[Global Histories]

A student journal

2018 – Volume IV, Issue 1

Impressum

Global Histories: A Student Journal. Volume 4, Issue 1 (2018) ISSN: 2366-780X

Publisher information
Founded in 2015 by students of the MA program 'Global History' at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 'Global Histories' is a Berlin based bi-annual journal published in association with the Freie Universität Berlin.

Freie Universität Berlin
Global Histories: A Student Journal
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Koserstraße 20
14195 Berlin

Sponsors
This journal project is realized with generous support from Freie Universität Berlin, specifically from the Center for Global History of the Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut, the OJS e-publishing project at CeDiS, and the ZEDAT hostmaster team.

Scope and purpose
In response to the increasing interest in the 'global' as a field of inquiry, a perspective, and an approach, 'Global Histories: a Student Journal' aims to offer a platform for debate, discussion, and intellectual exchange for a new generation of scholars with diverse research interests. Global history can provide an opportunity to move beyond disciplinary boundaries and methodological centrisms, both in time and space. As students of global history at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, our interest lies not in prescribing what global history is and what it is not, but to encourage collaboration, cooperation, and discourse among students seeking to explore new intellectual frontiers.

Publication frequency
The journal is published twice yearly in spring and autumn. Please see the website for further details.

This issue was published on May 1st, 2018.
The first issue was published in December 2015, the second in October 2016, the third in April 2017, and the fourth in October 2017.

Peer review status and ethics

This journal provides immediate open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge. All articles which appear in this issue, with the exception of editorial content, were subject to peer review.

Contact information

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Contents

Editorial Note

Dear Reader,

Thank you for your interest in this fifth edition of *Global Histories: A Student Journal*. In this, our first issue of 2018, we have again assembled an array of impressive research articles that together give an insight into the manifold opportunities connected to global history as a historical approach pursued from a student perspective.

The eight research articles in this edition cover a wide scope of locations and languages, as well as temporalities. Thematically, the explorations into the dynamics of international relations from a decentralized perspective—widening the range of considered actors and re-balancing their influences—as well as the analysis of discourses in the international realm surely stand out as a strong focus of this edition. These contributions show international affairs to have been shaped by unlikely interventions of 'southern' or civil society actors as well as economic connections, whose ramifications have not yet been adequately taken into account. At the same time, they present international politics not just as a crude struggle for power, but as a complex of translations, appropriations, and transformations of meaning. The multi-sided impacts of these discursive constructions are ably discussed across time periods and locations by several articles. Taken together, we hope that the reader gains a concrete idea of the common threads of the ways how we practice global history in this project despite the many different employed methodologies, concerns, or points of view in the published articles.

This edition again includes a number of book reviews surveying the latest research in a variety of global historical fields. The issue is completed by five insightful conference reviews, intended to encourage fellow students to use the chances of participating in or organizing such events—as well as giving proof of the already delightfully high degree of existing activities—and a museum review giving a glimpse of how 'global histories' currently play out in European publics.

The first research article of this volume is John Bagnall's *'Not Britain's Cause Alone': The Commonwealth, Britain, and the Falklands Crisis, 1982–1989* which points to the importance of the support that the post-colonial states of the British Commonwealth offered to the United Kingdom.

In the second article of this edition, Kevin-Niklas Breu's '*No Time for National Solutions': ACT UP/San Francisco and the Politics of Border-Crossing*, the author examines activism against the US travel ban on HIV-positive foreigners in the 1980s and 90s. Breu points out how the protesters shed light on US border politics before an international audience and how they collectively challenged the state practice of interlinking welfare and security policies.

Daniel J. Haverty Jr.'s *'Positive Neutrality': Revisiting Libyan Support of the Provisional IRA in the 1980s* reconsiders the existing historiography on the shifts in the balance of power within the Irish republican movement. Haverty shows the far-reaching consequences of this unlikely international partnership as the supply of Libyan weapons was counter-intuitively used by politically minded Irish republicans to abandon the militants' core principle of abstention from parliament.

The fourth article of this edition is Lea Kröner's *'Indian Brethren in English Clothes': The Praying Indian Figure in the Eliot Tracts, 1643–1675*. Focusing on these descriptions of British missionary work in New England, Kröner shows how the figure of the 'Praying Indian' was constructed as a response to different pressures within the colonial context, notably providing a benevolent Christian definition of the colony's purpose and countering accusations about a lack of missionary zeal.

The fifth article is Felipe Souza Melo's *Contract Enforcement and Risk Reduction: The Luso-Brazilian Companies in the last Quarter of the Eighteenth Century*. Meticulously analyzing contracts of merchants in Lisbon, Melo highlights how long-distance traders mitigated the connected risks and demonstrates the hierarchies between the marketplaces of Brazil and Portugal, casting doubts on assertions of Brazilian predominance.

In the sixth article, *Global Concepts and the Semantics of Social Spaces: Fascism and National Socialism in the Political Language of Subhas Chandra Bose*, Miguel Ohnesorge examines how 'Fascism' and 'National Socialism' were conceptually incorporated by the Indian nationalist through his cooperation with the Axis powers. Ohnesorge thereby focuses on the context of the relationships between globally circulating concepts and the political semantics of a specific social space, Congress politics, where these concepts were articulated and obtained practical functions.

The seventh article is Carlos E. Flores Terán's *'The Small Family Lives Better': Population Policy, Development, and Global-local Encounters in Mexico, 1974–1978*, which discusses the discursive power of the 'modernization' paradigm through the implementation and debate surrounding the first comprehensive population policy in Mexico in 1974. The article points out how Mexican actors intervened in family structures, appropriating and transforming the global discourse of 'development' and 'modernization.'

Finally, the eighth article, *The Amelia Framers, 1817: Farce as a Historiographical Model* by Charlie Zaharoff, reconsiders the attempt of a group of privateers to establish an independent nation-state on an island to the south of the United States. Zaharoff argues for the utility of narrativizing this event as a farce, due to the discrepancy between performances and intentions present in the conflict, and thereby to recognize how the privateers consciously manipulated the notion of nation-statehood to serve their particular ends.

In addition to the research articles, we have reviewed recently published books as well as an ongoing book series that are of interest to (global) history students. Phlipp Kandler reviews *The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values* by Steven Jensen, part of a growing historiography on human rights as a prominent topic in the field. His book review is followed by Peder Østebø's review of Steven Hyland Jr.'s *More Argentine Than You: Arabic-Speaking Immigrants in Argentina*, bringing a so far underexposed migration to the attention of the reader. Daria Tashkinova has reviewed the edited volume *Luxury in Global Perspective: Objects and Practices, 1600–2000*, which productively continues the tradition of reconsidering and decentralizing the historiographies of certain cultural concepts. Maximilian Vogel gives us a glimpse into the ongoing *Edible* series of Reaktion Books by introducing the *Global History* of *Rice*, by Renee Marton, as well as the one of *Herring* by Kathy Hunt, both entertaining volumes to particularly accessible commodity histories. Sam Wiszniewski has reviewed *Asia's Reckoning: The Struggle for Global Dominance* by Richard McGregor as a presentist example of international history with immediate political relevance. This section is closed by Kelvin Yudianto's review of *World War One in Southeast Asia: Colonialism and Anticolonialism in an Era of Global Conflict* by Heather Streets-Salter who follows the capillaries of World War I as a 'global' phenomenon.

We close this spring edition of our journal with reports from several conferences and workshops that have taken place over the past months. TCA Achintya opens the section with his review of the conference *Empires: Towards a Global History* that took place as an international collaborative event at the University of Delhi in September 2017. Eric Jeswein and Tamara Pataki then review last month's *Annual Conference* of the *International Students of History Association*, which was held in Maribor, giving an insight into the possibilities of independently organized student activity. This review is followed by Daniel R. Quiroga-Villamarín's of a major conference on international law in Latin America, *Repensando y Renovando el Derecho Internacional dentro, desde, y sobre la América Latina*, which was held by three universities of Bogotá last September and lets us consider the benefits of transcending our own disciplinary boundaries. Chase Caldwell Smith gives another example of a graduate student conference in his review of the *Geographies of World History Graduate Conference,* held at the University of Cambridge in September 2017, highlighting how the academic discussion can benefit from smaller settings. Finally, Daria Tashkinova reports back from the conference *Constructing 'the Soviet'? Political Consciousness, Everyday Practices, New Identities*, organized by students of the European University at St. Petersburg this April for the 12th time. She gives insight into their continued success in holding a conference aimed at young scholars, yet highlights that its

future installments are threatened by the fragile political situation of the European University.

Lastly, Alina Rodriguez has reviewed the reopened *Weltmuseum* in Vienna for us, the former ethnographic museum, and thereby addresses a new concern of this journal, public representations of 'global histories,' that we would like to follow over coming editions as well.

Reflecting on the production of this issue of *Global Histories* over the past months, it was extremely gratifying to have a considerably larger editorial team than in previous editions contributing to this collaborative project and allowing us to publish our most extensive edition yet, while also trying out certain changes in our editorial process. Over the justified praise for our editorial team we still should not forget to thank everyone who submitted an article to this edition. Equally, we would like to thank all our published authors for the fruitful collaboration over the past months and sticking with us over possible rougher stretches of way. We also want to apologize for the necessarily hard editorial choices that we had to make from time to time. Looking on this edition, the uneven gender balance of published authors is more than a grain of salt, that does not reflect previous editions, nor the composition of our student team for that matter; we will come to a more even balance again in our next issue.

Looking ahead, we will continue to develop our journal so that it adequately reflects our own academic interests as well as the perplexing diversity of tremendous global history scholarship by students worldwide. We also constantly attempt to increase the visibility of the journal and equally seek to establish different cooperations to include an even greater variety of different kinds of content after having published conference reviews from students outside the Berlin global history program for the first time in this edition.

On 9th and 10th of June, the fourth Global History Student Conference will be held in Berlin and hopefully stimulate many of its 40 participants from institutions in 19 different countries to submit their work to the journal as it has in the past. We also hope to welcome many of our readers as members of the audience to take part in this event dedicated to the production of new 'global histories.'

Your Editorial Team

Acknowledgements

We would like to acknowledge the work and interest of all students who submitted an article during the last call for papers and are especially grateful to the authors published in this edition with whom we have had an extensive and fruitful collaboration throughout the production of this journal:

John Bagnall, Kevin-Niklas Breu, Daniel J. Haverty Jr., Lea Kröner, Felipe Souza Melo, Miguel Ohnesorge, Carlos E. Flores Terán, and Charlie N. Zaharoff.

We would also like to acknowledge the dedication and excellent work of this edition's student team, this journal could not be realized without their sustained and committed contributions:

Sandra Alsén, Brace Bargo, Maurice Boer, Violet Dove, Ryan Glauser, Daniela Greca, Lukas Herde, Tyler Hoerr, Alexandra Holmes, Philipp Kandler, Tania Klimin, Dennis Kölling, Arunima Kundu, David Lang, Rotem Lipstein, Ben Miller, Ben Oldfield, Laetitia d´Orsanne, Peder Østebø, Lisa Phongsavath, Alina Rodriguez, Marjory Ruiz, Daria Tashkinova, Maximilian Vogel, Mary Walle, and Lara Wankel.

We are grateful for the continued support and assistance for this project by the Freie Universität Berlin, particularly the Global History faculty, chaired by Prof. Dr. Sebastian Conrad, and the Online Journal Systems team at CeDiS.

Special thanks go to TCA Achintya, Eric Jeswein and Tamara Pataki, Daniel R. Quiroga-Villamarín, Chase Caldwell Smith, Sam Wiszniewski, and Kelvin Yudianto for contributing conference or book reviews to this edition.

Articles

British Graves located near the Ajax Bay Field Hospital, Falkland Islands. 1982.
Photo Courtesy of Ken Griffiths.

‘Not Britain’s Cause Alone’: The Commonwealth, Britain, and the Falklands Crisis, 1982–1989

JOHN BAGNALL

John is currently a PhD candidate at Newcastle University, England, researching international responses to Britain and the Falklands Crisis, 1982–1989. John has wider research interests in post-war British political and military history with a particular focus on how changing international opinion of Britain has contributed to developing security threats facing the British government. John also retains a strong interest in analysing how historical trends can be applied to contemporary political thought.

The British Government was plunged into crisis on the 2 April 1982 after Argentina launched an invasion of the Falkland Islands. The sovereignty of the islands had long been disputed as an issue of decolonisation and the Argentine seizure of the land forced the question to be addressed by the international political community. One of the most noteworthy aspects of the ensuing dispute was the ardent support the Commonwealth nations offered to Britain in the face of this aggression, earning the gratitude of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Many expected the Commonwealth to condemn the British use of force to settle the dispute given their previous colonial status. On the contrary, however, many were quick to show their disdain for the Argentine actions and offered practical support to the UK government in their attempts to recover the islands. This paper exploits newly released material available through the National Archives to examine the nature of this support and its effect on the Falklands Crisis throughout the Thatcher Premiership. The thirty year anniversary of the conflict in 2012 combined with the adoption of the new Public Records Act (2013) has led to a large amount of source material becoming available that had previously been unavailable for public viewing. The study evaluates both the practical reasons for the support as well as the importance of personal relationships between government ministers to uncover a new aspect of this important period in contemporary British history.

Introduction

When Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982, many of the world’s governments and media were caught off guard—not least in the United Kingdom itself.[1] Despite a dispute that had begun in 1833 with the British capture of the islands, British diplomats and intelligence officials did not expect Argentina to resort to military action to assert its claim to sovereignty. As a result, a diplomatic crisis ensued.[2] Britain assembled and dispatched a naval task force which

[1] The Spanish word for the islands is ‘Las Malvinas.’

[2] For the purposes of this article the Falklands Conflict refers to the period between April 2nd and June 14th, 1982 and the military engagements between Argentina and Great Britain.

would retake the islands after several peace negotiations failed to find a resolution. The fighting marked the first instance in which live images of military conflict were broadcast worldwide. Footage of ships burning and wounded soldiers being rescued from wreckage brought the conflict to public as well as political attention. Immediately upon the loss of the islands, the British government sought international support for the cause of re-establishing British sovereignty in the South Atlantic.[3] Gaining the approval and backing of the international community was crucial to legitimise Britain's role in a fight that ultimately cost 907 lives, a figure that represented more than half of the islands' population at the outbreak of the crisis.[4] Although the islands were eventually retaken through military means, much of the British strategy was dependent on resolutions that would be passed in the United Nations. Gaining the approval of the international community was vital to this end and also gave the British more guarantees over the security of the islands after the conflict.

This article addresses the response of Commonwealth nations to Britain's request for support and is concerned specifically with the relations between Britain and the Commonwealth during the crisis period. The study analyses the nature of the support offered by the Commonwealth both during the conflict and after, through utilising documentary evidence available from the years of the crisis and evaluating the response of the Commonwealth states to Britain and the Falklands. This paper also looks at the relationship between Britain and the Commonwealth States prior to the crisis, as to provide a background for the political climate during the conflict. Most academic writing on international reactions to the Falklands Crisis has focussed on the response of the governments of the European Economic Community and the Unites States of America. As these states represented Britain's most powerful and influential allies, Margaret Thatcher did prioritise securing support of both; however, the Commonwealth of Nations was another important bloc whose backing needed to be urgently secured.

The Commonwealth was Britain's link with its colonial past. As many actors in favour of the Argentine cause attempted to describe the Falklands Crisis as an issue of colonialism, Commonwealth support for Britain was crucial in combating this notion. Commonwealth support for British action placed focus on the issues the UK government said were at stake, such as: the right to self-determination of peoples and the rejection of violence as a means to settle international disputes.

The Falklands Crisis refers to the subsequent diplomatic negotiation that took place after the outbreak of the conflict including all votes on the matter within the United Nations General Assembly until 1990.

[3] The debate also concerned other British possessions in the South Atlantic such as South Georgia.

[4] Figure taken from "Ley 24.950: Decláranse 'Héroes nacionales' a los combatientes argentinos fallecidos durante la guerra de Malvinas." *InfoLEG*, 18 March 1998, http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/50000-54999/50278/norma.htm; and "Databases – Falklands War 1982," *Roll of Honour*, www.roll-of-honour.com/Databases/Falklands.

Many member states of the Commonwealth had resolved sovereignty disputes with the British in the recent past and the issue of majority rule in Rhodesia had dominated discussions between Commonwealth states in the immediate years before 1982. As such, when General Secretary of the Commonwealth Secretariat Shridath Ramphal announced that the Commonwealth was firmly behind the British cause it was a significant boost for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's (FCO) attempts to legitimise the campaign to retake the islands. Writing thirteen years after the conflict, Thatcher referred to the leaders of the Commonwealth as "the staunchest of our friends," highlighting that, despite disagreements between herself and other Commonwealth heads of government in the years after the conflict, the support offered during the crisis left a strong and lasting impression.[5]

Thatcher's sentiment, however, gives an inaccurate impression of the responses of the Commonwealth states. Unlike in relations with the government officials in the USA and Europe, Thatcher did not take much of a personal role when interacting with the governments of the Commonwealth. Instead, negotiation was left to the Commonwealth Coordination Department (CCD) in the FCO. The individuals who engaged most with the Commonwealth nations on behalf of the British government were relatively junior ministers and diplomats such as Cranley Onslow and Roger Barltrop. This is not to say that the Commonwealth was unimportant. Much to the contrary, the entire CCD concerned itself with gaining Commonwealth support and British diplomats with specific expertise in this area were tasked to garner unanimous support throughout the years of the crisis. This therefore signifies that Thatcher's own reflections are based on a narrow sample of all interactions with Commonwealth states and her conclusions are self-justifying. Furthermore, given the structure of the Commonwealth of Nations, the opinion of the General Secretary of the Secretariat is not always representative of that of all member states. When the crisis is tracked through the years after the conflict, it is evident that the support offered to Britain by the Commonwealth was not without limitations and ultimately the islands themselves were only of real importance to Britain and Argentina. It was the principles that the conflict represented which were of value to the governments that made up the Commonwealth. The rejection of violence as a means to settle disputes, which Ramphal spoke of, is better described as a desire to maintain peace. As the UK continued to refuse to negotiate with Argentina, many Commonwealth governments viewed the UK as not sharing that same desire. Furthermore, not dissimilar to other non-western states that supported Britain openly or secretly such as Chile, which was involved in its own sovereignty dispute with Argentina, the Commonwealth countries had their own interests in the Falklands. Ultimately, who held sovereignty of the islands did not matter for the Commonwealth so much as the ability of the islanders to live without fear of transgressions by more powerful states. This, coupled with disputes

[5] Margaret Thatcher, *Downing Street Years* (London: Harper Collins, 1995),182.

between Britain and its Commonwealth partners at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGM), resulted in many member states voting against the British on resolutions concerning the Falkland Islands in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Extending the crisis beyond 1982 forces a re-evaluation of Thatcher's conclusions and thus the nature of Commonwealth opinion on the crisis can be understood.

No Longer a Leader

Commonwealth responses to the Falklands Crisis were heavily influenced by how the relationship between Britain and the Commonwealth had developed in the decades leading up to 1982. Successive British governments in the early twentieth century had not prioritised maintaining links with colonies who were seeking independence. It was only after nations such as Egypt and Ireland gained independence that the idea of a political union to maintain British influence in its economic areas of interest became popular in the UK, and thus the Commonwealth of Nations was formed in part to foster those partnerships.[6] The economic cost of the Second World War and the gradual dismantling of the British Empire meant that Britain needed to establish links with its former colonies more than the newly independent states depended on links with the UK. Britain sought to ensure that pro-British sentiment remained in its former colonies to secure favourable trade deals as well as prevent the spread of communism.[7] Nationalist leaders had risen to power in many of the new states and were able to attach conditions to their membership of the Commonwealth that were unfavourable to the British. An example of this was the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961 after Britain had weakened its links to the nationalist government in Pretoria in hopes of persuading other African countries to join the Commonwealth. The context of the Cold War meant that Britain chose to prioritise its western allies over its old colonial ties and the UK began working with the USA on matters which had once been Commonwealth affairs. This is not to say that the Commonwealth nations were against such actions, as it was hoped that the inclusion of other Western states would accelerate the resolution of problems in Southern Africa. [8]

World Politics Scholar at the University of London, Stephen Chan has commented that "even idealistic views of a future Commonwealth world role were

[6] For a fuller discussion on this as well as a comparison with the French model of decolonisation, see: Stephen Chan, "The Commonwealth as an International Organisation: Constitutionalism, Britain and South Africa," *The Round Table* 78, no. 2 (1989): 396.

[7] "The London Declaration," *The Commonwealth,* 26 April 1949, archived from the original, http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/history-items/documents/London%20Declaration%20of%201949.pdf.

[8] James Barber, *The Uneasy Relationship: Britain and South Africa* (London: Heinemann, 1983), 97.

expressed in terms of a British-centric power grouping."[9] However, this changed with the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat and the office of General Secretary. Calls for change were led by Julius Nyerere, President of Tanganyika following serious reservations about Britain's commitment to racial equality in South Africa and a move towards Rhodesian independence. At the 1964 CHOGM the Commonwealth Secretariat was established, with Arnold Smith as its first General Secretary in 1965. The Secretariat was supposed to represent the general opinion of the Commonwealth and thus placed pressure on Britain to compromise on issues of importance so a joint Commonwealth strategy could be formed. In the first decade of the Secretariat the Commonwealth became increasingly involved in matters of international development and economic relations. Although its reach and influence was still limited, by the time Ramphal was elected General Secretary in 1975 there was a lot more scope for the Commonwealth to intervene in affairs important to its member states. By the beginning of Thatcher's first term as Prime Minister, Britain had found itself being coerced into settlements it did not desire and the Commonwealth of Nations was a political entity free from supremacy of any of its member states.

Although the Commonwealth of Nations was important to Thatcher, her first few years in office highlighted the difficulties Britain had in agreeing to the policy consensus put forward by the other member states. Although she enjoyed a good personal relationship with Ramphal and usually agreed to compromise in the end, she often came into conflict over policy with many of the other Commonwealth Heads of Government. She would often argue her point forcefully even when everyone else disagreed with her. She once told a reporter "If I were the odd one out and I were right, that would not matter would it?"[10] Such attitudes led to difficult negotiations and also led to more questions about Thatcher's commitment to such issues as racial equality. This in turn made her very unpopular on the African continent.[11] Indeed, Thatcher disagreed with the majority of the other Heads of Government over the issue of Rhodesian independence, even being warned by Malcolm Fraser, Prime Minister of Australia, with whom she shared a strong mutual respect, that he would not support her if she continued to support the Ian Smith-Abel Muzorewa government. Although she did accept a compromise, an early leak of the agreement on the Lancaster House talks caused further tension. After Rhodesian independence, new disagreements emerged over how to tackle the issue of apartheid in South Africa. Thatcher did not share the belief that sanctions should be imposed against the nationalist government in Pretoria. Although Thatcher was largely unmentioned at the 1981 CHOGM in Melbourne, Ramphal

[9] Chan, "The Commonwealth," 397.
[10] Quoted in: Derek Ingram, "Thatcher and Ramphal: A Long and Turbulent Relationship," *The Round Table* 97, no. 38: 785.
[11] Peter Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past: Memoirs of Lord Carrington* (London: Collins, 1988), 277.

did make passing reference to her apparent support for the South African government in a speech made in advance of the summit.

Along with Thatcher, the FCO also struggled to work with officials from Commonwealth states. Ken Flowers, Director of Intelligence in Salisbury, summed up the frustrations of senior civil servants when he wrote of the struggles the British government had in getting 'fair' settlements on issues in Southern Africa when having to work with other African states and wrote with anger over the perceived U-turns that Britain had to make.[12] Lord Carrington had public disagreements with Ramphal, Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia over the Lancaster House talks. Ramphal accused Carrington of not acting within the "letter of spirit of the Lusaka agreement" and Carrington responded later by claiming that Ramphal "had no credibility as an impartial observer."[13] Carrington and Ramphal clashed again over how to observe the Rhodesian elections from within Rhodesia. Although Ramphal won that particular argument, there was a reinforced sense of condescension from Britain.

Although Thatcher enjoyed positive personal relationships with many of the other Commonwealth Heads of Government, there was always an underlying sense that Britain, while agreeing in principle with many of the objectives of the Commonwealth, disagreed strongly on the practicalities of achieving those objectives. The concerns (such as individual trade agreements) that Britain championed over principles such as racial equality led to turbulent negotiation. The Commonwealth of Nations was a union that based its action very much on the principle outlined in the Singapore declaration of 1971, seeking resolutions that aided in the movement towards racial equality regardless of their economic impact on member states. When Britain disagreed with the practicalities of policy implementation it was often seen to be acting against those principles. Over the issues of Rhodesia and apartheid, Britain struggled to adhere to the general opinion on how to best achieve racial equality. This led to long and difficult negotiation as well as a distrust of British intention from other Commonwealth nations. It was with this background that Britain sought the support of the Commonwealth following the loss of the Falklands.

'Patriotism is a Strong Plant not a Weed'

Ramphal was a very popular and influential figure within the Commonwealth and it was much due to his influence that the initial offerings of support from the member states came the way of Britain at the outbreak of the crisis. His reputation was formed during the Lancaster House talks and he was credited with ensuring that Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo continued to negotiate despite their reser-

[12] Ken Flowers, *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964–1981* (London: John Murray, 1987).
[13] See: Ingram, "Thatcher and Ramphal," 781–790.

vations over British intentions. British Economist Barbara Ward summarised the importance of Ramphal when writing that the General Secretary saw the Commonwealth as a "quiet influence for common good" reflecting the desire of member states through "raising aspiration to ethos and turning ethos into action."[14] Like the Commonwealth as an organisation, he believed in the importance of principle.

Ramphal saw the Argentine invasion as a violation of the right to self-determination through force, and swiftly wrote to Thatcher to offer his assistance. In his letter dated the 5 April 1982, he commented: "We have already had in our time too many acts of aggression by those who calculate on getting away with it … Argentina's action requires, from the whole international community, a stand for the maintenance of law and order worldwide." In doing so, he immediately underlined the principle based on which he was offering his support to Britain: the blatant violation of international law that Argentina committed.[15] This was reiterated in his subsequent letters to the other Commonwealth Heads of Government calling on them to support the British cause: "I am sure you will agree that in the face of such unprovoked aggression, there is need for Commonwealth countries to stand by Britain in this matter, consistent with your support for the principles of territorial integrity, the right of self-determination, and the rejection of the use of force to unsettle long established boundaries—principles [for which] the Commonwealth has persistently stood."[16] His words underlined his view of the conflict as less a matter of colonialism than a matter of the maintenance of law. Contrary to many cases of African nations becoming independent in the twentieth century, there was no clear majority in the Falklands that wished to be free of British rule.[17] As such, claims regarding the right of self-determination resonated more widely with the former British colonies in the Commonwealth. As a union that had been formed by ex-colonies, the Commonwealth stance was of importance in persuading other political blocks committed to the rejection of colonialism to side with Britain as well. Ramphal spoke personally with Commonwealth Heads of Government such as Forbes Burnham, President of Guyana, to persuade him to use the role of the country on the UN Security Council to aid Britain, as well as speaking with the government of Uganda, another Commonwealth member, which helped secure crucial votes in favour of Britain from the Non-Aligned Movement.[18]

[14] Barbara Ward, "Introduction," in *One World to Share: Selected Speeches of the Commonwealth Secretary-General, 1975–9* (London: Hutchinson Benham, 1979), 1.
[15] Ramphal to Thatcher, 5 April 1982, TCHR 3/1/20, f.27.
[16] Ramphal to Commonwealth Heads of Government included with his message to Thatcher, 5 April 1982, TCHR 3/1/20, f.27.
[17] "FCO Record of Nick Ridley's Visit to the Falkland Islands," 24–26 November 1980, *Margaret Thatcher Foundation,* https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/121850.
[18] The Non-Aligned Movement (henceforth referred to as NAM) is a group of states that were not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc of the cold war. In the Havana declaration of 1979, Fidel Castro outlined the purpose of the movement as ensuring "the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries" in their "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and all forms

Ramphal kept in contact with the FCO throughout the conflict and maintained support for the principles for which he believed Britain had to fight. Following the Argentine surrender on June 14, Ramphal wrote to Francis Pym saying, "[w]hat has triumphed…are the principles for which you stood steadfast on behalf of a wider international community."[19] Although the FCO never directly asked Ramphal to intervene, the initiative of the Secretary-General highlighted his agreement with the principles he saw Britain defending. Pym duly thanked Ramphal for his "magnificent efforts."[20] Ramphal expressed the same sentiments when speaking in public. In an interview on the Today programme on 28 April, he reaffirmed that there was joint Commonwealth backing for the British efforts, emphasising that the issues involved were not colonial in nature. His most ardent show of support for the British government, however, came at a speech given to the Commonwealth Press Union on 15 June, which was titled "Not Britain's Cause Alone." In his speech Ramphal stated that "Britain's response in this instance has been a service to the world community which condemned the invader but lacked the means to deny him the fruits of aggression, which demanded his withdrawal but was powerless to enforce its demand." In the same speech he also condemned aggressors who attempted to justify their actions through "waving the anti-colonial banner."[21] Ramphal never outright stated his support for the Task Force, although he did speak openly of his delight at their victory.[22] He maintained throughout that he supported the principles of self-determination and the rejection of violence as a means to settle disputes. It was Britain's defence of these principles which motivated Ramphal's support for the British cause.

Ramphal was just one voice in the Commonwealth and although many of his sentiments were shared by others, the response of other government leaders of the Commonwealth highlights the limitations to their support. Many leaders also wrote personally to Thatcher to state their agreement in the condemnation of the Argentine actions, however, it is important to note that many urged both Thatcher and the UK government to settle the dispute by peaceful means. Prime Minister George Price of Belize serves as an example of this concern, as he wrote: "please accept assurance that Belize strongly supports the principle of self-determination and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means."[23] After the dispatch of the Task Force, Forbes Burnham, President of Guyana, wrote to Thatcher, stating that his

of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics." By 1982, the movement had 95 members and made up just under two thirds of the United Nations General Assembly, another organisation committed to the end of colonisation.

[19] Ramphal to Pym, 15 June 1982, FCO 7/4574, f.40.

[20] Pym to Ramphal, 18 June 1982, FCO 7/4574, f.41.

[21] "'Not Britain's Cause Alone' Extracts from Shridath Ramphal's speech to the Commonwealth Press Union," 15 June 1982, FCO 7/4574 Part B, f.36.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Price to Thatcher, 5 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20, f.21.

government "called for an urgent return to negotiations for a peaceful solution."[24] Many of the Commonwealth Heads of Government also conveyed messages to President Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina, to outline their condemnation of his government's actions directly.[25] The British cause was further aided in that the Argentine Government did not concern itself much with the Commonwealth but focussed its attentions on gaining support through the United Nations and the Organisation of American States.

The governments of the Commonwealth could condemn the actions of the Argentine Junta given how the invasion had violated several basic principles of international law, however, to support Britain in waging further violent conflict to resolve the matter was something quite different. It became apparent that many Commonwealth governments felt one could not condemn violent action by one party yet support similar violence by another. The governments of the Bahamas, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and Swaziland all rejected the use of force to settle the dispute. Jamaica urged "both governments to exercise restraint" while Singapore and Sierra Leone expressed hopes that nothing further would be done to aggravate the situation.[26] Incidentally this had the potential to play in favour of the Argentine strategy, which sought to avoid a conflict but had miscalculated Britain's capacity to respond to the invasion of the islands. Commonwealth pressure on Britain to show restraint when using the Royal Navy unconsciously supported that Argentine strategy in its call to avoid further violence.[27] However, the failure to follow their expressions of concerns with concrete action to curtail the use of force underlined that they nevertheless supported the British position in the conflict. It is important to note that this reluctance to support violence may be explained by a rationale existing outside of principle. Not only do smaller states tend to uphold the principles of international law to protect themselves from more powerful states, but countries such as Belize were also involved in their own territorial disputes.[28] Argentine victory in the Falklands would have sent a message to other states that military force was an acceptable measure to settle such disputes. Condemnation for Argentine actions was offered out of the desire to see a peaceful negotiation to the settlement. In this respect, the Commonwealth reaction was not dissimilar from countries within the non-aligned movement in that they were both based on principle. As countries such as Cuba focused on the principle of decolonisation, the Commonwealth focussed on the

[24] Burnham to Thatcher, 8 April 1982, THCR 3/1/20, f.44.
[25] THCR 3/1/20 held at the Thatcher Archive in Churchill College, Cambridge.
[26] "Commonwealth Governments' Reactions to the Falklands Crisis," Commonwealth Co-ordination Department, FCO 7/4574, f.46.
[27] See: David Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonisation to Alfonsin* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1987).
[28] Belize was involved in a territorial dispute with Guatemala following Belize's independence in 1981. Guatemala still claimed territorial sovereignty over Belize at the time of the Falklands Conflict.

maintenance of peace. The British willingness to retake the islands by force contradicted the desire for the maintenance of peace and thus many Commonwealth states could not openly support those actions.

There were some governments in the Commonwealth that did offer practical support to the British cause. The Fraser government in Australia recalled its ambassador from Buenos Aires, as well as agreeing to delay its purchase of *HMS Invincible* from Britain so the vessel could be used as part of the Task Force. The Canadian government also ordered its ambassador to return to Canada and banned sales of military equipment to Argentina along with Argentine import and export credits. Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau wrote to Argentine President Galtieri condemning the actions of the junta. The New Zealand government released *HMNZS Canterbury* to take over some of the NATO obligations of the Royal Navy to free up more ships for use in the South Atlantic. New Zealand PM Robert Muldoon broke off diplomatic relations with Argentina and banned all trade, supply of arms, military material, and export credits.[29] Of all the Commonwealth leaders it was with Fraser, Trudeau, and Muldoon that Thatcher interacted most. She had maintained positive relations with her Anglosphere counterparts during her first few years as Prime Minister, and indeed Fraser had even sent his own advisors to aid her in the 1979 general election campaign. In a letter to Muldoon in June 1982, Thatcher wrote that "the response of the people of this country, and of the Commonwealth, especially in New Zealand, has convinced me that patriotism is a strong plant, not a weed, and that its flowers will indeed bloom even when peace is restored."[30]

The narrow sample of leaders to whom Thatcher spoke would explain the opinion of the Commonwealth's response expressed in her memoirs. This response came from only a small proportion of the Commonwealth as a whole. The records of the meetings of Commonwealth High Commissioners held in London portray a different attitude. There is evident concern at the escalation of the conflict as well as repeated questions concerning what non-military options were being pursued.[31] Even the support offered by the other Anglosphere nations in the Commonwealth had limits. Australia and Canada both sent the ambassadors back to Buenos Aires when it was evident that a military conflict was unavoidable.[32] Most notable was the AUS$ 250,000 donated by the Australian government to the South Atlantic fund.[33] Regional Australian governments also donated large sums of money to the

[29] "Commonwealth Governments' Reactions to the Falklands Crisis," Commonwealth Co-ordination Department, FCO 7/4574, f.46.
[30] Thatcher to Muldoon, 11 June 1982, THCR 3/1/22 Part 1, f.40.
[31] "Record of Mr Onslow's meeting with High Commissioners: India Office Council Chamber," 27 May 1982, FCO 7/4573, f.36.
[32] The Canadian ambassador returned on 21 April and the Australian ambassador returned on 28 April.
[33] The South Atlantic Fund was a private charity established to support servicemen and their dependents' needs as a result of the servicemen's involvement in the Falklands Conflict. It was established during the conflict and remained as a registered charity until 1993.

fund through unofficial channels. This could be seen as support for the conflict but the fund was actually set up to support the victims and their families. The Australian government was not backing the use of force but offering empathy to those who had suffered as a direct result of the fighting.[34]

The Commonwealth did offer support through criticising the seizure of the islands by Argentina. However, this was not a support for British sovereignty rights there nor was this support unconditional. The Commonwealth (both the office of the Secretariat and its individual member states) ultimately championed principles of self-determination and the resolution of disputes through peaceful means. The Commonwealth's collective refusal to openly support the dispatch of the task force, along with repeated calls for the British government to show restraint, reflect the true stance of the organization on the conflict. This would become more apparent upon the conflict's resolution when Britain refused to negotiate on the issue any further. The refusal to openly support the dispatch of the Task Force highlighted that the Commonwealth did not universally condone British action during the conflict. Rather, the Commonwealth states were concerned with the upholding of international law and the principle of peaceful negotiation to settle disputes. This became even more apparent after the conflict as the Commonwealth removed support for Britain when Her Majesty's Government refused to negotiate with a democratic Argentine government.

