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

Global histories: a student journal

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Scope and purpose

In response to the increasing interest in the 'global' as a field of inquiry, a perspective, and an approach, Global Histories: A Student Journal aims to offer a platform for debate, discussion, and intellectual exchange for a new generation of scholars with diverse research interests. Global history can provide an opportunity to move beyond disciplinary boundaries and methodological centrisms, both in time and space. As students of global history at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, our interest lies not in prescribing what global history is and what it is not, but to encourage collaboration, cooperation, and discourse among students seeking to explore new intellectual frontiers.

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Dear reader,

We are very pleased to present you with this short yet savvy issue, one which was colloquially referred to by our team as the 'Islamic issue'. Indeed, by sheer coincidence, all of the pieces in this issue deal with the global Islamic community in one way or another. Beginning with Gabriel Soares' look at Islamic communities in the Indian Sea and their encounters with the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, he examines literary sources throughout the Indian Ocean to draw attention to the narratives of those who experienced invasion. In Anna Breidenbach's study of two different ambassadors to the French court in the early eighteenth century, she traces the development of diplomatic norms and the uneven power relationships between so-called 'oriental' ambassadors and the French officials who received them. Jonas Araujo continues with his look at the concept of ummah as a practice of identity formation and resilience for enslaved Muslims in Brazil, Jamaica, and the United States during the nineteenth century. George Loftus' work on the Iranian Revolution in the minds of Yugoslavians rounds out the articles, connecting the threads of Non-Alignment to the tension between Yugoslav Muslim intellectual circles and the socialist state in its uneasy relationship as the 'gate to Europe'. Finally, Rohan Chopra reviews a text on the forgotten history of Hindustan, pointing towards the need for global histories which do well to not just reiterate colonial constructions.

Team Global histories has been extremely busy over the past months, with the return of our Global History Student Conference. From 24 to 26 June, 2022, 35 participants travelled to Berlin from all over the world to present their research and connect with fellow students of global history. It was an incredibly lively weekend, raising new discussions about our field and building new connections which will hopefully be sustained for long to come! We were very glad to have hosted the conference in person once more, but now, with the conference having come to an end and the release of this journal issue, we look forward to a fruitful break in our intellectual endeavors. In the meantime, we hope you enjoy this latest issue.

With best regards,

Ruby Guyot

Editor-in-chief

Acknowledgements

We would like to acknowledge the interest and work of all students who submitted an article, essay, or review during the last call for papers. We are especially grateful to the authors published in this issue, for both their fruitful contributions and efforts in revision. These authors include Anna Breidenbach, Gabriel Mathias Soares, Jonas Araujo, George Loftus, and Rohan Chopra. Although this issue may be short, their excellent pieces make for stimulating, enjoyable reads, and it was a pleasure to work with all of them. We are also grateful for their patience with our delays, as it was an extra special challenge putting together this issue while also hard at work planning the Global History Student Conference!

In addition, we would like to extend our immense gratitude to the students on the Global Histories journal team and students in our Global History MA program, particularly those who devoted extensive time and effort to reviewing and editing the published pieces. These members include Simone Steadman-Gantous, Janina Abts, Lennart Schmidt, Piotr Kardynal, Lukas Jung, Otsbal Quirós-González, Zaza Jung, Hanna Yateem, Sarah Gubitz, Charlotte Bracklo, Cecilia Burgos Cuevas, and Phoebe Ka Laam Ng. The attention and dedication these members provided towards the pieces they worked on during the arrival of another semester (and for some, alongside conference planning) ensured this issue's high quality. We would once again like to thank Cecilia Burgos Cuevas for her work in the layout and design of our journal, and for yet another visually appealing issue.

Finally, we are grateful for the continued support and assistance for this project by the Freie Universität Berlin, particularly the Global History faculty, chaired by Prof. Dr. Sebastian Conrad, and the Online Journal Systems team at CeDiS.

I.

Research Articles

Arabic History writing in the context of Portuguese transgressions in the sixteenth-century Indian Ocean

By

Gabriel Mathias Soares

Abstract

Early Modern Age maritime explorations produced a myriad of cultural encounters with varying outcomes, almost inevitably marked by tensions, if not outward conflict. The advent of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean world provoked uneasy reactions among Muslims, involving long-standing religious antagonisms and freshly sparked conflicts of interest. Muslim scholars from Kilwa to the Malabar Coast wrote a number of Arabic chronicles that addressed these Christian Franks' establishment in the region. The present research investigates sixteenth-century Arabic historical accounts on Portugal's encroachment in and around the Indian Ocean, examining interconnections of Muslims' experiences of —and reactions to— these encounters. The paper focuses on how discourses about the past were produced as a direct outcome of these interactions and as an instrument for political projects tackling the pressing challenges created by European intervention.

About the author

Gabriel Mathias Soares is a PhD Candidate at the Social History program of the University of São Paulo. This study was financed in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brasil (CAPES) – Finance Code 001.

INTRODUCTION

The maritime exploration of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries resulted in a series of new encounters that resulted in a watershed moment in world history. This contact with the unfamiliar challenged the worldview of both explorer and native, forcing them to come to terms with expectations inherited from their past traditions in light of the transformations in their present reality. This paper investigates how historical narratives of Muslim communities in the Indian Ocean were affected by the interference of the Portuguese during the sixteenth century. It focuses on two chronicles written in Arabic from the regions in opposite sides of the highly connected Monsoon system, the Swahili Coast and the Malabar Coast, that were both strongly cosmopolitan and also heavily targeted by Portugal's imperial aggression. The narratives share similar features with the Islamic historiographical tradition in the Indian Ocean, modeled after collective biographies from the Eastern Mediterranean and forms of Persian history writing.[1] They also featured their own specificities related to local lore and record keeping.[2]

Descriptions of European Christians' actions feature often in these other writings, but are rarely the main subject. Many Arabic histories in the period address the incursions of the Franks in the Western Indian Ocean region as important facts within a larger framework (like the Hadhrami chronicles,[3] such as *Tārīkh al-Shanbal* and *Tārīkh al-Shiḥri*, or the historical annals from Mecca,[4] such as *Bulūgh al-qirā* and *Nayl al-munā*). However, only two historical works can be defined as a direct by-product of —and response to— Portuguese encroachment over Muslim societies: they were created by the circumstance of these conflicts and with the purpose to actively transform them. One was composed by an unnamed author in Kilwa (a central port city of the Swahili Coast at the time) sometime between the Portuguese occupation of the city and the mid sixteenth century, entitled "The consolation of the History of Kilwa" (*Kitāb al-sulwa fī akhbār Kulwa* in Arabic). The other was part of larger anti-Portuguese literature from the Malabar Coast that included sermons and epic poems, yet the "The Masterpiece of the Faithful Strugglers in some accounts of the Portuguese" (T*uḥfat al-mujāhidīn fī ba*ʿḍ *akhbār al-Burtuqālīyīn* in Arabic) is the only known historical prose among these jihadi texts. This self-defined "masterpiece" was written sometime around the year 1580 by Zayn Al-Din, a religious leader and respected scholar in Islamic law. Both chronicles were composed not in areas outside of Portugal's reach, like all the other known contemporaneous Arabic chronicles, but where its power was manifested, even in political and intellectual terrains. Their reaction to this foreign hostile power was premised on a reevaluation of their own heterogenous past, seeking to underscore the rightfulness of the arrival of Islam to their regions.

The following analysis of these works seeks to understand their broader historical context and their responses to the challenges brought by newfound foreign contact. The appeal to history was certainly an important part of a local struggle against Portuguese dominion, since it served to bind the Muslim community closer together and to strengthen the legitimacy of Islamic rule. Yet both works are also representative of only a portion of

their respective Muslim communities. Narrating the past was a contentious subject, because it also involved disputes within Muslims themselves, namely of who had the right to govern them and how. These sixteenth-century Arabic histories of Kilwa and Malabar advocate for specific factions among the local and even outside elites who collaborated and/or resisted Portuguese encroachment. These two chronicles were then part of larger process of confronting and negotiating with Christian European expansion, painting a more intricate picture of the Early Modern period where historical transformations were not only at hands of Iberian conquerors, but also by the conquered and those beyond the territories controlled by Western empires. In this sense, the contexts surrounding the creation of these two chronicles can be understood as lying within "contact zones", what Mary Louise Pratt defines as "social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination – such as colonialism and slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out across the globe today."[5]

The debate on the origins of the modern world and the historical foundations of present globalization is still ongoing. Depending on the criteria, the earliest instance of interconnectivity on a global scale goes back to the first transoceanic navigations in the Early Modern period. These new oceanic routes enveloped most of the world in a system of exchanges, with networks circling the globe. Studies in the last decades have increasingly shown that the dynamics of worldwide transformations were never unidirectional, i.e. "from the West to the Rest", and even instances of indisputable subordination of non-Europeans did not completely strip subaltern individuals of their agency.[6] By decentering history, as Natalie Zemon Davis proposed, it is possible to "let the subalterns and their practices and beliefs carry the narrative" and thus show the means by which they "influence outcomes and their own destiny."[7] Though many histories of African and Asian societies in this period, particularly from the sixteenth century, can hardly be reduced to one of subjugation to Europeans, their complex relationship with the phenomena of increased global integration has been overshadowed by a discourse of Western pioneering. Where these extending processes collided, the Eurocentric narrative confined non-Western actors to a passive role. The first direct links between these societies were more often than not multidirectional and multifaceted. One such turning point in the long history of globalization was the Portuguese encounter with a world of trade networks, port cities, and coastal communities in the Indian Ocean, where the sea routes were dominated by Muslim traders. The historical narratives produced in these circumstances reflect newly established associations with a larger world and a past that could not be understood solely by long held traditions.

World History itself is not a new phenomenon, even if it has acquired different meanings as it reflects new discoveries.[8] Past historians have long written about what they understood as the world, a notion that would change as different regions and continents were gradually —or sometimes abruptly— connected.[9] In the sixteenth century, there were already several world historians starting to think on a veritable global scale about the human past. This worldwide consciousness was one outcome of long distance travels and

the wide-ranging circulation of products and ideas. Direct links between mutually unknown groups were increasingly established, with both auspicious and tragic consequences. These far-reaching interconnections deepened the ties between societies of different islands and continental landmasses —a process not exclusively driven by European expansionism. A broader "global view" was not the monopoly of a single cultural tradition. Western Christians' contact with the Americas and other regions generated among some historians in the Renaissance an awareness of pasts far beyond the classical and biblical traditions, as Giuseppe Marcocci has analyzed.[10] Particularly among Muslims around the Arabian Sea, a type of history writing developed with the increased interconnectivity through maritime routes, what Christopher D. Bahl defined in a recent article as "Transoceanic Arabic historiography".[11]

These new studies challenge long-held views, still present in certain "neo-Eurocentric" trends claiming that all significant changes in the sixteenth century, both in history and historiography, are exclusively a product of (Western) Europe's internal dynamics, which were then "dispersed" throughout the world by its plucky adventures and settlers.[12] Yet this view is unsustainable when one takes a closer look at evidence from different parts of the world and how the actions of non-Europeans reflected upon the peculiar transformations of the sixteenth century.[13] Independent dynamics were at play in a myriad of regions far beyond the reach of Europeans at that point in time or in the places where they represented only a minor presence, as in most of the Asiatic and African continents. Even where Western Christians were able to assert themselves, the balance of power could shift against them in favor of local or other outside actors. More importantly, most of the pre-established aspects of the different societies (religion, language, and social stratification, among others) in Asia and Africa would still carry on with little to no impact from newcomers. However, even in these early stages of European presence, some places were significantly more affected than others. What can be said about their limited influence inland, especially deeply inside the immense interior of Asia and Africa, cannot be extended to the oceanic rim. There was the point of arrival of the overseas expansions, bringing the latest advances in European naval technology, such as large ships capable of long transoceanic voyages with powerful cannons mounted on their broadsides. The sea is the space where one can thus see a major transformation in the East following the first caravels from Portugal crossing the Cape of Good Hope.

The Indian Ocean on the eve of the arrival of the Portuguese is often described as a "Muslim lake" of sorts, since it was dotted with Muslim networks and communities throughout its extension from the East African Coast to the Malacca Strait.[14] The Arabic language was a *lingua franca* for both trade and general communication, alongside Persian, Tamil, Swahili, Malay, and others.[15] After its initial expansion during the time of the Rashidun Caliphate and its Umayyad successors, Islam's dissemination in the oceanic shores of Africa and Asia —outside of Arabia, Persia and Northern India— was mostly slow and peaceful, through centuries of interactions among trade routes.[16] The adoption of the new religion usually began through individuals or parts of communities, with the later conversion

of the political elite finally giving Islam official status in a city-state or kingdom. Some local narratives sought a more ancestral connection with the time of the prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors, or even to himself and the earliest days of the revelation, but more detailed accounts pushed the definite introduction of Islam to a latter period.[17] As early as the sixteenth century, the constant interactions, travels, and migrations between the shores of the Indian Ocean had given a common sense of belonging to this multitude of societies adherent to Islam.[18]

An interconnected Indian Ocean, marked by what Engseng Ho called an "Ecumenical Islam", was the result of not just ongoing transformations in the millennia old sea routes from Africa to Asia, but also of disturbances in old Eurasian land routes commonly known nowadays as the Silk Road(s).[19] As intra and inter-dynastic struggles ravaged the Mongol Empire and its successors, the previously secure long distance trade path through the imperial domains became ever more dangerous. Yet trade across the East-West space did not merely decline with the fracturing of the Steppe Corridor: it was rerouted to the South, invigorating the maritime routes in the Eastern seas. The main trade lanes were then arranged in three sectors: from the Red Sea to Gujarat, from there to the Strait of Malacca, and then on until the South China Sea.[20] This division guaranteed a more manageable commercial economy, less unpredictable outcomes, and more foreseeable returns for each invested stakeholder. The pursuit of spices was a driving force in this system, arguably the most lucrative commodity in the route from the Molucca Islands to Suez. Religious solidarity thus played a key role in nurturing strong ties between confessional communities throughout these vast networks of trade, where a level of trust could be guaranteed by a common faith and shared ethical values regarding mercantile activities.[21] As attested in the accounts and personal experiences of North African jurist and traveler Ibn Battuta in the 1300s, these confessional bounds reached the farthest corners of "Muslim world" and had in the mosque a central place not only for communal prayer, but for lodging and feeding travelers, for education of the faithful, and for mediating disputes.[22]

As the tenth century of the Islamic calendar began, a people hitherto unfamiliar to the Indian Ocean world started to appear and to impose themselves over port cities and trade routes. The Franks (*franj*(*i*), pl. *īfranj* in Arabic), a term for European Christians of the Latin Church, had marked their presence in the South and Eastern Mediterranean since the eleventh century. They became well known as crusaders and merchants to both Muslim and Orthodox Christians.[23] Yet the societies in the Indian Ocean were mostly unaware of these outsiders until Vasco da Gama and his fleet started exploring the coast of East Africa and, with the help of a Muslim pilot whose identity is uncertain, managed to reach India.[24] The Portuguese were promptly identified as a part of the broader category of Franks, about whom there had been increasing references in Arabic scholarly literature after the capture of Jerusalem by crusaders in 1099, desecrating the third holiest site of Islam, and the religious wars for control of the Levant that lasted until their final expulsion in the end of the thirteenth century.[25] While old stereotypes from the time of the Crusades endured, such as the Frankish intolerant fanaticism and worship of the cross, new defining traits

emerged, most notably their attachment to the sea.[26] The Crown of Portugal's own religious and political project in the beginning of the sixteenth century, particularly the dream of a universal Christian empire, clashed with the interests and even the very existence of many Muslim communities in maritime Asia.[27] The Portuguese openly expressed a sentiment of hostility towards Islam, in spite of pragmatic accommodations in order to operate in an environment rife with the "hated sect". Both in mannerly and aggressive interactions, their contempt for the *umma* (the broader Islamic community) marked them, "especially in the Persian and Arabic chronicles, as a violent lot, who are also given to devious acts and chicanery in order to advance their interests," as Sanjay Subrahmanyam noted.[28] Such attitude is recorded not only in Islamic history writing, but also in letters from Muslim officials, merchants, and rulers written directly to the monarch in Lisbon, complaining about the attitudes of his Highness' subjects, local captains in particular.[29]

While European accounts are nearly the only available written sources of the encounters with people of the Americas, the Eastern seas from the Swahili Coast to Japan harbored strong literary traditions and produced records which have withstood the test of time. Written materials registered different African and Asian perspectives on the newcomers in chronicles, discourses, letters, poems, and more. The Arabic literary culture produced wide-ranging forms of documentary evidence referenced in Islamic tradition, itself containing an amalgam of biblical, Hellenistic, and Persian influences. Inheriting a series of *topoi* about cross-cultural differences from this accumulated legacy, a rich literature developed on the curious and strange creatures, places, and human beings of the world.[30] This "ethnological" lore mixed ancient classical views with Islamic "civilizational" values in its classification of alterity, meaning that the ideal Muslim would not only have superior beliefs, but also ethical and practical behavior. It shaped a significant part of Muslim discursive representation of different groups, creating stereotypes about societies outside of Islam's domain, such as the "barbarous" Franks of North and Western Europe.[31] Given the wide circulation of these accounts with travelers and scholars, some information —and prejudices— about Europeans were already hearsay long before visitors arrived. Thus, the contact with the Portuguese "appeared simultaneously strange *and* familiar".[32] Paradoxically, familiarity meant that some expectations could be shattered by the unforeseen arrival of impious interlopers with naval and military advantages over the pious Muslims. Disgraceful unbelievers overpowering the community of faithful Islamic followers in such a manner could fatefully imply a sort of subversion of the cosmological order. Providential reasoning needed a culprit for this calamity, usually found among Muslims themselves, be it powerful individuals' greed for power and wealth, or even the community's collective failure in abiding to God's will.[33] As shall be examined below, the Arabic historical descriptions of the actions of the Portuguese "Franks" are usually charged with religious condemnation, referred to as disgraced, damned, cursed, forsaken and so on.[34] These terms not only suggest God's ultimate power over events, but also a teleological explanation for all the misfortune based on piety itself as both cause and effect: wickedness among the believers brought about divine punishment, and only faithful

obedience to the revealed commandments could provide spiritual, and perhaps material, redemption from the heavenly ordained afflictions.

Much of what Arabic reports, sermons, and poems negatively reinforced or (re)constructed about the Franks was undoubtedly a product of the attitudes and actions of the Portuguese themselves. Their Iberian historical heritage was characterized by a strong Christian militant zeal, particularly against Muslims, what Jean Aubin defined as an atavistic hate for the “Moor”.[35] This was part of the legacy of the kingdom's own formation during the Reconquista, similar to Castille and Aragon. In general, Iberian expansionism was centered upon primacy of the militant faith: the conquistador was a warrior on a religious mission to expand Christendom.[36] Analogous to the way the Portuguese were inserted in the more generic category of “Franks”, they themselves used the term "Moors” (*mouros*) for all Muslims, despite the more circumscriptive origin of the word in North Africa. Portuguese writings of the time also categorically refused to recognize the central terminology Muslims applied to themselves and their religion (*Islam*), which was referred as the “sect of Mafamede” (*seita de Mafamede*), emphasizing that Muhammad (*Mafamede*) was a “false prophet”. On the other hand, divergences within Islam merit description in some cases, as did ethnic and, even more often, racial distinctions. There is an apparent paradox in the Portuguese records of their encounters with Muslims and, however troublesome it could be, the close partnership with some of them: the recurrence and importance of interactions did not bring about any systematic study of Islamic cultures and languages (like the Oriental studies that were beginning to develop in other contemporary European intellectual spaces).[37] While lacking a coherent discourse on the Orient, these explorers collected information and objects that served their enterprise, which could eventually reach intellectuals in Europe and help to foster the development of a new “worldview” or *weltanschauung*.[38] As with many other aspects of the Portuguese empire, a mixture of pragmatism and religious dogmatism was the prevailing attitude, despite the initial curiosity that nurtured the literature of discovery in Portugal.[39]

The narrative of historians of the Portuguese Crown could be surprisingly straightforward, despite the obvious bias towards the imperial interests of Portugal’s overseas expansion. They documented primarily what served their aggrandizing view of themselves and their actions, particularly in order to obtain privileges from the monarchy as the narrator of his countrymen’s great deeds. However, internal rivalry within the empire likely turned self-aggrandizing narratives into a disputable topic, making detailed and verifiable reports a potential leverage against an enemy or opposing faction.[40] Their reports can surely appear objective in the retelling of events, often describing Portuguese brutality without any need to embellish them – indiscriminate violence against the enemies of Christendom could be a commendable act in this crusading mission.[41] Al-Salman considers the Portuguese historians of the overseas conquests and explorations to be “religious historians” that sought to glorify the killings and systematic plunder carried out by the agents of the Crown as deeds blessed by God.[42] Thus, sincere curiosity about “enemies of Christ” was not something to be encouraged.[43] Information reported on their

literary traditions was remarkably superficial for the most part. Considering the immense variety and complexity of Islamic communities the Iberian explorers encountered, many Portuguese historical descriptions neglect details on Asian and African Muslims deemed irrelevant for imperial objectives.[44] Some authors, however, showed a genuine interest in xenology and in scrutinizing the past outside the biblical and Greco-Roman traditions, such as Pedro Teixeira's history of the sovereigns of Persia based on a much larger work by the historian Mir Khwand.[45] The eminent chronicler João de Barros before him pioneered the use of Eastern sources about these societies' past, though most certainly not in the original languages, but as either written or orally recited translations.[46]

The actions of the Portuguese in the East were predicated upon faith and trade, meaning both material and spiritual rewards were rightful and expected for the fulfillment of their sacred mission in the lands of heathens and infidels. The fight against the enemies of Christendom and the expansion of Christianity required resources as much as religious zeal. The crusader ethos was transposed from the land-based chivalric type to naval warfare and piracy.[47] Upon arriving in the Indian Ocean, a strategy devised by Catholic clergymen in the fourteenth century began to be implemented: the blockade of the Red Sea.[48] This central policy for the Crown aimed at weakening the rival Mamluk Sultanate by cutting its access to the rich spice trade and giving Portugal monopoly over it instead. Since the area from the Red Sea to Jeddah, the port directly leading to Mecca, and Jerusalem was under Mamluk domain, the entire endeavor was clearly meant as a crusade by the more zealous factions of the nobility, while others saw the benefits of this course of action without necessarily sharing its spirits.[49] Besides this naval blockade, the Portuguese sought to control the sources of the spice production, firstly in the Malabar Coast and later in the Molucca Islands. To implement these strategies, they needed a foothold in the main nodes of the Indian Ocean’s trade routes (the Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca). All these strategies often involved a militant anti-Muslim attitude, due both to religious and commercial rivalry; those “enemies of Christ” also dominated the spice routes from East to West.

Albeit without the condemnation of the Islamic historical accounts, Portuguese chroniclers recurrently registered all sorts of egregious acts against Muslims without reservations: expulsions, massacres, destruction of property and a ban on travel (including pilgrimage to the Holy sites).[50] These were not mere reckless actions of undisciplined individuals, but more often anti-Islamic policies ordered by the Crown and enacted under the direct supervision of its captains. The governor Afonso de Albuquerque (1509-1515) was particularly eager in implementing His Majesty's crusading dreams and bringing about the “destruction of the House of Mecca (*destruyçam da casa de meqa*)”.[51] Besides military power, the structures of the Portuguese empire (or rather a sparse thalassocracy in its outset) rested upon some degree of local cooperation that in many places could only be found among “impious” Muslims. Often downplayed (or omitted) in Muslim historical sources, the consolidation of alliances with —and pledges of vassalage to— the Crown of Portugal by Islamic authorities were important factors in sustaining the *Estado da Índia*[52]

itself, even when it pursued more zealous policies. These arrangements made sense in the higher scheme that was the ultimate aim of the Portuguese monarchy. They could also provide sufficient economic benefits to the Kingdom and its agents, particularly in the lucrative spice trade.

The reign of King Dom Emmanuel (1495-1521) oversaw the boom in the pepper trade amongst the Portuguese, in such a way that it quickly supplanted the import of African gold in revenue as the *Estado da Índia* lay the grounds for Portugal's thalassocracy in the East. Known at the outset of his rule as the "Gold King" (from trade established in West Africa), he later became known as the "Pepper King".[53] The actions of the Portuguese had a disruptive effect on the connections between the different parts of the Indian Ocean, negatively affecting trade from Southeast Asia to the East Mediterranean, including South Asia and East Africa.[54] Though never fully effective,[55] the naval blockade of the Red Sea did serve its purpose insofar as it maintained high prices for spices in the Mediterranean at least until the mid-1500s.[56] By this point, the resources and logistics required for implementing a complete monopoly and an impenetrable blockade of the alternative sea routes was too costly for distant Portugal. Moreover, this strategy became infeasible when direct confrontations with powerful Muslim empires, such as the Ottomans, occurred. Accommodations with rival forces were necessary to sustain the networks of the *Estado da Índia* in Asia, where markets demanded quantities and varieties of goods no single entity could entirely supply.[57] Taking into consideration the balance between their ambitions and their limited resources, the Portuguese authorities engendered a sort of protectionist 'racket' system based on paid safe-conducts for navigation inside the Indian Ocean known as *cartazes*.[58] Initially restricted to the Malabar coast as a way to demarcate ships from allied areas, the *cartaz* system developed into a revenue-system with the establishment of custom-houses on strategic ports from Hormuz to Malacca. They also functioned, by the late sixteenth century, as a diplomatic tool for exchanging favors with Asian rulers.[59] The Arabic historical sources provide an insight into the reality and insights of Muslims under Portuguese pressure, but—as most early modern historiographical works did— they tend to focus on major events more than recurrent incidents and slower changes, such as the effects of Portuguese naval patrolling and its extortions through its official permit system. However, those narratives still allude to a particular understanding of the marauding presence of the Franks in the Indian Ocean.[60]

It is commonly stated that the Portuguese introduced a political form of naval violence to the Indian Ocean in order to exert a type of domination previously unknown: maritime sovereignty.[61] Prior to this, the high seas were mostly an open space for navigation and no singular force claimed it as its domain. Critiques have been raised against such a thesis, pointing out how this was not entirely unprecedented (especially permits and safe-conducts for sailing from certain ports or through regional sea routes) and the novelty introduced was little more than Western Christendom's own notions of such oceanic politics.[62] However, though there were more regionalized forms of violence —such as piracy— and some projection of authority over sea waters, the use of force at sea that the

Portuguese brought was previously unmatched in terms of extension and systematics.[63] This is the context behind many of the descriptions of Arabic Muslim sources (letters, chronicles, sermons) of the incursion of the Franks from East Africa to Malacca: a certain perplexity at the aggressiveness of the Portuguese and their intransigence, encapsulated in the predicament of Malabari authors who "failed to understand why the Portuguese could not trade alongside other communities, rather than wishing to claim a monopoly, and could only attribute it to their inherently greedy and deceitful nature".[64] Though Islam had prevailed in the region as an ecumenical religion, interacting and negotiating with a variety of non-Muslims, the attitudes of the incoming Franks prompted militant reaction against these violent intruders.[65] This attitude defined an emerging transoceanic historiography in its approach to the Portuguese "Franks".

