: Fact and Fiction," *Monumenta Nipponica* 32, no. 4 (1977): 495-514.

[21] Havens, *Nishi Amane*, 40-65; Swale, *The Meiji Restoration*, 103-105.

[22] Numerous suggestions on the appropriate English translation of 理 have been put forward (e.g. "structure", "pattern", or simply avoiding the question by Romanizing the Chinese/Korean/Japanese pronunciation), but I have chosen to stick with the commonly used "Principle" for reasons of readability, capitalizing the initial letter in order to signify the use of the word as a philosophical concept. For a discussion on the translation of this and certain other Confucian terms, see John Makeham, ed., *Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), xiv-xxi, xxv-xxxi.

[23] Dainian Zhang, *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*, trans. Edmund Ryden (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 26-30, citation on 30.

[24] Zhang, 31.

[25] Ibid, 32-37.

[26] Paramore, *Japanese Confucianism*, 31-35.

[27] Jana Rošker, *Traditional Chinese Philosophy and the Paradigm of Structure (Li* 理) (Newcastle upon

Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2012), 85-90.

[28] Zhang, *Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy*, 36.

[29] Ronnie L. Littlejohn, *Confucianism: An Introduction* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 27-28.

[30] Edward Slingerland, trans., *Confucius Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2003) 9.3, 87. Note that when discussing rites and their relation to Principle, the concept of the "way", or "tao" (道) is often used.

[31] Warren W. Smith, *Confucianism in Modern Japan: A Study of Conservatism in Japanese Intellectual History* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1973), 26-27.

[32] Shao Yong's (1011-1077) concept of "observing things" or "investigation of things" carries the same meaning and was influential in Sakuma's thought. See Don J. Wyatt, "Shao Yong's Numerological-Cosmological System," in Makeham, *Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy*, 25-29.

[33] Rumi Sakamoto, "Confucianising Science: Sakuma Sh¶zan amd wakon y¶sai Ideology," *Japanese Studie*s 28, no. 2 (2008): 219-221, https://doi.org/10.1080/10371390802249180.

[34] MZ11, 139. In this particular section of his translation, Braisted refers to 天理 "Heaven's principle", although Tsuda simply wrote 理 "principle" in the original Japanese. This is probably for sake of convenience as Tsuda goes on to use 天理 throughout the rest of the text. There is no reason to believe Tsuda intended the two terms to be interpreted differently.

[35] Ibid, 139.

[36] Ibid, 139. Braisted has chosen to translate 理 as "reason" in this instance.

[37] MZ11, 140.

[38] Ibid, 140.

[39] Ibid, 140.

[40] In the text, Tsuda praises the "elevated imagination" of Confucius and Daruma (Bodhidharma, the Indian monk who is said to have brought Chan (Zen) Buddhism to China in the sixth century), although he is also critical of the "distinctions in the degrees of profundity in the later Chinese studies on the natural principles of the five elements", e.g. Neo-Confucianism.

[41] MZ13, 167-8.

[42] Ibid, 168.

[43] Ibid, 168.

[44] MZ13, 168.

[45] This, of course, is a reference to the Indian parable in which four blind men, having touched different parts of an elephant, reach wildly different conclusions about what it is that they had felt.

[46] MZ25, 315-318, quote on 317.

[47] MZ25, 317-318.

[48] Slingerland, *Confucius Analects*, 7.21, 71.

'They were laid down and flogged, their coats are stained with blood': Making Enslaved Womanhood Through Punishment and Deprivation in the British Caribbean

By

Toyin Akinkunmi

Abstract

Reproduction, embodied violence, and a raced experience of gender: these are cornerstone themes in the study of women under slavery. However, this emphasis has resulted in the body playing similar parts in studies of enslaved black womanhood. This article seeks to historicise the conditions by which the body could gain its importance. To this end, this article relies on a close reading of eleven complaint cases, recorded by the Fiscals and Protectors of Slaves between 1819 and 1830, in the British colonies of Berbice and Demerara-Essequibo. Through limited third-person testimony, I seek to explore the ways in which enslaved women perceived what was owed to them by their masters and the Protector. I argue that enslaved womanhood could operate as a process: one borne out of contradictions, where universal issues of overwork, material deprivation, and physical punishment were increasingly treated as having distinctly gendered causes. Moreover, I argue that the era of amelioration within the British Caribbean modified this gendering process. Finally, I evaluate the impact the workarounds that masters were repeatedly allowed when it came to the bodily vulnerability of enslaved women, and the resulting new definition of womanhood that was shared by slavers and colonial authorities alike.

About the author

Toyin Akinkunmi is a new graduate from the University of Cambridge, where she obtained an undergraduate degree in History.

Introduction

On 11 March 1819, the women Nelletje, Julie, Lea, and Mietje of plantation Gelderland complained about their workload to the Fiscal, the chief judicial officer in the colony. As nursing mothers, they argued, they should not have been given a similar amount of weeding as their fellow enslaved people, because they 'were not able to perform consequence of our carrying our children on our backs'.[1] When Nelletje and Mietje lit a fire to drive away the 'sand flies,' they also stopped to breastfeed their children. Viewing this as laziness, their manager whipped them.[2] Nelletje and her companions further emphasised that among them were young mothers: 'Julie was locked up in the stocks, because she did not keep up with the rest of the gang, and threatened to be flogged the next morning. She is a young girl, with her first child'.[3] The Fiscal considered this case, going as far as visiting the plantation in person instead of sending his *dienaars*, the force of investigators.[4] He concluded, however, that the complaints were 'greatly exaggerated,' and the case was then dismissed.[5] Such was the reality for many other women who visited the Fiscal and, after 1826, the Protector of Slaves. Women complained due to excessive work, and as a result, they were punished in a way that often deprived them of food, clothing, or their health. The colonial official to whom they complained would perhaps give their owner a written admonishment (or in extreme cases, a fine), and tell the women to return to their owners. This article will argue that this cycle of overwork, punishment (by means of material deprivation and embodied violence), and the corresponding appeal to the Protector of Slaves was key in constructing the category and identity of black womanhood in Britain's colonies of Berbice and Demerara-Essequibo.

The body and gender in historiographies of slavery

Bodily exploitation has endured as a theme of exploration for gender historians within the historiography of slavery. The literary critic Hortense Spillers highlighted the role of enslavement in disrupting the link between body and gender. Her argument in 'Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe', that the movement of Africans to the Americas severed them from their bodily existence, an essential part of their subjectivity, continues to animate the historiography.[6] However, her argument that dehumanising treatment reduced the enslaved body to flesh,[7] and that therefore enslaved women were outside of the gender difference,[8] relies on a troubling conceptualisation of gender. In 'Mama's Baby,' gender is interchangeable with biological sex, and with that, womanhood is immutably tied to reproductive ability. Nevertheless, focusing on 'women's issues' has grown the historiography of gender and slavery. Issues of the body, reproduction, and lifecycle are fundamental in the work of Barbara Bush, Darlene Clark Hine, and particularly Jennifer Morgan.[9] For example, low fertility rates do not indicate the low importance of black women's bodies in Morgan's study. Instead, she argues that their sexuality shaped the methods by which slavers augmented their power, but also the methods by which enslaved women could resist them. However, her emphasis on 'gynaecological revolt'[10] repeats a problem in the work of those who focused on 'women's issues'. The body is taken as an

essential constant in womanhood. So too are the themes of reproduction, family, and physicality in enslaved women's history. The reasons why such dynamics came to dominate the lives of enslaved women are thus far underexamined.

The focus on the experience of black womanhood is partly due to theoretical advances in wider gender history. The work of black feminists Angela Davis and Deborah Gray White,[11] which has shown that black women were subject to different realities of gender than white women, remains influential. The popularity of intersectionality theory, following the publication of Kimberle Crenshaw's 'Mapping the Margins,'[12] has only strengthened similar approaches to black women's identity in the twenty-first century.[13] Seeing black women at the sharp end of all forms of brutalisation and marginalisation can, just as with issues of the body, make these processes seem natural. This naturalisation of the subordinate status of women, and black women in particular, is not exclusive to the historiography of slavery and women. Jeanne Boydston's important 2008 article 'Gender as a Question of Historical Analysis' noted that treating gender as a universally applicable category has fixed its meaning and obscured its difference across time and space.[14] This article attempts to take up Boydston's challenge and explore how the sociocultural dynamics of slave society were processes, able to be contested even as it came to predominate lived experiences and realities. The slave societies on the Guyanese coast, between the abolition of the slave trade and the practice of slavery, are prime locations to examine such questions.

The colonies of the 'Wild Coast'

Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo were united formally as a single colony of the British empire in 1831, as British Guiana. Earlier, in 1812, Demerara and Essequibo had been joined. Even before their unification, however, their status as colonies on the frontiers of empire had long connected them. Aptly named the 'Wild Coast' by Dutch merchants when they first established trading posts there in the 1590s,[15] these Guyanese territories would live up to their name. The climate was wet, raining for six total months of the year across two rainy seasons.[16] Artificial canals, ditches, and other drainage systems cut across the landscape, with enslaved people being tasked to weed old ones and dig new ones.[17] Along with the three rivers which gave the territories their names, lesser rivers and creeks such as the Corentyne, Cange, and Mahaica wound towards the jungle highlands. With the water came heat, humidity, and disease. It was no wonder that it took thirty years for the Van Pere family, who founded Berbice on a hereditary lease from the Dutch West India Company, to move from their coastal trading post into the interior in 1627.[18] The establishment of their plantation Peereboom on the Berbice would be followed by those of other planters. Settlement remained on the rivers, on the coast, and out of the back country, populated by six Indigenous peoples.

In these thinly populated, marginal colonies, the British Parliament allowed continuity in Dutch law and in Dutch bureaucracy. Governors remained the executive officers, appointed by the metropolitan government, the Court of Policy and the Court of Justice were the chief judicial bodies, and the Fiscal remained the chief judicial officer. Importantly, this decision helps explain the particular importance of Guyana's slavery archival records. Unlike in other British Caribbean colonies, the retention of Dutch laws preserved limited first-person testimony for those enslaved.[19] Beginning after the 1807 abolition of the slave trade, Britain pursued a policy of amelioration in its colonies, which accelerated through the 1820s until the 1834 abolition of slavery. These efforts to improve the conditions of the enslaved further allowed for the grievances of enslaved people to be delivered to the Fiscal and, from 1826 onwards, the Protector of Slaves.[20] Fiscals and later Protectors of Slaves overwhelmingly sided with the decisions of owners, managers, and overseers. Yet these officials operated in a period when the mandate of amelioration supported their authority. The institutional dynamic of intercession created tension; the commitment to defending the status quo worked against their duty to improve the conditions for the enslaved. This tension often surfaced in conflicts regarding the treatment and behaviour of enslaved women. Importantly, enslaved people knew which concessions were owed to them under ameliorative laws; they used these tenets and structures alongside longer standing means of improving their existence. These tenets included newer discourses about the appropriate treatment of enslaved women. Emerging from these complaints was a seemingly contradictory discourse, wherein bodily vulnerability, which was supposedly peculiar to womanhood, incentivised brutal treatment.

Gendered divisions of labour and punishment

Punishing enslaved people differently depending on their gender was common practice in Berbice and Demerara-Essequibo. However, the development of the abolitionist movement in Britain changed the punishment of women. The Bathurst Circular of May 1823 prohibited the flogging of women,[21] and the 1826 Berbice Slave Ordinance applied this specifically to the colony. Notably, the 1826 Ordinance went further than the Circular by including an enforcement mechanism: for example, it induced slavers to keep a Punishment Record Book, which the Protector of Slaves collected biannually for better oversight. It also differentiated the Protector of Slaves from the Fiscal, presumably also to improve scrutiny by establishing a dedicated official.[22]

For most women who were enslaved, field work was their likely lot in life. Berbice and Demerara-Essequibo, like many other British Caribbean colonies, increased sugar production around 1800.[23] As in Jamaica and the French sugar islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe,[24] unskilled field labour was usually assigned to women. Of course, enslaved women were not limited to agricultural work. Domestic service was an option; additionally, in Nieuw Amsterdam, Berbice, there was a small contingent of enslaved people working as semi-independent artisans ('winkel slaves').[25] Yet positions as artisans and domestics were

few and far between, as well as being fiercely guarded. For example, Christina, a woman enslaved to the winkel department, complained to Berbice's Protector of Slaves David Power about her assignment to field labour on the Nieuw Vigilantie plantation, arguing she was 'never used to it,' on account of her 'being brought up as domestic' by her Dutch father.[26] The Protector of Slaves confirmed with the Fiscal and later the Superintendent of the Winkel department that like other 'slaves with European blood on the paternal side,' she should resume her seamstress work: her white paternity qualified her to join the ranks of the small cadre of people 'chiefly employed as domestics or mechanics'.[27] Yet Christina was forced into field labour because when her 'first husband… Mr. J.V. Mittelholzer' left the colony, his brother took the opportunity to put her on the fields.[28] Attempts to evade field labour therefore often proved temporary. The enslaved people favoured for domestic or artisan labour were in precarious positions, constantly under threat of being relegated to field work at the discretion of their enslaver.

Both men and women did field work, which included picking coffee, cutting cane, carrying the megass (the fibre left after sugar cane milling), and weeding the crops. Yet women were more likely to stay in these backbreaking positions whilst men were more likely to rise into skilled and managerial occupations.[29] The case of Jacoba, Julia, Dorothea, Una, and Effa exemplifies this. They complained to the Protector in October 1829 that the manager Mr. Rush had punished them for four days straight. Instead of carrying megass for a third day, as they were ordered to, they had defied Rush by cutting canes. Consequently, they were stocked throughout the morning, then transferred to solitary until the next day. This cycle of punishment continued from Saturday to Monday, when they were let out 'between one and two o'clock A.M.,' after which they were told to carry megass again.[30] They defied Rush as they viewed carrying megass as 'the hardest work on the estate'.[31] To substantiate this claim, they named their mill supervisor, Nelson. Nelson testified to the difficulty of carrying megass: because of the size of the mill, 'the megass comes from the mill too fast… [though] they worked as fast as they could'. Eating breaks were short and interrupted by work; on that Thursday 'it stopped twice, an hour each time, and the women then had, if they chose, time enough to clear away the megass and eat their victuals.'[32] Moreover, despite Rush's claim that megass clearing was easier work than collecting it in the logie, it often meant eighteen-hour workdays. Jacoba described their workday as 'commenc[ing]… in the morning at three o'clock' after which they 'kept on carrying until nine o'clock at night, without stopping'.[33] Crucially, Jacoba and her co-complainants argued that prolonged megass-carrying duties were atypical, asserting that Rush was 'harder upon them than upon the other people, and that he did not do fairly; that he should not give some light work, and kill others with the heaviest work'.[34] The Protector for Demerara-Essequibo at the time, A.W. Young, did take measures against Rush, fining him a thousand guilders. Yet this fine was only for violating an article in the Slave Ordinance which prohibited punishing enslaved people with two punishments on the same day. In essence, Rush was not penalised for ordering Jacoba and her co-complainants to do excessive work. Moreover, Young stipulated that Rush be punished with the 'lowest penalty,'[35] in a case where the punishment of the complainants was severe. Even when the Protector

acknowledged managerial wrongdoing, such admonishments were not meant to extend to the way in which a manager divided workloads.

Enslaved people were placed into field gangs based on expectations of strength and, therefore, productivity. Enslaved women were divided further based on these lines: pregnant women and new mothers filled the weak gang, along with older children and the elderly, while women deemed capable were, in contrast, placed in the strong women gang. Managers gave women the most physical forms of labour for a longer period of their lives compared to their male counterparts. This dynamic was not an irrational contradiction in ideas about gender, as Lucille Mair implies.[36] The Berbice Slave Ordinance of 1826 established that managers were not to whip new mothers. However, women a few weeks postpartum were still considered robust enough for eighteen-hour days.[37] This reveals an important element of the gendering process - setting conditions for further exploitation shaped the meaning of 'woman', not the 'fact' of the body itself.

No matter which gang a woman was in, managers expected her to do more work than was possible. This is illustrated by the complaints of Beckey and Lydia, two women who worked in plantation Le Penitence's weak gang for weeding work. Lydia complained to the Protector of Slaves in October 1829 about having been put in solitary confinement 'every night constantly for three weeks past, because she is not able to weed two rows of young canes, the task given her every day'.[38] Beckey echoed this, adding that she had 'begged the manager to lessen her work, but he said no, that she must do as much as the others' and that she was also not allowed 'time to get her supper' because 'she is put in the dark room as soon as she comes from the field at sun down'.[39] Their recent pregnancies were likely what placed them in that gang – Beckey was three months postpartum, and Lydia two. Whilst confined with no access to her child, Lydia also suffered from the 'milk sour[ing] in her breast'. This symptom could cause swelling in the breasts, as described by Rosey, also from Le Penitence, who complained about a similar physical ailment five months prior.[40] The justification behind dividing labour into strong and weak gangs and the predominance of women in the weak gang did not stem from a sensitivity to physical capabilities, or from the natural capabilities of each gender. Rather, it opened up a dynamic in which a woman's failure to meet standards led to punishment, which correspondingly increased pressure to work harder. In this way, the gendered rationale for such division helped to establish the conditions for further exploitation. That men rose into managerial positions consequently reinforced the validity of using physiological rationale to explain gender and divide labour.

Solitary confinement and material deprivation

In the era of amelioration, there was official disapproval towards whipping women. However, this did not mean that they were treated more gently. Instead, their material deprivation and physical punishment increasingly took the form of stocking and solitary confinement. Often referred to as the 'dark hole' or 'dark room' by enslaved people,

confinement for three days (sometimes whilst in the stocks) became the highest form of punishment for enslaved women.[41]

A confined person was given the bare essentials to survive, and sometimes less. Judy, Betsy, and Mary-Ann of plantation Peter's Hall complained about this in late August 1829. 'Ordered into the dark room' after the manager and doctor claimed they were faking illness to miss work, they were confined from 'Monday morning at seven o'clock until Friday morning at seven o'clock'.[42] During this time, the manager fed them with a dehydrating solution of salt and water, which the women refused to drink, 'because this was not a proper way to give them salts; that they ought to have got a dose each with a little water, and then they would have drank it'.[43] This is a more extreme case of deprivation, however. Those confined expected starchy staples such as 'plantains and water' as detailed by Diana of plantation Arcadia, who had complained two months earlier.[44] Still, the dismissal of all of the women's complaints indicates light regulation of confinement conditions.

Women's acts of insubordination were often considered to be manifestations of their femininity. When Syrinsky, Maria, and Susette of plantation Sandvoort were brought to the Protector in late November 1828, it was not out of their own volition. Instead, their manager Peter Nicolson complained of their insubordination, for which he had confined them.[45] In their defence, they argued that they did not follow the driver's order to collect coffee because it 'was on the ground, which was more difficult [to collect] than when it is on the trees'.[46] The Protector of Slaves saw this as a campaign of insubordination that included 'refusing' to do work, and upsetting the plantation hierarchy in an unwomanly way. The manager brought several enslaved men from the plantation to testify;[47] 'Mars, a tradesman' argued that they 'used such bad language as he had never heard before from women' against the manager.[48] In particular, Blaize argued that Syrinksy and her companions implied that Nicolson was a negligent father and a failed property holder: 'they said, that he has been a planter on the East Coast, No' nothing, and that he has a wife and children, whom he had killed by bad usage'.[49] Therefore not only were Syrinsky, Maria, and Susette's offences judged to be insufficient work, but also insubordination that impugned the masculinity of their manager and delivered in a way that was deemed as too coarse to be womanly. It was likely because of this challenge to the gender and labour hierarchy that the Protector of Slaves personally imposed the harsh punishment of being 'kept in solitary confinement until the ensuing Monday, and also to be confined during the holidays'.[50]

Such a sentence probably included further material deprivation, including the loss of new clothing. Solitary confinement was peculiar in that the material deprivation did not end on release. Clothing was typically distributed on the holidays, most notably Christmas, Whitsuntide, and Easter, and as such was a coveted resource.[51] In spite of this, it was relatively common to not receive clothing for a long time. On 1 February 1819, the enslaved man Kees complained with nine others that their mistress Mrs. Sanders had not distributed new clothing in two years.[52] The Fiscal recognised this as an extreme case of material deprivation, fining Mrs. Sanders over 500 guilders.[53] The deprivation of clothing was so commonplace because there was no law that specified the amount of yardage which

enslaved people should receive annually. This meant that yardage differed by estates. At the lower end of the spectrum, men might receive two loincloths and a jacket, whilst sixteen yards was on the upper end in 1829.[54] Moreover, the Fiscal tended not to enforce the harshest penalties when faced with the extreme and habitual instances of material deprivations, such as what Mrs. Sanders inflicted on those she enslaved. The Fiscal took no action when the people she enslaved complained in 1820 and again in 1823.[55] In this way, by being confined, Maria, Susette, and Syrinsky could likely have lost their chance at their year's supply of clothing. The case of Syrinsky and her companions demonstrated a contradiction which shaped the experiences of enslaved women: they were expected to conform to the ideal of woman as the more delicate gender, yet were still subject to heavy physical labour and punishment.

Sexuality, morality, and the politics of deprivation

Of course, men too complained of overwork. Remus and Paris of plantation Blankenburg complained to the Protector in August 1829. Paris's complaint that 'the task required of him daily is too much' and that 'the manager, Mr. Bascom, confined him every night in the stocks, if the thirty beds [of sugar cane] are not finished' is reminiscent of the complaints of Syrinsky and her co-complainants.[56] Remus's addition that 'in consequence of the task given him being too much, he has no time to eat his victuals' similarly reflects Jacoba and her companions' complaints about giving up break time in order to finish their task.[57] Managers also disregarded the health of the men under them. In the case of Brutus, who complained to the Fiscal in June 1819,[58] the manager leveraged his health against him by ordering him to work with those ill with yaws despite his repeated refusals and flogged him when he would not comply.[59]

However, enslaved women were subjected to a particular embodied violence. Along with the impact of reproductive labour on their productivity, the threat of sexual violence was built into the working environment. Brutus, for example, complained after manager Robert McDermott flogged him. Yet Brutus was ultimately flogged for refusing to allow McDermott to rape his daughter Peggy, as McDermott had 'kept the wife of Rule… [for] a few nights' then discarded her.[60] In the end, Peggy was not taken by manager Robert McDermott. Brutus' young daughter Aequasiba revealed that a woman named Fanny took the place of the sisters: 'the manager sent aunt Grace to call Peggy, and to say if Peggy would not come, I must; we said, daddy said we must not, I was too young… The manager sent to call Fanny. Fanny went up and found him in his room'.[61] Nevertheless, that the bodies of Peggy, Aequasiba, Fanny, and Rule's wife were proxies in the contest between Brutus and McDermott indicates the importance of sexual politics in assigning workloads. In addition, the way masters and the Protector punished women for resisting overwork and deprivation reinforced ideas of female morality. The case of Matilda, a cook to a Mr. Holmes of Georgetown, exemplifies this. She complained in late September 1829 that Mr. Holmes 'licked her yesterday with an umbrella stick, across her shoulder, arms and head' as a punishment for not serving dinner early enough for his tastes.[62] After beating her, he

'stripped her of her clothes and burnt them, and left her quite naked'.[63] Mr. Holmes denied burning her clothes, and countered that he beat her only with a switch, rather than an umbrella. Hearing this, the Protector dismissed the case, including Matilda's assertion that her clothes were destroyed. Yet his dismissal was revealing as it included an admonishment to Holmes about the correct way to punish a woman. In telling Holmes about the 'impropriety of striking a woman, even with a slight switch, however great the provocation might be,'[64] Protector Young gave a message: a woman could be materially deprived, but she should not be punished like a man. In this case, the notion of a delicate woman worked to reinforce the legitimacy of excessive punishment. Mr. Holmes reduced Matilda to sites of flesh, upon which he could inflict punishment. He stripped her naked, to humiliate her and expose her to the elements, presumably to demonstrate to Matilda her lack of bodily agency. Yet the Protector did not understand Matilda as an ungendered body, and he did not treat her state of enslavement as turning her into simple 'flesh', which Spillers argues would be the case.[65] The idea that Matilda possessed a female body worked to reinforce her enslavement. Here, embodied violence did not serve to sever her from womanhood. Instead, the Protector reinforced the conditional access that enslaved women might have to the ideal of female bodily delicacy in the era of amelioration.

Stripping recalcitrant women of their clothes was seen elsewhere as a fitting punishment. Georgiana, along with Sebella, Mersey, Sally, and Dido, complained of overwork in mid-September 1828. Georgiana argued that she was unable to finish her work because she had been on the tread mill for several hours over the past eight days and had been insufficiently fed. The manager nevertheless stocked her. Alongside her, Mersey, Sally, Sebella, and Dido complained that they were also put in the 'house stocks' for failing to finish watering the sugar canes.[66] To counter Georgiana, the civil magistrate Mr. Alvers and the owner of Plantation Reliance testified to the Protector that Georgiana had eaten 'bread and beef'.[67] Other enslaved people of the plantation Reliance, such as William and Fidel, claimed that she had boasted of eating mutton and had 'brought a sheep's bladder to show that a sheep was killed'.[68] In essence, they claimed she had eaten better than the norm, as subsistence food tended to be mashed plantain, cassava, or other starchy root vegetables, along with salted fish.[69] As punishment for this, Georgiana was ordered by the Protector of Slaves to 'be deprived of all her finery, and not allowed to wear any other than the estate's working dress, and to be confined solitarily from Saturday evening to Monday morning, for one month'.[70] Georgiana's behaviour was seen as excessive enough that she needed to be made an example of: the Protector directly punished her, and the stipulation that Georgiana be stripped of 'all her finery' implies an element of public humiliation. Indeed, four out of the five punishments given out by the Protector of Slaves between 1 September 1828 and 28 February the following year were to women complaining of overwork.[71] Thus, in the eyes of both her masters and the official meant to assure her good treatment, the worst thing a woman could do was feign material deprivation whilst also underperforming. This, along with Georgiana's appeal to the Protector being used against her, shows that deviant womanhood was associated with the resistance of material deprivation.

The connection between gendered experience and punishment is further illuminated when one considers the other maximum penalties and offences for men and women. Men cumulatively were punished more often than women for theft. In the Abstract of Offences for July to December 1828, 161 men and only 15 women were flogged for petty larceny and theft. Yet for the offence of receiving stolen goods, the ratio was flipped, with 6 women and 3 men being punished for it.[72] That masters perceived theft as a male crime can be seen in which crimes received maximum punishment – whilst men could get ninety-nine lashes for stealing, the female equivalent was 'making false complaints.'[73] Universal human needs of shelter and sustenance were, through cumulative interactions and conflicts with the enslaving class, differentiated by gender.

Conclusion

Boydston indicated that, as a dynamic of social organisation, gender could be made and unmade.[74] Berbice and Demerara-Essequibo, in the era of amelioration, was one such period in which the shape of enslaved womanhood underwent redefinition. Particularly important in this redefinition was the emphasis on the enslaved woman as possessing a delicate, female body. In this period between the abolition of the slave trade and slavery, the Protector and Fiscal increasingly defined enslaved womanhood as encompassing vulnerability and motherhood. The resulting conflict this redefinition brought to matters of overwork, punishment, and material deprivation highlights a characteristic of gender in Berbice and Demerara-Essequibo: it needed to continually be reinforced and renegotiated. Therefore, when Nelletje and her companions complained to the Fiscal in 1819,[75] they were one of many who were incentivised by the ameliorative moment to appeal to the Protector of Slaves based on these tenets of womanhood. Yet because the material subordination of women was important to the form of production, such appeals on the grounds of womanhood were often brushed away. In this way, black womanhood under slavery can be seen as a process characterised by essentialising the body and all its needs as specifically gendered. Such characteristics of bodily delicacy were then used to justify their exploitation. Hence, Spillers's assertion that the denial of motherhood as 'female blood rite'[76] was key to the enslaved position has some validity. The body was important in creating a modality of experience specific to the enslaved black woman. But rather than women being ungendered through the denial of fundamental female needs, as Spillers argues, this case study shows such female needs were in the process of being created and inculcated as natural amongst the enslaved women of Berbice and Demerara-Essequibo. The exploitation of women's physicality strengthened the idea of enslaved womanhood.

Notes

[1] Investigation of a Complaint preferred by the negresses Nelletje, Julie, Lea and Mietje, each having infants in their arms, belonging to plantation Gelderland, to the Fiscal, on the 11th of March 1819, in *Papers relating to Slaves in W. Indies: V. Record of Proceedings of Fiscals of Berbice in Disputes between Masters and Slaves*, House of Commons Papers 401, vol. 26, 19th Century House of

Commons Sessional Papers (Parliament sitting 1826): 8, The National Archives, https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1826-010157?accountid=9851.

[2] Investigation of a Complaint preferred by the negresses Nelletje, Julie, Lea and Mietje, *Proceedings of Fiscals of Berbice*, 8.

[3] Ibid, 8-9.

[4] Randy M. Browne, *Surviving Slavery in the British Caribbean* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 35.

[5] Investigation of a Complaint preferred by the negresses Nelletje, Julie, Lea and Mietje, *Proceedings of Fiscals of Berbice*, 9.

[6] Hortense J. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book," *Diacritics* 17 (1987): 65-81, www.jstor.org/stable/464747.

[7] Spillers, 68.

[8] Ibid, 73.

[9] See Barbara Bush, *Slave Women in Caribbean Society, 1650-1838* (Kingston, Jamaica: Heinemann, 1990); Darlene Clarke Hine, "Rape and the Inner Lives of Black Women in the Middle West: Preliminary Thoughts on the Culture of Dissemblance," *Signs* 14, no. 4 (1989): 912-21, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3174692; Jennifer L. Morgan, *Laboring Women: Reproduction and Gender in New World Slavery* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

[10] Morgan, *Laboring Women*, 11.

[11] See Angela. Y. Davis, *Women, Race & Class* (London: The Women's Press, 1981); Deborah Gray White, *Ar'n't I a Woman?: Female Slaves in the Plantation South* (New York: Norton, 1985).

[12] Kimberle Crenshaw, "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color," *Stanford Law Review* 43, no. 6 (July 1991): 1241-1299, doi:10.2307/1229039.

[13] See Daina Ramey Berry and Leslie M. Harris, eds., *Sexuality and Slavery: Reclaiming Intimate Histories in the Americas* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2018); Natalie Lightfoot, *Troubling Freedom: Antigua and the Aftermath of British Emancipation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015); Morgan, *Laboring Women*; Diana Paton and Pamela Scully, eds., *Gender and Slave Emancipation in the Atlantic World* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005).

[14] Jeanne Boydston, "Gender as a Question of Historical Analysis," *Gender & History* 20, no. 3 (2008): 558–83, https://doi-org.ezp.lib.cam.ac.uk/10.1111/j.1468-0424.2008.00537.x.

[15] Browne, *Surviving Slavery*, 19.

[16] Allyson Stoll, "Thoroughly Tested and Carefully Tried: Cane Culture, Agricultural Technology and Environmental Change in Nineteenth-Century Guyana," *The Journal of Caribbean History* 45, no. 1 (2011): 96-97, https://www.proquest.com/docview/883695100.