The Legacy of the Falklands

Upon the resolution of the conflict, the Falklands returned to obscurity. Since the principles outlined had been defended and international law was upheld, there was no need to further discuss the issue. The will of the majority in the Falklands had been restored and the military junta in Argentina had been replaced by a democratically elected government in December 1983. This made it unlikely that there would be any further military attempts to retake the islands. The issues of Grenada and apartheid dominated the discussion at the CHOGMs in the rest of the 1980s with only fleeting mention of the Falklands at the 1983 meeting in New Delhi. The 'Question of the Falkland Islands' was voted on annually in the UNGA from 1982 to 1988, and as such it is possible to track the opinion of the Commonwealth states through the voting records here and the British response to each vote.[35] The British refusal to formally negotiate with the authorities from Argentina led to questions about Britain's commitment to the maintenance of peace. Furthermore, as dissension became more apparent from Britain over South Africa, Commonwealth nations began to abandon their support.

[34] "Details of the Australian National Appeal," FCO 107/510.

[35] Argentina proposed a series of resolutions beginning in October 1982 which attempted to force Britain to negotiate on the issue of sovereignty. Following the restoration of Anglo-Argentine relations in 1989, there were no further votes on the matter.

The first vote on the Falklands after the conflict took place on 28 October 1982. The vote passed with 90 in favour of Britain and Argentina negotiating on the issue of sovereignty to 12 against and 52 countries abstaining.[36] Despite several Commonwealth states such as Guyana and Ghana voting yes, there was no great concern from London. The FCO was much more concerned with the USA taking the first opportunity to support an Argentine resolution in the UN, seemingly abandoning the position they had taken during the conflict. Given that many of the Commonwealth countries had previously urged both sides to find a peaceful resolution to their disagreements, voting in favour of talks was to be expected. Many of the Commonwealth states showed some support for the British arguments by abstaining, however, the vote displayed the true nature of the immediate Commonwealth response to the crisis as many Commonwealth countries within the non-aligned group, such as Uganda and India voted in favour of negotiation. The Commonwealth nations had not made a stand on the sovereignty issue but rather had stood for the maintenance of peace. Negotiation was, in their opinion, the best option for conflict resolution. The first vote at the UNGA affirmed those principles.

Even before the US invasion of Grenada took place, discussions regarding the agenda for the 1983 CHOGM showed that there would only have been fleeting mention of the Falklands. In a letter to Ramphal, Thatcher suggested that it would "perhaps be useful" for her to update her Commonwealth peers on Britain's future plans for the Falkland Islands but no further discussion was planned regarding any future Commonwealth role in the dispute.[37] In the communiqué issued at the end of the conference, the matter was given a short paragraph which started by mentioning that the leaders had the opportunity to discuss the issue in the UNGA and that they had reaffirmed their support for the principle of self-determination and "for the people of the Falkland Islands to live in freedom and security."[38] The matter had been resolved and the UN was the most appropriate place for the issue to be discussed. However, in the communiqué, the member nations 'reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity' and called for the strict observance of these principles. In doing so they reaffirmed the same principles that they had acted on in 1982. The communiqué echoed Ramphal's words to the Commonwealth Press Union in June 1982, affirming the Commonwealth would defend the rights of people who could not defend themselves, as Britain had done over the Falklands. The response recorded at New Delhi of the member states of the Commonwealth emphasised their role in the

[36] United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UBISNET), Voting Record A/RES/37/9, "Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)," 28 October 1982.
[37] Thatcher to Ramphal, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 23 September 1983, PREM 19/969 f.21.
[38] Acland minute to Coles, "The Communiqué" [progress report on drafting of communiqué for New Delhi Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting], 27 November 1983, THCR 1/10/64, f.55.

defence of small states. Their rejection of violence as a means to settle disputes as well as their affirmation of the importance of the democratic will of the people underlined the same principles with which they had responded to the crisis.

The 1985 UNGA Falklands vote proved to be the clearest indication of the opinion of Commonwealth states on Britain and the crisis. The 1983 and 1984 votes produced very similar results to that of 1982. However, in 1985, relations between Britain and its Commonwealth partners had soured over the British approach to dealing with apartheid in South Africa. At the CHOGM in Nassau that year, Thatcher had argued against the imposition of sanctions to attempt to force the hand of the South African government. This generated a sense of irony given how Britain had pleaded for sanctions on Argentina in 1982. It also led to further questions on Britain's commitment to racial equality with some accusing Britain of operating colonial attitudes. Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi commented "[t]hese are the sort of reasons Britain gave to all countries for not giving them independence when we were under British rule. It's better for you, they said. You're not capable of doing it."[39]

Despite three UNGA resolutions calling for further talks, Britain had still refused to speak with Argentina regarding the future of the Falklands. This was further compounded by the establishment of democracy in Argentina and the inauguration of Raúl Alfonsín as Argentine president in December 1983. Given the human rights violations of the junta, it had been easy for a Commonwealth which was mostly western and democratic to support Britain against an authoritarian junta but the 1984 UNGA vote was the first one that had called for Britain to negotiate with a democratic Argentine government and yet Britain still refused to do so. The condescension that had been evident in the early years of the Thatcher premiership reared its ugly head again. The result of this was eighteen countries changing strategy and joining the vast majority of those within the non-aligned group voting in favour of the 1985 resolution on the "Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)." The resolution passed with 107 total votes for Britain to negotiate with Argentina to reach a settlement on the sovereignty issue.[40] Only four countries voted against, including the UK. Belize was the exception to this trend as its own sovereignty disputes with Guatemala meant that it continued to vote against negotiation on the Falklands. Most notable was that Australia and Canada both voted in favour of the resolution and rejected British calls for the self-determination of the islanders to be included in any discussions.[41] Within the Commonwealth, there was a strong desire to prevent any future conflict over the Falklands issue. Britain's refusal to negotiate the sovereignty issue with Argentina only heightened concerns that violence may erupt again. As such, even Britain's

[39] Ingram, "Thatcher and Ramphal," 786.
[40] UBISNET Voting Record, "Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)," A/RES/40/21.
[41] "North Atlantic Council Meeting: Bilateral with Canadian Foreign Minister," FCO 7/6377, f.746.

closest allies in Canada and Australia attempted to exert pressure on the UK to return to negotiations as they attempted to build a relationship with Alfonsín's government. The inclusion of the self-determination of islanders in any talks would give Britain scope to refuse to compromise. The 1985 resolution was perceived as the best possibility to prevent another conflict. Despite further pleas from the FCO and Thatcher herself, the Commonwealth would not change its vote.[42] Britain lost the remaining votes of the 1980s by heavy margins with the heaviest taking place in 1986 when 116 countries voted in favour of the pro-Argentine resolution.[43] The Commonwealth made clear that it did not support Britain's perceived stubbornness on the issue, opting instead for international cooperation. In refusing to abide by the general assembly resolutions, Britain was in direct contrast to international cooperation and negotiation to settle disputes. As such, Britain found itself isolated in its position on the Falklands.

Conclusion

The study of the Commonwealth and the Falklands Crisis highlights that for many countries the Falkland Islands were not so much the central issue as were the principles invoked during the crisis that needed to be defended. Although small and isolated, the crisis shared many characteristics of greater issues in the twentieth century. The crisis forced many states to discern the importance of principle versus practicality. Many had to weigh the benefits of good relations with the British or Argentine governments against defending the legal rights of sovereign states and their citizens. Britain's colonial past was brought to the foreground of international discussion in both political and non-political spheres. Despite more importance being placed on other actors in international politics, the Commonwealth still presented a vital body from which Britain needed to secure support. Initially, that support was swiftly offered. That being said, Thatcher's self-justifying conclusion on Commonwealth support, made in her memoirs, does not offer an accurate conclusion on the nature of Commonwealth opinion on the Falklands.[44] A closer examination of the documentary evidence uncovers that it was not Britain *per se* that was supported but the several principles that were at stake in the crisis.

Shridath Ramphal was the most active Commonwealth figure in rallying support for the British cause but his words had limitations. He made robust statements in public identifying a common condemnation of the Argentine actions and gave an impression of universal Commonwealth support for the British cause. However, it was not the Falklands that were important to him, but the principle.

[42] "The Falklands at the UN 1985," FCO 7/6377.
[43] UBISNET Voting Record, "Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)," A/RES/41/40.
[44] Thatcher, *Downing Street Years,* 182.

His speech to the Commonwealth Press Union highlighted this commitment.[45] In achieving victory in the Falklands, Britain ensured that international law and the self-determination of people was upheld. This was a cause that echoed many pushes for independence from Commonwealth states. Ramphal held that sovereignty over the islands was of little importance and made no comment on the legitimacy of either side's claims. Rather he focussed more on the self-determination of the islanders and the rejection of violence. In asserting their claim to the islands through military force, Argentina had violated basic principles of international law, principles that the Commonwealth was dedicated to protect and that provoked Ramphal's reaction.

Although their membership of the Commonwealth was important, the member states also had their own motives and ideals which were not always met by their partner states in the Commonwealth of Nations. By 1982, Britain's relationship with other Commonwealth states was not reason enough alone to expect support. Although individuals such as Thatcher and Muldoon may have spoken of a sense of duty, there was certainly no patriotic feeling towards the crown prevalent across the member states.[46] Countries such as Ghana and India were deliberately hesitant in making any statement given their own experiences and their relations with both Britain and Argentina.[47] Some of the Commonwealth nations that did criticise Argentina for invading the islands, such as Belize, had their own vested interests in the outcome of the conflict while others stressed the need for negotiation, requesting both sides to exercise restraint. In doing so, they underlined the point that more than anything, they desired to see an end to the violence and a return to peace. The actions of the British government did not seem to support this same principle and it was in these moments that other Commonwealth nations did not support the UK's position.

The years after 1982 only served to reaffirm these notions and there was less difference in the actions of those Commonwealth states within the non-aligned group and those without. As Britain continued to refuse to negotiate, even its most ardent supporters during the conflict turned against them. Australia and Canada voted in favour of pro-Argentine resolutions in the UNGA and Britain found itself in an isolated position in its stance on negotiation. The Falklands Crisis was a testing time for Britain in its relations with many states, not least those which were also members of the Commonwealth. Both the conflict and the years after highlighted the nature of those relationships. The Commonwealth condemnation of the USA and Turkey for their invasion in Grenada and Cyprus respectively

[45] "Transcript of an interview by Stephen Cape with the Commonwealth Secretary General for the 'Today' programme," 28 April 1982, FCO 7/4573, f.29.
[46] Muldoon to Thatcher, 9 June 1982, THCR 3/1/22 Part 1, f.30; Thatcher to Muldoon, 11 June 1982, THCR 3/1/22 Part 1, f.40.
[47] "Commonwealth Governments' Reactions to the Falklands Crisis," Commonwealth Coordination Department, FCO 7/4574.

further highlighted the importance of these principles. The Commonwealth of Nations saw itself as the defender of the rights of small states to operate free of international interference, a notion that became manifest in the 1985 CHOGM communiqué and would intervene to defend the rights of people who did not have the means to defend themselves. The union stood for racial equality, the right of people to choose their own government and the achievement of these means through peaceful negotiation. Support was offered to Britain as a defender of these notions. Over the Falklands, Britain learned the importance of principle to the Commonwealth and when it was seen to be in violation of these principles, the member states could swiftly turn that support into condemnation.

END MANDATORY HIV TESTING BY THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS).



FOUR MILLION TESTED IS TOO MANY.

DEMONSTRATE:

Tuesday, Feb. 27th 12:15 PM
INS District Office 630 Sansome St., S.F.

ACT UP / SF AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power 563-0724.

GLBT Historical Archives. Jorge Cortiñas Papers 1989–1994. ACT UP Immigration Working Group. February 27th, 1990. Courtesy of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender Historical Society.

‘No Time for National Solutions’: ACT UP/San Francisco and the Politics of Border-Crossing

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In the early 1990s, anti-AIDS activists targeted the US travel and immigration ban for HIV-positive foreigners. The legislation, effective between 1987 and 2010, was perceived as symptomatic of the US nation-state’s contradictory response to the global HIV/AIDS pandemic in the 1980s and 1990s: While positioning the United States as a leading force in international medical research, the federal government systematically barred travellers with HIV from entering US territory and threatened seropositive immigrants with deportation. Using the annual International AIDS Conference as a platform, the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), an international grassroots network of anti-AIDS activists founded in New York in 1987, organised media-effective protests to shed light on the repressive character of US border politics before an international audience. Focusing on the local ACT UP chapters in San Francisco, this essay examines how local sexual and ethnic communities collectively challenged the federal and California state governments’ common practice of interlinking welfare and security policies. Moreover, it illuminates the dynamics of late 20th century protest movements which pledged themselves to the principles of basic democracy and civil disobedience. Due to the movements’ social heterogeneity, pivotal persons were integral to maintaining intra-group coherence and mobilizing fellow protesters and supporters. Drawing from anti-AIDS activists personal estates, a discourse analytical approach is employed to reconstruct queer immigrants’ role in ACT UP/San Francisco’s protest campaigns against the US HIV ban through collective action frames. This adds to a better understanding of the transformation of transnational social movements in the wake of neoliberal and neoconservative thinking in Northern Atlantic countries in the late 20th century.

Introduction

> We lead the world when it comes to helping stem the AIDS pandemic—yet we are one of only a dozen countries that still bar people with HIV from entering our own country. If we want to be the global leader in combating HIV/AIDS, we need to act like it. And that's why, on Monday my administration will publish a final rule that eliminates the travel ban effective just after the New Year.[1]

At a press conference held in the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House on 30th October, 2009, US President Barack Obama reauthorised the Ryan White Care Extension Act for comprehensive HIV/AIDS-centred health care and prevention programmes for the fiscal term 2009 through 2013. On that occasion, Obama also announced the ending of the legislation which had barred HIV-positive foreigners from the United States for twenty-two years. First issued as an executive order by President Reagan in 1987, the temporary ban became statutory as a supplement to the 1990 Immigration and Nationality Act under the Clinton administration in 1993. When the law was repealed in the United States in 2010, approximately 57 countries still imposed travel restrictions on foreigners with HIV/AIDS, including eleven countries which barred HIV-positive people entirely from entering their territory.[2]

In this article, I will examine how the United States HIV travel and immigration ban impacted anti-AIDS activism[3] in the Bay Area between 1990 and 1993 and how, in return, anti-AIDS activists shaped the political discourse on migration

[1] "Remarks by the President at the Signing of the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009," in Kerry Eleveld, "Obama Lifts the HIV Travel Ban," *Advocate*, October 30, 2009, https://www.advocate.com/news/daily-news/2009/10/30/obama-lifts-hiv-travel-ban.

[2] See "Regulations on Entry, Stay, and Residence for PLHIV," in *The Global Database: On HIV-Specific Travel & Residence Restrictions*, ed. Deutsche AIDS-Hilfe, www.hivtravel.org.

[3] In this article, I will use *anti-AIDS activism* when referring to activists committed to AIDS politics in the broadest sense. In so doing, I follow the terminology employed, but not further elaborated by Benita Roth; see: Benita Roth, *The Life and Death of ACT UP/Los Angeles: Anti-AIDS Activism in Los Angeles from the 1980s to the 2000s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1–5. In fact, as Jennifer Brier notes, the word "activism" falsely implies that actors distinguished between their work as volunteers in AIDS service organizations and their commitment to direct-action groups; instead, she proposes the word "AIDS worker"; Jennifer Brier, *Infectious Ideas: U.S. Political Responses to the AIDS Crisis* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 4. Nevertheless, I prefer the word *activism* as it highlights individuals' agency, i.e. their critical engagement with dominant discourses and the multiple creative ways in which they regained social visibility despite their discursively marginalised positions, and pressured both society and state to change their perception of the epidemic. Moreover, the prefix *anti-* emphasizes the activists' overall intention to end the HIV/AIDS epidemic while, at the same time, leaving open whether they considered the struggle against oppressive social structures as integral to this goal. In this sense, *anti-* also stresses the activists' opposition both to dominant media discourses on HIV/AIDS and the federal governments' response to the epidemic at the time. Given the variety of activists' political convictions and motivation, this common perspective served as an important nexus within ACT UP.

and citizenship in their attempt to overcome the legislation. Focusing on the local chapters of the international anti-AIDS activist network *AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power* (ACT UP) in San Francisco, I will demonstrate how immigrant activists contributed to the success of ACT UP's campaigns against the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) by mediating between different activist groups, organisations, and local politicians and by mobilising both sexual minority and immigrant communities in San Francisco.

Most Bay Area activists were first and foremost interested in eliminating all political and legal obstacles to a pragmatic and comprehensive governmental response to the epidemic. From their point of view, by criminalising immigrants and other disenfranchised communities through restrictive AIDS policies, the government of the United States sought to distract US citizens from its financial and organisational shortcomings—as well as from its moral and political obligations—in the political response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In this context, the Reagan administration also attempted to establish itself as an assertive government capable of protecting its citizens against what they referred to as an "external" danger brought in by "illegal aliens" and the international "gay jet set."[4] Drawing on their experiences in Leftist protest groups, the Bay Area activists perceived sexual minority and immigrant communities' vulnerability to contract HIV/AIDS on the one hand and their political disenfranchisement and social marginalisation on the other as interdependent. By revealing the ineffectiveness of US travel and immigration policy in general and that of US border protection in particular, the activists thus sought to both improve immigrant rights and stem the spread of HIV/AIDS in the communities most affected by the epidemic.

Furthermore, I will analyse how, with their media-effective protests for the lift of the HIV ban, ACT UP/San Francisco, ACT UP/Golden Gate and the associated Immigrant Working Group created a platform on which (especially undocumented) queer immigrants could develop their own vision of citizenship and cultural belonging. At the same time, increasing factionalism and intergroup disputes about the prioritisation of treatment activism over the broader struggle for immigrants' rights challenged the San Francisco activists' solidarity with one another. In this context, I will reassess the Immigration Working Group's pivotal role in overcoming intergroup conflicts and guaranteeing the San Francisco activists' capacity for joint action.

From the onset, the US HIV travel and immigration ban was met with protest among anti-AIDS activists, health professionals, and public health officials worldwide. As one of the most vociferous action groups, ACT UP launched a series

[4] On the homophobic and racist underpinnings of the conceptualization of HIV/AIDS as an external threat imported by queer non-white non-US citizens, see among others: Douglas Crimp, "How to Have Promiscuity in an Epidemic," *October* 43: 241–246; Paul Farmer, *AIDS and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame* (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1992] 2006), 212–221.

of demonstrations across the United States and abroad between 1987 and 1993 targeting the INS for the implementation of obligatory HIV tests in immigration and asylum procedures. Moreover, the activists protested against the US federal government's contradictory approach of funding AIDS research and prevention programmes while, at the same time, criminalising people living with HIV/AIDS.

To stem the epidemic in the United States, the government aimed at separating so called "high risk groups"—gay and bisexual men, drug users, sex workers, prisoners, immigrants, haemophiliacs, and Haitians—from the "general population," a term which Cindy Patton deconstructed as a residual expression for white male heterosexual middle-class citizens.[5] Its concrete measures comprised—among others—the criminalisation of sex between different status groups, the implementation of quarantine areas in hospitals and prisons, and the increase of border surveillance. At the same time, city councils, state and federal governments invested an increasing amount of public funds into private non-profit organizations that served to increase self-awareness and responsibility among individuals deemed at "high-risk" of contracting HIV.[6] The intertwining of welfare and security regimens, which manifested itself in the field of US travel and immigration policy, resulted from the rise of economic neoliberalism and political conservativism under the Reagan and Bush administrations.[7]

This development became obvious in the wake of the 1980 Mariel Boatlift, which had drawn approximately 125,000 Cubans to the shores of Southern Florida. According to Alice Solomon, "[t]hat event marked a major shift in U.S. attitudes towards immigrants […] from a 1950s image of brave entrepreneurial refugees seeking freedom from Communist oppression, to a Reaganite framing of refugees as deviant and driven to prey on American society as welfare recipients or criminals."[8] Only one year after the Cuban mass exodus, the Reagan administration ordered the opening of detention facilities in Florida to contain the influx of undocumented immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. In the 1980s, the new policy of immigration imprisonment affected mostly Cuban and Haitian

[5] Cindy Patton, *Inventing AIDS* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 99.

[6] According to Cindy Patton, the United States fueled an "AIDS service industry." This industry is neoliberal inasmuch as it depends on volunteers' work, and neo-conservative as its services are mostly restricted to US citizens. Ibid., 5–24. On the criminalisation of HIV-positive people, see: Sean Strub, "HIV: Prosecution or Prevention? HIV is Not a Crime," in *War on Sex*, ed. David M. Halperin (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 347–352; Gregory Tomso, "HIV Monsters: Gay Men, Criminal Law, and the New Political Economy of HIV," in *War on Sex*, 353–377.

[7] On the rise of neoliberalism and neo-conservativism under Ronald Reagan's and George Bush's presidencies, see: Alexander Reichwein, "Der amerikanische Neokonservativismus und seine Ursprünge, Ideen und Ziele: Eine liberale und eine realistische Kritik," *ZENAF Arbeits- und Forschungspapiere* 1 (2009): 1–37; Martin Schuldes, *Retrenchment in the American Welfare State: The Reagan and Clinton Administrations in Comparative Perspective* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2011), 13–24.

[8] Alice Solomon, "Trans/Migrant: Christina Madrazo's All-American Story," in *Queer Migrations: Sexuality, U.S. Citizenship, and Border Crossings*, ed. Eithne Luibhéid and Lionel Cantú (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 6.

refugees, but the federal government later extended the law's scope to include also the Texan border where Mexican and Central American immigrants were increasingly targeted.[9] The representation of mostly Latin American immigrants as "criminals" and "welfare recipients" developed into a problem for anti-AIDS activism as it reinforced the ideological divides between different interest groups within the open grassroots network.[10]

During the last two decades, political and social responses to the AIDS pandemic have attracted scholars' interest across disciplinary boundaries and national borders. This has led to numerous studies on the transformation of social movements worldwide, particularly in the Northern Atlantic countries from the late 20th to the early 21st century. The studies predominantly highlight the decisive role of US-American metropolitan LGBT communities in establishing services for people with HIV/AIDS and in lobbying for public funds for both comprehensive health care and medical research.[11] Moreover, they reconstruct the politicisation of LGBT communities in the mid-1980s following a period of growing social stigmatisation of people with HIV/AIDS and media hysteria about the disease, as well as political negligence regarding the disproportional spread of the epidemic in disenfranchised communities. In this context, ACT UP/New York, founded in 1987, has often been perceived as the hub of anti-AIDS activism in the United States. Recently, however, scholars have started to examine other chapters' contribution to the movement.[12]

This shift is also reflected in historian Joey Plaster's and the GLBT Historical Archive's oral history project which aims at documenting and preserving activists' accounts of the anti-AIDS movement in 1980s and 1990s San Francisco. Complementary to this project, historians Sarah Schulman and Jim Hubbard have

[9] Alice Solomon, "Trans/Migrant," 6.

[10] See: Deborah Gould, *Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP's Fight against AIDS* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 338–45; Tamar W. Carroll, *Mobilizing New York: AIDS, Antipoverty, and Feminist Activism* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 273–327.

[11] See: Brier, *Infectious Ideas*, 11–71. On the history of the anti-AIDS movements in the United States with a focus on the role of LGBT communities, see: Steve Epstein, *Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); David France, *How to Survive a Plague: The Inside Story of How Citizens and Science Tamed AIDS* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016), 13–120.

[12] In the wake of the infamous 1986 Bowers versus Hardwick case, in which the Supreme Court confirmed Georgia's anti-sodomy law, vociferous direct-action groups, such the Lavender Hill Mob in New York, Citizens for Medical Justice in San Francisco, and Dykes and Gay Men Against Racism/Repression/Reaganism (DAGMAR) in Chicago, appeared. Following the founding of ACT UP in New York in March 1987, these groups formed independent ACT UP chapters in other cities, and merged them into a trans-local grassroots network in the United States, and other North Atlantic countries. See: Gould, *Moving Politics*, 121–176; Brier, *Infectious Ideas*, 156–189. On the development, structure, and politics of ACT UP/New York, see: Carroll, *Mobilizing New York*, 131–161; France, *How to Survive a Plague*, 247–396. On the development of ACT UP/Los Angeles, see: Roth, *The Life and Death of ACT UP/LA*.

collected East Coast activists' testimonies for the ACT UP Oral History Project.[13] In recent years, both former activists and public historians have started to produce documentaries and feature film which both historicize former anti-AIDS activists' experiences and memories and make them accessible to a broader audience beyond academic communities.[14]

In my analysis, I will focus on the local protests against the US travel and immigration ban in the San Francisco Bay Area between 1990 and 1993 and the international protests at the AIDS conferences in San Francisco in 1990 and in Amsterdam in 1992 respectively. In so doing, I will draw from a wide range of documents, posters, clippings, internal statements, and letters of ACT UP/San Francisco, and ACT UP/Golden Gate in general, and the Immigration Working Group as an independent initiative associated with both chapters in particular. The sources are part of the personal estates San Francisco anti-AIDS activists left the GLBT Historical Society Archives in San Francisco beginning in the 1990s.[15] The sorting of the archive material in personal estates rather than in an organisational context suggested that I reconstruct the history of the San Francisco anti-AIDS movement along personal rather than collective lines. In fact, this person-centred approach implies the problem of singling out individual contributions to a broad social movement. Nevertheless, it makes it possible to illuminate how and in which direction knowledge, experience, and cultural practices diffused across borders.[16]

Following the examples set by other cultural histories of the US LGBT movement, individual biographies are included in this paper's analysis to illuminate the

[13] For more information on the San Francisco ACT UP Oral History Project see: "San Francisco ACT UP Oral History Project," Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender Historical Society Archives, http://www.glbthistory.org/2017/06/09/actup-san-francisco-oral-history-project/. As to Sarah Schulman's and Jim Hubbard's completed project, most interviews, soundtracks and transcripts, are already available online: Sarah Schulman and Jim Hubbard, "ACT UP Oral History Project," http://www.actuporalhistory.org/index1.html.

[14] Among the documentaries are David France's 2012 documentary "How to Survive a Plague" and Jim Hubbard's "United in Anger," released the same year. The two US-American productions, which draw from a wide range of archive footage and interviews, are centred on the development of ACT UP/New York in the 1980s and 1990s. Robin Campillo's 2017 feature film "120 BPM" uses a fictitious storyline to reconstruct ACT UP/Paris' internal disputes and protests against the Chirac administration in the 1990s. "How to Survive a Plague," dir. David France, prod. Dan Cogan and Howard Gertler, 109 min., (Public Square Films and Ninety Thousand Words, USA, 2012); "United in Anger: A History of ACT UP," dir. Jim Hubbart, 93 min, (Ford Foundation and the New York State Council on the Arts, USA, 2012); "120 Battement Par Minute," dir. Robin Campillo, star. Mahuel Pérez Biycayart, Arnaud Valois, and Adèle Haenel (Les Films de Pierre, France 3 Cinéma, Page 144, France, 2017).

[15] I draw especially on the following collections: GLBT Historical Society Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994; GLBT Historical Society Archives (henceforth: GLBT Historical Archives), Jorge Cortiñas Papers 1989–1994.

[16] In so doing, I aim at avoiding to write mere entangled histories of AIDS. On the concept of *entangled histories*, see: Dietmar Rothermund, "Globalgeschichte und Geschichte der Globalisierung," in *Globalisierung und Globalgeschichte*, ed. Margarete Grandner, Dietmar Rothermund, and Wolfgang Schwenktker (Wien: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2005), 22–24.

idiosyncrasies of cultural historical developments at the micro level and individuals' shaping of social processes in and between activist groups, organisations, and institutions at the meso level.[17] By highlighting individual activists' forging of strategic alliances and mobilisation of different communities, I will demonstrate their role both as pivotal persons and multipliers.[18] Specifically, I will do so by reconstructing the *collective action frames* the activists chose to justify and their protests against the HIV ban, and the practices with which they translated their "anger" into "action."[19]

It is no accident that this paper—which seeks to contextualize ACT UP's work on immigration within broader histories of international politics and transnational and migrant subjects—uses San Francisco's ACT UP collective as its case study. San Francisco has a long history of intersecting persecutions and movements in support of immigrants. The city offers a case in which the conflicting relationship between migrants, sexual minorities, and the US-American nation-state can be examined. According to Nayan Shah, the influx of Asian contract workers to San Francisco gave rise to public health concerns about the spread of syphilis and other sexually transmitted diseases in urban communities at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. Due to the lack of understanding of family structures in East Asian societies and the male-biased demographic in San Francisco's Asian American communities, especially unmarried women, who were sweepingly suspected of sex work, were subjected to recurrent STI screening and quarantine.[20] The 1875

[17] One good example is Duberman's study of the historical pretext and the social and cultural conditions leading GLBTs to join the Gay Liberation movement in the wake of the Stonewall riots in New York in June 1969. The study is based on six gay liberationist activists' extensive accounts of their youth and pre-Stonewall lives. See: Martin Duberman, *Stonewall* (New York: Plume, 1994). Also see: John D'Emilio, *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States 1940–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

[18] Ronald Burt defines a *pivotal person* or a "broker [as] an individual who manages to bridge one or more […] holes [gaps within a network], mediating between the parties involved, usually to the mutual benefit of all involved […]. A broker is the conduit through which resources, ideas and information can pass from one cluster or community to the other," in *Social Network Analysis for Ego-Nets*, ed. Nick Crossley et al. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2015), 36. Pivotal persons serve an important function as multipliers by drawing new individuals from different communities and/or interest groups into the movement.

[19] *Collective action frames* can be defined as discourses in which activists articulate their self-definition as a political group as well as their protest strategies, thus developing a notion of *collective identity*, i.e. a strong intragroup cohesion through shared convictions, aims, and experiences. See: Sebastian Haunss, *Identität in Bewegung: Prozesse kollektiver Identität bei den Autonomen und in der Schwulenbewegung* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2003), 76–77.

[20] Nayan Shah, *Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 77–104. As Natalia Molina demonstrates, health officials applied similar measures to Mexican, Chinese, and Japanese communities in Los Angeles in the first half of the 20th century to protect white residents against the spread of the Spanish flue, tuberculosis, and other contagious diseases. See: Natalia Molina, *Fit to Be Citizens? Public Health and Race in Los Angeles 1979–1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 75–115.

Page Law ultimately barred unmarried Chinese women from entering US territory entirely, thus revealing US lawmakers' and scientists' perception that moral fibre, physical strength, and health were linked to race and gender. Only seven years later, the Page Law was followed by a complete ban on Chinese immigration. Drawing on this eugenic discourse, US lawmakers added more ethnic groups to the list of exclusion in 1924, among them Japanese people, as well as Eastern and Southern European Jews.[21]

Between 1870 and 1920, the United States Public Health Service institutionalised a complex system of medical examinations in immigration procedures as a response to the rising fear of contagious diseases, which Barbara Lüthi describes as the "medicalization of [US] immigration procedures."[22] Both Shah and Lüthi illustrate that the queering and racialisation of non-white immigrants through practices related to public health and border protection long preceded the political responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 1980s and 1990s USA. Despite the impact of repressive public health and border policies on the port town, San Francisco attracted a multiplicity of ethnic and sexual minorities. Effective political alliances began to be forged between them in the 1970s and 1980s which shaped the urban political landscape decisively.[23]

In the 1980s, the entanglement of the Reagan administration's austerity and war politics led many formerly progressive anti-AIDS activists to join gay and lesbian leftists in their protests against US interventions in Central America, as well as their fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS in Latino/a communities in San Francisco as well as in Nicaragua, and El Salvador.[24] The activists benefited considerably from leftist ideas of coalitional grassroots politics and experiences with media-effective protest styles, especially non-violent direct action or civil disobedience. Drawing on feminist theories, Karma R. Chávez defines *coalition* as political "unions, fusions, and combinations designated for certain kinds of action." These political ties between subjects are usually "temporary, and goal-oriented" in character. Consequently, coalitions are always precarious inasmuch as the actors' differences in motivation, political convictions, and aims lead to constant tension within the group. Even though interest groups and actors remain

[21] Eithne Luibhéid, "Introduction: Queering Migration and Citizenship," in *Queer Migrations: Sexuality, U.S. Citizenship, and Border Crossings*, ed. Eithne Luibhéid and Lionel Cantú (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), XIV–XV.

[22] See: Barbara Lüthi, *Invading Bodies: Medizin und Immigration in den USA 1880–1920* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2009), 11.

[23] One example of successful coalitional politics based on strategic political ties between San Francisco's GLBT, Latino/a, Asian American, and Native American communities was the 1977 Coors Beer boycott organised by Chicano/a trade unionists because of the company's discriminatory hiring practices. See: Jesse Drew, "San Francisco Labor in the 1970s," in *Ten Years That Shook the City: San Francisco, 1968–1978*, ed. Chris Carlsson and Lisa Ruth Elliott (San Francisco: City Lights Foundation Books, 2011), 262.

[24] Emily Hobson, *Lavender and Red: Liberation and Solidarity in the Gay and Lesbian Left* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), 97–154.

separate within the grassroots collective, coalitional politics contribute to a blurring of dividing lines, thus facilitating the opening of new horizons of political possibilities.[25]

Most anti-AIDS activists started to embrace direct action in 1986 when three decisive events led to the radicalisation of the movement throughout the United States: the Supreme Court's confirmation of Georgia's sodomy law, right-wing demagogue Lyndon LaRouche's "AIDS quarantine" initiative for the California ballot, and the state and federal governments' discussion about HIV mass screenings in the military, in prisons, and hospitals.[26] In response, direct-action groups sprouted across the Bay Area. These included AIDS/ARC Vigil, a protest camp of HIV-positives on San Francisco's United Nations Plaza which had been opened in late 1985, and Citizens of Medical Justice (CMJ), a group of long-term leftist activists embracing AIDS politics. In conjunction with Lesbians and Gays Against Intervention (LAGAI) and the Marin AIDS network, these groups formed the AIDS Action Pledge (AAP), which explicitly drew on the ideals and practices of the leftist anti-war group Pledge of Resistance.[27]

During the Second March on Washington for Lesbian and Gay Rights in October 1987, the San Francisco activists contributed significantly to the forging of the AIDS Coalition To Network, Organize, and Win (ACT NOW), a national coordination committee for local protest groups across the United States.[28] Between 1987 and 1990, the AAP, renamed ACT UP/San Francisco in 1988, not only supported the national boycotts of federal health institutions, such as the National Institutes for Health (NIH) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and disruptions of international AIDS conferences for improved AIDS research and

[25] See: Karma R. Chávez, *Queer migration Politics: Activist Rhetoric and Coalitional Possibilities* (Urbana, IL: Illinois of Illinois Press, 2017), 7f.

[26] Specifically, these direct-action protests comprised blockades of federal authorities, and pharmaceutical companies, streets, and bridges, as well as creative and media-effective demonstrations in public buildings and places, involving agit-prop and guerilla theatre, i.e. unexpected dramatic performances which aimed at shaming public officials through pretended dying (die-ins), kissing (kiss-ins), or blockades (sit-ins) in conjunction with coordinated chanting and the spread of fliers. See: Gould, *Moving Politics*, 122–132.

[27] By signing a pledge document, both members of the Pledge of Resistance and the AIDS Action Pledge avowed their commitment either to "acts of civil disobedience or to support those willing to perform such acts." See: Emergency Response Network, *Basta! No Mandate for War: A Pledge of Resistance Handbook* (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1986); GLBTHS Archives, Arawn Eibhlyn Papers 1973–1995, Box 1, Folder 6, ACT UP History and Other Materials, "ACT UP Condensed History."