Despite the Portuguese disruption, the intensification of maritime connections during this time led to developments in Muslim cosmopolitan historiography in the Indian Ocean and beyond. Alongside Persian history writing developed over the previous centuries, a transoceanic Arabic historiography emerged in the sixteenth century, as Bahl has thoroughly analyzed.[66] An Arab cosmopolitanism crossed the Indian Ocean from the Hejaz to Gujarat, from Yemen to the Swahili Coast, and from Malabar to the Persian Gulf. As a prestigious language of erudition and religious worship, Arabic served was indispensable, bridging political and linguistic barriers. Its immense literary tradition held invaluable knowledge in all matters of life, from medicine to philosophy to astronomy and beyond. Being ever more connected, communities could better circulate information and update each other on recent events. Reports, older and newer, were selectively recorded in chronicles and annals, a number of which that were then copied and circulated around the Indian Ocean. The writing of history served to convey a shared sense of collective memory, even among faraway Islamic communities surrounded by vastly different environments. Stories linked the past between communities, places, and cultural traditions in an interconnected transoceanic space. With few exceptions, this rich historiography has not been given due attention, especially when compared to contemporary European sources or to Arabic sources of previous periods.[67]

The Swahili Coast: The Kilwa Chronicle

Located in the southernmost section of the Indian Ocean monsoon, the Swahili Coast's geography provided the conditions for a seasonal flow of vessels to navigate directly to and from the shores of the Arabian Sea (including the Gulf of Aden, Oman Sea, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea).[68] In the period between September and April, the monsoon produces winds from north to south in the coastal regions of the Indian Ocean, which allowed for constant voyages from the Arabian Sea to the Swahili Coast. Until the reversal in the direction of winds between April and early May (before the stormy weather between mid-May and September), commercial vessels could remain for months in these port regions, of which Kilwa was a privileged spot. This permanence required provisions for the merchants, their crew, their ships, and their animals. This trade flow made the fortune of Kilwa. Political

elites and merchants all sought to sustain this trading activity while trying to shape it in their favor.

The commercial port cities of the Swahili Coast, such as Kilwa, were not only connected to the wider Indian Ocean world, but also closely linked from the littoral to the African interior.[69] The vessels anchored along the continental coast (and Madagascar) and their crew required maintenance, supplies, and services. Wood, carpentry, and the manufacture of ropes and sails were indispensable to vessels. Merchants and crew (male-only, as a rule), staying seasonally on land for up to six months, demanded linguistic and religious services, as well as entertainment and sexual services, provided by locals at a high cost. Imports to the East African coast included beads from the Near East, Persian perfumes, cooking utensils, precious stones, wine, Indian rice, spices, cotton clothes, copper, metal objects, ceramics, and Chinese porcelain. This stimulated the local manufacture of ceramics, the adoption of cotton cultivation and techniques of cotton weaving, and the minting of coins, first in silver and then in copper. The most valuable exports were ivory, rhino horns, turtle shells, amber gray and, famously, gold from Sofala. The goods demanded in the Indian and Chinese markets were exported via Oman until around the year 900, when they were transported directly to the easternmost ports.[70]

Arabic was an important *lingua franca* for the Swahili elite, and most of them had at least basic proficiency for the purpose of maritime trade elsewhere, as well for performing religious duties such as pilgrimage.[71] Arriving alongside Islam, the Arabic script served not only to record the Holy Quran, but also as a tool of rulers in asserting their power and increasing their wealth. Copper coins bearing rulers' names in Arabic were minted by wealthy cities from the eleventh century on. The minting of coins in archeological dating and other Islamic epigraphical records attest to the historical period (the eleventh and twelfth century) set by later chronicles for the arrival of the Swahili cities founding Islamic dynasties from Persia and Arabia. The earliest of these writings, the Arabic chronicle of Kilwa, was probably composed in the mid-sixteenth century, but commissioned much earlier by the governing ruler of the city or the claimant to the throne during the strife unleashed with the arrival of the first fleets from Portugal.[72]

The Arabic title of the chronicle, *Kitāb al-sulwa fī akhbār Kulwa*, could be translated as “The consolation of the History of Kilwa”. The word “consolation” implicates a sentiment of atonement for the narrative. Indeed, rather opposing terms like "misfortune" and "restoration", found throughout the chronicle, are possibly a legacy of the turbulent events that followed Portuguese interference and were then aggravated with their occupation of the city from 1505 until their departure in 1512.[73] The text also mentions that the author was born in 1499 and, therefore, most probably had his childhood scarred by these events. The first mention of Portuguese appears at the beginning of the last chapter, in an isolated phrase, a little before the text turns to the account of their arrival. However short, the damning rhetoric of this initial excerpt presents one of the tropes about the Franks more ostensibly repeated in nearly all the other Muslim Arabic chronicles of the period:[74] “Under

[the emir] al-Fudail, internecine strife (*fitna*) emerged with the disgraced (*mukhādhīl*) Franks, [may] God forsake them [...]"

The Arabic chronicle of Kilwa presents the disgraced (*mukhādhīl*) newcomers as harbingers of corruption (*fasād*) and decadence (*khurbāt*).[75] This terminology implies both spiritual and material peril for the community. The narrative of the Portuguese's first interactions with the inhabitants of Kilwa is framed almost as a duplicitous game of wits, where the Franks are hiding their true wickedness and it is up to prescient locals to outsmart them. It starts with their arrival during the first year of Emir al-Fudail's rule when "[...] news arrived from the land of Mozambique (*musīmbiḥ*) that a people appeared from the country of the Franks (*min bilād al-īfranj*) on three vessels and their name of captain (*nwākhidh*) was Almirtī".[76] Sir Arthur Strong, who was the first to publish the Kilwa Arabic chronicle in print at end of the nineteenth century, identified the name of this captain as deriving from admiral (*almirante)* Vasco da Gama.[77] The chronicle continues, narrating the consecutive captains and their fleets attempting to trick the people of Kilwa into colluding with them. Finally, the *Almirtī* (Vasco da Gama) returns and forces the city to comply. Muhammad Rukn is made its ruler due to his merits, though implicitly not for his lineage.[78] As a last note, the author mentions how his own uncles were among the humiliated in this conundrum.[79] Then the narrative abruptly stops, indicating that a section of the original chronicle was lost or that it was never finished.

Another version of the chronicle survives in the contemporary *magum opus* of the Portuguese historian João de Barros' *Decades of Asia*.[80] Given their similarity, it has been safe to assume that an older writing existed, but was lost in time. Adrien Delmas argues that both versions were based on the same dynastic records kept through oral traditions that needed no written record until the disputes with a new power forced them onto paper, what he frames as the "scriptural paradigm of encounters".[81] Since both Portuguese and Swahili elites valued lineage as a source of legitimacy, it was in the interest of both parties to have in their hands this type of information. A historical account in written format had a stronger and more verifiable claim anywhere outside the established local tradition. Thus, Arabic history writing in the Swahili Coast was itself a product of the contentious encounter with the Portuguese.

India's western shores: *Tuḥfat al-mujāhidīn*

The Southwest region of the Indian subcontinent has been a bustling commercial hub for millennia, particularly in the trade of valuable spices produced in the region, such as black pepper and cinnamon. Though the external trade was dominated by Muslims (as elsewhere in the Indian Ocean), the Malabar coast was governed predominantly by Hindu sovereigns ruling over small kingdoms such as the Zamorin in Calicut, the Kolattiri kingdom in Kollattunatu, and the Rajas of Perumpatappunatu/Cochin.[82] At the end of the fifteenth century, the Zamorin became the most powerful ruler in the region, thus the epithet *samudra raja* (king of the Oceans), as well as *kunnalakkon* (Lord of the Sea and the

Mountain). Muslims in Malabar were a minority with a strong market, as well as cultural and political connections across the wider Indian Ocean. They enjoyed a privileged status before the Zamorin in commercial, political, and religious terms, controlling basically all maritime trade, as asserted by Portuguese chroniclers.[83]

A significant number of Malabari Muslims in the sixteenth century had ancestors partly outside the region. Among those of outside heritage was Zayn Al-Din (Makhdum, al-Ma'abari or al-Malibari), the main Muslim chronicler of Portuguese (mis)deeds in the region and a prominent Islamic jurist. His family came originally from Hadramawt to the Coromandel Coast and then finally immigrated to Malabar.[84] The Islamic community also had a division between those who were foreigners and controlled the profitable maritime trade, Pardeshi (*Paradeśi*), and the locals who delved in the coastal and interior commerce, the Mappila (*Māppiḷa*).[85] Portuguese antagonism was at first turned mainly towards the former, though it was far from restricted to them even at this initial stage.[86] As foreign merchants left under pressure, local Muslims lost important business partners and allies in faith, yet they could see opportunities emerge amidst very challenging conditions.[87] Naturally, wedges between these different segments could arise, though many still found common cause against their shared religious and commercial enemy. In the work entitled T*uḥfat al-mujāhidīn fī ba*ʿḍ *akhbār al-Burtughālīyīn* (The Masterpiece of the Faithful Struggle, in some accounts of the Portuguese), Zayn al-Din tries to depict a more cohesive *umma* in its heroic struggle against foreign oppressors. In doing so, he mostly omits internal tensions between these two Muslim communities, even glossing over the instances of trade collaboration with those "cursed Franks". Seeking to control the export of spices from the Malabar coast, the Portuguese tried from the very start to convince the ruler of Calicut to expel the Muslim traders and block them from traveling to the "land of the Arabs" (*barr al-'arab*), implying a ban on pilgrimage as well. The Zamorin rejected this demand, stating that it would be unthinkable to expel 4,000 families who lived as natives and provided much income to his kingdom. In this context, many Muslims galvanized support for the Hindu leader, mobilizing their community and raising funds for military action. Religious writings evoke a strong sense of jihad and other notions deep-seated in the Islamic tradition about the distinction of Muslims and non-Muslims, such as "abode of Islam" (*dār al-Islām*) and "abode of war" (*dār al-harb*).[88] The animosity between the Portuguese and the sovereign of Calicut erupts from then on, as reported by Zayn al-Din himself:[89]

> After a couple of years, six ships arrived and entered Calicut intending on trading and conducting trade business. They told the agents of the Zamorin to forbid Muslims from trading and traveling to Arabia (barr al-'arab) and that "greater benefits would be obtained from us [the Portuguese]". Then, they showed themselves to be enemies of the Muslims in their dealings, so the Zamorin ordered them killed and between sixty to seventy men were killed, the rest fleeing back to their ships.

For the chronicler, the newcomers' motivation was clear from the outset:[90]

> And the reason for their arrival in Malabar, as it is told about them, was their search for the countries of pepper to make its trade exclusively for them, because they were only buying it from intermediaries that bought it [the pepper] in Malabar.

Zayn al-Din argues that the actions of the Portuguese were not only an attack on Muslims in Malabar, but an invasion of Muslim territory, in terms no different for its implications than the abode of Islam (*Dār al-Islm*). This territorial violation of the faithful's sovereignty made holy struggle (*jihād*) an obligation for every single Muslim, no matter his or her status. Before starting his narrative of Portuguese's onslaught on Malabar, al-Din exhorts Muslims into resisting and struggling against these infidels. He tells readers that the origins of the Muslim community in that region was a product of divine grace over the believers, but that their ungratefulness led up to them the wicked Portuguese: [91]

> [The Muslims] returned God's blessing with unfaithfulness, offending and shrugging [Him]. Then God wrought upon them the people of Portugal from among the Franks —may God supreme forsake them— who oppressed, corrupted and attacked them [Muslims] in unspeakable manners [...]

In this providential framing, the advent of the Portuguese is an outcome of impiety. The "original sin" is Malabari Muslims' own failure in showing appreciation for God's blessing (*na'Ṇma Allah*) upon them due their impiousness (*kufrān*). Divine punishment comes as a penitence for the believers, so they may return to righteousness through faithful struggle (*jihād*). As a manifestation of God's divine judgment, the oppression and afflictions brought by the Franks upon Muslims in Malabar is, in a sense, a historical necessity. The tragedy is not an inevitability, but a consequence of believers' moral failure. Revelation is thus the key to understanding the duties of the faithful and deciphering the holy providence's plans. The revealed commandments are clear about the remedies against the scourge of infidelity, as Zayn al-Din writes:[92]

> So I compiled this collection to incite de People of the Faith (Ahl al-Īmān) against the Worshippers of the Cross ('abdat al-Sulbān), because the faithful struggle (jihād) is an 'individually imperative obligation' (fard 'aīn) for their intrusion in the Land of the Muslims (Bilād al-Muslimīn). They [the Franks] also captured unfathomable numbers of them [Muslims], killed many of them, converted a multitude of them to Christianity (al-nasarānīa), abducted unfortunate Muslim Women forcing them to give birth to Christian boys that would fight against Muslims and humiliated them.

Zayn al-Din thus openly states the purpose of his writing: to exhort Muslims to fulfill their duty of faithful struggle (*jihād*) against the Portuguese oppression over the believers of Malabar. In the title itself, the author makes it clear that the masterpiece (*tuḥfat*) honors Faithful Strugglers (*al-Mujāhidīn*) against the cursed unbelievers, presenting the case for (further) jihād. Written around the year 1580, the work is dedicated to the Sultan of Bijapur, a large Sultanate further north whose rulers had moved back and forth between conflict and negotiation with the *Estado da Índia*. The praises the Malabari scholar assigns to this sovereign does not fit other historical records and, depending on the period Zayn al-Din finally concluded his work, Sultan Adil Shah could have already been dead and replaced by his heir, Ali Adil Shah.[93] Other Muslim rulers he admonishes for their disinterest in religious observance and also for abandoning their brothers in faith to suffer under the Franks, preferring to indulge themselves in mundane pleasures.[94] However, the ruler who more often features in his narrative is actually the Zamorin, the Hindu sovereign of Calicut and, technically, an infidel. As Mahmood Kooria examined, earlier and contemporary Islamic writings regard the Hindu ruler of Calicut as the one possessing the moral and political

qualities to govern over the Muslims in Malabar.[95] Other rulers, such as the Muslim Rajas of Cannanor, are portrayed as corrupt and illegitimate because of their agreements with the Portuguese. Conversely, Zayn al-Din's own political project was to bring his region under the stewardship of powerful Islamic rulers to the north.[96] Bouchon understands his distancing from the local allegiance to Hindu rulers as inspired by the victory —and ultimate destruction— of Vijayanagar by a coalition of the Deccan sultanates.[97] Ultimately, this vision of a Malabar under one of those Sultans failed to materialize, but such a bold proposal itself signals, as Renu Elizabeth Abraham states in her recently concluded dissertation on Kerala (Malabar) in the sixteenth century, "a disintegration of at least a section of the MŌppilas from the local political order in the aftermath of the Portuguese arrival in the Indian Ocean".[98]

Zayn al-Din presents an even more unidimensional story about the main antagonists in his narrative. No other known Arabic historical work from that time was as thoroughly focused on describing the actions of the Portuguese, from their arrival to what this signified and entailed for Muslims.[99] However, the text maintains the same stereotypical portrayal of the 'disgraced' (*makhdhūl*) Franks of other histories without providing any of the details seen in some smaller accounts. As Sanjay Subrahmanyam noted, the whole narrative lacks relevant information on its main topic: the Portuguese.[100] No personal names are given and no information on Portugal is provided, referring to it only as a place of origin.

Conclusion

More than an account of events, the Arabic histories examined here are a direct outcome of the circumstances they narrate, conceived to play an active role in changing their course. They highlight a more multifaceted process of long-distance integration in the Early Modern world, often centered on European sea voyages. The people on the coast of the Indian Ocean were not mere spectators of these events. They informed themselves, interpreted events, and acted following them, influencing the reality in which they lived. Their historical accounts on the Portuguese encroachment are by definition a product of the dynamics of cross-cultural interaction that, as Kapil Raj states, "was a constitutive condition for the very possibility of sustained European presence in new and unfamiliar spaces".[101] In the two chronicles examined in this article, writing about the past was not merely a retelling of events that included the recent incursion by the "disgraced" Franks as part of their narrative. The very purpose of these histories is centered on challenging the constraining circumstances generated by this foreign transgression on the pre-existing order in the Swahili Coast and in Malabar.

Notes

[1] Christopher D. Bahl, “Transoceanic Arabic historiography: sharing the past of the sixteenth-century western Indian Ocean,” *Journal of Global History* 15, no. 2 (2020): 204.

[2] In the Swahili Coast, oral narratives were the primary form of transmitting dynastic genealogies from generation to generation. See Adrien Delmas, “Writing in Africa. The Kilwa Chronicle and other Sixteenth-Century Portuguese Testimonies,” in *The Arts and Crafts of Literacy, Islamic Manuscript Cultures in Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. Andrea Brigaglia and Mauro Nobili (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 199-200. In Kerala (called Malabar in Arabic), the *granthāvaris* (a form of record keeping produced by Hindu ruling houses) could be used as a reference material on historical events by local Muslims. See Renu Elizabeth Abraham, “History Writing and Global Encounters in Sixteenth-Century Kerala,” (PhD diss., University of Kent, University of Porto, 2020), 55, https://kar.kent.ac.uk/84828.

[3] See Robert Bertram Serjeant, *The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast: Hadrami Chronicles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).

[4] See Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “A View from Mecca: Notes on Gujarat, the Red Sea, and the Ottomans, 1517–39/923–946 H.,” *Modern Asian Studies* 51, no. 2 (2017).

[5] Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial eyes: Travel writing and transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 7.

[6] José Manuel Santos Pérez, “História Global, História Mundial. Alguns aspectos da formação histórica de um mundo globalizado,” in *Histórias Conectadas. Ensaios sobre história global, comparada e colonial na Idade Moderna (Brasil, Ásia e América Hispânica)* (Rio de Janeiro: Autografia, 2016), 20-21.

[7] Natalie Zemon Davis, “Decentering history: Local stories and cultural crossings in a global world,” *History and Theory* 50, no. 2 (2011): 190.

[8] Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “On World Historians in the Sixteenth Century,” *Representations* 91 (Summer 2005): 26.

[9] Sebastian Conrad, *What Is Global History?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 32-33.

[10] See Giuseppe Marcocci, *Indios, chinos, falsarios: las historias del mundo en el Renacimiento* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2019).

[11] See Bahl, “Transoceanic Arabic historiography”.

[12] Hodgson criticizes McNeill's *Rise of the West* as the paradigmatic example of Eurocentric history. Marshall GS. Hodgson, *Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam and World History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 93-94.

[13] Hodgson, 27.

[14] Luís Filipe R. Thomaz, *De Ceuta a Timor* (Lisboa: Difel, 1994), 176.

[15] Alam and Subrahmanyam, “A View from Mecca,” 256-257.

[16] “The principal agents in this extension of the medieval Muslim world were not sultans, soldiers, or scholars but ordinary, humdrum traders whose main objective was not to spread their faith but to turn a profit.” Sebastian R. Prange, *Monsoon Islam: Trade and Faith on the Medieval Malabar Coast* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 3.

[17] Prange considers the legend of a Cheraman Perumal, the Kerala (Malabar) king who converted to

Islam at the hands of the prophet, a "creative effort to bridge the divide between the global and the local, to designate a place for Islam within the social and political landscape of medieval South India." Prange, *Monsoon Islam*, 6-7. Chittick mentions the accounts of conversion in East Africa dating back to the first centuries of Islam, but basically discards these as evidence alongside more solid archeological data from much later periods. Neville Chittick, "Kilwa and the Arab Settlement of the East African Coast," *The Journal of African History* 4, no. 2 (1963): 181.

[18] Geoff Wade, "Islam Across the Indian Ocean to 1500 CE," in *Early Global Interconnectivity Across the Indian Ocean World, Volume II: Exchange of Ideas, Religions, and Technologies*, ed. Angela Schottenhammer (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 94.

[19] Engseng Ho, "The Two Arms of Cambay: Diasporic Texts of Ecumenical Islam in the Indian Ocean," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 50, no. 2-3, (2007): 351.

[20] Ho, "The Two Arms of Cambay," 352.

[21] Thomaz, *De Ceuta a Timor*, 174-175.

[22] Prange, *Monsoon Islam*, 121-123.

[23] Daniel G. König, *Arabic-Islamic Views of the Latin West: Tracing the Emergence of Medieval Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 330.

[24] The pilot that guided the first Portuguese fleet to India has been identified as the Arab navigator Ahmad ibn Majid, but this identification is probably incorrect and it is more likely that he was from Gujarat. See Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Europe's India: Words, People, Empires, 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 81, 291.

[25] Subrahmanyam, *Europe's India*, 269.

[26] Jorge Flores, "Floating Franks: The Portuguese and their empire as seen from early modern Asia," in *The Routledge History of Western Empires*, ed. Robert Aldrich and Kirsten McKenzie (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 35.

[27] Giuseppe Marcocci, *A consciência de um império: Portugal e o seu mundo (sécs. XV-XVII)* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2012), 79.

[28] Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Taking stock of the Franks: South Asian views of Europeans and Europe, 1500–1800," *The Indian Economic & Social History Review* 42, no.1 (2005): 73.

[29] Sanjay Subrahmanyam & Muzaffar Alam, "A Handful of Swahili Coast Letters, 1500–1520," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 52, no. 2 (2019): 256. The letters analyzed by the authors in this article are part of a series of documents in Arabic characters preserved in the Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo in Lisbon. They are found mostly in the section entitled "Collection of Letters" ranging from the year 1440 until 1690 (Colecção de Cartas 1499/1690) grouped together under the number 891.1, subtitled "Documents in Arabic characters from the East" (*Documentos em caracteres árabes provenientes do* Oriente) PT/TT/CART/891.1, available in digitized format at https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/details?id=3908183

[30] Aziz Al-Azmeh, "Barbarians in Arab Eyes," *Past & Present* 134, no. 1 (February 1992): 4-5.

[31] Al-Azmeh, "Barbarians in Arab Eyes," 5-6.

[32] Flores, *The Routledge History of Western Empires*, 35.

[33] Prange identifies this as "a prominent theme in Islamic historiography: both the Crusades and the Mongol devastation had been portrayed by Arab historians (not entirely without reason) as the result

of discord within the Muslim community." Prange, *Monsoon Islam*, 147.

[34] This pattern can be traced back to the aftermath of the first Crusade, as König notes that "Arabic-Islamic authors writing on the crusades often combine the ethnonym 'Franks' with an almost ritualized curse." König, *Arabic-Islamic Views of the Latin West*, 291

[35] Jean Aubin, *Le latin et l'astrolabe: recherches sur le Portugal de la Renaissance, son expansion en Asie et les relations internationales* (Lisboa & Paris: Centre Culturel Calouste Gulbenkian/ Commission Nationale pour les Commémorations des Découvertes Portugaises, 2000), 160.

[36] Marcocci, *A consciência de um império*, 47.

[37] João Teles Cunha, ""Dares & Tomares" no Orientalismo Português," in *Estudos orientais, Volume Comemorativo do Primeiro Decénio do Instituto de Estudos Orientais (2002-2012)*, ed. Eva-Maria von Kemnitz (Lisboa: Universidade Católica Editora, 2012), 136-137.

[38] Teles Cunha, 146.

[39] Ibid, 139-140.

[40] Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Impérios em Concorrência: Histórias conectadas nos séculos XVI e XVII* (Lisboa: ICS, 2012), 62.

[41] Luís Adão da Fonseca, "The Idea of Crusade in Medieval Portugal: Political Aims and Ideological Framing," in *Crusading on the edge*, ed. Torben Kjersgaard Nielsen and Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), 187-188.

[42] Mohamed Hameed Al-Salman, "Arabian Gulf in the Era of Portuguese Dominance: A Study in Historical Sources," *Liwa* 4, no. 7 (June 2012): 25.

[43] These attitudes towards infidels (Muslims, but also Jews to a certain degree) contrasts with a certain interest in different groups of pagans in order to convert them. Marcocci, *A consciência de um império*, 98-99.

[44] Al-Salman.

[45] Marcocci, *Indios, chinos, falsarios*, 52-53.

[46] Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Intertwined Histories: Crónica and Tārīkh in the Sixteenth-Century Indian Ocean World," *History and Theory* 49 (December 2010): 135.

[47] Fonseca, *Crusading on the edge*, 177.

[48] Luís Filipe R. Thomaz, "The Portuguese control over Indian Ocean and the *cartaz* system," in *Os mares do oriente: a presença Portuguesa circa 1507*, ed. João Abel da Fonseca and Luís Couto Soares (Lisboa: Academia de Marinha, 2011), 297.

[49] Thomaz, *De Ceuta a Timor,* 173-174.

[50] Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia*: *A Political and Economic History, 1500–1700* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 62.