[17] Browne, S*urviving Slavery*, 25.

[18] Ibid, 19.

[19] Ibid, 5.

[20] Ibid.

[21] David Barry Gaspar, "Slavery, amelioration, and Sunday markets in Antigua, 1823–1831," *Slavery & Abolition* 9 (1988): 3, https://doi.org/10.1080/01440398808574945.

[22] Browne, *Surviving Slavery*, 39-40.

[23] Stoll, "Cane culture", 92.

[24] See Morgan, *Laboring Women*, 35; Lucille Mathurin Mair, "Women field workers in Jamaica during slavery," in *Slavery, Freedom and Gender: The Dynamics of Caribbean Society*, ed. Brian L. Moore (Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press, 2003), 186.

[25] Thompson, *Unprofitable Servants*, 135.

[26] Complaint, No. 8, *Reports from Protectors of Slaves in Colonies of Demerara, Berbice, Trinidad, St. Lucia, Cape of Good Hope and Mauritius*, 1828-1831, House of Commons Papers 262, vol. 15, 19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers Collection (Parliament sitting 1830-1831), 228, https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1830-012809?accountid=9851.

[27] See Letter from M.S. Bennett, Esq., to D. Power, Esq. &c. &c. &c., under Complaint, No. 8, *Reports from Protectors of Slaves*, 228.

[28] Letter from M. S. Bennet, *Reports from Protectors of Slaves*, 228.

[29] For Berbice and Demerara-Essequibo, see Walter Rodney, "Plantation society in Guyana," *Review* IV, no. 4, (Spring 1981): 649, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40240885; and Emilia Viotti da Costa, *Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood: The Demerara Slave Rebellion of 1823* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 62. A similar dynamic was found by Mair in her study of cane workers in Jamaica. See Mair, "Women field workers in Jamaica during slavery," in Moore, *Slavery, Freedom and Gender*, 183-196.

[30] Complaint No. 57, R*eports from Protectors of Slaves*, 105.

[31] Ibid, 104.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid, 103.

[35] Ibid, 105.

[36] Mair, "Women field workers", 195.

[37] Trevor Burnard, "Toiling in the fields: valuing female slaves in Jamaica, 1674-1788," in *Sexuality and Slavery: Reclaiming Intimate Histories in the Americas*, ed. Daina Ramey Berry and Leslie M. Harris (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2018), 42.

[38] Complaint No. 58, *Reports from Protectors of Slaves*, 106.

[39] Ibid, 105.

[40] See Complaint No. 5, *Reports from Protectors of Slaves*, 48.

[41] Abstract of Offences, *Reports from Protectors of Slaves*, 307-8.

[42] Complaint No. 36, *Reports from Protectors of Slaves*, 78.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Complaint No. 17, *Reports from Protectors of Slaves*, 60.

[45] This was something slavers could do, under the 1772 code 'Rule on the Treatment of Servants and Slaves', which allowed for them as well as enslaved people to complain to the Fiscal and ask for redress of complaints. See Browne, Surviving Slavery, 34-5.

[46] Complaint No. 14, *Reports from Protectors of Slaves*, 231.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] List of Punishments directed by the Protector to be inflicted on slaves, from the 1st September 1828 to the 28th February 1829, inclusive, as appears on reference to his Book of Complaints for that period, *Reports from Protectors of Slaves*, 212.

[51] Thompson, *Unprofitable Servants*, 163.

[52] Investigation of a Complaint preferred by Nine Negroes, the property of Mrs. J. Saunders, residing up the Berbice River, by his Honor the President and the honorable member Mr. Helder. Berbice, 1st Feb. 1819, *Proceedings of Fiscals of Berbice*, 6.

[53] Ibid, 8.

[54] Thompson, *Unprofitable Servants*, 85.

(In)Visible Histories:

Postcolonial Histories of Gender and Sexuality Through the Lens of South African Visual Activism

By

Vanesa Medina-Godoy

Abstract

This article investigates the work of South African photographer and visual activist Zanele Muholi. It argues that what makes their visual project successful is its engagement with the multiple histories and discourses that inform Black queer identities and experiences in South Africa. To illustrate this point, I focus on a little-discussed image called ID Crisis *from 2003, a black and white photograph of a Black woman binding her breasts. Using this picture as a starting point, the article explores the ways in which Muholi's photography brings viewers into contact with transnational histories of Black queerness, from Western colonialism to Apartheid in South Africa. Throughout this discussion, I use the idea of (in)visibility as a guiding concept, understood as a simultaneous visibility and invisibility that allows Muholi to allude to several historical narratives without directly reproducing them. As such, it is this (in)visible articulation of history that allows Muholi to engage with Black queer histories and re-contextualise them from a Black queer perspective.*

About the author

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The question of queerness in Africa remains a contentious one, despite the recent boom in African scholarship, research, and activism around the topics of gender and sexuality. The history of lesbian and gay rights movements in Africa has been characterised by a complicated relationship with the West. Sexual rights circulate transnationally and their existence is closely linked to ideas of modernity and globalisation.[1] Western activism and academia have served as a starting point for discussions on gender and sexuality in an African context. Despite this, notions of queerness and queer identities remain ideas that are mostly informed by Western values and experiences. The concept of queer becomes potentially problematic, failing to acknowledge the different ways in which race, class, and nationality interact with gender and sexual identities around the world.

In South Africa, the work of photographer Zanele Muholi has become representative of a bourgeoning field of queer visual activism that seeks to challenge the lack of African perspectives in global discussions on gender and sexuality. Muholi's first visual project, *Only Half the Picture* (2002-2006), focused on the Black queer community in South Africa and offered an intimate peek into the world that queer and gender non-conforming individuals inhabit. Upon their first solo exhibition at the Johannesburg Art Gallery in 2004, Muholi's work gained both national and international recognition and made evident the need for more discussions around issues of race, gender, and sexuality in post-Apartheid South Africa. The 1996 South African constitution is famous for being the first in the world to explicitly protect gay and lesbian rights.[2] Yet, even today, queer individuals still find themselves marginalised, perceived as outsiders and not fully *African*. In 2009, the then South African Minister of Arts and Culture, Lulu Xingwana, walked out of an exhibition showcasing some of Muholi's photographs from *Only Half the Picture*. Xingwana justified her decision by calling the images immoral and pornographic, saying that they represented the opposite of "social cohesion and nation-building."[3] Images that displayed the semi-naked bodies of Black lesbians were considered too radical. By calling such pictures the opposite of nation-building, Xingwana became one of the many voices claiming homosexuality to be un-African.

Muholi's visual activism is a direct response to this misrepresentation of Black queer communities. Muholi uses photography for advocacy, to raise awareness of the challenges these communities face, and to create a Black queer visual history. In the last decades, the lack of representation for racial, gender, and sexual minorities has dominated debates around identity and cultural production around the world. Yet, even though it is true that Black gender non-conforming individuals have been historically subjected to systemic silencing and erasure, this does not mean that their existence has gone entirely unrecognised. Pumla Dineo Gqola notes that Black queer people can never be truly invisible. The hate and violence targeted towards them mark them as "highly visible manifestations of the undesirable."[4] As a visual activist, what sets Muholi's work apart is the complexity of its exploration of Black queer identities and experiences, going beyond the mere production of iconic images to consider the complex ways in which gender, sexuality, race, and nationality come together in an African historical and cultural context.

This article investigates the ways in which Muholi's images bring viewers into contact with transnational histories of Black queerness, from Western colonialism to Apartheid in South Africa. In particular, I focus on a little-discussed photograph taken in 2003 called *ID Crisis*. The image shows a semi-naked Black woman in the middle of a darkly lit room as she binds her chest with white strips of cloth. She looks intently at the bandages as the composition leads the viewer's eyes to the half-covered breasts. Critics praised Muholi's photographic series for its political engagement and message but have often dismissed the images as too disturbing to merit study on their artistic and aesthetic qualities.[5] Yet, photographs like *ID Crisis* make evident Muholi's expert use of the medium to craft intricate images that reflect on the experience of Black queerness. In its subject and composition, *ID Crisis* alludes to the complex history of Black female sexuality while avoiding direct references. Through this (in)visible articulation of history Muholi is able to navigate the variety of often contradicting narratives and histories that inform Black queer experiences. It is exactly because of this nuance and complexity that images like *ID Crisis* continue to warrant study.

Muholi's project necessarily leads to an inquest into what constitutes queer experience in an African context. In Western academia, queer has long been a concept characterised by indeterminacy and mutability. The idea of queerness represented a shift from established identities to practices and experiences primarily defined by their transgressiveness. However, it is this very indeterminacy that can make the concept potentially problematic, for queer is never completely unbiased. As Hiram Pérez has noted, there is a tendency towards anti-identitarianism in queer studies, a rejection of identity politics in favour of a "politics of difference" that often ends up catering to "the habits of the university's ideal bourgeois subject, among them, his imperial gaze, his universalism, and his claims to a race-neutral objectivity."[6]

The work of scholars like Pérez made evident the need to address issues of race and class in the context of queer studies. With the advent of queer of color critique in American academia, intersectional frameworks began to be used in the study of queerness.[7] African perspectives, however, remained largely absent. Queer studies and queer of color critique are both informed by Western values and experiences. They can often fail to acknowledge the ways in which race, class, gender, sexuality, and nationality are experienced differently in the global South. The concept of queer carries within itself the legacy and history of Western activism and academia. Thus, discussions of queerness in Africa often entail a re-evaluation of the concept itself.

In recent years, scholars have sought to redefine queer to reflect the complicated ways race, sexuality, and nationality come together in African queer identities.[8] Queerness must not only acknowledge sexual diversity, but also the ways in which the history of race and colonialism inform notions of Black sexuality, and how that colonial history, in turn, affects the attitudes of post-colonial nationalisms towards gender non-conformity. This new critical queerness is reflected in Muholi's practice and involves the creation of alternative

historiographies of queerness that look at sexual identities in the context of Black history and experience.

Scholars such as Anne McClintock, Sander Gilman, and Zine Magubane have noted how the legacy of colonial narratives on race and Black bodies have inevitably influenced the way we think about Black sexuality.[9] This racial stigmatisation that places Black bodies as deviant and degenerate has in turn informed post-colonial narratives on gender and sexuality. The work of Neville Hoad is particularly notable in this area, highlighting the need to explore the influence of colonial narratives and Western globalisation on the way homosexuality is perceived in Africa.[10] Indeed, discussions of homosexuality over the past decades have been characterised by narratives portraying it as un-African in an attempt to distance African culture from colonial notions of Black deviancy. At the same time, queer rights and activism are often perceived as foreign impositions and a possible new Western civilising mission.

By revisiting these histories of race and sexuality, Muholi's work allows viewers to explore their complexity and re-contextualise them from a Black queer perspective. A key aspect of their visual activism is the fact that Muholi is part of the Black queer community themself. As such, Muholi has always been concerned with the lack of Black queer voices and perspectives in mainstream culture and history. Muholi was born in 1972, at the height of Apartheid in South Africa. In 2002, Muholi co-founded the Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW) and it was through their work as an activist that they met many of those who would later feature in their photographs. This sense of community is what inspires Muholi to refer to the people they photograph as "participants" rather than "subjects," choosing to highlight collaboration and empowerment as crucial aspects of their practice.[11] In this way, Muholi's visual activism centres the Black queer subject and uses their perspective and experiences to re-frame the different histories of Black sexuality, from ethnography and colonial representations of the Black female body to Apartheid and the experience of institutional and hate-based violence.

Black bodies and female sexualities

One of the biggest challenges to Muholi's mission was reflected in the Lulu Xingwana incident of 2009. At the sight of naked Black women, the then Minister of Arts and Culture immediately thought of pornography and the long tradition of degrading images that presented Black bodies as specimens to be viewed and studied. Indeed, Black female sexuality exists within a complex social and historical context. As such, images of Black queer women cannot ignore the narratives that throughout history have defined how Black female bodies are meant to be displayed and consumed. Desiree Lewis points out that "sexuality is culturally mediated, and the body is a social signifier."[12] For Muholi, such cultural mediation is important and they are highly aware of the meanings and legacies invoked by pictures like *ID Crisis*, in which the Black female body is the main focus. The question, then, is how to address this complex history and racial stigma that Black bodies carry while producing positive images of Black queer representation.

ID Crisis' focus on a semi-naked female torso inevitably conjures up traditional ethnographic images of "native" women. The history of photography in Africa is filled with typological images of Black people, here presented as scientific specimens for study, classification, and collection. The development of ethnographic photography came with its own language and set of conventions to denote ideas of exoticism and primitivism. The typical female prototype involved a semi-naked woman with bare breasts, wearing beaded necklaces and bracelets or bound in colourful cloth. In Muholi's photograph, there is a clear parallel with these earlier pictures: the participant's body is also bound in cloth, while her breasts are left visible to the camera.

This traditional representation of Black women evokes colonialist stereotypes that declared Black people as primitive and uncivilised. Moreover, their perceived inferiority meant that Black bodies were often seen as degenerate and deviant. The colonial imagination turned to pathologising narratives on Black sexuality, which was defined by bestiality and lasciviousness. Anne McClintock notes that the colonies presented "a porno-tropics for the European imagination – a fantastic magic lantern of the mind out into which Europe projected its forbidden sexual desires and fears."[13] This denigration of African subjects served in turn to justify the systems put in place to control and exploit them. In the case of African women, the hypersexualised prototype meant that the Black female body could only be defined in terms of physical labour or as a sex object. This is the narrative behind the popular figure of the "African Venus," the epitome of African femininity.[14]

The African Venus archetype was perhaps best embodied by Sarah Baartman, a Khoisan woman who in 1810 was taken to Europe to be displayed in freak shows as an ethnographic specimen. Baartman's popularity in Europe meant the consolidation of these female stereotypes in scientific circles and Western popular culture. Prints of Baartman were circulated across Europe, highlighting her voluptuous body as a sign of sexual deviancy.[15] It is this voluptuousness that has come to characterise Black female bodies even today. Thus, the image of naked breasts in Muholi's *ID Crisis* necessarily invokes these notions of African sexuality and womanhood. In an echo to depictions of Baartman's unruly body, the participant's breasts stick out from underneath the binding, as though they cannot be contained.

The negative connotations of naked Black bodies are not lost on Muholi's audience. In 2005, Muholi directed a short film for the Gay and Lesbian Festival in South Africa titled *Enraged by a Picture*. The film documents responses that Muholi received to exhibitions of their early work in Johannesburg, *ID Crisis* among them. Most of the negative feedback was based around the photographs' focus on Black female sexuality. A visitor to one of their exhibitions left a comment saying, "It is truly unacceptable for you to undermine our race's especially black portraying nudity and sexual explicit content images as if they are the only one who are involved these inhuman activities."[16] Another visitor claimed Muholi's work to be discriminatory in its debasement of Black female bodies.[17] The attitudes displayed by these visitors reflect on the long history of images that have used sexuality to objectify and

denigrate Black women. Their rejection of hypersexualised stereotypes means that, in their eyes, Black women must never be represented in relation to sex.

The disavowal of Black sexuality is a prominent feature of post-colonial African discourses around gender, sexuality, and queerness. Indeed, narratives that say "homosexuality is un-African" have been supported by political figures throughout the continent. Most relevant to Muholi's work is a speech given by the then South African president Thabo Mbeki in 2002, when Sarah Baartman's remains were returned to South Africa. In the speech, Mbeki denounced how the European imperialist project used Baartman to spread lies of Black sexual deviancy and depravity.[18] Likewise, in subsequent speeches that addressed HIV, Mbeki rejected the idea of an AIDS emergency in South Africa by saying such claims relied on imperial notions of Black promiscuity.[19] In his refusal to address African sex, Mbeki established discussions of Black sexuality as foreign impositions. His approach was mirrored by other African leaders such as Zimbabwean Robert Mugabe, who characterised homosexuality as an external threat.[20] This is what Brenna Munro calls the "postcolonial politics of stigma," defined as "imperial shaming at the intersection of race, sexuality, and gender and the corresponding emergence of a desire for the postcolonial 'dignity' which is all too often formulated through the politics of a reconstituted heteronormative 'respectability.'"[21]

Muholi's visual activism is a direct response to this return to heteronormativity in Africa. As a result, Muholi finds themself in the difficult position of having to address these negative historical narratives and the negative connotations carried by depictions of sensuous, Black female bodies. Ethnographic photography is part of the history of Black female representation. Considering the negative consequences that the rejection of African sexuality can bring to gender non-conforming people in Africa, it is best to acknowledge, explore, and reframe this part of history.

Muholi is not alone in this endeavour. In 2001, South African artist Tracey Rose fashioned herself as a stereotypical Black Venus in her famous self-portrait titled *Venus Baartman*. In the photograph, Rose explores her own identity and sexuality. The figure of Sarah Baartman becomes representative of female struggle and the way Black women's identities have historically been defined by others. A similar reframing happens in *ID Crisis*. Muholi uses certain conventions of ethnographic photography to explore queer sexuality. In the same way that Baartman was usually depicted with artefacts and ornaments meant to represent her "ethnic" identity, in *ID Crisi*s Muholi shows the participant wearing breast binders, a practice often coded as queer and thus a signifier of her queer identity.

The act of breast binding can also inspire a different reading of *ID Crisis*. If bare breasts have become the symbol of stereotypical representations of hypersexualised Black female bodies, then the act of binding can be read as a direct rejection of the trope. The participant might be covering her breasts as a way of protecting herself from a sexualising gaze. The hands that hold the bandages are positioned between the participant and the camera, obscuring part of the torso. In this way, the binding represents a barrier for the

viewer, the parts of her body that the participant does not want to make available. Even though the breasts are still visible, the fact that the participant is covering them forces viewers to think of the photograph as more than just the image of a naked Black woman.

Breast binding as a rejection of the ethnographic hypersexualised prototype has another effect. By highlighting the naked breasts of a woman, ethnographic photography draws attention to the biological side of womanhood. Breasts are signifiers of fertility and thus it is not uncommon to find images of semi-naked African women holding infants. This narrative of fertility and womanhood persists even in post-Apartheid South Africa. With the abolition of Apartheid came a nation-building project that relied on metaphors of kinship, family, and the body. Deborah Posel has argued that the idea of a unified and prospering South African nation was inextricably tied to the promotion of a "productive, life-giving sexuality."[22] The idea of rebirth became a popular metaphor for the renewal of the nation. However, thinking of sexuality exclusively in terms of fertility is inherently problematic when considering queer sexualities because, in many ways, non-reproduction has become a defining feature of queer people's identities and queer politics.[23] In *ID Crisis*, Muholi's use of the conventions of ethnographic photography alludes to traditional African femininity and its reliance on fertility. Nevertheless, through the act of breast binding, Muholi simultaneously rejects the prominence of fertility and affirms the participant's queer identity.

It is also important to consider the ways in which *ID Crisis* diverges from the ethnographic tradition. Most notably, the way the participant is presented in *ID Crisis* is distinctly different from ethnographic photography. The camera does not have a clear view of her whole body and most of her features are obscured by shadows. Instead, by highlighting intimacy and immediacy with the participant, Muholi's photograph evokes the visual language of social documentary. Doing this avoids the risks and complications that come from directly reproducing a genre as controversial as ethnography. *ID Crisis* alludes to ethnographic images of Black female sexuality without directly replicating them. It is this (in)visibility of the ethnographic type that allows Muholi to explore the complex history of Black queer female sexuality while centring Black queer perspectives, an approach that continues to define Muholi's engagement with all other aspects of Black queer history.

Queer in South Africa

Muholi's exploration of Black queer histories highlights the different ways in which Black bodies have been historically policed. Moving beyond Western imperialism, Black bodies remained subjects to be measured and controlled during Apartheid in South Africa. Muholi was born at the height of Apartheid. As such, their photographs inevitably carry within them the legacy of that period of South African history, one that is particularly relevant in *ID Crisis*. The title references identity cards and South African pass books. Up until 1986, South African pass laws became one of the defining features of the Apartheid

system. They restricted the movement of people of colour, who were forced to carry a document to move into and across different spaces. The spaces that were available to them were determined by their race. Pass books put people into three categories: white, coloured, and native or Bantu.

Muholi's reference to pass books in *ID Crisis* reflects on a long history of systems that have sought to police the identities of Black individuals. In a similar way to how being classified Bantu or coloured would limit the mobility of individuals, being recognised as queer in contemporary Africa can bring its own set of dangers and limitations.[24] This does not mean that race and sexuality are analogous. Nonetheless, it exemplifies the ways in which both inform the experience of Black queerness. Nadine Gordimer put it best when she said, "There may be a particular connection between sexuality, sensuality, and politics uniquely inside South Africa. Because, after all, what is apartheid all about? It's about the body. It's about physical differences."[25]

Among the series, *ID Crisis* stands out as one of the few photographs that does not completely hide the participant's face, even though the woman remains anonymous. It is through this tension between showing and hiding the face and body that *ID Crisis* tells the story of South African pass books and Black identity. The participant faces the viewer, and the camera seems to have stopped in the middle of its journey from the body to the face. The face is not fully visible, but the possibility is there, encouraged by the tension produced by the cropped frame. Muholi alludes to the possibility of a conventional headshot while denying viewers the certainty of a clear portrait. The participant remains unknown. In this way, *ID Crisis* hints at the history of photo identification without replicating the type.

It is this double-edged approach that sets Muholi's photography apart. Indeed, Muholi is not the only South African artist to have taken an interest in racial profiling and the photographic conventions that are associated with it. Pass books, identity cards, and mug shots present a unique opportunity to comment on the power of Apartheid and its policing of identity. Roelof van Wyk's 2009 series *Young Afrikaner – A Self Portrait* employs the visual language of racial typology to investigate white Afrikaner identity. Van Wyk's approach consciously subverts racial expectations and questions the power of these types of images as tools for state regulation. Like van Wyk, Muholi is also aware of the effects that racial profiling techniques have on the subject. There is, however, an important difference in their approaches. Van Wyk is capable of reproducing the conventions of racial typology because his subjects' appearances do not carry the same racial stigma that traditionally Black subjects do. Despite the cool gaze of the camera, Van Wyk's Afrikaners are neither diminished nor objectified. They seem comfortable, looking back at the camera even with a hint of pride. As such, Van Wyk's series represents the failure of taxonomy. By turning the camera towards white Afrikaners, it is the conventions of racial typology that are exposed and undermined instead. In contrast, Muholi's participants carry the stigma of being not only Black, but also queer. In this case, the reproduction of photographic typologies of race becomes a more dangerous endeavour. Racial profiling, like ethnographic photography, is an undeniable part of Black South Africans' history. Muholi is nonetheless aware of the racist

readings that such conventions might welcome. Muholi's solution is a more ambiguous approach to this historical tradition that alludes to its existence without replicating it. Muholi's *ID Crisis* thus acknowledges the history of racial typology while protecting the participant from reliving the experience.

A protective attitude towards the participants is indeed characteristic of Muholi's approach to photography. Muholi addresses the issue of Black queer stigmatisation from the perspective of social documentary. Their photographs acknowledge the histories of ethnography and racial profiling, but also stand in distinct opposition to these dynamics. While the objective of ethnographic photography and racial typology is to expose the subject's body to the viewer, Muholi's pictures are instead presented as intimate insights into the lives and struggles of Black gender non-conforming individuals in South Africa. Their visual language invokes the work of notable South African social documentary photographers such as David Goldblatt and Ernest Cole, who gained notoriety for their work documenting the lives of South Africans under Apartheid. Muholi's photographs in *Only Half the Picture* are often in black and white and the framing tends to emphasise a sense of immediacy with the subject. Indeed, the South African documentary tradition is particularly suited to Muholi's project because of its historical relationship to political struggle. As a genre, social documentary rose to prominence in South Africa during Apartheid as photographers set to use their medium to record the harsh conditions and abuses endured by Black individuals. Besides documentary photographers like Goldblatt and Cole, the 1980s saw the rise of photographers that identified as political activists. A collective of amateur and professional photographers under the name "Afrapix" became one of the strongest voices speaking against the violence and abuses experienced by South Africans under Apartheid. Their work became known as "struggle photography," a photographic practice characterised by its political and social engagement.[26]

Muholi's visual project is not only concerned with the visual representation of the Black queer experience. Part of their advocacy is their concern with the gender-based violence that is so prevalent in South Africa, particularly against Black queer women. Lesbian women are often raped by family and friends who think that the act can cure them of their lesbianism. In the aftermath, they lack support from medical practitioners and local authorities, often facing further stigmatisation because of their gender and sexuality. As such, corrective rape stands as representative of the oppression that Black queer individuals experience in being rejected by society, let down by those meant to protect them. This political engagement is characteristic of Muholi's whole photographic practice.

Muholi's preoccupation with corrective rape parallels documentary photographers' interest in the struggle against Apartheid. In both cases, the goal is to create an archive documenting the plight of disenfranchised communities—a record of the systemic abuse they endure—as a way of pushing for a political agenda of social change. This point can be exemplified by the way Muholi's photographs often invoke images of this period of struggle. *ID Crisis*, in particular, recalls a picture by David Goldblatt of a fifteen-year-old boy that had been the victim of police violence. Both pictures focus on a semi-naked Black body

partly enveloped by something white. In the case of *ID Crisis*, it is the participant's torso that is bound in what might be medical bandages. In Goldblatt's picture, it is the boy's arms that are in casts after being assaulted by the Security Police. This reading sees both photographs as records of the effects of systemic violence on the Black body.

By considering the strengths of struggle photography, one must also acknowledge its limitations. Social documentary was used as a powerful tool that undermined the oppressor's authority. However, struggle photography often achieved its political impact through techniques of shock and spectacle, as it often focused on images of Black suffering, creating the impression of a country riddled with violence and misery. Given its emphasis on Apartheid oppression, this was not necessarily wrong. Nevertheless, it inevitably interacted with the legacy of colonial narratives that depicted Africa as a continent of darkness and death. To counteract this pessimistic view, struggle photography needed to be balanced by positive images of other aspects of South African life. Photographers like Santu Mofokeng, a member of Afrapix, recognised that oppression and violence were only partial realities and that there was more to people's lives.[27] Mofokeng's pictures are now remembered as nuanced looks into the everyday lives of Black South Africans.

Muholi's reference to struggle photography and social documentary brings with it this risk of spectacularisation. Corrective rape in South Africa has become somewhat of an international fixation; news agencies across the globe often present stories of this hate crime as distinctly South African.[28] And while corrective rape is an important issue that needs to be acknowledged, the fact that South African lesbians can only be thought of as victims in mass media is a traumatising event in itself. In 2011, reflecting on the popularity of the corrective rape narrative, Mary Hames noted that:

> Black lesbian bodies and stories, in particular, became the new commodities that need financial assistance. We see this in the way 'activists' are organising and forming new non-profit organisations around this new phenomenon. We read the media reports; we listen and watch television programmes and we see the horrific images of lesbians who have been beaten and raped. We have experienced how the mythical statistics become 'reality'; in fact we see how the spectacles are being created. All of us become re-traumatised.[29]

Muholi seeks to avoid this re-traumatising by following a similar approach to that of Mofokeng. They acknowledge that violence is only a limited part of the story. The participants of Muholi's photographs are either past or potential victims of corrective rape. However, the pictures never portray an actual instance of assault. Instead, Muholi alludes to a past event or the potential for future violence. This simultaneous visibility and invisibility of violence allows Muholi to address other aspects of Black queerness in the same image. The photographs in *Only Half the Picture* become stories not only of victimhood but also of strength, intimacy, and sexuality.

The (in)visibility of referents endows Muholi's photographs with a sense of ambiguity. An image of a semi-naked Black woman inevitably invokes the complicated history of Black female sexuality and representation, as well the systemic violence enacted by Apartheid and contemporary narratives of corrective rape. However, because these historical

referents are being alluded to without being reproduced, their existence can be read in multiple ways. As mentioned previously, the image of *ID Crisis* encodes within itself the complex history of Black sexuality. It alludes to the history of colonialism and Apartheid and their legacies in the way Black sexuality is understood in South Africa today. By doing so, *ID Crisis* can be read itself as a sort of queer historical archive.

How successful Muholi's photograph is as an archive of Black queer experience depends on its ability to navigate often conflicting narratives and histories. Muholi achieves this through showing and hiding, through visibility and invisibility. It is the photograph's uncertainty that allows viewers to revisit these histories and re-contextualise them from a Black queer perspective. However, this archival approach to photography is not without its risks. In addressing the full, complex history of Black sexuality, Muholi also alludes to the ways Black people, and women in particular, have been historically objectified and degraded—and it is this acknowledgement of history that makes Muholi so successful. Muholi's visual activism is about escaping the orthodoxies of Black female representation to reveal the true experience of Black queerness in South Africa, with all its contradictions and intricacies. To do so requires avoiding what Neville Hoad calls "the politics of moral outrage," which he describes as outrage "that only lingers long enough to establish a shared 'gayness' and does not care enough to learn the worldings of those it purports to help."[30] In the case of Muholi, this means addressing the negative episodes of history that have nonetheless influenced how Black queer women experience their own identities and sexualities. Homi K. Bhabha provides a useful way of thinking about this:

> To judge the stereotyped image on the basis of a prior normativity is to dismiss it, not to displace it, which is only possible by engaging with its effectivity, with the repertoire of positions of power and resistance, domination and dependence that constructs colonial identification subject.[31]

It is in this (in)visible articulation of historical narratives that Muholi ultimately finds success. Since their first solo exhibition in Johannesburg in 2004, Muholi has gained international recognition as a photographer and visual activist. Their images of Black queer communities continue to be praised for their political engagement and message, for how they address the contemporary issues that Black queer individuals constantly face. However, Muholi's project is successful not only because it provides images of an under-represented group, but also because it takes the time to explore the different historical narratives and discourses that influence Black queer identities. In this way, Muholi's photography provides a new approach to queer advocacy that centres Black queer histories.

As a series, Muholi's *Only Half the Picture* directly addresses the struggles and experiences of queer and gender non-conforming individuals in South Africa. The photographs remain relevant for their layered representation of Black queerness, using techniques of (in)visibility to bring viewers into contact with the complicated and often problematic histories of racial, gender, and sexual identities, and their intersections. By reframing these histories from a Black queer perspective, Muholi's pictures offer an insight into the multiple worlds that Black queer people inhabit. The participants in images such as *ID Crisis* are Black people, South African nationals, women, and queer individuals. Recent

years have seen Muholi gain international fame as their work is exhibited around the world. Yet, as their first visual project, *Only Half the Picture* remains an important subject of study and a starting point from which to consider the place of transnational histories of race, gender, and sexuality in South African visual activism. Muholi's engagement with Black queer histories remains a key aspect of their practice, even as their work continues to evolve through their role as a transnational spokesperson for Black queer and gender non-conforming individuals in South Africa and the world.

Notes

[1] See Marc Epprecht, *Hungochani: The History of a Dissident Sexuality in Southern Africa* (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004); Neville Hoad, *African Intimacies: Race, Homosexuality and Globalization* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).

[2] *The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, section 9(3), explicitly bans discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.

[3] Sally Evans, "Minister slams 'porn' exhibition," *The Times* (South Africa), 02 March 2010, accessed 21 November 2019, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2010-03-01-minister-slams-porn-exhibition/.