[28] Hobson, *Lavender and Red*, 166–70. In preparation for the event, East and West Coast activists drafted the handbook *Out and Outraged* which encouraged radical non-violent protest drawing on a tradition dating back to the gay liberation and feminist movements in the early 1970s. By engaging in civil disobedience, the authors suggested, activists could break the vicious circle of violence and counter-violence evolving around social minorities' resistance to state-sanctioned repression. See: *Out & Outraged: Non-Violent Civil Disobedience at the U.S. Supreme Court, For Love, Life & Liberation, October 13, 1987, C.D. Handbook, National March on Washington for Lesbian and Gay Rights, October 8-13, 1987*, ed. Nancy Alach et al. (Washington D.C., 1987).

treatment. The group also engaged with the pressing issues of comprehensive health care, housing, prison, and US immigration and travel policies.[29] Between 1991 and 1993, they supported protests against the quarantining of HIV-positive refugees at Guantanamo Bay in the wake of the overthrow of the Aristide government in Haiti.[30]

ACT UP/San Francisco's decidedly leftist confrontational stance, transnational consciousness, and trans-local networking also informed the protests against the Sixth International AIDS Conference in San Francisco in 1990. A faction of ACT UP/New York entered into a dialogue with national and international health professionals as official conferees, but most activists protested against the US federal government's HIV welfare and immigration policy outside the convention centre under the auspices of ACT NOW and ACT UP/San Francisco. Due to ACT UP/San Francisco's high visibility in the national and international media, the chapter drew in a large number of new activists. With more than 200 people attending the group's weekly plena and increasingly heated debates about internal sexism and racism, the group split over the discussion whether or not to hire office space. As a result, moderate activists centred on treatment activism formed the independent ACT UP/Golden Gate chapter, which coexisted with ACT UP/San Francisco, as well as various workings groups and caucuses. In fact, due to the increasing number of active members with different social backgrounds, ACT UP/San Francisco's adherence to decision-making by consensus contributed to the 1990 split. This notwithstanding, coalitional politics, specifically the forging of strategic alliances between groups, remained an important tool to stabilise the US anti-AIDS movement during the following years.[31]

As I will demonstrate in this essay, due to individual activists' personal ties with one another, the groups continued to organize effective common protest campaigns, among others against the HIV travel and immigration ban. I will argue that the lasting success of coalitional politics was owed to highly professionalised and specialised interest groups, such as the Immigration Working Group. Among other measures, the working group, in conjunction with ACT UP/San Francisco and ACT UP/Golden Gate, successfully pressured the organization committee to

[29] According to Benita Roth, the disruptions of the International AIDS Conferences in Montreal in 1989 and in San Francisco in 1990 furthered the ties between the local groups, thus inviting the local US anti-AIDS activist groups to punctuate their local work with international activism. See: Roth, *The Life and Death of ACT UP/LA*, 42.

[30] The social response to the Haitian refugee crisis which was led by East Coast law professionals, students, and anti-AIDS activists, will not be covered in this essay. The major protests took place on the East Coast where both the largest Haitian and Haitian American communities—in New York and Miami—and the most influential courts and law schools were situated. See: Michael Ratner, "How We Closed the Guantanamo HIV Camp: The Intersection of Politics and Litigation," *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 11 (1998): 193–200, 210–217.

[31] Gould, *Moving Politics*, 184–5. In this context, Gould and Brier identify similar developments in other local US chapters, including ACT UP/New York and ACT UP/Chicago. See: Gould, *Moving Politics*, 347–8; Brier, *Infectious Ideas*, 182–3.

translocate the 8th International AIDS Conference from Boston to Amsterdam in 1992. Despite its precarious and temporal character, coalitional politics facilitated anti-AIDS activists' adjustments to political and social developments, and thereby contributed to the stabilisation of 1980s and 1990s US grassroots movements.

Against this backdrop, ACT UP in San Francisco serves as a microstructural case study of a transnational grassroots movement which adds to the understanding of the conflicting responses to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in times of the increasing globalisation of national economies, the rise of the neoliberal order, as well as the success of the political Right in Northern Atlantic countries in the 1980s and 1990s.[32]

Calling for Action against the INS: ACT UP/San Francisco's Demonstrations against the HIV Ban in the Spring of 1990

Leading up to the Sixth International AIDS Conference in San Francisco, ACT UP/San Francisco launched a series of demonstrations against the HIV exclusion of immigrants and travellers in the Bay Area. On February 27, 1990, ACT UP/San Francisco members Jorge Cortiñas and Kate Raphael organized a rally leading to the local Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) Office at Sansom Street. With the protest, the activists intended to draw public attention to the agency's most recent decision to deny two immigrants, a married German man with two US children and a gay Mexican man, permanent residence because of their positive HIV-test results.[33] Under slogans, such as "Four Million Tested Is Too Many" and "Basta con la migra!" (Put an end to INS!), the protesters halted traffic in front of the INS building (**Article Cover Image**). This resulted in several arrests. Simultaneously, East coast chapters of ACT UP demonstrated at the INS headquarters in Washington, D.C. News on the demonstrations spread fast among the LGBT and Hispanic communities in the Bay Area and beyond. According to *Bay Area Reporter* journalist Allen White, "[l]ocal Spanish speaking television stations gave the demonstration a high priority because the immigration acts are now being viewed not only as an instrument against gays but also as an act of racism against minorities by the United States."[34]

In November 1990, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Bill into law. The new policy restored the Department of Health and Human Services'

[32] On micro- and macrostructural perspectives in global history, see: Sebastian Conrad and Andreas Eckert, "Globalgeschichte, Globalisierung, multiple Modernen: Zur Geschichtsschreibung der modernen Welt," in *Globalgeschichte: Theorien, Ansätze, Themen*, ed. Sebastian Conrad et al. (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2007), 28–9.

[33] GLBT Historical Archives, Jorge Cortiñas Papers 1989–1994, Box 1, Folder 12, INS Action February 27, 1990, "For immediate release, February 23, 1990."

[34] Allen White: "ACT UP, CDC Target INS Policy," *Bay Area Reporter* 20/9, March 1, 1990, 1; also see: Michele DeRanleau: "Opposition to INS Policy Mounts," *San Francisco Sentinel*, March 1, 1990.

(HHS) authority to define "communicable diseases of public health significance" on a scientific basis.[35] As it automatically lifted all grounds of exclusion, HHS was required to publish a new list of excludable diseases by June 1st, 1991. The new proposal published in January 1991 contained active tuberculosis only. Because of a protest initiated by conservative Congressmen, the new list was finally rescinded. President Bush, too, opposed the removal of HIV from the list of excludable diseases due to concerns about rising public costs of AIDS treatment granted to non-US citizens, a recurring topic in the national press.[36]

In his speech, Jorge Cortiñas, himself a Mexican immigrant, condemned the impact of the INS policy for immigrants with HIV/AIDS, people of colour, gays, and lesbians alike. Using a decidedly leftist antiimperialist rhetoric, he pointed out the inconsistencies of the request for cheap labour on the one hand and the lack of basic civil rights on the other when it came to living conditions for non-US nationals in the United States. As he argued, the working ban on undocumented immigrants, which invited agri-businesses to "exploit" them under "sweatshop" conditions, resembled the exclusion of people with HIV/AIDS as a similar means of degradation to a "second-class citizenship."[37] Addressing the intersections of legal discrimination against LGBT foreigners, who had been barred from entering the United States between 1917 and 1990, and HIV-positives since 1987, he called for a united response against US immigration policy at large. [38]

Implicitly drawing on the gay liberationist concept of *internal colonialism*, he saw the legal entanglement of welfare and security policy as an expression of the US nation state's *covert war* against disenfranchised groups. With this frame, he spoke to undocumented queer immigrants who, due to the constant fear of deportation, remained invisible at the margin of society. The term *internal colonialism* implied that GLBTs, classified as an "ethnic minority" in Marxist terms, endured constant repression by imperialist white capitalists who, in order to control them, forced them and other social minorities into urban ghettos and answered protest

[35] Ignatius Bau, "Immigration Law," in *AIDS and the Law*, ed. David W. Webber, 3rd edition, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, [1991] 1997), 488–489.

[36] Ibid.; Richard Cohen, "AIDS and Immigration," *The Washington Post*, June 14, 1991; "The Right Decision Loses: Aliens with the AIDS Virus Are Not a Threat to Public Health and Should be Allowed Into the U.S.," *San Francisco Examiner*, May 29, 1991.

[37] GLBT Historical Archives, Jorge Cortiñas Papers 1989–1994, Box 1, Folder 12, INS Action February 27, 1990.

[38] The immigration and travel ban on homosexual men and women as well as gender-nonconforming people dates back to the 1917 Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) which denied entry to the United States to individuals who were found "mentally defected" upon their arrival at the border. After several legal reforms, the 1967 INA added "sexual deviation" as a ground for a travel or immigration ban, thus explicitly barring same-sex desiring nonnationals from entering US territory. With the 1990 INA, "sexual deviation"—in contrast to HIV/AIDS—was no longer listed as a ground for denying non-US nationals entry to the US. See: Tracey J. Davis, *Opening the Doors of Immigration: Sexual Orientation and Asylum in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Washington College of Law, 2002), https://web.archive.org/web/20020822211541/http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v6i3/immigration.htm; Luibhéid, "Introduction," XII-XIII.

with state-sanctioned violence. This impression was reinforced by the San Francisco Police Department's abrasive actions against GLBT protesters in the Castro city district. The SFPD answered both the protests against Dan White's lenient sentence for assassinating liberal mayor George Moscone and openly gay supervisor Harvey Milk in 1979 and the registered demonstration organised by ACT UP/ San Francisco one decade later with so-called sweeps, comprehensive raids on both streets and bars. In the shape of what I call *covert war*, the frame of internal colonialism was adopted by gay and lesbian caucuses of anti-intervention and anti-nuclear groups in the Bay Area to address the link between the federal government's military intervention in Central America and its deprival of support for both people with AIDS and Central American refugees.[39] Examining the Mexican transgender woman and asylum seeker Christina Madrazo, who was incarcerated in a deportation prison in Florida for petty crimes at the end of the 1990s and the early 2000, Alisa Salomon provides another example of both the exclusion of sexually and gender non-conforming individuals from legal protection and the discriminatory and punitive practices towards GLBTs in US federal and state prisons.[40]

"George Bush and Jesse Helms think it's acceptable to tell the American public that people of color, people with an accent, aren't capable of incorporating [and] acting on the same safe sex the public is expected to act on."[41] With these words, Cortiñas alluded to the 1987 Helms Amendment which prohibited state funding of prevention campaigns that "promoted" sexual activity among gay men or among teenagers by advocating condom use and by spreading sex-positive safe-sex messages in posters and brochures. In effect, the law made it difficult especially for AIDS organisations to reach out for vulnerable populations with pragmatic recommendations. In addition to this, Lyndon LaRouche's successful 1986 "English only" initiative exacerbated the work with non-native speakers, including immigrants with precarious residence statuses, in California.[42] Like the HIV immigration and travel ban, the restrictions in public health education revealed the xenophobia rooting in the US political Right inasmuch as they created the image of people with HIV/AIDS as an alleged 'threat to the public health.' Cortiñas and

[39] See: Hobson, *Lavender and Red*, 12, 25–27, 173–177. One of the most important gay activists who introduced Marxist thought into the research on gay men was Harry Hay who was a temporary member of the Communist Party USA as well as founder of the homophile Mattachine Society in the 1950s and the gay radical Faery Circles in the 1970s. See: Lüder Tietz, *Homosexualität, Cross-Dressing und Transgender: Heteronormativitätskritische kulturhistorische und ethnographische Analysen* (PhD diss., Universität Oldenburg, 2014), 367–369. On the conceptualisation of gay men as a sexual minority, see: Harry Hay, *Radically Gay: Gay Liberation in the Words of Its Founder*, ed. Will Roscoe (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 331–340.

[40] Alisa Salomon, "Trans/Migrant: Christina Madrazo's All-American Story," in *Queer Migrations: Sexuality, U.S. Citizenship, and Border Crossings*, ed. Luibhéid, and Cantú, 5–24.

[41] GLBT Historical Archives, Jorge Cortiñas Papers 1989–1994, Box 1, Folder 12, INS Action February 27, 1990.

[42] See: Hobson, *Lavender and Red*, 161–163.

ACT UP activists argued against this by highlighting "that most undocumented people with HIV were infected right here"[43] in the United States.[44]

Despite the constant threat of deportation, Jorge Cortiñas managed to recruit undocumented immigrants, such as Jesus Reyes, a Mexican gay man who had just been denied a resident permit after testing positive for HIV. For the demonstration in front of the San Francisco INS headquarters in February 1990, Reyes wrote a speech in which he reconstructed his life as an undocumented immigrant and an HIV-positive gay man in San Francisco.[45] Reyes stated that he had been living in the Mission, a Latino neighbourhood in San Francisco since his entry to the United States. There, he had accepted two jobs to sustain himself and his family in Guadalajara. After becoming ill in 1987, he struggled for the legalisation of his residence status in order for him to become eligible for health care and social benefits. Feeling he did not qualify for the Immigration Control Act of 1986 because of his undocumented entry into the United States, he asked his brother, a US citizen, to file for permanent residence on his behalf in November 1989.[46] This option required an obligatory blood test to be taken by a physician authorised by the INS, and submitted by the applicant in a closed envelope to the INS official in charge. At the INS interview following the blood test, Reyes was informed about the test results along with the agent's decision to deny him permanent residence. To avoid arrestment, Reyes left the office immediately and concealed his whereabouts. The only hope Reyes was left with was the removal of the HIV travel and immigration ban announced by the Department of Health in early 1990.[47]

In his speech, Reyes described the common dilemma that an undocumented immigrant's legal status exacerbated their state of health, and vice versa. Fur-

[43] GLBT Historical Archives, Jorge Cortiñas Papers 1989–1994, Box 1, Folder 12, INS Action February 27, 1990.

[44] Later, the idea that most people were infected after entering the United States was even accepted by epidemiologists who stressed the high case load of people with HIV and AIDS in the United States and the important role of the United States in the spread of the virus outside of Africa in the early years of the epidemic: April Thompson, "The Immigration HIV Exclusion: an Ineffective Means for Promoting Public Health in a Global Age," *Houston Journal of Health Law and Policy* 145, no. 3 (September 2005): 168.

[45] It cannot be reconstructed from sources available whether Jesus Reyes actually gave his speech at the rally. Due to the fact that he was very likely to be arrested at the demonstration it appears improbable that he gave the speech in person. Nonetheless, his statement provides a deep insight into the impact of the HIV immigration ban on those who attempted to legalise their residence statuses.

[46] The Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986 allowed undocumented immigrants who had entered the United States before January 1st, 1982 to apply for permanent residence in the United States. In return, the law required employers to check their employees' immigration statuses and report cases of suspected document fraud to state authorities, which led to a short-term increase of dismissals of largely Hispanic workers. See: Bau, "Immigration Law," 476–7. This notwithstanding, approximately four million undocumented immigrants applied for the legalisation of their residence statuses; about half of the applications were approved. See: William Branigin, "U.S. Migrant Law Falls Hard on Jobless in Central Mexico," *The Washington Post,* March 3, 1987, A1.

[47] Bau, "Immigration Law," 476–7.

thermore, he described how, even though immigrants were often infected in the United States, they were still considered as 'importers of contagious diseases' and 'threats to tax payers.' Apart from this, Reyes' description of the INS testing procedures adds to the doubtfulness of the official arguments for mandatory testing. Anti-AIDS activists continuously emphasised that applicants were very likely to be traumatised and risked engaging in high-risk behaviour, such as drug abuse and unprotected sex, if they were confronted insensitively with a positive test result without pre- and post-test counselling. This and the fear of deportation drove them underground.[48]

ACT UP's demonstration at the INS office in San Francisco was not the only one addressing the INS travel restrictions for HIV-positive non-US citizens. As the opening of the Sixth International AIDS Conference approached, the pace of protest actions in the Bay Area and in Washington accelerated. On April 5th, 1990, nine members of Oppression Under Target! (OUT!) chained themselves to the front door of the INS headquarters in Washington, D.C. The local D.C. direct-action group, which was focused on GLBT rights, was in close contact with ACT NOW to coordinate its actions with other grassroots initiatives across the United States. Drawing constant links to the repeal of the travel and immigration ban for homosexuals, they protested against the INS restrictions for people with HIV/AIDS. In effect, the activists prevented employees from entering the building and thus halted work for approximately one hour.[49] The demonstration outside of the building was paralleled by a "National Phone Zap" launched by activist groups across the country.[50]

The action stimulated further radical approaches to keep the policy on the agenda of national media. On May 3rd, 1990, San Francisco-based Stop Now Or Else (SANOE) occupied the INS office building in San Francisco. In 1989, the group had become known for blocking traffic on the Golden Gate Bridge and disrupting an evening performance at the San Francisco Opera House. This time, the police reacted more abrasively. Both activists and members of the press were injured when the police stormed director Phil Water's office, in which the protesters were holding a sit-in. INS employees refused to make official press statements.[51]

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[48] GLBT Historical Archives, Jorge Cortiñas Papers 1989–1994, Box 1, Folder 12, INS Action February 27, 1990. These arguments received support from medical professionals and researchers. See: Demetrius Lambrinos, "Out of the Frying Pan and into the Quarantine: Why 8 U.C.S. Sec. 1182's HIV/AIDS Exclusion Should Not Apply to Refugees Seeking Entry into the United States," *Gender, Race, and Justice* 10 no.1 (2006), 129–132.

[49] See: Cliff O'Neill, "Activists Lock Up I.N.S. HQ," *Bay Area Reporter*, April 12, 1990, 24.

[50] See: GLBT Historical Archives, Jorge Cortiñas Papers 1989–1994, Box 1, Folder 13, INS Phone Zap March 1990. The activists used the word "zap" as a synonym for storming or blockade, both in the sense of storming a stage or an event and in the sense of blocking telephone and fax lines with constant calls and fax transmissions. In this context, the "National Phone Zap" served as a supplement to the protesters' demonstrations on-site in Washington, D.C.

[51] Peter Altman, "INS Office occupied," *Bay Area Reporter*, May 3, 1990, 1.

Different from OUT!, SANOE justified the protest by referring to the HIV restrictions in general and the increasing number of denied applications for amnesty under the 1986 Immigration Control Act in particular. SANOE considered travel ban waivers for international AIDS conference participants a deceptive maneuver by state officials to cushion international criticism of the ban. With their more general language, the protesters redirected the focus from travel restrictions for people with HIV to the broader issue of immigration.[52] ACT UP/San Francisco cemented this more fundamental criticism when the activists presented an open letter to the press in front of the INS office building in San Francisco on June 18th. In it, Kate Raphael and Jorge Cortiñas demanded that President Bush lift the ban and reopen the 35 cases of denied amnesty applications.[53] In the following days the activists intensified their pressure on the INS by protesting in front of the office building. The campaign culminated in a city-wide protest marathon during the conference week.

The US Travel and Immigration Policy in the Pillory: International Controversies on the US HIV Travel Ban in the Run-Up to the Eighth International AIDS Conference

Whether issues were put on the agendas of activist groups depended not only on the preferences of the majority, but also on individual members' social background, knowledge, and skills. In the Immigration Work Group, Jorge Cortiñas, himself a Mexican citizen, focused on issues related to permanent immigration such as access to US health care, social benefits, and labour rights, while other members, like Tomás Fábregas, were more concerned with the impact of the HIV travel ban on international networks of researchers and activists.

The case of Tomás Fábregas is worth discussing at length as it demonstrates both the professionalisation of AIDS activism in San Francisco, its local and international alliances, and the transformation of grassroots activism into effective media campaigning on the international stage between 1990 and 1994. Fábregas, a permanent US resident since 1979 of Galician origin, was diagnosed HIV-positive in 1989. After abandoning his career as a businessman, he joined the SFAF, first as a volunteer and later as a board member. At the same time, he worked with ACT UP where he became responsible for the Immigration Working Group.[54]

Long before its opening session, the Eighth International AIDS Conference brought about controversy in national and international media. Under the auspices of the Harvard Medical School, the conference was originally scheduled to

[52] Altman, "INS Office occupied," 1.
[53] GLBT Historical Archives, Jorge Cortiñas Papers 1989–1994, Box 1, Folder 14, Speaking Across Borders, June 17, 1990, Box 1, Folder 15, Press Conference June 19.
[54] See: Susan Stern, "Battling AIDS' Borders: Oakland Man Tests U.S. Immigrant Ban," *Oakland Tribune*, July 25, 1992.

be held in Boston in June 1992. Activists, scientists, journalists and politicians called for a boycott of the conference if it was held on US territory. Despite the possibility to obtain waivers for short-term visits, the HIV travel ban effectively deterred HIV-positive activists and scientists from entering US territory.[55] On August 2nd, 1991, the *Washington Post* published an article according to which the Bush administration decided not to lift the travel ban. The decision was officially justified on economic grounds.[56] Drawing on a Canadian case study, Republican Californian Senator William E. Dannemeyer estimated that, if the ban was lifted, the number of HIV-infected persons immigrating into the United States would rise from 3,000 to 6,000 annually. Consequently, annual costs of public health care programmes would increase to $720 million per year. The figures met firm criticism among progressive politicians and journalists. Washington Post writer Gladwell, for instance, estimated the actual number of immigrants to be between 1,200 and 2,400 and health care costs to amount to only $60 million per year.[57]

As a response to the administration's contradictory signals, the Immigration Working Group coordinated a protest campaign to urge the organising committee of the Eighth International AIDS Conference, the Harvard University AIDS Institute under Chairperson Max Essex, to either cancel the conference or relocate it abroad. Well before the Seventh International AIDS Conference in Florence in June 1991, various North American and European ACT UP chapters had circulated an internal statement in which they reminded Essex of his committee's announcement at the San Francisco conference "that they would not hold the conference in Boston if the restrictions in question were not removed from U.S. law."[58] At the Florence conference, however, the organising committee revoked its previous pledge by stating that "they may walk away from their previous commitment to move or cancel the conference and may go ahead with their intention to host the conference in the United States."[59]

The Immigration Working Group feared that they would lose the support of ACT UP/Golden Gate which remained undecided as to whether they should focus both on travel and immigration issues. Because of it, Tomás Fábregas urged the chapter in a letter on August 8th, 1991 "not to accept a split of the travel and im-

[55] Allen White, "Scientific Experts Ask Bush to Stop INS discrimination," *Bay Area Reporter*, February 22, 1990, 4; Allen White "Push to Change INS Policy on Visas and HIV," *Bay Area Reporter* 20/15, April 12, 1990, 1, 3, 21.

[56] Philipp Hilts: "U.S. to Admit Some Immigrants with AIDS under New Health Policy," *New York Times*, August 3, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/03/us/us-to-admit-some-immigrants-with-aids-under-new-health-policy.html; United Press International, "U.S. Won't Lift HIV Ban, 'Washington Post' Reports," *Bay Area Reporter*, August 6, 1991, 19.

[57] See: Malcolm Gladwell, "U.S. Won't Lift HIV Immigration Ban: Cost of those Who Develop AIDS Unacceptable," *The Washington Post*, August 2, 1991.

[58] GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 2, Flyers 1991–1993.

[59] Ibid.

migration issues.”[60] As a member of ACT UP/Golden Gate and of the board of the San Francisco AIDS Foundation (SFAF), Fábregas himself had been sceptical of a boycott stating that, in the wake of the 1990 conference, there had been “indeed too short a time to move the conference to another country, and […] there [had been] an explicit understanding that if the restrictions […] were not removed, *no international AIDS would ever again take place in the US* [italics i.o.; K.B.].”[61] Due to conservative lawmakers’ successful campaign to reinstate the ban on immigration while granting temporary waivers for HIV-positive conference participants, he changed his point of view: “The current attempt to split the issue in traveler and immigrant rights is unacceptable. HIV infected people have their lives in the U.S. Indeed, many of us have our families in the US, whether these families are legally recognized or not.”[62]

The conflict was settled when ACT UP/Golden Gate decided to support a joint appeal of the Immigration Working Group and ACT UP/San Francisco which was sent to collaborating activist groups and AIDS organisations across the country as well as abroad. In the appeal, the three groups called upon their friends to join a protest letter addressed to Max Essex and the organising committee of the 1992 AIDS Conference.[63] Many organisations and activist groups, including among others the German gay magazine *Magnus* and the German AIDS-Hilfe, responded to the appeal.[64] ACT UP/London, ACT UP/Paris, and ACT UP/Brussels, also pledged their support for the San Francisco chapters.[65] To draw the European media’s attention to the call for a boycott, ACT UP/Paris activists even attacked the Statue of Liberty in Paris with fake-blood bombs.[66]

In the United States, ACT UP could rely on various well-known organisations, such as the San Francisco AIDS Foundation, the American Medical Association (AMA), and the International AIDS Society (IAS). These had already revoked any support for an AIDS Conference in the United States under the restrictive travel and immigration policy during spring and summer 1990.[67] Growing national and international pressure led Essex to announce on August 16 that the location

[60] GLBT Historical Archives, Jorge Cortiñas Papers 1989–1994, Box 2, Folder 8, 8th International AIDS Conference, ACT UP.
[61] GLBT Historical Archives, Jorge Cortiñas Papers 1989–1994, Box 2, Folder 8, 8th International AIDS Conference, ACT UP..
[62] Ibid.
[63] See: GLBT Historical Archives, Jorge Cortiñas Papers 1989–1994, Box 2, Folder 9, 8th International AIDS Conference, Consensus Statement.
[64] See: GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 4, Correspondence, March 1991–April 1992.
[65] See: GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 4, Correspondence, March 1991–April 1992, ACT UP/Brussel’s Fax to the Immigration Working Group.
[66] See: Thompson Dick, “Keeping The Door Closed: America’s Stubborn Immigration Restrictions Could Force the Cancellation of Next Year’s Global AIDS Conference,” *TIME*, August 12, 1991, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,973588,00.html.
[67] Wanda Ochoa, “Volberding Announced Conference Pullout,” *The Sentinel*, June 6, 1991. GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 4, Correspon-

of the conference would be relocated from Boston to Amsterdam. He stated that "it is not possible at this time to offer assurance that U.S. immigration policy will allow individuals with HIV, health professionals and other essential participants to attend the 1992 conference."[68]

With the move of the conference, public protest against the INS policy did not stop in the Bay Area. On the contrary, the San Francisco activists were able to increase public pressure on the federal government. In January 1991, the Immigration Working Group urged Black basketball icon Magic Johnson, who had just been outed as HIV-positive in public, in an open letter to use his unique position as a person with AIDS in the government's National Commission on AIDS to plead for the lift of the ban.[69]

Apart from celebrities, the San Francisco activists sought to form strategic alliances with national health organisations. In February 1991, the Immigration Working Group convinced the American Foundation for AIDS Research (AmFAR) to encourage the Association of Schools of Public Health in the United States to officially join the protest.[70] On April 14th, 1992, the SFAF Board of Directors contracted the law agency Morrison and Foerster to send an official letter to Vassou Papandreou of the Commission of the European Communities urging him to "consider punitive measures against the United States in order to pressure the United States to change its immigration policies."[71] In a letter dated June 26th, 1992, the Commission replied that it had expressed its "concern" to US Secretary of Health, Louis Sullivan in June 1991.[72] After Sullivan had replied saying that immigration policy was currently under revision and that an interim regulation was in effect, the Commission did not push the issue further.[73]

Unlike previous conferences, ACT UP chapters from North America and Europe joined in the preparation of the conference programme. Tomás Fábregas, who was invited to the opening session, intended to scandalise INS practices by presenting slides of HIV-positive travellers' passports stamped at the US border. These stamps contained a code which disclosed the HIV status of foreigners who

dence, March 1991–April 1992, Letter by ACT UP/Golden Gate to James B. Todd, March 28th, 1991; Box 1, Folder 9, Memos 1990–1992.

[68] United Press International: "AIDS Conference's Decision to Shun U.S. Pleases ACT UP," in *Bay Area Reporter*, August 22, 1991, 15.

[69] GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 4, Correspondence, March 1991–April 1992, "An open letter to Magic Johnson."

[70] GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 4, Correspondence, March 1991–April 1992, Letter by Tomás Fábregas and Jeffrey Lee Brooks to Mathilde Krim, AmFAR Founding Co-Chair, February 26, 1992 Official Announcement by ASPH.

[71] GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 7, Papandreou Correspondence 1992.

[72] GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 7, Letter by A. Tryfillis to Morris Ratner of Morrisson and Foerster, June 26, 1992.

[73] GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 7, Letter by A. Tryfillis to Morris Ratner of Morrisson and Foerster, June 26, 1992, and the letter by V. Papandreou and J. Lature to Dr. Louis W. Sullivan, June 27, 1991.

applied for a waiver from the ban. For this purpose, he asked Férnand Beauval, a member of ACT UP/Paris, whom he had met at the 1991 AIDS Conference in Florence, for a hard copy of his passport.[74] The Immigration Working Group planned to juxtapose Beauval's travel documents with a historical sample of Jewish passports from Nazi Germany. For the occasion, a group had been invited to give a press conference in the Anne Frank House during the International AIDS Conference. After failing to receive such sources from various Jewish-American organisations, Jeffrey Brooks, Fábregas' lover and fellow activist, requested Irving Cooperberg, a New York gay Jewish man, to assist them.[75]

By presenting Beauval's passport and those of Jewish victims of Nazi persecution side by side, the Immigration Working Group drew on the US activists' discourse characterising the US federal government's response to the AIDS epidemic as decidedly "Nazistic"[76] to critique US immigration policy in an international forum. By using a Holocaust frame, the Immigrant Working Group sought to underpin its repeated argument that excluding HIV-positives equalled a "death sentence." Explicit references to the Holocaust in public protests, however, remained controversial among the activists.[77]

The Politics of Border-Crossing—How to Discredit the Federal Government on the International Stage

Rather than the juxtaposition of Beauval's travel documents and Jewish refugee passports, it was Tomás Fábregas' US border crossing as an HIV-positive non-US citizen which attracted international media attention. As a part of his media coup at the Eighth International AIDS Conference in Amsterdam in 1992, Fábregas revealed his HIV-status, his exact flight number, and return date to the public at the opening ceremony of the conference on July 19th. The following day, he and

[74] GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 4, Correspondence, March 1991–April 199, Fax by Tomás Fábregas on behalf of the Immigration Working Group to ACT UP/Paris, March 18, 1992, Letter by Tomás Fábregas to Fernand Beauval's personal address, March 25, 1991.

[75] GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 4, Correspondence, March 1991–April 1992, letter by Jeffrey Brooks to Irving Cooperberg, May 11, 1991.

[76] The allegation that the treatment of HIV-positive foreigners at the US border resembled that of Jews by NS officials during World War II occurred as early as 1990. In an article following the February 27th demonstration of ACT UP/San Francisco, *Bay Area* reporter Allen White noted: "The actual enforcement of the U.S, policy is shockingly similar to how Jews were treated during World War II in Hitler's Germany [...]. In what many describe as a degrading and humiliating experience, the passport is [...] stamped with an indication they [HIV-positive foreigners, K.-N. B.] are infected. During World War II, the Nazi government forced Jews to have their documents stamped with a yellow star," in: Allen White, "ACT UP, CDC Target INS Policy," *Bay Area Reporter* 20/9, March 1, 1990, 24.

[77] Gould, *Moving Politics*, 166–168; On US activists' use of Holocaust frames across political factions in the post-war period, see: Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000), 241–2.

AmFAR director Elisabeth Taylor held a press conference where Fábregas reiterated his intention to challenge the US federal government for its "grave abuse of human rights."[78]

Fábregas affirmed that he saw US society at the centre of the epidemic, stating, "I am a permanent resident in the United States who in 1989 was diagnosed with AIDS, an illness I am absolutely sure I unknowingly acquired in the United States." As a result of legally "stigmatizing those of us with HIV/AIDS," he perceived US immigration and travel policy as reinforcing the pandemic by "driv[ing] us into hiding, away from the treatments and the prevention and education efforts that may save our lives and teach us how to avoid infecting others."[79] Addressing President George Bush personally, Fábregas warned the US government that he would mount challenges to "the validity of these laws in both a court of law and the court of public opinion."[80]

Fábregas' campaign immediately caused controversy in international media.[81] On the day of his return to the United States, the local *Oakland Tribune* discussed the legal consequences Fábregas might have to face upon his arrival at San Francisco International Airport. According to the director of the San Francisco Immigration District Office, David Ilchert, "[h]is short trip may be deemed only a 'casual departure,' a type of trip after a legal resident cannot be barred, or Fábregas may be allowed to return to his Oakland home under a waiver of the law."[82] In another scenario, the activist might also be detained by the INS and forced to revoke his residence status.[83] These actual possibilities led Fábregas's attorney, Ignatius Bau, to affirm his client's criticism of the contradictory character of the US immigration and travel restrictions: "If he is successful in coming in, he makes the point that he's not a public threat […] And if he's not a threat, how can they say that the immigrant with AIDS behind him in line is a public health threat?"[84]

On Saturday, July 25th, Fábregas was, actually, granted entry to the United States after arriving at San Francisco International Airport. According to *El País*, Fábregas credited the immediate positive decision to the pressure of a welcome

[78] GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 1, ACT UP Immigrant Working Group–Articles, 1991–1993, "Challenge from Tomás Fábregas, a Person with AIDS, to George Bush, the President of the United States."

[79] GLBT Historical Archives, Tomás Fábregas Papers 1990–1994, Box 1, Folder 1, ACT UP Immigrant Working Group–Articles, 1991–1993, "Challenge from Tomás Fábregas, a Person with AIDS, to George Bush, the President of the United States."

[80] Ibid.

[81] See: Justin Westhoff, "'Eigentlich sollte ich mich um meine Krankheit kümmern,'" *Der Tagesspiegel*, July 24, 1992, 1; ANSA/EFE: "Liz Taylor Atacó a Bush Por Su Política Sobre El Sida," *Clarín*, July 24, 1992; Eric van den Berg, "Nee, laten we het vandag maar niet over Liz hebben," *De Volkskrant*, July 24, 1992; Alfonso Armada, "El Gran Día de Tomás Fábregas: Un Activista Antisida Español Desafia Con Éxito Las Leyes de Inmigración de EE.UU.," *El País*, July 27, 1992.

[82] Susan Stern, "Battling AIDS' Borders: Oakland Man Tests U.S. Immigrant Ban," *Oakland Tribune*, July 25, 1992.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid.

committee consisting of fellow activists, representatives of local AIDS organisations, politicians, and journalists waiting for him at the security check. As one of the opponents of the ban, Democratic Mayor Frank M. Jordan released a "Proclamation" in which he countenanced Fábregas's re-entry to the United States and acknowledged his "historical" and "courageous efforts" by declaring July 25th, 1992 "Tomas Fábregas Day." This move evoked memories of the declaration of "Hans Verhoef Day" three years earlier. In 1989, the previous mayor Art Agnos welcomed the Dutch citizen who had been detained for several days by the INS because of his HIV status while on his way to a nursing conference in San Francisco.[85]

Conclusion

The protests against the US HIV travel and immigration ban became a central issue for anti-AIDS activists in the Bay Area at the beginning of the 1990s. Despite the constant fear of deportation, many undocumented immigrants joined ACT UP/San Francisco and the affiliated Immigration Working Group in their effort to end discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS in the United States. In this context, activists with an immigration background, such as Jorge Cortiñas and Tomás Fábregas, helped mobilise supporters from communities of both sexual minorities and immigrants in San Francisco, thus serving both as pivotal persons and as multipliers. Protesting in front of and in the INS building in San Francisco, the activists used their mere bodies to target a core element of the United States' border surveillance apparatus. The physical violence with which the US nation-state answered the protests involuntarily cast a light on the repressive and de-humanising character of its border politics. By framing the state's responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic as well as to ACT UP's protests as a 'covert war' or even as a 'Holocaust,' the activists not only managed to attract more supporters, but also discredited the United States AIDS policies, including the HIV travel and immigration ban, internationally. In this context, the Sixth International AIDS Conference in San Francisco served as an important media platform on which the activists decried the state's contradictory response to the AIDS pandemic, which combined the funding of international medical research and the exclusion of foreigners for security and economic reasons, before an international audience. By pointing to the fact that most immigrants very likely contracted HIV after entering the United States, the activists reminded the federal government that it could not stem the epidemic by closing the borders. In this context, it became apparent that

[85] See: Armada: "El Gran Día de Tomás Fábregas"; A copy of the proclamation is printed in the Galician newspaper *La Voz de Galicia*, together with an article on Fábregas' campaign in its August 9th, 1991 issue: M. Guisande, "Un Coruñés que Tiene el Sida Reta a Bush a que lo Deporte de EE.UU.," *La Voz de Galicia*, August 9, 1992, https://tomasfabregas.wordpress.com/category/fundacion-antisida-de-san-francisco/.

even though the US economy relied on undocumented immigrants as an indispensable work force, the government exacerbated the spread of the virus in their communities by denying them social benefits and threatening them with deportation. This also applies to the state of California where the "English only" policy made it difficult for AIDS organisations to reach out to the large Spanish-speaking population.