[51] "Carta de Affonso de Albuquerque ao Rei Dom Manuel I em que dá conta de como mandou liberar Chaul, onde estava cativo o embaixador de Preste João, e da recepção do mesmo em Goa, 1512, Dezembro 16" (Torre do Tombo, Gaveta 15, maço 19, n.º 23) in *Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, seguidas de documentos que as elucidam,* vol. I, ed. Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato (Lisboa: Academia Real das Ciências de Lisboa, 1884), 384.

[52] The Estado da Índia comprised all Portuguese possessions east of the Cape of Good Hope.

[53] Dietmar Rothermund, *Violent Traders: Europeans in Asia in the Age of Mercantilism* (Delhi: Manohar, 2014), 68.

[54] Philippe Beaujard, *The Worlds of the Indian Ocean: Vol. 2, From the Seventh Century to the Fifteenth Century CE: A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 607.

[55] The extent and significance of the blockade's impact are still debated among modern historians, particularly in regard to the first decade of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, as discussed in Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Rethinking the Establishment of the *Estado da Índia*, 1498–1509," in *Empires Between Islam and Christianity, 1500-1800* (New York: SUNY Press, 2019), 26-55.

[56] Subrahmanyam, 41.

[57] "The Portuguese had understood that they did not have the means to prevent spices from reaching the Mediterranean, but they also understood it was in their interests to allow a certain amount to make its way to the Ottomans because they did not have the means to furnish the coral, the gold dust, the copper, the gold and silver specie, the opium, the madder, or the brocades needed by India and that Indian merchants could not obtain elsewhere than at the ports of the Red Sea." Michel Tuchscherer, "Trade and Port Cities in the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden Region in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century," in *Modernity and Culture*, ed. Leila Fawaz and C. A. Bayly (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 35-36.

[58] Rothermund, *Violent Traders*, 69.

[59] Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia*, 82.

[60] These authors' positions appear to arrive from a consensus among religious scholars. Abraham states that "Muslim *ulama* from distinct parts of the Indian Ocean world seem to have adopted a similar stance – of war and non-cooperation – toward various European powers." Abraham, *History Writing and Global Encounters in Sixteenth-Century Kerala*, 212.

[61] Michael Honig, "Portuguese Maritime Meddling in the Indian Ocean," *Endeavours* 3 (2010): 46.

[62] Sebastian R. Prange, "A trade of no dishonor: piracy, commerce, and community in the western Indian Ocean, twelfth to sixteenth century," *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 5 (2011): 1277.

[63] While recognizing technical and institutional advantages, Prange maintains that the Portuguese disproportionate power over oceanic circulation "cannot be simply attributed to their introducing politics in the Indian Ocean world." Prange, *Monsoon Islam*, 1292.

[64] Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Morality and Empire: Cases, Norms, and Exceptions in Sixteenth-Century Portuguese Asia," in *A Historical Approach to Casuistry: Norms and Exceptions in a Comparative Perspective*, ed. Carlo Ginzburg and Lucio Biasiori (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019), 221.

[65] Ana Roque, "The Sofala Coast (Mozambique) in the 16th Century: between the African trade routes and Indian Ocean trade," in *Fluid Networks and Hegemonic Powers in the Western Indian Ocean*, ed. Iain Walker, Manuel João Ramos, and Preben Kaarsholm (Lisboa: Centro de Estudos Internacionais, 2017), 22.

[66] "Bahl, "Transoceanic Arabic historiography," 204.

[67] Alam and Subrahmanyam, "A View from Mecca," 315.

[68] Gwyn Campbell, "The Role of Kilwa in the Trade of the Western Indian Ocean," in *Connectivity in motion: island hubs in the Indian Ocean world*, ed. Burkhard Schnepel and Edward A. Alpers (Cham:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 112.

[69] Stéphane Pradines, Françoise Le Guennec-Coppens, and Sophie Mery, "L'art de la guerre chez les Swahili: les premiers forts d'Afrique orientale," *Journal des africanistes* 72, no. 2 (2002): 82.

[70] Campbell, *Connectivity in motion*, 112.

[71] Ibid, 116-117.

[72] Elias Saad, "Kilwa dynastic historiography: a critical study," *History in Africa* 6 (1979): 194.

[73] Delmas, *The Arts and Crafts of Literacy, Islamic Manuscript Cultures in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 119.

[74] *Al-sulwa fī tārīkh Kilwa* (Sultana Oman: Wazira al-Turath al-Qawmi w al-Taqatha, 1980), 48.

[75] *Al-sulwafī tārīkh Kilwa*, 50-51.

[76] Ibid.

[77] S. Arthur Strong, "The History of Kilwa," *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* (1895): 401.

[78] Muhammad Rukn was a rich merchant respected by the Kilwa community, but he did not possess aristocratic ancestry, although the Kilwa Chronicle did not mention this fact explicitly. *Al-sulwa fī tārīkh Kilwa*, 52. Other sources from the period attest to his lack of nobility, such as the letter written by his son to the king of Portugal. PT/TT/CART/891.1/46, https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/details?id=3908227.

[79] Ibid, 53.

[80] Joam de Barros, *Asia de Joam de Barros* (Lisboa: Bermão Balharde, 1552), 97-99.

[81] Delmas, *The Arts and Crafts of Literacy*, 187.

[82] Mahmood Kooria, "An Abode of Islam under a Hindu King: Circuitous Imagination of Kingdoms among Muslims of Sixteenth-Century Malabar," *Journal of Indian Ocean World Studies* 1, no. 1 (2017): 90.

[83] Barros, *Asia de Joam de Barros*, 111; Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, *História do descobrimento & conquista da India pelos portugueses*, *Livro Primeiro* (Coimbra: João de Barreyra & João Alvarez, 1552), 40; Gaspar Correia, *Lendas da India, Tomo I,* ed. Rodrigo José de Lima Felner (Lisboa: Academia Real das Sciencias, 1858), 80.

[84] Kooria, "An Abode of Islam.," 93.

[85] Ayel Amer, "The rise of jihadic sentiments and the writing of history in sixteenth-century Kerala," *The Indian Economic and Social History Review* 53, no. 3 (2016): 4.

[86] Engseng Ho, "Empire through Diasporic Eyes: A View from the Other Boat," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46 (2004): 223-224.

[87] Prange, *Monsoon Islam*, 155; Genevieve Bouchon, "Sixteenth Century Malabar and the Indian Ocean," in *India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800*, ed. Ashin Das Gupta and Michael N. Pearson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 175.

[88] Mahmood Kooria compares Zayn al-Din's work with other non-historical accounts of the struggle

with the Portuguese, such as his grandfather's (Ibrahim Zayn al-Din) poetic 'sermon' *Tahrīḍ ahl al-imān and the qaṣīda* (ode or poem) *Fatḥ al-mubīn* by Muhammad al-Kalikuti. Mahmood Kooria, "An Abode of Islam.," 92.

[89] Zayn al-Din, *Tuhfat al-mujāhidīn fī baʿḍ aḥwāl al-purtughālīyīn,* in David Lopes, *História dos Portugueses no Malabar por Zinadím* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1898), 4-5; see also the English translation for comparison, Zaynuddin Makhdum, *Tuḥfat al-mujāhidīn fī baʿḍ akhbār al-Burtughālīyīn of Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn*, ed. and trans. S. Muhammad Husayn Nainar (Calicut: Other Books, 2006), 37.

[90] David Lopes, *História dos Portugueses no Malabar por Zinadím*, 4-5.

[91] David Lopes, *História dos Portugueses no Malabar por Zinadím*, 5.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Kooria convincingly argues that Zayn al-Din might have confused the sultan Adil Shah with his son, Ali Adil Shah, whose attitude towards the Portuguese was more hostile at the beginning of his rule. Kooria, "An Abode of Islam.," 101.

[94] Besides the Zamorin, the other exception of rulers resisting the Portuguese is the Sultan Ali Al-Ashi from Aceh, who "conquered Sumatra and made it an abode of Islam (*dār Islām*)." See Zayn al-Din, *História dos Portugueses no Malabar por Zinadím*, 68.

[95] David Lopes, *História dos Portugueses no Malabar por Zinadím*, 92

[96] Amer, "The rise in jihadic sentiments.," 16-17.

[97] Bouchon, *India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800*, 179.

[98] Abraham, *History Writing and Global Encounters in Sixteenth-Century Kerala*, 207.

[99] Ibid, 3.

[100] Subrahmanyam, "Taking stock of the Franks," 72.

[101] Kapil Raj, "Spaces of Circulation and Empires of Knowledge: Ethnolinguistics and Cartography in Early Colonial India," in *Empires of Knowledge: Scientific Networks in the Early Modern World*, ed. Paula Findlen (New York: Routledge, 2019), 272.

Public displays of Power and Respect.

A global perspective on two "oriental" embassies to France in the eighteenth century

By

Anna V. Breidenbach

Abstract

The following article examines two ambassadorships to France that were received at the court of the ailing Louis XIV in 1714/15 and of the minor King Louis XV in 1720/21. It looks at the formal displays of power and respect during the mission of the Persian ambassador Mohammed Reza Beg and of the Ottoman ambassador Mehmed Efendi. Both ambassadors, perceived as "oriental" *in the eyes of their hosts, were structured by French protocol that set up rules for the ambassadorial stay. By perceiving diplomacy in its dialectical character, this article assesses the interplay between the requirements of the French court and the reactions and actions of the ambassadors themselves. While the article looks at parallels between the missions, it also suggests that the Persian ambassador's actions as well as his reception in France influenced the Ottoman ambassadorship to France five years later. By comparing the two legations, the presented research takes up a global perspective on the development of diplomacy in early modern times. In so doing, the article aims to contribute to a "new diplomatic history" that moves away from Eurocentrism by taking into consideration the impact of the perceptions of and connections between two* ambassadeurs orienteaux.

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Introduction

In the 1720s, two books were published in France that became very popular, as they met the European reader's taste for "oriental" culture.[1] In 1721, the Baron de Montesquieu published the *Lettres persannes*, a fictional adaptation of the journey of Mohammed Reza Beg, who came to the French court as an ambassador of the Persian Shah in 1714. Six years later, Germain de Saint-Poullain took this book as a model and published a letter-style book about the adventures of Nedim Coggia, a fictional secretary to the Ottoman ambassador Yirmisekiz Mehmed Efendi, who came to France in 1721.[2]

Imagining what the foreign guests had thought about French customs and culture and thereby experiencing the literary effect of defamiliarization was popular among European readers in the early eighteenth century. Plenipotentiaries from faraway countries frequently aroused the curiosity of those who did not know what life outside their home countries was like. After the success of the *Lettres persannes*, the *Lettres de Nedim Coggia* drew a clear literary line from the Persian to the Ottoman visitor. It followed a successful blueprint – for the readership, both an Ottoman and a Persian visitor to the French court were seen as "oriental", individually different, but still comparable.[3]

Besides the intertextual references between their literary adaptations, the question remains whether a connection can also be seen between the two events themselves. Even though both missions had been highly anticipated and were of great public interest, they still had different aims. While Mohammed Reza Beg's stay in France aimed for the conclusion of a contract between the Safavid Empire and France, Mehmed Efendi's stay was meant to be a symbolic demonstration of Franco-Ottoman friendship, interpreted mainly as the manifestation of a changing Ottoman strategy regarding the "West". As the Ottoman Empire suffered severe military defeats at the end of the seventeenth century, the Sultan and his officials at the Sublime Porte changed their foreign policy from military conquest to the adoption of diplomatic relations and started to open up to "western" culture.[4]

The following article focuses on a revision of this view of the Ottoman mission, suggesting that it cannot be simply understood as merely an adaption to the West. By expanding the perspective regarding the Ottoman mission, this article takes into consideration that it was not only Europe, but also the Safavid Empire that was of concern for the Sultan and his counsellors. This work thus shows that the Ottoman mission and its representation in the *sefaretname*, its official report, was influenced and shaped not only through the requirements of the French court as a host, but also by the Persian embassy that had preceded it. To achieve this, the article is structured into two parts. First, the importance of the geographical setting of the Ottoman Empire as a transit zone between the Persian Empire and France will be outlined, suggesting that diplomatic relations between them were always of concern for the Ottoman Sultan. Leading up to the beginning of the eighteenth century, I will show that Ottoman authorities did indeed know about the Persian ambassador and his reception in France.

Against this background, I will further analyse the course of the ambassadorial stay, comparing Mohammed Reza Beg and Mehmed Efendi. On the one hand, the many similarities between the two missions' diplomatic procedures, due to the protocol determined by the French government, will be stressed. On the other hand, I will show how the ambassadors behaved differently in relation to the French protocol, negotiating between following procedures and acting against them. Special focus will be put upon the tension between the requirements of the hosting state and the interpretation of each guest, perceiving the diplomatic procedures in their "dialectical character". Taking all this into consideration, I will demonstrate that the Ottoman mission can be perceived as a symbolic policy designed to show a friendly inclination towards the French state, while at the same time clearly distinguishing itself from its Persian predecessor.

"European" diplomacy and "oriental" ambassadors

It is important to first explore the "style" of foreign policy in early modern times, which has been subject to classification and, more importantly, hierarchisation regarding the relationships between European and non-European states within historical studies. Traditionally, western scholars have assumed that from the fifteenth until the seventeenth century, a "European" style of diplomacy, namely the institution of the "resident ambassador", had been established, resulting in a tight European diplomatic network following an elaborated protocol.[5] Non-European realms and states were regarded as not taking part in this system.[6]

Since the 1980s, however, two major developments contributed to a more differentiated historical view on the nature of diplomatic relations in early modern times. On the one hand, historians of diplomacy, influenced by new cultural theories, began to envision diplomacy not as a fixed game with firm rules, but as a cultural act evolving in a reciprocal way during the encounters between plenipotentiaries of different states. Historians began to acknowledge that it was only during the latter half of the seventeenth century, after the peace treaty of Westphalia, that certain elements of diplomatic protocol became widely accepted within Europe. By 1700, the institutionalisation of diplomacy was still developing by practice.[7]

Historians today focus on the processual character of diplomatic relations in early modern times and envision the possibilities of different actors to take part in the shaping of diplomatic relations. A "diplomatic protocol" is therefore perceived as a sign system that was developed through an interplay of different actors. Hosting rulers did formulate requirements, but the ambassadors could also shape the rules regarding their reception.[8] It was also through the "widened scope"[9] of postcolonial studies that scholars engaging in diplomatic history began to acknowledge the integral part the relations with those political entities in greater distance to the "European" actors played in the growing practice of diplomacy.[10]

It is in the context of the dominant role France took up during the seventeenth century that a widening of the scope and therefore a global perspective becomes important for the historian working on diplomatic relations in early modern times. During the developing process of diplomacy, France under Louis XIV became a powerful state, dominating the European powers and also developing a growing colonial rule outside of Europe. Therefore, France took a leading role in the development of diplomacy on a global scale. At the court of Louis XIV, a thorough protocol with strict rules for the public acts of diplomacy was established, which soon became a role model for other European courts.[11]

Still, the "*ambassadeurs orienteaux*", as the Ottoman, Persian, but also North African ambassadorships were called in the French court of Louis XIV, were not marginalized in this game.[12] Of course, interactions with ambassadors from regimes regarded as "*orientaux*" did not take place at the same frequency as with plenipotentiaries of neighbouring states. But as "*ambassadeurs*", they were regarded as belonging to the highest of the different ranks of envoys.[13]

In summary, it is important to not perceive a "European diplomatic system" as some sort of container the "*ambassadeurs orienteaux*" would simply adapt to.[14] In the following analysis, the requirements of the French diplomatic protocol will be perceived as a "contact zone" in which plenipotentiaries from different rulers met and communicated, focusing on how the ambassadorships were shaped by different actors.[15]

Sending a Persian ambassador

Mohammed Reza Beg, ambassador to the Persian Shah, came to France in 1714 to obtain the ratification of a treaty between the Shah and the French king. It was designed to secure French support, through vessels and money, against pirates threatening the Shah's rule in Persia. In return, French merchants were to obtain trade privileges in Persia.[16] The treaty can be perceived as the result of a gradual increase of entrepreneurial engagement of French merchants as well as missionaries from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century.[17] They travelled to Persia, brought back goods and stories, and pleaded for the support of the French government for protection regarding their missions.[18] One reason for the merchants and missionaries' repeated pleas for support were the dangers of the journey from France to Persia, as well as the insecure status of the foreigners on Persian territory. French merchants were not protected from crimes such as robbery and put themselves in great danger, as the Shahs of the Persian Empire had not adopted a policy of permanent diplomacy, which would allow for residential ambassadors to represent the interests of their subjects.[19]

In this, the location of the Ottoman Empire in between the territories of Persia and France cannot be underestimated – not merely because French and Persian subjects had to cross Ottoman territory to reach the other's shores. It is also important to note that France enjoyed the privilege of a residential embassy at the Ottoman court, a tradition reaching

back to the fifteenth century.[20] The French ambassador at the Sublime Porte as a key figure in the Franco-Ottoman-Persian relationships did not only work for the interests of French subjects on Ottoman soil, but also supported French subjects travelling to Persia. This is recorded in the official "*instructions aux ambassadeurs*" that were given to each ambassador who took up the position at the Ottoman court. As early as the time of Charles de Ferriol, who was ambassador from 1699 to 1709, ambassadors were given the instruction to work for the protection of Christian missionaries going to Persia.[21] Pierre des Alleurs, who came to Constantinople in 1709, worked as a contact person for Mohammed Reza Beg and organised his travel to France.[22] When Louis Usson de Bonnac took up the position in 1716, it was remarked that he could rely on the practice of his predecessors regarding the protection of French subjects travelling to Persia.[23] Here, the tradition of the ambassador at the Porte, working for the interest of French subjects in Persia, is explicitly noted. After the ratification of the treaty of commerce was completed, Louis Usson de Bonnac received further instructions and was asked to make sure that the agreement settled during Beg's stay would be put into practice, to the advancement of French merchants on Persian soil.[24]

It was mostly French merchants that were interested in improving the relations between the French and the Persian State during the seventeenth century. From the perspective of the Persian Savafid Shah, an alliance with powerful France became important only at the beginning of the eighteenth century, as Safavid rule under Shah Hussein (1668-1726) was threatened by rebel groups and pirates.[25] In a treaty that was first signed in the city of Isfahan in 1709, privileges for French merchants trading in the Persian Empire were to be secured in exchange for sending French military vessels as support for the Shah. Although the treaty was brought back to Louis XIV, he did not ratify it immediately.[26] To secure the ratification, Shah Hussein decided to send an ambassador to the French court. He delegated the task of choosing the appropriate candidate to the governors of Erivan, one of his provinces. It was the governor who appointed Mohammed Reza Beg, the *kalender*[27] of the province and third in rank of the provincial government.[28]

Mohammed Reza Beg's coming was announced to the French court in 1712 through Pierre des Alleurs.[29] This French ambassador at the Porte was aware of the dangers Beg would face when he crossed Ottoman soil on his way to France. Officially, the two empires were at peace since 1639, but still they were rivals in a struggle about Islamic hegemony. The Safavid Shahs were the leaders of the Shiites, while the Ottoman Sultans promoted the Sunni form of Islam. Neither side was interested in an alliance or friendly relations– rather the contrary.[30] The Persian and the Ottoman rulers mistrusted each other, as demonstrated in the occurrences during Mohammed Reza Beg's journey to France in 1714.

When Beg crossed Ottoman territory during his travels, he was in contact with Pierre des Alleurs, who advised him to continue his journey by ship from Smyrne to France as fast as possible. But Beg hesitated and even went to Constantinople to meet the French ambassador. There, he was taken as prisoner by the Ottoman authorities, who questioned

him about the purpose of his journey. It was only thanks to Pierre des Alleurs that Beg could leave the prison and continue his journey.[31]

At this point, a remark on the sources concerning the Persian ambassador has to be made. Since no personal record of his travels exist, it is not possible to retrace the personal motivations behind each of Beg's actions. For example, it is unclear why Beg did not continue his travels as fast as possible. The surviving French records only note that Beg insisted upon coming to Constantinople even when he was warned that this could be dangerous for him.[32] It is through the eyes of his hosts and through the perspectives of his companion from Constantinople on, Étienne Padéry, that his actions are recorded. The research presented in this article therefore can only refer to an outside view of his actions and is cautious not to interpret too much upon the motivations attested to him by the French. Still, it is important to know how the French would judge Mohammed Reza Beg as it is this judgement that would be known to Mehmed Efendi later and that he would react to. The self-representation of the Ottoman ambassador therefore has to be seen in relation to what the French had thought of Mohammed Reza Beg, and not what the latter's intention had been.

Étienne Padéry, a Dragoman (interpreter) at the Ottoman court who was sent to France to provide Beg with company and support, wrote of his travels with Beg in a report meant for the French authorities at the Sublime Porte. Padéry was well acquainted with the French language and French culture. He played an important role during the ambassadorship as he was translating between the Persian ambassadors and the French authorities.[33] Padéry joined Mohammed Reza Beg and travelled with him to France after the ambassador had been released from Ottoman imprisonment.

Although the occurrences of Mohammed Reza Beg's journey to France have only been summarized above, his adventures serve to illustrate the tensions in Ottoman-Persian relations that pose an important outset for the comparison of the two embassies. The short imprisonment Beg suffered during his journey indicates a relationship between the Persian and the Ottoman Empire that was marked by suspicion and mistrust at the turn of the eighteenth century.

Sending an Ottoman ambassador

Jumping forward to the Ottoman embassy that was sent to France in 1721, the outset of this mission could not have been more different. The aim of the Ottoman authorities was not the conclusion of a treaty of commerce or about military support. Instead, the mission was designed to reinforce a "traditional French-Ottoman friendship".[34] The ambassador, Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed Efendi, was instructed to show interest in French science and culture, and to record his stay in a *sefaretname*, an official account of his journey that was designed to be presented at the Ottoman court and eventually published in print.[35] Indeed, Mehmed Efendi brought back many European inventions, innovations, and ideas.[36] He had

already gained experience on previous diplomatic missions, as he had been present at the negotiations around the Peace Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718. On this occasion, he had been in contact with different European ministers, and he had worked closely with the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha, who was also the driving force behind the organisation of the mission.[37]

By 1716, the Grand Vizier had approached Louis Usson de Bonnac, Pierre des Alleurs' successor as French ambassador at the Porte, with the idea of sending an ambassador to France. The motivation to send an ambassador has been interpreted as a means of "opening up" to the West, a change in Ottoman outer policy at the turn of the eighteenth century. The Ottoman empire had suffered severe territorial losses at the end of the seventeenth century and could not continue with the strategy of keeping outer relations through military conquest. Mehmed Efendi's embassy can be seen as part of this new strategy that was taken up especially by Ibrahim Pasha, to pursue diplomatic relations with other powerful states. Choosing France seemed natural, from the Ottoman perspective, as their relations were traditionally close through the French ambassadorship at the Porte.[38]

Louis Usson de Bonnac also supported the idea of an Ottoman mission to France that would symbolically demonstrate the friendship between the two states. He enjoyed a high reputation at the Ottoman court and was instructed to strengthen the connection to the Sultan, as the Ottoman empire was seen as an important counterbalance to the growing continental power of the Habsburg monarchs. When he took up his post, the power constellation on the continent was shifting. Louis XIV had died in 1715, shortly after he had received Mohammed Reza Beg in the mirror room in Versailles, and the minor King Louis XV was still under the guardianship of his uncle, the Duc d´Orléans.[39]

It is important to note that the ambassadorship was set on a symbolic level. It was planned to demonstrate a friendship between the two powers – a friendship that was important for the French as counterbalance to the Habsburgs, and for the Ottoman government as a support in a time where Ottoman military power was starting to decline. This aim could be achieved through acts that were perceived publicly, and that would be transported throughout the world. Thus, the public diplomatic procedures, that were designed to be seen, perceived, and interpreted by some sort of spectatorship, were the decisive elements through which the success of the Ottoman mission would be tangible.[40] Furthermore, it was important that the ambassadorship would be recorded in the media transporting news throughout Europe, including books that would be written about these events, as well as early newspaper reports.[41] To influence the way that he himself —as well as the empire he represented— would be remembered, Efendi had to take care to be perceived, during the public procedures but also in the media, as an agreeable guest. He complemented this further through his own record that would be published shortly after his stay.[42]

Although Efendi's ambassadorship has been traditionally viewed as an adaption to French customs,[43] I argue that there is a second dimension that must be taken into

account, which played an important role for Efendi's travels and his comportment in France. The difficulty in accomplishing his task was that Efendi would be seen in line with other *ambassadeurs orienteaux* that had come to the French court before. In the past, the visits of those delegates had always been characterised by troubles. The last time an Ottoman ambassador, Süleiman Aga, had come to the French court in 1669, he had refused to receive a letter from the French king that was handed to him while the French king stayed seated on his throne.[44] In his case, but also in the case of Mohammed Reza Beg, the ambassadors had refused to meet the Christian plenipotentiaries standing and did not accept that the French king as a Christian would remain seated during the audience with them, as they were Muslims.[45] All in all, the reports that circulated about the *ambassadeurs orienteaux* stressed the problematic differences in the diplomatic cultures.[46] In relation to Mehmed Efendi, the most recent example of those rather negatively remembered ambassadors to France was Mohammed Reza Beg. He was known as an eccentric figure who did not comply with French customs, rules, and procedures, instead attempting to transgress those rules whenever he could.[47]

The Ottoman government did know about the course, the reception, and the impact of the Persian mission in France. Even though he tried to keep his destination a secret when he crossed Ottoman territory, Mohammed Reza Beg no longer concealed his identity when he safely arrived in Marseille in October 1714, and reports about his reception reached the Ottoman court.[48]

Taking this into consideration, de Bonnac stressed the importance of the Ottoman ambassador distinguishing himself from previous *ambassadeurs orienteaux* who had come to the French court. Against the backdrop of former negative experiences, de Bonnac advised Ibrahim Pasha to therefore choose a delegate who would be able to show himself as being compliant to French customs instead.[49] Mehmed Efendi was given instructions to make sure that he was seen as more cultivated, as open towards French culture, and as an ambassador that would be able to adapt to French customs.[50]

Efendi made a strong effort to distinguish himself from his younger predecessor, Mohammed Reza Beg. By taking the position of the spectator looking at the formalised, public acts of the embassy that were designed to be seen (and read about), it is thus possible to show how Efendi tried to make himself agreeable to the French and thus working for a friendly approximation between France and the Ottoman Empire while at the same time differing and thus distancing himself from the other “oriental” ambassador Mohammed Reza Beg. One can draw this comparison by considering the *sefaretname* that Efendi completed after returning from his journey, together with the accounts about Beg that were kept by French authorities and by Étienne Padéry during his stay.[51] The following will compare the course and the different elements of the diplomatic events between the two ambassadors. While the self-presentation of Mehmed Efendi in his report serves as a source to see how he described his own comportment and attitude, the analysis will show how Efendi distinguished himself in his sefaretname from the way in which Beg's behavior was perceived in France.