[4] Pumla Dineo Gqola, "Through Zanele Muholi's eyes: Re/imagining ways of seeing Black lesbians," in *Zanele Muholi: Only Half the Picture*, ed. Sophie Perryer (Cape Town: Michael Stevenson, 2006), 83.

[5] Gail Smith, in particular, describes Muholi's photographs as "not artistically or technically brilliant" in "Outlaw Culture," *Mail & Guardian*, 8 September 2004, accessed 14 November 2019, https://mg.co.za/article/2004-09-08-outlaw-culture/.

[6] Hiram Pérez, "You Can Have My Brown Body and Eat It, Too!" *Social Text* 23, no. 3-4 (2005): 172, https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-23-3-4_84-85-171.

[7] See for example Roderick A. Ferguson, *Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color* Critique (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); José Esteban Muñoz, *Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); José Quiroga, *Tropics of Desire, Interventions from Queer Latino America* (New York: New York University Press, 2000); Robert Reid-Pharr, *Black Gay Man: Essays* (New York: New York University Press, 2003).

[8] See Sylvia Tamale, *African Sexualities: A Reader* (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2011); Sokari Ekine and Hakima Abbas, *Queer African Reader* (Dakar, Nairobi, and Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2013); Zethu Matebeni, *Reclaiming Afrikan: Queer Perspectives on Sexual Identities* (Athlone: Modjaji Books, 2014).

[9] Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Postcolonial Context* (London: Routledge, 1995); Sander Gilman, "Black bodies, white bodies: towards an iconography of female sexuality in late 19th-century art, medicine and literature," *Critical Inquiry* 12, no. 1 (1985): 204-242, https://doi.org/10.1086/448327; Zine Magubane, "Which bodies matter? Feminism, poststructuralism, race and the curious theoretical odyssey of the "Hottentot Venus"," *Gender and Society* 15, no. 6 (2001): 816-834, https://doi.org/10.1177/089124301015006003.

[10] Hoad, *African Intimacies*.

[11] See Zanele Muholi and Deborah Willis, "Zanele Muholi Faces & Phases: Conversation with Deborah Willis," *Aperture*, no. 218 (2015): 63, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24475138.

[12] Desiree Lewis, "Against the Grain: Black Women and Sexuality," *Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity* 19, no. 63 (2005): 17, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4066624.

[13] McClintock, *Imperial Leather*, 22.

[14] See Deborah Willis, *Black Venus 2010: They Called Her 'Hottentot'* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2010). Nicolas Monti also discusses the figure of the African Venus in relation to photography in *Africa Then, Photographs 1840-1918* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1987), 72-76.

[15] Janell Hobson, *Venus in the Dark: Blackness and Beauty in Popular Culture* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 46. Also see Zoë Strother, "Display of the Body Hottentot," in *Africans on Stage: Studies in Ethnological Show Business*, ed. Bernth Lindfors (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 1-61.

[16] *Enraged by a Picture*, directed by Zanele Muholi (Out in Africa Films, 2005), accessed 8th January 2020, https://youtu.be/JLSMCBWDKSU. The viewer comment is reprinted here as it was originally written, including misspellings.

[17] *Enraged by a Picture*.

[18] Cited in Hoad, *African Intimacies*, 93-94.

[19] Cited in Deborah Posel, "'Getting the nation talking about sex': reflexions on the politics of sexuality and nation-building in post-apartheid South Africa," in *African Sexualities: A Reader*, ed. Sylvia Tamale (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2011), 135-139.

[20] Epprecht, *Hungochani*, 4-5.

[21] Brenna M. Munro, *South Africa and the Dream of Love to Come: Queer Sexuality and the Struggle for Freedom* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), xvi.

[22] Posel, "Getting the Nation," 139.

[23] A key text in queer studies that discusses the politics of reproduction is Lee Edelman, *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

[24] See the work of psychologist Jacqueline Marx, who explores situations in which invisibility might be desirable for queer people of colour in Africa as a result of surveillance and disciplinary power in "Negotiating Homosexual In/Visibility," in *Reclaiming Afrikan*, ed. Zethu Matebeni (Athlone: Modjaji Books, 2014), 29-32.

[25] Nadine Gordimer in Jill Fullerton-Smith, "Off the Page: Nadine Gordimer," in *Conversations with Nadine Gordimer*, ed. Nancy Topping Bazin and Marilyn Dallman Seymour (Jackson, MI: University Press of Mississippi, 1990), 304.

[26] See Patricia Hayes, "Power, Secrecy, Proximity: A Short History of South African Photography," *Kronos*, no. 33, (2007): 139-162, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41056585; Darren Newbury, *Defiant Images: Photography and Apartheid South Africa* (Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 2009); John Peffer, *Art and the End of Apartheid* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).

[27] See Jon Soske, "In Defence of Social Documentary Photography," *South African History Online* (2010), accessed 12 February 2020, https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/In_Defence_Social_Documentary_Photography.pdf

[28] See, for example, Claire Carter, "The Brutality of 'Corrective Rape'," *The New York Times*, 27 July 2013, accessed 17 February 2020, http://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/07/26/opinion/26corrective-rape.html; Patrick Strudwick, "Crisis in South Africa: The shocking practice of 'corrective rape' – aimed at 'curing' lesbians," *The Independent*, 4 January 2014, accessed 17 February 2020, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ africa/crisis-in-south-africa-the-shocking-practice-of-corrective-rape-aimed-at-curing-lesbians-9033224.html.

[29] Mary Hames, "Violence against black lesbians: minding our language," *Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity* 25, no. 4 (2011): 89, https://doi.org/10.1080/10130950.2011.631774.

[30] Hoad, *African Intimacies*, xiii.

[31] Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), 95.

II. Special Section

Migration and Diaspora

“Migration and Diaspora”

Introduction

By

Felipe Caroca González

Joseph Duffy

Sophie Genske

Migration is a deeply historical and profoundly contemporary affair. Various scholars have called it a defining characteristic of certain centuries, societies, or humanity itself.[1] Migrations and mobility at large seems not just ubiquitous, but often appear to the global historian as quintessentially transnational. But for every translocal displacement, migration also spurs highly local processes of emplacement.

In the 2020/21 winter semester, Felipe Caroca González, Joseph Duffy, and Sophie Genske attended Frederik Schröer’s seminar on “Migration and Diaspora” which approached migration and diaspora as pertinent cases and methodological challenges in global history. Their term papers all dealt with different times and places, as well as aspects of migration and diaspora. Now, they are published here together, offering new perspectives to address different intersectionalities from the local and translocal. Moreover, these pieces aim to unveil the power relationship between rulers and ruled societies[2] while reflecting on the (legal and cultural) creation of national belonging.

Felipe Caroca González's text analyses current migration law in Chile, implemented in the midst of a continental migration crisis. It aims to unveil historically normalised practices within the continent that are often related to xenophobia and racism, but not from recently conceptualised practices, such as aporophobia. He proposes a transnational perspective of the migratory phenomena within the South American continent, considering the challenges and historical local positions in Chile.

Joseph Duffy’s text examines long-distance Irish nationalism during the Irish War for Independence between 1919-1921. By examining speeches of nationalist leaders and the foundational documents of the Irish nation, he argues that the Irish nation was conceived of by actors who thought globally and looked outward, both to Ireland’s diaspora and to an interconnected world.

Sophie Genske’s text retraces the history of the law on German citizenship alongside the case of the contemporary citizenship activist Gerson Liebl, who descends from a German colonial doctor in Togo. In so doing, she enquires about the intertwinement of legal history, (post-)colonial forgetting, migration, and (national) identity.

Notes

[1] Asya Pisarevskaya, Nathan Levy, Peter Scholten, and Joost Jansen, "Mapping migration studies: An empirical analysis of the coming of age of a research field," Migration Studies 8, no. 3 (2020): 455-481, https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnz031; Adam McKeown, "Global Migration, 1846–1940," Journal of World History 15, no. 2 (2004): 155-189, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20068611.

[2] Nina Glick Schiller, "A Global Perspective on Transnational Migration: Theorising Migration without Methodological Nationalism," in Diaspora and Transnationalism, ed. Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 109-130; Nina Glick Schiller, "Theorising Transnational Migration in Our Times: A Multiscalar Temporal Perspective," Nordic Journal of Migration Research 8, no. 4 (2018): 201-212, http://doi.org/10.2478/njmr-2018-0032.

When Chile Faces The Otherness: Aporophobia and Racism in the New Migratory Policy of Chile through Transnational Lenses

By

Felipe Gabriel Caroca González

Abstract

In 2018, the Chilean president Sebastián Piñera launched a new migration policy that changed the situation in Chile for all current and prospective migrants. This paper addresses these new migration norms in Chile by focusing on how racism and aporophobia[1] form the basis of new imaginaries towards "otherness". These circumstances are a direct consequence of the transnational migration phenomenon or South-South migration that Latin America, since the end of the twentieth century, has experienced. Therefore, this work will provide a global perspective of this migratory phenomenon in order to explain contemporary and contradictory narratives about migrants.[2] Here, through an analysis of newspapers, a journalistic discourse is constructed in which the government and various social actors, such as religious and human rights institutions, contrast, contradict, and highlight the objective of this new policy by displaying its discriminatory characteristics.

About the author

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I. Introduction

Political and economic interventions, wherever they occur, can alter global migration flows. These interventions impact not only migration dynamics, but also national imaginaries and preconceptions about people from other countries. Using a multidisciplinary perspective, this work analyzes the current Chilean migratory imaginary, which is linked to a growing intraregional migration process in Latin America, also referred to as the South-South migration phenomenon.[3] This flow has been developing for the last two decades, and existing academic works[4] have sought to explain the phenomenon through several approaches, examining various internal economic, social, and political problems. Nevertheless, all of these issues are historically linked to the imposition of neoliberal policies on the Southern Cone during the 1970s and 1980s.[5] In this line, this paper will focus specifically on the comparison of the Haitian and Venezuelan migratory case and their respective categorisations within the Chilean integration system.

Although current Chilean migratory issues have been studied through different lenses, including those of race, gender, and other social intersections,[6] this work seeks to provide new insights into this current transnational debate through the analysis of journalistic expressions. Here it is useful to show how previous work, both in academia and in the public sphere, has failed in its analysis when it did not take into account practices towards the poor prior to Adela Cortina's neologism thesis.[7] Moreover, focusing on how this neologism operates within the human migration system, in this case the current Chilean one, facilitates many questions. For instance, what are the main features that the Chilean government observes in order to categorize migrants who are living within Chilean territory or are attempting to live in Chile? In attempting to answer this question, this paper incorporates the concept of aporophobia to unveil current economic categorisations –such as poor, middle class, or rich– and how these determine migrant behaviour within Chilean society.[8] Aporophobia, as defined by Cortina, points to the *fear* and *rejection* of the poor within modern societies that expect retribution from all actors following socio-economic parameters based on capitalism.[9] Chile is a country that has been affected by neoliberal economic impositions due to international interventions and a seventeen-year dictatorship, thus making a class-analysis of migratory policy prudent.

In addition, this work brings transregional migration approaches to the fore, in order to conceptualize the idea of 'migrant' beyond socio-cultural frames, national methodologies, and economic structures. Following Nina Glick Schiller's research, it is necessary to understand migration from a *global power perspective* to grant a new analysis of the interdependency of processes related to migration affairs, rather than examining these processes separately. A global perspective on migration implies a transnational analysis in order to understand how power is deployed either nationally or internationally with regard to the flow of migrants and the interests of different capitalist societies and their reaction to these migration phenomena. Thereby Glick Schiller adopts a contrasting position in relation to academics who have analyzed migration from methodological

nationalism.[10] A global perspective of Latin America's migration phenomenon provides tools to identify contemporary and contradictory narratives that both the dominant political and economic elites and the media, whatever the funding of the latter, utilize in order to either demonise or celebrate migrant subjects.[11] By tracing historical power relationship features between the Global North and the Global South,[12] a global power perspective approach provides a framework to consider how the current migratory crisis might be a consequence of the failed global neoliberal agenda[13] of the United States during the 1970s and 1980s.

Furthermore, it is also necessary to understand the national imaginaries and responses related to "*otherness*" that may be related to xenophobia, racism, ultra nationalisms, and so forth. Here, the term "othering" refers to the self-description of identity that expands to include other social markers of difference (culture, class, religion, race, sexuality, etc.), differentiating oneself as the "other" from the in-group as well as from power, politically and judicially justifying one's difference from others. Moreover, the authors argue for the creation of emergent hybrid identities through shifting meanings, appropriating and amalgamating different aspects of knowledge about the "other".[14] Thus, taking into account the constant contact between nations, and how these nations must be understood from their varied cultural influence between local imaginaries towards otherness, the analysis of socio-spatial scales and the mapping of transnational migratory networks becomes substantial.[15] In this vein, this study relies not only on secondary sources and existing scholarly findings, but also on primary sources from Chilean newspapers, both print and digital, which are reshaping national imaginaries and public opinion.

Overall, this paper is divided into three sections. The first section briefly describes the historical background of Chilean migration studies in order to present how economics and gender studies have developed within transnational migration analysis in the Southern Cone since the mid-1990s and the 2000s respectively. Subsequently, a new transnational historical analysis is offered, unveiling the aporophobic and racist practices within political discourses and social practices shown through the media, aiming to shed light on the reactions and emotions conditioned, in part, by the Chilean economic and geopolitical positionality. Finally, a journalistic thread based on the analysis of several Chilean newspapers will represent the argumentative support that shows not only how racism directs social and political decisions regarding migration, but also how aporophobia is the main characteristic of this new Chilean migration policy, evidenced in many titles of various journalistic sources.

II. Historical background of Chilean migration studies

Chilean migratory studies have been heavily impacted by several academic currents, particularly focusing on making gender dynamics visible within migratory phenomena. It must be said that, as this research does not delve deeply into gender issues, the perspective addressed here does not discount the power imbalance experienced by women.

From the mid-1990s, Chilean academics began to focus more seriously on analyzing migration flows and their national economic impacts. Some scholars have pointed out migrant remittances[16] as a relevant migration feature, where migrant women become the protagonists of this economic flow.[17] Nonetheless, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, this perspective was strongly criticized for its overemphasis on economic impacts, arguing that remittances also have substantial influence beyond the economic sphere.[18] In the Latin American context, this debate was followed by an increment of migrant women as protagonists in international migration, in which topics such as the effects of the asymmetries of gender caused by the spread of some neoliberal reforms attained a place in academia, specifically in gender studies.[19] While highlighting women's protagonism within the aforementioned migratory phenomena, Lube Guizardi and Gonzálvez Torralbo argue that most of this debate lacked a critical reading on gender, and relied on quantitative data without in-depth interpretations.[20] Although during this time researchers have taken economics into account when analysing migration, they mainly focus on gender perspectives and how migrants adapted to a neoliberal system such as the Chilean one, rather than how the national economic spectrum reacted to these migrants and how it reified and instrumentalised them in order to integrate them.

During the mid-2000s, there was a shift in academic theory toward making visible the gender-based subordination and power asymmetries in constructing a framework of migrant family life between the Global North and the Global South.[21] Here, concepts such as transnational social reproduction and social organization of care were essential to understanding economic and social practices of giving and receiving "care" in the Latin-American and Chilean context, their actors (family, community, market, and the state), and their responses.[22]

Some years after, a third stage began within Chilean migratory studies, categorized by a post-global perspective of capitalism. Authors such as Zigmund Bauman, Judith Butler, and Carmen Gregorio influenced Chilean scholarly debates towards global crisis theories of macro-scale phenomena and the migrant woman's daily life.[23] As a result, a (trans)border perspective began to cast light on the intersection of patriarchal power asymmetries.[24] The concept of "border" highlights two things, as Glick Schiller states in her work *A Global Perspective* on Transnational Migration: “the specific migratory movement that prevails in the north of the country, and the liminality of the female experience, investigating the juxtaposition between cultural patriarchy and state patriarchy”.[25] In short, ethnized, proletarized, and/or feminized bodies were reified as producers of capital and care, facing a hyper-border condition within cultural and national patriarchal structures.[26]

Despite all the efforts these scholars made to understand how migrants, especially women, faced new economic and social conditions abroad under an unbalanced gender relationship, I suggest in this paper to add local reactions towards poor migrants. This paper therefore embraces the previous analysis and brings in another problematic issue that intersects with gender concerns: the material poverty of those who enter Chile for migration purposes.

III. Bad migrants: an issue of poverty or Race?

The categorisation of migrants in Chile, following Adela Cortina's argumentative line, follows different patterns related to the degree of economic growth that these migrants can offer to the country, discarding any other type of contribution, such as cultural aspects. This availability to offer something is not only related to the gaps within the labour system, but also the economic and racial load that the migrant brings, in this case, to Chile. However, the "cultural backpack" is only taken into account as long as the migrant's racial canons fit into the eugenic inheritance of Chilean society.[27]

From a historical perspective, the term "race" has been a characteristic that shaped national imaginaries. Although the Iberian peninsula influenced a huge portion of the American continent homogeneously since the sixteenth century after its independence, each country in the Southern Cone followed different paths concerning their national development and their relationship with indigenous communities. Many ideologies based on the European 'race' categorization thus led to complex relations within each national imaginary during the nation-building process. Sarah Walsh's work *The Chilean Exception* provides insight, through a history of eugenics, on how Chile engaged with this racial homogeneity.[28] According to Walsh, Chileans addressed it through white supremacy ideals during the 1900s, shaping the social imaginary within the country in order to distinguish themselves from their native roots and especially from inhabitants of neighbouring countries that possessed more indigenous physical features.[29] Nowadays, this spectrum has changed by adapting and reconfiguring relationships, following the new economic context, but generally maintaining eugenic patterns around the ideal of whiteness.[30]

So what do aporophobia and neoliberalism have to do with the migration crisis in the Southern Cone? More specifically, what is the relationship between capitalism and aporophobia? Cortina's work highlights that aporophobia, a neologism she coined, is learned, and in contrast with xenophobia, is not “prehistorically rooted”.[31] In her book, she proposes several ways in which education, mass media, institutions, and the state can diminish aporophobia[32] and promote positive changes such as the development of empathy, compassion, and justice in the human mind. Moreover, Cortina's philosophical argument is based on the idea that we are living in an exchange society, a society which relies on the reciprocity expectation in human nature, especially under the capitalist model. It follows that those who are not able to give something back in this exchange society are rejected and blamed.[33]

Moreover, scholars such as Guy Feldman and Ramón Grosfoguel argue that neoliberalism as the last stage of capitalist development is constantly creating poverty in order to succeed in the maximization of profits[34] and retain the status quo based on unequal power relationships. While an inquiry into the relationship between capitalism and aporophobia is a complicated one (due to the slippery nature of the concept of

neoliberalism in academia[35] and the absence of debates surrounding the rescaling processes on this economic system on human behavior), it can provide some useful insights and offer a more global perspective to the study of transnational migration. As Neil Brenner argues, rescale mechanisms are contemporary patterns of geo-economic and geopolitical restructuring which are profoundly transforming the scalar configuration of urban processes under modern capitalism.[36] This restructuring is directly related to the flow of migrants and how the modern neoliberal capitalist system, in the case of Chile, is reorganised in order to balance and maintain its reproductive labour-power role.[37] In addition to this, the rescaling approach is important in order to understand transformations of new codes and behaviours, and with this, new imaginaries linked to concepts such as "otherness", poverty, and national belonging.[38]

The concept of aporophobia provides a glimpse of how South American countries such as Chile deal with the current migratory influx by selecting and categorising migrants as desirable or undesirable. Proof of this is the "Humanitarian Return Programme", which was considered a benefit for migrants seeking to return to their countries of origin; however, this programme was considered by many pro-migrant organisations to be a government tool to deport undesirable migrants, and in the Chilean case in particular, Haitian migrants. Ultimately, the objective of countries under the current neoliberal system is to improve national GDP[39] indicators and to establish a better political and economic position in relation to the economic power of other countries within the continent, which also takes into account racial characteristics.[40] For example, the distinctions drawn by the Chilean government between Venezuelan and Haitian migrants in granting them different visa permits is a consequence of the process of rescaling Chilean society along neoliberal and racist lines respectively. In this sense, old and new categorisations through authorisations such as "humanitarian" and "tourist" visas are mixed in this new context, where racism and xenophobia are secondary actors, leaving aporophobia as the main characteristic that appeals to the GDP increase as a requirement for integration.

In the case of Venezuela, the country has had constant problems in developing its political and economic model, which is understandably due to the failure of its democratic system after the socialist putsch of Batista,[41] and the prolonged economic blockade by the United States.[42] Moreover, unclassified documents by the CIA[43] prove that Operation Condor was officially implemented by the U.S in the Southern Cone during the 1970s, primarily intending to get rid of communism across the continent. Therefore, Venezuelan migrants are a perfect political instrument for the current right-wing Chilean government, in order to curb left-wing political forces within the country and strengthen attempts at political leadership in future elections. For instance, La Tercera published an article showing the difficulties of Venezuelans in applying for humanitarian visas under the headline “The odyssey of Venezuelans seeking to leave their country to get to Chile”, highlighting the corruption of Venezuelan institutions and the long process it takes due to irregularities in the socialist country.[44] Venezuelan migrants are thus portrayed by La Tercera and El

Mercurio as victims of a socialist system, a system that Chile should not take as an example to follow.[45]

Regarding Haiti, as a result of ongoing crises—including the political chaos after the French occupation in Haiti and its social instability, the eventual occupation by the United States and its subsequent imperialist attempts, and the importance of the control of Panama's canal, this country has long struggled to reach real economic independence.[46] The economic dependence on other countries was grounded in the program Food for Work in 1954, established by the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) which provided the United States with control over Haiti's national resources[47] and the current political and economic debacle.[48] In this sense, Haitians are seen as migrants who cannot contribute to the Chilean economy, at least in the short term, and therefore, for the Chilean state, Haitians are an expense rather than an opportunity for economic growth. It is thus not openly acknowledged that Haitian migrants have also been victims of the same abuses of their democratic system. This is directly linked to the unfavourable economic reasons that the Haitian migrant would mean for the Chilean national economy.

In short, the construction of migrant imaginaries in Chile relies on the categorization of displaced people into the profiles mentioned in the last section of this work. Whether the migrant is an expense through lack of Spanish language skills, through vulnerability, or whether the migrant makes a contribution to the neoliberal narrative by representing "socialist failure", all depends on the nation's standards. However, these standards are constantly being dynamised as processes of rescaling take place due to new cycles of migration and, whether considering migrants as a contribution or a burden,[49] these constructions generate inevitable contradictions.

IV. Chilean journalism and the national migrant imaginary[50]

As this paper exposes through the analysis of printed newspapers such as El Mercurio and La Tercera, as well as in digital publications such as El Mostrador and El Desconcierto, the media promotes discourses that incite the construction of an "other".[51] Before entering into the discursive analysis of these newspapers, it is necessary to clarify that El Mercurio and La Tercera[52] were part of the official communicational duopoly within Chile, both born within the first half of the twentieth century (1900 and 1950 respectively) which remained predominant until the beginning of the twenty-first century. These papers, especially the former led by Augustin Edwards, were thus complicit in the Chilean dictatorship. The main characteristic of these outlets during Pinochet's dictatorship was the manipulation and concealment of information.[53] Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, various journalistic groups have been able to make their way into the mainstream journalism, starting digitally. El Mostrador and El Desconcierto, the former a public limited company created in 2000 and the latter a joint-stock company created in 2012, among others that are not mentioned in this piece, have been the window to new pluralistic communicational paths, challenging the national mouthpieces.

Concerning the migratory issue in Chile, the migrant is usually considered as an alien that must be categorized. The migrant is made out to be the "other", and through this journalistic analysis it is possible to observe that the "good migrant", in these discourses, prevails over the critical approach to a process that is more complex. In the case of Chile, this process is established through South-South migration, which challenges the frameworks of interpretation of current migratory movements, which are based on simplistic categorisations such as the "good or bad migrant".[54] Representations of migrants and coverage of the migration policy dispute oscillate between the defence of an order achieved through national security in relation to foreign dangers and an inclusive approach in which policy could foster the possibility of a more diverse society. It is this content and rhetoric within the aforementioned coverage that can present the possibility of instating either racism or interculturalism in the media of everyday life, thereby constructing social reality.[55]

Following this line, a considerable quantity of information, speeches, and media coverage can help identify discursive threads on the construction of a migrant imaginary within a specific society. Additionally, this literature offers the opportunity to identify rising stereotypes and profiles that have been used as justifications in articulating a migratory policy that does not consider the rights of people in displacement, or provide real opportunities for their dispute. Therefore, describing the development of this discursive line chronologically constructs a comprehensive spectrum of the everyday knowledge related to migration conveyed through the media.

"This is not an apology"

A day after Sebastian Piñera's election as the new Chilean president,[56] his government announced that one of its priorities would be migration. The analyzed news reflects the existence of specific objectives from the executive power, as identified by their motto, "security, infancy, and migrations".[57] At the beginning of this thread, the migratory impact is presented in three dimensions: economic, social, and cultural. Within the economic dimension, the improvement of migrant labour conditions is highlighted, pointing to temporal visas and the increase of migrant workers within the country.[58] Within the cultural and social dimensions, it is mentioned that Chile is facing "a new demographic picture that is not only echoing in politics but also in entertainment".[59] On April 9, 2018, Piñera's government announced a new migratory policy. This announcement adverted the definitive closure of the National Consultative Council on Migration,[60] a democratic body that provided technical advice to the Immigration and Migration Department of the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security.[61] Piñera argued that "this migratory policy is modern", and that "Chile urgently needs a new migration law since the current one, from 1975, poses the migrant as a threat rather than an opportunity".[62]

The difference in visas for Haitians and Venezuelans, where the former can opt for a tourist visa and the latter for a humanitarian visa, exposes the categorisation to which migrants from these countries are being subjected. This official announcement was released

on April 9, 2018, and is linked to the regularization process that started on April 16, 2018.[63] I refer to the regularization process as a reorganisation, normalization, and identification of migrants within the country to categorise them as legal or illegal residents within Chile. Therefore, an irregular situation implies refusing this process of legal adaptation under the change of national regulations and thus becoming an illegal alien. In this case, the analyzed media disseminated the government's messages regarding the severity of the process, posed in a tone of positivity but also rigidity. In this context, El Mercurio explicitly points out that "the measures of the Executive seek that those who wish to come to reside make it transparent and thus not fall into irregularity".[64]

The news media's coverage of this process had a strong migrant testimonial component, relying heavily on public voices and opinions. One such case is from a report by El Mercurio on the arrival of migrants to the southern zone of Chile, entitled "Los Nuevos Patagones",[65] and another report from La Tercera, "Regularization sites for migrants registered long lines".[66]

"This is not an apology", was one of the lines in the newspaper La Tercera, which made clear the government's position on the new migration policy.[67] A very narrative iteration provided the testimonies of migrants, enabling them to express their opinions and experiences. One day before, the same newspaper used the term "illegal" for the first time, referencing foreigners with irregularities under the title "Prosecutor's Office investigates ten police officers for pressures against foreigners and street vendors".[68] Following the chronology, El Desconciento highlights that chaos and disinformation during the process of regulation was predominant; the National Network of Migrant and Pro-Migrant Organizations[69] described the process as "erratic, disorderly, changing, and chaotic".[70] The confusion and chaos were also highlighted by La Tercera three months after, during the conclusion of this process, with an article titled "Confusion marks the last hours of the migrant process".[71] This confusion as a consequence of the closure of the National Consultative Council on Migration led to massive expulsion, leaving migrants without information or resources. The decision to close this council was considered "[...] a lack of respect for all citizens and, in particular, for migrants. [...] because it takes away our voice just at the moment when a migration policy that is harmful to us and that was made behind our backs is being made public".[72]

On June 25, 2018, the government released an announcement through these newspapers entitled "Two thousand migrants expulsed", detailing the coordinated work of the Investigative Police[73] (PDI) and the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security. Other data provided included the number of migrants in Chile, which rounded to a total of 1,119,000 migrants. Only 300,000 of them were under an irregular situation.[74] This new announcement sought to "expel from the country those who do have a record", as the newspaper El Desconcierto exposes, and was to be carried out in two stages: firstly, by identifying foreigners who have already served their sentence in Chile and, by law, must be expelled, and secondly, by identifying those who are offenders of immigration law, whether they have a criminal record or not.[75] Further, the same document reports that after July 23,

when the registration of the regularization process concludes, "foreigners who did not register within the period indicated by the Government will be sanctioned." At this point, the Undersecretary of the Interior states that “those who do not register is because they probably have a criminal record”.[76]

Another important event in this trajectory was the announcement of a “Humanitarian Return Program” on August 30, 2018. This program is voluntary and oriented toward individuals and families who want to leave Chile.[77] As with the aforementioned migratory regularization process, the details of this program are not given, and the subsecretary Rodrigo Ubilla notes that “during September we will define the conditions of this program, in order to inform the Haitian community as soon as possible”.[78] Although this program is oriented to all migrants of countries that are not touching the Chilean borders,[79] the political speeches are addressed specifically to the Haitian community, exhibiting them as the main target of this program. Moreover, the organization Migrant Jesuit Service countered this move and proposed a global perspective with their statement, “we have met people from other countries who have also indicated their desire to return to their homeland”,[80] insinuating their doubt as to why the government would make another specific determination regarding the Haitian community.

In addition, during the following month, it was announced that the beneficiaries of the “Humanitarian Return Program” would not be able to come back to Chile within nine years of their departure. As a response to this measure, on October 17, 2018 El Mostrador launched an opinion column by Cristian Orrego[81] entitled "*Voluntary deportations*" *or punishment for being poor*, referring to the critiques that this new program received after launch. By contrasting this title with the concept of aporophobia, behavioral features become evident regarding how mankind rejects poverty in all its forms and how invisible social structures have been setting behavioural codes within and beyond national borders.[82] This condition was considered by Haitian organizations as a “forced deportation”;[83] however, the Minister of the Interior, Andrés Chadwick, argues that “it is not a disguised deportation [...] the point is that this is not understood as a travel agency”.[84] Another argument given by Piñera is related to the fact that this act is promoted because “many of them were brought in deceptively, some under fraud, with unfounded, and disproportionate promises”.[85]

Eventually, on November 7, 2018, the first flight of this “Humanitarian Return Program” was carried out, and a total of 176 applicants were the “beneficiaries”. This number is contrasted with the total number of applicants, 1,087, constituting only 1.4% of the community that would be interested in returning. In the end, only 160 applicants boarded the plane.[86] It should be noted that all throughout the process of this plan's articulation, the first big public demonstration against racism occurred on September 30, 2018, in Joane Florvil's honour.[87] Florvil was an Haitian woman who died inside a police station in Santiago. She had come to the station asking for help, however due to misinterpretations and police inefficiency, the situation ended in a fatal outcome.