The practice of consensual decision-making and of forging alliances across political camps, classes, sexual and gender identities, and ethnic communities, however, increasingly gave rise to internal conflicts and factionalism within and between the chapters. How activists related to the issue of immigration and naturalisation when protesting against the US HIV travel ban reflected these divisions. Whereas Jorge Cortiñas, himself a Mexican gay man living in California, considered the decriminalisation of undocumented immigrant workers an integral part of anti-AIDS activism, Tomás Fábregas, a US resident from Spain and board member of SFAF, was more concerned about the viability of the activists' demands and their solidarity with one another. Nevertheless, he was aware that the issue of travelling could not be separated from that of immigration. As to the relationship between the activists and the US federal government, it became clear that despite their call for the opening of US borders, they were not interested in a radical alternative to the state. Instead, the activists called upon the state to decouple its welfare and security policies to do justice to the global character of migration and research.

Over the years, the San Francisco activists became more and more professional. The national coordination committee ACT NOW helped the San Francisco chapters synchronise local protests, dove-tail targets and procedures. By combining phone-zaps with rallies and seizures, they effectively disrupted the Immigration and Naturalization Service not just locally but nationally. At the same time, the dramatic, but non-violent nature of their protests assured them (inter-)national media attention. The same applied to the Immigration Working Group which maintained close ties to local, national, and international AIDS organisations, scholars, politicians, celebrities, and activists. The media campaign run by Tomás Fábregas in the context of the Eighth International AIDS Conference reveals that he, who was officially invited to the conference, by no means abandoned ACT UP's commitment to vociferous protest styles and street theatre. In this context, the International AIDS Conference not only served as an important platform on which activists met and exchanged their knowledge and experience, but also as an important international media stage.

All in all, this case study served to illuminate the idiosyncratic development of US anti-AIDS activism as a grassroots movement at the local, national, and international level. Even though its focus on San Francisco helped clarify the local activists' personal ties to and exchange with other local chapters, more re-

search will be needed to understand how ACT UP functioned as a national, and later, international network. To do so, it will be necessary to conduct a comparative analysis of different US-American and European ACT UP chapters regarding their internal structures and social make-ups, their protest strategies and aims, as well as the political and social conditions in which ACT UP's protests were embedded. Such a comparative study is all the more compelling as it would help to reassess the relationship between the multiple transformations and adaptions of 1980s and 1990s anti-AIDS activism and various profound developments at the global level, including the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the consolidation of the European Union, as well as the increasing number of refugees due to political, economic, and ecological crises. Against this backdrop, it would be possible to determine to what extent anti-AIDS activism was and still is a global movement.

This essay is a part of my Master's Thesis which is based on research at archives in the San Francisco Bay Area during my academic year abroad at the University of California at Santa Barbara. I would like to thank UCSB Professor Stephan Miescher and University of Bremen Professor Delia González de Reufels for their critical remarks and motivation which made this work possible. Apart from this, I would like to thank the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst (DAAD) for its one-year grant without which my stay at UCSB would not have been feasible.

Photo Courtesy of Diarmuid O'Hare

‘Positive Neutrality’: Revisiting Libyan Support of the Provisional IRA in the 1980s

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The Provisional IRA’s campaign against the British state in Northern Ireland (1969–1998) attracted a wide range of attention from the Third World, especially from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Under the leadership of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan government sent enormous supplies of weapons to the Provisional IRA in the middle of the 1980s. This article examines the events surrounding the Libyan government’s support of the Provisional IRA and assesses its long-term impact on both the republican movement and the conflict itself. The changing power dynamic within the republican movement and the consequent ascendance of Sinn Féin in the late 1980s and early 1990s proved vital to the burgeoning peace process that followed. The injection of Libyan weapons into Northern Ireland was a crucial part of those developments. By focusing on Libya’s role in this particular phase of the conflict, this article emphasises its transformational consequences and argues that the Libyan dimension must be considered integral in order to properly assess the critical changes that occurred in Northern Ireland in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Introduction

After the 1 September 1969 military coup in Libya, the newly-established Libyan Arab Jamahiriya saw itself as a vanguard—not just of the Arab world, but of the entire Third World. Its interventionist foreign policy—rare at the time for a post-colonial state—and its vehement anti-imperial character brought it into frequent conflict with the United States and the United Kingdom. After a major diplomatic fallout with the UK in the mid-1980s, the Libyan government began covertly sending aid to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), both in a show of solidarity for its armed struggle against Britain, but also in an attempt to destabilise the UK internally. This article will examine the origins and immediate causes of Libyan support for the Provisional IRA in the 1980s, and then will demonstrate that the injection of Libyan arms into Northern Ireland had several important consequences for the conflict and the subsequent peace process. The arms were used by politically-oriented republicans in the Sinn Féin leadership

to convince militant republicans to agree to abandon abstention from the Irish parliament Dáil Éireann, permitting republicans to pursue a political strategy in conjunction with the armed campaign. Unfortunately for the military wing, Libyan support ended abruptly after the British and Irish governments seized an enormous supply of Libyan arms from the *Eksund* in 1987, and it was discovered that Libyan-supplied weapons were used in the Enniskillen bombing—arguably the most significant and highly publicised atrocity of the entire conflict. Thus, at the same time as Sinn Féin was initiating its entrance into constitutional politics, the Provisional IRA's support network began to crumble, causing it to gradually cede its position of predominance within the republican movement. This was a pivotal outcome of the Libyan arms shipments which is largely neglected in the existing literature. Libyan support of the Provisional IRA in the 1980s—though brief—fundamentally changed the direction of the conflict because it facilitated Sinn Féin's entrance into constitutional politics in 1986, and then inadvertently brought the forces of state down upon the Provisional IRA after 1987, helping to accelerate the ascendance of Sinn Féin over the Provisional IRA within the republican movement by the early 1990s. This article will begin with a review of the established historiography of the Libya-Provisional IRA relationship in order to highlight the limitations of the previous scholarship. It will then detail the specific events surrounding Libyan involvement in Northern Ireland, before finally analysing the consequences of Libyan support for the republican movement internally and within Northern Ireland.

Historiography

The established historiography has a tendency to misrepresent the importance of the Libyan arms shipments and therefore fails to appreciate their long-term consequences. Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrick discuss the contents of the shipments in detail, as well as the consequent intensification of Provisional IRA violence in the years that immediately followed.[1] Additionally, they rightly observe that the horrors of the Enniskillen bombing dealt a devastating blow to the republican movement. But Mallie and McKittrick do not address that the use of the explosive Semtex imported from Libya facilitated the destruction caused at Enniskillen, thereby failing to establish the necessary link between Libyan weapons and the overwhelming emotional response that followed their deployment. Moreover, they do not discuss the events leading up to and including Sinn Féin's decision to drop abstention in 1986—a development crucial to the early stages of the peace process—and thereby overlook the use of Libyan arms as propaganda tools to convince militant republicans that the armed campaign would continue.

[1] Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrick, *Endgame in Northern Ireland* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2001), 61.

In his comprehensive study of the history of Sinn Féin, Brian Feeney provides a detailed discussion of the Libyan arms shipments, and also recognises the end of abstention in 1986 as a monumental shift within the republican movement. Unfortunately, he glances over the enormous efforts made by Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness to convince militant republicans to accept that policy change, curtly stating that "the northern leaders had placated IRA opponents,"[2] but providing no insight into what that process entailed. By omitting any discussion of Adams' and McGuinness' skilful use of Libyan weapons to that end, Feeney fails to appreciate that the end of abstention required a bargain-like arrangement—the Provisional IRA only permitted the change in policy because it was assured that its armed campaign would continue.

Similarly, Tim Pat Coogan acknowledges that Libyan arms helped to intensify Provisional IRA violence, but he also misses the important role they played in the transformation of the internal dynamics of the republican movement. When discussing the end of abstention in 1986, he says only that "Sinn Féin leaders successfully initiated and carried through a process of dialogue within the movement, which…resulted in their taking control of Sinn Féin, even to the extent of dropping the abstention policy, without any bloodshed."[3] Moreover, Coogan rightly considers the *Eksund* seizure and the Enniskillen bombing significant events which jointly affected the direction of the conflict from 1987 onwards, but he does not establish the necessary link between them. It was not a coincidence that both events occurred within weeks of one another; the horrifying new capabilities of the Provisional IRA displayed at Enniskillen were possible precisely *because* it now had access to highly-advanced, Libyan-supplied weaponry. Failing to acknowledge that the Enniskillen bombing and the *Eksund* seizure were inextricably linked fails to appreciate the entirety of the international dimension, especially the developments borne out of those events.

Indeed, Richard English links Libyan arms to the end of abstention, stating that "armed with Gaddafi's guns…[the Sinn Féin leadership] could confidently proclaim that the war would continue, with electoralism complementing rather than eclipsing physical-force republicanism."[4] Upon closer examination, however, English's observation misrepresents the internal composition of the republican movement in this period, and therefore misses the crucial internal changes that resulted from the Libyan arms shipments. "With the arms dumps full of weapons," he continues, "who could charge that the republican movement was moving away from the armed struggle?"[5] In other words, the knowledge of Libyan arms was sufficient enough to keep the militants from questioning the political leadership and allowed Sinn Féin to advance its agenda without hindrance. It implies that

[2] Brian Feeney, *Sinn Féin: A Hundred Turbulent Years* (Dublin: The O'Brien Press, 2002), 331.
[3] Tim Pat Coogan, *The Troubles* (London: Hutchinson, 1995), 330.
[4] Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (London: Macmillan, 2003), 250.
[5] Ibid.

the job of Adams and McGuinness was only to *placate* their counterparts, rather than to actively *persuade* them. But if the task before the Sinn Féin leadership was simply to quiet the military wing, it minimises the position of the Provisional IRA within the republican movement at the time. In fact, the Provisional IRA was still predominant in the mid-1980s, and it effectively had the power to accept or reject policy proposals originating in Sinn Féin. The Libyan arms, then, were not convenient devices used by Sinn Féin to quiet the military wing, but propaganda tools used to propel the party's political strategy and place it on a near-equal footing with the armed campaign, while simultaneously convincing—however disingenuously—the Provisional IRA that the move did not signify a change in the balance of power.

Jonathan Tonge details the Libyan arms shipments extensively, but he only considers their consequences from a military perspective. He correctly observes that the arms gave the Provisional IRA a brief capacity to inflict devastating damage, and that the seizure of the *Eksund* "decimated the capacity of the IRA."[6] Unsurprisingly, then, he calls the arms shipments an "overall failure"[7] because ultimately the Provisional IRA was unable to launch a renewed campaign and force a complete British withdrawal. True, from the military's standpoint, characterising the arms shipments as a failure carries weight. But it does not appreciate the diversity of use of the arms, especially their political function. Although it is inaccurate to say that politically-oriented republicans were opposed to the escalation of violence, it is certainly true that they were primarily interested in using Libyan arms to achieve specific political objectives. Thus, it is necessary to avoid the binary 'success/failure' paradigm if one is to appreciate that, from the beginning, the arms served different purposes for different factions, and although the military wing probably considered them an overall failure, the political wing likely perceived them somewhat of a success.

The established historiography of the Provisional IRA must be broadened and placed in an appropriate international context in order to recognise that the consequences of Libyan support in the 1980s far outlasted the end of Libya's direct involvement in 1987. It should be noted that Ed Moloney and Brendan O'Brien have each discussed the Libyan arms shipments in the richness and detail that they warrant, but they too stop short of reaching the ultimate conclusion that the direct and indirect consequences of Libyan involvement in Northern Ireland were critical factors in shifting the balance of power within the republican movement. Sinn Féin—already interested in entering constitutional politics by this time—used Libyan weapons to convince militant republicans to consent to the abandonment of abstention and allow elected Sinn Féin representatives to enter Dáil Éireann. It was a major development that signalled that the republican movement was adopt-

[6] Jonathan Tonge, *Northern Ireland* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 55.
[7] Ibid.

ing a more political approach to its broader campaign—a change that necessarily resulted in the aggrandisement of Sinn Féin within the movement. The overwhelmingly negative public reaction to the Enniskillen bombing, as well as the Irish and British security crackdown on the Provisional IRA after the discovery of the *Eksund* cargo, demonstrates that one of the important indirect consequences of Libyan intervention was that it ultimately helped to stifle and reverse much of the operational improvement the Provisional IRA had made in the mid-to-late 1980s. The use of Libyan arms affected both wings of the republican movement differently and, therefore, a proper re-examination of Libyan involvement is necessary in order to understand its full impact on the conflict in Northern Ireland. The existing scholarship typically exhibits one of the following three shortcomings: 1) it practically ignores the role of Libyan arms, thus divorcing the conflict from its international dimension; 2) it grossly undervalues the role of the arms which fails to appreciate the international dimension in its entirety; or 3) it assigns proper value to its short-term effects but fails to recognise its long-term *transformational* consequences. This article challenges the established historiography and demonstrates that the arrival of Libyan weapons into Northern Ireland shifted the balance of power within the republican movement which, itself, helped create the conditions necessary for peace in the early 1990s.

Libyan Involvement in Northern Ireland

Popular dissatisfaction with Libya's pro-Western regime mounted until 1969, when a cohort of junior military officers ousted King Idris I and his government in a bloodless coup on 1 September. The officers established the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to undertake governmental administration, and placed a twenty-seven-year-old colonel—Muammar Gaddafi—at its head. Weeks after the coup, an RCC member specified the officers' motivations and identified their opponents: "the Libyan people…considered the pre-revolutionary *status quo* as corrupt, reactionary, backward, [and] practically at the beck and call of the foreign British and American forces."[8] The new leaders had twin objectives; they sought to undo and remove the foreign influence of Western powers from Libya as well as to revive a sense of Arab national consciousness.[9] Libya's relations with the West never recovered after the military's seizure of power in 1969, especially as the state cultivated a closer relationship with the Soviet Union than it did with the United States or the United Kingdom. Within days of the coup, the Soviet Union offered diplomatic recognition to the new regime and started sending it rounds of

[8] "The Libyan Revolution in the Words of its Leaders," *Middle East Journal* 24, no. 2 (Spring 1970): 205.
[9] John Wright, *Libya: A Modern History* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 134.

economic and military aid.[10] British and American policymakers concluded that its socialist leanings, its anti-colonial character, and its close relations with the Soviet Union were evidence that it was moving into the Soviet sphere, and relations between Libya and the West sunk to a low-point in the 1970s.[11] They worsened considerably after the ascent of Conservative Margaret Thatcher as British Prime Minister in 1979 and the election of Republican Ronald Reagan as US President in 1980. Reagan—backed by Thatcher—increased pressure on Libya substantially, all while accusing the government of being a Soviet puppet regime and advocating leadership change.[12]

Libya's relationship with the UK crumbled further in the middle of the decade. On 17 April 1984, an operative working for the Libyan People's Bureau in London (the Libyan Embassy) shot and killed Police Constable Yvonne Fletcher.[13] Libya claimed that the shots were intended for anti-government protestors demonstrating outside, but London was not convinced, and it responded five days later by expelling every Libyan diplomat from the country.[14] Gaddafi reacted to the British expulsion by similarly ordering the expulsion of British diplomats from Libya, sparking a major diplomatic standoff between the two states.[15] In the midst of the crisis, a speaker on the "Voice of the Arab Homeland"—a prominent Arab nationalist radio service based in Cairo—openly flirted with the idea of supporting the Provisional IRA in response to the events in April:

> The People's committees [the collection of local governing bodies in Libya] will form an alliance with the secret IRA in view of the fact that it champions the cause of liberating Ireland and liberating the Irish nation from the tyranny of British colonialism…if Britain tries to use any means to pressurise and oppress Libyan Arabs

[10] Ronald Bruce St. John, "The Soviet Penetration of Libya," *The World Today* 38, no. 4 (April 1982): 133.

[11] For an overview of Libya's position in a global Cold War context, see: *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II: Crises and Détente*, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[12] Ronald Bruce St. John, "Terrorism and Libyan Foreign Policy, 1981–1986," *The World Today* 42, no. 7 (July 1986): 113.

[13] Alan Hamilton, Stewart Tendler and John Witherow, "London Embassy Shots Kill Policewoman," *The Times*, April 18, 1984, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1984-04-18/1/3.html?region=global#start%3D1981-01-01%26end%3D1985-01-01%26terms%3DYvonne%20Fletcher%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/Yvonne+Fletcher/w:1981-01-01%7E1985-01-01/1%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/Yvonne+Fletcher/w:1981-01-01%7E1985-01-01/2.

[14] Henry Stanhope, "Libyans Given Week to Leave Britain," *The Times*, April 23, 1984, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1984-04-23/1/2.html?region=global#start%3D1984-04-17%26end%3D1984-12-31%26terms%3DLibya%26back%3D/tto/archive/find/Libya/w:1984-04-17%7E1984-12-31/o:date/3%26prev%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/Libya/w:1984-04-17%7E1984-12-31/o:date/22%26next%3D/tto/archive/frame/goto/Libya/w:1984-04-17%7E1984-12-31/o:date/24.

[15] "1984: Libyan Embassy Siege Ends," *BCC News,* April 27, 1984, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/27/newsid_2502000/2502565.stm.

> the revolutionary committees will enable the IRA to do whatever it wishes in Britain and to retaliate twice as strongly.[16]

Anglo-Libyan relations continued to worsen until 15 April 1986 when—in response to the killing of two American soldiers in West Berlin—Reagan "launched a series of strikes against the headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military assets that support Muammar Gaddafi's subversive activities" in Libya.[17] Thatcher offered her full support to the United States, permitting American F-111 jets carrying out the bombing to use airfields in Upper Heyford, Oxfordshire for the operation.[18] The bombers ravaged select targets in Benghazi and Tripoli. In the capital, Gaddafi watched his palace crumble under the weight of American missiles and, although he managed to escape with his life, his fifteen-month-old daughter Hana and fifteen other civilians were killed.[19]

The bombing was roundly condemned as a blatant act of aggression. In November, the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 38/41 which explicitly "[condemned] the military attack perpetrated against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 15 April 1986, which constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law," and implicitly condemned the United Kingdom's involvement by "[calling] upon all States to refrain from extending any assistance or facilities for perpetrating acts of aggression against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya."[20] Thatcher justified her country's support by accusing Libya of shipping arms to the Provisional IRA, citing a discovery by the Irish police force Garda Síochána the previous January of a huge cache of Provisional IRA weapons in counties Sligo and Roscommon stored in boxes mysteriously labelled "Libyan Armed Forces."[21] Despite her defence, Northern republicans were unequivocal in their denunciation. Gerry Adams—President of Sinn Féin—called Reagan a "maniacal warmonger" and accused the United States of committing "an act of international terrorism."[22] Danny Morrison—a prominent figure in the

[16] *Voice of the Arab Homeland*, Tripoli, Libya, April 22, 1984, quoted in: Brendan O'Brien, *The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Féin, 1985 to Today* (Dublin: The O'Brien Press, 1993), 138.
[17] Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on the U.S. Air Strike Against Libya" (1986), in *Speaking My Mind: Selected Speeches* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 286.
[18] Tony Geraghty, *The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict between the IRA and British Intelligence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 181.
[19] Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974–2008* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), 224.
[20] General Assembly resolution 41/38, *Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the aerial and naval military attack against the Socialist People's Libya Arab Jamahiriya by the present United States Administration in April 1986*, A/RES/41/38 (20 November 1986), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r038.htm.
[21] Fergus Pyle, "Thatcher firm on support of US despite criticism," *The Irish Times*, April 16, 1986, https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1986/0416/Pg006.html#Ar00611:37FA8A3AEA9D3959783B498B.
[22] Jim Cusack, "SDLP, DUP and Sinn Féin critical," *The Irish Times,* April 16, 1986, https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1986/0416/Pg006.html#Ar00611:37FA8A3AEA9

Provisional IRA—added that "the Libyan people…the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the IRA are not the terrorists. The real terrorists are the governments of Britain and the United States."[23] In addition to Gaddafi's identification with the Provisional IRA's struggle for national liberation, the deterioration of diplomatic relations with the UK after 1984 convinced him of the need to send arms to Northern Ireland in order to destabilise the region and force the British government to direct its focus and its resources to its internal problems. The 1986 bombing of Libya further served to validate that decision.

According to O'Brien's research, Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) sources indicate that the first contacts made between the Provisional IRA and Libya that decade occurred as early as 1981,[24] in the midst of the republican hunger strikes in the Maze Prison—by which, it should be noted, Gaddafi is said to have been deeply impressed.[25] One of the core tenets of Gaddafi's brand of Arab nationalism was the concept of *jihad*—a fundamental responsibility in the Islamic tradition. It roughly translates into English as "struggle" and is broadly defined as the duty of all Muslims to preserve and defend their faith and belief in God against unbelievers.[26] Gaddafi broadened its application considerably, believing that, not only should it be employed within Libya and the Middle East against their internal enemies, but throughout the world in support of anti-imperialist national liberation struggles against the traditional great powers. In an interview with *al-Abram* shortly after the 1 September coup, Gaddafi specified that "the foreign policy of my country in the revolutionary era is, in brief, positive neutrality, non-alignment, and support for all liberation causes and for freedom in the whole world."[27] The Provisional IRA's armed struggle against Britain overlapped with Gaddafi's extreme Third World anti-imperialism in several fundamental ways. Both the Provisional IRA and the RCC aimed to (re-)establish a sense of nationhood—inter alia based in a sense of religious identity—and which was at least partly influenced by socialist strains of thought.[28] Crucially, they both identified the UK as an aggressor and therefore as a primary target of their campaigns. These overlaps provided the outlet through which Gaddafi could apply his broad definition of *jihad* to Northern Ireland when relations with the UK broke down completely in the mid-1980s.[29]

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[23] Geraghty, *The Irish War,* 182.

[24] O'Brien, *The Long War*, 138.

[25] Ibid.

[26] For an analysis of the traditional meaning of *jihad* and its modern political applications, see: Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 41–66.

[27] "The Libyan Revolution in the Words of its Leaders," 212.

[28] Ronald Bruce St. John, "The Ideology of Muammar al-Qadhdhafi: Theory and Practice," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 15, no. 4 (November 1983): 477–8.

[29] For a discussion of the ideological factors that motivated Libyan support of global terrorist organisations including the Provisional IRA, see: Ronald Bruce St. John, "Terrorism and Libyan Foreign Policy, 1981-1986," 111–5.

Negotiations between the two sides took time to materialise, but by 1984 the Libyan government had agreed to covertly funnel enormous supplies of weapons into Northern Ireland. It agreed to send approximately 240 tonnes of weapons—a supply that included surface-to-air missiles (SAM), rocket-propelled grenades, heavy-duty machine guns, Semtex explosives, 2,000 AK-47 rifles, and about 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition.[30] The Provisional IRA commissioned a county Wexford man, Adrian Hopkins, to shuttle the weapons. Hopkins had no known republican links, but he had extensive shipping experience, owing to the few years he spent as the owner of a small holiday boating company, Bray Travel, before it went bankrupt in 1980.[31] Hopkins was an ideal candidate because he owned a swathe of private property on the south-eastern coast of Ireland and, more importantly, he still owned a seventy-foot fishing boat christened *Casmara*—later changed to *Kula*. On transport missions, Hopkins sailed with a small contingent of Provisional IRA volunteers to Malta. There they met Libyan representatives chosen by their government to transfer the arms. The weapons were swiftly moved into the boat and hidden before Hopkins reversed the boat's course and returned to Ireland.

The first shipment arrived in Wexford in August 1985, carrying a cargo that included seventy AK-47 rifles, several Taurus pistols, and seven RPG rockets.[32] The next shipment—which arrived in October of that year—carried "100 AK-47s, ten machine guns and seventy boxes of ammunition."[33] The third shipment was undoubtedly the largest and it was the prize that republicans had longed for; the first instalment contained fourteen tonnes of weapons and ammunition—including four SAMs—and was accompanied by a second instalment two months later that contained eighty tonnes total, including one tonne of Semtex explosive and another supply of SAMs.[34] Upon arriving in Wexford, the arms were moved to various dump spots located throughout the Republic, and then stored in purpose-built bunkers in counties Limerick, Longford, Galway, and several other places.[35] The Provisional IRA successfully smuggled the first three shipments through its makeshift Wexford port, but the fourth shipment—which contained about twice the materiel of the first three combined—was intercepted on 30 October 1987 by French customs authorities in the Mediterranean. Although there were initial doubts that the arms were indeed destined for Northern Ireland, all of the passengers on board the *Eksund*—the vessel which transported the fourth arms shipment—were later found to be Irish citizens, and three of them possessed "passports

[30] Ronald Bruce St. John, "Terrorism and Libyan Foreign Policy, 1981–1986," 129.
[31] "Captain is Bray Travel Founder," *The Irish Times,* November 2, 1986, https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1987/1102/Pg011.html#Ar01105.
[32] Peter Taylor, *Behind the Mask: The IRA and Sinn Féin* (New York: TV Books, 1997), 323.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Geraghty, *The Irish War,* 182.
[35] O'Brien, *The Long War,* 131.

linked to the IRA."[36] The entire sequence changed the direction of the conflict. The arms provided the Provisional IRA with a powerful new set of weapons with which to unleash a devastating wave of violence on the public, but also provided politically-oriented republicans with a useful tool to change long-standing policy. The interception of the *Eksund* forced Britain and Ireland to change their approach to the conflict, precipitating a major enhancement of their security strategies.

Consequences

The Republican Movement

The arms imports occurred at a particularly important moment in the history of Sinn Féin. The party belongs to the modern Irish nationalist tradition which itself dates its origins to the middle of the nineteenth century. Irish nationalism composed of two main strands which fundamentally differed on the legitimacy of the use of violence. Constitutional nationalists believed in using the established governmental institutions to achieve their objectives by nonviolent means, while republicans rejected political institutions entirely, and sought instead to realise their aspirations through armed insurrection. Although armed uprisings were frequent occurrences for much of the nineteenth century, constitutional nationalism reigned as the dominant form of Irish nationalism until the Easter Rising in 1916. The strength of Irish nationalism shifted back to the constitutionalists after the end of the War of Independence and the establishment of the Free State and Northern Ireland in 1922, but nonetheless, republicans continued to hold on to the belief in an 'unfinished revolution.' Throughout the middle of the twentieth century, the IRA waged multiple, small-scale insurrections in a series of doomed attempts to unite Northern Ireland with the Free State/Republic. Those successive failures, however, ultimately forced it to choose a decidedly more non-violent, constitutional route in the early 1960s. The outbreak of open violence between Northern Ireland's Protestant and Catholic communities in 1969 factionalised the IRA and facilitated the establishment of the younger, traditionalist, and more militant Provisional IRA. The emergence of the Provisional IRA abruptly shifted nationalist politics away from constitutional social reform and back towards militant republicanism.

Between 1926 and 1981, Sinn Féin was little more than a support organisation for the (Provisional) IRA, providing public representation but being subject to the dictates of the IRA Army Council.[37] Sinn Féin's status changed dramatically after 1981, when republican prisoners in the Maze Prison went on hunger strike to agitate for the return of political status. Ten hunger strikers starved themselves to death in a highly publicised showdown with Margaret Thatcher, causing an uproar

[36] "Passports Linked to IRA," *The Irish Times,* November 3, 1987, https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1987/1103/Pg011.html#Ar01106.
[37] Feeney, *Sinn Féin: A Hundred Turbulent Years*, 272.

in Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic, and throughout the world. As mentioned, the hunger strikers' stand against Thatcher left an impression on Muammar Gaddafi, compelling him to open contacts with the Provisional IRA that year.[38] More importantly for the internal politics of Northern Ireland, the hunger strikes generated a surge of energy and sympathy for republicanism, and Sinn Féin tested its renewed popularity by contesting the Fermanagh and South Tyrone by-election caused by the death of Frank Maguire MP in the early days of the hunger strike. Bobby Sands—the lead hunger striker—stood for and won the election by a margin of 30,492 to 29,046, sending shockwaves through the British, Irish, and Northern Ireland political establishments.[39] Unfortunately for republicans, Sands' victory was not enough to convince Thatcher to concede the prisoners' demands, and he eventually succumbed to starvation in May 1981. His death sparked riots and unrest across Northern Ireland and—in addition to the deaths of the nine other hunger strikers—led directly to a boost in support for the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin. Republicans saw their electoral support increase substantially—thirty-six republicans were elected councillors in 1981, two Sinn Féin candidates won seats in Dáil Éireann that same year, and five Sinn Féin candidates won seats in the 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly elections.[40]

Reacting to the impressive performance of republican candidates in 1981, Danny Morrison asked his now-famous question at Sinn Féin's 1981 annual conference in November: "will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in the other, we take power in Ireland?"[41] The question posited a new strategy for the republican movement: the Provisional IRA would continue to wage its armed struggle against the security forces, but simultaneously, Sinn Féin would pressurise the British government constitutionally by contesting elections. Moreover, it revealed a broader shift occurring within the republican movement at the time; republicans were increasingly moving away from strict adherence to the armed struggle and towards a greater emphasis on constitutional politics. In the five years between 1981 and 1986, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness mounted an internal campaign to entice the Provisional IRA leadership and the rank-and-file to approve the end of abstention from Dáil Éireann.[42] Abstention was central to the republican strategy and had been a core principle since the founding of Sinn Féin in 1905, so those republicans who favoured its abandonment understood the near insurmountability of the challenge they faced. Adams

[38] O'Brien, *The Long War,* 138.
[39] Ibid., 290.
[40] Ibid., 301.
[41] John A. Hannigan, "The Armalite and the Ballot Box: Dilemmas of Strategy and Ideology in the Provisional IRA," *Social Problems* 33, no. 1 (October 1985): 34.
[42] In traditional republican doctrine, the 1921 Treaty that ended the war of independence was unacceptable because it did not confer full independence on the Irish nation. Therefore, traditionalist republicans recognise *neither* the Northern Ireland Parliament/Assembly *nor* the Republic of Ireland's Dáil Éireann as legitimate institutions, and have traditionally refused to participate in both.

and McGuinness knew that the only way to convince militant republicans to agree to abandon abstention was to guarantee them that the armed campaign would continue unaffected.[43] They used the Libyan arms shipments in 1985–6 to that end.[44]

The importation of huge supplies of weapons from Libya indicated to volunteers that, despite the move towards political participation, the republican leadership was continuing to plan and arm for the struggle. Indeed, the sheer sophistication of the Libyan weapons provided the Provisional IRA with previously unmatched capabilities, and that fact convinced militant republicans that the leadership would not squander a new opportunity to win militarily. It was physical proof of the most convincing type that the armed campaign would not go the way of abstention, and it helped compel volunteers to trust the leadership and to support the monumental change in policy. The piece of tactical propaganda that the Libyan arms provided Adams and McGuinness helped them tip the scale in their favour, and at Sinn Féin's 1986 annual conference, delegates voted in favour of a resolution calling for the end of abstention from Dáil Éireann. The so-called 'ballot box and Armalite strategy' partly freed Sinn Féin from the constraints of the militant wing, allowing it to develop a viable political strategy inextricably linked to, but fundamentally distinct from the armed struggle. It was a major change within the republican movement; it legitimised Sinn Féin's political vision and at least implicitly legitimised its plan for a political solution. It gave both nationalists in Northern Ireland—who might have been sympathetic to republican objectives but opposed to the Provisional IRA's tactics—and republicans already involved in the movement—who might have been funnelled into the military wing simply because of its power and influence—a new political vehicle through which to direct their energies and resources. The change conferred legitimacy and authority on Sinn Féin, empowering it within the republican movement—and within Northern Ireland society more broadly—and helping to set the foundation for later moves towards peace.

The arms shipments were ironically used as tools by politically-oriented republicans to change decades of republican strategy with minimal internal disruption, but their primary purpose, of course, was for use by the Provisional IRA. By the early 1980s, the armed campaign had nearly ground to a halt.[45] London's policy of 'Ulsterisation' had effectively localised the conflict and removed British-born soldiers from the line of fire, severely reducing the Provisional IRA's capacity to inflict maximum emotional distress on the British public. Indeed, republican violence itself declined steadily from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, and 1984 saw the fewest killings than in any other year of the conflict to that point.[46] The

[43] Feeney, *Sinn Féin: A Hundred Turbulent Years*, 326.
[44] David Sharrock and Mark Devenport, *Man of War, Man of Peace: The Unauthorised Biography of Gerry Adams* (London: Macmillan, 1997), 244.
[45] Feeney, *Sinn Féin: A Hundred Turbulent Years*, 326.
[46] Feeney, *Sinn Féin: A Hundred Turbulent Years*, 326.

republican leadership recognised that the armed campaign was dulling. After the 1981 hunger strikes rejuvenated the movement, the leadership started planning for a major escalation of violence. In what was affectionately called the 'Tet offensive'—itself a show of solidarity with the Vietnamese national struggle—the Provisional IRA planned to unleash a barrage of violent attacks against the British presence in Northern Ireland in order to create a massive 'no-go' area and force a British withdrawal by the end of the decade.[47] Libyan arms were vital to the successful implementation of the 'Tet offensive.' The arms, it was hoped, would dramatically enhance the Provisional IRA's military capabilities and give it the capacity to inflict damage on British Army and RUC installations, personnel, and vehicles to an unprecedented degree. That would in turn overwhelm both state forces and loyalist paramilitaries and force a political settlement in the republicans' favour.

Despite the loss of the *Eksund*, republican violence in Northern Ireland increased sharply after the arrival of Libyan arms. The RUC reported that there was "a 50 percent increase in deaths caused by terrorist activity" in 1987, primarily committed by the Provisional IRA.[48] Libyan arms played a prominent role in that sharp escalation of violence. In 1990, *The Irish Times* reported that weapons imported from Libya—particularly Semtex—had been involved in "most" of the "230 [conflict-related deaths] in the North since the arrival of the first shipment of arms from Libya."[49] Semtex was one of the most destructive weapons with which Libya supplied the Provisional IRA during the period. It is a highly explosive plastic substance which, importantly for insurgents, is odourless and extremely difficult to detect.[50] It was produced in the Soviet-aligned Czechoslovakia during much of the Cold War, and after the military coup in Libya in 1969, it was exported in enormous quantities to Gaddafi's government. Indeed, traces of Semtex were discovered in the debris of numerous Provisional IRA bombings in the late 1980s, and it was later discovered in the rubble of one of the most publicised, dramatic, and significant killings of the entire conflict—the Enniskillen bombing.[51]

The bombing occurred on 8 November 1987. As throngs of people—mostly Protestants—gathered near the cenotaph in Enniskillen, county Fermanagh for the annual Remembrance Day commemorations, a bomb planted by the Provisional IRA detonated nearby, killing twelve people and wounding a further sixty-three. Without the use of Semtex from Libya, it is unlikely that the attack would have

[47] Tonge, *Northern Ireland*, 55.
[48] Arwel Ellis Owen, *The Anglo-Irish Agreement: The First Three Years* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1994), 170.
[49] "Libyan Weapons Transformed the IRA campaign," *The Irish Times*, July 28, 1990, https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1990/0728/Pg002.html#Ar00200.
[50] "Semtex," in *Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History*, eds. Jeffrey A. Larsen, Eric A. Croddy and James J. Wirtz, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO, 2005), 256.
[51] "The 38-Year Connection between Irish Republicans and Gaddafi," *BBC News,* February 23, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-12539372.

caused as much death and damage as it did. It was one of the most destructive single attacks of the entire conflict to that point—ostensibly a victory for the Provisional IRA—but the international response was so critical that it forced the Provisional IRA leadership to issue a statement expressing remorse for the killings, and admitting that its intended targets were the security forces scheduled to parade later in the day.[52] Nonetheless, the international condemnation was fierce and total. Even those who were generally sympathetic to the republican movement (i.e. Irish Americans) denounced the bombing. The backlash was so harsh and so damaging to republican objectives that Gerry Adams publicly warned Sinn Féin to "be careful" and expressed privately that another attack of that nature could "undermine the validity of the armed struggle."[53] Additionally, the barbarity of the bombing seemed to motivate those individuals who were interested in bringing a peaceful resolution to the conflict to increase and coordinate their efforts. Months after the bombing, Gerry Adams began meeting secretly with John Hume—longtime leader of the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party—in order to begin formulating a pan-nationalist plan for peace. In addition to the incorporation of the Irish government, the creation of a pan-nationalist front later proved vital to uplifting Sinn Féin to the political mainstream and isolating the militant republicans.