Arriving to France

Both Mohammed Reza Beg and Mehmed Efendi first stepped on French soil in Mediterranean port cities – the former at Marseille, on the 21st of October 1714, and the latter at Toulon on the 22nd of November 1720. While Efendi had to go into quarantine for 40 days at nearby Sète because of a recent outbreak of the plague, Mohammed Reza Beg only had to undergo a short examination in the infirmaries.

Immediately upon his arrival, Mohammed Reza Beg's choleric character was noted by the French officials who received him. He successfully resisted a search through his baggage and insisted upon making a great entrance into the city. Although the city officials tried to dissuade his wishes, indicating that this procedure was not according to French customs, Beg overrode the rules of the protocol and made an entrance into the city with three carriages on the 28th of October.[52]

While staying in the city, an Intendant who received Beg organised a multitude of pastimes for the Persian ambassador, including promenades, evening festivities, and sightseeing tours. In return, the Persian ambassador invited many guests into the house that the Intendant had made available for Beg. He entertained his guests with exquisite dinners that cost his hosts a lot of money, thus making himself known to be of extravagant taste and character. Reports about his behaviour soon reached the high officials of the French court.[53]

Some days after Beg's arrival in France, François Pidou de Saint-Olon came to Marseille, to deliver the official greetings of the king, but also to encourage him to start upon his journey to Paris. Beg again insisted upon staying a few weeks longer in Marseille, adding to the high expenses he already had incurred.[54] It was custom not only in France, but also in the Safavid Empire, to cover the expenses for the foreign guest's lodging and upkeep. The height of the expenses granted to a visitor was therefore to be taken as a scale for the deference bestowed upon the guests.[55]

While Mohammed Reza Beg stood out for his strong will and extravagance from the beginning of his stay in France, Mehmed Efendi presented himself in his *sefaretname* as compliant to all the demands of his hosts regarding his arrival in France. He agreed with the requirement of staying in quarantine in the ruins of an old church for 40 days, and he agreed to the French plans about his journey to Paris by boat, on the Canal du Languedoc.[56]

Efendi's report about his entrance into the city of Toulon is remarkable. As he recounts, he took his entrance into Toulon by horse, where he was greeted by the city Intendant. Furthermore, his entrance was accompanied by a procession of marine officers and captains, including a group of marine musicians:

> The troops under armour were arranged by our sides; the marine musicians with their instruments, like trumpets, tambourines, flutes, played, divided into different groups, and some thousand people followed us on the right and on the left side. With this whole suite we arrived at the Jardin du Roi.[57]

It is striking that Efendi was granted the official entrance into the city that Mohammed Reza Beg had to insist upon. Even though one can imagine that the entrance Efendi enjoyed was not a great procession with many carriages, the ambassador presented it to his audience as a testimony of honour.

The Route to Paris – Expenses and Honours

After their respective stays in the cities of their arrival, Mohammed Reza Beg and Mehmed Efendi both began their journeys to Paris. Again, the reports about Beg's behaviour and Efendi's self-presentation show a great deal of difference. It is remarkable that Efendi balanced his account of his compliance with reports upon the high honours that were granted to him.

This was different to Beg, who quarrelled with the French authorities that accompanied him to Paris upon the honours granted to him. Beg insisted upon travelling with a great entourage, including a group of military men, as well as making a great entrance in all cities he passed on his way to Paris.[58] The Marquis de Torcy, who was in touch with Nicholas de Saint-Olon, asked the latter to hinder Beg in his wishes and to prevent him from making his grand entrances into each city, as it was not according to French protocol. But Saint-Olon maintained that due to the strong will of the ambassador, it was very difficult to stop him from carrying out his wishes.[59]

The great expenses that Beg incurred during his journey posed a second problem during the ambassador's journey to Paris. The correspondence between Torcy and Saint-Olon shows that Beg spent far more money than initially intended to cover his expenses for the lodging and food for the embassy. Repeatedly, the French officials tried to limit those expenses and used different strategies, from persuasion to a clear limit of provisions to, finally, a definite end that was put on Beg's stay later in Paris, when he made no sign of leaving after a lengthy stay.[60]

All in all, it is remarkable that Mohammed Reza Beg seems to have tried to cross the financial boundaries granted to him. He may have aimed to position himself as an exceptional guest to France, requiring a surplus of financial support. This view is stressed by Susan Mokhberi, who interprets parts of Beg's behaviour in France as a means of demonstrating the power and the might of his ruler. Requiring more money and thereby transgressing French customs could be, following her interpretation, seen as a public display of power of the Persian Shah.[61] Still, in the eyes of the French, Beg's comportment was merely seen as pretentious; he would forever be remembered as "*insolent et extravagant*".[62]

Comparing this to what Mehmed Efendi writes in his *sefaretname* about financial issues, it is striking that monetary concerns are nearly left out completely. Efendi does not mention any needs that could not be met, nor any restrictions upon his expenses. On the contrary, he always stresses how well he was provided for. There is only one remarkable passage in his report that seems worth noting, keeping in mind that the financial support of the oriental ambassadorships seems to have been a delicate subject. At the end of his stay, he complains about not having been granted an extra sum of money to cover the costs for his travels back to Constantinople. In the edition of the *sefaretname* translated by Veinstein, a comment by Bonnac is put into a footnote, remarking that this was an inappropriate complaint. This slight indication makes it possible to see that the report was shaped by an awareness of its public character – there might have been some inconveniences for Efendi that he would not dare to write about in his *sefaretname*.[63] Still, those remarks were very slight and seldom, and Efendi was careful not to endanger his overall praising tone.

Taking into consideration that Beg had to insist upon grand entrances into the cities he passed on his way to Paris, it is remarkable that Efendi repeatedly details the warm welcome that was granted to him when he went to each place. First travelling on the Canal du Languedoc, Efendi praises the Canal as being one of the wonders of the world.[64] From Bordeaux, Efendi continued his journey by horse. Upon reaching Paris, he summarises that:

> In all the cities and fortresses that I passed, there was always a troop of soldiers that would be sent to me in advance and that would meet me already on my route. Once I arrived in the city, the soldiers accompanied me with great pomp to my accommodation, where the grands du pays, as well as the consuls, came to congratulate me upon my happy arrival and brought me fruits and confitures.[65]

The two main features of Efendi's self-representation thus can be seen in his modesty and compliance to French customs, arrangements, and to the French protocol in general. In his report, he openly demonstrates his turning towards French culture and customs. By showing this, he differentiates himself greatly from the conduct that was reported from the Persian ambassador, who did not follow French customs and rules but whose demands went beyond the bounds of the French protocol.

Meeting the "Introducteur"

A very important part of the ambassadorial procedure in France during the reign of Louis XIV, and still under Louis XV, was the meeting of the Ambassador with the *introducteur des ambassadeurs*, an office that was held in high regard at the French court. The introducteur had the task of delivering the official greetings from the king and acting as his highest deputy in regard to the reception of *ambassadeurs*. By meeting the *introducteur des ambassadeurs*, the ambassadors were officially acknowledged as legitimate plenipotentiaries in the rank of *ambassadeur en titre*.[66] By looking at the problems during this meeting that occurred in the case of Mohammed Reza Beg, the careful preparation of the same procedure in the case of Mehmed Efendi can be fully understood.

Both ambassadors met the *introducteur des ambassadeurs*, the Baron de Breteuil, when they reached the chateau of Charenton at the outskirts of Paris, the place where the ambassadors traditionally prepared for their official entrance into the city. In the case of Mohammed Reza Beg, the Baron had already been informed by Nicholas de Saint-Olon, who accompanied Beg, about the difficulties regarding the conduct of the Persian ambassador.[67] It was anticipated that Beg would refuse to greet the *introducteur* standing, because he saw it as undignified to greet a Christian standing. Indeed, Beg remained seated during the meeting. This behaviour would be remembered as Beg's biggest offense and a demonstration of disrespect against his hosts.[68]

Against the background of a diplomatic "faux-pax" in the case of his Persian predecessor, it is clear why Mehmed Efendi's meeting with the officials of the young French King Louis XV prepared for his visit carefully and well in advance. The meeting posed a critical situation where Efendi could show his respect or disrespect for the French. Already the meeting with the envoy who was to guide him to Paris, Sr. de la Baune, was prepared with great care, and was also reported in detail in Efendi's sefaretname. He met him shortly after the end of his quarantine, while he was still in Sète.[69] Sr. de la Baune had written a letter in advance in which he delivered his greetings. In this letter, whose content Efendi openly delivered through his report to his readership, he had asked the ambassador to show him all the appropriate signs of honour required from him, writing "as it is custom to give many signs of honour to those who deliver the royal greetings, in consideration of him who sends them, I ask you to observe this custom regarding my person".[70] Efendi met all those requirements as he rose to his feet, even coming towards Sr. de la Baune and greeting him with "toutes hônnettes possible".[71]

In this situation, Mehmed Efendi was able to demonstrate his inclination towards French customs while clearly distancing himself from the behaviour of the Persian ambassador, which had become the topic of public discussion. The meeting with the *introducteur* was not reported in detail. But Efendi does mention the importance of the office, as well as the numerous times they met at Charenton for the preparation of his entrance into the city.[72]

The entrance to Paris

In preparation for their entries into Paris, the ambassadors continued to follow their respective strategies regarding the protocol set by their hosts. Mohammed Reza Beg, unsurprisingly, continued to cause troubles. He managed to push the date of his entrance into the capital a few days behind the date that had been scheduled by the French court – he justified this with reference to astrological constellations that were more favourable at the latter date – insisting upon choosing a "happy" day for his entrance to Paris.[73] He also contested the French requirements concerning the course of the entrance by insisting upon

entering the city on horseback, instead of taking the royal carriage that was put at his disposal for this occasion.[74]

It seems again ostensible that Efendi's *sefaretname* in contrast delivers a thoroughly smooth preparation for his entrance. Remarkably, he also wished to enter the city by horse, and he did not indicate any trouble from his hosts about this wish.[75] On the contrary, Efendi was provided with a number of horses from the royal stables.[76] To the reader of the *sefaretname*, it seems that some of the wishes that Mohammed Reza Beg insisted upon, and that had been interpreted as insults to the French protocol in his case, were granted to Mehmed Efendi without any trouble.

Concerning the royal audience, the preparation of Efendi's meeting with the king can again be seen in relation to the experiences the French court had already had with Beg. When the latter met Louis XIV in the magnificent Mirror Room in Versailles, he again caused a scandal when he refused to first address the Sun King and instead remained silent.[77] When Efendi's audience with the young King Louis XV, alongside his uncle, the Duc d´Orléans, was prepared, the French officials clearly wanted to prevent an irritation like the one that had been caused by Beg before. The *sefaretname* details how Efendi delivered the instructions given to him in advance of the royal audience. It was agreed that the king would greet him standing (a great honour, as we already know). But in exchange, it was explicitly demanded of Efendi to address the king first and to deliver honourable greetings and expressions of friendship from his Sultan.[78]

After their respective audiences with the French king, both Mohammed Reza Beg and Mehmed Efendi, together with their entourage, stayed in the *Hôtel des Ambassadeurs* for a few months. This was the crucial time to fulfil the purposes of their missions. We can once again perceive a great difference in the conduct of the ambassadors, according to the different purposes of their mission. Apart from when he went to the negotiations, Mohammed Reza Beg rarely left the *Hôtel des Ambassadeurs*. He showed no sign of interest in French culture and lifestyle and instead followed a strict daily routine that was centred around religious practice and banqueting. He invited the Parisians to watch himself eating and thus presented himself to the ever-curious spectators in Paris, who soon talked even more about the extravagances the Persian ambassador enjoyed during his meals.[79] On some evenings, he was also invited to dine with members of the French court. On this occasion, he insisted upon bringing his own food, along with his cook who prepared the meals for him.[80]

Mehmed Efendi's conduct may be perceived as the exact opposite of his Persian predecessor. It is important to remember that it was the purpose of Efendi's visit to reinforce the Ottoman-French friendship and to demonstrate openness for French customs and culture. Thus, it is not surprising that Efendi spent his days visiting all sorts of French institutions, buildings, and cultural events, demonstrating a special interest in French architecture and horticulture. He was curious to learn about new scientific methods and knowledge, and his hosts organised a great number of demonstrations and visits for him.[81]

At the same time, Mehmed Efendi himself caused great curiosity among Parisians, just like Mohammed Reza Beg. On the curiosity of people who watched him take his meals, Efendi wrote, "What they desired most was to watch me eat. […] those manners, which were very new to me, embarrassed me very much, but my compliance made me be patient."[82] We can see in this comment that the public attention Efendi received was something rather inconvenient for him. But it was an opportunity for him to demonstrate his goodwill towards the French to let them observe him, as he himself was invited to get to know French culture. It is against the backdrop of Mohammed Reza Beg openly inviting the Parisians to watch him eat, staging his "oriental" manners in the eyes of the spectators, that we can understand why the people in Paris were so very curious to be present at the Ottoman ambassador's meals. Nevertheless, the Ottoman ambassador notes his disappointment about not having been invited by his French hosts to dine with them:

> For honours in words, they were so very liberal that one could take them for the most devoted people of the world. The proverb could be applied here that says: eat our souls, but do not touch our plates.[83]

Such invitations had been offered to Mohammed Reza Beg, who refused to eat the meals the French cooks prepared. It is therefore possible to assume that in the case of Mehmed Efendi, the French were reluctant to invite him, based on their experience with the Persian ambassador.

Conclusion

At the end of his stay, Mehmed Efendi could look back at a successful mission. The French newspapers were full of praise for his behaviour and described him as an agreeable ambassador. His adaptability was remarked by attesting to his "European taste".[84] When he came back to Constantinople in 1721, he had accomplished his mission of demonstrating friendship and inclination towards the French.

Mohammed Reza Beg also succeeded in fulfilling the purpose of his mission. The treaty of friendship and commerce between the Safavid Empire and France was reassessed and ratified during his stay. He returned to Erivan in May 1717, after he took a route through Russia to avoid having to cross Ottoman territory once again.[85] In his absence, however, the power constellations within the Safavid government had changed. His former protector, the Khan of Erivan, had been replaced, as well as some members of the government in Isfahan. Fearing persecution, Beg poisoned himself shortly after his return.[86] The ratification of the treaty would be obtained by Étienne Padéry, who was nominated as delegate by the French authorities to travel as "*Consul*" to Chiraz in 1719.[87]

The outset of this research has been to investigate how the Ottoman ambassadorship of Mehmed Efendi had been influenced by the Persian ambassadorship of Mohammed Reza Beg. From the analysis of the procedure of both the ambassadorial journeys to France, it is

clear that the embassy of Mehmed Efendi was shaped by its predecessor in several ways. Firstly, the choice of the ambassador at the Porte was influenced by the experiences the French court had (and communicated through its ambassador) with Mohammed Reza Beg. Due to the information and the counsel the French ambassador gave, the Ottoman officials made sure to choose a personality of a "new format", who would be able to present himself as open towards French culture, politics, and science.

Mehmed Efendi was extremely successful at this task. He became known as respectful, cultivated, and open towards French culture, noted often in the reports circulating about him after his stay. But Efendi also made a strong effort in his *sefaretname* to present himself the way he wanted to be perceived in France. He agreed upon a lengthy quarantine and upon taking a different route to Paris to avoid the plague. No quarrels with the French officials he met are mentioned in the report, but instead the mutual courtesy during the different interactions is recorded. It is in the way Efendi described his own comportment that he distinguished himself greatly from Mohammed Reza Beg, who became known as eccentric, choleric, and ignorant towards French culture.

On several occasions, Mohammed Reza Beg questioned the requests of his hosts that were designed to structure the ambassadorial stay. He insisted upon public entrances into the French cities that the French officials tried to avoid, as well as upon keeping a high standard of living throughout his stay, costing his hosts a great amount of money. He also questioned the French protocol by refusing to greet the French officials standing and thus managed to display the power of his ruler through the symbolic acts surrounding the diplomatic meetings. His aim was likely to demonstrate the strength of the Persian ruler by not complying to the conditions and requests of his host. On many occasions, he caused outrage among the French officials who dealt with the "stubborn oriental" ambassador. Indeed, he managed to force his hosts to change their plans and to adapt the procedure according to his own wishes many times. Mohammed Reza Beg could insist upon grand entrances into the different French cities, he could change the date for the entrance to Paris, and he could insist upon entering Paris by horse.

With these examples, the "dialectical character" of the diplomatic protocol in early modern times is clearly shown. The possibility to change the protocol is illustrated by the fact Efendi was granted privileges that Beg had to insist upon. All in all, it seems that the reception of Mohammed Reza Beg influenced the ambassadorship of Mehmed Efendi in two different ways. On the one hand, the actual course of events had been subject to change, but on the other, the self-representation of Efendi was shaped by his desire to distinguish himself from the way his predecessor had been perceived in France.

Beg's and Efendi's diplomatic experiences form a contribution to a "new diplomatic history", taking into account relationships outside of Europe that influenced diplomatic procedures. Not only did French customs shape the ambassadorships that were perceived as oriental, but also these oriental ambassadorships shaped the protocol at the receiving courts and were of concern not only for their hosts, but also for other ambassadors coming

from “oriental” states. A Persian ambassador could manage to change the French protocol and to make a lasting impression in Europe. An Ottoman ambassador coming to France shortly afterwards could present himself as agreeable to French customs, as he was perceived in comparison to his predecessor.

In light of the length of Efendi’s *sefaretname*, this article could only highlight some specific places where the relation between the two missions were most clear. A more detailed study of all the stages of these journeys, taking into consideration the communication of the French officials, would give a more precise depiction. The French actors have only been referred to in this article as decisive communicators, delivering their perception of Mohammed Reza Beg and shaping the procedures of both embassies. How and in what detail information about Beg was passed on to Louis Usson de Bonnac, however, remains uncertain. The transfer of knowledge has been anticipated according to the indications given in the existing scholarship, but it would be a fruitful field of research to analyse the structures of communication between the French and the Ottoman court around 1700 in more detail – especially in a time of change for the Ottoman outer policy.

Instead of writing a history of the reception of the Ottoman ambassador Mehmed Efendi in France, 1721, and simply regarding it as an adaptation to French customs and rules, it has been possible to indicate a demarcation against the conduct of Mohammed Reza Beg by looking at the event and its account from a more global perspective. By taking into consideration the impact of Mohammed Reza Beg, it is possible to assess Mehmed Efendi’s conduct in France, as well as his self-representation in his *sefaretname*, in a new way.

Notes

[1] Nicholas Dew, *Orientalism in Louis XIV´s France* (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship, 2009), 6-7.

[2] For the *Lettres persannes* see: Olivier Bonnerot, *La Perse dans la littérature et la pensée française au XVIIIème siècle* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1988), 66; for the *Lettres de Nedim Coggia* see: Francois Labbé, “Un Rennais de la République des Lettres: Germain-François Poullain de Saint-Foix (1699-1776),” *Mémoires de la Société d’Histoire et d’Archéologie de Bretagne* T. LXIII, (1986): 319-327.

[3] Orientalism in early modern France cannot be understood as a centrally organised political force but as a rather vague interest in the culture and in trade with the powers that were perceived as “oriental”. These encompassed cultures in the near East but also in North Africa – and Persian and Ottoman culture in particular were compared in the imaginations and depictions of the time. See Ina Baghdiantz Mc Cabe, *Orientalism in Early Modern France: Eurasian Trade, Exoticism, and the Ancien Regime* (New York: Berg, 2008), 2-3 and 72.

[4] For this rather traditional view of Efendi’s Stay, see Fatma Müge Göcek, “Encountering the West: French Embassy of Yirmisekiz Celebi Mehmed Efendi: 1720-1721,” in *IIIrd Congress of the Social and Economic History of Turkey*, ed. Heath W. Lowry and Ralph S. Hattox (Istanbul, 1990), 79.

[5] Heinz Durchhardt, „Grundmuster der internationalen Beziehungen in der frühen Neuzeit," in *Strukturwandel internationaler Beziehungen: zum Verhältnis von Staat und internationalem System seit dem westfälischen Frieden*, ed. Jens Siegelberg (Wiesbaden: VS Springer, 2000), 80.

[6] J.C. Hurewitz, "Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System," *Middle East Journal* 15/2 (1961): 141.

[7] Daniel Legutke, *Diplomatie als soziale Institution. Brandenburgische, sächsische und kaiserliche Gesandte in Den Haag, 1648–1720* (Münster: Waxmann, 2010).

[8] On protocol in its dialogical character see: Susanne Schattenberg, „Die Sprache der Diplomatie oder Das Wunder von Portsmouth. Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Außenpolitik," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 56, no. 1 (2008): 7.

[9] See for example Natalie Zemon Davis, "Decentering History: Local Stories and cultural crossings in a global world," *History and Theory* 50, no. 2 (May 2001): 190.

[10] See Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Par-delà l´incommensurabilité: pour une histoire connectée des empires aux temps modernes," Revue d´histoire moderne et contemporaine 5 (2007): 38.

[11] For an overview on France's leading role see Lucien Bely, *Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV* (Paris: Fayard, 1990).

[12] The term is used in this way by the French politician Nicolas de Sainctot, who recorded the different diplomatic customs at the court of Louis XIV. See: *Mémoires de Nicolas de Sainctot (1602-1702) – Tome II* (Paris: 2015), 20.

[13] Concerning the different ranks of envoys see: Francois de Caillière, *De la manière de négocier avec les Souverains. De l´utilité des négociations, du choix des Ambassadeurs & des Envoyez, & des qualitez nécessaires pour réussir dans ces emplois,* A Amsterdam pour la Compagnie, 1716, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k936753.image#.

[14] John Watkins, "Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 38, no. 1 (2008): 5.

[15] For the term "contact zone" see: Mary Louise Pratt, "Arts of the Contact Zone," *Profession*, 1991, 33–40.

[16] On piracy in the Persian Gulf see for example Jane Hooper, "Pirates and Kings: Power on the Shores of Early Modern Madagascar and the Indian Ocean," *Journal of World History* 22, no. 2 (2011): 215–42.

[17] Roger Savory, *Iran under the Safavids* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 120.

[18] Laurence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavid Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 426.

[19] Anne-Marie Touzard, *Le drogman Padéry, émissaire de France en Perse*: *(1719-1725)* (Paris: Geuthner, 2005), 33.

[20] Jensen De Lamar, "The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 16, no. 4 (1985): 451.

[21] *Recueil des Instructions Données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France depuis les Traités de Westphalie jusqu´à la Révolution Francaise, publié sous les auspices de la Commission des Archives diplomatiques au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. XXIX Turquie, par Pierre DuParc* (Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1969), 166.

[22] Maurice Herbette, *Une ambassade Persane sous Louis XIV. D´après des documents inédits* (Paris: Librairie Académique, 1907), 20.

[23] *Instructions,* 223.

[24] *Instructions,* 239-240.

[25] Lockhart, *Safavid Dynasty*, 450.

[26] Touzard, *Le drogman Padéry*, 71.

[27] Official rank at the Persian provincial courts. .

[28] As "Kalender", Beg had the task of collecting taxes. See: The Marquis de Sade, *Misfortunes of Virtue and other Early Tales*, trans. David Coward (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press 1999), 275.

[29] Herbette, *Une ambassade,* 15.

[30] Ernest Tucker, "The Peace Negotiations of 1736: A Conceptual Turning Point in Ottoman-Iranian Relations," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 20, no. 1 (1996): 20.

[31] See Herbette, *Une ambassade*, 17-29.

[32] Herbette, *Une ambassade,* 20.

[33] Anne-Marie Touzard's monograph offers a detailed description of Padéry's life, as he managed to obtain important roles at the French court following his companionship with Beg. He even completed the latter's mission as he went back towards Persia with Beg.

[34] Gilles Veinstein, introduction to his edition of Mehmed Efendi's *sefaretname*: *Le Paradis des infidèles. Relation de Yirmisekisz Calebi Mehmed efendi, ambassadeur ottoman en France sous la Régence* (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1981), 25.

[35] On this type of source, see Fatma Müge Göcek, *East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 16.

[36] Among them the printing press, which had been forbidden in the Ottoman empire. See Veinstein, *Le Paradis*, 23.

[37] THeinrich Benedikt, „Ibrahim Pascha," *Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas* (München, 1976), 212.

[38] This view is maintained by Göcek, *East encounters West*, 80.

[39] Martin Sicker, *The Islamic World in Decline: From the Treaty of Karlowitz to the Disintegration of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Praeger, 2001), 50.

[40] On the public elements of diplomacy see for example Barbara Stollberg-Rillinger, "Zeremoniell als politisches Verfahren. Rangordnung und Rangstreitigkeit als Strukturmerkmale des frühneuzeitlichen Reichstages," *Zeitschrift für historische Forschungen* 19 (1997): 94.

[41] Newspapers started to become an important factor at the turn of the eighteenth century. See for example the special issue "Communications revolutions," *German History* 24, no. 3 (2006).

[42] Mehmed Efendi completed his *sefaretname* shortly after his return to Constantinople. It was translated by Julien-Claude Galland in 1721, and again in 1723, into French. It is this version of the

report, which has been edited by Gilles Veinstein in 1981, that this article refers to.