The circumstances of Florvil's death were largely underreported by the media, although El Mostrador released a column in which Cristian Orrego argues:

> Apparently, for the government, the death of Joane Florvil was not enough to understand that migration represents a challenge and there are particularities that make certain groups more vulnerable. Given this, the action by the State should not take unfounded measures in order to prevent them from migrating or to return them once they do. Rather, it should undertake actions aimed at integrating them, in compliance with the international obligations that Chile has acquired through the ratification and entry into force of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families.[88]

Finally, this journalistic thread concluded with the Chilean government's decision not to subscribe to the Global Compact for Migration. Although this UN pact aims to improve databases of migratory information, reduce vulnerabilities in migration, combat human trafficking, and grant migrants with proof of legal identity,[89] the Chilean government argues that its focus is national security and its relation with the irregular migratory flows within the Southern Cone. This decision was announced on December 14, 2018, with the justification that this agreement "(...) hurts and does not protect the interests of Chileans, which encourages and focuses on irregular migration".[90] Here, it is important to highlight the government's management of information and the criticism that it raised. Following the aforementioned lines, the Supreme Court's substitute president, Sergio Muñoz, stated critically that this position "[...] is intended to condition the recognition of the human dignity of some people to their nationality of origin".[91] Additionally, on December 15, 2018, La Tercera and El Mercurio focused their editorial columns on the economic impact of migration flows within the country. On December 9, 2018, Chile officially abstained from voting on this agreement.[92]

The construction of the "other"

A prominent theme within the contents of the sampled newspapers is that of "migratory impact," presented mainly from an economic perspective, and from editorial lines that are articulated by and/or linked to the government's official discourse. Following this, the construction of imaginaries concerning "the migrant" can be understood through the following discursive arguments:

-*Good workers*: The migrant is framed as a member of the workforce. The Labor Minister stated, "I like to see migrant workers, well-received, good colleagues, good friends of their colleagues. Let's go ahead with that and count on the Ministry of Labor for your dreams".[93] This quote was included as part of an article referring to the intention to increase the permitted percentage of working migrants from 15 to 25 percent for all companies, to which the trade unions and large conglomerates expressed their agreement. In addition to these working associations, a report by El Mercurio recounts how the presence of immigrants, mainly Haitians, has increased in the southern part of Chile. In this report, a business owner refers to and objectifies his Colombian worker as one of the best *elements* in his company: "Availability, charisma, she likes to work in a team, optimistic ... Qualities difficult to find in Chileans".[94] Additionally, the National Network of Migrant and Pro-

Migrant Organizations indicate that "it is an urgent measure to give them a RUN[95] for one year until the end of the process, which allows them to work and lead a regular life as a right",[96] thus framing the issue in regards to labour.

-*A possible victim of crime*: One point where the profile of good workers converges to that of possible crime victims has to do with violations of labour rights. According to a report by La Tercera, Haitian workers are the ones leading this type of accusation. "This is revealed in a report by the Labor Directorate, which shows that in total 3,471 complaints from foreigners have been received as of June, which are concentrated in the hotel and restaurant sector".[97] One of the proposals of Piñera in the framework of the explanations and reactions to the measures announced on April 9, 2018 is that the bill, in its second objective, "is proposed in line with tightening the measures with the smuggling of migrants".[98]

-*Sources of income-contributions*: Another profile that emerges is that of the migrant as a source of economic income to the treasury via taxes, official procedures, or fines. In this sense, as Rodrigo Sandoval, former head of the Foreigners' Department, points out in another column, "the foreigners from these immigration permits subsidize too much what is the action of the State".[99] Some of the reactions and discussions raised by the April 9, 2018, announcement contributed to the construction of this profile. An El Mercurio editorial on April 15, 2018 stated that "it is key to the development of our country if awareness of the positive contribution to the economic, scientific, and cultural development of the increase in resident foreigners; of the need for policies for their effective settlement and integration to respond to possible problems associated with their vulnerability, exclusion, discrimination, and transnational criminal networks".[100]

-*People classified by their nationality*: After the official communication of the migration policy, some of the sampled media sources described and evaluated the policy as discriminatory, depending on the nationality of the migrants wanting to enter the country. This demonstrates the possibility of the media "classifying" the population. "If you were born in Switzerland or Germany, come calmly, we do not demand anything. If you are Haitian or Venezuelan, we are going to ask you even for the dental history of your grandparents(...)".[101]

-*An expense for the State*: Among the information published with the announcement of the new immigration policy were figures from a report by the Budget Office regarding state spending on institutions related to migration management, as well as access to rights. This data profiled migrants as an "expense", ignoring the income they contribute through other means, such as taxes and payment of fees for procedures and fines. According to La Tercera, "currently the Treasury quantifies the annual cost associated with immigration at $154,358,000".[102] Later, El Mercurio launched an article referring to the high cost of the "transfer of Haitians who died in the country". This report mentions Joane Florvil, whose body "remained 220 days in SML before arriving in Port-au-Prince, Haiti".[103]

–*An Offender*: According to an opinion column published by El Desconcierto, "the government's proposals and its vision on immigration are part of its propaganda fight against crime, terrorism and drug trafficking. The punitive populism that characterizes his campaign discourse and his government actions extend to the figure of the migrant at the time that he emphasizes that he intends to promote safe, orderly, and regular migration".[104] This classification is also presented within the framework of the regularization process where, in front of the migrants stationed at the Víctor Jara Stadium, President Piñera stated that "we do not want smugglers, drug traffickers or criminals to enter [...] we do not want to open the doors of our country to those who want to cause us harm".[105]

Despite the fact that migration has been a priority for the Executive from the outset, the first signs of a restrictive approach have become more evident since April 9 with the announcement of a migration policy and its respective measures. It is clear that under these argumentative points, journalism in Chile shows that, at least from the government's position, migratory flows have more negative than positive consequences, inciting the population to have a sceptical attitude towards the "other". Moreover, the feeling that Piñera's government is "putting everything in order" functions as a curtain for the main objective of the economic and political elites, the accumulation of wealth, which is directly related to the increase of GDP in the case of neoliberal systems such as the Chilean one. Here, the power of the Chilean government reorganises itself to take advantage of the migration phenomenon without taking into account global migration rights and their transnational dynamics on the Latin American continent.

V. Conclusion

A global perspective of power on migration studies enables us to comprehend migratory flows on a macro level. However, it is also necessary to analyse internal national imaginaries about migrants in "receiving countries" in order to understand governmental reactions, social behaviours, and dynamics of rescaling processes. A journalistic discourse analysis provides a picture of the state's position on migrants, and how they are categorized, integrated, and expelled. Based on this research, it is possible to state that the new Chilean migratory policy relies on a national imaginary of the other as an economic benefit or disadvantage more than as an agent with a cultural and experiential load. This analysis shows that Chile categorises the citizens of Venezuela as victims, in this case of a dictatorial socialist state, but not Haitians, even though they have been subjected to constant interventions of both a political and economic nature. However, both countries have been facing similarities in social instabilities that are fostering the increment of migration flows throughout the continent, in addition to similar economic crises. Therefore, I argue that the new Chilean migration policy is not only based on racist characteristics but also on the economic retribution that migrants could bring into national borders—making it evident that this migration policy is aporophobic.

The comparison of public discourses analysed through the language of journalistic sources and the impact of policy regulations could be productive in future debates related to the extent to which migration studies focus on social behaviours and media discourses - which are affected by rescaling processes - providing theoretical arguments for understanding current social pathologies, such as racism, classism, and xenophobia. Moreover, future debates should not exclude possible impacts on our emotions within social behaviours, for instance empathy or hatred towards the other.

Concerning racial categorizations, "whiteness" has been a dominant narrative historically, especially when concerning the relationship with indigenous people within its territory.[106] Unfortunately, this canonical trait is leading Chilean culture to adopt external and distant references instead of its own cultural roots within its continent. This situation renders the nation far from achieving a critical interculturality, hindering decolonial efforts to re-establish new possibilities for an epistemology linked to Chileans' own roots and their connection to the global.[107] Moreover, unveiling and comparing the self-images of countries within a given region in order to understand geopolitical dynamics both within the continent and globally contributes to a harmony between the macro and micro perspectives in migration studies, which is of utmost importance.

It is well-known in academia that neoliberal practices in the Latin American continent from the 1970s onwards enforced market freedom while minimizing state control on economic affairs. Although this economic system was criticized around the world and underlined, firstly as an experiment,[108] and secondly as a failure in terms of capital distribution in other parts of the globe,[109] it remains today in many countries. To consider the current increment of the South-South migration flow as a direct imposition of neoliberalism in the Southern Cone is irresponsible and simplistic, considering that migratory phenomena are more than just economic issues. Nevertheless, the internal economic and political crises leading to a concerning increase in emigration flows within the South American region are, in part, the consequence of neoliberalism, but neoliberalism as a cause of aporophobic categorizations.

Notes

[1] Adela Cortina's neologism, which is referred to in her book as "[..] signs of aporophobia, of rejection, aversion, fear and contempt towards the poor, towards the underprivileged who, at least in appearance, can give nothing good back in return". See Adela Cortina Orts, *Aporofobia, el rechazo al pobre: Un desafío para la democracia* (Barcelona: Paidós, Estado y Sociedad, 2017), 19.

[2] Nina Glick Schiller, "A Global Perspective on Transnational Migration: Theorising Migration without Methodological Nationalism", in *Diaspora and Transnationalism*, ed. Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 110.

[3] Katja Hujo and Nicola Piper, "South-South Migration: Challenges for development and social policy", *Development* 50 (2007): 19, https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.development.1100419.

[4] Menara Lube Guizardi and Herminia Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement: The Field of Studies on Migrations, Social Remittances, Care and Gender in Chile", *Revista de Estudios Sociales* (2019): 70, https://doi.org/10.7440/res70.2019.09; Cristián Carrère Álvarez and Michelle Carrère Álvarez, "Inmigración femenina en Chile y mercado de trabajos sexualizados: La articulación entre racismo y sexismo a partir de la interseccionalidad", *Polis (Santiago)* 14, no. 42 (2015): 33, http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-65682015000300003; Silke Staab and Kristen Hill Maber, "The Dual Discourse about Peruvian Domestic Workers in Santiago De Chile: Class, Race, and a Nationalist Project", *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, no. 1 (2006): 88, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4490450; Herminia Gonzálvez and Elaine Acosta, "Cruzar las fronteras desde los cuidados: la migración transnacion-al más allá de las dicotomías analíticas", in *Las fronteras del Transnacionalismo: Límites y desbordes de la experiencia migrante en el centro y norte de Chile*, ed. Menara Guizardi (Santiago: Ocho Libros, 2015), 127; Amaia Pérez-Orozco, *Miradas globales a la organización social de los cuidados en tiempos de crisis I: ¿qué está ocurriendo?* (Madrid: INSTRAW, 2009), 10; and María Emilia Tijoux Merino and María Gabriela Córdova Rivera, "Racismo en Chile: colonialismo, nacionalismo, capitalismo", *Polis (Santiago)* 14, no. 42 (2015): 8, http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-65682015000300001.

[5] Jamie Peck, "Political Economies of Scale: Fast Policy, Interscalar Relations, and Neoliberal Workfare", *Economic Geography* 78, no. 3 (2002): 333-334, doi:10.2307/4140813; Nina Glick Schiller, "Theorising Transnational Migration in Our Times: A Multiscalar Temporal Perspective", *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*, no. 4 (2018): 206, http://doi.org/10.2478/njmr-2018-0032; Neil Brenner, "The Urban Question and the Scale Question: Some Conceptual Clarifications", in *Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants*, ed. Nina Glick Schiller and Ayse Çağlar (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011), 28.

[6] Lube Guizardi and Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement", 70; Carrère Álvarez and Carrère Álvarez, "Inmigración femenina en Chile y mercado de trabajos sexualizados", 33; Staab and Hill Maber, "The Dual Discourse about Peruvian Domestic Workers in Santiago De Chile", 88.

[7] It should be noted that there is already the German word *Armenfeindlichkeit* which has a similar meaning, but has not been studied in depth from a philosophical perspective as Cortina has done.

[8] Glick Schiller, "A Global Perspective on Transnational Migration", 117.

[9] Cortina Orts, *Aporofobia*, 57.

[10] Glick Schiller, "A Global Perspective on Transnational Migration", 128.

[11] Glick Schiller, "A Global Perspective on Transnational Migration", 110.

[12] Caroline Levander and Walter Mignolo, "Introduction: The Global South and World Dis/Order", *The Global South* 5, no. 1 (2011): 3, doi:10.2979/globalsouth.5.1.1.

[13] Glick Schiller, "A Global Perspective on Transnational Migration", 117; Glick Schiller, "Theorising Transnational Migration in Our Times", 206.

[14] Oliver Dimbath, Katinka Meyer, and Anja Kinzler, *Vergangene Vertrautheit: Soziale Gedächtnisse des Ankommens, Aufnehmens und Abweisens* (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019), 6-7.

[15] Brenner, "The Urban Question and the Scale Question", 24.

[16] Migrant remittances as transference of money or goods from one country to another. Lube Guizardi and Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement", 104.

[17] Lube Guizardi & Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement", 104.

[18] Lube Guizardi and Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement", 104.

[19] Lube Guizardi and Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement", 105.

[20] Lube Guizardi and Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement", 105.

[21] Gonzálvez Torralbo and Acosta, "Cruzar las fronteras desde los cuidados", 127; Pérez-Orozco, *Miradas globales a la organización social de los cuidados en tiempos de crisis I*, 10.

[22] Lube Guizardi and Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement", 106.

[23] Lube Guizardi and Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement", 108.

[24] Lube Guizardi and Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement", 108.

[25] Lube Guizardi and Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement", 108.

[26] I omitted theoretical approaches in order to just mention the evolution of migratory studies in Chile. For more detailed information please read Lube Guizardi and Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement", 108; Menara Guizardi, Felipe Valdebenito, Eleonora López, and Esteban Nazal, "Forms and Movement in Hyper-border Space: Peruvian Migrants in the Arica Terminal (Chile)", *Revista Migraciones Internacionale*s 9, no. 1 (2017): 155.

[27] Simone Lässig and Swen Steinberg, "Knowledge on the Move: New Approaches toward a History of Migrant Knowledge", *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 43, no. 3 (2017): 338, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26381960; Sarah Walsh, "The Chilean Exception: Racial homogeneity, mestizaje and eugenic nationalism", *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies* 25, no. 1 (2019): 107, DOI: 10.1080/14701847.2019.1579499.

[28] Walsh, "The Chilean Exception", 107; Lube Guizardi and Gonzálvez Torralbo, "Women in (Dis)placement", 101.

[29] Walsh, "The Chilean Exception", 109.

[30] Peck, "Political Economies of Scale", 333-334; Glick Schiller, "Theorising Transnational Migration in Our Times", 206; Staab and Hill Maber, "The Dual Discourse about Peruvian Domestic Workers in Santiago De Chile", 101; Tijoux Merino and Córdova Rivera, "Racismo en Chile", 8.

[31] Cortina Orts, *Aporofobia*, 18.

[32] Cortina Orts, *Aporofobia*, 28.

[33] Cortina Orts, *Aporofobia*, 141-148.

[34] Guy Feldman, "Neoliberalism and poverty", in *Routledge International Handbook of Poverty*, ed. Bent Greve (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), 342-346; Ramón Grosfoguel, "Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality", *TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World* 1, no. 1 (2011): http://dx.doi.org/10.5070/T411000004.

[35] Feldman, "Neoliberalism and poverty", 340.

[36] Brenner, "The Urban Question and the Scale Question", 24.

[37] Peck, "Political Economies of Scale", 332, Brenner, "The Urban Question and the Scale Question", 25.

[38] Peck, "Political Economies of Scale", 332; Glick Schiller, "Theorising Transnational Migration in Our Times"; Brenner, "The Urban Question and the Scale Question", 26.

[39] Lässig and Steinberg, "Knowledge on the Move", 315; Cortina Orts, *Aporofobia*, 21.

[40] Tijoux Merino and Córdova Rivera, "Racismo en Chile", 9; Walsh, "The Chilean Exception", 109.

[41] "Cuba: Fidel Castro's Record of Repression", *Human Rights Watch*, November 25, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/26/cuba-fidel-castros-record-repression.

[42] UN Affairs, "UN General Assembly calls for US to end Cuba embargo for 29th consecutive year", *UN News*, June 23, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/06/1094612.

[43] J. Patrice McSherry, "Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System", *Social Justice* 26, no. 4 (78) (1999): 145, http://www.jstor.org/stable/29767180.

[44] Alejandra Jara, "La odisea de los venezolanos que buscan salir de su país para llegar a Chile", *La Tercera*, May 28, 2018, https://www.latercera.com/mundo/noticia/la-odisea-los-venezolanos-buscan-salir-pais-llegar-chile/182459/.

[45] Gaspar Ramírez, "Todo lo que ha ocurrido en Venezuela puede servir como material para series televisivas", *El Mercurio*, Economía y Negocios, November 2, 2018, http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=518084; Alejandra Jara, "La odisea de los venezolanos que buscan salir de su país para llegar a Chile".

[46] Kelly McKenzie, "In Dependence: Haiti in the Period of Neoliberalism", History in the Making 11, no. 7 (2018): 69, https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/history-in-the-making/vol11/iss1/7.

[47] McKenzie, "In Dependence", 72-73.

[48] McKenzie, "In Dependence", 80.

[49] Staab and Hill Maber, "The Dual Discourse about Peruvian Domestic Workers in Santiago De Chile", 88.

[50] This chapter was made possible thanks to the great Chilean journalists Monserrat Lorca Pavez, Ximena Póo Figueroa, Francisca Palma Arriagada, and Génesis Moreno Leiva, who provided a considerable amount of sources and helped in illuminating the way to create a proper journalistic thread.

[51] Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, eds., *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2009), 4.

[52] Belonging to the private conglomerate COPESA.

[53] These acts during the dictatorship were brought to light, with some of them being judged decades later, after democracy had been restored under the current neoliberal canons at the core of a constitution imposed in the darkest years of the Chilean dictatorship. For more information please see Marco Herrera Campos, "La prensa que se calló con Pinochet", *Chasqui. Revista Latinoamericana de Comunicación* [En línea], no. 96 (2006): https://doi.org/10.16921/chasqui.v0i96.1598; "Colegio de Periodistas valora condena a Copesa por montajes durante la dictadura", *Diario UChile*, April 15, 2019, https://radio.uchile.cl/2019/04/15/colegio-de-periodistas-valora-condena-a-copesa-por-montajes-durante-la-dictadura/.

[54] Montero Sánchez and María Dolores, "Tuchman, Gaye. La producción de la noticia. Estudio sobre la construcción social de la realidad", *En Anàlisi: quaderns de comunicació i cultura* [en línia], (1987): 312-315, https://raco.cat/index.php/Analisi/article/view/41866.

[55] Jessica Retis, "La construcción de la imagen de la inmigración latinoamericana en la prensa española", in *Comunicación, Cultura y Migración*. ed. Fernando Contreras, Rafael González, and

Francisco Sierra (Sevilla: Junta de Andalucía, 2003), 144; Marta Rizo, "Miedo y compasión: dos estrategias de movilización afectiva en el discurso informativo sobre el inmigrante", *Revista Comunica* 2 (2001); Miquel Rodrigo Alsina, *Comunicación intercultural* (Barcelona: Anthropos Editorial, 1999), 5.

[56] March 11, 2018.

[57] Marcela Jiménez and Macarena Segovia, "La segunda oportunidad de Piñera y la derecha peligrosa", *El Mostrador*, March 12, 2018, https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2018/03/12/la-segunda-oportunidad-de-pinera-y-la-derecha-peligrosa/.

[58] "La alta presencia de extranjeros en el mercado laboral chileno", *EMOL*, Capital Humano, March 11, 2018, https://capitalhumano.emol.com/13149/extranjeros-mercado-laboral-chileno/.

[59] Claudio Vergara, "La inmigración venezolana empieza a asomarse en la cartelera chilena", L*a Tercera*, March 14, 2018, https://www.latercera.com/entretencion/noticia/la-inmigracion-venezolana-empieza-asomarse-la-cartelera-chilena/98356/.

[60] In Spanish: Consejo Consultivo Nacional de Migraciones.

[61] In Spanish: Departamento de Extranjería y Migraciones del Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública.

[62] Álvaro Bellolio, "Migraciones hoy y mañana", *La Tercera*, April 14, 2018, https://www.latercera.com/opinion/noticia/migraciones-hoy-manana/132540/.

[63] "El Gobierno chileno crea un visado especial para migrantes venezolanos", *Agencia EFE*, April 9, 2018, https://www.efe.com/efe/cono-sur/politica/el-gobierno-chileno-crea-un-visado-especial-para-migrantes-venezolanos/50000818-3578304.

[64] Irregularity concerning legal aspects of migration status of migrants. Please see "Gobierno propondría que extranjeros pidan visas para buscar un trabajo en Chile, con un plazo de un año para encontrarlo", *El Mercurio*, April 20, 2018, http://impresa.elmercurio.com/Pages/SearchResults.aspx?ST=extranjeros&SF=&SD=&ED=&NewsID=561454&.

[65] Patagón: People who live in Patagonia.

[66] "Los nuevos patagones", *EMOL*, April 21, 2018, http://buscador.emol.com/noticias/Mario+Virgil; S. Vedoya and E. L. Chekh, "Recintos de regularización para migrantes registraron largas filas", *La Tercera*, April 23, 2018, https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/recintos-regularizacion-migrantes-registraron-largas-filas/142205/.

[67] Vedoya and Chekh, "Recintos de regularización para migrantes registraron largas filas".

[68] Javiera Matus, "Fiscalía indaga a 10 carabineros por apremios contra extranjeros y vendedores ambulantes", *La Tercera*, April 22, 2018, https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/fiscalia-indaga-10-carabineros-apremios-extranjeros-vendedores-ambulantes/142079/.

[69] In Spanish: Red Nacional de Organizaciones Migrantes y Promigrantes.

[70] Meritxell Freixas, "¿Es esta la cola para sacar número para pasado mañana?: Así esperaron los migrantes en el Estadio Víctor Jara", *El Desconcierto*, April 24, 2018, https://www.eldesconcierto.cl/nacional/2018/04/24/es-esta-la-cola-para-sacar-numero-para-pasado-manana-asi-esperaron-los-migrantes-en-el-estadio-victor-jara.html

[71] Sebastián Vedoya M, "Confusión marca últimas horas de proceso migrante", *La Tercera*, July 22, 2018, https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/confusion-marca-ultimas-horas-proceso-

migrante/252795/.

[72] Ximena Bertin, "Gobierno eliminó Consejo Consultivo de Migraciones", *La Tercera*, April 12, 2018, https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/gobierno-elimino-consejo-consultivo-migraciones/130670/.

[73] In Spanish: Policia de Investigación.

[74] Irregular situation refers to illegal status within the country, or without documents proving "regular" residence. Please see "«Ordenar la casa»: Gobierno expulsará a más de 2 mil inmigrantes con antecedentes penales", *El Desconcierto*, June 25, 2018, https://www.eldesconcierto.cl/nacional/2018/06/25/ordenar-la-casa-gobierno-expulsara-a-mas-de-2-mil-inmigrantes-con-antecedentes-penales.html.

[75] «Ordenar la casa», *El Desconcierto*.

[76] "Gobierno expulsará este año a más de dos mil extranjeros irregulares con antecedentes penales", *El Mercurio*, June 25, 2018, https://www.elmercurio.com/blogs/2018/06/25/61274/Gobierno-expulsara-este-ano-a-mas-de-dos-mil-extranjeros-irregulares-con-antecedentes-penales.aspx.

[77] Dr. Frederik Schröer also commented to me that this type of program could be part of certain "global strategies" due to its repetitive application in many countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and others, including Chile. Under these examples, some questions rose to him such as: is there a transnational knowledge transfer happening? Are governments consciously or unconsciously copying policy from elsewhere?

[78] Óscar Pérez Tapia, "Gobierno anunció plan de retorno para migrantes haitianos", *La Tercera*, August 30, 2018, https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/gobierno-anuncio-plan-retorno-migrantes-haitianos/302147/.

[79] Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno, Comenzó inscripción: en qué consiste el Plan de Retorno Humanitario para migrantes, Requisitos, *Chilean Government*, https://msgg.gob.cl/wp/2018/10/18/comenzo-inscripcion-en-que-consiste-el-plan-de-retorno-humanitario-para-migrantes/.

[80] In Spanish: Servicio Jesuita Migrante.

[81] PhD candidate in Latin American Studies from UNAM Mexico, Master in Sociology, Bachelor of Political and Government Sciences and Public Administrator from the University of Chile.

[82] Cortina Orts, *Aporofobia*, 14.

[83] Consuelo Ferrer, "Migración haitiana: El 76% dice que su trabajo actual 'es muy distinto' al de su país y 74% gana menos de $400 mil [Pesos] al mes", *EMOL*, November 8, 2018, https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2018/11/08/926697/Migracion-haitiana-El-76-dice-que-su-trabajo-actual-es-muy-distinto-al-de-su-pais-y-74-gana-menos-de-400-mil-al-mes.html.

[84] "«Operación Retorno» de haitianos: jesuitas advierten que restricción para no volver en 9 años es un exceso", *El Mostrador*, November 7, 2018, https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2018/11/07/operacion-retorno-de-haitianos-jesuitas-advierten-que-restriccion-para-no-volver-en-9-anos-es-un-exceso/.

[85] In Spanish: "muchos de ellos fueron traídos en forma engañosa, algunos bajo estafa, con promesas infundadas y desproporcionadas", see Consuelo Ferrer, *Migración haitiana*.

[86] "El racismo como política de Estado: La deportación de haitianos en Chile", *El Desconcierto*, November 7, 2018, https://www.eldesconcierto.cl/cartas/2018/11/07/el-racismo-como-politica-de-estado-la-deportacion-de-haitianos-en-chile.html.

[87] Carla Ruiz Pereira, "Los 30 días de calvario de Joane Florvil", *La Tercera*, October 7 2017, https://www.latercera.com/noticia/los-30-dias-calvario-joane-florvil/.

[88] In Spanish: Al parecer, para el Gobierno la muerte de Joane Florvil no fue suficiente para comprender que la migración representa un desafío, y que existen particularidades que dotan a ciertos colectivos de una mayor vulnerabilidad. Ante esto, la acción por parte del Estado no debiera ser el tomar medidas sin fundamento con el fin de evitar que migren o devolverlos una vez que lo hacen. Más bien debería emprender acciones orientadas a integrarlos, en cumplimiento a las obligaciones internacionales que Chile ha adquirido mediante la ratificación y entrada en vigencia de la Convención Internacional sobre la Protección de los Derechos de Todos los Trabajadores Migratorios y de sus Familiares. Cristian Orrego, "Política migratoria antihaitiana: cuando evitarlos y devolverlos es más fácil", *El Mostrador*, October 4, 2018, https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/opinion/columnas/2018/10/04/politica-migratoria-antihaitiana-cuando-evitarlos-y-devolverlos-es-mas-facil/.

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[94] *EMOL*, "Los nuevos patagones".

[95] Rol Único Nacional, or ID number.

[96] Meritxell Freixas, "¿Es esta la cola para sacar número para pasado mañana?"

[97] Pía Toro, "Trabajadores inmigrantes: haitianos lideran denuncias por vulneración a derechos laborales", *La Tercera*, September 2, 2018, https://www.latercera.com/pulso/noticia/trabajadores-inmigrantes-haitianos-lideran-denuncias-vulneracion-derechos-laborales/304906/.

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Exile, Dual Belongings, and Long-Distance Nationalism: The Role of the Irish Diaspora Within the Irish Independence Movement, 1919-1921

By

Joseph Duffy

Abstract

This paper examines long-distance Irish nationalism between 1919-1921 and argues that the Irish diaspora played an instrumental role in the formation of the Irish state. The sources considered reveal the symbiotic nature of Irish long-distance nationalism, as well as how the Irish nation was conceived by actors who thought globally and looked outward, both to Ireland's diaspora and to an interconnected world. Long-distance Irish nationalists employed a broad definition of belonging to the global Irish nation that allowed for dual allegiances to the homeland and host country – an elasticity which benefitted the nationalist movement. This loose sense of attachment was connected by feelings of generational loss, exile, and dispossession. This cohering sense of exile was strongly linked to Ireland's experience of imperialism and led the leaders of the Irish diasporic movement to position themselves between the American and British empires.

About the author

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In February 2021, the President of Ireland, Michael D Higgins, wrote an article to commemorate the centenary of Irish independence. He referred to how the Irish diaspora in the years preceding 1921 sought to express their resistance to British imperialism:

> through exerting political pressure from engaged emigrant populations in the United States … Most resorted to available strategies of escape through emigration, or survival within the empire, with a widespread, if suppressed, anger over humiliation experienced or remembered.[1]

The role of the Irish diaspora in the formation of the Republic of Ireland is the focus of this paper, which examines long-distance Irish nationalism between 1919 and 1921. It analyses two primary source bases: the documents adopted by the first meeting of the Irish Parliament –the *Dáil Éireann*– in January 1919, and three speeches recorded by Éamon de Valera in 1921 during a tour of the US. These sources reflect the instrumental role that the Irish diaspora played in the formation of the independent Irish Republic and reveal the symbiotic nature of Irish long-distance nationalism, in which the homeland and diaspora drew strength from one another.

De Valera's speeches posited a broad definition of belonging to the global Irish nation that allowed for dual allegiances to the homeland and host country – an elasticity which included attempts to draw connections between Irish and American culture. This loose sense of attachment was connected by feelings of generational loss, exile, and dispossession. As Higgins identified 100 years later, feelings of 'anger' and 'humiliation' were a persistent feature of the Irish diasporic experience.

This cohering sense of exile was strongly linked to Ireland's experience of empire and, coupled with their global mindedness, led the leaders of the Irish diasporic movement to position themselves between one ascendant (American) and one embattled (British) empire. The 1919 Dáil documents reveal how the Irish nation was conceived by actors who thought globally and looked outward, both to Ireland's diaspora and to an interconnected world.

This paper argues that whilst the Irish are rightly not considered a 'classic diaspora', strong similarities can be drawn between the nationalisms of classic diasporas and Irish long-distance nationalism. Finally, conclusions are offered regarding the 'Wilsonian moment', the nature of long-distance nationalisms, and the global origins of the Independent Republic of Ireland.