External Reactions

When the British and Irish governments first suspected that Adrian Hopkins' boats were engaged in illegal activity, they suspected only illicit drug smuggling. The arms smugglers had slipped past the British and Irish intelligence apparatuses virtually undetected, so, when the *Eksund* was intercepted in October 1987 and the contents of its cargo revealed, the Irish and British governments were jubilant. The FBI had recently sealed off an arms supply route from Irish America, and it appeared that Dublin and London had closed another one, levelling a serious blow to the Provisional IRA's paramilitary capabilities.[54] Their brief triumph was crushed, however, after they discovered that the *Eksund* delivery was the fourth arms shipment from Libya, and that republicans had already successfully smuggled three previous shipments into Ireland which, combined, contained about twice the materiel that the fourth shipment did. The revelation was a major intelligence failure that was deeply embarrassing to both governments and threatened to harm the credibility of their security structures.[55] The intelligence failure alone was enough to cause them to enhance security measures, but more urgently, the realisation that a massive quantity of highly sophisticated military-grade weaponry was stored

[52] Taylor, *Behind the Mask,* 324.
[53] Ibid., 353.
[54] Ibid., 323.
[55] O'Brien, *The Long War,* 137.

somewhere in Ireland forced both governments to change their tactics and employ a more concentrated effort to defeat the Provisional IRA.

At a special meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference[56] shortly after the capture of the *Eksund*, the two governments planned and agreed to implement Operation Mallard. The Irish government agreed to "[commit] 7,500 Garda and Irish army troops to co-operate with the RUC and British army troops" to conduct a major security sweep in both the Republic and Northern Ireland.[57] Publicly, it appeared that Operation Mallard was a response to the carnage inflicted by republicans in the Enniskillen bombing in November, and although Enniskillen was certainly a factor, the primary reason for the security sweep was the governments' need to seize the hidden stores of Libyan arms.[58] The operation initiated a debilitating crackdown on republicans. In a 23 November press conference, Irish Minister for Justice Gerry Collins called it "the most comprehensive search operation ever mounted by the security forces of this state."[59] Forty people were immediately arrested in the North—including Martin McGuinness—and four bunkers were discovered in counties Galway, Wicklow and Cork.[60] Additionally, the Garda reported that it had confiscated huge stores of weapons in counties Sligo and Roscommon, and later seized over one hundred rifles in county Donegal.[61] The RUC disclosed that it had seized "247 weapons, 18,000 rounds of ammunition and 13,000 lb of explosives."[62] Neither the British nor the Irish governments ever captured the entirety of the Libyan arms supply, but Operation Mallard was a major victory for state forces and a punishing blow to the republican armed campaign. It removed much of the Provisional IRA's newfound capacity to inflict unprecedented damage, but also kept it under close watch for the remainder of the conflict, eliminating its ability to wage the armed struggle to the degree that republicans had envisioned when the Libyan arms first arrived.

In addition to Operation Mallard, the revelation of Libyan arms smuggling helped force another major change in the Republic's Northern strategy. For most of the twentieth century, the southern Irish state had frequently been accused of

[56] The Intergovernmental Conference was established by the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in order to coordinate Northern policy between Britain and Ireland. It was later disestablished by the Good Friday Agreement (1998), but it was an important development in the peace process because it officially incorporated the 'Irish dimension' for the first time and facilitated unprecedented cooperation between London and Dublin in regards to Northern Ireland. For an assessment of the impact of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, see Arthur Aughey, and Cathy Gormley-Heenan, "The Anglo-Irish Agreement: 25 Years On," *The Political Quarterly* 82, no. 3 (July 2011): 389–97.

[57] Owen, *The Anglo-Irish Agreement,* 165.

[58] Ibid.

[59] "Arms Landings Threaten State, Says Collins," *The Irish Times*, November 24, 1987, https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1987/1124/Pg004.html#Ar00406.

[60] Owen, *The Anglo-Irish Agreement,* 169.

[61] "Libyan Weapons Transformed the IRA Campaign," *The Irish Times*, July 28, 1990, https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1990/0728/Pg002.html#Ar00200.

[62] Owen, *The Anglo-Irish Agreement,* 169.

acting as a safe haven for the IRA, much to the annoyance of Irish officials. The discovery seemed to confirm decades of accusations and helped to convince officials in the Republic of the need to strengthen the Extradition Act—an older security measure which allowed the Dublin government to extradite suspected IRA volunteers to the United Kingdom in order to stand trial there.[63] In a speech to Dáil Éireann on 1 December 1987, Minister for Foreign Affairs Brian Lenihan justified his support of the Extradition (Amendment) Bill by warning that "the capture of the *Eksund* and its cargo shows the extent of the danger and the conspiracy we are all faced with."[64] Numerous other TDs (Teachtaí Dála, members of the Dáil) specified the capture of the *Eksund* as one of the primary reasons for their support of the amendment. Furthermore, several TDs also cited the Enniskillen bombing as a reason for their support, expressing open disgust at the Provisional IRA's apparent disregard for innocent human life. Collectively, it was the fear of Libyan support of the Provisional IRA, the appreciation of the damage that this support could cause, and the realisation that republicans had in their possession highly-advanced modern weaponry that motivated Irish politicians to strengthen the Extradition Act. The amendment ultimately passed Dáil Éireann on 1 December with seventy-eight votes in favour, twenty-six votes against, and sixty-two abstentions.[65] The new legislation streamlined the extradition process, making it substantially easier for Dublin to move suspected terrorists to the United Kingdom, and ultimately broke the back of the Provisional IRA's vital support network in the Republic.

The British government responded to the discovery of Semtex in the wreckage of the Enniskillen bombing by intensifying its pressure on the Libyan government. But Gaddafi was unwilling to suffer diplomatic consequences on the global stage in order to stand behind the Provisional IRA. Additionally, Libyan officials expressed disgust at the Provisional IRA's use of Libyan weapons to kill civilians indiscriminately and, shortly after the events of 1987, it decided to cut off all aid to the organisation.[66] The consequence was, ironically, the outcome that the British and Irish governments had thought they had achieved with the capture of the *Eksund* in October—the closure of the Provisional IRA's last international arms supply route. The end of Libyan support, the Irish and British security crackdowns, and the international reaction to the Enniskillen bombing all combined to deal a devastating blow to the Provisional IRA's campaign. Ultimately, the 'Tet offensive' was brief and proved counterproductive, and the immense pressure placed on the Provisional IRA by the late 1980s severely restricted its paramilitary

[63] Denis Coghlan, "Government Gives Go-Ahead to Extradition Act," *The Irish Times,* November 14, 1987, https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1987/1114/Pg001.html#Ar00100.
[64] "Extradition (Amendment) Bill, 1987: Second Stage (Resumed)," *Dáil* Éireann *Debate* 376, no. 1 (December 1 1987): 5, http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail1987120100005?opendocument.
[65] Owen, *The Anglo-Irish Agreement,* 167.
[66] Geraghty, *The Irish War,* 184.

capabilities and therefore its power within the republican movement just as Sinn Féin was emerging as a viable political force. Those changing fortunes effectively transferred the strength of the republican movement away from the armed faction and towards the political wing.

Conclusion

Even before the arrival of Libyan arms, the 1980s were an important transitional period for the republican movement. Sinn Féin in particular evolved from an IRA support group into a highly-organised political party in a relatively short period of time. Despite Sinn Féin's rise, however, the Provisional IRA had not conceded its position of predominance within the republican movement, and at no point in the 1980s was it secondary to Sinn Féin. But the importation of Libyan weapons proved to be a transformational experience for the republican movement and, ultimately, the conflict in Northern Ireland itself. Politically-oriented republicans used the Libyan weapons as a tool to persuade their counterparts to abandon one of the core principles of Irish republicanism—a crucial development for the movement that signalled a shift away from the armed struggle and towards a political strategy. It was a key development that the previous literature on the conflict tends to miss. Neither Mallie and McKittrick, Feeney, Coogan, nor Tonge acknowledge this crucial role played by the Libyan arms, without which Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness could not have avoided a debilitating republican split in 1986—had they even proceeded with the policy change at all. Despite the end of abstention, the armed struggle retained its importance and the Provisional IRA continued to wage its campaign against the British state. But the seizure of the *Eksund* cargo in October 1987, the bombing of Enniskillen a month later, and the collective reactions to both of those events were major turning points for the Provisional IRA. Libya completely abandoned it, cutting off its last international weapons supply route; and the Irish and British governments cracked down, seizing much of its arsenal and restraining its support network in the Republic. The consequences of those reactions severely damaged the Provisional IRA's ability to wage an effective guerrilla campaign, and by the early 1990s—less than a decade after it was at its operational height—it found itself losing the reins of the republican movement to Sinn Féin.

Simultaneously, the destruction caused by the Enniskillen bombing in particular prompted a renewed push for peace, helping to initiate the beginning of the secret meetings between Gerry Adams and John Hume. The existing literature tends to overlook the use of Libyan-supplied Semtex in the Enniskillen bombing. Without it, it is unlikely that the Provisional IRA could have unleashed the level of death and destruction that it did and, consequently, the overwhelming international, public, and internal reactions which helped to spark moves towards peace might

have been muted. Sinn Féin's legitimacy gradually rose as its leaders publicly expressed a willingness to end the armed campaign and to pursue their objectives by nonviolent means. The 1993 Downing Street Declaration[67] was a major peace initiative because it demonstrated to republicans that the route chosen by Sinn Féin could and would deliver substantive results. The end of the broadcasting ban on Sinn Féin speakers in the Republic, and US President Bill Clinton's granting of a travel visa to Gerry Adams conferred national and international legitimacy on Sinn Féin and the wider republican movement, lifting both to unforeseen heights.

The Provisional IRA, though, never recovered from its late 1980s setbacks, and it was clear by the early 1990s that it had lost irretrievable ground to Sinn Féin. The Downing Street Declaration placed the onus squarely on the IRA Army Council—either it could continue to wage an armed campaign which had lost virtually all of its support and much of its effectiveness by that point, or it could support Sinn Féin's pursuit of the unprecedented opportunity to achieve republican objectives by peaceful means. The Army Council finally announced the complete cessation of hostilities on 31 August 1994, which was followed less than two months later by a loyalist ceasefire. Although the Provisional IRA's ceasefire was temporarily broken in 1996–7, it paved the way for the beginning of peace talks which, ultimately, delivered the momentous Good Friday Agreement in 1998, ending the conflict and ushering in an era of peaceful reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

Libyan involvement in Northern Ireland in the 1980s was a major component to the latter stages of the conflict. It indirectly helped to change the Provisional IRA-Sinn Féin power dynamic, unintentionally nudging the focal point and strength of the republican movement away from the former and towards the latter. That shift centralised Sinn Féin's political strategy and marginalised the militant republicans, moving the conflict considerably closer to a peaceful resolution. Although the existing literature generally acknowledges an important role played by the Libyan government, it fails to appreciate its full impact. The lack of attention given to the Libyan arms imports divorces the conflict from its international dimension, treating the Libyan intervention as an influence which only temporarily affected the conflict, rather than as a force which had profound consequences for the future development of the republican movement. It is not this article's intent to argue that Libya under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi helped bring peace to Northern Ireland—the Libyan government had no desire to see peace there and, conversely, sought to intensify the conflict for its own selfish interests. Still, Libyan involve-

[67] The Downing Street Declaration was a joint-statement issued by British Prime Minister John Major and Irish Taoiseach (prime minister) Albert Reynolds in December 1993, in which the two committed their respective governments to support the right of self-determination for the people of Northern Ireland. Importantly, Major also declared that the British government had "no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland," a major concession which challenged decades of republican understanding of the British presence in Ireland and indicated that the British would be willing to withdraw if an adequate political settlement was formulated.

ment played a major role in the conflict in the 1980s, and it is this article's intent to demonstrate that in order to understand the complexity of the Northern Ireland peace process, one must accept that the Libyan dimension was a key component that fundamentally changed the direction of the conflict and helped set the foundation for the process that eventually brought peace in 1998.

Special thanks to the editors of the Global Histories student journal, and to Dr. Mervyn O'Driscoll and Gabriel Doherty at University College Cork all for providing invaluable feedback during the research, writing, and editing processes.

Massachusetts Bay Colony Seal. 1629.

‘Indian Brethren in English Clothes’: The Praying Indian Figure in the *Eliot Tracts*, 1643–1675

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This article focuses on the *Eliot Tracts*, a collection of eleven documents published in London between 1643 and 1671 that describe missionary work by the British among the natives in New England. Written by John Eliot, Thomas Shepard, and other missionaries, these tracts constitute the most detailed and sustained record of early British missionary work in the New World and serve as an important counterpart to earlier accounts by French and Spanish missionaries. Drawing on methods of discourse analysis, this article examines how Puritan missionaries described the converted natives of New England—the so-called Praying Indians—in the *Eliot Tracts*. It shows that the figure of the Praying Indian was constructed as a response to economic, theological, and political pressures within a transatlantic colonial context: New England’s mission rhetoric generated not only support from observers in England and was essential in order to stimulate donations, but also provided a necessary redefinition of the colony’s purpose in the context of the English civil wars. In addition, it allowed the Puritans to redefine their relations with the natives in terms of Christian benevolence and countered accusation about a lack of missionary zeal among the British settlers.

Introduction

One of the reasons the Massachusetts Bay Company gave for colonizing New England was the obligation to convert its native inhabitants to Christianity. The Massachusetts Bay Colony’s charter of 1629 had granted the Governor and his deputies the authority to establish laws

> whereby our said People, Inhabitants there, may be soe religiously, peaceablie, and civilly governed, as their good Life and orderlie Conversacon, maie wynn and incite the Natives of Country, to the Knowledg and Obedience of the onlie true God and Savior of Mankinde, and the Christian Fayth, which in our Royall Intencon, and the Adventurers free Profession, is the principall Ende of this Plantacion.[1]

[1] Francis Newton Thorpe, “The Federal and State Constitutions Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America.” Compiled and Edited Under the Act of Congress of June 30, 1906

The colony's seal, which depicted a native figure pleading with the English to "come over and help us," further reinforced this claim. Nevertheless, during the 1620s and 1630s, the Puritan settlers devoted little effort to the proselytization of the Algonquian-speaking people of that region, focusing instead on expanding their towns and farms.

Effective missionary work in New England only began in October 1646, when Puritan minister John Eliot began preaching to a local Algonquian community and thus paved the way for a missionary program. In order to raise funds for this work in New England and to publicize it as part of the fulfillment of the colony's charter, a number of tracts were published in London between 1643 and 1671. These consisted of different documents, ranging from letters describing the missionaries' work, and accounts of observers and commentators from both England and the colonies to records of the confessions of natives, and a multitude of dedications. The tracts were not treated as a coherent sequence as they appeared and quality of the original publications varied widely. Today, these works are collectively known as the *Eliot Tracts* because Eliot not only published the majority of them but was also most closely associated with the missionary project.[2] While some of the early tracts were published independently, most of them were collected and printed by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England (later known as the New England Company) established by the English Parliament in 1649 to support missionary work in New England.

The *Eliot Tracts* constitute a detailed account of early British missionary work in the New World and serve as an important counterpart to earlier accounts by French and Spanish missionaries. Despite their social and political importance for the role of New England in the transatlantic context of British colonialism, they have received relatively little attention from scholars. The most notable exception is Richard W. Cogley's *John Eliot's Mission the Indians before King Philip's War* (1999), which offers an overview on Eliot's missionary work among the natives with an emphasis on his theological writings.[3] Worth mentioning is also William Kellaway's *The New England Company 1649–1776* (1962). Interpreting the British sources relating to the New England mission, this work presents a detailed account of the organization and administration within the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel.[4] Older works, such as Alden T. Vaughan's *New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620–1675* (1965), often had a tendency

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909). Accessed August 16, 2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th century/mass03.asp.

[2] Michael P. Clark, "Introduction", in *The Eliot Tracts: With Letters from John Eliot to Thomas Thorowgood and Richard Baxter*, ed. Michael P. Clark (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 1–52. Clark was the first to publish these eleven works together in 2003; the majority of these works have not been reprinted since the nineteenth century.

[3] Richard W. Cogley, *John Eliot's Mission to the Indians before King Philip's War* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1999).

[4] William Kellaway, *The New England Company 1649–1776: Missionary Society to the American Indians* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962).

to exclude missionaries from the expansionist policies of New England and to portray their motives as benign and honorable.[5] Around ten years later, historians like Francis Jennings, Neil Salisbury, Robert J. Berkhofer, and James Axtell contested Vaughan's thesis and situated the Puritan missionaries in a broader context of British colonialism in New England.[6] Even later, Dane Morrison and Jean M. O'Brien focused on the native perspective on the missionary project. Morrison's work *A Praying People* (1995) shows how the Massachusett tribe experienced conversion and stresses native agency; whereas O'Brien's *Dispossession by Degrees* (2003) focuses on how the native community in Natick resisted colonialism and defended its lands.[7] Beginning around 2000, literary theorists like Kristina Bross and Hilary Wyss have also turned their attentions towards the *Eliot Tracts*. While these works demonstrate the importance of adding literary analysis to the historical approach, Bross and Wyss primarily focus on a later period and largely ignore the early years of the missionary project.[8]

This article then aims at uncovering a part of this overlooked history by examining how Puritan missionaries described the converted natives—the so-called Praying Indians—in the *Eliot Tracts*. I follow Kristina Bross and James Holstun in their assessment that we have to "understand Indian mission policy as fundamentally constructed in relation to Puritan theology rather than simply as a product of Indian and English contact".[9] The figure of the Praying Indian then, I argue, was constructed in a similar way in response to economic, theological, and political pressures within a transatlantic colonial context: The construction of the Praying Indian figure helped to win the favor of an English audience (rather than a New English one) and was essential in order to stimulate further donations for the missionary project. In addition, it allowed the Puritans to redefine their rela-

[5] Alden T. Vaughan, *New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620–1675* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965).

[6] Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975); Neal Salisbury, "Red Puritans: The 'Praying Indians' of Massachusetts Bay and John Eliot," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (1974): 27–54; Neal Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500–1643* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Robert F. Berkhofer, *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York: Knopf, 1978); James Axtell, *The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

[7] Dane Morrison, *A Praying People: Massachusett Acculturation and the Failure of the Puritan Mission, 1600–1690* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995); Jean M. O'Brien, *Dispossession by Degrees: Indian Land and Identity in Natick, Massachusetts 1650–1790* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003).

[8] Kristina Bross, "'That Epithet of Praying': The Praying Indian Figure in Early New England Literature" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1997); Kristina Bross, *Dry Bones and Indian Sermons: Praying Indians in Colonial America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Hilary E. Wyss, *Writing Indians: Literacy, Christianity, and Native Community in Early America* (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000).

[9] Bross, "'That Epithet of Praying,'" 10. See also: James Holstun, *A Rational Millennium: Puritan Utopias of Seventeenth-Century England and America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 104.

tions with the natives in terms of Christian benevolence, thus assuming a positive self-identity on the international stage.

The time period between the publication of the first tract in 1643 and 1675 is of great importance as it is demarked by two turning points in the history of Aboriginal-European relations: the Pequot War from 1636 to 1638 and Metacom's War, which lasted from 1675 to 1678. During the 1620s and early 1630s, the territory of Southern New England was dominated by the Pequot, who had subjugated dozens of other tribes. With the arrival of English traders and settlers, tensions over power and control of trade escalated, and finally led to the defeat of the Pequot by an alliance of the colonists of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and the Mohegan and Narragansett tribes in 1638. The Pequot War ended the political and economic dominance of the Pequot tribe in Southern New England and permanently shifted the balance of power from the natives to the colonists.[10] The dominance of the colonists should only be threatened again in 1675 when Metacom, sachem of the Wampanoag people, led half of New England's native population against the colonists. Around 5,000 natives were killed, which constituted approximately 40 percent of the natives in Southern New England. About half that many settlers died, roughly five to six percent of the English population.[11] By analyzing Puritan descriptions of natives in that relatively peaceful time period between these two wars, this article thus contributes to a broader discourse that analyzes early images of the native in New England. While the Praying Indian was constructed as a rather positively loaded term, Metacom's War led to a vilification of the Indian figure as all natives came to be depicted as inherently evil.[12]

I begin my article with an overview on the origins of the missionary project in New England, before I take a closer look at the *Eliot Tracts*. Drawing on methods of discourse analysis, I focus on how Eliot and other Puritan missionaries constructed the Praying Indian figure. Information about the Praying Indians is obviously filtered through the Eurocentric lens of the New England authors, and, moreover, subordinated to the religious objectives of the missionaries' work, and must therefore be treated with considerable skepticism. Even though my article focuses on the missionaries' perspectives, I emphasize the intentional constructed nature of the Praying Indian figure, thus trying to avoid mistaking these discursive features for "authentic native" characteristics.[13] In the second part of the article, I take a closer look at the economic, theological, and political factors that contributed to the construction of the Praying Indian figure in the *Eliot Tracts*.

[10] Vaughan, *New England Frontier*, 152.
[11] Clark, "Introduction," 22.
[12] See: Berkhofer, *The White Man's Indian*, 83–85.
[13] See also: Wyass, *Writing Indians*, 11.

The Origins of the Missionary Project in New England

The first attempts to evangelize the natives of New England were made on Martha's Vineyard in 1643 when Thomas Mayhew Jr. began preaching to the Wampanoag on the island that his father had colonized one year earlier. The Mayhews however, largely acted without official support or notice, and systematic missionary effort only began in 1646. Historians commonly cite several reasons to explain this delay to the mission: The earliest settlers were confronted with problems of survival and focused on more pressing concerns in their lives such as the construction of towns. Additional problems were created by the lack of ministers who were able to master the Algonquian dialects, and by the poor infrastructure conditions.[14]

Furthermore, it was only in 1644 that five sachems formally submitted themselves and their people to the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts General Court. The agreement also included an explicit willingness "to be instructed in the knowledge and worship of God".[15] While the reasons for this "voluntary" subjugation were complex and are still debated by historians, it is certain that it presented a strategy of survival for some native groups: The Alqonquian-speaking natives in the Boston area had suffered through two major epidemics, the first lasting from 1616 to 1619, the second from 1633 to 1634. The two epidemics had a devastating impact on the natives, killing up to 90 percent of its pre-contact population. The population of the Massachusett tribe, once numbering around 25,000 people, dropped to just 750 in 1631 and was even further reduced by the smallpox epidemic of 1633–1634. The settler population of Massachusetts alone in contrast, had reached 20,000 in 1646.[16] For some native groups, submission to English jurisdiction then must be understood as a pragmatic solution to changing power relations, threats from native enemies to the south and northwest, and British land claims. It is therefore hardly surprising that the missionary project was appealing to small and weak tribes like the Massachusett or Nipmuc; whereas stronger tribes such the Mohegan under the leadership of their sachem Uncas formed political alliances with the English but resisted all missionary efforts.[17]

In October 1646, John Eliot was selected to give the first missionary sermon to a group of Massachusett at Dorchester Mill near the native village of Nonantum. Eliot was born in Widford, England in 1604 and attended Jesus College at Cambridge. He received his bachelor's degree in 1622 and worked as schoolteacher before he emigrated to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1631. Serving as a min-

[14] Anonymous [Thomas Weld, Hugh Peter, and Henry Dunster (?)], *New Englands First Fruits, in respect, First of the Conversion of Some, Conviction of Divers, Preparation of sundry of the Indians …* (London, 1643). Reprinted in Clark, *Eliot Tracts,* 58. See also: Cogley, *John Eliot's Mission*, 21–22.
[15] Cogley, *John Eliot's Mission*, 28.
[16] Ibid., 31–32; Axtell, *The Invasion Within*, 219–20.
[17] Salisbury, "Red Puritans", 38–39.

ister to the English at the church at Roxbury until his death in 1690, Eliot divided his time between his ministry and missionary work to the natives. A number of those assisting him in missionary work among the Massachusett were similarly pastors of English churches in Massachusetts Bay: John Wilson and William Leverich were pastors in Boston; Thomas Shepard at Cambridge.[18]

John Eliot and the other missionaries believed that the natives needed to receive the word of God in their own language and therefore produced printed books in the Algonquian language. In 1663, a translation of the Bible, the *Mamusse Wunneetupanatamwe Up-Biblum God*, was published, followed by translations of other sermons.[19] Funds were not only needed to pay for these publications but for Eliot's salary and supplies as well as for educational programs for native children. New England settlers however, were reluctant to donate for the proselytization of native people. Following the Pequot War of 1637, a large number of white settlers perceived the natives as hostile.[20] Because of this resistance, missionaries in the Puritan colonies were financially dependent on charity from England.

In order to raise funds and to report the successes of the mission to its supporters in England, the "Act for the promoting and propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ in New England" was passed by the English Parliament on 13 June 1649.[21] It established a corporation in England consisting of 16 people, mostly wealthy merchants, named "The President and Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New-England"—the first Protestant missionary organization in the world. Of all activities supported by the Society, the most historically significant was the construction of settlements for all native proselytes in Massachusetts Bay, which became known as "Praying Towns". The mobility of many tribes was often considered one of the greatest obstacles to their conversion and a fixed settlement was seen as the first step to the conversion of the natives—similar to the French Catholic reserve system.[22] In 1651, the first Praying Town, Natick, was created. Although Natick remained the most famous of the Praying Indian towns, 13 additional towns were created in the Bay colony by 1675. According to Daniel Gookin, who was later appointed the first superintendent of the Praying Indians, each of the Praying Towns had about 70 to 90 inhabitants, for a total of 1,000 residents in all Praying Towns combined.[23]

[18] Cogley, *John Eliot's Mission*, 45–47.
[19] Wyass, *Writing Indians*, 21–22.
[20] Salisbury, "Red Puritans," 29. See also: Horst Gründer. "John Eliot und die 'Praying Indians': Vom Scheitern einer Puritanischen Mission in Neuengland,"*Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte* 5, no. 2 (1992): 210–222.
[21] Bross has pointed out that in 1649, Charles I. was executed and Parliament "found itself free to legislate as it wished." Bross, "'That Epithet of Praying,'" 29.
[22] Ulrike Kirchberger, *Konversion zur Moderne? Die britische Indianermission in der atlantischen Welt des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2008), 115.
[23] Daniel Gookin, "The Historical Collections of the Indians in New England, 1674," in *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, vol. 1, 1792* (Boston: Munroe and Francis, 1806), 180-196. See also: O'Brien, *Dispossession by Degrees*, 81.



Southern New England. Map by the Author

Praying Indians and Wicked Indians

New Englands First Fruits, today known as the first of the *Eliot Tracts*, defends New England's settlers against charges that they had been lacking in missionary zeal, and recounts several instances of native interest in Christianity. The early converts are pictured as "more courteous, ingenious, and to the English more loving than others of them," they "desired to learne and speake [the English] language", and they "are very inquisitive after God." One of the converts even refuses to be called by "Indian name, but would be named William," and "abhorre[s] to dwell with the Indians any longer."[24]

While the authors of the first tract celebrate converts' attempts to imitate the Puritans in "behaviour and apparrell," they also establish a clear dichotomy between themselves and the colonial other: while the natives (at least prior to conversion) "goe naked"[25] and lead an "unfixed, confused, and ungoverned a life, uncivilized and unsubdued to labor and order,"[26] English settlers not only wear clothes but on the whole come to represent civilization and order. This simplistic dichotomy (us – them; Christianity – lack of religion; civilized – uncivilized) is even further enforced by a number of linguistic devices, which are employed throughout the

[24] Anonymous, *New Englands First Fruits*, 59–60.
[25] Ibid., 60.
[26] Edward Winslow, ed., *The Glorious Progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians of New England* (London, 1649). Reprinted in Clark, *Eliot Tracts*, 159.

Eliot Tracts: the unconverted natives are linked to evilness and sin, and frequently pray to the devil,[27] whereas the Puritans are constructed as their antithesis and become embodiments of "holiness" and "righteousness."[28] Metaphors revolving around "light" and "darkness" also figure prominently in the missionaries' writings.[29]

The standard adjective, however, to describe the natives—whether converted or not—is "poor": natives are labeled "poor Indians" and "poor outcasts," and are furthermore characterized as "deepest degeneracies," "the dregs or mankinde," or "the saddest spectacles of misery of meere men upon earth."[30] The missionaries make clear that the natives are in "vast distance […] from common civility" and thus are in continual need of English guidance and support. The authors of the *Eliot Tracts* were convinced that the natives could only be converted after they have reached a certain stage of "civility."[31] Even though these characterizations sound condescending to a modern reader, Richard Cogley argues that Eliot's choice of words "indicates that he viewed the natives with sympathy and not contempt." While some of his contemporaries characterized the natives as "animals" or "beasts", Eliot did not deny their humanity—even though he was convinced of the Puritan's superiority.[32]

Praying Indians, however, are not only different from the English but also from those natives who refuse to give up their traditional ways. As early as September 1647, John Eliot separates the natives in two categories: the Praying Indians "who would be all one English" and the "other wicked Indians."[33] The term "wicked" can be found throughout the *Eliot Tracts* but other adjectives such as "prophane" or "unsound" are sometimes used as well.[34] In 1649, Eliot for example reports that "Linn Indians are all naught save one […] and the reason why they are bad is, partly and principally because their Sachim is naught, and careth not to pray unto God (Bad Governours have an evill inflence upon the people)."[35] While the

[27] See for example: Henry Whitfield, ed., *The Light appearing more and more towards the perfect Day, or a farther discovery of the present state of the Indians in New England* (London, 1651). Reprinted in Clark, *Eliot Tracts*, 209; John Eliot and Thomas Mayhew, Jr., *Tears of Repentance: Or, A further Narrative of the Progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians in New-England* (London, 1653). Reprinted in Clark, *Eliot Tracts*, 288; John Eliot, *A further Account of the progress of the Gospel Amongst the Indians in New* England (London, 1660). Reprinted in Clark, *Eliot Tracts*, 373.

[28] Eliot and Mayhew, *Tears of Repentance*, 258.

[29] Thomas Shepard, *The Clear Sun-shine of the Gospel breaking forth upon the Indians in New-England* (London, 1648). Reprinted in Clark, *Eliot Tracts*, 107.

[30] Anonymous [Thomas Shepard (?)], *The Day-Breaking, if not the Sun-Rising of the Gospell with the Indians in New England* (London, 1647). Reprinted in Clark, *Eliot Tracts*, 92–93.

[31] "So in religion such as are extreamly degenerate, must bee brought to some civility before religion can prosper, or the word take place." Anonymous, *The Day Breaking*, 93.

[32] Cogley, *John Eliot's Mission*, 247.

[33] Shepard, *Clear Sun-shine of the Gospel*, 124–125.

[34] See for example: John Eliot, *A Brief Narrative of the Progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians in New England, in the Year 1670*. London, 1671. Reprinted in Clark, *Eliot Tracts*, 404.

[35] Winslow, ed., *The Glorious Progress of the Gospel*, 158.

natives in general are characterized as eager to learn more about Christ, it is their "naught" sachems that present an obstacle to the conversion. Even worse than the sachems, however, are the native shamans—referred to as "Powwaws." They are presented as "Sorcerers and Witches,"[36] "that cure by help of the devil."[37]

The Praying Indians then occupy a middle ground between the English and the unconverted, "wicked Indians." The tracts report that the powwows "mock and scoffe at those Indians which pray, and blaspheme God when they pray"[38]; on the other hand, however, English cattle frequently destroyed the natives' corn and conflicts over the settlements' boundaries led to an atmosphere of mutual distrust.[39] In a postscript to *Clear Sun-shine of the Gospel* pastor Thomas Shepard quotes one of the converted natives named Wampooas, who reflects on the Praying Indian identity: "That is because wee pray to God, other Indians abroad in the countrey hate us and oppose us, the English on the other side suspect us, and feare us to be still such as doe not pray at all […]."[40]

Intertribal conflicts between converts and those loyal to traditional ways also seem to have occurred frequently: one of Massachusetts Bay's first and most prominent converts, Wequash, was poisoned by "some of the Indians, whose hearts Satan had filled" and others were threatened with a similar fate.[41] The Praying Towns also faced serious threats from the Iroquois confederation in northern New York. Especially the Mohawk, the most feared tribe within this confederation, began raiding the Praying Towns Nashobah and Wamesit in the 1650s. In 1671, Eliot wrote that he planned to arm the inhabitants of these Praying Towns for their own protection during these dangerous times, which stirred feelings of fear and suspicion among the English settlers.[42]

Eliot and the other missionaries also differentiate between "two sorts of English men": "Some are bad and naught, and live wickedly and loosely […] but there are a second sort of English men, who […] repenting of their sinnes, and seeking after God and Jesus Christ, they are good men."[43] Thus, the adjective "wicked" applies not only to natives but to sinning English settlers as well. Other authors take one step further by attaching the term "Indian" to those sinning settlers. In *Strength out of Weaknesse*, William Leverich writes: "There is no difference between the worst Indians, and such English, saying, they are all one Indians"—thus it seems that the term "Indian" itself has become a signifier for evil and wickedness.[44] In

[36] Anonymous, *The Day Breaking*, 96.
[37] Shepard, *Clear Sun-shine of the Gospel*, 115. See also: ibid., 97 and 125 for a more detailed description.
[38] Ibid., 125.
[39] O'Brien, *Dispossession by Degrees*, 33.
[40] Shepard, *Clear Sun-shine of the Gospel*, 136.
[41] Anonymous, *New Englands First Fruits*, 62. See also: Salisbury, "Red Puritans," 40.
[42] Morrison, *A Praying People*, 157–158.
[43] Anonymous, *The Day Breaking*, 85–86.
[44] Henry Whitfield, ed., *Strength out of Weaknesse, Or a Glorious Manifestation of the Further Progresse of the Gospel among the Indians in New England* (London, 1652). Reprinted in

The Light appearing more and more, Eliot even evokes a scenario in which the roles of Puritans and natives are completely reversed:

> These Indians will rise up in judgment against us and our children at the last day. Brethren, the Lord has no need of us, but if it please him, can carry his Gospel to the other side of the world, and make it there to shine forth in its glory, brightnesse, power and purity, and leave us in Indian darknesse.[45]

This scenario then might serve as a warning to the English settlers: natives, who adopt English manners and practices, can "assume an identity which also challenges English spiritual superiority" if the English settlers neglect God's word.[46]

The Financing of the Mission

The "Act for the promoting and propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ in New England" of 1649 stated that England had to fund the missions because New England—even though "willing"—was too impoverished to do so. Furthermore, it enacted that a collection should be taken up in all the "counties, cities, towns and parishes of England and Wales" to support the mission in New England:

> The Ministers and Church wardens or Overseers of the poor of every such Parish and place … are hereby authorized after the reading hereof, to go with all convenient speed from house to house, to every of the Inhabitants of the said Parishes and places respectively, and to take the subscription of every such person in a schedule to be presented by them for that purpose, and accordingly at the same time to collect and gather the same.[47]

Even though many parishes contributed only comparatively small amounts, the total was impressive: in the first ten years after its establishment the Society raised almost £16,000; an average of £440 per year was directly sent to New England.[48]

However, while the English audience seemed to be generally more sympathetic to the missionary project than the settlers in New England, there was still opposition to collections in England as many critics argued that the money available for the mission should be given to the poor at home.[49] In order to raise more funds, the

Clark, *Eliot Tracts*, 235.