[43] Göcek, "East encounters West".

[44] Veinstein, *Le Paradis,* 23.

[45] Susan Mokhberi, "Finding Common Ground between Europe and Asia: Understanding and Conflict during the Persian Embassy to France in 1715," *Journal of early modern history* 16, no. 1 (2012): 57.

[46] Susan Mokhberi, "Finding Common Ground between Europe and Asia: Understanding and Conflict during the Persian Embassy to France in 1715," *Journal of early modern history* 16, no. 1 (2012): 57.

[47] Herbette cites different contemporary voices in her depiction.

[48] Herbette, *Une ambassade*, 37.

[49] Veinstein, *Le Paradis,* 36.

[50] Göcek, *East encounters West*, 10. The author mentions official orders regarding the sending of Mehmed Efendi, which I have not been able to verify.

[51] For a detailed view of Mohammed Reza Beg's account, reconstructed through the surviving French sources, see Herbette, *Une ambassade*.

[52] Herbette, *Une ambassade,* 33-35.

[53] Herbette, *Une ambassade,* 39.

[54] Ibid, 42.

[55] On the Persian diplomatic customs see for example: Ahmad Guliyev, *Safavids in Venetian and European Sources* (Fondazione Università Ca' Foscari, 2022).

[56] Mehmed Efendi, *Le paradis des Infidels. Relation de Yirmisekisz Calebi Mehmed efendi, ambassadeur ottoman en France sous la Régence,* trans. Julien-Claude Galland (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1981), 66-68.

[57] Efendi, *Le paradis*, 65: "Les troups sous les armes étaient rangés à nos côtés; les musiciens de la marine avec leurs instruments particuliers, comme trompettes, tambours, fifres, jouaient, partagés par troupes, et de milliers de personnes nous suivaient à droite et à gauche. Nous arrivâmes avec tout ce cortège au Jardin du Roi".

[58] Herbette, *Une ambassade*, 71-74.

[59] Herbette, *Une ambassade*, 63.

[60] Regarding the quarrels during the journey, see Herbette, *Une ambassade*, 80. Herbette mentions here that the amount of money granted to an "*ambassadeur oriental*" was fixed in the French protocol to about 300-400 livres per day.

[61] Mokhberi, "Finding Common Ground," 77.

[62] Herbette, 6, citing Saint-Simon in the *journal des Dangeau*, op. cit. t. 15, 273.

[63] Efendi, *Le paradis*, 161. The comments of the French ambassador in the report indicate the few passages where Efendi shed a slightly different light on his stay in France.

[64] Ibid, 76.

[65] Efendi, *Le paradis*, 85: “Dans toutes les villes et forteresses où je passais, on envoyait toujours une troupe de soldats une lieue au- devant de moi. Lorsque j´étais arrivé à la ville, ils me conduisaient en pompe à mon logis, où les grands du pays, de même que les consuls, venaient me féliciter sur mon heureuse arrivée et me portaient des fruits et des confitures”.

[66] Herbette, *Une ambassade*, 93.

[67] Herbette, *Une ambassade*, 99.

[68] For a detailed analysis see Mokhberi, “Finding Common Ground,” 53-80.

[69] Efendi, *Le paradis*, 70.

[70] Efendi, *Le paradis*, 71: “comme la coutume est qu´on fasse beaucoup d´honneurs aux personnes qui portent un compliment de la part du roi, en considération de celui qui les envoie, je vous prie d´observer cet usage à mon égard”.

[71] Efendi, *Le paradis*, 70, “all honours possible”.

[72] Efendi, *Le paradis*, 90-91.

[73] Herbette, *Une ambassade*, 112.

[74] Ibid, 119. It was finally decided that Beg would take the carriage to one of the city gates where he would mount a horse.

[75] *Al-sulwafī tārīkh Kilwa*, 50-51.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Mokhberi, “Finding Common Ground,” 79.

[78] Efendi, *Le paradis*, 95.

[79] Herbette, *Une ambassade*, 201.

[80] Ibid, 196.

[81] A great part of the *sefaretname* is dedicated to the description of Efendi’s visits during his stay. See: Efendi, *Le paradis*, 104-152.

[82] Ibid, 94: “Ce qu´ils désiraient le plus était de me voir manger. […] ces manières très nouvelles pour moi me gênaient beaucoup, mais ma complaisance me faisait prendre patience”.

[83] Ibid, 142: “Pour des honneurs en paroles, ils en étaient si libéraux, qu´on les aurait pris pour les gens du monde les plus dévoués. On peut appliquer à cela le proverbe qui dit: Mangez nos âmes, ne touchez pas à nos assiettes”.

[84] Mercure, August 1721, printed in the annex of Efendi, *Le paradis*, 204.

[85] Herbette, *Une ambassade*, 326.

[86] Herbette, *Une ambassade*, 327

[87] Touzard, *Le drogman Padéry*, 33.

The Diasporic Ummah: Identity, Resistance, and Diversity

By

Jonas Fernandes Araujo

Abstract

This article works with the concepts of identity, resistance, and diversity under the scope of the socio-cultural customs practised by communities of enslaved African Muslims, present in different locations of the American continent throughout the nineteenth century. These practices, despite having a religious significance, are also perceived as autonomous acts, distancing themselves from a passive observance of religious duties towards an active and conscious socio-religious posture. The article, therefore, aims at presenting a system of practices, connecting them to the Muslim idea of the ummah, to understand how action and choice served as a tool to engender agency and potency in the lives of thousands of enslaved Muslims throughout the African diaspora, while also discussing the diversity within the Muslim diasporic community.

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Introduction

This article discusses the concepts of identity, resistance, and diversity in Muslim societies found in Brazil, Jamaica, and the southern United States throughout the nineteenth century. Its aim lies in demonstrating how a cultural practice, although seen as a religious aspect, is not essentially ritualistic. The notion of praxis as part of an individual's religious experience can therefore be treated less as a rule and/or rite and more as an action. These practices happen within the ummah, understood here as a Muslim community on a national level or an imagined community on a transnational level, and also under the concept of Imam, the act of reposing faith in Allah.[1] This community allows its individuals its own set of practices and concepts, generating an identity that in the context of slavery consequently prompted resistance. This assertion follows what is proposed by Katrin A. Jomaa in her book *Ummah: A New Paradigm for a Global World*, where she examines how Islam emphasizes the element of active and conscious choice in contrast to "an inherited tradition that is blindly followed."[2] That is essential to the argument disclosed here, which aims to demonstrate, in the lives of enslaved Muslims, a devout disposition which was permeated with self-consciousness and agency. Thus, this concept of religious practice establishes itself as a premeditated attitude, a choice in search of a real objective rather than a passive attitude regarding a religious tradition, and seeks to show a conscious act imbued within a defiant and even life-risking stance. Therefore, according to Jomaa, the critical element of choice associated with the term ummah lays emphasis on the responsibility of embracing reality and taking active choices in that regard, that is, humans taking responsibility for their life.[3]

The diasporic ummah was a great example of this practice, as it can be seen amidst enslaved Muslims in the Americas, who exercised their faith despite the risks of doing so. This can be seen in the Muslim Bahian community of the 1830s, which created a structured and organized society within the Brazilian Empire. Known as the Malês, they enjoyed relative freedom to perform their customs and practices in the city of Salvador, despite occasional police raids.[4] The houses of freed Africans were used to hold meetings for prayers, ritual feasts, and religious festivities, and they even built a mosque, where on 29 November 1834 the Lailat al-Miraj was celebrated.[5] However, after the 1835 Malê uprising, the Islamic identity began to be strongly linked to a prospect of insurgency and impudence, producing a constant fear of another rebellion.

As a result, being a Muslim in nineteenth-century Brazil meant keeping an extremely secretive attitude while performing the duties of the faith. Nonetheless, it was based on action, both individually and collectively, in search of the common goal of creating an ethos faithful to what was expected of a Muslim. That is, in the words of Abul A'la Al-Maududi, "the plan of life which Islam envisages, this plan and code of conduct are known as the Shari'ah. Its sources are the Qur'an and the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad."[6] This plan was also seen in the lives of other enslaved Muslims in Jamaica and the southern United States. Although not persecuted to the same extent as their Brazilian counterparts, many Muslims

in these regions had to convert to Christianity, even if only for show, and perform their actual faith in private.

Consequently, it is important to emphasise that despite its apparent religious content, the argument discussed here is in no way a proselytising or religious one. This article does not even propose to discuss religion, but rather the agency of enslaved and oppressed communities, who, despite their limitations, created means to subsist according to their own parameters, denying the slaver society the imposition of its racist and degrading discourses. However, it is also undeniable that religion was a fundamental factor in the sovereignty of these individuals, and as a consequence, even if indirectly, it is presented in a positive light. Likewise, this article does not insinuate an exclusivity of Islam in providing its faithful with autonomy and agency. Other diasporic communities, imbued with different religions, demonstrated the same.

Concerning diversity, the objective is to discuss the distinction of each Muslim community, despite each belonging to the same Sunni religious perspective. The ummah concept does not impose a global uniqueness, and certainly, there is no universal Islamic experience. Each society had its own characteristics, without, however, delegitimizing itself as Muslim. Due to its global scope, Islam is bound to attain differences amongst the communities that practice it. This relationship between diversity and unity is also examined by Katrin A. Jomaa and is central to the objectives proposed here. Jomaa works with the idea of several ummahs connecting themselves like a sewing thread, forming a conforming but paradoxically diverse fabric. She writes, "if we imagine each thread representing a single ummah, their coming together through bonds of covenants will result in the formation of an inclusive ummah that is unified and strengthened by its interconnected relationships."[7] That was indeed what was apparent in the Muslim communities formed in the Americas.

Therefore, the purpose of the article lies in discussing the concepts of identity, resistance, and diversity within the acts, opinions, behaviours, and religious practices of the Muslim diasporic community. It outlines these examples that can vary from performing the duties of religion, writing letters or books, and rebelling, to the different interactions within the Muslim community and between Muslims and non-Muslims, revealing how the concepts discussed here found their way into the material experience of life.

Identity, Resistance, and Diversity in Practice

During the whole of the Atlantic slave trade, thousands of enslaved Muslims were brought to the American continent, and in 1522 the Wolof of Hispaniola were already leading the first African slave revolt in the history of the Americas.[8] Coming from Western Africa, these individuals formed and continued their own traditions on the new continent, forging a distinct community within an oppressive Christian slave-holding society. Despite being uprooted from their lands and having their community ties broken, they planted their

culture and built new ties, interconnecting themselves at a regional and an Atlantic level. Consequently, whilst performing their own identities, the enslaved individuals resisted the imposed *status quo*. In fact, Chartier affirms that "the identity construction of each individual is always located at the intersection of the representation he gives of himself and the credibility attributed or refused by others to this representation."[9] Thus, the presence of a community of believers reinforced that they were "the best community that emerged in humanity, because you recommend what is good, forbid the illicit, and believe in God."[10] It is in line with Ala Maududi's depiction of Islamic moral order, which "stipulates for man a system of life which is based on all good and is free from all evil. It invokes the people, not only to practise virtue but also to establish virtue and eradicate vice, to bid good and to forbid wrong."[11] This fact reflected an emancipatory stance, subversive and integrative, which credited its participants with a dignified identity, contesting the pejorative attributions imposed by the oppressing slaver society. This is equivalent to Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi's reminder that oppression (zulm) is the second-largest moral wrong after disbelief, and that it is incumbent on each Muslim, as the hadith ordains, to remove it from themselves and from others by hand, tongue, or heart. In so doing, this allows for the ordering and unification of practices, actions, behaviours, and representations that converge to the understanding of the self, of the subject's identity, and also of a given society in which the individual moves.[12] Hence, it explains the posture and the ethnic affinity of the diasporic ummah, under Islam and its concepts concerning praxis and identity.[13] This article understands them as central pieces in the emancipation of the individual and the Islamic community's main coordinating agents.

Moreover, a further concept present in the Muslim diasporic community and one of its leading identity-forming designers is the ummah. The ummah can be understood as a community united in faith, as the prominent historian and classical Qur'anic exegete Al-ṬabarṆ (839–923 AD) thinks, stating that its original meaning is a group of people practising one religion.[14] However, according to Muhammad Abduh, a nineteenth-century religious scholar from Egypt, the ummah is defined as more than just a religious group that has confined its religion to rituals, without a practical implementation in society. Consequently, it requires a religious performance that is imbued with conscious action and not passive practice, enjoining righteousness and deterring wrongness, monitoring its performance such that if it goes astray, it can be rectified.[15]

> Thus, this is a principled society, a society radically different from those which are founded on the basis of race, colour or territory. This society is the result of a deliberate choice and effort, it is the outcome of a "contract" which takes place between human beings and the Creator.[16]

Naṣīf Naṣṣār, an Arab intellectual of the 1970s, also argues that the ummah is a community that agrees on following a specific way or path. Therefore, the concept of the path takes precedence over the concept of the community, whereby the community becomes known and determined by the path it follows.[17] That can be noted among the Muslim community of Rio de Janeiro in 1865. Through the travel report of Abd al-Rahman al-Baghdadi, an Ottoman imam, it is possible to grasp many features concerning the members

of that society. Following a request from that community, Baghdadi decided to remain in Brazil between 1865 and 1868, teaching and instructing the Islamic brotherhood not only in Rio de Janeiro but also in Salvador and Recife, where there was also a well-established Muslim community. However, that was risky, as the Brazilian authorities, since the Malê uprising of 1835, were deeply concerned with anything that could be linked to Islam. Therefore, it is notable to perceive that the Muslim populace, even at the possibility of being persecuted, imprisoned, and banned, deliberately decided to educate themselves more about the religion they practiced, agreeing on taking a specific path.

The Muslim community in Rio de Janeiro therefore urged Baghdadi to stay and educate them, emphasising that they wanted neither material possessions nor protection, demonstrating, according to Baghdadi's narrative and discourse, a sincere and devoted desire.[18] That is in line with the concept of an active and conscious religious practice that fomented resistance and identity. A similar attitude, embedded with the same concepts of resistance and identity within a religious practice, can also be seen in the account of Francis de Castelnau, a French consul stationed in Bahia in the mid-nineteenth century. Here, de Castelnau stated that a certain Fulo, a freed Black man named Mohammad-Abdullah, refused to work for him, saying that he would not return to a "Christian dog" house.[19] Such behaviour is explainable by the fact that in the Islamic religious narrative, there are several reproaches, regarding the Christian religion, which misrepresented and denied the precepts of God. Therefore, by being Christian, Castelnau might have failed to hold Mohammad-Abdullah's respect. In fact, the Quran states that all of those who qualify the signs of God as lies are like dogs.[20] That is also in accordance with the views of Mohammaed Ali Sa'id, a sergeant in the American Union Army and also an African Muslim from Borno, who reported that the Muslims "look upon the Christians, from a religious point of view, as no better than dogs."[21]

Furthermore, Castelnau's report allows us to analyse something peculiar: a freed black man despising a French consul. This fact goes in opposition to the belief which credited white people with a higher status and tells us a lot about how Mohammad-Abdullah perceived himself and consequently behaved. The disdain of the Muslims for the white population was also noted by another observer, this time in Rio de Janeiro. Elizabeth Agassiz, an American educator and naturalist who was part of a scientific expedition to Brazil in 1866, reported how the Muslims did not seem so affable and responsive as the Congo slaves. Feelings of contempt and a lack of envy for what they would have perceived as the degenerate, heathen way of life of the Christians are wholly consistent with the Muslims' mentality.[22]

Another great example was the Malê community of 1835, in Salvador, Bahia. In that year, in January, they led one of the largest urban revolts in Brazil. Composed mostly of enslaved Muslims, they left valuable information about their community in the judicial files. Although their revolt was not successful, they still marked Brazilian society in such a way that even in 1865, dressing as a "Muslim" was still a reason for imprisonment. In his report, Baghdadi states that he

> asked several times about the reasons for this exaggerated care in hiding, especially since the state granted all sorts of freedom to individuals. They informed me that a war had taken place between them and the Christians. Until now, if the Christians know that somebody is Muslim, they will probably kill him, exile him or jail him for life.[23]

The Malês demonstrated in practice the link between identity and resistance. In the various reports on their revolt, it is possible to see how their community was well structured and how it allowed, despite the limiting conditions of its members, a breath of freedom, reinforcing the precepts and practices inherent to their religion. These practices and precepts are observed, for example, through the testimony of José, an enslaved man from the Nagô nation, who in responding to questions about his partner and his tie with the revolt said that

> the black Joaquim, his partner, did not do anything suspicious in the house of his master so that he the respondent could see it because his custom was to kill sheep at Father Ignacio's house, and there he would chat, only bringing home sometimes his food that was made there and it is in the so said house where some blacks gathered.[24]

Joaquim's act of slaughtering sheep is connected to lamb being one of the most consumed meats in regions with a strong Islamic tradition, especially on *Eid al-Adha*. This feast of sacrifice is celebrated in deference to the prophet Abraham and his willingness to sacrifice his son, Ishmael, following a divine vision. However, in the Islamic tradition, Allah only wanted to test Abraham's faith and given this, sent him a ram to be sacrificed in place of his son. That led to the Muslim practice of sacrificing domesticated animals such as sheep and distributing its meat among neighbours and friends, celebrating this date to mark Abraham's act of faith, something Joaquim probably did many times.

Another reference that the passage above allows us to discuss is the Islamic precept concerning the proper way to slay an animal for consumption. Therefore, Joaquim's custom of killing sheep may be related to the need that Salvadorian Muslims had to consume halal food. The fact that Joaquim brought his meal from Father Ignacio's house and that several other people gathered there may refer to this specific demand. Adding to José's narrative, another enslaved Nagô, named Antônio, confirmed that Joaquim killed sheep, and a freedwoman named Ellena, from the Gegê nation, who lived in the house of Father Ignacio also testified the same.[25] Furthermore, Ellena stated that Joaquim also used to

> do functions in his room with his comrades during the day, together with black people from the beach below who came there to eat and party, which she does not understand because she is not Nagô, and also the black Limtam who is in jail, slave of the surgeon Mesquita, is [in] the same assemblage.[26]

These could be related to prayers and Arabic/Quranic lessons, mainly due to the presence of the name Limtam in the report, which was in fact a misspelling of Licutan, one of the most influential people in the Muslim community of Salvador and also a Muslim teacher. João José Reis states that during the attacks on the day of the uprising, some Africans assaulted the city jail, in an attempt to free Licutan, a highly esteemed Malê leader who was imprisoned there.[27] Thus, these facts point to the community's effort to choose its own path, promoting its identity and resistance through its religious practice.

This entailed a series of religious and cultural duties that not even the limiting condition of their slavery prevented them from performing.

Such practices could still be observed thirty years later, in the city of Rio de Janeiro. According to Baghdadi:

> At the time of prayers, the men close themselves in a room, apart from each other and their acquaintances and friends. They pray alone, fearing that the Christians will discover them. In the afternoon, some of them go to their places specifically to perform their prayers of *zuhr* and *asr*. Others do their duties in the evening after they finish the business of this low world.[28]

In a slave-owning society as oppressive as the one established in the Americas, the ummah was one of the many means used by enslaved Muslims to maintain their identity, being both a community of believers practicing together a specific faith, and also, a source of identification.[29] Baghdadi corroborates it by reporting that the Muslim community deeply loved and protected each other.[30] Thus, for many, religion was a meaning of resistance and survival. Throughout the diaspora, enslaved people of different creeds and ethnicities organised themselves and sought a way to create and maintain their identities, forming a society of their own. Christianity was no exception, and neither was Islam and its ummah.

Even in places such as the U.S. and Jamaica, where enslaved Muslims found themselves isolated without a community of their own, the ummah still provided identity and resistance. Omar ibn Said, an enslaved man from Futa Toro, belonging to the Owen family of Bladen County, North Carolina, reveals, albeit subjectively, that despite suffering the imposition of a new identity, he still identified himself as a Muslim.[31] It is important to emphasize that slavery, despite being legitimized by Islamic jurisprudence, was not considered legal when forced upon the Muslim faithful, especially in the case of the Atlantic slave trade where most of the potential buyers were Christians. In fact, according to Khalīl, a fourteenth-century Egyptian scholar and one of the main references of Maliki Islamic law, it was unlawful for Muslims to sell slaves to non-Muslims, as it was the responsibility of Muslims to initiate slaves to the religion of Islam.[32] In addition, Chouki El-Hamel, a specialist in West and Northwest Africa and a professor at Arizona State University, also states that “all free or freed Muslims should not be enslaved under any circumstances.”[33] Therefore, the Islamic jurisprudence and its theological concept validated their distinction and the inconsistency of their enslaved status in the Americas.

As a consequence, a set of arguments written by Islamic scholars were produced to justify and legitimate those claims, especially in Western Africa. Among many, the most well-known was Ahmed Baba, the great Timbuktu jurist. He stated in a treatise written circa 1615 entitled *Mi'raj al-Su'ud* that the cause of slavery was a lack of belief. Thus, being Black or white was of no importance. However, he also linked ethnicity and its relationship to Islam to prove that certain ethnicities could not be enslaved, as there were some inquisitions about whether all Black Africans were by definition non-Muslims, and therefore, had permanent slave status, regardless of later conversions to Islam.[34] Baba concludes that

the Muslim ethnicities and those under their protection could not be enslaved.[35] Supporting this view, El-Hamel cites Sidi Abdullah bin al-Hajj Ibrahim al-Alawi who stated that in the "case of a newly enslaved person being sold shortly after her capture, her claims to be from free Muslim people are to be believed unless someone else can bring evidence to the contrary."[36] Shaykh Bay al-Kunti, one of the greatest jurists of the Saharo-Sahelian area in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, also agrees with Ahmed Baba, linking one's place of origin and connection with Islam as a guarantee of freedom.[37] In theory, a freeborn Muslim could never become a slave, and despite the few exceptions, the West African Muslims largely followed the rule that prohibited them from selling their brethren.[38]

Consequently, enslavement was considered an attribute of the infidel, thus, not being incorporated into the ummah's ethos. It is also important to note that this concept did not imply an Islamic opposition to the slave regime, but rather to the illegality or immorality of the enslavement of people who, from the Muslim legal perspective, would be immune to this condition.[39] For this reason, the Muslim resistance could also mean, besides the struggle which was common to all slaves, a religious practice. A good example of this can be seen in the writings of the aforementioned Omar ibn Said, known due to his 1831 autobiography. He begins the narrative of his history by quoting a sura of the Quran called Al-Mulk, which translates into English as The Sovereignty. That sura addresses the power of Allah in contrast to those of the unbelievers, attesting to their coming punishment. Accordingly, a particular verse of this sura states what Said might have thought of his condition in comparison to his owner's. It reads: "Say, ⌜O Prophet,⌝ Consider this: whether Allah causes me and those with me to die or shows us mercy, who will save the disbelievers from a painful punishment?"[40] That is in line with the sura's fragment cited by Said in his book, which also reads:

> It is He who has made the earth subservient to you. Walk about its regions and eat of His provisions. To Him all shall return at the Resurrection. Are you confident that He who is in heaven will not cause the earth to cave in beneath you, so that it will shake to pieces and overwhelm you?[41]

It can be assumed that this passage alludes to the Owen family who enslaved him, and the all-powerful slaver and Christian society as a whole. Despite its power and importance, Said reminded that society of its insignificance before Allah, the supreme al-Mulk, the lord and judge of all human beings. Thus, Omar ibn Said reaffirmed his identity as a Muslim and resisted, maintaining his culture and religion, albeit hidden under an apparent conversion. It is also worth mentioning that the name of that sura comes from the Arabic word al-Mulk. That is not a coincidence, because the noun al-Mulk comes from the tripartite Arabic root "Malaka," meaning both to own and to have dominion. The title is, therefore, the perfect allusion to slavery.[42]

Similar to Said, there was also the example of Abon Becr Sadika, who maintained his Muslim identity despite being separated from an Islamic community. He was enslaved for thirty years in Jamaica, until being freed through the efforts of an Irish doctor named Richard Robert Madden, who was a member of the Anti-Slavery Society. In a letter, dated in

Kingston, September 15, 1834, and addressed to a certain JS Buckingham, Madden states the following:

> A Negro was recently brought before me, to be sworn in as constable on his master's property. I discovered by the mere accident of seeing the man sign his name in very well-written Arabic, that he was a man of education, and on subsequent inquiry, a person of exalted rank in his own country, who had been kidnapped in a province bordering on Timbuctoo. He had been sold into Slavery in Jamaica nearly 30 years ago, and had preserved the knowledge of the learning of his country, and obtained the character of one a little more enlightened than the majority of his savage brethren, and that was all.[43]

Notwithstanding Madden's blatant prejudice towards all other African cultures, it is interesting to note that many enslaved Muslims were noticed by Europeans during their excursions in America. Lovejoy affirms that the biographical accounts of Muslims indicate that despite their relatively low numbers, individual Muslims often stood out within a society that was still largely illiterate, in part because they were usually educated.[44] This contributed to the distinction and respect that many had for the Islamic community. Two examples of this can be seen through Thomas Ewbank's 1856 book Life in Brazil, or *A Journal of a Visit to the Land of the Cocoa and the Palm* and Allan D. Austin's citation of Bilali Mohamed, an enslaved man belonging to Thomas Spalding of Sapelo Island, Georgia, during the 1812 Anglo-American War. According to Ewbank, citing a Bahian planter, the enslaved Muslims were shrewd and intelligent, some wrote Arabic fluently and were vastly superior to most of their masters.[45] Bilali Mohamed, for instance,

> told Spalding that he could defend his charges, and Spalding's faith in his promises led him to give Bilali eighty muskets to defend the island property while his master was elsewhere. This appears to have been the only instance in which slaves were given guns in Georgia during the antebellum period. Bilali put his own faith on the line; he declared to Spalding that in the event of an attack, "I will answer for every Negro of the true faith, but not for the Christian dogs you own.[46]