Defining the Irish Diaspora

Studies of Irish migration and its diasporic nationalism have greatly benefitted from a conceptual broadening of the definition of diaspora. Lawrence McCaffrey was the first to speak of the Irish diaspora in a 1976 study of the American Irish.[2] In subsequent decades the term has been expanded from the unique scattering and settlement of Jewish people to include a wide range of major involuntary and voluntary historical dispersions.[3]

The position of the Irish diaspora within this extended field remains contested. In Robin Cohen's five-part typology of diasporas, which includes labour, trade, imperial and cultural, the Irish are categorised within the 'victim diasporas' alongside Jewish, Palestinian, African, and Armenian diasporas.[4]

This paper explores how feelings of exile, departure, and loss contributed to long-distance Irish nationalism in the build-up to independence, and especially how this experience of diaspora was engaged with by its political leaders and reflected in the fledgling independent state. In this sense, Cohen's categorisation is useful, especially when considered in tandem with the seminal study of the American Irish diaspora by Kerby Miller.[5] Miller's central argument, based on an extensive study of letters by members of the Irish diaspora, is that "the Irish consistently regarded emigration as exile", and that "Irish and Irish-American newspapers and orators characterized those who left Ireland as 'exiles', compelled to emigrate, either directly or indirectly, by 'English tyranny'".[6] Miller draws on the work of Thomas Brown, who in the 1960s highlighted the loneliness, alienation, poverty, and prejudice inherent in the Irish diasporic experience.[7]

Donald Akenson's influential comparative studies of the global Irish diaspora developed a reassessment of Miller's thesis. Akenson not only challenged the Catholic-centric focus of previous historiography, but also disputes the notion that the Irish were forced to leave their homeland, or that they suffered disproportionately on arrival to America.[8] Akenson instead stresses that "the Irish diaspora was an overwhelmingly voluntary phenomenon" which, due to the cost involved of travelling across the Atlantic, invariably involved economically stable Irish citizens seeking better lives.[9] Building on Akenson's critique that Miller's focus on exile robs migrants of their agency, Mary E. Daly criticises Miller for implicitly perpetuating the "conspiracy theory" of Irish nationalists that blames the British empire for mass Irish migration and subsequent population decline.[10]

This study does not seek to replicate Miller's argument in its entirety. For instance, Miller's dismissal of labour historians, particularly Eric Foner, does not allow for useful consideration of working-class and trade union culture and organisations within Irish migrant communities. Yet Miller's conception of the exiled Irish diaspora remains valuable when considering long-distance Irish nationalism. As Miller puts it,

> not all Irish emigrants regard themselves as exiles, or as victims of English oppression, or even as acutely homesick. Yet large numbers of them certainly did so, and their letters suggest why the image offered so pervasive and unifying a sentiment to the politics of Irish-American nationalism.[12]

Sentiments of exile and dispossession are not always based on a reality of hardship and are therefore possible even within the more affluent and privileged Irish migrant communities identified by Akenson. Rather than attempting to impose an empirically grounded category of diaspora backwards through time, it is more important to prioritise how members of the Irish diaspora conceived of their own experience. This is especially the case when considering how leaders of the Irish diaspora engaged with long-established feelings of exile that were particularly prevalent in the build-up to Irish independence.

The notion of exile is a central feature of what Nina Glick-Schiller termed 'Long-Distance Nationalism', defined as "a set of identity claims and practices that connect people living in various geographical locations to a specific territory that they see as their ancestral home".[13] Kachig Tölölyan developed a valuable concept of 'exilic nationalism', caused either by violence or severe economic pressures, in which "not living in the homeland is regarded as a loss, a deficiency, as painful distance from a centre".[14] This has particular resonance for the Irish diaspora, whose nationalism was shaped by a preoccupation with martyrdom, dispossession, and exile. Similarly, in a study of classic diaspora nationalisms, Anthony Smith identifies four 'pillars' of cultural resources:

> myths of origins and ethnic election, idealised territorial attachments and memories, vivid traditions of ethnohistory with their heroes, saints, sages and golden ages, and ideals of sacrifice and martyrdom in the face of oppression, persecution and exile.[15]

Whilst Smith rightly does not consider the Irish as a whole to be a classic diaspora, a consideration of the sources in this paper indicates that this definition of transnational nationalism can be applied to the Irish in the US in the build-up to Irish independence.

Some scholars, notably Alan O'Day, have sought to downplay the significance of the Irish diaspora to the domestic nationalist movement.[16] O'Day argues that the Irish "diaspora … never advanced, and, on the whole, did not seek to advance beyond the designated role as an adjunct to the main movement".[17] Yet O'Day's argument fails to appreciate the interrelation between the diaspora and the homeland, which have been increasingly recognised by scholars of global history. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier see the period of 1800-1930 as a time of "increasingly entangled political struggles around the globe" in which political disputes were "fought with concepts that carried explicit global connotations".[18] Similarly, in their study of Chinese migration during the late nineteenth century, Conrad and Klaus Mühlhahn argue that "it was the process of mobility and migration that particularly affected the global discourse on what it meant to be a nation".[19]

This global mindedness is especially evident in the Irish experience, as recognised in the recent growth of global studies of the Irish Revolution, spearheaded by a 2020 special edition of *Irish Historical Studies*. In the edition's introduction, Edna Delaney and Fearghal McGarry argue that

> the history of the revolution should not be confined to the island of Ireland … [which] flattens out the complexity of this global revolutionary movement … Such an approach would impose ahistorical boundaries which few contemporaries would have recognised or understood.[20]

David Fitzpatrick has gone as far to say that Irish historiography has always had a "transnational" focus, as "the lingering fact of British rule has always made it impossible to write about modern Ireland's political history from an 'insular' perspective".[21] There is some truth to this assessment, especially when one considers the many global histories of Irish nationalism by Kevin Kenny, Howard Lune, and Ely Janis – to name but a few.[22] This paper applies this transnational focus to the years directly preceding Irish independence.

Dual Belongings and Transnational Martyrs

Between June 1919 and December 1920, Éamon de Valera, the self-proclaimed yet largely unrecognised President of the Irish republic, toured the United States. His visit took him from coast to coast during which he directly addressed the Irish diaspora in continuous speeches and interviews. As recorded by Darragh Gannon, meetings with de Valera in his New York hotel were referred to by local press as interviews with the "'President of the Irish Republic' in the 'Irish White House'".[23]

From the outset of his visit, de Valera made a concerted effort to draw connections between Irish and American culture. As an American-born Irish nationalist whose dual nationality helped him to avoid the death penalty for his role in the 1916 Easter Rising, de Valera encapsulates the diasporic identity of the global Irish independence movement. This was especially apparent in three speeches that de Valera recorded for the Nation's Forum, a project initiated by attorney and arts promoter Guy Golterman to collect and publish speeches by prominent Americans. A record of the speeches was available at the time to buy for $2, with royalties of 25 cents paid to the trustees of *Dáil Éireann*. Whilst the recordings were abridged due to the three-minute capacity of phonograph records, they condensed much of de Varela's speeches from his tour across the US. In the first address, a Saint Patrick's Day message recorded in March 1920, de Valera's appeal to the Irish diaspora is clear in the opening lines:

> Sons and daughters of the Gael, wherever you be today, in the name of the motherland, greetings. Whatever flag be the flag you guard and cherish, it is consistent with your highest duty to link yourselves together to use your united strength to break the chains that bind our sweet, sad mother.[24]

This evokes an imagined Irish family, with imagery of 'sons', 'daughters' and the 'mother' land conjuring the nationalist tropes of blood and soil. Later in the address, de Valera continues this with reference to "the scattered children of Éire".[25] As Glick-Schiller describes, such appeals to a shared ancestry were a common feature of long-distance nationalists between the First and Second World Wars, who "tended to evoke a now discredited concept of 'race', portraying each nation as 'racially' distinct".[26] This also speaks to an ever-present truth regarding the Irish in America, which is that it is impossible to imagine a non-white diaspora group obtaining the kind of political leverage enjoyed by the Irish diaspora. The considerable platform enjoyed by de Varela, evident both in these recordings and throughout his US tour, therefore reveals the avenues that are either open or closed to diaspora groups based on their immutable characteristics.

The opening of de Valera's address also reflects the hybridity of the Irish diasporic experience. The president of *Dáil Éireann* celebrated the duality of Irish Americanism, granting his listeners permission to "guard and cherish" a flag other than the Irish tricolour. This can be read as a recognition of the Irish nationalist movement's reliance upon the material and political engagement of the American Irish community. Indeed, by the 1890s,

more than $5 million a year was being remitted to Ireland via American postal money orders.[27]

Yet beyond this *realpolitik*, another attempt to appeal to American culture can be discerned with de Valera's assertion that "we [the Irish diaspora] can be the shaft of dawn for the despairing and the wretched everywhere".[28] It is likely that the "shaft of dawn" is a quotation from the poem 'Dawn' by popular Kentuckian poet Ella Higginson.[29] Couching an anti-imperialist appeal in the register of an American writer reveals another attempt to highlight the connections between Irish and American cultures. By appealing to these similarities, de Valera strengthened the claim of long-distance Irish nationalism by justifying support for the Irish cause in a way that aligned with American sensibilities.

The suffering implicit within the language of "despairing" and "wretched" is indicative of de Valera's invocation of Ireland's oppressive experience of the British empire. This is also apparent in de Valera's use of "chains" and "binds", as well as a later reference to the Irish as "the spear point of the hosts in political slavery".[30] This register of sorrow is reinforced with the assertion that Irish Americans are

> the children of a race that has endured for ages the blight of war and the disappointment of peace, who have had the cup of the fruition of hope dashed from our lips in every decade and have not despaired.[31]

This critique of the bondages of empire, combined with the rhetoric of family, demonstrates how de Valera engaged with the longstanding resentments of exile within the Irish diaspora that Miller identifies. The evocation of a resilient and martyred Irish 'race' also aligns with Tölölyan's definition of exilic nationalism, in which "the homeland is sacred" and its national identity "must be preserved in exile, must remain "pure" or "true" to their origins".[32]

This sense of loss within an imperial context is especially apparent in the second of de Varela's National Forum recordings, a memorial address for Terence MacSwiney. The Lord Mayor of Cork, MacSwiney died on hunger strike in Brixton prison on 25th October 1920. The international attention and sympathy for MacSwiney's suffering made his death an international *cause célèbre*, with actions of solidarity spanning from the United States to Catalonia.[33]

The memorial begins with another invocation of the global Irish family, as de Valera laments that "England has killed another son for Ireland to mourn".[34] This is followed by a revealing reference to a hero of American independence: "Tomorrow a boy, Kevin Barry, they ['the English'] will hang, and, Hale-like, he will only regret that he has but one life to give".[35]

Here, de Varela draws parallels between Kevin Barry, an 18-year-old IRA soldier executed by the British government just days after MacSwiney's death to great international contestation, and Connecticut militiaman Nathan Hale, who was executed by

the British in 1776, aged 21. When referring to Barry's martyrdom, de-Valera invokes Hale's iconic final words, that "if I have one regret it is that I have but one life to give to my country," in another appeal to the dual nationality of the American Irish diaspora. Indeed, de Valera also recalls Founding Father Patrick Henry's 1775 famous 'Give me liberty, or give me death' speech in his prorogation: "the glorious standards our comrades have set must be ours and in this last phase of Ireland's struggle … our motto must be theirs – the motto of victory, liberty or death".[36]

This duality has been identified by Chantal Bordes-Benayoun, who argues that diasporas "always tried to reconcile their relations, on the one hand with the society of settlement, and, on the other, with both the homeland, and the other parts of their scattered nation".[37] As well as the evocative technique of rooting Irish martyrdom in the American mythology of independence, de Valera's appeal speaks to the sense of loss and exile which was the defining feature of diasporic Irish nationalism. As Lune argues, "each campaign drew on the language, framing, and nationalist vision of the United Irishmen, often extolling the heroes and martyrs of past campaigns to motivate the latest campaign".[38] This is reinforced by de Valera's declaration that "Ireland dries her tears over the graves of her martyred ones".[39]

The strong sense of loss, dispossession, and exile apparent in de Valera's addresses acted as a glue to cohere the broad conception of diasporic belonging that allowed for dual national allegiances. Therefore whilst it was intentionally elastic and inclusive, the Irish nationalism outlined in de Valera's tour, predicated as it was on a strong sense of exile amongst its members, must be considered alongside the long-distance nationalisms of 'classic' diasporas.

Exiled Between Two Empires

The long-distance Irish independence movement conceived of itself along global lines and spoke to a sense of exile and dispossession derived from Ireland's colonial experience. As a result of this, its leaders sought liberation from the British empire by positioning themselves alongside another. This is alluded to by Akenson, who observed that "the Irish diaspora was intimately related to the two great English-speaking empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the British and the American".[40]

It is important to situate transnational Irish nationalism within the declining legitimacy of formal empires after WWI and President Woodrow Wilson's rhetoric of global self-determination, formalised in his '14 point' address to the US Congress on January 8th, 1918. Leaders of the Irish diaspora were intensely concerned with this context. As Bernadette Whelan has argued, securing Wilson's recognition for an independent Ireland was a primary aim of Irish nationalists prior to and during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and 1920.[41] As de Valera wrote from the US in a March 1920 letter to Arthur Griffith,

"It seems to me there is only one hope, and that is to get both sides pledged to the principle of recognition of the Republic … every nerve should be strained now to get resolutions urging recognition passed through Congress here".[42]

This appeal to a United States that was rhetorically positioning itself as a neo-imperial leader on the world stage is apparent throughout de Valera's three recorded speeches. For instance, during the St Patrick's Day address, he asserted that

> never before have the scattered children of Éire had such an opportunity for noble service. Today you can serve not only Ireland but the world. A cruel war and a more cruel peace have shattered the generous of soul.[43]

The emotive appeal to the "scattered children" of Ireland's diaspora engages with long-standing feelings of resentment that the British empire had dispossessed Irish migrants of an ancestral family. The description of a peace even crueller than a war which claimed millions of lives refers to President Wilson's ongoing refusal to recognise Ireland's independence and his administration's determination to leave the 'Irish problem' to the British to solve.[44] This is also apparent in the prorogation

> those of our race, citizens of this mighty land of America whose thought will help to mould the policy of the leader among the nations, how much the world looks to you … You have only to have the will … What would not the people of the old land give for the power which is yours?[45]

The duality inherent to de Valera's conception of the Irish diaspora is evident in the simultaneous reference to members of the Irish 'race' also being 'citizens' of America. This fluid binary allows for the powerful call to action, which indicates that a broad conception of diasporic belonging was a source of strength for the Irish nationalist movement. The primacy with which the leaders of the Irish nationalist movement held the Irish diaspora is evident with de Valera's insinuation that the diaspora possessed more 'power' than Irish nationalists in the 'old land.' This encapsulates the global dimensions of the Irish revolution and the symbiotic relationship between its diasporic and homeland nationalisms, which runs counter to O'Day's thesis of the weakness of long-distance Irish nationalism.[46]

The global mindedness of its leaders is even more apparent in the third of de Valera's National Forum speeches on the 'Recognition of the Republic of Ireland.' The speech is addressed as much to the American public as it is to members of the Irish diaspora, beginning with a vivid claim to Irish nationhood from the shadows of imperial possession:

> The Irish Republic exists. Its shackles serve but to make its reality the more concrete. It is not destroyed when individuals or nations plunge their heads into the sand and say they cannot see it. It is there, recognized or not, and it can be destroyed only by the power that brought it into being - the will of the Irish people.[47]

The notion of an Irish nation existing in the minds of its global citizenry strongly recalls Benedict Anderson's 'imagined communities' thesis that national belonging is forged through religious communities, print languages, and modern communication.[48] That this imagination came from a global 'Irish people' suggests that Anderson's theory need not be

limited by spatial specificity but can also exist across borders. Anderson tended to see long-distance nationalists as pernicious, including Americans who provided material support for violent Irish nationalists.[49] Yet de Valera's insistence that the Irish nation is brought into reality by the sheer will of its people suggests that long-distance nationalisms should not be overlooked within the imagined communities thesis. The example of the Irish diaspora therefore reveals the limitations of Anderson's focus on constrained public arenas in which the imagination of the nation can emerge. Global historians have rightly pushed against this tendency to downplay the 'translocal' origins of nations, and the strength of Irish long-distance nationalism reaffirms the importance of this global perspective.[50]

De Valera's reference to 'shackles' is another appeal to the legitimacy of Ireland's claim to nationhood from the oppressive legacy of imperialism, alongside the assertion that the Irish nation "is not destroyed when individuals or nations plunge their heads into the sand and say they cannot see it".[51] Here, Wilson's government is portrayed as the proverbial ostrich, denying Ireland the self-determination promised by his administration's rhetoric. This manipulation of the United States' professed anti-imperialism is even more apparent later in the recording, in which de Valera asserts

> Ireland's cause is not Ireland's cause only. It is the cause of the world. It is the cause of right, and of justice, and of true democracy everywhere. If I were an American, I would make it the supreme object of my life to win for my country the distinction of securing now for mankind, in peace, what millions have died for vainly in war. Ireland's claims furnishes America the opportunity.[52]

The global mindedness of Ireland's diasporic leaders is self-evident with the assertion that Ireland is the "cause of the world", although in this case the conceptual 'world' is very narrowly tailored to distinctly American ideals and nationalism. The direct appeal to non-Irish Americans speaks to de Valera's strategy of linking the Irish claims of independence to the emotive memory both of recent bloodshed in WWI and of American independence from the British empire. This is supported with the language of 'justice' and 'democracy' inherent to the American mythology of its founding fathers. De Valera ends the recording with a brazen willingness to drive a wedge between these values and the betrayal of the Wilson administration:

> This question of recognition is distinctly an American question … The Paris Peace Treaty, the international diplomats and the international financiers, have not answered these questions as the American people intended them to be answered. It is now a question for the American people to answer them for themselves.[53]

The willingness of de Valera to appeal directly to the American people suggests that the notion of a 'Wilsonian moment', as coined by Erez Manela, is a misrepresentation of the rise of nationalist movements that promotes American exceptionalism and erases the agency of diasporic nationalist leaders.[54] The post-WWI decline in the legitimacy of empire is best understood, not as a US-inspired shift away from colonialism, but rather as a turning point between formal and informal modes of Western-led capitalist domination. In his account of the 'Wilsonian moment', Manela attributes Wilson's rhetoric of self-determination as one of the key drivers of anticolonial nationalism.[55] Here, Wilson is

portrayed as "a millennial figure, a prophet of a new world order" whose impact was essential in the rise of anticolonial nationalism.[56]

To its credit, Manela's account recognises the limitations of Wilson's "illusory" global moment. Manela identifies the irony of Wilson's rhetoric inspiring independent movements that he neither anticipated nor approved, and that the vehemently racist US President had no intentions of applying his avowed principles in India, China, Korea, and Egypt. The importance of how Wilsonian self-determination as a discursive strategy was adopted and deployed by colonial independence movements is also emphasised.[57] Yet the very notion of a 'Wilsonian Moment' is fraught with American exceptionalism. As argued persuasively by Hussein Omar, freedom was not a concept that needed to be imported from the United States to colonised peoples.[58] Indeed, Lune traces the interrelation between American and Irish conceptions of freedom to centuries before Wilson's administration.[59]

The fact that De Valera was willing to speak, over the head of the American president, directly to the Irish diaspora and the American people undermines the validity of understanding the post-war wave of anti-imperial nationalism as the 'Wilsonian moment.' Rather than Manela's focus on one individual, de Valera's tour of the United States demonstrates the benefits of considering how diasporic nationalist leaders engaged with the declining legitimacy of formal empires after the First World War. His rhetoric also demonstrates how appeals to publics and popular sentiments could be leveraged against world leaders. This shows that the Irish diaspora's position between two empires did not only mean strategic allegiance with the US, but also implicit or threatened allegiance with other burgeoning anti-colonial and liberation movements that could be dangerous to America.

In the case of Irish long-distance nationalism, therefore, an elastic invocation of diaspora that enabled multiple allegiances and aligned with anti-colonial sentiments became a key weapon in the years preceding Irish independence.

The Global Origins of the Irish Republic

Taken together, de Valera's speeches reveal how the Irish diaspora was connected by a sense of loss and dispossession. These sentiments thus allowed for an ambiguous conception of the global nation that recognised and enabled a multiplicity of national allegiances. As its founding documents also illustrate, the Irish nation itself was constructed along global lines in a manner that was outward looking and reflected both the contribution and connection of its diaspora.

The Declaration of Independence was adopted by the *Dáil Éireann* at its first meeting in the Mansion House, Dublin on 21st January 1919. To underline its international scope, it was adopted in Irish, English, and French. The declaration made a direct global appeal that "we claim for our national independence the recognition and support of every free nation in

the world, and we proclaim that independence to be a condition precedent to international peace hereafter".[60] With this, the leaders of Irish nationalism again displayed a desire to link the struggle for independence to worldwide debates around self-determination and the declining legitimacy of empires.

The declaration repeatedly refers to "the Irish nation" and the "Irish People", such as in the assertion that "we, the elected Representatives of the ancient Irish people in National Parliament assembled, do, in the name of the Irish nation, ratify the establishment of the Irish Republic".[61] By invoking the 'ancient Irish people', the leaders of Irish independence were asserting a strong and legitimate claim to nationhood in a manner that was inclusive to the global Irish diaspora.

To support this claim, it is important to consider concurrent discourses around the Irish 'race.' Between 1881 and 1922, nine Global Irish Race Conventions took place – five in the US, with the others in Melbourne, Buenos Aires, Dublin, and Paris.[62] As Gerard Keown argues, these conferences were far from a linear display of global Irish unity and often reflected the splits in the Irish nationalist movement.[63] However, this global discourse of Irish ethnicity suggests a deep connection between the homeland and the diaspora – with Gannon going as far as describing Ireland as a 'transnational nation' in his study of the 1922 Paris Irish Race Conference.[64] This is supported by the fact that the fledgling Irish state was actively involved in establishing the conferences, and in 1921 sent missions to gain support for recognition of the Republic to Australia, the US, New Zealand, Russia, South America, and South Africa.[65] Whilst this global connection was never formalised, despite de Valera's failed efforts to establish the global organisation '*Fine Ghaedheal*', the prevalence of global debates regarding the Irish race indicate that the Irish nation was conceived along global lines and looked outward to the nation's diaspora.[66]

The notion of a global Irish nation was reaffirmed in the 1916 Proclamation of the Irish Republic, which was ratified by the *Dáil Éireann* in January 1919. The 1916 Proclamation was issued by the Military Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood during the Easter Rising of April 1916. It begins with the call that "in the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom".[67] The language of the global Irish family is again apparent here, as well as the appeal to past martyrdom as a Janus-faced symbol of both dispossession ('dead') and strength ('strikes'). The Irish diaspora is then directly referred to with the statement that Ireland's struggle is "supported by her exiled children in America".[68]

The motif of martyrdom and sacrifice is a recurrent theme throughout de Valera's speeches and the foundational documents of the Irish nation. This had a particular resonance for members of the Irish diaspora and in particular Irish Americans, whose political and social identity, as identified by Miller, overwhelmingly drew from the Catholic church.[69] Akenson, who rightly emphasises the Protestant diasporic experience,

links the nature of diasporic Irish nationalism to the biblical suffering of The Chosen People.[70] In addition, Lune outlines how the evocatively storied heroes and martyrs were used to mobilise subsequent generations of Irish nationalists, and it is clear that the religious imagery evoked by the recurrent appeal to and valorisation of self-sacrifice powerfully resonated with the predominantly Catholic Irish diaspora.[71]

This religiously imbued sense of exile and dispossession, which de Valera would articulate so frequently in his forthcoming tour of the United States, was also codified into the founding documents of the fledgling nation. In this sense, especially when considered in tandem with the Irish race conferences, the independent Irish nation was designed to belong to all its citizens around the world. This was an elastic sense of belonging that allowed for multiple national allegiances, yet one which facilitated a powerful interchange between diasporic and homeland nationalism.

This conception of strength through flexibility is supported by the *Dáil's* "Message to the Free Nations of the World". McGarry details how the media spectacle of the public session of Ireland's unofficial 'Day of Independence' on 21st January 1919 was "intended for an international, as much as domestic, audience".[72] The message begins with an appeal for global recognition of Irish independence at the upcoming Peace Congress:

> The race, the language, the customs and traditions of Ireland are radically distinct from the English. Ireland is one of the most ancient nations in Europe, and she has preserved her national integrity, vigorous and intact, through seven centuries of foreign oppression.[73]

As well as being a politically necessary attempt to garner sympathy for the Irish cause from a global audience, the fact that this sanctified ('intact') and dynamic ('vigorous') image of the homeland was targeted at Irish migrants across the world is indicative of the symbiotic relationship inherent to long-distance nationalisms. This relationship was based on an appeal to global notions of peace and freedom, which is also evident in the following section:

> Ireland to-day reasserts her historic nationhood the more confidently before the new world emerging from the War, because she believes in freedom and justice as the fundamental principles of international law … because the permanent peace of Europe can never be secured by perpetuating military dominion for the profit of empire but only by establishing the control of government in every land upon the basis of the free will of a free people.[74]

This firmly situates the Irish claim to independence within the context of declining empires, which enables the claims of a pure homeland to be developed even stronger in contrast to the perception of a violent, extractive, and profit-seeking British empire. This notion of a pure Irish homeland is intrinsically linked to the Irish diaspora, as persuasively argued by Tölölyan:

> In exilic nationalism, the nation-state must be maintained … not only because political sovereignty is a value in itself but also because the homeland is where diasporan identity, ever more precarious in the face of persecution or assimilation or hybridity, draws its strength.[75]

This is an apt summary of the home front of Irish long-distance nationalism. The three documents adopted by the Dáil Éireann in January 1919 reveal how the Irish nation was forged by actors who thought globally, both towards the Irish diaspora and within the context of shifting empires. They indicate how the concerns of the global Irish community were codified into the founding documents of the independent nation. Crucially, when considered alongside de Valera's subsequent tour of the United States, they also illuminate the ways in which the Irish diaspora and homeland nationalism drew their strength from one another.

Conclusion

The *Dáil Éireann* documents of 1919, coupled with de Valera's National Forum speeches, indicate that that the Irish diaspora played an instrumental role in the independence movement. They also reveal that this involvement was facilitated upon a flexible understanding of the Irish diaspora as a global nation, which allowed for dual allegiances, and that what connected this broad conception was a sense of loss that derived from Ireland's colonial experience.

That the duality and elasticity inherent to de Valera's conception of the Irish diaspora was a source of strength may appear counterintuitive. Yet by drawing connections between Irish and American culture, the leaders of Irish diasporic nationalism were able to launch an inclusive appeal to the dual status of Irish Americans and evoke long-standing feelings of dispossession and exile. If we return to Smith's four pillars of cultural resources that define classic diaspora nationalisms, it becomes clear that the Irish experience must be considered within this category. Smith talks of myths of national origins, idealised territorial attachments, vivid traditions of ethnohistory and ideals of sacrifice and martyrdom – which were the bedrock of de Valera's engagement with the Irish diaspora.[76]

The strength of the diaspora's contribution to Irish long-distance nationalism was reflected in the founding documents of the independent nation. The *Dáil Éireann's* publications were imbued with a global mindedness and consideration of the global Irish nation that aligned with contemporary debates of the Irish 'race'. The *Dáil's* anti-imperialist rhetoric and invocation of a global Irish community mirrored the feelings of exile within the Irish diaspora that would be so persistently engaged with by de Valera in his subsequent US tour. Taken together, this indicates a symbiotic relationship between homeland and diasporic Irish nationalism in which both sites of struggle drew strength from one another. Ultimately, the formation of the Irish Republic cannot be understood without a consideration of both the global context and the influence of "the scattered children of *Éire*".[77]

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Gerson Liebl Makes his Case: Citizenship and (Post-)Colonial Forgetting in Germany[1]

By

Sophie Genske

Abstract

Shortly before World War I, the Law on German Citizenship—which is still largely in place today—was adopted. At the same time, a debate about "family politics" and "mixed races" was sparked in Togo, a German colony at the time, where Jean Johann Liebl, the child of a German colonial doctor and the Togolese daughter of a chieftain, had just been born. Around eighty years later, in 1991, his son Gerson Liebl would migrate from Togo to Germany, (unsuccessfully) claiming his right to German citizenship based on descendance. But people like Gerson Liebl—descendants of Germans living in colonial territories at the time—have no legal place in the German bureaucratic judicial system. This article will argue that in fact they have been and still are forgotten by the German national public. The collective forgetting in place as well as its accompanying silence will be laid out in respect to Aleida Assmann's theories on remembrance culture. Both the close retracing of Gerson Liebl's case and the examination of the legal history of German citizenship provide evidence of how the German state has silenced and continues to silence its colonial past as well as postcolonial present.

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Introduction

During the final drafting of this paper, on 28 May 2021, the news that Germany officially recognised the genocide of the Herero and Nama peoples between 1904 and 1908 on what is now Namibian territory travelled through the international press. It marks one of several political measures taken recently that touch upon the German colonial past or aim to 'compensate' for it. However, both the delay and the implementation of these measures—whether in the context of the recognition of a colonial genocide, the renaming of streets, or the restitution of stolen cultural artifacts—are being criticised by the affected parties. According to them, the respectively planned legal consequences are insufficient, with public and international economic relations forming a greater concern to the German government than a proper engagement with the colonial past.[2]

Related but seemingly individual matters, such as legal disputes over German citizenship, oftentimes receive less media attention. In 1991, citizenship activist Gerson Liebl, the grandchild of a German colonial doctor and the Togolese daughter of a chieftain, migrated from Togo to Germany. Ever since then he has been fighting (unsuccessfully) for his right to German citizenship. Although descending from a German, Liebl has been and still is excluded by a law that came into being more than a century ago, when his ancestor's home was still German colonial territory. In this paper, an introductory overview of the history of said law, the Law on German Citizenship, will show how it was designed to exclude and define who is a German citizen by who is not. Subsequently, the case of Gerson Liebl will be traced back in a close examination of sources, such as (colonial) legal documents and political speeches. The last chapter of this paper will look at collective forgetting, referring mostly to Aleida Assmann's respective theories,[3] and the (current) state of post-colonialism in Germany. This will lead to an understanding of how Liebl's case represents (the consequences of) colonial remembrance in Germany, whose mainstream society meets this chapter of its transnational past with a defensive, complicit, and comparative silence—[4] manifested in the Law on Citizenship that is purposely unable to remember and face its continuing follow-ups. Therefore, people like Gerson Liebl continue to lack legal recognition in the German bureaucratic judicial system: they have been and still are forgotten.

1. Designed to Exclude: A Brief History of German Citizenship

During the German national movement of the mid-nineteenth century, nationality as an institution, namely the development of a procedure for obtaining an early form of citizenship and therefore being part of the nation, provoked existential debates around belonging and foreignness. The importance of a differentiation between one nation(ality) and the other grew and hence appeared to call for further definitions. Those with agency within the movement believed that a cultural and ethnic "entirety of Germans" categorically existed, which, for example, included Austria.[5]

In 1871, German nationality became a concrete instrument of inclusion and exclusion. While it was used as the core element in integrating inhabitants of the newly annexed Alsace-Lorraine, it simultaneously instigated the severe sentiments against and rejection of Poles and (above all) Jews on state territory.[6] As the procedure established its bureaucratic character and people became components of meticulous statistics, the discrimination towards specific social groups was formalised. These people were either fully excluded from attaining citizenship or had to prove their assimilation through various special regulations.[7] The so-called *Abwehr der Polen* (defence against the Poles) helped to significantly increase the sense of belonging within mainstream society and can be seen as the decisive starting point of defining who is *in* by who is *out*. Through the Initiative of 1894/5 it became harder for foreigners to become Germans, while those perceived as Germans living abroad, such as *Wolgadeutsche* (Volga Germans), had an easier time getting or retaining their citizenship.