[45] Whitfield, ed., *The Light appearing more and more*, 208.

[46] Bross, "That Epithet of Praying," 34.

[47] *An Act for the promoting and propagating the Gospel of Jesus Christ in New England*, July 1649, in: *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660*, ed. C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1911), 197–200. Accessed 15 February, 2018, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/acts-ordinances-interregnum/pp197-200.

[48] Kellaway, *The New England Company*, 14–15. Figures from ibid., 38–39.

[49] Alison Stanley, "The Praying Indian Towns: Encounter and Conversion through Imposed Urban Space," in *Building the British Atlantic World: Spaces, Places, and Material Culture,*

Society also began publishing a series of tracts describing the missionary project in New England. By 1649, a certain amount of publicity material was already at hand as *New Englands First Fruits* (1643), *The Day-Breaking* (1647), *The Clear Sun-shine of the Gospel* (1648), and *The Glorious Progress of the Gospel* (1649) had already been published independently in London. During the following ten years, seven more tracts were published and distributed by the Society, each assuring the reader of the mission's worthiness and progress. The tracts not only stressed the natives' willingness to be converted but also contained constant appeals for financial assistance.[50]

In order to ensure the flow of donations, Eliot and the other missionaries also had to demonstrate proof of the natives' conversion to Christianity and civilization. Outward manifestations of the natives' conversion—such as English-style clothing and housing—provided the missionaries with a possibility to measure their success and to present evidence of the success of the missionary project to their benefactors. Therefore, the Puritan missionaries often demanded visible signs of conversion from the Praying Indians: when Nataôus (who was later baptized as William of Sudbury) tells a Mr. Brown that "[he] will pray to God as long as live," Brown demands proof of his spiritual conversion: "He said, I doubt of it, and bid me cut off my hair."[51] All efforts of the Praying Indians to transform themselves into imitations of English men are applauded: at Eliot's first sermon, he sees the sachem's son, who was educated by the English, "standing by his father among the rest of his Indian brethren in English clothes."[52] In 1648, Thomas Shepard notes at one of his sermons that many natives are dressed like the English and "you would scarce know them from English people."[53] Kristina Bross points out that this exact sight—natives in English-style clothing—had earlier been a cause for concern and even fear as "Indians in the middle ground challenged otherwise clear battlefield boundaries."[54]

Puritan missionaries and their audiences were also occupied with the living situation of the natives: colonial thought had created a dichotomy between towns, which were clearly marked as English spaces, and the unsettled wilderness, which was associated with the natives. The decision to establish towns for the Praying Indians then was largely based on ideological reasons as Alison Stanley points out: "Merely living in a town was seen to be a significant step on the way to becoming Europeanized Christians."[55]

1600–1850, ed. Daniel Maudlin and Bernard L. Herman (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 143; Cogley, *John Eliot's Mission to the Indians*, 208.

[50] See for example: Anonymous, *The Day Breaking*, 99; Shepard, *The Clear Sun-shine of the Gospel*, 110; Winslow, ed., *The Glorious Progress of the Gospel*, 167.

[51] Eliot and Mayhew, *Tears of Repentance*, 273.

[52] Ibid., 83.

[53] Shepard, *Clear Sun-shine of the Gospel*, 120.

[54] Bross, "'That Epithet of Praying,'" 48.

[55] Stanley, "The Praying Indian Towns," in Maudlin and Herman, *Building the British Atlantic World*, 145.

Adopting English-style buildings also meant a restructuring of the social structures within those Praying Towns: English-style houses were designed for nuclear families and a law imposed on the Praying Indians of Natick in 1647 required "every young man if not anothers servant, and if unmarried, hee shall be compelled to set up a Wigwam and plant for himselfe" instead of "shifting up and downe to other Wigwams," implying that this had been the case before.[56] The natives were expected to conform to English ideas on gender roles. In Algonquian society, the division of labor ran along gender rather than class lines. Men were largely responsible for hunting, fishing, and making of tools and weapons, while women assumed the work compatible with the supervision of children: gathering of firewood, berries, and herbs, building and maintaining the homes, and working the fields.[57] This division of labor collided with the English ideal where men should work in the fields, while women belonged in the household, raising children, and ideally engaging in some sort of household production such as carding and spinning wool.[58]

Puritan missionaries were interested in presenting their work among the natives as important task in order to stimulate donations from potential benefactors. In order to dramatize their work, natives prior to conversion were often presented as "wicked," "poor," and "degenerate"; and the darker the picture of native wickedness and savagery, the greater the need for missionaries and the more praiseworthy their work. On the other hand, the English audience had to be convinced of the worth of the missionary project and therefore, converted natives were presented in a positive light—they became Praying Indians who were almost like English settlers. The erection of Praying Towns was presented as a productive halfway step to the civilization and conversion of the natives and was thus intended to please the English audiences.

Puritan Missionary Theology

In order to fully understand the construction of the Praying Indian figure, it is important to consider how the Puritans understood their work within a broader framework of millennialist thought at that time. Puritan millenarianism was a form of historical understanding that interpreted recent events through the prophetic calendar based on the Book of Revelation and other books of the Bible, believing that in the end Christ will establish a kingdom on earth that would last for a thousand years. Eliot, like other believers in millenarianism, assumed that

[56] Anonymous, *The Day Breaking*, 98.
[57] See: Alan Taylor, *American Colonies: The Settling of North America* (New York: Viking, 2001), 190–191.
[58] See for example: Shepard, *Clear Sun-shine of the Gospel*, 132: "The women are desirous to learn to spin, and I have procured Wheels for sundry of them, and they can spin pretty well." See also: O'Brien, *Dispossession by Degrees*, 43–44.

England occupied center stage in this apocalyptic drama, and events in England and New England were viewed as special disclosures of the divine will.[59] In England during the 1640s and 1650s the civil wars, the execution of Charles I, and the disestablishment of the Church of England indicated, that "the time had come for the saints in England to erect the millennial orders for church and state."[60] Furthermore, the Puritans were convinced that God was favoring the English settlers "in sweeping away great multitudes of the Natives by the small Pox a little before we went thither, that he might make room for us there."[61] The English presence in North America was then interpreted as the last step in "the spiritually inevitable westward expansion of Christianity and British rule" before the arrival of Christ.[62]

Eliot's radical interpretations of the events in England also led him to embrace the belief that the New England natives were descended from the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel, a theory that was first discussed in 16th century Spain, and gained popularity in England during the 1640s and 1650s.[63] Eliot suggested that the descendants of Shem had migrated to North America via an overland route that led them first to India and China and, finally, America.[64] While this theory was rejected by the majority of the other authors in the tract, who instead believed that the natives were "Tartars passing out of Asia into America,"[65] Eliot's unique view led to a feeling of "millennial urgency": according to Puritan millennialist theory, Christ's kingdom on earth would only be established after the general conversion of the Jews to Christianity.[66] The successful conversion of Praying Indians, who in addition were of Hebraic ancestry, then could be interpreted as a sign of Christ's coming.

The emergence of the Praying Indian figure also coincides with a feeling of crisis in England during the 1640s and 1650s. The beginning of the civil wars in England in 1642 had taken its toll on New England and the supply of goods, money, and immigrants came to a halt.[67] Even worse, large numbers of New Englanders were called back to England to take part in the civil wars. Out of 24 Harvard students who graduated between 1642 and 1646 for example, 14 returned to England or Ireland.[68] The Puritan persecution in England had ended with the arrest and execution of Anglican bishop William Laud in the 1640s, and migration to

[59] Cogley, "John Eliot and the Millennium," 228–229.
[60] Ibid., 227–228.
[61] Anonymous, *New Englands First Fruits*, 74.
[62] Clark, "Introduction," 25.
[63] Kirchberger, *Konversion zur Moderne?*, 158.
[64] See for example: Winslow, ed., *The Glorious Progress of the Gospel*, 164. See also: Cogley, *Eliot's Mission to the Indians*, 86.
[65] Anonymous, *The Day Breaking*, 92.
[66] Richard W. Cogley, "John Eliot and the Millennium,"*Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation* 1, no. 2 (1991): 227–50, 229.
[67] Andrew Delbanco, *The Puritan Ordeal* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 184–185.
[68] Ibid., 184–185; Bross, "'That Epithet of Praying,'" 22.

New England, once a righteous response to the situation in England, now "seemed a poor choice" as Kristina Bross phrases it.[69] Instead of contributing to the erection of a holy commonwealth in England after the execution of Charles I, Puritans in New England now felt that they were missing the main event, which according to Andrew Delbanco caused a Puritan "crisis of identity."[70] An increased focus on the evangelization of the natives and the construction of the Praying Indian figure then provided a necessary redefinition of New England's purpose in the context of the English civil wars.

The International Context of the New England Mission

The first of the tracts, *First Fruits* recalls the atrocities committed against the indigenous people by the Spanish in order to advocate what Kristina Bross calls the "anti-conquest" theme of the English missionary project.[71] The Puritan authors emphasize that—unlike the Spanish—the English had occupied the land without violence and were welcomed by the natives.[72] Just five years after the Pequot War, New England is described as a place of "such peace and freedome from enemies, when almost all the world is on a fire that (excepting that short trouble with the Pequits) we never heard of any sound of Warres to this day."[73] For the author, the victory over the Pequot (and the "genocidal rage" that came with it) are presented as necessary for the missionary undertaking:[74] Wequash, one of the early converts, was finally convinced of the Christian God's power after he witnessed the massacre at Mystic River.[75] Eliot also recalls the story of "an Indian […] taken in the Pequott Warres," who is "ingenious, can read," learnt to write and later became Eliot's translator and a firm believer.[76] After the Pequot War, Puritans thus redefined their relations with the natives in terms of Christian benevolence, rewriting the objective of their settlement around the evangelization of the natives and around the figure of the Praying Indian. Praying Indians came to symbolize the peaceful, benevolent mission strategy and thus reflected positively on New England's self-identity.

[69] Bross, "'That Epithet of Praying,'" 24.
[70] Delbanco, *Puritan Ordeal*, 189.
[71] Bross, "'That Epithet of Praying,'" 14.
[72] "At our entrance upon the Land it was not with violence and intrusion but free and faire, with their consents … the chief Sagamores … professed we were all welcome." Anonymous, *New Englands First Fruits*, 63.
[73] Anonymous, *The Day Breaking*, 74–75.
[74] Clark, "Introduction," 24.
[75] "This man, a few years since, feeling and beholding the mighty power of God in our English Forces, how they fell upon the Pegans [Pequots], where divers hundreds of them were slain in an houre ... from that time he was convinced and perswaded that our God was a most dreadfull God." Anonymous, *New Englands First Fruits*, 61.
[76] Winslow, ed., *The Glorious Progress of the Gospel*, in Clark, *Eliot Tracts*, 160.

Prior to the beginning of the mission in 1646, contemporaries in England had criticized New Englanders for their neglect of the native people and had compared them unfavorably to Catholic missionaries in the Spanish and French colonies, who had started to convert native peoples in the 1540s.[77] In order to counter these accusations, Puritan missionaries contrasted the works of the Catholic missionaries to their own work amongst the natives:

> That when other Nations who have planted in those furthest parts of the Earth, have onely sought their owne advantage to possesse their Land, Transport their gold, and that with so much covetousnesse and cruelty, that they have made the name of Christianitie and of Christ an abomination.[78]

English missionaries on the other hand, had the natives' best interest at heart and were invited by the natives to preach among them. While it is not surprising that Puritan writers would be more favorably disposed towards English than towards Spanish missionaries, descriptions of Spanish atrocities against the natives became an important motif in Puritan missionary writing. In 1552, Dominican friar Bartolomé de las Casas published his work *Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias*, an account about the mistreatment of the indigenous people in the Spanish colonies, which formed the basis for Puritan missionary propaganda.[79]

Furthermore, Catholic conversions were presented as superficial, whereas Puritan converts experience the true knowledge of the Gospel. In an appendix to *The Glorious Progress of the Gospel*, John Dury writes, "The Gospel in its advancement amongst these Western Indians, appears to be not in word only (as it was by the Spaniards among their Indians) but also in power, and in the Holy Ghost, and in much assurance."[80] The Puritans argue that they require a full conversion and true knowledge of the gospel from their converts, unlike the Spanish who "force them to baptisme" after "having learnt them a short answer or two to some Popish questions."[81]

The English feeling of coming late to the New World had by the late 16th century led to the development of an aggressive form of proto-nationalism directed against Spain and the Catholic Church more generally as Carl Ortwin Sauer has pointed out.[82] Emphasizing differences between the Catholics and themselves, thus allowed England to take rhetorical advantage of their missionary endeavor.

[77] Bross, "'That Epithet of Praying,'" 25. See also: William R. Hutchison, *Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Mission* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 16–17.
[78] Whitfield, ed., *Strength out of Weaknesse*, 218.
[79] Clark, "Introduction," 2–3.
[80] Winslow, ed., *The Glorious Progress of the Gospel*, 165.
[81] Anonymous, *The Day Breaking*, 93.
[82] Carl Ortwin Sauer, *Sixteenth Century North America: The Land and the People as Seen by the Europeans* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 234.

The *Eliot Tracts* then provide evidence of the spiritual superiority of New England's Praying Indians in comparison to the converts in Spanish and French colonies.

Conclusion

The authors of the *Eliot Tracts* established a clear dichotomy between two groups of natives: the Praying Indians, who believed in God, wore clothes, and lived in English-style buildings, and the "wicked Indians," who refused to give up their traditional ways. The efforts of the Praying Indians to transform themselves into English men seem even more praiseworthy when contrasted with the "wickedness" of both unconverted natives and sinning English men.

Taking a closer look the economic, theological, and political factors of the 17th century, it becomes clear that the Praying Indian figure emerged as a response to economic need, millennial enthusiasm, and competing claims over the New World. Puritan writers thus transformed the existing representations of natives as according to their own needs. New England's mission rhetoric generated not only support from observers in England and convinced many to contribute money and goods to the further evangelization of the natives, but also justified England's belated embrace of the missionary work. Furthermore, the emergence of the Praying Indian figure in the *Eliot Tracts* coincided with a perceived feeling of crisis in the early years of the missionary project.

Metacom's War in 1675 forever changed Aboriginal-White Relations in North America: it reinforced English fears towards all natives, even though one fourth of all tribes, and an overwhelming majority of Praying Indians remained loyal to the English. The Praying Indians were interned at Deer Island in Boston Harbor, where many died from disease and starvation in the harsh winter of 1675–76.[83] English hostility towards natives in the aftermath of Metacom's War undermined commitment to the missionary enterprise, and with Eliot's death in 1690, the missionary effort was set back even further.[84] Maybe still more devastating was the dramatic reversal of the Praying Indian figure among the English settlers: while previously differences between Praying Indians and unconverted natives were stressed, this was now overshadowed by the stronger binary opposition between all natives and English settlers.

[83] Cogley, *John Eliot's Mission*, 123.
[84] O'Brien, *Dispossession by Degrees*, 87.



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Contract Enforcement and Risk Reduction: The Luso-Brazilian Companies in the last Quarter of the Eighteenth Century

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Felipe Souza Melo holds a Bachelor's degree in History from the Federal University of São Paulo and a Master's degree in Economic History from the University of São Paulo. His research explores the economic features of the Portuguese Empire, especially the overseas trade, during the eighteenth century. Lately he has been pursuing a doctorate to continue his research into commercial relations between Portugal and Brazil.

Recent investigations into long-distance trade in the early modern period have highlighted several strategies which were used by traders to mitigate risk. This article attempts to contribute to this historiography by analyzing contractual clauses of mercantile companies registered in Lisbon notarial records between 1784 and 1807, comprising merchants residing both in Portugal and in Brazil. These contractual clauses reveal that companies were a form of trade organization in which the capital owners residing in Lisbon limited the scope of action of agents in Pernambuco, in the northeast of Brazil, in order to protect their investments. In addition, this study demonstrates that mercantile hierarchies existed between the marketplaces of Portugal and Brazil. Thus, I cast some doubts on the most recent investigations of the economic history of the Portuguese Empire that argue for a predominance of Brazilian merchants in the overseas investments. I assert that, at the end of the eighteenth century, merchants residing in Lisbon still financed and directed colonial trade with agents in Pernambuco. This analysis explores the reasons that led trade to assume such a framework.

Introduction

For exchanges to take effect, traders need to rely on institutions to enforce agreements in the future. The seminal theoretical framework of Douglass North states that there are two types of institutions that make this possible: formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions are normally associated with state organizations, broader economic regulations, laws and courts. Informal institutions, by contrast, are concerned with the behavior of private agents and the organizations they develop to carry out their business. Whether formal or informal, institutions are rules or social conventions that "define and limit the set of choices of individuals." Both types of institutions can either reduce or increase transaction costs, which are the costs associated with the exchange of goods or services derived from market imperfections. These costs refer to the expenditure of money, time, supervision, and effort to obtain reliable information to ensure that a prop-

erty is transmitted to another party. Inspired by North, economists and historians have tried to interpret the history of commerce through this institutional paradigm.[1] This article seeks to incorporate this framework by investigating the ways in which mercantile company charters concluded in Lisbon for trade with Brazil stipulated rules that reduced the transaction costs for merchants who financed the enterprises, focusing on the informal institutions that supported part of the trade in the Portuguese Overseas Empire.

Institutions and transaction costs appear in the literature, directly or indirectly, as an essential feature for commercial analysis. Nonetheless, historiography on Portugal and Brazil has mostly focused on formal institutions. Several Portuguese regulatory bodies helped secure private property in trade. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the most important of these was the *Secretarias* and the Board of Trade (*Junta do Comércio*).[2] Imperial economic policies that guaranteed the exclusivity of exchanges with the colonies for the Portuguese tradesmen, manufacturing protectionism, regulation of freight prices, courts, among others, were also institutions that tried to make the mercantile scenario more secure and predictable for the Portuguese trading community and thus attempted to reduce the transaction costs of certain agents.[3]

However, traders relied on informal institutions to circumvent the deficiencies of formal institutions. Such deficiencies included the fact that recourse to courts was both costly and time-consuming. Legislation, while protecting certain agents and groups, discouraged others. The particularities of markets in the eighteenth century—the great distances, the weather, the risks associated with maritime travel, the lack of information and the mismatch between supply and demand in Atlantic ports—were elements beyond the control of formal institutions.

Despite their differences, the distinctions between formal and informal institutions should not be seen as overly rigid. Merchants who made use of their networks (informal institutions) were able to gain access to political circles and thus

[1] Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 4, 61. For some theoretical formulations on neo-institutionalism, see: Malcom Rutherford, *Institutions in Economics, the Old and the New Institutionalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Ronald Coase, "The New Institutional Economics," *The American Economic Review* 88, no. 2 (May 1998), 72–74. For a conceptualization of transaction costs, see: Oliver Williamson, *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting* (New York: The Free Press, 1985).

[2] For more information on the *Secretarias*, see: Nívia Pombo, *D. Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, pensamento e ação político administrativa no Império Português (1778–1812)* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 2015). On the Board of Trade, see: Nuno Luís Madureira, *Mercado e privilégios, a indústria portuguesa entre 1750 e 1834* (Lisboa: Editorial Estampa, 1997), 37–82.

[3] For more on Portuguese trade exclusivity of exchanges with the colonies, see: Fernando Novais, *Portugal e Brasil na crise do Antigo Sistema Colonial (1777–1808)* (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1995). On protectionism, see: Jorge Pedreira, "Tratos e contratos: actividades, interesses e orientações dos investimentos dos negociantes da praça de Lisboa (1755-1822)," *Análise Social* 31 (1996), 136–137 (2.º–3.º). On the regulation of prices and freights, see: Felipe Souza Melo, *O negócio de Pernambuco: financiamento, comércio e transporte na segunda metade do século XVIII* (Master's thesis, São Paulo FFLCH/USP, 2017).

help shape formal institutions. Therefore, the economic performance of some merchants and mercantile communities was also closely linked to their skilfulness or opportunism in clinging to the mechanisms of government power in order to extract private benefits.[4] Yet, unlike the state-backed institutions, the historiography on Portuguese trade (both with the colonies and with Europe) has paid little attention to informal institutions, especially with regard to the period spanning the end of the eighteenth century.[5]

This article presents and discusses some of the strategies that Portuguese merchants developed to mitigate the risks of moral hazard without the direct aid of formal institutions. Moral hazard—a crucial aspect of the principal-agent problem by which agents sought to derive maximum personal gain from the principal's capital—comprised the risk that the agent would have an economically dishonest attitude to the principal's property.[6] Moreover, this analysis attempts to offer a differing perspective on the business hierarchies in the Portuguese Atlantic and their agency arrangements.

It has been repeatedly asserted in Brazilian and Portuguese historiography for at least the last thirty years that merchants based in Brazil had become independent of the Portuguese-based merchants credits by the end of the eigteenth century. In such interpretations, the colonial merchants are seen as being mainly responsible for the financing of the exchanges in the Portuguese Atlantic. Criticism of this historiography targets the concept of "center and periphery." With colonists doing overseas business without the assistance of the metropolitan capitals, "center and periphery" are no longer useful concepts.[7] More recently, with the advent of institutionalist literature and the concept of a principal-agent problem, another aspect has played a role in raising suspicion about center and periphery issues. In this interpretation, the relationship between the principal (the Portuguese-based

[4] See: Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550–1653* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 54; Nuala Zahedieh, *The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy (1660–1700)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 55.

[5] Daniel Strum has meticulously studied Portuguese trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries from the agents' point of view in his *O Comércio do Açúcar: Brasil, Portugal e Países Baixos, 1595–1630* (Rio de Janeiro: Versal São Paulo, 2012); see also: Christopher Ebert, *Between Empires: Brazilian Sugar in the Early Atlantic Economy, 1559–1630* (Leiden: Brill, 2008). Towards the end of the eighteenth century, one of the few texts which focuses on agents is: Leonor Freire Costa, Maria Manuela Rocha, and Rita Martins de Souza, *O ouro do Brasil* (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional–Casa da Moeda, 2013).

[6] On the principal-agent problem, see: Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," *Journal of Financial Economics* 5, no. 3 (1976), 308–310.

[7] João Fragoso, "A noção de economia colonial tardia no Rio de Janeiro e as conexões econômicas do Império português: 1790–1820," in *O Antigo Regime nos Trópicos: a dinâmica imperial portuguesa (séculos XVI–XVIII)*, ed. João Fragoso, Maria Fernanda Bicalho and Maria de Fátima Gouvêa (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2001), 327–328; A. J. R. Russell-Wood, "Senhores de engenho e mercadores," in *História da expansão portuguesa, Vol. III: O Brasil na balança do Império (1697–1808)*, ed. Francisco Betthencourt and Kirti Chaudhuri (Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, 1998), 208–209.

merchant) and the agent (in Brazil) was seen as one of interdependence and co-operation, rather than one of hierarchy. Relationships of control were viewed as irrelevant, making it more difficult to posit the existence of an economic hierarchy between merchants of Portugal and Brazil.[8]

Most importantly, this article demonstrates through analysis of company charters that merchants in Portugal managed and financed trade with agents in Pernambuco (a large region of sugar and cotton plantations in the northeast of Brazil). I argue, therefore, both that mercantile hierarchies between the marketplaces of Brazil and Portugal did exist and that it is perfectly possible to explore hierarchical relations through the institutional approach. Trading companies were a form of commercial organization that tried to overcome the moral hazards of colonial business. Written and notarized agreements could guarantee honest conduct and the fulfillment of contracts by the agents overseas. It was part of a governance mechanism of control, made by private agents and, at first, did not depend on the formal institutions of the Portuguese State. At the same time, the partnership agreement was an instrument permitted as evidence in legal disputes if merchants entered into disagreements in the course of or at the end of their activities, even though they sought to avoid and prevent this resolution. Likewise, contracts relied on formal institutions by certifying the identities of the agents and their capitals, signaling to the state authorities and the mercantile community that the merchants were responsible and trustworthy. Those contracts, above all, reflected the experience that the commercial community had about the hazards of the Atlantic world and the colonial market.

In this research, I scrutinized ninety-four contracts of mercantile companies contained in several record books of seventeen notary's offices in Lisbon for the period from 1780 to 1807.[9] Although these are the main sources used in this ar-

[8] Costa, *O Transporte no Atlântico*, 293; Leonor Freire Costa, *Império e grupos mercantis, entre o Oriente e o Atlântico (século XVII)* (Lisboa: Livros horizonte, 2002), 60; Leonor Freire Costa, "Entre o açúcar e o ouro: permanência e mudança na organização dos fluxos (séculos XVII e XVIII)," in *Nas rotas do império: Eixos mercantis, tráfico e relações sociais no mundo português*, ed. João Fragoso (Vitória: EDUFES, 2014), 99, 100, 101, 108–109; Fábio Pesavento, *Um pouco antes da corte: a economia do Rio de Janeiro na segunda metade dos setecentos* (Ph.D. diss., Rio de Janeiro UFF, 2009), 107–120, 198.

[9] Approximately 1,203 notary books of the Lisbon offices have been consulted, about 76% of the total number of notary books for the period from 1780 to 1807. The society contracts are in the National Archive Torre do Tombo (Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo – ANTT) in different Notary Books (Livros de Notas – LN) of Lisbon registry offices (Cartórios Notariais de Lisboa – CNL). The notarial documentation is henceforth referenced as ANTT, CNL–LN, Box (Cx.), Book. (liv.), fólio (f.). The documentary reference of the ninety-four societies is as follows: 1º CNL–Ofício A, Cx. 120, liv. 548, f. 51–52. 1º CNL–Ofício B, Cx. 97, liv. 813, f. 12v–13v e 27–28. Cx. 98, liv. 815, f. 37v–38. 1º CNL–Ofício C, Cx. 14, liv. 68, f. 60–61. Cx. 15, liv. 72, f. 31v–32. 2º CNL, Cx. 132, liv. 624, f. 52v–53. liv. 626, f. 88v-90. Cx. 133, liv. 628, f. 58–58v. Cx. 135, liv. 638, f. 27–27v. Cx. 137, liv. 651, f. 55–55v. Cx. 139, liv. 662, f. 40–41v. Cx. 139, liv. 662, f. 42–43v. Cx. 140, liv. 664, f. 25v–26v. 6º CNL, Cx. 22, liv. 109, f. 96–98v, liv. 110, f. 38–39. Cx. 24, liv. 120, f. 14–16v. liv. 120, f. 93–95v. Cx. 26, liv. 129, f. 7–8v. Cx. 27, liv. 135, f. 22v–24, 58–59 e 97–99. Cx. 30, liv. 146, f. 54–55. liv. 147, f. 19–21. liv. 150, f. 15–16v. Cx. 31, liv. 154, f. 20v–22. Cx. 32, liv. 158, f. 13v–14v.

ticle, I also used some powers of attorney from the same registry offices, as well as documents from the Overseas Historical Archive (*Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino*) and from the Board of Trade. I analyze a specific segment of the Portuguese-Brazilian trade, the Lisbon-Pernambuco circuit, in a context of commercial growth driven by increased exports of cotton and sugar.[10] In the period from 1760 to 1780, trade between Pernambuco and Portugal was under the monopoly of the General Company of Pernambuco and Paraíba. In 1808, the ports of Brazil were opened to other nations, and Portuguese merchants lost their commercial exclusivity. Thus, the years between 1780 and 1807/1808 constitute a period without major political and economic turmoil for Portuguese private merchants, who were able to conduct their business freely.[11]

The article consists of two sections. In the first section, I present the partners involved in the commerce with Pernambuco, the unequal division of the initial capital they invested, and the duration of existence of the companies. I then analyze the clauses of the contracts, emphasizing the duties that the partners without capital, or with little capital, had with the partners who called themselves owners of the society. At this point, it is important to note that the partner with more capital is referred to as the principal or the silent partner, while the partner with less or no capital is referred to as the agent or as an active partner. In the second section, I explore the reasons why charters were favorable to partners with more

Cx. 33, liv. 165, f. 45v–47v. Cx. 35, liv. 172, f. 45–46v. liv. 175, f. 89v–92. Cx. 37, liv. 181, f. 72–74. liv. 183, f. 43v–44v e 49–50. Cx. 37, liv. 184, f. 86–87. liv. 185, f. 8–10. liv. 186, f. 57v–59. 7º CNL–Ofício A, Cx. 106, liv. 644, f. 16v–18. Cx. 109, liv. 662, f. 37v–40v. Cx. 110, liv. 671, f. 40v–42v. Ofício B, Cx. 26, liv. 116, f. 27–28. 9º CNL, Cx. 21, liv. 102, f. 4–5. 10º CNL, Cx. 22, liv. 121, f. 42–43v e 84v–86v. Cx. 24, liv. 132, f. 16–17V. Cx. 25, liv. 134, f. 42–42V. Cx. 26, liv. 136, f. 21–22V. liv. 141, f. 50–51V. Cx. 27, liv. 147, f. 99v–100v. Cx. 28, liv. 152, f. 29v–31. liv. 153, f. 25–26. Cx. 30, liv. 165, f. 109v–110v, 11v–12, 16v–17v, 4v–5 e 64v–65v. Cx. 31, liv. 167, f. 12–12v e 16v–17. liv. 168, f. 9v–10. liv. 169, f. 62–63v. liv. 170, f. 108v–109v, 25v–26v e 98–99. Cx. 32, liv. 175, f. 58–58v e 60–61. liv. 176, f. 4v-5v. liv. 185, f. 58–58v. liv. 187, f. 120v–122v e 47v–48v. liv. 189, f. 27v–28v e f. 30–31. Cx. 36, liv. 190, f. 103–104 e 67–67v. liv. 192, f. 110v–111. Cx. 37, liv. 196, f. 104–105. liv. 200, f. 36v–38. Cx. 38, liv. 203, f. 114–115v. liv. 204, f. 65v–67 e 77–78. liv. 206, f. 135–136. liv. 207, f. 44–45. Cx. 39, liv. 208, f. 8–9v. liv. 209, f. 77v–78. liv. 211, f. 127 e 43v–44. Cx. 40, liv. 216, f. 126–127 e 23–23v. liv. 218, f. 71–72. Cx. 41, liv. 221, f. 93–94. 11º CNL–Ofício B, Cx. 11, liv. 72, 35v–38. Cx. 12, Liv. 86, 57v–59. 12º CNL–Ofício B, Cx. 22, liv. 110, f. 92v–93v. Cx. 24, liv. 119, f. 88v–87. Cx. 29, liv. 143, f. 53–55. 14º CNL, Cx. 21, liv. 101, f. 1–2. 15º CNL–Ofício A, Cx. 125, liv. 781, f. 24–24v.

[10] Between the 1780s and 1790s, Pernambuco benefited from the high demand for cotton from Europe's textile manufactures. In addition, because of the slave revolution in Saint-Domingue, which was one of the largest sugar producers of the world, Pernambuco and the rest of Brazil increased their sugar exports. See: Melo, *O negócio de Pernambuco: financiamento, comércio e transporte na segunda metade do século XVIII,* 142–196.

[11] Although it corresponds to a relatively turmoil-free period for Portuguese private trade, it is necessary to mention that between 1793 and 1815 there were a series of wars and blockades in the Atlantic world. The specific ways in which these events affected trade between Pernambuco and Portugal requires detailed research that goes beyond the scope of this article.

capital, and investigate some of the strategies employed to overcome the dangers and risks of commercial activity in the late eighteenth century.

Agents, Capital and Contracts

Companies—also called "mercantile societies," "firms" or just "societies," according to the individual society charter documentation—was a type of organization often used by merchants who plied the colonial trade. Its roots can be found in the *commendas* (a type of medieval merchant arrangement resembling early modern companies) and was a contract still used in the Portuguese Empire in the second half of the eighteenth century as well as elsewhere in Europe and the Americas.[12] It differed from the commission system, another well-known form of commercial organization in this period.[13] The Portuguese companies generally involved two agents: one resident in Lisbon and another resident within or regularly traveling to Brazil. Like commission contracts, the contractual terms of a trading company were also private and thus the nature of the agreements varied from case to case. However, unlike the commission contracts, which rarely appear in the notary records, companies were often registered.[14] Notarial records registered the obligations of each partner, the portion of capital that each committed and who was the main director for the company.

The profile of the partners was very heterogeneous, and the size of their investments varied. Companies were established by businessmen, merchants, grocers, clerks, tax farmers, goldsmiths, bakers, charioteers, tinsmiths, cooks, customs officers, ship captains and maritime pilots, carpenters, caulkers, cake sellers, sur-

[12] Robert Lopez and Irving Woodworth Raymond, *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 174–176. For the Spanish and Dutch case in the eighteenth century, see: Antonio García-Baquero, *Cádiz y el Atlantico (1717–1778): el comercio colonial español bajo el monopólio gadatino* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1976), 406; Jan De Vries, "The Dutch Atlantic Economies," in *The Atlantic Economy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice and Personnel*, ed. Peter A. Coclanis (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005), 2. The societies have also been analyzed for the Luso-Brazilian context. For Bahia, see: David Grant Smith, *The Mercantile Class of Portugal and Brazil in the Seventeenth Century: a Socio-economic Study of the Merchants of Lisbon and Bahia, 1620–1690* (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1975), 345-351. For Rio de Janeiro, see: Antônio Carlos Jucá de Sampaio, "Os homens de negócio do Rio de Janeiro e sua atuação nos quadros do Império português (1701–1750)," in *O Antigo Regime nos Trópicos: a dinâmica imperial portuguesa (séculos XVI–XVIII)*, ed. João Fragoso, Maria Fernanda Bicalho and Maria de Fátima Gouvêa (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2001), 90–94.

[13] Societies and commissioned relationships were perhaps the two main ways by which the merchants concluded deals with each other. For the commission system, see: Jacob Price, "Transaction Costs, a Note on Merchant Credit and the Organization of Private Trade," in *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750,* ed. James Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 279.

[14] It is worth remembering that only societies formed for negotiations with Pernambuco were consulted here. In the Lisbon offices, there are many other companies for Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Maranhão, Angola, Asia and other places.

geons, priests, and owners of shipyards. The average duration of a society was around 4 years and 2 months, with companies lasting at least 1 year, up to 8 years, some with a possibility of renewal.[15]

Lisbon-based partners contributed the most capital and they thus proclaimed themselves the real owners of the companies. In total, they subscribed 216,116,924 *réis* (73.02%). Those who traveled to Pernambuco or who were already there invested 79,825,769 *réis* (26.98%). All subscriptions, most of them invested in manufactured goods (so-called *fazendas*), totaled 325,012,999 *réis*.[16] The average amount of funds for each company was about six million *réis*. However, some societies had capital as low as 72,710 *réis*, while others had 41,820,000 *réis* at their disposal.

Among a number of different rules, one clause appears constantly in almost all companies charters: profits and losses would be equally divided between all partners at the end of the company (although a few contracts divided gains and losses unequally). This is another difference from commission contracts. In the latter, merchants in Lisbon carried the risks on the goods (*fazendas*) consigned to merchants in Pernambuco, while the commissioner in Brazil did not bear any risk. Splitting equal shares of profits between the partner in Lisbon and Pernambuco, the mercantile society paid agents in Brazil or those who were going to travel there larger remunerations than commission arrangements. In addition, merchants in Pernambuco generally did not subscribe funds. In most cases, they entered into a society only with their work and, in few cases, they contributed a small portion of capital. On the other hand, these agents could not maximize their own profits, as I shall try to demonstrate. Moreover, in cases of partial losses or total bankruptcy, partners in Pernambuco shouldered half of the losses.