This account and the classification of Christians as dogs are in line with the same attitude shown by Mohammad-Abdullah regarding Francis Castelnau, while also demonstrating a slave explicitly admitting his opinion about his master's religion. Correspondingly, Nicholas Owen, an eighteenth-century slave trader, reports the same contempt shown by Muslims towards the Christian faith. He asserts the following:

> As to our religion, it has made no impression in at least otherwise than a matter of ridicule or laughter in so many years as they have had us among them, notwithstanding there have been some trials to convert them to a notion of a better state.[47]

The enslaved Muslims were not interested in converting to a religion that was considered corrupt and which denied the prominence of their greatest prophet Muhammad, which was, along with other deviations, incompatible with what they had learned and practiced. Connecting also with what Max Weber notes, ethnic groups almost always believe that their way of life is more honourable than that of others.[48] Consequently, Europeans and other non-Muslim slaves could be spurned by the Muslim captives in the Americas. The sources make it clear that there were many cases of intentional segregation done by Muslims towards non-Muslim slaves, motivated by a desire to not mix with the *kafir*, that is,

the infidels. João José Reis states that the "Nagôs who know how to read, and partners in the Malê insurrection, did not shake hands, nor did they treat well those who were not, calling them infidel out of contempt."[49] The same attitude was applied to a Catholic slave who was provoked by some of the Malês since she was "going to Mass to worship the wood that is on the altar because the images are not saints."[50]

This distinction can also be seen through the letters that Madden wrote concerning the enslaved man Abon Becr Sadika. In his missives, Madden recounts Sadika's story, translating it from Arabic. According to himself, Sadika was born in the city of Timbuktu, was raised in Gineh, and acquired Quranic knowledge in Gounah. He was taken captive when Abdengara, king of Buntuco, captured his city, taking many of its inhabitants as spoils to be sold on the coast. Sadika, in writing his story, states the following:

> My parents' religion is of the Mussulmans: they are all circumcised, and their devotion are five times a day; they fast in the month Ramadan; they give tribute according to the law; they are married to four wives, but the fifth is an abomination to them. They fight for their religion, and they travel to Hedjaz (those who are capable). They don't eat meat except what they themselves kill. They do not drink wine nor spirits as it is held as an abomination so to do. They do not associate with any that worship idols, or profane the Lord's name, or do dishonor to their parents, or commit murder, or bear false witness, or who are covetous proud, or boastful; such faults are an abomination unto my religion. They are particularly careful in the education of their children, and in their behaviour.[51]

A number of these precepts and practices listed by Sadika can be more explicitly found in some hadiths, such as the one regarding praying five times a day and the one concerning circumcision. Both are reported in Sahih al-Bukhari's collection of hadiths.[52] Other practices listed by Sadika (such as fasting, tribute, number of wives, jihad, hajj, food, drinking alcohol, and worshiping idols) are explained by both hadiths and the Quran.[53] In any case, Sadika sees them as a privilege and distinction lost due to his enslaved status, making him a Muslim at fault with Allah, as it is clear that Iman, the act of reposing faith in Allah, is a contract, a form of pledge between man and God and does not consist of a mere profession of belief in Allah.[54] Hence, action is extremely important in the practice of the Islamic faith, the ummah itself being a group of people in action. Consequently, Sadika found himself in a worrying condition for not performing what was considered pertinent to the faith. The now freedman continued to state in his letter the ensuing preoccupations:

> I am lost to all these advantages: since my bondage I *am* become corrupt and I now conclude by begging the almighty God to lead me into the path that is proper for me, for he alone knows the secrets of my heart and what I am in need of.[55]

Such an account shows a desire to remedy oneself, a desire akin to the enslaved Brazilians seen in Baghdadi's narrative. This story also shows the importance and difference that a community can make, as it may allow, even in a limiting way, a place where the faithful could exercise their faith. Madden also reports another interesting situation: shortly after Sadika's manumission, he received a letter from a Mr. Angell, residing in the parish of Manchester, also in Jamaica. The purpose of the missive was to put Sadika in contact with an enslaved African, named Tuffit, who was from the same region as Sadika and according to

Mr. Angell, had the objective of converting the fellow countryman to Christianity, as he had previously been a Muslim, but was now a devoted Christian. Madden reports that Tuffit wrote the letter in Arabic and was surprised at finding it commencing in these terms: "in the name of God, merciful and omnipotent, the blessing of God, the peace of his prophet Mahomet!" revealing that the Muslim slave might not have renunciated Islam after all.[56]

In conclusion, despite Omar ibn Said and Tuffit claiming to be Christians, they left clear signs that they had not abandoned their faith. Nevertheless, the Quran makes Christianity's incompatibility with Islam quite clear. Despite recognizing it as a predecessor, and even demanding respect for the people of the book, the Christians' insistence on declaring Jesus as the son of God and Christianity's persistence in denying the Prophet Muhammad's prominence and legitimacy make the religion, in the eyes of Islam, somewhat corrupt. Therefore, the apparent conversion of Omar ibn Said and Tuffit may reveal only a means of survival, mainly because they were alone, without a community of their own.

Another important concept that could explain the apparent conversion would be the *taqiyya*. This is an Islamic doctrine aimed for Muslims under persecution due to their faith, indicating the ability to forgo the ordinances of religion in cases of constraint and when there is a possibility of harm."[57] Therefore, these enslaved individuals could just be preserving their lives by pretending to be Christians while concealing their true faith. The Muslim community encountered by Baghdadi, for example, faced a similar situation. According to the commander of Baghdadi's ship, "the Muslims living here, unwillingly hide their Islamic beliefs and fear the Frankish communities very much because the latter know them publicly as Christians according to some English men."[58] Despite that, these Muslims were not willing to emigrate, made evident from Baghdadi's commander later on as they told him:

> If you tell us to migrate to Islamic lands where we can learn to pray and fast, we will reply that we are bound within particular conditions. If one of us migrates, he will leave all his possessions for the state, and they will not be returned to him. This is difficult for our souls, especially since this country is a familiar land for us.[59]

This extract allows some assumptions: first, this specific group was likely composed of freedmen since the biggest impediment to their migration was the fact that if they were to leave Brazil, they would lose their assets to the state. Another interesting point was the recognition of Brazil as their home. They did not want to migrate "back" to their supposed countries of origin, where they could exercise their religion freely, because they were already in a familiar place, regardless of belonging to a different culture. That event is interesting because it is the opposite of what a group of African Muslims in Trinidad, around 1825, did when they petitioned the British government to return them to Africa, demonstrating a materialistic approach to life and also a different view regarding being part of a specific place.[60] Nevertheless, the Malês, together with Omar ibn Said, Abon Becr Sadika, and Tuffit revealed a trend found throughout the Muslim diaspora: the search or desire for more knowledge about Islam, the practice of its precepts, the enforcement of their identity as a Muslim, and the concern about their status as a believer. However, while

searching for all of these features, each Muslim community detained characteristics of their own, a good example of this which is shown through Baghdadi's account. Once in Brazilian territory, Baghdadi dedicated himself to teaching and instructing the local Muslim community on the Islamic religion, and consequently, carefully watched how each community practiced their faith. His total stay lasted three years and was not restricted to Rio de Janeiro, as the news of his presence spread along the national ummah. Baghdadi reports that the Muslim community of Salvador and Recife both invited him to instruct and teach them about the Quran and the precepts of Islam.

Baghdadi's role within different Muslim communities allowed him to point out the differences observed in each space, exposing attitudes and customs that he considered a mistake. Many of these supposed errors that Baghdadi criticised stemmed from the fact that many did not have a proper Islamic education, as they were captured and brought to Brazil at a very young age. Yet, some other aspects were just part of each community's own religious and practical experience, which were preserved regardless of Baghdadi's admonitions. Some of these practices were what Baghdadi referred to as geomancy and natural magic, which commonly consisted of foretelling the future, curing illnesses, and undoing spells.[61] According to the imam, these works were rooted among the various group leaders within the Muslim community. Baghdadi reported that those leaders knew some Syriac words (which was in truth some other language unknown to Baghdadi) and tongue clacking. According to the Iman, each leader used these skills to attract members to their own group. In his goal of teaching what was considered the right way, Baghdadi stated that he had sworn to those leaders that their "sciences" were without benefit, repeating it several times and showing them that it was illicit to deal with these divinatory and "magic" practices.[62] That was in line with Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi's critique of Islam's deviations that allowed all sorts of spiritual "experts" in fortune-telling, healing, and divination. According to al-Kawakibi, these practices had turned religion into a plaything and a fraud, something that Baghdadi also tried to revert, reflecting an orthodox view that discredited any other interpretation of Islam.[63]

Nonetheless, these practices reveal the diversity of a Muslim community, one that was distinct from the religious experience of the Ottoman priest. The Muslims themselves followed multiple spiritual paths, subscribed to various legal schools, spoke many languages, and hailed from diverse backgrounds.[64] From Islam's beginning, not long after the death of Prophet Muhammad, internal tensions and intra-Muslim violence would mark the nascent Islamic community.[65] Baghdadi provides another example of this when reporting that the Muslim community in Rio de Janeiro had several leaders, emphasizing the hostility they secretly harboured toward one another, disputing disciples, and trying to increase their own group of followers.[66] In other words, not even in a community as small as the Muslim society of Rio de Janeiro was there a holistic and homogeneous socio-religious perspective.

The diversity of the Muslim society is also evidenced in Baghdadi's comments on Recife's community, which was, according to him, more diligent, being able after only six

months to demonstrate a better understanding of Islam than Baghdadi's companions.[67] More evidence of this fact exists in the request the Malês of Recife made to the chief of police in 1873, asking for allowance to practise their religion in private, which was granted. Therefore, unlike the other communities, the one in Recife had the authorization to exercise its faith and was tolerated by the authorities. Baghdadi states that this freedom came from the protection and "magic" services they provided, which increased the amount of influence they possessed.

Lastly, in 1877, an event that still involved the Malês of Recife, demonstrated once more the diversity of the Muslim community. In that year, in a series of letters published in the Diário de Pernambuco, a Recife newspaper, the local Muslims demonstrated a strong knowledge of Islam. In effect:

> The Malês took the opportunity to teach a lesson on Islam to the readers of the journal. They taught about their great division between Sunnis and Shias, asserted the observance of the "main dogmas that unify them", as well as the abstinence from alcoholic beverages, the fasting of Ramadan, and the "ban from the cult of images.[68]

The reason for publishing the letters was a dispute between two communities over the legitimacy of being Muslims. Supposedly, a group of non-Muslim Africans presented themselves as such, to protest against the police embargo on their festivities and religious practice, which was promptly refuted by the Muslims. In their response to the Malê's rebuttal, the interdicted community replied that the "Muslims were not all gathered under the same sect, neither in Africa nor Pernambuco, as the Malês wanted, in whose name the protest was made."[69] Despite not being Muslims, their replica, as well as the reports from Baghdadi, attest then to the plurality of the ummah. However, it did not reflect an absence of unity, as is evidenced by the fact that the whole national ummah organised themselves to accommodate Baghdadi.

Conclusion

This article aimed to demonstrate how the enslaved Muslims overcame the imposition of their degrading status as slaves and built their own community in the Americas, being as a diverse society which displayed unity amidst diversity. In short, the African-Muslim diasporic community engendered its own culture on the American continent, importing every element that structured their way of life and implementing them according to the degree of freedom they enjoyed in the new continent. As a consequence, in each decision made and in each exercised choice, as stated by Sylviane Diouf, in her book *Servants of Allah: African Muslims Enslaved in the Americas*:

> they shaped their own world and re-created their culture as best they could. By their dress, diet, names, rituals, schools, and imported religious items and books, they clearly indicated that they intended to remain who they had been in Africa — be it emir, teacher, marabout, alfa, charno, imam, or simply believer.[70]

Living by a conscience that was true to their belief of who they were, the Muslim communities portrayed in this article were a testament of resistance and identity embedded within a religious practice. That can be associated with al-Kawakibi's thought on political action, which required honour as its main drive, being a natural aspiration, a source of great satisfaction, and more important than life itself. Such a concept is in line with the risk that many Muslims assumed in practising their faith, showing how that conscience, which pervades the notions of dignity and honour, prompted them into action. According to al-Kawakibi, rather than an egoistic feeling, honour derives from serving the community, in the way of God and religion, and in the event of subjugation, it also meant resistance to oppression.[71] That can be seen throughout the American ummah, where identity, religious practice, and resistance worked side by side. Thus, within the Muslim diaspora, each individual acted consciously and according to the precepts of the culture and religion, they followed, building an integrative and unsusceptible society, all defined under the precepts of Islam and its way of interpreting life.

From this perspective, religious practice is not seen as a tradition that believers blindly follow, but as a choice that permeates a series of attitudes, establishing an interpretive discourse of itself. Therefore, despite the subjugating and humiliating status given to the enslaved, Islam and its ummah determined another status of its own. As a result, the ignoble place imposed on the enslaved did not define or keep them there.[72] They used all the advantages and tools Islam gave them in their means of survival, including fortitude, faith, literacy, occult protection, common language, sense of community, organization, frugality, and especially, hope.[73]

Concurrently, the Muslim diasporic communities were also distinct. Although Islam had a global trajectory, its adherents were not homogeneous. These communities had their own customs and practices, which reflected their identity and way of living. Still, paradoxically, they were part of a whole. Lastly, the ummah knew how to cultivate its identity amidst its diversity, in a continuous resistance to the oppressive culture in which it was inserted. This fact does not mitigate the brutality of slavery, and such concepts do not summarize its entire structure. However, the idea of identity, resistance, and diversity can help understand the diasporic society and how it endured and to some extent even prospered in such a hostile environment.

Notes

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[3] Jomaa, *Ummah*, 30.

[4] João José Reis, *Rebelião Escrava no Brasil - A história do levante dos Malês em 1835* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012), 206.

[5] Reis, *Rebelião Escrava no Brasil*, 216, 234.

[6] Maududi, *Islamic Way of Life*, 19.

[7] Jomaa, *Ummah*, 48.

[8] Sylviane Diouf, *Servants of Allah: African Muslims Enslaved in the Americas* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2013), 38.

[9] Roger Chartier, *A história cultural entre práticas e representações*, trans. Maria Manuela Galhardo (Lisboa: Difusão Editorial, 1988), 112.

[10] Quran 3:110.

[11] Maududi, *Islamic Way of Life*, 46.

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[15] Jomaa, *Ummah*, 116-118.

[16] Maududi, *Islamic Way of Life*, 20-21.

[17] Jomaa, *Ummah*, 23-24.

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[21] Paul E. Lovejoy, "Mohammed Ali Nicholas Sa'id: From Enslavement to American Civil War Veteran," *Millars: Espai i Història* 42, no. 1 (2017): 220–221, https://www.e-revistes.uji.es/index.php/millars/article/download/3252/2677/; Nicholas Said, *The Autobiography of Nicholas Said, A Native of*

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23 Baghdadi, 2007, 89-90.

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[45] Thomas Ewbank, *Life in Brazil, or A Journal of a Visit to the Land of the Cocoa and the Palm* (New York: Harper and Brother, 1856), 439.

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[47] Diouf, *Servants of Allah*, 127.

[48] Weber, *Economy and Society*, 391.

[49] Reis, *Rebelião Escrava no Brasil*, 237.

[50] Reis, *Rebelião Escrava no Brasil*, 238.

[51] R.R Madden, *A Twelvemonth's Residence in the West Indies, During the Transition from Slavery to Apprenticeship* (London: James Cochrane and Co., 1835), 129, http://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/01/45/03/00002/mdp39015014707494.pdf.

[52] Sahih al-Bukhari 9:7, https://sunnah.com/bukhari:528; Sahih al-Bukhari 60:31, https://sunnah.com/bukhari:3356.

[53] Quran 2:185; Quran 7:156; Quran 4:3; Quran 2:190; Quran 3:97; Quran 6:118; Quran 2:219; Quran 4:36; Jami` at-Tirmidhi 7:47; Musnad Ahmad 5:144; Sunan Ibn Majah 9:108; Bulugh al-Maram 11:9; Sunan Ibn Majah 25:85; Sahih Muslim 34:84; Sunan Abi Dawud 40:132; and Sahih al-Bukhari 46:39 are all citations of verses of both Quran and Hadiths that refer to the practices listed by Sadika, in the order of appearance.

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[63] Weismann, *Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi Islamic Reform and Arab Revival*, 77.

[64] Cemil Aydın, *The idea of the Muslim world: A Global Intellectual History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 16.

[65] Aydın, *The idea of the Muslim world,* 19-20.

[66] Baghdadi, 2007, 87.

[67] Baghdadi, 2007, 114.

[68] Reis, dos Santos Gomes, and de Carvalho, *O alufá Rufino*, 340.

[69] Reis, dos Santos Gomes, and de Carvalho, *O alufá Rufino*, 336.

[70] Diouf, *Servants of Allah*, 282l

[71] Weismann, *Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi Islamic Reform and Arab Revival,* 109-110.

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‘Allah is in Fashion’: The Iranian Revolution in Non-Aligned Yugoslavia

By

George Loftus

Abstract

Despite its recent resurgence in Cold War scholarship, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) remains elusive. Outside of certain diplomatic or political-economic theatres, our understanding of the organisation is limited. This is particularly the case for the effects of the Non-Aligned Movement below the state-level and amongst individuals and groups ‘on the ground’ in its member states. This paper is an intervention into this gap in the literature, examining experiences of ‘actually-existing Non-Alignment’ in Yugoslavia through responses to the Iranian Revolution. The Iranian Revolution presented both a problem and an opportunity in the minds of many Yugoslavs. Occurring towards the end of Non-Alignment’s time as a pillar of Yugoslav society, Ruhollah Khomeini’s Islamist movement was a world-historical movement that forced groups from across Yugoslav society to reckon with its meaning. What this paper argues is that such interpretations were developed out of experiences of Non-Alignment. As such, the ‘imaginative geographies’ of the NAM and the interactions they enabled since 1961 provided the foundation for reactions to the Iranian Revolution. In turn, events in Iran would influence the development of the NAM’s role in a changing Yugoslavia, specifically as it pertained to the lives of Muslims. Depicting the clashing and shifting interpretations of the Iranian Revolution by Yugoslavia’s Muslim and state institutions, this paper advances our understanding of how Non-Alignment was lived and how this global entity founded upon anti-imperialism bled into the daily experiences of Yugoslavs as ‘Non-Aligned subjects.’

About the author

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In September 1989, Belgrade was home to Iranian revolutionaries, both real and imagined. The Summit of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) was in town, the ninth one since its establishment in 1961 in Belgrade. As part of the events, an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati sat down for an interview with the Bosnian Muslim magazine *Preporod*.[1] The magazine's editorial board, led by scholar Džemaludin Latić, were keen to understand the revolution and Iran's place in the Non-Aligned community of which Yugoslavia was a major member. Across town, sociologist S. P. Ramet recorded the views of two Serb intellectuals who imagined something much worse from Velayati's countrymen and Latić's aims. For these Serbs, Ramet records, it was clear that the Muslims of Yugoslavia wanted "to see a Khomeini in charge here."[2] With curiosity amongst the Bosnian Muslim intellectuals on the one hand and growing Islamophobia amongst Serb nationalists on the other, these views represented the prevailing interpretations of the Islamic Revolution in Yugoslavia. Such interpretations were established in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution between 1979 and 1983 and became inextricably linked with the growing sectarian domestic strife in Yugoslavia during the 1980s. More significantly, these understandings were also influenced by Yugoslavia's pre-1979 entanglements with the Islamic world through the framework of the NAM and reveal much about how global solidarity networks like the NAM were lived in multipolar societies under socialism.

Lacking many longstanding or developed connections with Iranian society, Yugoslavs relied on their existing conceptions of the world order and their place in it to interpret the events in Iran. These mental geographies were influenced by Yugoslavia's position as the European stronghold of the predominantly Asian and African NAM. This article will argue that the Yugoslav reaction to the Iranian Revolution cannot be divorced from Yugoslavia's specific position within the Non-Aligned world. For Yugoslavia's Islamic Community and its members, responses to the events in Iran were often contextualised in a larger Islamic world that they experienced through the infrastructures and networks of the NAM. In these reactions, the phenomenon of 'Islamic internationalism' which grew in prominence in the Middle East and North Africa from the 1970s looms as large as Iran's Islamist rupture. All these movements were seen as part of a new 'Islamic internationalism.' For the Yugoslav state and party, the Islamic Revolution would act as a key moment in the larger journey away from the NAM and their increasing claims of a 'European' identity. In such a process, Iran and the fear of the "Khomeini in charge here" would provide an impetus for increased scrutiny over domestic Muslims and a hardening of certain intellectual tendencies at home and affiliations abroad. Moreover, the internal responses to the revolution in Iran are significant beyond the borders of Yugoslavia, as they upend assumptions of connectivity which anchor current scholarship on the Global Cold War.

Non-Alignment and Islam in the Historiography

In recent years, there has been an explosion in scholarship on the so-called 'Third World' and the Non-Aligned Movement. The relationship between these two concepts is and

was unstable, but for this paper I understand the NAM as the institutional and diplomatic 'cousin' of the more amorphous, and more militant, Third Worldist movement. This new scholarship is part of an attempt to integrate decolonisation into the historiography of the Cold War, positioning it as one of the major, if not the major, historical processes of the twentieth century.[3] This 'new Cold War history' has revolutionised our understanding of how the Cold War was fought, with what aims, and by whom. Emerging out of this historiographical trend is a renewed focus on the Non-Aligned Movement. The NAM, although less so than the post-Bandung anti-colonial organisations, has become the focus of an increasing number of studies which seek to explore its role in both decolonisation as a process and in developments during the Cold War.[4] Given the recency of this expansion in the scholarship, the level of critical depth applied to the aims and practices of the NAM can be shallow. Such works can also slip into depicting nostalgia-tinted anti-colonial worlds populated by larger-than-life Nassers and Titos. This is clear for example in Vijay Prashad's foundational *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*, in which he frames the 1956 Brioni Declaration, the first step in the NAM's creation, as a meeting of "titans".[5] Another example comes from Nastaša Mišković, who frames Tito in particular as the "driving force" of the organisation.[6] This focus on the masculinist heroic imaginary of the summit and its aftermath belies a reality of much more complex engagements and disengagements from the NAM ideal and its institutional framework. Crucially, such views underemphasise the extent to which the NAM as an institution became the foundation for international interaction by certain social groups within the signatory states.

There have been attempts to correct some of this nostalgia in the literature. Standing in contrast to Prashad is Robert Vitalis, who argues that much more attention should be focused on the "the regional rivalries, clientelism, and log rolling" at Belgrade "lest one still imagines the moment as a time when a better, more principled form of world order might have come into being."[7] Vitalis's emphasis on the multiple stakeholders at Belgrade provides a sorely needed account of some the tensions and contradictions that populated the organisation, while also warning against romanticising specific historical figures and their supposed influence. Outside of the specific moments of 1955 and 1961, longer histories of the NAM at various scales have emerged. The most significant of these is Jürgen Dinkel's volume on the history of the NAM until 1992. For Dinkel, the NAM was only truly empowered after its institutionalisation during the 1970s, significantly later than the heyday of the Brioni 'titans'.[8] Dinkel's view cuts against some of the earlier works which portray the post-1968 NAM as a husk, left without its necessary charismatic leadership.[9]

My article is part of this developing revisionist trend in studies of the Global Cold War and decolonisation. I echo Dinkel's criticism that the existing literature is almost myopically focused on "just a few detailed accounts of individuals" and that as a result "we know nothing about" others "who may have contributed to cooperation between the non-aligned countries".[10] How various national and subnational figures beyond the 'titans' used, understood, and received the NAM is at the core of this article. The primacy of handshakes and handwritten notes between notables in the literature does not however mean that the

NAM was a shallow, purely diplomatic entity or an exercise in charismatic pageantry. The flashpoint of the 1979 Iranian Revolution presents a perfect case study in which to examine the various socio-political relationships with the NAM in its core state, Yugoslavia. Non-Alignment —its infrastructure and ideological underpinning— was the presupposition of Yugoslav reactions to the Iranian Revolution.

An accompanying void in the literature concerns the history of Islam in Yugoslavia. This body of work has yet to deal extensively with the relationship between domestic and global Islamic practice and belief under Yugoslav socialism. The ruptures of war and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans have contributed to an understanding which suggests that, between 1945 and 1992, Islam (and other religions) were 'frozen' institutions, only to re-emerge after the collapse of socialism.[11] Such blockages in the historiography have meant that the history of Non-Alignment has not been integrated into the history of Islam in Yugoslavia. This is the case despite the fact that the half-century under socialism saw the most sustained interaction between the Yugoslav space and the Islamic world since Ottoman rule.[12]

Some recent interventions in this area have attempted to address this absence by integrating new literature on socialist internationalism and the Islamic world in the Cold War. The events of the Islamic world and of revolutionary internationalism have often been seen as separate, yet they were in fact deeply bound together. A major intervention is for example Paul Thomas Chamberlin's *The Global Offensive*, which presents revolutionary practices in Palestine and the Middle East as part of a continuum with Algerian, Vietnamese, and Cuban struggles.[13] On the role of the NAM specifically in these connections, Piro Rexhepi, for example, has argued that the official contacts of Albania and Yugoslavia with Muslim states led to what he calls a "fermentation of solidarity" between Balkan Muslims and the rest of the Islamic world, even if such solidarities were opposed to the prevailing order of state socialism.[14] More expansive is the work of Darryl Li. His work on foreign 'jihadists' in the Bosnian War seeks to eliminate many of the boundaries between religious and political internationalisms, arguing that the NAM provided for Yugoslav Muslims "a way of identifying with both the socialist state and the *umma* at once."[15] This article builds on this emerging research of the intersection of Yugoslav socialist internationalism and global Islam. Islam's often contested place in Balkan society intensified the influence of the NAM in shaping such contestations. Through the NAM, a new Muslimness was beginning to be expressed.