In 1913, when the Law on Citizenship was passed, descendance became the sole pillar of German nationality, making it *ius sanguinis* (of the blood) and not *ius soli* (of the soil), thereby legally manifesting the racial unity of the German people.[8] As Dominik Nagl, who has studied the linkage between colonialism, racism, and citizenship, argues, "the principle of a discriminatory bipolar colonial jurisdiction and the exclusion of the colonial subject from the legal community of citizens characterises modern colonialism overall".[9] Separate legal, political, and economic systems were crucial in creating and maintaining asymmetrical colonial governance. Thus, although both British and French law, for instance, differed from the German version—as they were partly territorial (*ius soli*) and far more nuanced—equal citizenship rights for colonised subjects were neither reached, let alone pursued in their pre-World War I territories. Keeping colonial subjects from obtaining German citizenship with both the privileges and duties it entailed was thus important for two reasons: first, to be able to continually exploit colonial territories and people, and second, to successfully evocate a national community at home based on pseudo-scientific, racist, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic concepts.

The small number of individuals from African, Asian, and Pacific overseas territories who (temporarily) lived in Germany during colonial times were mostly either male children of noble families who were sent there to study or (forced) participants of the racist, exoticised spectacles known as *Völkerschauen*.[10] Their legal status was not comparable to other migrants or tourists; they did not receive proper visas, and were forced to rely entirely on personal guaranties by colonial officials, missionaries, or employers. When they or their descendants married white women after World War I, these women would lose their German citizenship (which corresponded with the rules of many European countries at the time).[11]

Despite the evidential racial discrimination across Europe, there was never a decided *Rasserecht* (race law) established anywhere on the continent until the Third

Reich. During their twelve years in power, the Nazis built a large system of racially discriminatory citizenship regulations[12] which were later abolished during the Allied occupation after World War II. Almost the entire pre-1933 judiciary was re-introduced in this context, including the 1913 Law on German Citizenship, which was distinctly "provisory and retrograde".[13]

As was the rest of the 1949 German constitution (*Grundgesetz*), the Law on Citizenship was contradictory in its endeavour. On the one hand, it simply re-adopted pre-1933 regulations, but on the other, it attempted to not only revoke but balance out Nazi directives and their horrid consequences. The former colonies—which never went through a process of decolonisation but were lost to other empires during World War I—were excluded from any reflections in the process and rendered fully invisible in the context of nationality and post-national socialist Germanness.

In the following decades, the discourse that Germany, unlike other European colonisers, was subsequently 'no country of immigration' was "strategically re-activated" and "meant rather prescriptively than descriptively",[14] as Jean-Pierre Félix-Eyoum and Florian Wagner point out. The German government was determined not to treat those considering moving abroad from former overseas territories differently to other non-Westerners willing to immigrate. Furthermore, no efforts were made to explicitly recruit people from these countries as *Gastarbeiter*innen*—as was done in the UK with the invitation to the Windrush generation between 1948 and 1971 (which of course later resulted in its own scandal around citizenship).[15] A statistic category for post-colonial immigrants was not established either, whether they were descendants of German citizens or not. Up to this point, they hardly play any part in reference books about migration and/or legal history in Germany.

In the 1990s, alongside Gerson Liebl, half a million Togolese citizens fled from Togo's repressive regime, but due to the asylum regulations of 1993 they very rarely received asylum in Germany, despite the shared history of the two countries. However, some individuals from former German overseas territories (and elsewhere) were able to become German citizens unsystematically or in summary proceedings, due to economic necessities. Félix-Eyoum himself, for instance, is from Cameroon originally, and became a German citizen in 1980 'simply because' he was a trained special education teacher and members of this profession were needed in Bavaria at the time.[16]

In 1999, Jürgen Habermas commented on the debate on national belonging, stating that normative terms alone cannot explain the entity of a legal national community.[17] He went on to claim that the juristic construct of the constitutional state therefore leaves a hole which triggers its filling with a "naturalistische[m] Begriff des Volkes"[18] (naturalist concept of a people). One year after these lines were published, the Social Democratic-Green coalition of the German government issued the first and, as of now, only reform of the almost 100-year-old law, at that point still called the *Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*.[19] Once again, the reform provided no regulations for people

from areas that had been under German colonial rule. In general, it did adopt territorial elements (*ius soli*) and was supposed to simplify the (second and third generation) migration to Germany. Nevertheless, it was and continues to be criticised for not effectively reaching that goal in practice.[20] In reality, it did not pick up on claims like Gerson Liebl's—which will be discussed shortly—in any way.

Generally speaking, citizenship in itself remains an infinite negotiation process. In the German case, it continues to be defined by factors of exclusion up to this day. It is oblivious of historic global entanglements, and is shaped—or rather kept unchanged—by mainstream actors only. Instead of igniting an extensive revision of nationalist-socialist thought and its roots, the German Federal Republic's preferred handling of its legal history can be labelled forgetful at best and a deliberately negligent continuation of racial hatred at worst.

2. A Descendant Claims the Right to a Homeland: A Case Study[21]

On 12 October 1909, the government doctor Friedrich Karl Georg Liebl[22] appeared in front of the assessor of the Imperial District Office, Dr. Asmus, in Lomé, Togo, to financially settle the future of his unborn child. In his statement, he noted that he had "lived together" with the "native Kokoè Aite Ayaron" during the last years of his stay in Togo, which had been a German *Schutzgebiet* for more than two decades. Liebl further reported that "the Kokoe" was expecting a child due in January 1910, and that for raising this child he would store 1000 Mark in her name, of which she was allowed to withdraw smaller amounts in a precisely defined frequency within two years—that is, if the baby would turn out to be a "Mulattenkind" (*mulatto child*). If it were to be a Black child, Liebl stated, she would only be entitled to 200 Mark after the birth, and the rest was then to be sent back to him. At the time of this statement, Kokoè was supposedly staying with her brother Emanuel, who was a nurse, so she could spend her pregnancy in his care.[23]

In February 1910, said brother, Emanuel Ajavon,[24] appeared to confirm that his sister had given birth to a child of mixed race on 26 January. The respective report filed by a secretary of the Imperial District Office shows that he was consequently given 50 Mark for expenses related to the birth plus 10 Mark of alimonies each for the months of January and February, as had been laid out by Fritz Liebl. Moreover, two small notes—the last one dated 31 March of the same year—read that on the first account another 70 and on the second "100 Mark have been paid to Kokoè".[25] Below this, the document does not state what happened to the remaining sum which Liebl had saved as sustenance for the mother and child.



Figures 1 and 2: Edith Kokoè Ajavon with her son Jean Johann Liebl in Anecho, Togo, in 1912 (left), Dr. Fritz Liebl, date and place unknown (right).

In German and under German law, the colloquial term for relationships like the one between Fritz Liebl and his child, who was given the name Jean Johann Liebl, was—and as of today still is—*Zahlvaterschaft* (payment paternity). In pre-World War I Germany and its colonies, a *Zahlvater* was usually someone who did not wish to acknowledge their illegitimate child but was still willing to, partially, pay for its upbringing. It is this particular legal construct which would become crucial in the life of Jean Johann Liebl's son Gerson, and which will re-emerge when reaching the circumstances of his ongoing struggle.[26]

2.1 "We are Germans, we are white, and we want to remain white"[27]

Around the time of Jean Johann Liebl's birth, a public debate about *Mischehen* (mixed race marriages) as well as *Mulattenkinder* took place amongst German colonial politicians, which eventually reached the colonial metropole of Berlin.[28] Politicians of all parties generally agreed that a legal reform of family politics in the colonies was necessary since there were next to no detailed regulations. However, most who were either employed in the colonies or by the Reichskolonialamt strongly opposed the legalisation of marriages between Togolese women and German men. At that point, these marriages were forbidden on the base of racial arguments. According to Adolf Friedrich, Duke of Mecklenburg, who assumed office as Colonial Governor in Togo in 1912, allowing *Mischehen* would have endangered "the strong sentiment of race, which we absolutely need".[29] Next to his ostensible concerns about protecting the "status of white women" and the inseparability of marriage—which, according to him, could not be guaranteed in these cases due to "climatic reasons"—he was mainly driven by Social Darwinist and white supremacist thought, which he summed up under a "position of knowledge policy".[30] Dr. Asmus, the assessor of the Imperial District Office in Lomé who was not only in charge of the guardianship for Jean Johann Liebl but dozens of children of Togolese mothers and

German fathers, furthermore emphasized the crucial importance of the ban on carrying the father's surname. He imagined that in a future without this ban, it would become severely difficult to tell "African" and "European" individuals apart. Asmus believed that descendance was mainly determined by the family name—especially once racial lines started to blur—and could therefore, with all that it entailed, be legally claimed by people whom he believed were not entitled to it. In order to prevent children like Jean Johann Liebl and their descendants from ever becoming German and including themselves into the society of their colonisers, he proposed a Regulation in 1909 which ensured that the children in question were named after their mothers—or in fact, after their parents of colour.[31]

While it certainly was an act of political rebellion against this racist and misanthropic world view, the illegal bearing (and later also the subsequent passing on) of Jean Johann Liebl's paternal name initially lost its immediate relevance in 1914. After World War I broke out, Germany was quickly unable to hold its overseas territories. In the case of Togo, British troops rapidly seized the country in 1914. Due to this rather abrupt end of the "German Empire", the entire debate around family politics in the colonies appeared to be forfeited. Thus, one colonial governance superseded the other and brought along its own legislation.

2.2 Intergenerationally in between

Roughly a century later, a man camped in front of the Berlin Town Hall, demanding travel documents, a residence visa, and recognition as the grandchild of the German government doctor Fritz Liebl. The hunger strike of the stateless Gerson Liebl in November 2019 marked the climax of almost 30 years of citizenship activism.

Figure 3: Still from the short film and 2021 Berlinale entry "Zahlvaterschaft" (Germany 2021, directed by Moritz Siebert), showing Gerson Liebl during his hunger strike in Berlin (2019).

In 1991, the trained goldsmith moved from Togo to the German state of Rheinland-Pfalz and directly applied for asylum as well as for German citizenship on the basis of being the grandchild of a German—both of which were rejected. Liebl claimed that his grandparents were in fact married and eventually provided documents to prove it: the ceremony was held according to Indigenous traditions around Aného, Togo, by chieftain Kwakou Kponton in 1908, and at the time represented the only form of marriage possible to the couple since colonial law forbade *Mischehen*. But the German state neither recognized the marriage then, as it was not legally valid under German law (unlike Fritz Liebl's second marriage to a German woman in Germany a few years thereafter) —nor did it do so upon Gerson Liebl's petition. Based on the German Law on Citizenship of 1913, different German courts ruled against Liebl over the years, claiming that legal lineages were only formed by marriage and legitimate children and that he was therefore Togolese and not German. All the while, the Togolese state actually deprived him of his papers by claiming the exact opposite, namely that he lived in Germany and was (of) German (heritage), which in the end made him a stateless person—intergenerationally in between. Ironically, his brother Rodolf Dovi Liebl received a German passport in 1996 when filing for it in Lomé. However, it was withdrawn from him again a mere six months later.[33]

In 2003, when Gerson Liebl petitioned for "Wiedergutmachung staatsangehörigkeitsrechtlichen Unrechts" (reparation of legal citizenship wrongdoing) during colonial times of the German Reich, the official refusal of his claim stated the following: "The Federal Republic of Germany is 'aware of its colonial past' since the German Minister of Foreign Affairs has condemned colonialism as a crime against humanity and apologised for it on behalf of the country at the World Conference against Racism two years prior to the petition".[34] Six years later, shortly after moving from Straubing, his grandfather's hometown, to Berlin, Liebl was then detained and deported to Togo after 18 years of living in Germany, leaving behind his wife and child. Only in 2017, after his son became a German citizen, was he allowed to return to the country due to family reunification. Not giving up on his demands, he went on a hunger strike—one form of protest he had not yet turned to, but which would also prove itself to be mostly powerless against the German state's determination to deny his claims. Although immigration authorities offered him a temporary leave to remain after he had been taken to the hospital on the tenth day of his strike, the City's House of Representatives held on to prior decisions and commented that even if the Federal State were to adopt a reform concerning German descendants from former colonies, it would not include Gerson Liebl "because the form of acknowledgement of paternity described by the petitioner was regarded as a so-called *Zahlvaterschaft* until 30 June 1970, which did not result in any kinship relations".[35]

Gerson Liebl faced a great many resolutions and denials by the German state (as well as the Togolese state) over the years, which were often contradictory and characterised by the concurrent dissociation and perseverance of (past) colonial realities. To attempt an unravelling, or at least a deeper understanding of the case's context

beyond the legal level alone, this article will proceed by looking at memory politics of forgetting.

3. Collective Forgetting and its Defining Consequences

Forgetting and remembering are often seen as binaries with opposite connotations and valuations. However, a more enmeshed understanding of them is crucial. Both exist in an active and a passive version within cultural memory. Here, active entails that there are not only various strategies to remember, but also to forget.[36]

Regarding the case of the German Law on Citizenship and its connection to colonial times, it can be argued that the German nation state has only passively remembered its colonial past. This means that its artefacts and relics have been gathered in the collective archive, but never made it to the canon.[37] According to Aleida Assmann, in the archive cultural memories are stored, available to historians at best but remote from the present society, continuously waiting for resurrection. What becomes part of the canon, however, is actively admired, shapes the collective self-perception, and forms the connection between remembered past and imagined future.[38]

Concurrent with this passive colonial remembrance, there is an active form of forgetting at work: the silence. Assmann determines that when silent, a certain element is banned from the collective communication without being deleted. Institutions like courthouses and parliaments, which could be dealing with said element's legacy and actively shape its public status, remain silent instead. Therefore, what is silenced is simultaneously conserved in a state of latency without being processed.[39] Following Assmann's theories further, longer-term silence is never random, but rather follows certain patterns in which stories and memories remain unheard as long as there is no memory frame—cultivated by the collective—in place for them.[40]

In the event of trauma, such a defensive and complicit silence generally protects those causing the trauma as a result. Not only are they not being prosecuted in any way, but they for the most part do not pass on their trauma intergenerationally, which affected victims, on the contrary, tend to do. However, even later generations of victims are not able to claim their rights, get media attention and therefore be heard doing so, if a silence in the name of their perpetrators and the mainstream society (both of which overlap in the German case) continues.[41] In fact, Gerson Liebl migrated 'solely' as a historically affected person rather than as the descendant of a victim. After his migration, however, when making said distinction a subject of discussion, the German legal system did not recognise him and therefore victimised him, too. His case is representative of a struggle that is purposely created and nourished by the collective defensive and complicit silence towards the colonial past in Germany.

Finally, this case of silence is characterised by one additional accompaniment: comparison. By constituting cultural memory like individual memory –as something which only provides so much room for storage—the silence appears to legitimise itself through asymmetrical comparisons to other times and places. Those times and places are awarded a more legitimate claim to the 'limited space' full of dedicated remembrance—which makes it impossible to address concrete legal reparations and is designed to play victims against each other. One effect of what I will now call comparative silence (as an addition to Assmann's theories) seems to be that the time span between past and present is enlarged, since through comparative silence past events become compressed, minimised, and are supposed to yet are unlikely to ever fully disappear. On the other hand, the very same time span is shortened, for no revision or cultural reaction has taken place in the meantime and certain hard structures, such as the Law on Citizenship, remain to this day.

But which steps have been taken to address and eventually break the silence in recent times, and by whom? Who constitutes the collective now? According to Oliver Dimbath, Anja Kinzler, and Katinka Meyer, collective identity is not a shared conscious but the "mythologised narrative of a group that means to cause social cohesion".[42] It is therefore important to have a look at the current state of German collective identity and attempt an evaluation of whether certain present measures break the silence or rather manifest it long-term.

3.1 Breaking the Silence? A Snapshot of Postcolonial Germany

Andreas Eckert, in his latest article that bears the question of "Postkoloniale Zeitgeschichte?", writes that Germany could have been considered the first postcolonial nation of the twentieth century.[43] However, postcolonial practice was not visible in German society for a long time. Postcolonial theories—which were heavily discussed in the Anglo-Saxon world at the beginning of the 1990s—did not swiftly reach the young (West-)German contemporary historians who, at that point, were fully occupied with securing the abundance of GDR archival material after the two countries had been reunited.

In 1991, sociologist and famous participant of the debate on postcolonialism Stuart Hall wrote, "[n]ow, that Europe has consolidated and approximated itself, similar efforts have been made in order to reinforce the borders to its 'Others' in the Third World. The two most popular discursive markers at work at the moment are 'refugees' and 'fundamentalism'".[44] At this exact time, when Gerson Liebl first came to Germany and German lawmakers began to prepare the reform of the *Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*, the migration of Europeans within Europe became increasingly relaxed. All the while, hospitable legal regulations were never extended to non-Western nationals.

In the 1990s, Germany—a country which had sought to compensate its national-socialist guilt with an expansive but rather self-important remembrance culture[45] but which was still silencing its colonial era—was about to gulp up its post-socialist Eastern part. Hito Steyerl describes the specific historic background in place in Germany as "coined by rifts and fractures just as much as it is by transitions and continuities. Meaning that we are confronted with a historical palimpsest which is structured partly by dense and loose sequences of difference and repetition".[46] From this historic palimpsest, a diverse German society has developed despite the legal and cultural obstacles which continue to exclude them. In the late 1990s, the number of people from places that once were German colonial territories increased, and by 2004 around 12,000 Togolese and 14,000 Cameroonian people were living in Germany.[47] It is also their fight against racist and othering[48] positions that eventually made postcolonial thought more popular.

Of course, activism could and can mostly be pursued by people who are legally allowed to stay and therefore able to gain societal agency.[49] That this remained a privilege in the new millennium and that the colonial silence continued with the majority of German society is not only evident when individual stories that remain fairly hidden, like Gerson Liebl's, were concerned, but also when it came to public events. Following Germany's first official apology for the atrocities committed against the Herero and Nama people in 2004, for instance, conservative parts of the national press responded in an agitated way. In fact, the tabloid BILD labelled the (female) German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development who had delivered the apology a traitor and employed 'othering rhetoric' to an extreme, asking on their front page: "What will be the cost of the minister's tears?"—a casual cocktail of colonial silence and patriarchal sexism.[50]

"What we aim to forget and have forgotten collectively constitutes the foundation of national identity"[51] —although said in 1882 Paris, Ernest Renan's quote remains applicable today. Based on prior analysis, however, we can generally suspect that the more inclusive and pluralistic *the we* is, the more heterogenous the cultural memory. Ultimately, the settlement on long-term forgetting will not be indispensable in order to constitute belonging anymore. Apart from a growing number of recent literature about German colonial as well as postcolonial history, which applies a more intersectional methodological framework, the sources—especially once we look at non-white and non-male sources-[52] show us that German colonial practices never went unchallenged, neither then nor now, and that there are still many (micro) global histories to write and many foundations of national identity to shake.

Conclusion

Despite a growing number of people who were willing to migrate to Germany, the German Federal Republic self-labelled itself a no-immigrant country over the course of the second half of the twentieth century. While European neighbours and former empires crumbled over their respective decolonisation processes, the German societal majority as well as political and legal decision makers looked upon Germany's colonial period—which was longer than the timespan between the construction and the eradication of the Berlin Wall—as a marginal phase. Therefore, it appeared perfectly sensible that those European neighbours, unlike Germany, were subsequently becoming immigrant countries.

Those with legal and political agency felt no immediate pressure to reform the Law on Citizenship, which still existed in its form from 1913. In fact, it continued to reflect the ideas of how nationality is formed and forms itself: a nationality which was based on the exclusion of othered individuals and simultaneously stimulated the remembrance of a pre-1933 national unity which was not yet tied to national-socialist atrocities. And even as the 2000 reform was passed, it did not fundamentally change those elements. Although territorial legislation was put in place which for the first time would allow people to become citizens if they were born in the country and met certain requirements, descendance remained the main pillar of the German Law on Citizenship—for some, that is.

Gerson Liebl, whose second generation descendance from the German colonial doctor Fritz Liebl can be proven, remains excluded from the ius sanguinis. For almost thirty years, authorities have told him that the two major legal obstacles in his pursuit of German citizenship were that his grandparents were not married and that Fritz Liebl was only the Zahlvater of Jean Johann Liebl, which would not establish paternity. In 2000, the legal administration failed to tackle any of these complications in its reform and thereby revise its colonial past. After all, the Law on Citizenship was established when Germany was a colonial power. It was passed in a time when marriage under Colonial Law was illegal for Fritz Liebl and Kokoè Ajavon and when raising a mixed child was thereby rendered impossible.

One could carve out that the handling of Liebl's case and the circumstances he has been forced to live under for several decades now are part of a colonial continuity which is kept in place by a defensive, complicit, and comparative silence. This active version of collective forgetting is defensive of as well as complicit with its national collective that has been the offender of colonial trauma. Constitutively, the silence legitimizes itself through comparative strategies that thrive on decreasing the importance of colonial memory even further.

Though the silence can be and has been long-term, it conserves itself permanently and will—through a transforming collective—eventually transform itself. The national collective it has been nourished by and protective of starts to be challenged and entangled in a postcolonial negotiation process. Although kept remote from civil power, people like Gerson Liebl have developed agency, shaped their own fates, and shaped German history and nationality.

Notes

[1] A different and significantly shorter version of this paper has been published as an in-depth film review and part of a dossier on the Berlin Film Festival 2021 in the *Zeitgeschichte Online*: Sophie Genske, "Zahlvaterschaft: A Brief History of Gerson Liebl's Case, the German Law on Citizenship, and Colonial Forgetting", *Zeitgeschichte-Online* (June 2021), www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/film/zahlvaterschaft.

[2] See for example Reinhart Kössler and Henning Melber, "Namibian genocide: Why Germany's bid to make amends isn't enough", *The Conversation* (June 2021), www.theconversation.com/namibian-genocide-why- germanys-bid-to-make-amends-isnt-enough-161820.

[3] Aleida Assmann, *Formen des Vergessens* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2016).

[4] Assmann, *Formen des Vergessens*, 22-23, 53-57.

[5] Dieter Gosewinkel, "Einbürgern und Ausschließen: Staatsangehörigkeit und Bürgerrecht in Deutschland während des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts", *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte*, Germanistische Abteilung 137, no. 1 (2020): 373, https://doi.org/10.1515/zrgg-2020-0006.

[6] See Gosewinkel, "Einbürgern und Ausschließen", 376-377.

[7] For detailed information and numbers see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, Bd. III: 1849-1914* (München: C.H. Beck Verlag, 1995), 961-965.

[8] See Julia Angster, "Staatsbürgerschaft und die Nationalisierung von Staat und Gesellschaft", in *Staatsbürgerschaft Im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Dieter Gosewinkel and Christoph Guys (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 2019), 125-144.

[9] Dominik Nagl, "Unterordnung und Trennung. Die rechtliche Stellung von Europäern und Indigenen in den europäischen Kolonialreichen", *Fremd und rechtlos? Zugehörigkeitsrechte Fremder von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Ein Handbuch*, ed. Altay Coskun and Lutz Raphael (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2014), 292.

[10] Völkerschauen were zoo-like mass events in which colonial subjects were „exhibited" during the late nineteenth/early twentieth century. See Anne Dreesbach, *Gezähmte Wilde. Die Zurschaustellung „exotischer" Menschen in Deutschland 1870-1940* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2005).

[11] See Jean-Pierre Félix-Eyoum and Florian Wagner, "Das verdrängte Politikum. (Post-)Koloniale Migration nach Deutschland," *Zeitgeschichte-Online* (February 2021), https://zeitgeschichte-online.de/themen/das-verdraengte-politikum.

[12] It would extend the framework of this paper to further describe these regulations. Since the focus is set both on the colonial and the reunified period of Germany (when Gerson Liebl migrated), the time in between can only be touched upon superficially when immediately relevant. Also, I will not be able to discuss regulations in the GDR since they did not prevail within German law after the fall of the Berlin Wall and are therefore not directly linked to this case.

[13] Gosewinkel, "Einbürgern und Ausschließen", 385.

[14] Félix-Eyoum and Wagner, "Das verdrängte Politikum".

[15] See for example Huon Wardle and Laura Obermuller, "The Windrush Generation", *Anthropology Today* 34, no. 4 (2018): 3-4, www.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8322.12445.

[16] See Félix-Eyoum and Wagner, "Das verdrängte Politikum".

[17] Jürgen Habermas, "Der europäische Nationalstaat – Zur Vergangenheit und Zukunft von Souveränität und Staatsbürgerschaft", *Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie*, ed. Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1999), 139-140.

[18] Habermas, "Der europäische Nationalstaat", 140.

[19] The German Law on Citizenship (StAG), via Bundesamt für Justiz, www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stag/BJNR005830913.html.

[20] See Henning Storz and Bernhard Wilmes, "Die Reform des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts und das neue Einbürgerungsrecht", *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung* (May 2007), www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/dossier-migration-ALT/56483/einbuergerung?p=0.

[21] All images in this chapter are reproduced with the kind permission of filmmaker Moritz Siebert.

[22] Referred to as Fritz Liebl, which he was often called, below.

[23] See Statement of Dr. Liebl, *Fürsorge für uneheliche Mulattenkinder deutscher Väter 1905-1914, Lomé, 12.10.1910*, German Federal Archive Berlin R150/1170. Quotes are taken from pages 1-2.

[24] In the source material, both Kokoè's and Emanuel's names are spelt differently at times. I have used and will use the spelling which Gerson Liebl uses in his statements—unless, of course, it is part of a direct quote.

[25] See Statement of Kokoè's brother, *Fürsorge für uneheliche Mulattenkinder deutscher Väter*, 1.

[26] See *Concluding Statement of the Petitions Committee*, Berlin House of Representatives (November 2019).

[27] "Speech Dr. Heinrich Solf", *Reichstag Protocols*, Meeting 53, May 2nd, 1912, Berlin.

[28] See "Speech Dr. Heinrich Solf", *Mischlings- und Mischehenfrage: Diskussion eines Verordnungsentwurfs durch den Gouvernementsrat (Sitzungsniederschrift vom 18. Sept. 1912)*, German Federal Archive Berlin R150/412; *Rapport de Dr. Asmus sur le port de noms allemands par les enfants métis*, Archives Nationales du Togo (ANT) - FA3/185, 143-147.

[29] Mischlings- und Mischehenfrage, 2-3.

[30] Ibid.

[31] See *Rapport de Dr. Asmus sur le port de noms allemands*.

[32] *Bescheinigung der traditionellen Eheschließung zwischen Friedrich Karl Georg Liebl und Edith Kokoè Ajavon* (issued by chieftain Nana Quam-Dessou XIV of Aného/Togo on April 4th, 1997), private collection.

[33] About the entire paragraph and for a detailed account, see interviews with and articles about Gerson Liebl, such as: Bernhard Hübner interviewing Eckart Dietzfelbinger, „Das ist rassistisch", *taz* (February 2009), www.taz.de/Abschiebung-von-Gerson-Liebl/!5167547/; Susanne Mermarnia, "Gerson Liebl's letzter Trumpf", *taz* (May 2021), www.taz.de/Deutscher-Kolonialismus/!5592254/; "Schatten der Kolonialzeit," *DW* (November 2019), www.dw.com/de/schatten-der-kolonialzeit/av-51458018; Gerson Liebl's website: www.give-me-the-hand.de/Deutsch/Gerson/gerson.html; in addition, see *Concluding Statement of the Petition's Committee*, Berlin House of Representatives (2019).

[34] *Concluding Statement of the Petition's Committee*, German Parliament (2003), 24.

[35] *Concluding Statement of the Petition's Committee*, Berlin House of Representatives (2019), 5-6.

[36] See Assmann, *Formen des Vergessens*, 12-19.

[37] Regarding both terms, see Ibid, 36-38.

[38] See Ibid, 37-38.

[39] Assmann, 22-24.

[40] Paul Connerton, "Seven Types of Forgetting", *Memory Studies* 1, no. 1 (2008): 59-71, https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698007083889.

[41] See Assmann, *Formen des Vergessens*, 55-57.

[42] Oliver Dimbath, Katinka Meyer, and Anja Kinzler, "Einleitung und Überblick", in *Vergangene Vertrautheit: Soziale Gedächtnisse des Ankommens, Aufnehmens Und Abweisens*, ed. Oliver Dimbath, Katinka Meyer, and Anja Kinzler (Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag, 2019), 6.

[43] Andreas Eckert, "Postkoloniale Zeitgeschichte?" *Studies in Contemporary History*, no. 17/3 (2020), www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/3-2020/5881.

[44] Stuart Hall, *Europe's Other Self [1991]*, trans. Wilhelm Werthern, ed. Kölnischer Kunstverein (Köln: Verlag Walther and Franz König, 2005), 804.

[45] For more on the debate about the so-called "Gedenkweltmeisterei", see Alexandra Klei, Katrin Stoll, and Annika Wienert, "Der 8. Mai, ein staatlicher Feiertag? Kritische Anmerkungen zum Begriff der Befreiung im Kontext der deutschen Gedenkkultur", *Zeitgeschichte-Online* (May 2020), https://zeitgeschichte-online.de/themen/der-8-mai-ein-staatlicher-feiertag.

[46] Hito Steyerl, "Postkolonialismus und Biopolitik. Probleme der Übertragung postkolonialer Ansätze in den deutschen Kontext", in *Spricht die Subalterne deutsch?* ed. Hito Steyerl and Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez (Münster: Unrast Verlag, 2018), 41.

[47] See Félix-Eyoum and Wagner, "Das verdrängte Politikum".

[48] Apt to what we have established so far, othering as a term means that the mythical self-description gets expanded to include other social markers of difference (culture, religion, race, sexuality, etc.), which are intended to distinguish the 'other' from the ingroup as well as—and this is particularly important—from power. From the difference to othered individuals and groups, one's own identity is established. See Dimbath, Meyer, and Kinzler, "*Einleitung und Überblick*", 6-7. They refer to the thought of Stuart Hall, Edward Said, and Homi Bhabha.

[49] See Félix-Eyoum and Wagner, "Das verdrängte Politikum".

[50] See Michael Perraudin and Jürgen Zimmerer, "Introduction", in *German Colonialism and National Identity*, ed. Michael Perraudin and Jürgen Zimmerer (New York: Routledge Editorial, 2010), 1-6.

[51] Ernest Renan, "'Was ist eine Nation?' Lecture, given at Sorbonne 11 March 1882", *Was ist eine Nation? Und andere politische Schriften*, ed. Walter Euchner and Silvio Lanaro (Wien/Bozen: Folio Verlag, 1995), 44.

[52] See for example A Native of Aneho, "The Germans in Togoland. The Mixed Marriage Question", *The Gold Coast Leader* (January 1914); Quashie, "Gold Coast and German Togoland. Togo-Germans and Immoralism and its Effect on the Gold Coast", *The Gold Coast Leader* (July 1912).

III.

Methodologies

Self-Strengthening and Nation-Building in the Eurasian World: Transnational Dynamics of Japan, Germany, and Russia

By

Joseph Beaden

Abstract

A shorter historiographical essay, examining the ways 'space' might be employed as an analytical category for the study of the nineteenth century. Japan, Germany, and Russia are often seen as latecomers to the modern world (if they arrived at all), and as a consequence are labelled passive recipients of an essentially Atlantic modernity. 'Eurasia' as a spatial category has been discarded, as our understanding of space focuses overwhelmingly on connectivity and exchange over conflict and consciousness. This essay argues that, in the realms of economic self-strengthening and the construction of national identities, these polities represent a common 'Eurasian' modernity, distinct from Western and colonial forms. The argument roots itself in the novel concept of 'cognitive space': space defined not by connectivity, but by coincidences of cognition stemming from common circumstance.