Merchants in Lisbon resorted to company charters to secure the exclusive services of an agent in the colony. Commission agents instead could work for multiple merchants. This exclusivity clause limited the parallel mercantile activities that could jeopardize the interests of the senior partner. Senior partners in Lisbon, however, could have more than one partner in Pernambuco, and of course, they could have commission agents and partners in other colonial marketplaces.

An example that demonstrates how company charters limited the leeway of agents in Brazil is that of Manuel da Silva Franco and José de Matos Girão, both of whom were businessmen from Lisbon. They entered into a partnership in 1797,

[15] Fifty-eight societies declared their duration of existence, eleven functioned indefinitely and twenty-five simply did not declare the duration for their existence.

[16] This is the total sum of all societies, even those that did not distinguish between what was owned by the Lisbon merchant and what was owned by the merchant in Pernambuco. That is why it is a value greater than the sum of the capitals divided up between the merchants in Lisbon and those of Pernambuco. Of the ninety-four societies, fifty-three declared the amount of initial capital with which they would work. The *fazendas*, as they were commonly called, consisted of foodstuffs, cloths, wines, olive oils, irons, copper, steels, and a number of other products that were produced in the Kingdom of Portugal or abroad.

which was to last seven years. The 32 million *réis* funds belonged solely to Manuel da Silva Franco. José de Matos Girão did not subscribe any capital but participated in the company "only with his agency, service and intelligence." According to the contract, Girão was to go to Pernambuco, where he was to rent houses and warehouses, and receive and reinvest the goods that the partner of Lisbon sent him. The latter should always be considered "at all times as sole master of the entire assets and owner of this society, both of the capital, and of the profits to be made during the said seven years of its duration, in which time there will be no division of the same profits, but shall join the same capital." Girão could not do other business outside the company, since "everything must be employed and occupied in the progress and advancement of this society." Franco, by contrast, could enter into other commercial operations, in other ports, with other people, including in Pernambuco. The reason for this was that Franco owned the company's capital and "because this negotiation [the company in partnership with Girão] is also considered as one of the branches of its trade." Girão could even act as a consignee for other people in Pernambuco, but one third of the profit from this activity would go to the partner in Lisbon. Expenses arising from provisions and the employment of clerks, among other things, would be paid by each one at their respective place of residence. Both partners should send the annual balance sheets of the company. After five years, Franco could withdraw 50% of the invested capital, and after the sixth year could withdraw the other 50%. In the seventh year, he would share profits and losses equally with Girão.[17]

Even when partners subscribed an identical number of shares of capital, the contractual terms could be disadvantageous to the partner in Pernambuco. Take the example of Manuel Francisco Lavra in Lisbon and Amaro Branco in Pernambuco. In 1793, both agreed on a partnership that would last 4 years and each subscribed the same amount of six million *réis,* which they quickly invested in goods. The analysis of contractual clauses makes evident some strategies used to better manage the business and clearly discriminate how the partner in Lisbon sought to diminish the influence and interests of the other partner. For example, if there were shipwrecks on the round trip, both partners should share losses equally. Since in Brazil there were no insurance houses, the partner in Lisbon was responsible for taking out a policy and the partner in Pernambuco was obliged to consent to the policy terms, even if he did not agree with the premium rate. The company had to keep their books "in the form of the merchant style," so the partners could check one another's records in case of suspicion of dishonest activity. They could sell the goods and receive the payments later, but the collection of debts would be the responsibility of each one and not of the society. This provided an incentive to the parties to commit themselves to recover the money.

[17] ANTT, 7º CNL–Ofício A, LN, Cx. 110, liv. 671, f. 40v–42v.

More than that, these last two partners were barred from making use of the company capital in potentially risky and perhaps unnecessary activities. They could not act as guarantors at all and could only buy shares or interest in a ship with the explicit authorization given by the other partner. If a partner acted as guarantor for someone, he was obliged to surrender the gains of that activity to the other partner. Commission profits "from any remittances or cargo of goods from private persons consigned to them" would be directed to the company and not benefit one of the partners. The firm would only be charged for the rental of the warehouse in Pernambuco, with the partners sharing the costs. Each partner would bear the costs of clothes, wages and support of clerks. They could not contract another society. However, although both entered into a company with equal shares, the partner in Pernambuco could not trade on his own account, only the Lisbon merchant could do so. At the end of the society, each one would take back their money and divide the profits, or losses, equally.[18]

Almost ten years later the same Manuel Francisco Lavra began a company with José Francisco Mindello, already based in Pernambuco. Mindello entered into the partnership with an attorney who represented him in Lisbon. According to the contract, the company would last 5 years and had an initial fund of 4,800,000 *réis*, of which the members invested equal shares. Despite the equality of capital subscribed, the one who benefited most from the negotiation was Lavra. Among other things, Lavra was free to enter into contracts with other companies and agents of Pernambuco. Mindello, however, was restricted to acting only with the partner. The purchase of a vessel—or shares in a ship—by the partner in Pernambuco, for example, was explicitly forbidden, as was the purchase of real estate. The partner in Lisbon, on the other hand, was free to make such investments. José Francisco Mindello could not negotiate on his own, neither in Pernambuco nor elsewhere. Yet, the Lisbon-based partner could freely negotiate anywhere with capital that was not owned by the company. At the end of the partnership, José Francisco Mindello would have to travel to Lisbon and settle the accounts, recovering the initial capital he had subscribed and sharing profits and losses equally. Having "more funds and credits," only the partner of Lisbon had the freedom to terminate the partnership and to have the accounts of the partner in Pernambuco to be presented when he requested.[19]

An extreme case of how these contracts limited the autonomy of merchants in Brazil is that of Nuno Antônio Rodrigues Lima, who was about to go to Pernambuco in 1788. The company would begin on January 1st of that year and would end in December 1793. The Lisbon partner was the grocer Antônio Pires Marinho, who had subscribed "his present and future movable property" in the society. The partner in Pernambuco did not enter with any capital, only with his "agency

[18] ANTT, 6º CNL–LN, Cx. 30, liv. 147, f. 9–21.
[19] Society created in 1802. ANTT, 6º CNL–LN, Cx. 35, liv. 175, f. 89v–92.

and personal work". In Pernambuco, Nuno Antônio had to leave all his business operations registered in books: the draft, the book in which he copied the letters he received and sent, the journal and the ledger book. The contract stipulated that Nuno Antônio could "hire a clerk if he needs" or even buy, on behalf of the company, "a slave to serve him and as many as they need." Both could sell goods to receive payments in the future, but these types of sales could not exceed the limit of one million *réis*. On the other hand, the clerks could not do this without the permission of their "bosses." The partners could not "take any money from this society, nor the partner from Pernambuco [Nuno Antônio] to pay individual debts." This part of the contract clearly refers to Nuno Antônio, who had defaulted on debts of 626,439 *réis* with six people, including his own partner Antônio Pires Marinho. Still, Nuno Antônio could not "receive goods from other people"; also, throughout the duration of the company, he could not marry, could not join any brotherhood or "make superfluous expenses." These clauses would ensure that Nuno Antônio's property would not be shared with either a wife or religious institutions.

Most of the contracts stipulated the equal share of profits and losses at the end of the companies. It was, as already mentioned, one of the few clauses favorable to the agents about to travel to Brazil. However, some contracts divided gains and losses unequally. In one of them, for example, Manuel Xavier did not subscribe capital, but only "his agency and personal work." As a result, Xavier would receive, at the end, a third of the profits. Moreover, the losses, "whether of sea or land," were his own sole responsibility. The partners in Lisbon—Correia, Viana and Company—would receive two thirds of the profits.[20] In another case, the company would keep all the profits from commissions, sales, or purchases they made on behalf of other people. According to the contract, the partner in Pernambuco could not be a tax farmer, a guarantor, and he could not buy buildings and ships. At the end of the company, the partner in Pernambuco would receive 33.3% of the profits and the one based in Lisbon would be entitled to receive the remaining percentage.[21] At the end of another firm, the partner in Lisbon, the cod seller José Rodrigues, would receive 66.6% of the profits and the partner in Pernambuco, Martinho Francisco Pereira, would receive the rest. Furthermore, the latter was prohibited from doing business with other people. The contract explained the unequal division of earnings. Since the partner in Pernambuco did not subscribe any capital, he was exempt from paying the debts to the company's creditors. However, the partners would share freight and insurance costs.[22]

[20] ANTT, 6º CNL–LN, Cx. 27, liv. 135, f. 97–99.
[21] The partner in Lisbon had subscribed eight million *réis* in the society and the partner in Pernambuco subscribed four million *réis*. Society between Fernandes de Matos, in Lisbon, and Antônio do Couto, in Pernambuco. ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 31, liv. 169, f. 62–63v.
[22] Society formed in 1803. ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 39, liv. 208, f. 8–9v.

As should now be clear, analysis of the contracts demonstrates clear asymmetry between the counterparties in terms of invested capital. Lisbon-based merchants usually subscribed either the entire startup capital or the largest part of it. The contribution of the Pernambuco-based partners comprised largely their "work and agency." Even when both counterparties subscribed equal shares, the relations were unequal as it limited the potential gains of the Pernambuco-based partner. Moreover, many contracts stipulate that the Pernambuco-based merchant should obey the strict orders of the Lisbon partner. According to a company charter, when Manuel Lourenço went to Pernambuco in 1797, he was to establish "a house of business that he will administer with all care and zeal, following the orders of João José [the partner in Lisbon]."[23]

These examples suffice to reveal the clear existence of hierarchies of command between the merchants of Lisbon and the agents in Pernambuco. These unequal conditions are explained by the role of capital originating in Lisbon, which governed relations with the colony. Restricting the latitude of merchants in Pernambuco was a strategy to minimize the moral hazard of agency relations. From the perspective of the Lisbon-based merchant, it was unproductive to allow partners in Pernambuco dedicate their time to operations that would not maximize the senior partners' profits. Hence, the agent was prohibited from doing business on his own. Likewise, the profits accumulated from activities outside the societies should be allocated to the company's capital, as in the case of commissions.[24] It also guaranteed that, in the event of losses, capital would not be sacrificed. Therefore, Lisbon-based merchants insisted that their partners in Pernambuco could not act as guarantors, inhibiting their participation in any type of transaction involving mortgages, as was the case of tax farming, or buying ship-shares. Moreover, these clauses may explain why some merchants in the colony had no part in sugar mills, leaving that investment—and others mentioned above—in the hands of colonial merchants who were not bound by company contracts.

The equal division of profits remained as one of the few sources of profit for the agents who moved to the colony, even though they were responsible for sharing the losses as well. Nonetheless, these unequal contracts might have been ultimately favorable to those minor partners. Being deprived of capital and dependent on a senior partner could be more profitable than participating in another type of arrangement, such as commissioner agent or being a full merchant. As a commissioner, the agent earned only commissions, a lower remuneration when compared to the money he would earn as a partner. As a merchant who traded at his own

[23] ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 32, liv. 176, f. 4v–5v.

[24] The best example of this is a society charter dating from 1790. It was stipulated that a member in Lisbon would receive 3% for both purchases and sales, and the members of Pernambuco would receive 5% in sales and 3% in purchases. The fact that commissions' fees were higher in Brazil, which gives the impression of greater gains to these agents, is quickly negated by the clause stipulating that the fees would go to the society and when the company ends, profits and losses would be divided equally. ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 26, liv. 141, f. 50–51V.

risk, the agent would cease to be an agent and would have the possibility of greater profits than if he were a partner or a commissioner, but in such an arrangement he would bear all expenses and eventual losses.

Risk, Credit, and Strategies[25]

The reason for such caution in these contracts may be rooted in the startup capital of the companies. Whether from Lisbon members or from partners of Pernambuco, the funds could have origins in loans. Some companies made it clear that they were registering contracts at notary offices in order to produce legally admissible evidence to their creditors and enable them to file a lawsuit to recover their credits. It should not be surprising, therefore, that companies first pledged to pay their creditors before sharing profits and losses. Even if the companies started with their own resources, they could, in the course of their activities, opt for loans.

The practice of borrowing money from smaller and more speculative investors, such as ship crews, or traveling commissioners, was probably more frequent in the early stage of the company. In this particular situation, trading through traveling commissioners (*comissários volantes*) is very similar to short-term societies. Traveling commissioners were small traders who worked as agents of merchants in Portugal. They gathered capital from several investors and went to Brazil to do quick business and return to the Kingdom with the tropical goods. In this case, the only difference between traveling commissioners and short-term companies was that in the first instance, agents received commissions and in the latter, they had equal participation in the profits and losses of negotiations. João Francisco Lucas and Manuel da Silva Soares, both traveling to Pernambuco are a case in point. According to the company charter, they borrowed money from several people, which they employed in commodities (the "*fazendas*"). They registered the society at a notary's office to prove to the creditors that they were committed to pay the debts.[26] João Raposo and Manuel Inácio Ferreira, both crewmembers of the ship Santo Antônio Delfim, began an unlimited-duration partnership for trading with Paraíba (an administrative region adjacent to Pernambuco). Both signed up to a company charter to guarantee payment to both present and future creditors. They pledged to pay them, whether through "credit, risk, interest or gratuity." The

[25] Many issues discussed here were inspired by the analyses of researchers who discussed the relationship between risk and credit, see: Antonio-Miguel Bernal, *La financiación de la Carrera de Indias (1492–1824), dinero y crédito en el comercio colonial español com América* (Madrid: Consorcio Urbanístico del Pasillo Verde Ferroviario de Madrid, 1992); Nuala Zahedieh, "Credit, Risk and Reputation in Late Seventeenth Century Colonial Trade," *Research in Maritime History* 15 (1998); Jeremy Baskes, *Staying Afloat: Risk and Uncertainty in Spanish Atlantic World Trade, 1760–1820* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

[26] Society signed in 1789. ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 25, liv. 134, f. 42–42V.

profits could only be divided after the debts were settled with the creditors and, in order to guarantee the payments, they mortgaged their assets.[27]

Another company also formed by two seamen, Manuel dos Santos da Cruz and Domingos da Costa, was valid only for a round trip. The contract left open if both or only one of them went to Pernambuco. Yet the contract was very clear about the following: "that this society makes them of several parcels of money, that both took at risk, and of the most that they could find ..." and that everything was employed in goods. After they returned from Pernambuco, they would pay the "respective risks" and interest and then would make a profit-and-loss split.[28] The society that was named "João Manuel Álves and Company," with a fund of 4,800,000 *réis* and a duration of three years, could not be guarantor of anything and anyone. Furthermore, the firm was also forbidden to be responsible for tax farming contracts, since nothing should come out of it other than paying the creditors. For this reason, the contract stipulated that the sales should be made only to people of trust and no company capital could be used for operations outside it.[29]

These examples demonstrate how credit was critical to trade, not only for small operators, since even large merchants made use of money from others. Moreover, mercantile societies could rely on long chains of credits. The contract between José Joaquim Ramos e Silva in Lisbon and Manuel Rodrigues Sete in Pernambuco exemplifies this. The list of creditors who invested in the company was very long and judging by the foreign names of the dealers, it is safe to conjecture that the credits came from income with other places in Europe. Julien Guilot, Porter & Horton, João Batista Travesso, João Henrique Hannivenkel, Gilstiphens & Company, Vale & Peres, Delente & Costa, Antônio Hozenclever (son of Pedro Jacob Hozenclever), Tealdor Brothers, Sebastião Alizeri, João Batista Bertholon & Company, Lequen & Company, all residents of Lisbon, Joaquim Ramos da Costa and Antônio Monteiro Neves, both from Porto and Manuel José Pereira, from Vila do Conde, were "all dealers and creditors of the society." Even though they were based in different places, distance did not prevent them from making a joint power of attorney to allow the merchant João Crisóstomo da Fonseca e Silva collect their credits from Manuel Rodrigues Sete in Pernambuco.[30]

Charging debts, sometimes, might not be easy. When João Theodoro Koster and Company, described as "British Nation businessmen with established house" in Lisbon, wished to charge the company composed by Francisco José da Costa and Feliciano Batista de Aguiar, residents of the village of Goiana, Pernambuco region, they encountered many difficulties. Not only did the debtors refuse to pay,

[27] Society of 1792. ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 28, liv. 153, f. 25–26.
[28] Society of 1793. ANTT, 1º CNL–Ofício A – LN, Cx. 120, liv. 548, f. 51–52.
[29] Society formed by João Manuel Álves in Lisbon and José Francisco Belem in Pernambuco, signed in 1789. ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 26, liv. 136, f. 21–22V.
[30] Power of attorney written in 1785. The register of this company was not found. ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 21, liv. 114, f. 12v–13.

but the courts also did not enforce the law, according to Koster. The British merchant had loaned more than five million *réis* to the Pernambuco-based merchants in the form of goods in the year 1782. Since the debtors were slow to pay, Koster issued a power of attorney for someone to charge them. The attorney went to the town of Goiana and "ordered the relevant action against the" debtors "in the ordinary court of the said village." However, "ordinary judges" of that place "are lay men who dispatch by advisors who are often the lawyers of the parties themselves and, when they are not, they are always dependent on them because the debtors are powerful" men in Goiana. Besides, Koster was afraid that the debtors could "bribe" their attorneys in the village. That is why he asked for the official of justice (*Ouvidor*) of Pernambuco to intervene in the case. In 1787, the debts were still outstanding.[31] The last two cases describe that the capital necessary to deal with Brazil went beyond national borders as they could be raised through foreign merchants residing in Lisbon. More than that, these examples show how investors had jurisdiction to charge their debtors, either by private solicitors or through government officials in the colony.

Sales on credit called for caution, especially in Brazil. Poorly paid goods, or simply unpaid, could be reflected in the merchants' accounts in Lisbon, affecting even their credit lines. One of the functions of Francisco Nunes Correa, a partner in Pernambuco who did not subscribe any capital in the firm led by Antônio José dos Santos Rodrigues in Lisbon, was to sell the goods in exchange for money and only sell on credit to people "of reputable credit and probity." By doing so, he would remit the proceeds of sales as quickly as possible "so that he [Antônio] does not suffer humiliation by the creditors of the society."[32]

Goods not sold in the colony owing to bad payers, could make it difficult to purchase colonial goods, which in turn caused extreme distress to the partner in Lisbon, who probably had to pay the goods bought on credit that he had sent to Brazil in the first place. The old practice of purchasing sugar in advance by selling goods on credit (*adiantamentos*) was still in use in Pernambuco in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. It was one of the ways that Antônio José da Silva, in Pernambuco, could use to sell the goods that the partner in Lisbon, Manuel José da Cruz e Silva, sent to him. According to the contract, he should sell the goods "for cash and in exchange for agricultural products and still even sale goods on credit for a limited time." This tactic could be used in regions outside Recife (capital of Pernambuco), "to well-established *sugar mill* owners and cane growers" so that at the time of harvest, the planters would pay their debts with sugar to

[31] Overseas Historical Archive, 015, Cx. 160, D. 11524. João Theodoro Koster, or John Theodor Koster, later returned to England. In Liverpool, he became one of the main importers of cotton from Portugal between 1784 and 1815. See: Alexey Krichtal, *Liverpool and the Raw Cotton*. *Trade*: A *Study of the Port and its Merchant Community*, *1770–1815* (Master's thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2013), 57–60.

[32] The Society had been established in 1783, but was only recorded on paper in 1785. ANTT, 2º CNL–LN, Cx. 132, liv. 626, f. 88v–90.

José da Silva."[33] The same strategy was not found, for example, in the company between Francisco Antônio Lago and José Pinto, who, although allowing sales on credit, excluded this practice from the interior (*sertões*) of Pernambuco.[34] These examples of mercantile strategies clearly show that the senior partners sought to minimize risks by stipulating the privileged spaces in which the junior partners would act.

Senior partners could also raise capital from partners' debts, whether past, present or emerging from the activities of the company. For instance, Álvaro Gonçalves owed eight million *réis* to José Bento de Araújo and it was with this money that they started a company in 1796. Even so, Álvaro was forbidden from negotiating with anyone other than his partner in Lisbon.[35] The ten million *réis* that Jacinto José Dias de Carvalho, the partner in Pernambuco, invested in the company was a loan from the partner of Lisbon, Manuel Ribeiro da Silva. The partner in Pernambuco should pay the partner in Lisbon 4% p.a. interest to satisfy the loan, and if the partner in Lisbon wanted to borrow money to leverage the firm, both partners should take responsibility for debt repayments.[36] At the end of the company between the Lisbon baker, José Rodrigues, and the seaman, Domingos da Costa, in 1804, da Costa owed Rodrigues 2,773,130 *réis*, which was used as credit to renew the company for another four years.[37]

The issue of indebtedness is particularly interesting, as seen in the previous case. Because formal institutions were weak and/or insufficient, merchants relied on informal mechanisms to mitigate their losses. One of these strategies involved assisting debtors with their finances. As frustrating as it may have been, this was the less disruptive option for creditors: by supplying debtors with more credit, creditors hoped that they would be eventually reimbursed in the near future. In addition, initiating or renewing contracts with defaulting agents in Brazil was perhaps a strategy that the partner with more capital consented to in order to have an experienced agent in the colonial market. Appealing to higher judicial bodies—formal institutions—constituted an alternative strategy, but here, resolving disputes took a long time and entailed a high operational cost. In the worst-case

[33] The tactic of using an "advance" (*adiantamento*) meant that the merchant sold goods on credit to sugar mill owners and cane growers so that he, the merchant, would receive the crates of sugar in the future. Thereby the trader could avoid the market of free-floating prices. In this type of negotiation, planters promised crates of sugar exclusively to the merchant who had financed them. Society of 1785. ANTT, 6º CNL–LN, Cx. 22, liv. 109, f. 96–98v. See: Stuart Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society, Bahia*, *1550–1835* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 207–208.

[34] Society of 1801. ANTT, 6º CNL–LN, Cx. 35, liv. 172, f. 45–46v.

[35] ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 32, liv. 175, f. 58–58v.

[36] Society of 1803. ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 38, liv. 206, f. 135–136.

[37] For the initial formation of society in 1796, see: ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 32, liv. 175, f. 60–61. For the renewal of society, eight years later, see: ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 39, liv. 211, f. 127.

scenario for the creditor, he would break the agreement with the debtor and waive his debts.

Some companies expressly prohibited recourse to the courts. One charter made it clear that any quarrels arising at the end of the company could not be settled judicially.[38] Another charter stipulated that in case of disagreements, each partner should appoint a private arbiter—*louvado*—to mediate and decide the matter. If that did not work out, they should appoint a third arbiter to settle it.[39] In other instances, merchants ultimately resorted to the formal institution of the Board of Trade. In the "settlement of accounts" of a company, if there was any contestation or doubt, it would proceed as follows: two arbiters would be appointed, one for each partner, and if they were not resolved, they would ask the Board of Trade to appoint a casting vote.[40] In another company, if the decision of the arbiters did not find a solution, the case would be sent to the Board.[41] Finally, only one contract out of the ninety-four expressly stipulated that any disagreements would be resolved "summarily" at the Board of Trade.[42]

Private judgments, with *ad hoc* arbitrators—*louvados*—being called to resolve disputes thus clearly played an active role. This is very relevant considering that arbiters were also traders. As such, arbiters of such judgments were experts in trade matters and commercial documents and accounts. This means that there were networks of arbiters/merchants who were familiar with resolving disputes between merchants in the trading community. Their performance fostered the production of information on both the most reputable and least reliable traders. This informal and private arrangement helped the merchant community of Lisbon to identify the agents' reputations, thus reducing the possibility of moral hazard.[43]

In the above cases, disputes between partners were resolved or at least there was a planned solution. However, in other cases, the partners who broke the charter of the company encountered penalties. Twelve powers of attorney registered in the Lisbon notary offices reveal that partners in Lisbon appointed agents in Pernambuco to fine the partners who violated the contract.[44] Contrasting society charters with the powers of attorney curiously reveals that the societies mentioned

[38] ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 32, liv. 176, f. 4v–5v.
[39] ANTT, 7º CNL–Ofício A, LN, Cx. 110, liv. 671, f. 40v–42v.
[40] ANTT, 2º CNL–LN, Cx. 132, liv. 626, f. 88v–90.
[41] ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 31, liv. 169, f. 62–63v.
[42] ANTT, 6º CNL–LN, Cx. 30, liv. 150, f. 15–16v.
[43] Avner Greif discusses issues surrounding agent reputations in "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," *The Journal of Economic History* 49, no. 4 (1989); Zahedieh, "Credit, Risk and Reputation."
[44] There were twelve mercantile companies mentioned in records of powers of attorney for the period from 1784 to 1799. ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 21, liv. 114, f. 12v–13. Cx. 26, liv. 139 f. 92–92v. Cx. 32, liv. 173, f. 115. Cx. 36, liv. 190, f. 41v. ANTT, 6º CNL–LN, Cx. 26, liv. 128, f. 93–94. Cx. 27, liv. 133, f. 54v–55v. ANTT, 7º CNL–Ofício A, LN, Cx. 107, liv. 647, f. 6v–7. Cx. 110, liv. 667, f. 85v–86. ANTT, 1º CNL–Ofício C, LN, Cx. 12, liv. 58, f. 49. ANTT, 2º CNL–LN, Cx. 132, liv. 624, f. 52v–53. ANTT, 3º CNL–LN, Cx. 152, liv. 711, f. 53–53v. ANTT, 14º CNL–LN, Cx. 25, liv. 122, f. 82v–83v.

in the powers of attorney are not listed in the 94 society charters analyzed as part of this study. Therefore, not all actors felt the need to notarize their companies in Lisbon. To be sure, the merchant João Antônio Fernandes Batalha declared to have made a "verbal society" with Francisco José Peixoto de Freitas.[45] Yet, even without a written charter—private or notarized—creditors could grant powers of attorney to recover their capital in Brazil, authorizing their representatives to turn to the colonial courts and to have the assets of the debtor partner sequestrated.[46]

One of the most striking cases is that of the company between the brothers Julião Gervásio de Aguiar and José Estevão de Aguiar, underwritten in 1799.[47] It reveals that kinship ties did not preclude the two brothers from having to register a charter in the presence of a public notary.[48] This is not the only case. Joaquim Leocádio da Fonseca e Silva, who owned one of the largest number of ships in the 1780s, operated as a resident merchant in Pernambuco since at least 1777. He had a company with his father, Manuel da Fonseca e Silva, a businessman resident in Lisbon. The company started with 6,400,000 *réis* in 1777 and was to end in 1783. However, Manuel da Fonseca e Silva filed a suit against his son at the Board of Trade in 1784, accusing Leocádio of having started a partnership with his brother, João Crisóstomo da Fonseca e Silva, resident in Pernambuco, and of investing the capital he owed to his father.[49] Although there are few cases of family-owned companies, the vast majority of the charters did not have their immediate relatives as partners. Moreover, as seen in the above two cases, even when a mercantile society was composed of relatives, legal disputes could arise. Companies therefore relied upon these more formal features including notarial scriptures rather than depending on family relations.

Company charters thus had the function of providing written guarantees to creditors. They also helped to resolve disputes among partners through the use of

[45] ANTT, 10º CNL–LN, Cx. 26, liv. 139 f. 92–92v.

[46] For more on how courts were an efficient way for resolving trade disputes, see: Yadira González de Lara, "The Secret of Venetian Success: A Public-order, Reputation-based Institution," *European Review of Economic History* 12 no. 3 (2008). For an opposite view, see: Francesca Trivellato, *The Familiarity of Strangers, the Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

[47] On two occasions, the partner in Lisbon charged the brother for debts of the society in 1804. ANTT, 1º CNL–Ofício C–LN, Cx. 14, liv. 69, f. 24V–25 and ANTT, 1º CNL–Ofício C–LN, Cx. 15, liv. 75, f. 7V–8v.

[48] According to a more traditional historiography, religious, family and ethnic ties were sufficient to resolve the problems of commerce. It is argued that such ties were more reliable, for example, in concluding agreements with relatives, thus reducing the possibility of moral hazard. For these cases, see: Daniel Maurice Swetschinski, *The Portuguese Jewish Merchants of Seventeenth Century Amsterdam: a Social Profile* (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 1979). However, according to other authors, even familial business partners could be dishonest. Furthermore, to expand their business, merchants necessarily would have to expand their networks by looking for agents outside family circles. See, for instance: Sherylynne Haggerty, *'Merely for Money'?: Business Culture in the British Atlantic, 1750–1815* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2012), 52.

[49] ANTT. Junta do Comércio, Registo Geral, liv. 122, f. 137–140v.

arbiters and the Board of Trade. However, society charters had another function as well. It is worth stressing that some merchants and adventurers who were both inexperienced and only periodically engaged in colonial trade, sometimes acted unscrupulously. Employed as "traveling commissioners" (*comissários volantes*), they received capital from merchants in Portugal, traveled to Brazil to conduct quick business, and returned to Portugal thereafter. This arrangement was legally banned in 1755, when traveling commissioners were accused of having repeatedly defaulted.[50] Despite the ban, the activities of traveling commissioners never ceased,[51] which forced both colonial and metropolitan authorities to monitor their movements on the routes between Portugal and Brazil. When in 1788 the king and the Board of Trade inquired if the traveling commissioners were going to Pernambuco, the officials of the Board in Brazil, who controlled their entry, recommended that all those who went to Brazil were to present their company charters, with the names of the partners in Lisbon and the capital they had at their disposal to do business. This allowed the officials "to find out whether or not the trade they are going to do is right."[52] Basically, the concern was to make sure that the partners would not be mistaken for traveling commissioners and to prove that the travelers had capital, signaling to the authorities that they were trustworthy merchants.

In addition, the Board of Trade had clear intentions to privilege firms over other colonial trading arrangements. Notaries, for example, were only to register company charters for those who produce evidence of their enrollment in the Board of Trade, in accordance with the law of August 30th, 1770. That law, according to the Board itself, reserved trade with the colonies only to merchants enrolled in the Board of Trade.[53] Obviously, this did not happen, and most of the charters never presented merchants' registers. In addition, another part of the trade was made without the need for notarization, including for resident and traveling commissioners.

Still, there is no doubt that by ensuring that agents in Brazil had honest and responsible actions contractually, the merchants of Lisbon were given greater security in business, thereby facilitating market flows. By circumventing these moral hazards, several avenues were thus opened for merchants to sell colonial goods in different marketplaces in Europe. Cotton and sugar were the principal colonial goods sold in this period. Cotton was exported to Great Britain and France in great

[50] Antonio Delgado da Silva, *Collecção da Legislação portuguesa desde a ultima compilação das ordenações [...]. Vol. 1* (Lisbon: Tip. Maigrense, Correia da Cunha, 1830–1849), 404. Kenneth Maxwell, "Pombal and the Nationalization of the Luso-Brazilian Economy," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 48, no. 4 (November 1968), 613–614.

[51] The performance of the traveling commissioners at the end of the eighteenth century is discussed in Melo, *O negócio de Pernambuco*, 261–287.

[52] ANTT. Junta do Comércio, mç. 10 (38). "Correspondência recebida das autoridades ultramarinas."

[53] ANTT. Junta do Comércio, Registo Geral, livro. 113, f. 128–129.

quantity; sugar, meanwhile, was in high demand in Hamburg, in the Italian states and in the Netherlands.[54]

Conclusion

Contrary to the conventional historiography outlined in the introduction, the mercantile societies for trading between Lisbon and Pernambuco clearly indicate that most capital was invested by the Lisbon-based partners. In addition, various contractual clauses significantly limited the freedom to pursue individual trading activities for the partners in Brazil. While merchants in Portugal subscribed the largest amounts of capital for the business ventures, in most cases it was the residents in Brazil who contributed their work and sometimes some capital. Hence, societies' charters suggest a hierarchy between trading actors that follows the hierarchies between marketplaces. Maximiliano Menz has already pointed to such relationships between marketplaces: "...a Lisbon was worth three Rio de Janeiros, a Rio de Janeiro was worth eight Rio Grandes and so on. Consequently, market communities tended to reflect this mercantile territorial distribution."[55]

The analysis of many companies' charters makes it possible to recognize that these asymmetric relations were the manifestation of the hidden concerns and needs of financiers and managers in Lisbon to reduce the moral hazards of employing agents in Brazil. In the case of mercantile companies, it was the management of risk, therefore, that led the economic relationship between merchants and agents to be unequal. Notarized charters helped ensure honest conduct of the agent overseas, the need for minimal control over agent activities and ensured that agents monitored the marketing and transfer of assets, while also ensuring that bookkeeping was accurate and information was constantly exchanged. Likewise, contracts made it possible to raise capital from different creditors and at the same time ensured that the financiers, including foreigners would be paid. Resolutions of disputes between partners were also incorporated in the contracts, with the services of private arbiters being the most frequently used contractual stipulation. All this made the company a very appropriate strategy to mitigate risk and thus reduce transaction costs for those players who had more capital and who led the negotiations.

[54] José Jobson de A. Arruda, *O Brasil no comércio colonial* (São Paulo: Ática, 1980), 362–363, 370–371. H. E. S. Fisher, "Lisbon, its English Merchant Community and the Mediterranean in the Eighteenth Century," in *Shipping, Trade and Commerce: Essays in Memory of Ralph Davis*, ed. P. L. Cottrell and D. H. Aldcroft (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1981), 23–44.

[55] Maximiliano Menz, "O crédito e a economia colonial," in *À vista ou a prazo: comércio e crédito nas Minas setecentistas*, ed. Angelo Alves Carrara (Juiz de Fora: Ed. UFJF, 2010), 28.

This article was only possible thanks to the financial support provided by the São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP). The author is grateful to the Professors Maximiliano M. Menz, Daniel Strum, Jesus Bohorquez, and the reviewers of Global Histories: A Student Journal for suggestions to improve this paper. *e-mail: felipe_melo1989@hotmail.com.*

Subhas Chandra Bose with Heinrich Himmler. 1943.
Photo Courtesy of Bundesarchiv.

Global Concepts and the Semantics of Social Spaces: Fascism and National Socialism in the Political Language of Subhas Chandra Bose

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This paper examines the conceptual incorporation of 'Fascism' and 'National Socialism' into the political language of Indian nationalist icon Subhas Chandra Bose, who influentially cooperated with the Axis powers during the Second World War. The article thereby tries to situate this case study in a wider methodological context shedding light on the relationship(s) between globally circulating concepts and the semantics of the specific social spaces they were articulated in. By reconstructing Bose's political language on the background of his political biography, it offers new insights into the entanglements between Indian political thought and European fascism. His framings of Italian Fascism, German National Socialism and fascist ideology were closely tied to his role in the Indian anticolonial struggle. The paper, thus, highlights the role that the 'social field' of Congress politics and the looser social formations of wartime politics played in structuring the reference semantics. Beyond the case study, it thereby proposes a heuristic framework to further analyse the practical functions that globally circulating concepts may obtain in specific social spaces.

Introduction

On the 3rd of January 1946, Colonel Prem Sahgal, Colonel Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon and General Shah Nawaz were sentenced for high treason at the historically charged Red Fort in Delhi. With this verdict, the preceding trials of functionaries within the Indian National Army ceased to be merely a matter of law or juridical discourse; these three officials became icons of a fundamental transformation in the anticolonial political culture of British India.[1] Despite military failure and dissolution, the armed forces of the *Azad Hind*[2] counter-government—proclaimed

[1] The "Red Forth Trials" were British military trials for Indian National Army officials. The trials involved more than the three mentioned subjects overall, but they, specifically, became symbolic figures of the post-war independence movement. As Sikh, Muslim, and Hindu, they evoked pan-religious solidarity, even causing a collaboration between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League.