I will interrogate this 'new Muslimness' first by demonstrating the 'actually-existing Non-Alignment' of Yugoslav life in the 1970s. This first section will show that the religious practice of Muslims under Yugoslav socialism was inseparable from Yugoslavia's socio-political engagements with the rest of the Muslim world. I will then explore some of the interpretations of the Iranian Revolution by Yugoslavs. The scope of this article is institutional, focused on the Yugoslav *Islamska Zajednica* (IZ), the sole legal representative body of Yugoslav Muslims, and the Yugoslav state and party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [*Savez komunista Jugoslavije*] (SKJ). The first section, using commentary from IZ

publications such as *Preporod* and *Glasnik*, will assess some of the Muslim perspectives on the events in Iran in 1979. These publications were, and are, invariably dominated by local news, but each issue during the socialist period always contained some commentary on contemporary world events, especially those occurring in the Islamic world. Whilst suffering to an extent from self-censoring on the part of the editors, events and movements of historical significance, such as conflicts over Palestine and the Iranian Revolution, were hotly debated. The events themselves would generally be covered by syndicated, or quoted, news reports from the general Yugoslav press and then become the topic of editorials, opinion articles, columns or as letters to the editors. Whilst the editorial board would often hold a specific view on some event, the Islamic press, and *Preporod* especially, was a platform for debate for Yugoslav Muslims. Due to the structure of the IZ and its centre of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this paper privileges the views of Bosnian Muslims over other Muslims in Yugoslavia. Whilst Kosovar, Macedonian, and Turkish Muslims in Yugoslavia had their own views on the Iranian Revolution, IZ publications almost entirely relied on the voices of the Bosnian Muslim intellectual elite. Establishing the changing relationship of other Islamic communities to the international Islamist movement is a vital area in need of future study but, due to the nature of the sources available, remains beyond the scope of this article. The second section of this paper will contrast these Muslim views with those of the party and governmental elites through Yugoslav state policy decisions made domestically and internationally after the breakout of the Iranian Revolution. This section will rely more on journalist accounts of the time and a reconstruction of the existing historiography of this period to re-centre the Iranian Revolution in the domestic repression of Islamic intellectuals.

Non-Alignment and Islam in Yugoslavia

When the Iranian Revolution began in 1979, Yugoslavia's links to the Muslim world, especially Arab states, were extensive. The year also coincided with a high point in the IZ's domestic revival, which had been building since the late-1960s.[16] These twin processes of state internationalism and religious revival formed the background to interpretations of the Iranian Revolution. This section will explore these processes, their role in the institutional development of the IZ and the SKJ, and how they became the basis for later perceptions of the events in Iran.

The Non-Aligned Movement was established in 1961 in Belgrade. Inspired by but crucially not directly related to the 1955 Bandung Conference, the NAM was founded as an international organisation similar in structure to the UN.[17] The coalition of states which founded the organisation saw themselves as building an international movement of post- and anti- colonial states.[18] Whilst at first something of an ad-hoc group with unclear objectives, by the 1970s the NAM had become, according to Jürgen Dinkel, an institutionalised transnational entity.[19] Whilst the revolutionary 1960s were rhetorically dominant, and remain so in the historiography, the post-1968 NAM and its associated networks only grew in importance for Yugoslav institutions and citizens. Gal Kirn has argued

that Non-Alignment, along with the anti-fascist struggle of World War II and development of a 'self-management socialism' modelled not on the Soviet Union, formed one of the three 'ruptures' which set the path for Yugoslavia after its forced break with Stalin in 1948.[20] The Yugoslav state articulated its commitment to Third World anti-colonialism as "partisan politics by other means," a position of solidarity which shifted Yugoslavia socio-politically outside of Europe.[21] Such articulations would become institutionalised domestically not just in terms of trade and diplomacy, but also socio-culturally.[22] These new "imaginative geographies" were expressed by Yugoslav party intellectuals such as Edvard Kardelj, who linked "national-liberation, anti-fascist and revolutionary struggles" as a cohesive oppositional bloc against the bipolar world order of the late twentieth century.[23] Such expressions of solidarity and their institutionalisation led to real connections between Yugoslavs and citizens of other Non-Aligned countries, which was especially the case for Yugoslavia's Muslims.

Extensive diplomatic and economic interactions between Yugoslavia and Muslim-majority postcolonial states formed the basis for transregional interactions between Muslim Yugoslavs and their co-religionists in the Middle East and North Africa.[24] Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito cultivated strong relationships with the Arab republics of Egypt, Libya, and Iraq, which led to an increasing presence of Arab Muslim students in urban centres and, reciprocally, Yugoslav technical workers in Arab states.[25] The Yugoslav diplomatic service was also a common home for Muslim party members, as the expanding ties with Muslim-majority states increased the need for Muslim diplomats.[26] This kind of official work also extended to the IZ itself, as it often sent delegations of *ulema* to Muslim nations at the behest of the Yugoslav state.[27] The interactions brought forth by these networks became central to how Yugoslav Muslims understood themselves; that is to say, as part of a wider anti-colonial network of Muslims extending from Algeria to Indonesia.

Islam, as a belief and practice, existed awkwardly amongst these expanding ties. Until Iran's entry into the organisation in 1979, Muslim states that participated in NAM often did so in entirely secular capacities. This was not only the case for nationalist regimes, such as Egypt and Iraq, but also avowedly 'Islamic' governments such as Mauritania or even Saudi Arabia.[28] From the Yugoslav perspective, the ideology of Non-Alignment was concerned only with anti-colonialism and economic justice, with bonds of race or religion excluded, often explicitly.[29] As Catherine Baker argues, such attitudes were voiced by Tito himself, who espoused a "race-blind" solidarity during the Algerian War.[30] The incorporation of Islam into Yugoslav claims to solidarity was avoided with the IZ acting more as an example of Yugoslavia's brand of "tolerant socialism" vis-à-vis Soviet religious policy.[31] Hostility to pan-Islamic politics in the movement from Yugoslavia and others meant that such tendencies, whilst present, were never part of official networks.[32] Rather, these tendencies, particularly amongst Yugoslav Muslims, were ideological stowaways, using the established infrastructure of the NAM to form their own transnational connections and systems of knowledge transfer. Such sub-networks, alongside certain kinds of official patronage, fed into Yugoslavia's domestic Islamic 'revival' in the 1970s.

The causes of Yugoslavia’s Islamic intellectual revival and the subsequent expansion of the IZ’s institutional capacity were twofold. They were, on the one hand, a rapid mosque building programme and, on the other, an influx of a new generation of local Muslim intellectuals, many of whom studied abroad. Both causes were a direct result of the official networks established through the NAM, which were made use of in unofficial ways. From the mid-1960s, mosques were rapidly built and rebuilt across Yugoslavia, primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Often, these projects were funded by Middle Eastern NAM countries and contributed to the expansion of IZ’s reach and institutional role in Muslim lives in Yugoslavia.[33] Such expansion also provided space for new Muslim intellectuals to assume roles in the IZ hierarchy. Yugoslav graduates from Al-Azhar in Cairo and the Universities of Baghdad and Kuwait provided the foundation of a new generation of Islamic scholars in Yugoslavia.[34] Inspired by their experiences in the MENA states and enabled by a more muscular IZ, these new intellectuals, alongside older *ulema* members, pursued an Islamic revival movement in Yugoslavia. In engaging in this revival movement, Yugoslav Muslim intellectuals took part in the contemporaneous global Islamist phenomenon which was taking hold in the Muslim world. The most visible result of the local movement was the proliferation of publications under the IZ banner. These included *Preporod* (Renaissance), established in Sarajevo, *El-Hilal* (Crescent), in Skopje, and *Edukata Islam* in Prishtina.[35] For Bosnian Muslims this moment also coincided with the wider process of Muslim national affirmation which started around 1961 and culminated in the inclusion of the ‘*Muslimani*’ nationality in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution.[36] This process, which was spearheaded by secular elites, granted Bosnian Muslims the same national autonomy as Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and contributed to an increased identification with Islam, particularly as the IZ took on the role of a dual national-religious institution.[37]

This revival was never political, but this is not to say that Yugoslav Islamic intellectuals were ignorant of Islamism as an ideology. As I will show, state censorship certainly would have reacted harshly to any support for Islamist politics.[38] Islamism also remained unpopular within Muslim intellectual circles in Yugoslavia due to a long tradition of Islamic Modernism. This theological approach promoted cooperation with the secular state and was popular amongst the intellectual core of the IZ.[39] Yet, through the connections of Non-Alignment, pan-Islamist politics passed through Yugoslav Islamic intellectual circles. Li has highlighted the example of Elfatih Ali Hassanein, a Sudanese medical student who arrived in Belgrade in 1964.[40] Hassanein, as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was one of many foreign students who helped make Yugoslav Muslims aware of Islamist politics in the Muslim world. Hassanein was also a friend of future Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović, who would later claim that his knowledge of the Muslim Brotherhood came from his contacts with his Arab peers as a student.[41] Outside of these interpersonal connections, publications such as *Preporod* and the IZ’s official journal *Glasnik Islamske Zajednice* (Bulletin of the Islamic Community) published frequent commentary and reporting on events in the Islamic world, including on the implementation of Islamist policies and the successes of Islamist parties. These dynamics of Non-Alignment and Islamic revival influenced how the Iranian Revolution was interpreted in Yugoslavia. Acting as both

the progenitor of 'bottom-up' networks and as a 'top-down' geopolitical institution, the NAM was the mechanism by which 'Iran' and its revolution, in its real and imagined capacities, came to Yugoslavia.

The Islamic Community and the Iranian Revolution

The Iranian Revolution was largely poorly understood inside of Yugoslavia's Islamic Community. Due to Iran's place outside of the NAM sphere before 1979, IZ members experienced few interactions with Iranians.[42] Instead, the Yugoslav *ulema* and associated IZ members relied on both Yugoslav foreign reporting from Belgrade and their connections with Arab states and people to understand the events of 1978 and 1979. In this process the Iranian Revolution lost its place as a definitive 'rupture' in geopolitics that it had gained in the West. It was for Yugoslav Muslims a part of a wider shift in global Islamic politics which privileged the well-known Sudanese, Libyan, and Egyptian contexts over Iran. Nevertheless, whilst IZ members never openly supported the strategies of Khomeini, they received the revolution warmly and viewed it in anti-imperialist terms, attaching it to their own experiences and understandings of revolution and the world order.[43] Moreover, the Iranian Revolution gave some impetus to homegrown 'Islamist' tendencies. Such tendencies were limited, but within some of the more full-throated support for the Iranian revolutionaries we can observe sympathies for a pan-Islamic political project for Yugoslav Muslims.

In the IZ's press, the Iranian Revolution received two major features in *Preporod* and a handful of coverage in other publications such as the *Glasnik*. There were also translations of books and articles by Iranian intellectuals such as Ali Shariati and Ruhollah Khomeini into BCMS.[44] None of the coverage was concerned with specific events in the revolution, nor did it feature original reporting. All these pieces were published between 1979 and 1981, with the 1989 Ali Velayati interview quoted above being the only major exception. This cut-off in coverage coincides with the onset of the Iran-Iraq War and was connected to the parallel response of the Yugoslav state to the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution explored in the final section of this article.

The first major coverage of the Iranian Revolution by IZ publications came in April 1979 in *Preporod* in a centrefold feature entitled "Iran and Islam". The articles in this feature are orientated around what is referred to as "the Iranian miracle of Islam [*Iransko čudo Islam*a]" which is said to have been "a phenomenon of modern history on a global scale."[45] It is also understood as the "natural progression" of a "much broader process of modern revival" in the Islamic world.[46] This contextualised understanding forms the basis of *Preporod*'s coverage in this feature. The Iranian Revolution is presented as one part of a wider trend in the Islamic world with another article stating that "at the end of the 20th century" there appears to be "a great deal of possibility for political power in large parts of the Muslim world."[47] Also clear is that knowledge about the revolution was limited. The latter article used the first *Fitna*, the civil war initiating the Sunni/Shia break in the early

Islamic caliphate, as a means of explaining the political nature of the divisions in Islam. Such an explanatory device speaks to a lack of detailed knowledge of the ongoing events in Iran and a reliance on commonly understood tropes of Islamic history.

Understood more deeply were the possible geopolitical implications of the Iranian Revolution. This forms the basis upon which *Preporod* found common cause with Iran. A major example of this was a dispute over an article by Jelena Marinčić titled "Allah is in Fashion [*U Modi je Allah*]". Originally published in the Belgrade *Nedeljne Novosti* (Weekly News) and syndicated by Preporod in April 1979, the article suggested the possibility of a "worldwide geopolitical reversal."[48] Marinčić argued that, in the aftermath of the revolution, "Muslims are united" and that an "Islamic internationalism transcends national borders."[49] Marinčić saw the pan-Islamic trend, which was given new life by Iran, as a new opposition against the bipolar world order, or a rebellion against the "developed world [*razvijeni svet*]."[50] Three issues later, an author cited only as 'J.M.' took issue with Marinčić's conclusions about the supposed 'threat' of the Islamic Revolution. Questioning primarily the use of 'fashion [*moda*]' to describe Islamic belief, J.M. argued that "such an article" presents the "Iranian constellation" as "a flash", as part of a wider "stage of fashion events [*na pozornici modnih zbivanja*]."[51] Whilst agreeing with the "wisdom" of Marinčić's conclusion on the potential upending of the world order, J.M. argued for a recentring of Islam within interpretations of the events in Iran.[52] They argued that what is often ignored by the non-Muslim press is that Islam, "which surrounds the thoughts of those most concerned Iranian revolutionaries", is "a spiritual refreshment and a driver for the transformation of man."[53] What J.M.'s retort to the non-Muslim Marinčić reveals is that the Iranian Revolution was, for many Yugoslav Muslim intellectuals, an event defined by both its anti-imperialist meaning and its Islamic meaning. This debate thus shows a synthesis on the part of these Islamic intellectuals, a unity of Islam and Non-Alignment which was forged, vitally, through their engagement with the Islamic Revolution.

This was also clear in a 1981 *Glasnik* article on the practice of sharia, written by scholar Hasan Čengić. Čengić surveyed the implementation of sharia law across the Muslim world, with Iran being one of a number of countries which exhibit "a growing tendency to break with Western models and a determination to return to their own the laws, culture and civilisation."[54] Alongside Nimeiry in Sudan and Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan, Khomeini is quoted extensively in the article. The proclamation of the Islamic Republic is seen as the most representative moment of the strength of the new Muslim coalition alongside the 1973 oil embargo.[55] For Čengić, "Muslims have the space, population, dynamism, strength, energy and money," meaning there is no reason why they cannot become the "the master of tomorrow's world."[56] Like Marinčić and J.M.'s response, this piece connected the economic struggles of the North-South conflict against the developed world with global Islamic revival. In such a narrative, Iran was an anti-Western bulwark both economically and culturally. It additionally highlighted the potential strength of a unified Islamic bloc led by Islamic law. In Čengić's article, Yugoslav Muslims remain absent, but his full-throated support for a potential coalition of Islamic 'masters of tomorrow' implicitly made space for

his own community. This celebration drew on the experiences of Non-Alignment and transregional communication with the Muslim world, as well as an emerging 'Islamic consciousness' amongst some post-war Islamic intellectuals.

The most significant example of this synthesis came from prominent *ulema* member and editor of *Preporod*, Husein Đozo. Đozo is one of the most well-known Islamic intellectuals in Yugoslav history and is credited with developing a distinctive 'Yugoslav' approach to Islamic thought.[57] Educated in Egypt in the 1930s and a deeply influential figure in post-war Yugoslavia, Đozo helped establish the Modernist trend in Bosnian and then Yugoslav Islam. He also helped found *Preporod* and was a consistent member of its editorial staff from 1971 to 1979, with regular columns in a number of other Islamic publications.[58] In one such column in August 1979, 'Ramadan Reflections,' Đozo offered his position on the Iranian Revolution. Đozo was polemical in his column, making the claim that:

> The uniqueness of the Islamic Revolution is made clear, amongst other things, in the small number of victims. It is surely the "cheapest" revolution ["*najjeftinija*" *revolucija*]. No revolution in the world has had less executions of the opposition than this Islamic [one] in Iran.[59]

Regardless of the truth in Đozo's claim, it clearly indicates his support for Khomeini's cause. He went on, reflecting J.M. and admonishing what he called "European secularist-laïcité and materialistic thought" which could not hope to understand the revolution without a firm grounding in Islam.[60] The European public are also portrayed as hypocrites who "demand from Khomeini that he… pardon the Shah's regime and forgive the criminals who… tortured the Iranian people."[61] Đozo also highlighted his links with Iran, limited as they are, through his connections with foreign Shia *ulema*, including the Lebanese Musa al-Sadr.[62] Đozo's article is the closest IZ publications were to unconditional support for the Iranian Revolution as a political project. Yet the image it conjures up of a Western materialist culture, unable to comprehend the bloc Khomeini is helping to build, mirrors those in the other articles. From his supportive rhetoric, it is clear that Đozo imagined such a bloc could become home to Yugoslav Muslims.

There is no doubt that figures such as Čengić and Đozo extended their sympathy to the Iranian revolutionaries, and certainly they perceived a great deal of potential in a new internationalism. This support was based in understandings cultivated amongst Yugoslav Muslims by Non-Alignment and the interactions it engendered with the Muslim world. Such pre-existing understandings were intensified by the lack of on-the-ground knowledge of the fast-moving and far-away Iranian situation, forcing Yugoslav Muslim intellectuals to draw on their connections and prevailing ideologies. As is clear, however, such limitations did not prevent complex understandings of the Iranian Revolution. As the first section demonstrated, Muslimness was transformed under Yugoslavia's embrace of the Non-Aligned philosophy. These new experiences of Muslim subjectivity under the NAM therefore shaped responses to the Iranian Revolution. Notions of North-South conflict, anti-colonialism, and networks of knowledge sharing animated Yugoslav Muslim interpretations of the Iranian Revolution. The responses to the Iranian Revolution are also indicative of how the networks of interaction under the NAM served domestic politics as the revolution worked like a spark

for Čengić and Đozo, leading them to advocate a more pan-Islamic course for their own community. These local political ramifications could be supported by a potential new Islamic global coalition which could commandeer the institutions of the NAM. This project may have been extremely limited, yet this did not stop the Yugoslav state and party from over-interpreting these IZ-affiliated responses to the Islamic Revolution.

The Yugoslav State and Party and the Iranian Revolution

Like the IZ and its members, the Yugoslav state and party members also ascribed great power to the Iranian Revolution in the context of an emerging Islamic internationalism. Unlike the IZ, however, such visions were almost wholly negative. Whilst the Yugoslav state had supported secular and religious Muslim elites in their process of national 'affirmation', the responses to the Iranian Revolution contributed to renewed fears of 'Muslim nationalism' seeking an Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[63] The potential for a new Islamic 'international' empowering nationalist secessionism amongst Yugoslav Muslims became deeply integrated into how the Yugoslav state responded to the Iranian Revolution. Such interpretations and responses were characterised also by their basis in the changing nature of Yugoslav Non-Alignment. As NAM's network in the Balkans began to collapse in the 1980s, so did the Yugoslav state's identification with the anti-colonial struggles which previously formed a pillar in its national mythos. Yugoslavia's connections to the Middle East and foreign Muslims would become a source of fear. Despite Iran's limited role in such networks, even after the revolution, such fears were propelled by specific anxieties of an Iran-led Islamic 'International' that that could enable secessionist and 'extremist' attitudes at home. It was a period of 'counter-revolutionary' discourses which actively challenged the assumptions of the NAM's place in Yugoslavia. The specific responses to the Iranian Revolution were more about the place of Yugoslavia in the world and its place in the weakening NAM.

Despite a certain instrumentalization of Muslims in the diplomacy of the NAM, the Yugoslav state always expressed an ambivalent attitude to Islam. Whilst the orthodox post-socialist historiographical position emphasises religious persecution as built into the Yugoslav system, it is generally agreed that religion had a role to play in 'Titoism' greater than that of other Eastern Bloc states.[64] With organisations such as the IZ, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia exhibited oversight, but religious bodies were generally autonomous with the *ulema* and priests operating their own systems of hierarchy and administration.[65] However, just like in the networks of the NAM, Islam as a belief system existed uneasily in Yugoslav society. Much of this was due to Yugoslavia's socialist position which emphasised modernity over all else. Returning to Gal Kirn's framing of Yugoslavia's three 'ruptures' – the partisan struggle, self-management, and Non-Alignment —one can see an overarching ideology of modernisation.[66] Because of this, Yugoslavia under Tito embraced anti-traditionalism, fearing the resurgence of ethnic alignments that relied on mythical ethnogeneses. Such modernity was therefore sceptical of the place of Islam, or religion generally, in contemporary society. Muhamed Filipović, for example, an ethnic

Muslim and member of the SKJ, argued that “in order for Muslims to become what they shouldn’t become” that the Party should take the lead in resisting the “conservative elements” of the *ulema*.[67] Islam, whilst tolerated and widely practiced, could not entirely shake its place in the ‘past,’ opposed to Yugoslavia’s triumphant socialist modernity.

This suspicion was also combined with latent European Orientalist views on Islam. Despite Yugoslavia’s claims to exist outside of ‘Europe’ and the colonial Western space, such attitudes were never eradicated. As Catherine Baker has described with reference to the place of race in socialist Yugoslavia, the state and societies’ closer identifications with the Third World did not mean that “whiteness had not been displaced from identity construction.”[68] The European civilisationist ideal had not been completely overturned despite socialism’s breaches with this cultural legacy. This form of identity construction applied equally to Islam, despite its long-term presence in the region. The idea of a dual or false national loyalty amongst Muslims, developed in the post-Ottoman Balkans, persisted through socialism.[69] The 1981 Kosovo Crisis, which saw Kosovar students protest against anti-Albanian discrimination, energised an anti-Muslim intellectual bloc who picked up the banner of old prejudices.[70] A new contingent of Serb “critical intellectuals” began to develop conspiratorial views of not just the *ulema* but all Yugoslav Muslims, including those in the SKJ.[71] The Iranian Revolution, however, was the key instrument by which these resurrected prejudices escaped the minds of Serb nationalist fantasists and entered the halls of the League of Communists. This is because they were resurrected within a new context shaped by the party-state’s commitment to Non-Alignment.

On 25th November 1979, Tito condemned in a speech what he called “the undermining activity in some clericalist circles,” referring to the IZ *ulema*.[72] In the same month, at a conference in Banja Luka, Bosnian Muslim and party member Hamdija Pozderac accused the IZ’s leadership of “their failure to condemn” a growing tendency of “pan-Islamic nationalism.”[73] These comments followed a growing trend on the part of the party to criticise an apparent ‘Muslim nationalist’ tendency amongst the *ulema*. This criticism had been developing against the IZ throughout the 1970s, but 1979 was the beginning of a new series of attacks on Islam in Yugoslavia. For Pozderac and other Muslim Communists this became as much about diverting attention away from themselves to the *ulema* as a target for anti-Muslim sympathies in Yugoslavia.[74] Tito’s comments especially spoke to a new state-sponsored attitude of hostility to domestic Islamic institutions. *Preporod* was specifically targeted as a supposed hotbed of “Muslim nationalism” after a dispute over the historical legacies of Muslim collaboration with the wartime Nazi-puppet regime of the Croat Ustaša.[75] After defending the wartime conduct of some of its editorial staff, including the aforementioned Husein Đozo, a former SS member, *Preporod* was forced to purge itself of supposed ‘pan-Islamic clerics’ by the IZ, under pressure from the SKJ.[76] Iran, as a supposed reference point for these clerics, was brought into these disputes on numerous occasions. One such instance was in the Zagreb based magazine *Stuart*, where Fuad Muhić, a Muslim party member, accused certain *ulema* of falling for “a form of Khomeini-style fundamentalism.”[1 7] It is clear from such statements that the Iranian

Revolution was acting as an animating cause in this authoritarian episode. This was not because of its actual presence in the IZ, which was minimal, but because of the fear the Islamic Revolution generated of possible seditious international alliances which would empower the supposed underlying 'Muslim nationalist' secessionist tendencies in Yugoslavia.

This increased scrutiny and surveillance culminated in the 'Sarajevo Process', a 1983 trial of accused members of the *Mladi Muslimani* (Young Muslims) Islamist organisation. Pozderac identified this group as working toward a "pan-Islamism" which would lead to an "ethnically cleansed Bosnia and Herzegovina."[78] He also argued that the accused would pursue relationships "with the Muslim world" and, specifically, "the Islamic Republic of Iran."[79] Whilst the indictment listed then-Islamist dissident and future president Alija Izetbegović as the leader, the accused group included many prominent IZ members, such as Hasan Čengić and Džemaludin Latić.[80] The prosecution argued that the 'members' identified with the Islamic Revolution and that some had travelled secretly to attend the anniversary of the revolution in Tehran.[81] These supposed international connections with the increasingly demonised Iranian regime were underlined by the writings of the accused, including most significantly Izetbegović's 'Islamic Declaration.'[82] The threat of this latter document, an undeniably 'pan-Islamic' text produced in 1970, was made real by its potential empowerment through the Iranian assistance which he was accused of soliciting. At the end of the trial the accused were sentenced to fourteen years each.[83] By the time these sentences had been handed down, the Process had established a relationship between an idea of the Iranian Revolution and the Islamophobic panics of Yugoslavia in the 1980s.

These ideas of the Iranian Revolution had potency for the Yugoslav state not simply because of latent prejudices. Yugoslavia's specific international relationships, both in and out of the NAM, led to a deeper fear of the Islamic Revolution and its threat to Yugoslavia. A major issue within the NAM during the early 1980s was the Iran-Iraq War. As a conflict between two Non-Aligned states, it represented a crisis of legitimacy for the organisation which was increasingly weak on the world stage.[84] Iraq was a close ally of Yugoslavia and its biggest trading partner in the NAM bloc.[85] Iraq also served as an idealised NAM state: officially secular, nominally 'socialist' and with a 'Great Man' leader ensuring stability and modernisation. Whilst Belgrade remained officially neutral in the conflict, it did supply some $2 billion worth of arms to Iraq during the course of the war.[86] Iran's increasingly aggressive foreign policy under Khomeini, often voiced within NAM forums, coupled with Yugoslavia's commitment to Saddam Hussein's rule meant that domestic fears of Iran-inspired 'pan-Islamism' were fed through a new threat to the state's global strategic interests.[87] Such threats to economic interests abroad exacerbated the state pressure on Muslims and linked those suspected dissidents to Iran and Iranian interests.