About the author

Joseph Beaden works primarily on the history of nationhood and identity, with a particular focus on modern Korea and Japan. As a self-described global historian, he is always keen to explore comparative, big-picture history, and the possibilities of new cross-disciplinary methodologies.

In *The Transformation of the World*, Jürgen Osterhammel makes two claims that frame the position of the 'Eurasia' as connective space and analytical category. Commenting on the geographical spaces of the nineteenth century, he states: "The Eurasian age (…) began with Genghis Khan and ended sometime before 1800. For the nineteenth century, "Eurasia" is not a spatial category of prime importance".[1]

Reproducing this quote may seem decadent, but it serves to illustrate the position of Eurasia in current narratives of global history. Both Osterhammel and his contemporary, John Darwin, relegate the space between Central Europe and Korea to the status of seedy back-alley in comparison to the congested oceanic thoroughfares of the Atlantic and Pacific. Partitioned by empires, no longer containing that strength which through the Khans shook earth and heaven, 'Eurasia' became another European frontier. Links between its great states became primarily oceanic, underwritten by European sea-power and characterised by unequal treaties and Western European economic gravity.

The marginalisation of Eurasia is based on Osterhammel's conception of space as entirely physical, material, and active. Of the five kinds suggested by Osterhammel, spaces imprint themselves onto the populations within them by way of physical environment or connectivity.[2] Yet space cannot think for itself—it is made real only through human experience. The nineteenth century was a period of what David Harvey calls 'time-space compression', during which space became less significant in the lives of many.[3] To attempt to speak of active material spaces, then, increasingly loses significance or defaults to ordering the world as the periphery of a European-centred 'world-system'. This periphery exists mostly economically, and inevitably echoes into the cultural domain. It is defined by its subordinate status in relation to the centre. The advance of technology similarly rendered physical distance less significant in this ordering as imperial power increasingly penetrated even the most remote spaces.[4]

This does not make space less useful as an analytical concept, but suggests that new approaches are needed to avoid a purely economic, Eurocentric interpretation. To this end, this essay suggests *spaces of cognition* as an additional category of spatial analysis. These are spaces that, by the lived experiences of those within them and their relations to the world around them, and despite connectivity or lack of it, produce 'co-incidences' of similar worldview, ideology, and action. It is the contention of this essay that Eurasia continues to exist meaningfully in the nineteenth century as a cognitive space.

When analysing cognition, we are lucky to have one concept that dominates the study of thought, both everyday and intellectual, during the nineteenth century—*modernity*. What features defined this Eurasian modernity? To a degree, these were features common to all forms. Pericles Lewis notes three primary features of modernity in the English-speaking context: crisis of representation, crisis of liberalism, and crisis of reason.[5] The English-speaking world, with Britain at its hegemonic helm, experienced these as instances of moderated creation. The crisis of representation tackled life within industrial modernity, rewriting Britain's self-confidence as much as its anxiety. The crisis of liberalism saw the

franchise gradually extended—notably to women in 1918. The crisis of reason saw the world redefined in rationalist, Darwinian terms—'survival of the fittest' devoured any teleology. As the planet's apex predator, however, Britain had less to fear than others.

The opposite of moderated creation was uncontrolled destruction. This was most obvious in instances of 'colonial modernity', where the crises of modernity were twinned inexorably with the crushing experience of colonialism.[6] This analytical concept stemmed from a need to articulate informal European empire in East Asia, but has found applications in the study of Japanese colonialism in Korea, particularly by Gi-Wok Shin and Michael Robinson.[7] Nayoung Aimee Kwon takes this concept further, tackling the crisis of representation in Korean literature—a crisis made more acute by the need for representation to conform to imperial interests.[8] Across East Asia, modernity became tied to the immanent, often hostile 'West'. Colonial modernity saw all three crises become more acute in their psychological and social impact. Deprived of political agency, however, this condition did not enduringly impact the behaviour of states until later processes of decolonisation.

Modernity exists in myriadic different forms. Western modernity and colonial modernity are far from the only possibilities. Still, they serve to conveniently situate the subject of this paper. Eurasian modernity, then, sits between these two conditions. Its qualia include the mixed suspicion, adoration, and disavowal of the 'West' shared with colonised peoples, mixed with the cautious optimism of a rapidly industrialising state. Still possessing sovereignty, the crises of modernity manifested as political and strategic anxieties, often producing uncontrolled suspicion, conflict, and violence between Eurasian powers.

This essay traces these two strands to make the case for Eurasian modernity. Japan, Germany, and Russia experienced Eurasian modernity in different ways, reminiscent of their unique cultural, political, and historical circumstances. The life of the average citizen would have differed radically in each polity, but here lies the central argument of this paper: space is not determined solely by what it can *make*, but by what it can *make its inhabitants think*. In each case this paper tackles the crisis of representation as articulated by the ideological 'nation building' of intellectuals, and then the manifestation of this work at the international, strategic level. It argues that the writing of modernity onto space through international interaction, conflict, and strategic 'self-strengthening' recreated, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a meaningful Eurasian space.

Beginning with Germany, this paper addresses nation-building, economic hyper-modernity, and the subversion of liberal nationalism during unification. Its strategic participation in Eurasian space will be addressed via Germany's colonial experience in eastern Europe, and its political similarities to Russia. It will then move to Japan and discuss its successful industrialisation and entrance into Eurasian power politics through its defeat of Russia in 1905. Finally this essay will address Russia, its strategic competition with both Germany and Japan, and its attempts to find alternatives to Western modernity

through its conditional adoption of citizenship and nationality as political concepts. The pursuit by intellectuals of a 'Eurasian' identity beyond the national echoed efforts in Germany and Japan to construct distinct domestic nationalisms.

Like any good circus, this essay has a number of elephants in its room. The first is the overlap between 'Eurasia' as meaningful spatial category, and Eurasia as Russian ideological project, to be addressed in the section on Russia. Secondly, though central to any treatment of Eurasia, due to the failure of the Hundred Days' Reforms and its lack of sovereign agency during this period, China (like Korea) has reluctantly been treated as falling within the space of colonial modernity during this period, rather than Eurasia. Finally, the trio of states selected for this study may raise eyebrows. Eurasian modernity may be applied to a range of contexts in the nineteenth century and beyond: polities from Austria-Hungary to Qajar Persia experienced similar symptoms, and might be profitably analysed in the same way. Germany, Japan, and Russia were selected in this case to highlight the trilateral lattice of anxieties that bound the three states together.

Germany

In highlighting the distinctiveness of Germany's encounter with nationhood and modernity, this essay does not seek to reinvigorate the *Sonderweg*. This thesis, fallen out of fashion since the 1990s, characterises a broad sweep of scholarship that found the origins of the Nazi cataclysm in the *Kaiserreich*.[9] These works constructed narratives in which Germany deviated from the Western norm: its authoritarian government and the artificiality of its nationalism—both rendering Germany's nineteenth century nothing more than the skeleton of more monstrous futures.[10] Naturally we cannot see modernity as a linear movement toward a Western standard. We can, however, highlight aspects of the German experience that evidence commonality with Russia and Japan—an epidermis of nationalist hypermodernity concealing the ancient and tortured sinew of a multi-ethnic Eurasian empire. The aspirations of its liberals and conservatives were bent up together, feathering into myriad different ways of being 'modern' and 'German'.[11] In essence, the reaction of Germans to their rising status in a world of established hierarchies, the pursuit of alternative modernities to guide them, and the commonalities of this experience with others across Eurasia provide the basis for this comparison.

Germany, Geoff Eley argues, differed from the West in its excess of modernity. By the twentieth century the Atlantic world looked to Germany as the standard of success, through the productivity of its factories and the genius of its technology.[12] Joachim Radkau's argument that hypermodernity ushered in an 'age of nervousness', defined by economic, social, and existential anxieties, reflects this. In this paradigm Kaiser Wilhelm II became the symbol of a hypermodern Germany—reckless and paranoid, yet wielding vast economic and military might.[13] Wilhelm sat at the intersection of the 'encirclement' anxieties of Bismarck, and the crushing personal pressure of the urban capitalist routine. Germany's economic and political success was predicated on continued economic expansion, and the

navigation of an increasingly hostile diplomatic status quo.[14] As in Japan, demands for democracy ran up against an economic and militaristic paranoia in which both peace-time production and wartime violence became integral to a national project centred on preserving German modernity.[15]

One example of this consciousness was the *Werkbund*, a society of artists, architects, and designers intimately involved with artistic movements such as the Bauhaus school. Founded in 1907, it was promoted by writer Joseph August Lux as a way to concentrate German artistic ingenuity into the project of national self-strengthening.[16] Art, he argued, took on a moral imperative under modernity—to strengthen the 'cultural power' of German society, particularly by promoting bourgeois domesticity as the zenith of modern civilised life.[17] The links drawn between German production and national strength echoed the militaristic machismo of the discourse on 'German work' analysed by Sebastian Conrad. Driven by the increasingly central status of 'work' in regimented modern life, German society embraced the idea that German production was qualitatively different and superior—that work was essential to the strength of the nation.[18] This was not a view unique to Germany, yet it was backed by the force of real economic strength, and found far broader popular support than top-down modernisation efforts in Japan and Russia. 'German work' was reinforced by foreign reaction to it. In Britain, German competition was perceived as a genuine threat to British hegemony, a condition shared by Russia in central Asia.[19] This Darwinist paranoia is the first sign of a cognitive partition between Eurasian and Oceanic worlds: to imagine your neighbours as red in tooth and claw makes it easier to imagine them as other.

Economic nationalism coupled with practises of violent colonialism in eastern Europe, in cooperation and competition with Russia. Philip Ther argues that Germany, despite a majority German population, was shaped by its experience in Poland into building a multi-ethnic empire in the model of Russia or Austria. The reality of German empire was constructed in Central Europe, long before its brief flash of ambition in Africa and Asia.[20] Naturally this must be qualified. Germany was far less dependent on multi-ethnic cooperation than either Russia or Austria. Nevertheless, this colonial experience transcended the historical circumstances of Wilhelmine Germany, finding its origins in the strategic priorities of the pre-unification Prussian state, and its conclusion in the genocidal violence of the 1940s.[21] Despite its efforts to compete with the West in the arena of hypermodernity, Germany could not escape the logic of the space it occupied. Facing Russification from the east, and the anti-Catholic policies from the West, Poland was crushed within a shared lattice of violent assimilation.[22] The transition from Prussian to German empires was a marginal one, changing little about the political reality of the Prussian state. The new empire inherited its generally eastern-facing strategic outlook, its reluctance to embrace democratic institutions, and its autocratic militarism.[23]

Annemarie Sammartino deepens this perspective, analysing the Kaiserreich from the perspective of Russian historiography and highlighting a number of similarities. Both

Germany and Russia denied nationalisms and identities not supportive of imperial projects. The Prussian monarchy wrapped itself in German nationalist armour to silence and integrate other German identities. The *Kulturkampf*—the political campaign initiated by Bismarck to weaken the ties between German Catholics and the papacy—illustrated the effect of this mindset on southern Germany.[24] Indeed, the Prussian empire failed to fulfil the German nationalist aspirations it claimed to support. Hagen Schulze argued that, in creating a *Kleindeutschland* based around an autocratic Prussian monarchy, Bismarck's conquest had successfully sidelined nationalism in its liberal form.[25] Though he amends this argument to frame unification as a dialectical process by which Bismarck made concessions to liberals, the empire created bore little in common with the liberal visions expressed during 1848. Despite its hypermodernity, Germany's empire was an autocratic one, engaged with Russia in the dance of Eurasian imperial geopolitics. Frustrated in its ambition to challenge the maritime power balance, and thus distanced from the modernity of the Oceanic worlds, it had more in common with its eastern neighbour—the form and conduct of its politics, its complex semipermeable approach to the West—than with Britain or France.

By the 1870s this autocratic nature had met in concert with a shift of nationalism toward the right. Eric Hobsbawm argues that it was an emergent middle class, their fortunes closely tied to an industrialising national economy, that caused this shift. Their insecurities drove their embracement of anti-Semitic and xenophobic ideas, and as leftist movements came often to oppose the nation, the right began to gain a sole monopoly on nationalist rhetoric.[26] In Germany this saw what John Breuilly calls the 'national idea' being invoked to support greater centralisation within the new federal empire. This led national liberals to take up common cause with the autocratic monarchy—an illiberal position that led naturally to illiberal outcomes. The similarities between the German and Russian empires is what may have prompted John Darwin to group together the three powers of the *Dreikaiserbund* (Germany, Austria, and Russia) as the stuttering and reactionary shadow of Europe—inheriting only the most violent impulses of European imperialism.[27] This approach is of no more use than A.J.P. Taylor's diagnosis of an autocratic engine driving Germany towards pre-determined genocidal outcomes.[28] Germany was part of a cognitive Eurasian space—not shadowing Europe but responding to it—as well as a product of its own internal strategic logic. Its hypermodernity, its economic and militaristic nationalism, and its participation in patterns of multi-ethnic Eurasian empire reflect this. Germany's economics, politics, and imperialism were driven by its attempts to mediate Western modernity, whilst building an empire that could continue to compete in Eurasian power-politics. Spatial reality mediated not just materiality, but cognition.

Japan

Japan's first official encounter with the Prussian state came with the Eulenburg expedition of 1860. This expedition, though insignificant in itself, evidences Prussian interaction with Japan around this time. When attending the funeral of two murdered Russian soldiers, the delegates commented on the overwhelming number of Prussians at the

ceremony—a Prussian chaplain officiating, and a Prussian gunboat offshore.[29] This incident highlights the lived experience of Eurasian cognitive space. The Prussian state, by the presence of its delegates and its navy, sought to strengthen its relationships with Russia and Japan. Such interactions between Westerners in East Asia were not uncommon. The lives of foreign communities in China and Japan often bridged cultural and political boundaries. Still, the political implications of this mutual support in regards to such a diplomatically fraught issue should not be understated.

In the case of Japan, this cooperation continued in more practical ways. The leaders of Kishu domain, seeking to challenge the military advancement of the southern Daimyos, invited Carl Köppen, a Prussian military instructor, to reform their army.[30] Though Kishu domain sided with the Tokugawa, ending up on the wrong side of the Satsuma rebellion and subsequent Meiji restoration, its Prussian-style force was integrated into the new imperial army. Officers trained in Prussian doctrine challenged the dominance of British, Dutch, and French military ideas. By 1885, a second instructor, Klemens von Meckel, was hired to build on this work, supporting the Japanese victory against China in 1894.[31]

Japan's desire to build a modern military, and one based on a mixture of models, was a result of its forcible integration into the global trade economy following the Perry expedition of 1854. Conrad points out that for the new, modernising elite, 'The Reich constitution, which was seen as a 'third way' between absolutism and egalitarian democratisation, was used as a model for the Meiji constitution of 1889'.[32] Germany provided Japan an example for how a late-comer might hold their own in a European-dominated world. Japan thus became part of the Eurasian cognitive space. Comparing two land empires and an island archipelago may seem unusual, however, Japan quickly entered Eurasian power politics through its expansion into Korea and Manchuria. Additionally, as a cognitive space, Eurasia in the nineteenth century was not necessarily defined by its physical geography, but by the worldview imposed by forces within and without.

The first of these forces was the tidal influence of Western modernity. Between Japan's opening in 1854 and the Meiji restoration of 1868, the elites of Japan faced humiliation through unequal economic treaties, and the psychological effect of new strategic and existential anxieties.[33] At first, this manifested as an inexorable attraction toward the West. Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote of 'leaving Asia' to become a Western nation in 1885. For him, Asia was defined by its backwardness and its inability to provide answers to the problems of modernity. As the twentieth century arrived, however, Japanese intellectuals reevaluated their continental neighbours, seeing in Asia a source of strength and community. Okakura Tenshin, writing fifteen years later, saw the communitarianism of Confucian society as a counter to the individualistic materialism of Europe. For historians Tetsuo Najita and Harry Harootunian, this was Japan's 'revolt against the west'.[34] Japan was not alone in this enterprise. Intellectuals across Asia sought ways to understand their culture under the shadow of European colonialism. In these discussions, viewing itself as an Asian liberator, Japan took centre stage.[35] The aesthetic and communitarian values that

came to define this revolt were broadly grouped under the heading 'national body' or *kokutai*. The construction of this national body was not a coherent project, but a diffuse one. As Carol Gluck points out, the writers of ideology were spread throughout society—the 'fitful and inconsistent' project of a diverse elite.[36]

Within all these projects, however, we find an anxiety reflective of the German case. One Japanese writer commented on the adoption of days off on Sundays: 'Even if we cause the people to run day and night, we shall not overtake the West in less than a few decades. If such is the case, how much longer will it take if they waste a day each week?'.[37] This parallels the spread of 'nervousness' in the model of Radkau. The construction of the political nation was linked directly to the strengthening of its economy. The outcome was an anxiety that penetrated all arenas of economic life, transforming even the most mundane of activities into a scrambling battle for national survival.

The 'return to Asia', and the growing confidence to challenge Western norms, did not exist in a vacuum. The Russo-Japanese War was the first major military victory for an Asian power over a European one. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea—overturning a lattice of power shared with China and Russia.[38] Seiji Lippit identifies this confidence with 'Taisho cosmopolitanism', born of a new generation's seeming familiarity with an increasingly globalised world.[39] Where Harootunian sees a genuine opening to the world—a flowering beyond the siege mentality—Lippit sees the reinforcement of the illusion of the West. Its status as other is entrenched as its reality is transformed into a fantastical illusion.[40] As Japan came to grips with its own crisis of representation, its disavowal of, yet magnetic pull toward, the West reproduced itself as a permanent feature of Japanese modernity. Intellectually, Japan had been drawn into the Eurasian cognitive space.

This spatial move also took place at the strategic level. The annexation of Korea drew Japan intractably into a strategic logic of expansion—first Korea to better defend Japan, then Manchuria to better defend Korea. Korea had been secured with the defeat of Russia, an event that, Rotem Kowner argues, inaugurated Japan's entrance into Eurasian power politics.[41] In Germany, Wilhelm II became increasingly agitated at the idea of a 'yellow peril', commissioning a telling painting depicting Germania as the defender of Europe against Japanese expansion. Though functionally an attempt to draw the US into closer cooperation with Germany, the painting illustrated Wilhelm's personal anxieties.[42] Japan's victory was thus both confirmation and question. It affirmed the German belief that a kind of Darwinian aggression was central to strategic success, whilst prompting them to reassess the balance of power in Europe. Russia was now compromised by humiliating defeat, and increasingly clashed with Germany. Both ideologically and strategically, Japan was now an Eurasian nation.

Russia

Russia differs markedly from the first two victims of our comparison. The Russian empire did not experience hypermodernity, a unifying nationalist movement, or expend

undue effort ideologically uniting its subjects. Its experience of the Eurasian cognitive space was defined by relative passivity on the part of the Tsarist regime, and the strongest rejection of Western modernity on the part of non-state intellectuals.

Yanni Kotsonis treats Russian modernity in a way by now familiar—to remove it from the list of 'incomplete' modernities, to examine what was achieved in Russia's nineteenth century, and the relationship of the West to these changes.[43] A broad trend identified by Kotsonis and other authors is the gradual extension of citizenship and nationhood within the empire. The term *narodnost* had gradually matured into a general term for ethnicity or nation. Charles Steinwedel argues that in the 1880s and 1890s, this new concept was increasingly used to differentiate between peoples. Where previously religion and 'estate' had dominated imperial views of subject peoples, as opponents of the state began to spring from increasingly varied religious and economic backgrounds, ethnicity began to be employed as a more flexible category.[44] This was accompanied, under the reign of Alexander III, with the increasing association of the empire with Russian ethnicity.

This gradual shift, though not the economic hypermodernity of Japan and Germany, did inaugurate new kinds of citizenship and subsequent political rights, and with them the arrival of Eurasian modernity. Alexander Morrison argues that *narodnost* became the foundation for a Western-inspired, if vague, form of citizenship. Imperial subjects, particularly in Asia, gained access to local government through these forms, no longer bound by military rule.[45] Kotsonis sees these intellectual shifts as evidence that Russia shared a framework of modernity with the West.[46] The distance between Russian and Western concepts of citizenship and nationality, however, undermines this. Russian concepts of citizenship, however inspired by the West, served to reinforce Russia's own, illiberal modernity.

The idea of Russia as an overland extension of European imperialism goes hand-in-hand with the rejection of Eurasia as meaningful space. When we recognise Russia as the eastern frontier of colonial expansion, it becomes easier to reject any claims to the distinctiveness of a 'Eurasian civilisation'. As a concept, 'Eurasia' has recently returned to prominence through Russian intellectuals seeking to push a nationalist agenda centred on Russian exceptionalism.[47] John Darwin is quick to point out that, despite its ideological claims, Russia is as much a European empire as Britain or France. He presents Russian expansion as following the same patterns, driven by the same economic, cultural and security incentives.[48] We should not let our resistance to contemporary ideological projects twist our understanding, however. Though viewing Russia as the eastern arm of Europe elucidates much, it also silences those Russian intellectuals and statesmen that did view themselves as distinct from Europe.

In many cases, it was intellectuals outside of the Tsarist state, and opposed to it, who imagined Eurasia. Marlene Laruelle begins her history of Russian Eurasianism with these exiles—intellectuals who, having failed in the attempted revolution of 1905, sought new forms of personal and national identity.[49] Though this Eurasian movement would only truly

mature in the 1920s, it was not bound to the Russian state in the manner of its twenty-first century echoes. Matthew Schmidt is quick to point out that early Eurasianism was not necessarily coherent or politically engaged enough to become imperial ideology.[50] In some ways it thus resembles the cosmopolitan nationalisms of Germany and Japan—sidelined by the state, and subsumed when convenient.

The Eurasianists were also not the only group imagining transnational alternatives to Western modernity. Anarchism, an intellectual movement that grew to maturity in Russia, actively and violently opposed Western capitalism. Steven Marks sees anarchism as Russia's first true intellectual export. It was Russian thinkers who developed anarchism into a true programme of revolutionary action.[51] Anarchism was also essentially transnational—Russian thinkers travelled to support the revolutionary cause in Spain, Italy, and notably, Japan. Sho Konishi documents the emergence of this transnational 'anarchist modernity', developed by intellectuals in transit between the two countries. Notable among these thinkers was Lev Mechnikov, who saw the roots of Japan's modernisation in the ability of its workers to adopt technology and production techniques independent of state guidance.[52] Japan's restoration was an Asian revolution, and a middle path for Russia to follow. This conclusion obviously echoed the Japanese view of Germany's industrialisation—a middle ground preserving both culture and independence, whilst strengthening the nation. The exiles of 1905 built intellectual networks across Eurasian space, reaching both east and west. Though not supported by the state, they contributed as much to the creation of Eurasian cognitive space as state diplomacy.

Strategically, Russia formed the bridge between Germany and Japan—the military backbone of the Eurasian space. Alex Marshall's history of the Russian general staff highlights the sense of paranoia this created, with constant debates between Asian and European frontiers.[53] This was encirclement anxiety in the manner of Germany and Japan, and in turn informed the anxieties of both nations. Russia's eventual defeat by Japan led to a broad withdrawal from Asia, but for the majority of the period, Russia participated in strategic contests with both, helping to push the boundaries of cognitive space into reality. Though it shared strategic concerns, the Tsarist regime was unable to mobilise society toward military ends to the same degree as Germany and Japan—evidenced by its defeat in 1917.

Conclusion

Eurasia, as a spatial category, was made not by cooperation, connectivity, or geography, but by the shared mindsets of those within it. This paper has attempted to present space not just as a physical category, but as a set of circumstances and resulting anxieties that inform the decisions of historical actors. This was a process of interaction, but also of co-incidence. Eurasian modernity, the condition between Western hegemony and colonial subjugation, was an experience created by the intellectual and economic pressures of industrialisation, and strategic pressures of competing in a continuous geographic space surrounded by maritime empires. In Germany and Japan, this manifested as radical anti-

Western nationalism, facilitated by the social and strategic opportunities of rapid industrialisation. Even in Russia, where industrialisation was slower, strategic competition drove attempts to articulate unique forms of identity and modernity. Eurasia was no longer the trade highway of the early modern period, but for the nineteenth century it remains a useful spatial category by which to analyse the empires within it.

Moving forward, this re-conceptualisation of space presents possibilities for further inquiry. Several additional concepts might be introduced to strengthen the link between the intellectual and physical worlds. Duncan Bell's concept of 'mythscape' provides the ground on which forms of identity might be related more explicitly to 'cognitive space'.[54] The mathematical concept of 'state-space' might allow a more comprehensive mapping of historical forms of identity, and how those identities impinge on the more material aspects of history. When the divisions between concepts, times, and places are blurred—as in the Eurasian cases presented in this paper—a more holistic, more global history might be constructed.

Notes

[1] Jürgen Osterhammel and Patrick Camiller, T*he Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 104.

[2] Osterhammel and Camiller, T*he Transformation of the World*, 94.

[3] David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Wiley, 1990), 10.

[4] Stephen Halsey, "Sovereignty, Self-strengthening, and Steamships in Late Imperial China," *Journal of Asian History* 48, no.1 (2014): 84, https://doi.org/10.13173/jasiahist.48.1.0081.

[5] Pericles Lewis, *The Cambridge Introduction to Modernism*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3.

[6] Tani Barlow, "Debates over colonial modernity in east Asia and another alternative," *Cultural Studies* 26, no. 5 (2012): 618, https://doi.org/10.1080/09502386.2012.711006.

[7] Gi-Wok Shin and Michael Edson Robinson, *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 5.

[8] Nayoung Aimee Kwon, *Intimate Empire: Collaboration and Colonial Modernity in Korea and Japan* (Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 14.

[9] Matthew Jefferies, *Contesting the German Empire, 1871-1918* (Oxford: Wiley, 2008), 48.

[10] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Course of German History* (London: Butler and Tanner, 1962) is a good example drawing a causal narrative directly from the eighteenth century to the rise of Hitler.

[11] John Breuilly, *The State of Germany: The National Idea in the Making, Unmaking and Remaking of a Modern Nation-state* (London: Longman, 1992), 13.

[12] Geoff Eley, Jennifer Jenkins, and Tracie Matysik, *German Modernities from Wilhelm to Weimar: A Contest of Futures* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 66.

[13] Jefferies, *Contesting the German Empire*, 181.

[14] Shigeki Sato, *The Politics of Nationhood in Germany and Japan* (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1998), 4.

[15] Helmut Walser Smith, *The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 11.

[16] Eley, *German Modernities*, 65.

[17] Jennifer Jenkins, "Introduction: Domesticity, Design and the Shaping of the Social," *German History* 25, no. 4 (2007): 465, https://doi.org/10.1177/0266355407082760.

[18] Sebastian Conrad and Sorcha O'Hagan, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 74.

[19] Conrad and O'Hagan, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, 44.

[20] Jefferies, C*ontesting the German Empire*, 171.

[21] Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander M. Martin, *Fascination and Enmity: Russia and Germany as Entangled Histories, 1914-1945* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 229.

[22] Conrad and O'Hagan, *Globalisation and the Nation*, 387.

[23] Annemarie Sammartino, "Alternative Modernities: Imperial Germany through the Lens of Russia," in Eley, *German Modernities*, 86.

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IV.

Museum Reviews

Global History in Berlin Global

Reviewed by

Phoebe Ka Laam Ng

About the author

Phoebe Ka Laam Ng, coming from Hong Kong, is currently a third-semester Global History MA student at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. With the aspiration of becoming a museum curator, her research interests lie primarily in East Asian Studies, Buddhism and Art History.

After years of reconstruction and continuous delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the former Berlin Palace was finally opened to the public as the Humboldt Forum on July 20th, 2021. Located on Schlossplatz in Berlin Mitte and consisting of the Ethnological Museum and the Museum of Asian Art, the museum complex aims to provide an immersive and innovative cultural experience by hosting various art and historical exhibitions and cultural events. However, such an ambitious goal has also brought heated controversy on the restitution of colonial artwork. Part of the museum collection contains artwork and artefacts allegedly looted from Africa and Asia during the German colonial period. In the era of postcolonialism, the public is aware of the controversy of displaying the stolen colonial pieces in the former colonisers' museums. Discussions in the cultural industry have advocated for returning such stolen goods to their places of origin. Meanwhile, museums argue that the items were purchased and obtained legally during the colonial era, and that their significant investment into the long-term maintenance of the pieces should be taken into consideration. As compensation, the European museums then suggest provenance research on the colonial objects, which is tracing the object's origin and trade history. By presenting the research outcome, the museums would thus address the colonialism question in the collection.

The official opening of the Humboldt Forum has been shaded by art historians and activists' criticisms of its failure to conduct restitution or provenance research of the controversial items. Bénédicte Savoy, a renowned French art historian and a former member of the Humboldt Forum panel, left the board because of the lack of progress in the provenance research. She argued "no Humboldt Forum or ethnological museum should open," as the public has to know "how much blood is dripping from a work of art".[1] For us global historians, we are eager to see how the museum responds to such strong criticisms and acknowledges the issue of colonialism in the exhibitions.

One of the Humboldt Forum's official opening highlights is its first permanent exhibition –*Berlin Global*.[2] The exhibition presents how Berlin, as a city, is connected to and influenced by the world regarding the past, present, and future. However, the curators faced many challenges in constructing the exhibit. In attempting to curate global history in Berlin, issues of colonialism and Eurocentrism are critical to address—similar to the writing of global history itself. In addition, as the first permanent exhibition of the Humboldt Forum, the curators had to deal with the public criticisms of the museum's controversial collections. Therefore, the current display attempts to not only connect Berlin's history and cultural scenes to the world, but also to fairly address and respond to challenges posed by the development of postcolonialism and globalism in narratives of Berlin. To address whether the museum expresses globalism through the lens of Berlin successfully, this review goes through the strengths and weaknesses of this exhibition. In so doing, it will evaluate whether the narration manages to describe the mutual significance of Berlin and the world - how Berlin's development has shaken the world and how the world has influenced Berlin's growth.

Highlights and Achievements

The 4,000-square-metre exhibit space is divided into a reception room named *Thinking the World*, an introductory area called *Berlin Images*, and then followed by seven main rooms with individual themes –*Revolution*, *Free Space*, *Boundaries Entertainment*, *War*, *Fashion* and *Interconnection*. The spaces are designed with a wide variety of immersive installations and rich in a dynamic presentation of perspectives from residents, experts, artists, initiatives and associations in Berlin. Such diversity shows the city's close connection with the world through its people and culture.

The first highlight in this exhibition is the extensive use of innovative technology, which encourages visitors' active participation throughout their visit. At the exhibition entrance, visitors are given a chipped wristband. They can activate it and choose their language preference using the check-in monitors in the reception room, called *Thinking the World*. This wristband helps visitors explore different interactive installations around the exhibition space and works as a personal tour guide. The wristband is also essential in the exhibition's voting feature. When visitors explore the themed main rooms, they can use the device to vote in different scenarios, such as their personal preference for participation in social movements, and play various mini-games throughout the tour. In addition, two portals are set up as voting entrances between the main rooms. There are two contrasting statements written separately on top of the portals, and visitors have to make a choice when crossing the rooms, where the wristband records their choices. At the end of the tour, the *Lounge* is where visitors can use the check-out machines to return the smart devices and print out their personalised tickets. They can check the voting results on the machines by comparing their choices and what others have voted for in the exhibition. A summary of the visitor's choices is also printed out on the ticket.