These threats to Yugoslavia's global position also came at a time of profound change in Yugoslav foreign policy. As Konstantin Kilibarda has argued, Yugoslavia began a transition toward 'Europe' as its diplomatic and political focus during the 1980s.[88] Deeper integration into the European economy, through guest workers and trade, contributed to a "more open

tendency to explicitly privilege Yugoslavia's 'European' locality (and 'future')."[89] The 'worlding' Yugoslavia had undergone through the NAM was beginning to unravel and the Yugoslav leadership attached themselves to the reformist Communist project on the continent, voiced by Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev as "a common European home."[90] New strategic and economic relationships pushed the post-Tito Yugoslav leadership to 'cash in' on their white Europeanness and enact "a 'European' subject position that was defined against the 'Balkan' and 'oriental' locally and against the 'Non-Aligned' internationally."[91] This was voiced by S. P. Ramet's subjects, whom I discussed in the introduction, who framed the NAM as a *Dolchstoßlegende* (stab in the back) by Muslim Yugoslavs, highlighting the "on-going contacts between Islamic clerics and believers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their co-religionists in the Middle East."[92] Yugoslavia soon became the gates of Europe, rather than a comrade nation of Africa and Asia. Reactions to the Iranian Revolution amongst the party-state elites formed a crucial discursive bridge in this process. Geopolitical realignment and latent Orientalist fears of Islam would feed into the rhetoric and action of Slobodan Milošević, who capitalised on white European ideas of Islamic threat, often symbolised by Iran and Khomeini, to assert his dominance over a collapsing state.[93]

Rather than cautious support or even recognition for the new Iran, the Yugoslav state and the SKJ developed a fearful stance to the Islamic Revolution. Yugoslavia was of course not unique in this; the Iranian Revolution was a cause of worldwide panic. Yet the SKJ's specific reactions were drawn from the constellation of local nationalist anxieties and the breakdown of true anti-colonial international solidarity, which could have cushioned the influence of the Islamic Revolution on local fears. Like those in the IZ, they also knew little of the revolution itself. Rather, the NAM, and Yugoslavia's engagement and subsequent retreat from it, which coincided with the Islamic Revolution, provided the basis for the state's reaction. Persistent Orientalist ideals, the development of homegrown Islamic revivalism, and geopolitical threats all contributed to a state response which saw Iran, or the potential of it, as a threat to both Yugoslavia's place in the world and the integrity of its national borders. Iran was not the only animating cause of the anti-Muslim actions of the 1980s, but it did provide a crucial and seemingly credible threat, pushing forward ideas of a possible 'Islamic international' ready to take over Yugoslavia, or at least break it up. Just like the responses from among the IZ, state interpretations of the Iranian Revolution demonstrate how the NAM and its networks formed the basis of Yugoslav global identities.

Conclusion

Existing at the intersection of Non-Alignment and domestic Islamic revival, the spectre of the Iranian Revolution, rather than the presence of it, became inseparable from ongoing processes in Yugoslavia's final decade. For the IZ and the Yugoslav state, the idea of Iran became inextricable from twenty-five years of interaction with the Islamic world. Whilst the Iranian Revolution seemed thought-provoking to the IZ and Yugoslav *ulema*, for the state and party it became part of an existential threat from within. With both sides operating from behind the veil of ignorance, Non-Alignment, and each institution's

distinctive and changing relationship to it, generated the preconditions for how the Iranian Revolution was understood. With state power and increasingly aggressive persecution, the SKJ managed to stop the IZ from exploring its position on Iran in more depth, preventing any real connections between the two Islamic communities during the socialist period. Whilst their immediate concerns were over the presence of 'Muslim nationalist secessionism', the Iranian Revolution became discursively tied to this local threat because of the state's changing relationship to Non-Alignment and the Islamic world.

The institutional reactions to the Iranian Revolution also reveal how Yugoslavia was connected to the Islamic world through the Cold War. Rather than being separated from either their belief or their global co-religionists, Yugoslav Muslims were part of a wider network of inter-Islamic dialogue which often worked because of, but not through, the infrastructure of Non-Alignment. The idea of the 'demonic' Iranian influence in Yugoslavia, acting through the ulema, was a product on the one hand of a collapsing diplomatic network in the NAM and a return to 'European normality' on the other. Returning to Belgrade in 1989, we can see a crystallisation of the views that had developed over the course of the 1980s. For Ramet's Serb psychologists, there was no doubt in the threat posed by Muslims, now uniformly identified with Khomeini. For Latić, Non-Alignment and Islam still made sense together, as did the potential of Iran as an anti-colonial actor. Such interpretations would not have been possible without the influence of Non-Alignment in shaping everyday Yugoslav experiences. Even as nationalism took hold, its forms were developed through reactions to the socio-political and economic networks established in 1961.

Finally, it is perhaps even more important to note briefly the 'afterlives' of this initial interaction between Iranian political Islam and Bosnian intellectuals. Whilst Husein Đozo died in 1982, Hasan Čengić's initial forays into the Iranian Revolution would spring into a sustained engagement with Iran and the Islamic Republic's ideology.[94] He was even widely seen in early post-Yugoslav Bosnia and Herzegovina as 'Iran's man' in the Bosniak-nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA).[95] Although many of these real, material relationships came about through a sustained diplomatic offensive by Iran, it was no accident that its biggest client in Bosnia and Herzegovina had previously engaged positively from afar with the ideas of the Islamic Revolution.[96] Whilst the wars in the formerly Yugoslav space constituted their own political revolution amongst the various national groups, the legacies of the NAM were not so easily swept away. The Iranian Revolution, whilst hardly the cause of the anti-Muslim sentiment and violence of 1980s and 1990s, served to further stress the fraying bonds of Yugoslavia's ethno-religious communities. All of this was crucially taking place in the context of a collapsing NAM network, the ideological underpinning of which had been so vital to Yugoslav national identity. The results of this breakdown were both a repurposed internationalist infrastructure for Muslims and an imagined betrayal of a deserved White destiny for Serb xenophobes. What remained of the network was being slowly and disastrously cannibalised by new and emergent nationalist entrepreneurs.

Notes

[1] Džemaludin Latić, "Ekskluzivno: Za Preporod Govori Ali Akbar Velajati, Ministar Inostranih Poslova Islamske Republike Irana," *Preporod*, 15 October 1989, 4.

[2] S. P. Ramet, "Islam in Yugoslavia Today," *Religion in Communist Lands* 18, no. 3 (1 September 1990): 226.

[3] By far the most significant early work in this trend is Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Other major examples include Quỳnh N. Phạm and Robbie Shilliam, *Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); Christopher J. Lee, ed., *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Afterlives* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010).

[4] Despite recent developments, scholarship on NAM is still lacking. This is especially the case for the period after 1968. For a recent volume on the NAM's antecedents and the organization's Cold War history see Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992)* (Leiden: Brill, 2018). Two notable edited volumes are Sandra Bott et al., eds., *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: The Non-Aligned Movement in the East-West Conflict* (London: Routledge, 2015) and Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska, eds., *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung - Belgrade* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).

[5] Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2008), 277.

[6] Nataša Mišković, "Introduction," in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War*, 8. Whilst not exclusive to Mišković, this focus on Yugoslavia's undeniably huge role in the creation of NAM can often tip into the territory of 'Yugonostalgia'. This desire to resurrect a history of internationalism makes sense given the region's re-peripheralization via nationalism, war, and neoliberalism.

[7] Robert Vitalis, "The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-Doong)," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 4, no. 2 (2013): 27.

[8] Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992)*, 14.

[9] Lorenz M. Lüthi, "Non-Alignment, 1961–74," in *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: The Non-Aligned Movement in the East-West Conflict*, ed. Sandra Bott et al. (London: Routledge, 2015), 101–102.

[10] Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 12.

[11] For this view see: Harun Karčić, "Islamic Revival in Post-Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina: International Actors and Activities," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 30, no. 4 (2010): 519–534; Xavier Bougarel and Asma Rashid, "From Young Muslims to Party of Democratic Action: The Emergence of a Pan-Islamist Trend in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Islamic Studies* 36, no. 2/3 (1997): 533–549.

[12] Xavier Bougarel, *Islam and Nationhood in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Surviving Empires* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018), 94.

[13] Paul Thomas Chamberlin, *The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[14] Piro Rexhepi, "Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the

Balkans," in *Eastern Europe Unmapped: Beyond Borders and Peripheries*, ed. Irene Kacandes and Yuliya Komska (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 63.

[15] Darryl Li, *The Universal Enemy: Jihad, Empire, and the Challenge of Solidarity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019), 158.

[16] Hazim Fazlic, "The Elements That Contributed to the Survival of Islam In Tito's Yugoslavia," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 26, no. 3 (2015): 292.

[17] Vitalis, "The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-Doong)," 26.

[18] Mišković, "Introduction," 7–8.

[19] Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 6.

[20] Gal Kirn, *Partisan Ruptures: Self-Management, Market Reform and the Spectre of Socialist Yugoslavia* (London: Pluto Press, 2019), 85.

[21] Kirn, 88.

[22] Kirn, 93.

[23] Konstantin Kilibarda, "Non-Aligned Geographies in the Balkans: Space, Race and Image in the Construction of New "European" Foreign Policies," in *Security Beyond the Discipline: Emerging Dialogues on Global Politics*, ed. Abhinava Kumar and Derek Maisonville (Toronto: York Centre for International and Security Studies, 2010), 27.

[24] Li, *The Universal Enemy*, 151.

[25] Li, 154–155.

[26] Fazlic, "The Elements That Contributed to the Survival of Islam In Tito's Yugoslavia," 295.

[27] *Ulema* being a generic term for the religious hierarchy of the IZ; see Fazlic, 295.

[28] Houman A. Sadri, "An Islamic Perspective on Non-Alignment: Iranian Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice," *Journal of Third World Studies* 16, no. 2 (1999): 30.

[29] This rigid set of focuses would exacerbate the collapse of the NAM when it confronted crises which seemed to question to immortal role of economic exploitation, such as in the cases of Lebanon and especially the Third Indochina War.

[30] Catherine Baker, *Race and the Yugoslav Region: Postsocialist, Post-Conflict, Postcolonial?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), 111.

[31] Li, *The Universal Enemy*, 158.

[32] Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 263.

[33] Rexhepi, "Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the Balkans," 61.

[34] Fikret Karčić, "Islamic Revival in the Balkans, 1970-1992," *Islamic Studies* 36, no. 2/3 (1997): 568.

[35] Fikret Karčić, "PREPOROD Newspaper: An Agent of and a Witness to Islamic Revival in Bosnia," *Intellectual Discourse* 7, no. 1 (1999): 92.

[36] Husnija Kamberović, "Between Muslimdom, Bosniandom, Yugoslavdom and Bosniakdom: The Political Elite in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Late 1960s and Early 1970s," in *The Ambiguous Nation: Case Studies from Southeastern Europe in the 20th Century*, eds. Ulf Brunnbauer and Hannes Grandits (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013), 69–73.

[37] Bougarel, *Islam and Nationhood in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 93.

[38] Karčić, "Islamic Revival in the Balkans, 1970-1992," 567.

[39] Sejad Mekić, *A Muslim Reformist in Communist Yugoslavia: The Life and Thought of Husein Đozo* (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 4–7

[40] Li, *The Universal Enemy*, 160.

[41] Rexhepi, "Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the Balkans," 71, note 33.

[42] Sadri, "An Islamic Perspective on Non-Alignment," 30.

[43] Hasan Čengić, "Uloga i Značaj Šeriata u Nekim Muslimanskim Zemljama," *Glasnik Islamske Zajednice* 1, no. 1 (1981): 182; J.M., "Aktuelnost Allaha," *Preporod*, 15 May 1979.

[44] BCMS being an abbreviation for the Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian, the *lingua franca* and majority language of Yugoslavia.

[45] "Irankso Čudo Islama," *Preporod*, 15 April 1979, 10.

[46] "Irankso Čudo Islama," 10.

[47] "Iran i Islam," *Preporod*, 15 April 1979, 10.

[48] Jelena Marinčić, "U Modi Je Allah," *Preporod*, 15 April 1979, 11.

[49] Marinčić, 11.

[50] Marinčić, 11; Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 137.

[51] J.M., "Aktuelnost Allaha," 4; 'J.M.' is likely a pseudonym which was commonly used by certain *Preporod* writers wary of state censorship. This would have been particularly the case for an article praising the Iranian Revolution. See Karčić, "PREPOROD Newspaper: An Agent of and a Witness to Islamic Revival in Bosnia," 93.

[52] J.M., 4.

[53] J.M., 4.

[54] Čengić, "Uloga i Značaj Šeriata u Nekim Muslimanskim Zemljama," 180.

[55] Čengić, 181.

[56] Čengić, 182.

[57] Mekić, *A Muslim Reformist in Communist Yugoslavia*, 4.

[58] Mekić, 57.

[59] Husein Đozo, "Ramazanska Razmišljanja: Homeini," *Preporod*, 15 August 1979, 8.

[60] Đozo, 8.

[61] Đozo, 9.

[62] Đozo, 8.

[63] Dženita Sarač Rujanac, "Constructing the Nationalist Image and Confronting "Muslim Nationalists": The Lawsuit Against Muslim Intellectuals in Sarajevo in 1983," in *The Ambiguous Nation,* 167.

[64] Fazlic, "The Elements That Contributed to the Survival of Islam In Tito's Yugoslavia," 292–293.

[65] Fazlic, 297.

[66] Kirn, *Partisan Ruptures*, 216.

[67] Kamberović, "Between Muslimdom, Bosniandom, Yugoslavdom and Bosniakdom: The Political Elite in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Late 1960s and Early 1970s," 72.

[68] Baker, *Race and the Yugoslav Region*, 116.

[69] Rexhepi, "Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the Balkans," 55, 58.

[70] Rujanac, "Constructing the Nationalist Image and Confronting "Muslim Nationalists": The Lawsuit Against Muslim Intellectuals in Sarajevo in 1983," 154–55.

[71] Rujanac, 157.

[72] K. F. Cviic, "Yugoslavia's Moslem Problem," *The World Today* 36, no. 3 (1980): 108.

[73] Cviic, 108.

[74] Rujanac, "Constructing the Nationalist Image and Confronting "Muslim Nationalists": The Lawsuit Against Muslim Intellectuals in Sarajevo in 1983," 159.

[75] Karčić, "PREPOROD Newspaper: An Agent of and a Witness to Islamic Revival in Bosnia," 94.

[76] Karčić, 94–95; Đozo's SS record is, understandably, highly controversial given his later high-status in the IZ. He was undeniably a member of the SS 'Handžar' Division, which was Himmler's attempt to create an entirely Muslim unit during the war. Whilst largely a failure and made up of conscripts who immediately deserted upon contact with the enemy, Đozo did, notably, volunteer for the unit. His motives seem to have been mostly anti-Chetnik (Monarchist, anti-Muslim and Serb nationalist forces) rather than pro-Nazi and his relationship with the collaborationist Grand Mufti Al-Husayni of Jerusalem also played into the decision. He was punished for his wartime activity, first with jail time, between 1945 and 1950, and then a ban of Islamic intellectual activity (such as writing for the *Glasnik* or being a member of the IZ) until 1958. As a lifelong Islamic Modernist, Đozo eventually found himself willing to accommodate his beliefs and practice with state socialism and the restrictions on his activities were lifted in the late 1950s. He joined the reconstituted IZ in 1960. For more on his wartime activity see Mekić, *A Muslim Reformist in Communist Yugoslavia*, 51-54.

[77] Cviic, "Yugoslavia's Moslem Problem," 111.

[78] Rujanac, "Constructing the Nationalist Image and Confronting "Muslim Nationalists": The Lawsuit Against Muslim Intellectuals in Sarajevo in 1983," 1677.

[79] Rujanac, 167.

[80] Rujanac, 167; Husein Đozo died in 1982 and, therefore, escaped indictment.

[81] Rexhepi, "Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the Balkans," 62. It is disputed how legitimate the charges were in the Process. Whilst Izetbegović was at the time a committed Islamist, it was not clearly the case for all accused. It is also not clear to what extent the revived *Mladi Musliman* existed. Regardless, links to Iran were at the very least overstated. For more on the *Mladi Musliman* organisation and its activity see: Bougarel and Rashid, "From Young Muslims to Party of Democratic Action".

[82] Rujanac, "Constructing the Nationalist Image and Confronting “Muslim Nationalists”: The Lawsuit Against Muslim Intellectuals in Sarajevo in 1983," 168.

[83] The collapse of SKJ’s power in the late 1980s, leading to a general clemency for ‘political’ prisoners, meant they only served five years each of the fourteen-year sentences.

[84] Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 233–234.

[85] Glenn E Curtis, *Yugoslavia: A Country Study* (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1992), 273, 300.

[86] Curtis, 273.

[87] Sadri, "An Islamic Perspective on Non-Alignment," 37.

[88] Kilibarda, "Non-Aligned Geographies in the Balkans: Space, Race and Image in the Construction of New “European” Foreign Policies," 38.

[89] Kilibarda, 38.

[90] Kilibarda, 39–4.

[91] Kilibarda, 40.

[92] Ramet, "Islam in Yugoslavia Today," 226.

[93] Rexhepi, "Unmapping Islam in Eastern Europe: Periodization and Muslim Subjectivities in the Balkans," 62.

[94] Gordon N. Bardos, "IRAN IN THE BALKANS: A History and a Forecast," *World Affairs* 175, no. 5 (2013): 62.

[95] Bardos, 62.

[96] Bardos, 62.

II.

Book Review

The Loss of Hindustan: The Invention of India. By Manan Ahmed Asif, Harvard University Press, 2020. Hardcover: 39.95, Pp. 336, ISBN 9780674987906.

REVIEWED BY

ROHAN CHOPRA

Most of South Asian history has been written by European, more specifically British, chroniclers. Even in the years following the end of formal colonisation, these accounts of history continued to remain predominant. Broadly, they painted a picture of a subcontinent which was heavily divided, stuck with regressive socio-political conditions (like child marriage), and had to be civilised, modernised, and unified by those on a divine mission — the British. Significantly, this version of Indian history was adopted by Indian nationalist historians and leaders who acknowledged India's civilisational achievements, but at the same time bought into the new category of "India", with its own set of implications, that colonial historiography constructed. This India that was intellectually, politically, and socially manufactured vastly differed from the idea of Hindustan,[1] a spatial concept predominant in the subcontinent prior to its colonisation and subsequently lost.

The Loss of Hindustan: The Invention of India by Manan Ahmed Asif arrives as a refreshing text in this context. Asif studies the Tarikh-i-Firishta, a historical account by Muhammad Qasim Firishta, a historian at Ibrahimʿ Adil Shah II's court in late sixteenth century Deccan. With a strong grounding in postcolonial theory, Asif argues that the colonisation of India required the creation of a "colonial episteme" — way of thinking or knowing — which replaced any alternate way of envisioning the socio-political community (of Hindustan) that Firishta had written of. To quote Asif, "I would like to show how we know the precolonized is shaped irrevocably by the colonial knowledge-making machinery".[2]

Asif's text is relevant in the context of global history, wherein our understanding of the histories of different regions is filtered through colonial knowledge. This orients how and what we think about history and historical sources, making alternate forms of history and knowledge inaccessible.

In the introductory chapter, Asif charts out some recurring themes: the deliberate erasure of precolonial concepts, the political debates regarding Hindustan in the nationalist period (where he cites political thinkers such as Muhammad Iqbal and VD Savarkar) and the colonial writing of Indian history which was based on the historical notions of universal history and teleology. Through this, he traces the fall of Hindustan as a space, and the rise of India as a category created through colonial archiving of precolonial histories.[3]

In the second chapter, titled 'The Question of Hindustan', Asif elaborates on how the British construction of India was guided by the "five thousand years" history. This expressed Indian history in religious terms, wherein the 5000 year old Hindu "Golden Age" was interrupted by Muslims who unleashed despotism over India beginning from the thirteenth century, which would only come to an end with British secular rule.[4] He contrasts this with Arabic and Persian accounts from the eleventh to the twentieth century to emphasise how vastly differing accounts of this history existed, which drew upon Sanskrit textual sources and did not exist in opposition to each other.

In chapter three, Asif examines the practice of history-writing among historians that Firishta refers to, something deeply significant as British historiography was based on the assumption that South Asian historians lacked an "ethic" of history. He contrasts British positivist history drawn from the Rankean tradition with Firishta's history, which uses the past to develop "new ethical registers", while engaging with the "genealogy of historians interested in the practice and ethics of history writing".[5]

Asif uses the next two chapters to chart out the "contents" of Hindustan, such as what places it comprised of, and who its peoples were. For the former, Asif makes a strong case for the erasure of pre-existing relations and ways of belonging that followed from the reduction of spaces to cartographic realities. As for who inhabited India, he offers vastly differing accounts of the Europeans and Firishta. While for Firishta, Hindustan was a diverse place with a just ruler, the Europeans categorised it in terms of contrasts between people of different religions — the Hindus were oppressed by the Muslims, who were in a civilisational clash with the Christians.

In his sixth chapter, "A History of Hindustan", Asif engages with Firishta's history and illustrates how soldier-scribes of the British East India Company, in using Firishta's account to write histories of Hindustan, fundamentally distorted its key characteristics. Further, he suggests that by the time Muslim intellectuals used Firishta to write the subcontinent's history in the nineteenth century, the concept of Hindustan itself had fallen into ruin. As Asif astutely notes, "It [Hindustan] would emerge in the debates on Hindustani as a language, in the articulation of a Hindustan that is a homeland for Hindus alone, in the nostalgia for a long-lost Hindustani culture, in the rallying cry for a free Hindustan. Largely forgotten in popular memory, however, is the history of histories in which Hindustan was an archive, a space, and a belonging for diverse peoples".[6] In his penultimate chapter, Asif binds together the diverse strands in his text to conclude that "as post-colonized historians we have inherited the colonial episteme, but we are also inheritors of a deep archive of history writing that stretches from Juzjani to Firishta to Muhammad Habib… it is our collective task to re-imagine the past".[7]

Asif's arguments have incredible bearing on not just South Asian historiography, but also on world history, which has been troubled by the same processes of imperial knowledge-making as South Asia. The existence and erasure of alternate notions of conceiving space, belonging, and territory are central to Asif's claim of the creation of a colonial episteme. In other words, it was in the erasure of this different way of knowing space and cross-cultural relations that followed that there was a loss of the intellectual and literary category of Hindustan. Such a reformulation of space following the European model was undertaken by colonial officials globally. Here, the basis of dividing space was based on religion and their reading of history, which was very different from indigenous conceptions.

This can be seen across the world, prominently in places like Palestine, Africa, and South Asia, where constructed partitions and borders were based on religious or other communitarian divisions. These differences were seen as fundamental, although as is clear

from Asif's account of an "undivided" Hindustan, they were often not. A vital part of colonisation, then, is an internalisation of the logic of divisions expressed by people living in these countries. This was best seen in the formation of Pakistan — the debates that led to its foundation represented the loss of a multicultural *Hindustaniyat* and relied on arguments of "inherent" differences and conflicts among Hindus and Muslims.

Colonial history-writing, oft discussed in Asif's account, also forms a large area of interest within global history. Not only did the histories written by the British erase any alternate ways of understanding the past, but they also rewrote previous local histories to suit their colonial purpose of divide and rule. In demonstrating that some communities were fundamentally opposed to each other — and had been for centuries — they paved a fertile path to their supposedly uniting rule. This created the binaries of natives and settlers, majorities and minorities, and perpetrators and victims that were not only useful for imposing colonial authority then, but also are popular in contemporary political discourses[9] as well.[9] Lastly, these histories were imbued with judgemental stereotypes wherein indigenous peoples who were seen as "backward" and in eternal conflict required both a civiliser and arbiter to resolve their disputes.

This aspect of history-writing is crucial to seeing contemporary global issues of civil wars and apartheid not as inevitable, but rather constructed in a particular colonial context. What history does — particularly with a decolonial approach such as Asif's — is to help us think differently of our world and identities as not being driven by the logic of fundamental divisions (as colonialism made us believe) but a separate logic altogether. In a Foucauldian sense, the past exists in a different paradigm of knowledge which is important for us to tap into to understand and recreate our present differently. Just as two hundred years ago when history writing was used to colonise, we must now use history as a tool of liberation. Liberation permits us to imagine the world through frames that have been rendered inaccessible by colonial knowledge; to shift how we see ourselves with reference to our world. *The Loss of Hindustan* does an impeccable job at this by opening up a repository of knowledge that comprehends history in a vastly different way. It allows us access to this paradigm and its frames of knowledge, thereby granting us the agency to not be confined by our world and to liberate ourselves.

Notes

[1] Subcontinental South Asia was more commonly known as Hindustan prior to the arrival of colonisers. Manan Ahmed Asif argues how Hindustan was a space imbued with meaning and knowledge of its own, something that is developed throughout this review.

[2] Manan Ahmed Asif, *The Loss of Hindustan: The Invention of India* (London: Harvard University Press, 2020), 26.

[3] Asif, 26.

[4] Ibid, 29.

[5] Asif, 101.

[6] Ibid, 219.

[7] Ibid, 225.

[8] In contemporary India, Muslims are seen to have unleashed violence against the native Hindu populations, in the process imposing their culture and traditions on the Hindus. This rhetoric has gained increasing popularity with the rise of Hindu nationalism in India which feels that Islamic influences are alien and demands a return to "original" Indian traditions.

[9] Mahmood Mamdami, *Neither Settler Nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities* (London: Harvard University Press, 2020), 20.