Apart from the interaction with visitors, the element of active participation can also be seen in creating this exhibition, which celebrates ethnic and cultural diversity by mobilising individuals and institutions related to Berlin. Through interviews and artwork creations, residents, artists, and associations from Berlin are invited to contribute to this exhibition. The *Free Space* showroom leaves visitors with a strong impression of freedom in Berlin by depicting the diverse cultural scenes. Apart from the detailed reconstruction of *Potse-Drugstore* as the social centre for youth in Berlin, the hand-painted murals created by the exhibition curators also help explain Berlin's histories of subculture, religion, gender, and art in a clear, fun, and impressive way. To reflect on the potential threat of surveillance to Berlin's freedom in the future, the curators also cooperated with Berlin-based artists to create a sculptural centrepiece in the room. A giant human head painted in grey with a screen in hand uses different surveillance devices to spy on every part of the city. Another eye-catching collaboration is in the space of *Fashion*, where students from Berlin's School of Fashion participated in constructing and displaying different Berliners' daily outfits. On a global scale, the exhibition also invited New York graffiti artists *How&Nosm* to conceptualise and address the global issue of colonialism and cultural appropriation through an enormous four-wall mural in the *Thinking of the World* –the first space where visitors

enter. The exhibition succeeds in encouraging everyone's active participation and celebrating cultural diversity through its interactive installations and a wide range of collaborations.

To be Expected...

With the name Berlin Global, it is expected that this exhibition would have a balanced layout to discuss the mutual influence on cultural development between the international world and Berlin. However, the curation team extensively focused on how incidents in Berlin affected the world, and left out how international cultures changed Berlin. The parts that included foreigners, migrants, and refugees were the spaces of *Entertainment*, *War* and *Interconnection*, where their stories and interviews are featured in written texts, voice recordings, and videos. Still, the forms of presentation, such as written stories of refugees' experiences and interview videos about racial inequalities, lacks active engagement and overlooks other ethnic minorities' significant role in building Berlin as an international city. For example, Turkish, African, and Asian individuals not only contribute heavily to the famous multicultural scenes in Berlin, but also shape today's city landscape. Turkish, African, and Asian supermarkets and different religious centres like Jewish synagogues, Islamic mosques, and Buddhist temples can be easily found around the city. In the room of *Interconnection*, the representation of these prominent minorities' influences on Berlin's city development is expected. To highlight the globalism in Berlin, the exhibition should make good use of the remaining *Open Spaces* (three empty areas in blue and open for public-initiated projects to be featured) or rearrange the current exhibition rooms, so as to make sure the active contribution of ethnic minorities to the city's growth can be seen too.

Meanwhile, in regard to the recent controversy over the restitution of the Humboldt Forum's colonial collections, a response to such debate is expected in the museum's first permanent exhibition. Contrastingly, the discussion on colonialism in Berlin is rather limited in *Berlin Global*. Some items shown are related to German colonialism, but there is not much explanation on how colonialism influenced German and world history and the city planning of Berlin, such as street names and colonialist statues. Only a warning sign about racism, which acknowledges the danger of triggering images and terms of racism in the interview video, exists in the *Entertainment* space. Since the exhibition stresses the significance of Berlin's connection with the world, it is expected that the curating team would address the colonial controversies within Berlin and the Humboldt Forum. To improve the awareness of colonial history, curators may consider adding more educational signs next to the colonialism-related items to provide more background information. They could utilise one of the remaining *Open Spaces* to discuss the colonial history of the German Empire that affects today's Berlin.

In conclusion, the Humboldt Forum's first permanent exhibition, *Berlin Global*, successfully tells the story of Berlin through innovative technology and Berliners' active collaborative participation. However, the linkage of Berlin and the world is relatively weak, as the narratives mainly focus on how Berlin's socio-political incidents and cultures

influenced the world. The exhibition is quite conservative in addressing the heated public discussions on German colonial history. From a global historical perspective, the narration is Eurocentric and lacks the representation of ethnic minorities who have been contributing to Berlin. With the few remaining *Open Spaces* in the exhibition area, future improvements on raising the awareness of postcolonialism, Eurocentrism, and ethnic diversity in the exhibition narration are anticipated.

Notes

[1] Philipp Jedicke, "Berlin's Humboldt Forum launches with unanswered questions", *Deutsche Welle*, December 16, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/berlin-humboldt-forum-controversy-colonial-art-africa/a-55943819.

[2] The visit to this exhibition took place on August 8th 2021. The Ethnological Museum and the Museum of Asian Art, which are part of the Humboldt Forum and contain controversial colonial objects, were open from September 23rd 2021. However, the current condition may still be subject to change.

V.

Book Reviews

James Mark, Bogdan C Iacob, Tobias Rupprecht, and Ljubica Spaskovska. *1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe*. New Approaches to European History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. vii, 372.

Reviewed by

George Payne

Once hailed as the high-point of Western-inspired free-market liberal democracy, the so-called 'End of History', 1989, seems all the more hollow with the passing of time.[1] The images of popular rejoicing at the fall of the Berlin Wall have been replaced with populist disillusion. Fukuyama's liberal democratic *Weltgeist* is encountering significant headwinds three decades later. Communism remains the self-professed ideology of the world's emerging superpower China. Theocracies and dictatorships are growing in number. Promises of economic prosperity under capitalism were not realised for many on the periphery or semi-periphery. Nor did the end of the Cold War translate into peace. What had been understood as a liberal moment was followed by distinctly illiberal outcomes, inside and outside of Eastern Europe. This was not how the 'dominant liberal script' was supposed to play out.[2]

These new political realities have informed a recent contribution to Cambridge University Press's *New Approaches to European History* series timed to coincide with the thirtieth anniversary of the 1989 revolutions. Co-written by four current and former University of Exeter academics, *1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe* demonstrates what collaborative writing and research can achieve.[3] Regional specialisations from James Mark (Central Europe), Bogdan C Iacob (Eastern Europe), Tobias Rupprecht (Soviet Union and Latin America), and Ljubica Spaskovska (Yugoslavia), allow for a truly transnational and comparative analysis of a region never explicitly defined, but taken to mean former socialist states. That includes Russia and the Balkans, but excludes Finland and potential candidates in the Caucasus region. The six chapters entitled Globalisation, Democratisation, Europeanisation, Self-Determination, Reverberations, and A World Without '1989', reflect the 'global turn' in history, itself the product of post-colonial and decolonial approaches.

The introduction begins with a reappraisal of the familiar vision of 1989 propagated by the likes of French historian François Furet and German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. They saw the end of the Eastern bloc as the 'passing of an illusion' and a 'catching-up revolution', in which the semi-peripheral and isolated eastern half of the continent returned to Western Europe.[4] What emerges in their place is a rich, nuanced, and compelling re-casting of the collapse of state socialism as the culmination of a long-running debate over Eastern Europe's centuries-old 'in-betweenness'.[5] 'Transitional elites', a term frequently used by populists of the present, are the key actors in this story, makers of their own future and active participants in shaping the world.[6]

While the events of that year appeared to confirm a particular Western form of globalisation, the book brings to life forgotten alternative or socialist globalisations, a nod to a methodology informed by the 'global'. A focus on East-South connections is part of a growing trend and highlights a promising field of enquiry.[7] Such links, forged out of anti-imperialist solidarity with newly de-colonised states, came under pressure from crises in the global economy from the 1970s onwards. Eastern European elites, interacting with global ideas on governance during the Cold War and struggling to manage a foreign debt

crisis, gradually dropped socialist internationalism in favour of a Western mode of development: small-state, market economy, and democratic.

The democratic path was taken up late in the day, as the book reminds us. Removing the Communist party from power was not seen as politically feasible at the time. An authoritarian capitalist path lay in the realm of the possible. Consequently, modernising dictatorships in Latin America and East Asia were more relevant comparisons for Eastern European one-party states on the periphery of the global economy than Thatcherism or Reaganomics. Hungary's 'Korea Boys' looked to Seoul's military rule.[8] 'Formula Pinochet', named after the Chilean dictator, was admired in Poland and Russia both before and after the transition.[9] Case studies like these add nuance to the claim that there is a natural bond between democratisation and marketisation and feed into ongoing research into the global history of neoliberalism from the likes of Dieter Plehwe and Quinn Slobodian.[10] Only when dictatorship was perceived as an obstacle did democratisation come to the fore. Even after 1989, however, Western advisors, long accused of imposing neoliberal reforms, were used as political 'cover' by enthusiastic neoliberal reformers who remained apathetic towards democracy.[11]

Chapters Three and Six elaborate on how Eastern Europe's negotiated transition was instrumentalised by the West to usher in the 'winds of change' on a global scale.[12] In the 1990s, dictators were toppled, particularly in Africa. Western-dominated institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank pointed to Eastern Europe when constructing 'conditionality'.[13] The radical left felt the effects too. The collapse of Soviet-style communism was the impetus for an 'accommodation' with the capitalist world order.[14] The 'transition paradigm', rightly criticised in these pages as elite, out of date, and un-democratic, meant the path of violent revolution was dropped in favour of roundtable transformations.[15] Elsewhere, the authors trace a line from the collapse of state socialism to liberal interventionism in the Middle East or, more credibly given their shared history, the Colour Revolutions of the 2000s in the former Soviet sphere.

The questionable aftermath of these world-making projects and the financial crisis of 2008 provoked an identity crisis among regional elites. This sentiment was fed by a bitterness at not being accepted as 'full Europeans' by the West, particularly in immigration debates.[16] Early supporters of the liberal script, like Viktor Orbán, started to turn against the liberal aspects of Western globalisation.[17] Nationalists in Poland and Czechoslovakia, who saw the end of state socialism as another 'end of empire' story in the struggle for self-determination from 'Soviet colonisation', had a particular vision of a common civilisation space: Christian or Fortress Europe.[18] In the same stroke, if not somewhat paradoxically, elites pivoted away from the 'return to Europe' and rekindled old ties with Russia or the South. The rise of China and its blend of authoritarianism and capitalism was used to teach a different lesson: 'the European model had failed'.[19] The dynamism of the Baltic States, poster children of liberal reformers, was conveniently forgotten in this narrative. Estonian elites, enamoured by a 'Hungarian model', enthusiastically opened up to the global

economy after 1989 and reaped the rewards: European Union accession and NATO membership.[20]

While Eastern Europe remains allied to the West for the time being, it is searching for alternatives. This process is again led by elites, some of whom openly embraced the liberal script. They feel shunned by the superior attitude of Western counterparts, captured in the enduring words and 'illusions' of Habermas and Furet, and are looking anew at forgotten links and traditions. That description of the intellectual history of Eastern Europe would correspond with the book's narrative that this 'swing region' has been shaped by its global interconnectedness and in-betweenness.[21] The same cannot be said for geopolitical in-betweenness, trapped between Russia and Western Europe, a position which is in the long-run unsustainable, then as now.

While the historical contingency of a blow-by-blow account of the events of 1989 is lost in the narrative of a 'long revolution' guided by elites, the main argument of the book is convincing and returns agency to a region too often portrayed as passive.[22] Its title and cover, which features graffiti of a Trabant breaking through the Berlin Wall, are misleading in so far as their purpose is to relativise the 1989 moment. To what extent this was the choice of the publisher or the authors is unclear. Reinforcing of the argument and crossover between themes occasionally strays into repetitiveness. The final chapter looks to the future, but the text still lacks an overall concluding statement. Still, the sections are well-structured with copious footnotes. Researchers should pay attention to the archives and primary sources listed in the bibliography. The book ends on an ambiguous note: the liberal interpretation of 1989 is under threat, but is still a 'mobilising symbol' not yet forgotten by the peoples of Eastern Europe.[23]

Notes

1 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *The National Interest* 16 (1989).

2 James Mark, Bogdan C Iacob, Tobias Rupprecht, and Ljubica Spaskovska, *1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe*, New Approaches to European History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 3.

3 The book was also the product of a research project with ties to the University of Exeter: "1989 After 1989: Rethinking the Fall of State Socialism in Global Perspective", https://1989after1989.exeter.ac.uk/.

4 François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Jürgen Habermas, *Die Nachholende Revolution*, Edition Suhrkamp 1633 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990).

5 Mark et al., *1989*, 8.

6 Mark et al., *1989*, 12.

7 One of the authors has helped set the terms of the new debate: James Mark, Artemy M. Kalinovsky

and Steffi Marung, eds., *Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2020).

[8] Mark et al., *1989*, 71.

[9] Mark et al., *1989*, 119; for a more detailed history, see Tobias Rupprecht, "Formula Pinochet: Chilean Lessons for Russian Liberal Reformers During the Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000", *Journal of Contemporary History* 51, no. 1 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009415585891.

[10] Dieter Plehwe and Quinn Slobodian, eds., *Market Civilizations: Neoliberals East and South, Near Future Series* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2022).

[11] Mark et al., *1989*, 15.

[12] Mark et al., *1989*, 6.

[13] Mark et al., *1989*, 226.

[14] Mark et al., *1989*, 231.

[15] Mark et al., *1989*, 91.

[16] Mark et al., *1989*, 282.

[17] Mark et al., *1989*, 265.

[18] Mark et al., *1989*, 19–141.

[19] Mark et al., *1989*, 22.

[20] Mark et al., *1989*, 81–193.

[21] Mark et al., *1989*, 8.

[22] Mark et al., *1989*, 11.

[23] Mark et al., *1989*, 267.

Colonial Fantasies, Imperial Realities: Race Science and the Making of Polishness on the Fringes of the German Empire, 1840–1920. By Lenny A. Ureña Valerio. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2019. Hardcover: $34.95. Pp. 320. ISBN: 978-0-8214-2453-7.

Reviewed by

Adam Dargiewicz

In recent years the application of post-colonial perspectives has facilitated new analytical opportunities within the history of Central-Eastern Europe. By implication, scholars have increasingly turned their attention towards aspects such as space, race, social engineering, and public health, which shaped the societal arrangements and national identities in the region. The case of partitioned Poland is one notable example. The existing literature emphasized the fact that the attitudes of the partitioning powers (especially the German Empire and Russian Empire/Soviet Union) towards the Polish population (i.e. systemic Germanization or Russification) displayed strong resemblance to the coercive means embraced in overseas colonies.[1] Against this background, the work of Lenny A. Ureña Valerio, titled *Colonial Fantasies, Imperial Realities: Race Science and the Making of Polishness on the Fringes of the German Empire, 1840–1920*, makes a noteworthy contribution to the blossoming subject of colonial imaginaries within the field of Polish Studies.

Right from the outset, the work strives to considerably rearrange the academic debate by pointing towards the gap in the historical literature: "If the colonial question is ever addressed in historiography, especially in the context of the German Empire, it is mostly done to show how Poles were being colonized in Europe, without questioning how invested they were in colonial projects".[2] What the author intends to stress is the fact that the subjugation to the increasingly racialized German and Russian discourses tells only a part of the story, as Poles also developed their own vision of colonial ideas and practices. In this sense, they were "both *objects* and *subjects* of colonial agendas".[3] In order to gain a more accurate grasp of the Polish responses to the proliferated colonial discourse, Valerio investigates the way in which Poles positioned themselves in relation to Germans and local populations in Africa and Brazil. To that end, Valerio explores the transfer of scientific ideas, narratives, and the evolution of identities which occurred in the process of migration or colonization. Informed by cultural and post-structural studies, the analysis intends to capture the dynamics behind the constant making of the self in relation to symbolic and imaginary orders.[4] *Colonial Fantasies, Imperial Realities* combines the primary evidence containing the direct and intimate experience of historical actors (scientists, explorers, politicians) with notable pieces of popular culture, such as travel novels, that exercised a profound influence over the development of colonial imaginaries.

The analysis begins with an extensive scrutiny of the political and public health conditions of the Prussian part of Poland. Chapters One and Two uncover the German intellectual and scientific languages which were utilised to construct "Polish otherness". Most notably, the reoccurring instances of typhus during the 1850s encouraged the assumptions that eastern provinces "were the natural, endemic places of the illness".[5] "Germ theory", which was formulated by German scientists, was a significant tool for relating disease and race even before Germany became an overseas colonial power. What these two chapters effectively demonstrate is the shift from considering the Polish population from the perspective of "cultural otherness" (formulated already in the late

Enlightenment) into a "biopolitical threat" which was facilitated by the scientific language of the mid-nineteenth century.

The third chapter primarily addresses the implications of the German colonial expansion for German-Polish relations by investigating how the German East and overseas colonies became embedded in the same political imaginary. Essentially, this part of the analysis seeks to present the critical Polish opinion of the means and strategies employed by the German colonial authorities. Moreover, the editors of such journals as *Dziennik Poznański* strove to emotionally relate to the situation of the native populations by stressing the longevity of the German oppression in Eastern Europe. However, as the author indicates in Chapter Four, the lack of political and cultural sovereignty as well as the vocal criticism of German imperialism did not make Poles immune to the lust for expansion or the exclusionary elements embedded in the colonial discourse. Accordingly, the Polish subjectivity was shaped by the undertaken exploratory expeditions (the most significant one was organized by Stefan Szolc-Rogoziński to Cameroon in 1884) and the set of discursive tools such as travel novels, which resonated with the public opinion. Most importantly, Valerio devotes significant attention to the work of a renowned Polish nineteenth century writer, Henryk Sienkiewicz, in his work entitled *In Desert and Wilderness*. In her view, the popular story about the adventures of Polish teenagers in Africa during the Mahdi uprising shows how Poles were approaching African otherness from their own colonial and national anxieties.[6] The last chapter touches upon the Polish migration to Brazil and the establishment of Polish settlements starting from the 1870s. Valerio approaches this phenomenon as the nexus of policies instigated by the Brazilian government and the Polish colonial imaginary that emerged in the German part of Poland. Essentially, the change of a geographical destination resulted in a considerable shift in the position of Poles within the societal hierarchy: "after being treated as 'inferior' citizens of the German Empire they settled in a place which praised them for their European industriousness and racial worthiness".[7]

While bringing different strains of analysis together in the conclusion, Valerio asserts strong parallels to the ways in which German scientific and political discourses perceived eastern borderlands and African colonies. The necessity of preventing contagious diseases served as justification for establishing segregationist methods on the institutional level (health stations in Prussian Poland, sleeping-sickness camps in German Africa). At the same time, she stresses the fact that Poles were not "passive receptors" of colonial ideas by pointing to the engagement of Polish physicians and nationalists in competing colonial projects.

There are several aspects in *Colonial Fantasies, Imperial Realities* which constitute valuable contributions to postcolonial inquiries into the nineteenth century history of Poland and Germany. Firstly, the lack of sovereign state did not prevent Poles from participating in the broader discussion about European expansion, as there were still ideas which effectively shaped the public discourse and individuals who actively pursued a colonial agenda. Secondly, by connecting the perspectives of the Poznań province, German

Africa, and Polish colonies in Brazil, the author manages to sketch the history of globalized German-Polish relations which were not solely limited to the borders of the partitioned Poland. The mutual scientific interactions as well as political animosities between the two nations played out in varying geographical and cultural contexts. By implication, this research should be considered as an example of an "entangled history" which moves beyond the fixed borders of nation-states and focuses not only on the transnational mobility of individuals and groups, but also ideas.

Finally, Valerio introduces an interesting perspective of a subaltern group which effectively overcame its "inferiority" by becoming a part of different colonial projects. While discussing the increasing presence of Polish peasants in Brazil, the author strives to portray the "migration process as an example and product of global colonialism in the second half of the nineteenth century".[8] To prove this statement the author focuses on the discourse that transformed Polish peasants into "colonial pioneers". However, one should not also ignore the economic motivations that stood behind the migration of the lower social classes which have been stressed by Polish historiography.[9] More attention could have been ascribed by Valerio to the extent to which historical actors felt empowered by the colonial ideas to go overseas by exploring the sources corroborated by the Polish peasants. Similarly, the image of Brazil in the writings and plans of Polish nationalists is acknowledged but not extensively elaborated.[10] Finally, Polish emigrants in Brazil came not only from the German partition, but also from the Russian and Austro-Hungarian parts of Poland. By implication, there is a clear limitation to the claim about the overarching transfer of ideas between German and Polish discourses, as the Polish imaginary was scattered and subjugated to multiple intellectual and political influences.

Colonial Fantasies, Imperial Realities deserves academic recognition for capturing the connection between science and race in the Central-Eastern European contexts. This certainly contributes to the overarching discussion about the origin and transfer of colonial practices from Europe to the rest of the world. When it comes to the Polish colonial imaginaries, it is praiseworthy that the author referred to a large number of Polish sources, even if the perspective of some historical actors requires further elaboration. In essence, this study effectively uncovers a novel analytical avenue which will be hopefully pursued by scholars in the upcoming years.

Notes

[1] For instance see Ewa Thompson, "It is Colonialism After All: Epistemological Remarks", *Teksty Drugie* 1 (2014), 67-81, https://rcin.org.pl/Content/51834/WA248_71045_P-I-2524_thompson-it-is.pdf.

[2] Lenny A. Ureña Valerio, *Colonial Fantasies, Imperial Realities: Race Science and the Making of Polishness on the Fringes of the German Empire, 1840-1920* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2019), 117.

[3] Valerio, *Colonial Fantasies, Imperial Realities*, 6.

[4] Ibid, 7.

[5] Valerio, *Colonial Fantasies, Imperial Realities*, 27.

[6] Ibid, 136.

[7] Ibid, 171.

[8] Valerio, *Colonial Fantasies, Imperial Realities*, 149.

[9] Henryk Siewierski, "Emigracja, kolonizacja, antropofagia w kontekście 'gorączki brazylijskiej'", *Konteksty Kultury* 16, no. 2 (2019): 389, https://www.ejournals.eu/Konteksty_Kultury/2019/Tom-16-zeszyt-3/art/16208.

[10] This topic is scrutinized by Michał Starczewski, "Mrzonki racjonalnej kolonizacji w duchu narodowym. Roman Dmowski i polska emigracja do Brazylii," *Przegląd Humanistyczny* 449, no. 2 (2015): 63-74, https://depot.ceon.pl/handle/123456789/8181.

Ten Days in Harlem: Fidel Castro and the Making of the 1960s. By Simon Hall. London: Faber & Faber, 2020. Hardcover: £17.99. Pp. 276. ISBN: 9780571353064.

Reviewed by

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While US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, on 22 September 1960, hosted a luxurious lunch for the heads of eighteen Latin American delegations to the United Nations (UN) in Manhattan's Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, the Cuban prime minister Fidel Castro treated twelve employees of the Theresa Hotel in Harlem "to steaks and a round of beers in the hotel's downstairs coffee shop". The *Máximo Líder*, who in a calculated but strikingly counterproductive move had not been invited by the White House to join the high-ranking inter-American gathering, amusingly declared that "we are going to take it easy, we wish them a good appetite" and added that he felt "honoured to lunch with the poor and humble people of Harlem".[1] *Revolución*, the official newspaper-mouthpiece of Cuba's young revolutionary government, added insult to injury by publishing front-page photos of the two quite different luncheons, stating that whilst "the shark and the sardines eat together" their premier had regarded it as an "honour to eat with the humble".[2]

This staggering retort was one of many brilliant PR coups during Castro's week and a half sojourn in New York in September 1960. The then 34-year-old former *guerillero* used the opening of the fifteenth UN General Assembly to establish revolutionary Cuba on the world stage at a time of rapidly deteriorating relations between Washington and Havana to rhetorically attack the "Yankee Imperialists" from inside their very heart.

Simon Hall, Professor of Modern History at the University of Leeds, captures this spectacular moment in time with his latest book, *Ten Days in Harlem: Fidel Castro and the Making of the 1960s*,[3] a highly fascinating and lively popular history account of the *Máximo Líder's* eventful stint in the unofficial centre of capitalism. The British historian, who with *1956: The World in Revolt* had already written an event-based book, convincingly depicts the visit as a catalytic event which provided a meaningful insight into things to come, and which would echo throughout various global conflicts of the 1960s.

Hall begins his 227 pages by outlining the tremendous mixture of challenges at the turn of the decade. In the autumn of 1960, the US "was beset by a series of deepening crises": growing demands from African-Americans for equal rights found their expression in a series of direct-action student protests that shook the "Jim Crow" South and "exposed President Eisenhower's gradualist approach to the race problem as hopelessly out of touch".[4] As if this was not enough, the US found itself on the eve of an indicative presidential election between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon. At the same time, Washington was hectically searching for ways to deal with a newly confident and belligerent Moscow, which perceived the accelerating dawn of the European empires as an opportunity to outplay its Western rivals in the nascent theatre of the so-called Third World. Tender hopes for rapprochement and disarmament between the Eastern and Western blocks quickly vanished following the U-2 incident of May 1960 and the lingering Berlin crisis.

The opening of the fifteenth UN General Assembly was meant to bring together an unprecedented who's who of international statesmen against the backdrop of further seismic geopolitical upheaval. In 1960, sixteen African nations gained independence and joined the UN, marking the "Year of Africa". In the aftermath of the newly independent

states joining, the successor of the League of Nations decisively changed its character and morphed into a "key forum for anticolonialism".[5] Meanwhile, the worsening Congo crisis kept the world in suspense.

For Castro, this unique setting presented an unparalleled chance that he used to establish Cuba as an important actor in international affairs, promoting "the politics of anti-imperialism, racial equality and leftist revolution". Furthermore, he was able to add to the United States' discomfort, guaranteeing "a decisive and fateful rupture in US-Cuban relations".[6]

Hall's narrative history centres around the many personal interactions and hard-to-believe storylines of Castro's trip, such as the headline-grabbing switch from downtown's unwelcoming Shelburne to Harlem's Theresa Hotel. This incidentally placed a global spotlight on the US's biggest wound, racial discrimination, and Castro was subsequently met with an enthusiastic reception by the local African-American community. Holding court from inside the famous but not all too luxurious landmark, he welcomed iconic world leaders such as Nikita Khrushchev, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Jawaharlal Nehru, Black civil rights activists like Malcolm X, and idols of the rising Western counterculture such as Allen Ginsberg.

The author complements his informed prose through American and British primary sources from the inside of their respective political administrations and by exhibiting the coverage of Cuba's propaganda outlets. The excessive use of the latter probably marks the work's biggest weakness, as it hinders the reading flow, inadvertently turning the reader into an expert on socialist didactics.

Although the text is chronologically based on Castro's ten days in New York, Hall repeatedly makes excursions to provide the reader with a wide context of related topics, such as the history of Harlem, biographies of several luminaries who the *Máximo Líder* encountered, or the lasting fascination for revolutionist Cuba in the countercultural movements of Western societies. For example, Hall expounds on how Castro's journey to New York "inspired adulation from an emergent New Left" and how it "helped to usher in a new decade of political, social and cultural tumult in an appropriately irreverent, rebellious and anarchic manner".[7] Furthermore, it is not rare to find gripping anecdotes throughout the book, such as the reference to Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre's visit to the Caribbean island in March 1960, among others.

The author also describes the numerous rumours surrounding Castro's legendary spell in Harlem. For instance, it was said that during a meeting at the Theresa, Black nationalists presented Fidel with their adventurous plans to "wage armed struggle in the belly of the beast", right there in New York. After listening patiently, Fidel had allegedly walked over to the window. Dismissing the rather naïve plans for armed insurrection, the Cuban premier is supposed to have answered: "the Sierra Maestra,[8] the mountains. I don't see any mountains out there".[9]

On a structural level, Hall emphasizes the many international developments that were set in motion as a direct result of Castro's theatrics in the Big Apple. He argues that the effusive meetings with Soviet leader Khrushchev, the first between the two statesmen, launched a Cuban-Soviet "honeymoon",[10] that he interprets as a basic ingredient for the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Although the aftermath of the latter marked a serious estrangement in Moscow-Havana relations, it could not rupture the cementation of a "critically important alliance"[11] that lasted until the end of the USSR in 1991.

Hall also notes that the fervour and audacity in which the charismatic revolutionary attacked Washington during his days in NYC marked the last nail in the coffin for an already heavily strained relationship with the US, for which Castro's dismissal now became an urgent foreign policy imperative. This was a notion shared by contemporaries in *Time* magazine a week after Castro's departure, where they predicted that a "showdown" between the two neighbours was now "much closer",[12] foreshadowing the Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961.

According to Hall, Castro's sojourn also strongly symbolized the inexorable shifting of the Cold War's focus "from Europe to the Global South".[13] The bustling protagonist of the book drew his own lessons from his stay in the US. The publication explains how Castro's spirited four-and-a-half-hour speech[14] immeasurably strengthened his "reputation as a hero for the oppressed peoples of the world". In the following years, Castro would try to set up Cuba as "the torch bearer of the post-Bandung world",[15] leading the island to host the Tricontinental Conference of 1966, which sought to enhance solidarity and cooperation between the Third World. He also felt inspired to further pursue the export of his revolution to Latin America and Africa, resulting in support for various leftist liberation movements. Castro was also further encouraged in his anti-American sentiment by the unhospitable antics of the Eisenhower administration (such as their limiting of the unwelcomed guest's radius of movement to Manhattan). Britain's ambassador summarized his observations after the revolutionary leader's triumphant return to Havana by pointedly noticing that Castro "was more megalomaniac than ever".[16]

Although Hall's underlying thesis is not all too sophisticated, characterizing Castro's stay as a "turning point in the history of the Cold War and a foundational moment in the creation of what we think of as the 'Sixties'",[17] it comes across as fairly cogent. However, in particular, the concluding thoughts lack an in-depth macro history context, which could have provided the readership with a more nuanced understanding of the significance of the book's subject. The further course of Havana's relations with Egypt, Ghana, or India, whose leaders Castro had met in New York, or additional paragraphs on the shape of Cuban South-South cooperation after 1960 probably would have been revealing.

In spite of this, *Ten Days in Harlem* is an educational, panoramic, and enjoyable piece of microhistory, which manages the balancing act between appealing to a broad audience and maintaining academic substance with playful ease (such as by providing an extensive bibliography that invites the interested reader to research further). Vividly manoeuvring

between diplomatic tricks, the Cold War's systemic competition, decolonization, and the emergent civil rights, Black power, and radical student movements, *Ten Days in Harlem* would appeal highly to anyone interested in the "Global Sixties".

Notes

[1] Simon Hall, *Ten Days in Harlem: Fidel Castro and the Making of the 1960s* (London: Faber & Faber, 2020), 107.

[2] Hall, 107.

[3] The paperback edition was published in November 2021.

[4] Hall, 1.

[5] Hall, 3.

[6] Ibid, 2.

[7] Ibid, 223.

[8] The rebel's hideout during the armed struggle for Cuban Revolution.

[9] Hall, 220.

[10] Hall, 212.

[11] Ibid, 223.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Still a UN record.

[15] Hall, 215.

[16] Ibid, 203.

[17] Ibid, 2.