[2] Translated into English as "Free India."

in October 1943 and led as well as epitomised by Subhas Chandra Bose[3]—continued to exercise unbroken symbolic power in South Asia. Gandhi's mantra-like dictum of nonviolence, which had shaped the Indian National Congress' politics for decades, was now widely replaced by more aggressive forms of political practice.[4] Different symbolic actions like Jawaharlal Nehru's legal defence of the three military officials or the mutiny of over 20,000 soldiers in the Royal Indian Navy culminated not only in the end of the Raj, but also embedded the political legacy of Subhas Chandra Bose in various South(east)-Asian cultural memories.[5]

These historical developments of Indian political culture are at the core of Indian national history. Nonetheless, they can only be understood thoroughly in a global historical frame. Bose's *Azad Hind* Government and the Indian National Army were not only nationalist projects rooted in Indian colonial society and culture, but also strategic instruments of the Axis powers, deeply entangled in the geopolitics of the Second World War.[6] The dynamics, which climaxed in a military organisation, were situated in global networks of communication and interaction. From the mid-1930s, Subhas Chandra Bose had sought political connections with national socialist and fascist officials. Moreover, Italian Fascism and German National Socialism had been functioning as points of reference in wider Indian political discourse for a much longer time.[7] Recent studies by Maria Framke, Marzia Casolari, and Tobias Delfs have shown how these two states and their political cultures were discursively integrated into Congress and Hindu-nationalist rhetoric during the 1930s.[8]

[3] Subhas Chandra Bose, "Proclamation of the Provisional Government of Free India," in *Chalo Delhi: Writings and Speeches 1943–1945,* Netaji: Collected Works 12, ed. Sisir Kumar Bose and Sugata Bose (Calcutta: Netaji Research Bureau, 2008), 117–120. Subhas Chandra Bose's leadership of the Indian National Army was institutionalised in this, so called, *Azad Hind* government. It was intended as a political counter project and "revolutionary" follow-up to British rule in India in the long run. The cited declaration was backed by Germany, Italy, and Japan.

[4] Sugata Bose, *His MMajesty's Opponent: Subhas Chandra Bose and India's Struggle against Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1; Yasmin Khan, *India at War: The Subcontinent and the Second World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), x.

[5] Ibid., xi; William F. Kuracina, "Sentiments and Patriotism: The Indian National Army, General Elections and the Congress's Appropriation of the INA Legacy," *Modern Asian Studies* 44, no. 4 (2010), 817–856.

[6] Jan Kuhlmann, *Subhas Chandra Bose und die Indienpolitik der Achsenmächte* (Berlin: Schiler, 2003); Johannes H. Voigt, *Indien im Zweiten Weltkrieg,* Studien zur Zeitgeschichte 11 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978); Romain Hayes, *Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany: Politics, Intelligence, and Propaganda 1941–43* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

[7] Kris Manjapra, *Age of Entanglement: German and Indian Intellectuals across Empire* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014), 7; Benjamin Zachariah, "Indian Political Activities in Germany, 1914–1945," *Transcultural Encounters Between Germany and India: Kindred Spirits in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, ed. Joanne Miyang Cho et al. (New York: Routledge, 2013).

[8] Maria Framke, *Delhi – Rom – Berlin: Die Indische Wahrnehmung von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus 1922–1939* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2013); Tobias Delfs, *Hindu-Nationalismus und Europäischer Faschismus: Vergleich, Transfer- und Beziehungsgeschichte* (Hamburg: EB-Verlag, 2008); Marzia Casolari, "Hindutva's Foreign

Such temporally and spatially amplified frameworks not only challenge notions of "the absence of fascism in India"[9] and recall old questions regarding over-reaching definitions of 'fascism,' they also point to methodological possibilities and necessary elaborations of applied global histories of ideas. Maria Framke and Benjamin Zachariah rightfully point out that constructing an Ideal Type of fascism, i.e. a purely theoretical model of what essentially constitutes a fascist ideology, is methodically problematic for such a task.[10] Such a Weberian approach to the conceptual and discursive history of fascism has been widely dismissed in historical research in general.[11] Moreover, it is also unable to uncover the processes of semantic transformation and negotiation that are crucial to understanding the global circulation of concepts. Thus, it is of limited use beyond comparative methods.

Recent studies have methodologically replaced fascist Ideal Types in different productive ways. One may avoid narrow definitions by tracing 'fascism' in smaller practices and ideas shared by most social groups or formations widely understood as fascist.[12] Another insightful approach was the attempt to empirically reconstruct networks of communication and thematic discourses.[13] I will try to offer a different, more basic approach by following a modified Cambridge School method of conceptualising the history of ideas.[14] Hence, this paper tries to show what was meant and especially what was done by incorporating references to 'Fascism' and 'National Socialism' into anti-colonial political communication. Shedding light on the processes of integration, disintegration, and entanglement of political languages and their semantics, such an approach offers a valuable perspective on the history of concepts and idioms that transcended individual political formations and groups.

On a broader theoretical level, this points to a fundamental methodological issue for global historians, which has been closely linked to ongoing critiques of the approach: How are global concepts integrated in specific social spaces[15] and in their political languages? To do this issue justice, it is necessary to go beyond the mainly textual approach of the classical history of ideas and include social formations and spaces in my analytical framework. Therefore, I will situate political

Tie-up in the 1930s. Archival Evidence," *Economic and Political Weekly* 35, no. 4 (2000), 218–228.

[9] Benjamin Zachariah, "Rethinking (the Absence of) Fascism in India, c. 1922–45," in *Cosmopolitan Thought Zones: South Asia and the Global Circulation of Ideas,* ed. Sugata Bose and Kris Manjapra (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 178–210.

[10] Framke, *Delhi – Rom – Berlin*, 39–40; Zachariah, "Rethinking (the Absence of) Fascism in India," 178–210.

[11] Robert O. Paxton, "Comparisons and Definitions," in *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism*, ed. R. J. B. Bosworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 547–565.

[12] Zachariah "Rethinking (the Absence of) Fascism in India," 185.

[13] Delfs, *Hindu-Nationalismus und Europäischer Faschismus*, Framke, *Delhi – Rom – Berlin*.

[14] For further theoretical and methodological elaborations, see chapter 2.

[15] When I talk about 'social spaces' I do not reference to Bourdieu's model of social class and distinction, but the spatial localisation of social fields in the geographical sense.

language and speech acts in the broader context of a theory of social practice and social fields, drawing on the theoretical work of Pierre Bourdieu.

In this article, I will focus on Subhas Chandra Bose as one specific actor. While his actions had global implications, he was at the same time a regionally symbolic figure with a key influence on South-Asian political communication. His political activities, as well as his mostly sympathetic interactions with German and Italian dictatorships have been the subject of ample historical research, which has increasingly pointed to his interest in fascism and national socialism.[16] Besides the geopolitical implications of his actions, the historical impact Bose had on the broader Indian independence movement highlights the value of such an actor-centred approach. In this regard, he was influential in shaping Indian perceptions of World War, fascism and national socialism.

After a chapter outlining the theoretical foundation of this paper, I will reconstruct Bose's political biography to sketch the social fields and spaces his actions were situated in. Afterwards, I turn to his political language in order to examine how he incorporated references to 'Fascism' and 'National Socialism' into his rhetoric. Building on these contextual and conceptual analyses, my conclusion will show how his references were imbedded in the described social formations and their semantics. Not only did Bose reframe 'National Socialism' and 'Fascism' in order to fit the language of Congress politics, they also were conceptual instruments of producing political distinction and power.

Beyond these empirical results, I will end my article with a proposal of some general lessons about the relationship between the semantics of specific social spaces and global political concepts, which can be drawn from this case study for global history in general.

Political Languages in Global History

Historians of ideas have discussed working definitions of their object of enquiry for a long time. Drawing on philosophy of language, the so-called Cambridge School, led by Quentin Skinner and John G.A. Pocock, reassessed the vague notion of the "political idea" by breaking it down to spoken or written forms of language.[17] Ideas, therefore, should be researched in their verbal or scriptural frames, uttered or written down by concrete historical actors in specific political languages. Skinner modified the structuralist approach of "the Language of poli-

[16] Bose, *His Majesty's Opponent*; Kuhlmann, *Subhas Chandra Bose und die Indienpolitik der Achsenmächte*; Johannes H. Voigt, "Hitler und Indien," In *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 19, no. 1 (1971), 33–63; Voigt, *Indien im Zweiten Weltkrieg*; Leonard A. Gordon, *Brothers against the Raj*, 2nd edition (New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2015); Maria Framke, "Encounters with Fascism and National Socialism in non-European Regions," *Südasien-Chronik* 2 (2012), 363–365.

[17] Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas" in *Visions of Politics, Vol. 1: Regarding Method*, ed. Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57–89.

tics" proposed by J.G.A. Pocock[18] by drawing on Austin's theory of speech acts and Wittgenstein's assessment of languages as non-systemic grammatical sets (language games) situated in underlying *Lebensformen*, i.e. embedded and utilised in human practices.[19] While pointing to languages of politics and their rules of articulation as necessary contexts for historical research, he stressed the agency of speakers and writers to change the shapes of discourses. Skinner's agents are still largely discursively determined, but can eclectically and intentionally appropriate concepts and, thus, "logical grammars"[20] from different political languages that historically coexisted. Therefore, the intentions of speakers and writers must be traced because they constitute "illocutionary meanings."[21] This article follows Skinner's elaborations, perceiving "political languages" in plural. Global history, i.e. the different methodologies generally associated with the term, is highly skeptical of considering historical spaces in terms of hermetically sealed containers.[22] To write global histories of ideas, thus, resonates with the more pragmatic Skinnerian framework. But then, such an approach makes it analytically necessary to identify the circulating concepts and to render political languages.

The expansionist imperial projects of Italian fascism and German national socialism changed the lives of communities around the globe. Furthermore, the concepts 'Fascism' and 'National Socialism' also structured perceptions of the global and altered the logics of various political discourses on each continent.[23] Marking a process of global discursive integration, they fit into the concept of global history proposed by Sebastian Conrad, which is concerned with "a focus on integration and structural global transformations"—one might also speak of structural globalisation(s).[24]

It is, nevertheless, a more difficult task to find criteria that at least heuristically determine the boundaries of a specific political language. I want to propose a possible approach drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social practice

[18] John G. A. Pocock, The Concept of a Language and the *metier d'historien*," in *Political Thought and History. Essays on Theory and Method*, ed. John G. A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 87–105.

[19] John L. Austin, *How to do Things with Words. The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2015), §22, §241.

[20] Ibid., §496–497.

[21] Austin, *How to do Things with Words*, 98–103. The illocutionary meaning describes the intentionally anticipated results of a speech act.

[22] Sebastian Conrad, *What is Global History?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 4.

[23] Reto Hofmann and Daniel Hedinger, "Axis Empires: Towards a Global History of Fascist Imperialism," *Journal of Global History* 12 (2017), 161–165; Sven Reichardt, "Globalgeschichte des Faschismus: Neue Forschungen und Perspektiven," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42–43* (2017), 10–16; Framke, "Encounters with Fascism and National Socialism in non-European Regions," 363–365.

[24] Conrad, *What is Global History?* For a discussion of the relations between globalisation(s) and global history, see also: Niels P. Petersson et al., "Globalisierung und Globalgeschichte," in *Globalgeschichten: Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven,* ed. Niels P. Petersson et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2014), 9–18.

and social fields. Alongside Skinner, his work follows Wittgenstein and Austin in stressing speaking and writing as "structured-structuring practices" that shape and are shaped by the structuring rules of symbolic communities.[25] Additionally, he clearly situates these "symbolic structures" in social fields of individual or collective power competition, which are the "market places" for the "symbolic capital" produced through verbal and scriptural performance.[26] Such social fields are stable formations of interaction and communication with specific correlations of different capital types.

Such a theoretical framework allows for a new assessment of globally circulating concepts which takes account of the semantics of the social fields in which they are mobilised as symbolic capital. Only afterwards can they be spatialised. I will, therefore, try to historically sketch the social fields in which Bose operated. Only subsequently, I will analyse the semantics of appropriation and their spatial dimensions.

Politics between British-India and the World of Global Warfare

Born into a *Bhadralok*[27] family attracted to the Hindu-reformist ideas of the *Brahmo-Samaj* and *Vedanta* Philosophy in 1897, Subhas Chandra Bose was already genealogically situated near transformative processes in colonial society.[28] The economic, technological and epistemic dynamics of European imperialism and a converging world market deeply affected South-Asian cultural and social realities. As a consequence and driving force of change, the Bhadralok, with increasing frequency, created new narratives of belonging by making use of colonial infrastructure and printing press media.[29] In what was later amalgamated into the long-durée idea of a "Bengal Renaissance" or "Indian Renaissance", various sets of Hindu-revivalist, pan-religious, radical, and liberal ideas merged into new visions of national identity.[30] Articulating idealised ideas of a precolonial Indian

[25] Pierre Bourdieu, *Sozialer Sinn: Kritik der theoretischen Vernunft*, 9th edition (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2015), 61, 98; "Symbolic capital" can in short be defined as power actualized through specific intersubjectively understood symbolic artefacts or actions. These function as displays of the position of its actualiser in the power relations of a social field. It is the most basic type of power in which all more specifically constituted ones, e.g. economic capital (institutionalized through currencies), cultural capital (institutionalised though educational systems), are transformed, when they are actualized.

[26] Ibid., 205–212.

[27] *Bhadraloks* were a new predominantly Hindu Bengal middle class that mainly consisted of Indian officials in the colonial state and college apparatus; Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India, 1885–1947*, 23rd edition (Delhi: Macmillan, 2012), 65–67.

[28] Bose, *His Majesty's Opponent*, 19; Subhas Chandra Bose, *An Indian Pilgrim: An Unfinished Autobiography,* Netaji: Collected Works 1 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 6–13.

[29] Joya Chatterji, "Nationalism in India. 1857–1947," in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*, ed. John Breuilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2013), 264.

[30] See prominently: Aurobindo Ghosh, "The Renaissance in India," in *The Renaissance in India and Other Essays on Indian Culture*, ed. Sri Aurobindo (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ahsram, 1997), 3–42.

history and a particular Indian spiritual consciousness, such increasingly anti-colonial discourses were at least partially institutionalised in the Indian National Congress in 1885.[31] The radicalisation of political practices caused by the Russo-Japanese-War and the partition of Bengal and the Swadeshi boycott movement took place in the nexus of this emerging social field of politics and its nationalist political languages. The births of radical revolutionary organisations and Bengal anti-colonial terror, thus, went hand in hand with the development of a new political field.[32]

As early as in his school and college years, Bose was inspired by Swami Vivekananda, a major protagonist and icon of nationalised and reformist Hinduism, whose "profound religious authenticity" he admired.[33] He also early on sympathised with revolutionary nationalism and its iconic political advocate Aurobindo Ghose. Bose regarded Aurobindo as fulfilling an urgent need for nationalist and anti-colonial agitation in a country "[which] was politically still dead."[34] Furthermore, Bose was influenced by a political reading of German Idealist philosophy, especially Hegelian dialectics.[35] After leaving India to study at Cambridge, he developed a profound interest in the roots of the troubled post-war political culture of Europe. In particular, 19th century nationalist icons like Bismarck, Metternich or Cavour, the Bolshevik revolution, and socialist and communist movements in Britain and continental Europe influenced his thought.[36]

Already before returning to India in the summer of 1921, Bose exchanged multiple letters with Chittaranjan Das, the leading radical in contemporary Congress politics. This correspondence and—at least if one believes his only literal accounts—the influences of Aurobindo Ghose and Mohandas Gandhi motivated him to dismiss a post in the Indian Civil Service in favour of a political career.[37] Bose became organised in Das's radical wing of the Congress, while morally appreciating but politically dismissing Gandhi for his non-violence ideas and an alleged lack of strategic policy plans.[38]

Mainly due to the agitative praxis of Gandhism, the Congress gained popularity and influence in the 1920s. At the same time, expanding religious communalism

[31] Aurobindo Ghose, "New Lamps for the Old," in *Bande Mataram, Political Writings and Speeches 1890–1908*, ed. Sri Aurobindo (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 2002), 11.
[32] Peter Heehs, *The Bomb in Bengal: The Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism in India 1900–1910* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993); Shukla Sanyal, *Revolutionary Pamphlets, Propaganda and Political Culture in Colonial Bengal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
[33] Bose, *An Indian Pilgrim*, 19.
[34] Ibid., 19.
[35] Ibid., 124.
[36] Bose, *His Majesty's Opponent*, 35–38.
[37] Subhas Chandra Bose, *The Indian Struggle, 1920–1942*, 3rd edition (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 57–58; Subhas Chandra Bose, "Letter to Sarat Chandra Bose from the 23 February 1921," in: *Indian Pilgrim*, ed. Bose, 222.
[38] Bose, *Indian Struggle*, 59–60.

challenged its political power in various regions.[39] Furthermore, the Congress became further discursively and often practically entangled with asianist, socialist, and global anti-imperialist ideas.[40]

Although imprisoned by colonial jurisdiction multiple times, and continuously for two years from 1925 to 1927, Bose became the editor of the *Forward Journal* and took over political offices for the radical *Swaraj Party* in Calcutta. He advocated for a doctrine of *purna swaraj,* or unconditioned independence, and extending the political struggle across boundaries of class, religion, and caste. Additionally, he openly distanced himself from Gandhi's *satyagraha* ideas in order to stress the importance of the radical Bengal tradition and the importance of a socialist political economy.[41]

The crisis of global capitalism severely affected the 1930s in India. The resulting power struggle between old rural elites, aspiring capitalists, and starving agrarian workers resulted in new political interest groups and were a major cause of the Gandhian mass uprisings since 1929.[42] Frustrated by these waves of political mobilization only culminating in the Gandhi-Irwin Pact of 1931, Bose reinforced the necessity of a socialist industrialisation in a planned economy and unconditional independence. He iconised Bhagat Singh, executed in 1931, thereby trying to integrate radical and violent organisations into the political corpus of the Congress.[43] Bose replied to Gandhi's notion of *satyagraha* by developing the concept of *samyavada*, an idea of "Indian Socialism" that stressed planned industrialisation and sharply opposed nonviolence. In doing so, he took part in a larger oppositional reframing of the paternalistic colonial discourses of development. With reference to the political economies of Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union, he situated economic advances in the larger context of an abstract theory of national development, resistance and strength.[44]

Having left India for Austria due to health reasons in 1933, Bose spent the following three years in various European countries, amongst them Germany, Italy, and the Irish Free State meeting people, speaking, and writing. He was invited to

[39] Sarkar, *Modern India, 1885–1947*, 73–74.

[40] Harald Fischer-Tiné and Carolien Stolte, "Imagining Asia in India: Nationalism and Internationalism, ca. 1905–1940," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54, no. 1 (2012), 65; Emily S. Rosenberg, "Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World," in *A World Connecting, 1870–1945: A History of the World*, ed. Emily S. Rosenberg (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012), 860–864.

[41] Bose, *The Indian Struggle*, 39–194; Bose, *His Majesty's Opponent*, 45–84.

[42] Brian Roger Tomlinson and Gordon Johnson, *The Economy of Modern India: From 1860 to the Twenty-first Century*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 53–57.

[43] Subhas Chandra Bose, "India Freed Means Humanity Saved: Naujawan Bharat Sabha Conference Speech from the 26th May 1933," in *Netaji: Collected Works 6*, ed. Sisir Kumar Bose (Calcutta: Netaji Research Bureau, 1987), 176–186.

[44] Benjamin Zachariah, *Developing India: An Intellectual and Social History, c.1930–50* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 25–59; Framke, *Delhi – Rom – Berlin*, 179–187; Subhas Chandra Bose, "The Anti-Imperialist Struggle and Samyavada: Indian Politics Conference Speech from the 10th June 1933," in *Netaji: Collected Works 6*, ed. Sisir Kumar Bose, 176–186.

the opening of the *Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente* (IsMEO) in Rome and met Eamon de Valera as well as the Sinn Féin leader Cathal Ó Murchada. In addition, Bose gave a speech about "The Indian Situation and World Opinion" at the conference of the League against Imperialism in Paris.[45] He published reflections on his journeys in Indian newspapers, positively commenting on the "national awakenings" of Italy, Ireland, and Turkey.[46] As late as 1934, Bose praised Germany's national development in his writings, including his monograph *The Indian Struggle*. By 1936 he had begun to criticise the dictatorship for its anti-Indian racism, as can be seen in a speech delivered to a group of Indian students in Berlin, which was published in India as well.[47] His criticisms, however, did not hinder his attempts to establish diplomatic contacts to the German *Auswärtiges Amt* and the *Außenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP*, which proved to be unsuccessful.[48]

After returning to India in April 1936, Bose ultimately became an iconic figure of the 'Congress Left,' i.e. a loose set of political groups distancing themselves from Gandhi, as well as the Communist movements, while advocating anti-imperialist politics and planned industrialisation. He was imprisoned again until 1937, only to be elected the new President of the Congress in 1938.[49] Gandhi and his 'moderate' followers in the Congress expected to gain increased influence on Bose following his integration into leadership circles. However, Bose stayed on his radical political course, which led to his re-election in 1939. When these conflicts culminated in an open Gandhian campaign against him, he ultimately resigned from the presidency. After leaving the congress as a result of this struggle, Bose founded the *Forward Bloc* party and political journal.[50]

In his constant commenting on world politics from Europe and India, Bose, by now an oppositional leader, had ongoingly criticised the Italian, German and Japanese "imperialist expeditions,"[51] only to blame the allegedly British global paradigm of imperialist politics for them afterwards.[52] He kept praising their national

[45] Bose, *His Majesty's Opponent*, 93–95, 104–107; Subhas Chandra Bose, "The Indian Situation and World Opinion: League Against Imperialism Speech in Paris from the 17th March 1936," in *Letters, Articles, Speeches and Statements, 1933–1937,* Netaji: Collected Works 8, ed. Sisir Kumar Bose (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 347–350.

[46] Subhas Chandra Bose, "Impressions of Ireland. Statement in Lausanne from the 30th March 1936," in ibid., 350–352; Subhas Chandra Bose, "Italy: Amrita Bazar Patrika from the 9th March 1935, In ibid., 289–291.

[47] Subhas Chandra Bose, "Indians in Germany: Speech Excerpt from the 4th February 1936," in ibid., 342–343.

[48] Hayes, *Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany*, 11–13.

[49] Bose, *His Majesty's Opponent*, 123–127.

[50] Barun Mukherji, *Subhas Chandra Bose and his Political Weekly Forward Bloc* (Delhi: Roman Books Academic, 2012).

[51] Subhas Chandra Bose, "On Congress and the Constitution, Fascism and Communism: Daily Worker from the 24th January 1938," in *Congress President: Speeches, Articles and Letters, January 1938–May 1939,* Netaji: Collected Works 9, ed. Sisir Kumar Bose (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 2.

[52] Subhas Chandra Bose, "Japans Role in the Far East: Modern Review Article from October 1937," in *Letters, Articles, Speeches and Statements, 1933–1937*, ed. Bose, 411–429; Subhas Chandra Bose, "The Secret of Abyssinia and its Lessons," in ibid., 309–326.

developments, while neither supporting nor opposing the Congress's critiques and international relief action plans.[53] In addition to this, Bose's critiques have to be situated in the context of the dominant contemporary anti-colonial discourses that evoked an implicit political coercion to solidarity with China and Abyssinia.[54] After the beginning of global warfare, he interpreted the conflict as a disintegration of global imperialism, which presented a unique possibility for independence. He thus openly advocated violent resistance akin to that used by the Irish left-wing party, Sinn Féin.[55]

After being imprisoned again in January 1940, Bose escaped to Berlin by the Eurasian overland route, thus becoming a major actor of world war diplomacy. While mainly working with the *Auswärtiges Amt* under Joachim von Ribbentrop, he also maintained regular contact with Italian officials or even Mussolini himself.[56] While Bose requested a formal declaration by the Axis powers to provide an institutional framework for his anti-colonial struggle, the imperialist dictatorships planned to destabilise British colonial rule and drain Allied human resources.[57] Hitler, nevertheless, still hoped for peace opportunities with Great Britain. He, furthermore, believed in a "racial inferiority of these so called 'supressed nations,'"[58] and was afraid of a sheer symbolic declaration that bore the possibility of a geopolitical humiliation.[59] Although Bose managed to arrange a personal meeting with the German dictator and gained Mussolini's support for his cause, the *Auswärtiges Amt* and Hitler effectively prevented such a measure.[60] Beyond these diplomatic activities, Bose founded the Free India Center in Berlin and the *Legion Freies Indien*, a military unit consisting of Indian prisoners of war under the high command of the *Wehrmacht*.[61]

On the 19th of February 1942, Bose openly re-entered the global stages of world war and anti-colonial nationalism. Five days after the Japanese overthrow of Singapore, he broadcasted his first speech on the *Azad Hind Radio*. Via a transmitter

[53] Bose, "Japans Role in the Far East"; Bose, "The Secret of Abyssinia and its Lessons," 309–326. After the Japanese expansion in 1938, the Congress sent a group of doctors as a relief project to China. Already in the context of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, sending a Congress medical unit was widely discussed and there were multiple boycott calls articulated. For more details, see. Framke, *Delhi – Rom – Berlin*, 249–256.

[54] Ibid., 256.

[55] Subhas Chandra Bose, "Heart Searching," in *The Alternative Leadership: Speeches, Articles, Statements and Letters June 1939–January 1941,* Netaji: Collected Works 10, ed. Sisir Kumar Bose (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 20; Subhas Chandra Bose, "The Ramgarh Adress at the All-India Anti-Compromise Conference from the 19th March 1940," in ibid., 83–88; Subhas Chandra Bose, "Danger Ahead: Article from the Forward Bloc of the 6th January 1940," in ibid., 64–68.

[56] Hayes, *Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany*, 73–90.

[57] Kuhlmann, *Subhas Chandra Bose und die Indienpolitik der Achsenmächte*, 354.

[58] Adolf Hitler*, Mein Kampf*, 855th edition, (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP Franz Eher, 1943), 747.

[59] Johannes H. Voigt, "Hitler und Indien."

[60] Hayes, *Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany*, 153–155.

[61] Bose, *His Majesty's Opponent*, 213–225.

operating from the Dutch town Hurizen, his address reached South(east)-Asia in English, Hindustani, Bengali, Tamil, Telegu, Guajarati, Persian, and Pashtu. The transmission was widely received and contributed to transformative dynamics in anti-colonial political language leading to Gandhi's first approval of political violence, the "Quit India" resolution, and, ultimately, the biggest anti-colonial uprisings during the World War. This prompted instantaneous positive responses from Gandhi and the Congress leadership circles. The broadcasts of 250 minutes a day, which streamed on *Azad Hind Radio,* started to play a key role in anti-colonial daily politics. Bose even provided day-to-day strategic advice to the "Quit-India" protest movement. Although it is impossible to definitively reconstruct its influence on a quantitative scale, one might get a glimpse of its factual importance by considering that *Azad Hind Radio*'s role as a "favourite clandestine activity," must be embedded in the context of eight available broadcasting languages and an estimated 120,000 radio sets spread over British India.[62]

In the following three years, Bose not only constantly increased his influence on Indian political imagination, but also became more practically engaged in the war in Asia. Due to the internment of the Congress leaders after the mass uprisings, his radio broadcasts, backed by the *Reichsministerium für Propaganda*, continued to increase in importance.[63] He then reacted to the Japanese advances in Southeast-Asia by travelling to Tokyo with the help of the German and Japanese naval forces. After diplomatic engagements in the imperial capital, Bose continued his journey to Singapore to become the leader of the Axis-Power backed Indian National Army.[64] The INA developed into a military mass organisation, which conducted a 40,000-strong Japanese-backed offensive on Imphal in 1944. By this time, the army had long been subordinated under a rival government endorsed by the Axis powers and lead by Bose.[65] Now a military leader, he believed that the symbolic impact of an attack by an official nationalist military power would be overwhelming and lead to the disintegration of the British-Indian military and colonial rule in general.[66] Contrary to these hopes, not only did the Raj survive alive and well, but early advancements of the INA also soon turned into a military debacle of constant retreat and defeat.[67]

[62] Ibid., 225; Hayes, *Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany*, 86–88. The estimates are also borrowed from Sugata Bose. Although not of quantitative nature, Yasmin Khan, *India at War,* x also offers a 'history from below' insight into the incorporation of anti-colonial broadcasts into wartime daily life.

[63] Hayes, *Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany*, 135–137.

[64] Bose, *His Majesty's Opponent*, 240–251.

[65] Bose, "Proclamation of the Provisional Government of Free India," 117–120.

[66] For the theory of symbolic officialisation, i.e. the monopolisation of symbolic capital through the bureaucratic apparatus, legislative, and the corresponding construction of standardised official truths in state-building processes, see: Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 35–64; Pierre Bourdieu, *Über den Staat. Vorlesungen am Collège de France 1989–1992* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2017), 75.

[67] Christopher Bayly and T. N. Harper, *Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1914–1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 372–380.

While Bose subsequently acknowledged the end of the campaign in August 1945 and allegedly died on a plane crash afterwards, the INA's inscription into the South(east)-Asian cultural memories had only just begun. The cause of his death has been at the root of dozens of nationalist conspiracy theories until today.[68] Nearly instantaneously, the INA's legacy was interwoven within enfolding political dynamics. Not only did the "Red Forth trials" of three leading functionaries develop into a nodal point of decolonisation dynamics, widely discussed not just in London and Delhi, but in thousands of India's "remotest villages."[69] But in consent with the self-ascribed "antifascist" Nehru,[70] the Congress reclaimed Bose's legacy to generate "a popular consensus in support of Indian independence."[71]

Bose's Political Language

To reconstruct the referential and illocutionary meanings of 'National Socialism' and 'Fascism' in Bose's political language, one must first sketch the conceptual framework in which his references took place. This does not mean giving up the pragmatic nature of speaking and the agency of speakers in favour of deductions from hypothesised discursive principles. I simply heuristically point to the conceptual schemes that played on a configurative role in Bose's political texts and speeches.

The first constitutive political idea in Bose's political language was his conception of nationalism that largely drew on Bengali radical nationalist thought. Like Bankim Chandra Chatterjee or Aurobindo Ghose, he depicted India as a precolonial and meta-institutional community with a collective historical agency. As such, her alleged inherent national character should have produced sociocultural coherence over centuries. Already at its conceptual core, this national identity was defined through its distinction from British rule:

> In order to understand India […] it is essential to bear in mind at the outset two important facts. Firstly, the history of India has to be reckoned not in decades or in centuries, but in thousands of years. Secondly, it is only under British rule that India for the first time in her history has begun to feel that she has been conquered.[72]

This 'pre- and meta-colonial v. colonial' distinction, exemplified in this quote, which opens Bose's book titled *The Indian Struggle*, framed his vision of na-

[68] Bose, *His Majesty's Opponent*, 309–320.
[69] Jawarharlal Nehru, "Speech in Patna from the 24 December 1945," in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru 14*, ed. Sarvepalli Gopal (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1981), 279.
[70] Jawarharlal Nehru, "Spain, China and India: Rude Pravo Interview from the 31st July 1938," in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Vol. 9,* ed. Sarvepalli Gopal (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1981), 92.
[71] William F. Kuracina, "Sentiments and Patriotism," 856.
[72] Bose, *The Indian Struggle*, 1.

tional ideals, and thus nationalist politics. India, described as historically having been "able to absorb different races and impose on them one common culture and tradition," was portrayed as inherently pan-religious, inclusive and democratic "self-contained unit," which until British conquest culturally united Muslims and Hindus, invaders and invaded, peasants and landlords.[73]

Although this "imagined community" seemed somewhat metaphysical, it was also directly intertwined in Bose's conceptualisation of political practice.[74] Nationalism always meant struggling for *purna swaraj,* and was thus a teleological project. Correspondingly, building on a dialectical conception of political ideas,[75] Bose demanded a constantly developing "national struggle" for independence, based on physical, tactical, and ideological strength. The Indian Rebellion of 1857, the Bengal radical tradition or the "martyrdom" of Bhagat Singh could thus be used as fuel for the political imagination. Such frames of a revolutionary independence and dialectical development tightly bound Bose's concept of "national struggle" to bodily discipline and youth mobilisation.[76]

Ultimately, his vision of nationalist politics was also an internationalised one. Bose spoke of national development, i.e. "national struggle", as a universal historical process with different spatial manifestations. By this, he was able to "asianise" and internationalise his political projects. National strength "physically as well as militarily" provided an explanation for political developments from Ireland to China, situating Bose's politics on an international stage and producing nationalist visions of globality.[77]

The "struggle" rhetoric and the international framing of nationalism were at the core of his critiques of Gandhi. Bose mobilised such concepts to point to an alleged backwardness of Gandhian politics in front of the assumed universal, but indeed national, dialectics of international politics. Additionally, the traditional revolutionary visions of national community and "struggle" enabled Bose to easily gain influence in Congress politics and later provided nationalist visions of discipline and martyrdom rooted at the heart of the INA's self-legitimisation.

The discursive capacity of his nationalism was widened further by stressing the importance of socialist theory against vast parts of the Congress. With the *samyavada* concept he deeply nationalised socialist theory. As highlighted in various

[73] Ibid., 2–10.
[74] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 5.
[75] Bose, *An Indian Pilgrim*, 124; Subhas Chandra Bose, "My Political Testament: Letter to the Government of Bengal from the 26th November 1940," in *The Alternative Leadership*, ed. Bose and Bose, 197; Subhas Chandra Bose, "Why Forward Bloc. Editorial of the Party Journal from the 5 August 1939," in ibid., 1.
[76] Subhas Chandra Bose, "Lecture at the Opera House on the Mission of Young India from the 22nd May 1928," *Netaji: Collected Works 5,* ed. Sisir Kumar Bose (Calcutta: Netaji Research Bureau, 1985), 255–257; Subhas Chandra Bose, "Bengals Message of Universalism and Socialism, Speech at the Politics Conference in Rangur from the 30 March 1929," in *Netaji: Collected Works 6*, ed. Bose, Bose, "India Freed Means Humanity Saved," 176–186.
[77] Bose, "The Indian Situation and World Opinion."

speeches and articles, this "new Indian socialism" implied a creative appropriation of socialist political economy:

> New ideas of socialism are nowadays travelling to India from the West, and they are revolutionizing the thoughts of many. […] We have therefore to shape society and politics according to our own national ideals and according to our needs.[78]

Additionally, Bose's visions of planned industrialisation went far beyond economic connotations, as they were interwoven in his larger ideas of national development. He stressed the precolonial history of the national community by interchangeable uses of the terms "reconstruction" and "development." This was exemplified in his first speech as Congress president:

> A comprehensive scheme of industrial development under state-ownerships and state-control will be indispensable. A new industrial system will have to be built […] [together with] schemes of reconstruction in the spheres of education, health, prohibition, prison reforms, irrigation, industry, land reform, workers' welfare etc.[79]

Beyond nationalism and *samyavada*, Bose's political language was also characterised by a dominant concept of (anti-)imperialism. If his vision of the global was based on the idea of national communities as collective actors, it was also structured by a systemic idea of imperialism. Inherently fragile and thus bound to end through "an overthrow by an anti-imperialist agency or through an internecine struggle among imperialists themselves,"[80] the imperialist world system was, in Bose's eyes, at its core British and, of course, demanded resolute resistance: "Ours is a struggle not only against British Imperialism but against world imperialism as well, of which the former is the keystone."[81] This further strengthened ideas of international anti-colonial solidarity while also pointing to an archetypal role of India in overthrowing British imperial rule. As Bose put it: "We are, therefore, fighting not for the cause of India alone but of humanity as well. India freed means humanity saved."[82]

This further reinforced his critiques of the Congress's politics as showing "no interest in International affairs."[83] He thereby emphasised the uniqueness of his own political endeavour. Building on this logic, Bose saw "[t]he age of imperialism […] drawing to an end" with the beginning of the World War, making

[78] Bose, "Bengals Message of Universalism and Socialism," 2–3.
[79] Subhas Chandra Bose, "The Haripura Address at the INC February meeting of 1938," in *Congress President*, ed. Bose and Bose, 3–30.
[80] "The Secret of Abyssinia and its Lessons," 326.
[81] Bose, "The Haripura Adress," 30.
[82] Ibid., 30.
[83] Bose, "The Secret of Abyssinia," 326.

political responses—Forward Bloc, *Azad Hind* and the INA—necessary.[84] This conceptual setting developed even further during the World War, when Bose mobilised its inherent binarity to depict the warfare as conflict between imperialists and anti-imperialists.[85]

Speaking about National Socialism and Fascism

In the context of the political concepts sketched above, Bose used the term "Fascism" to refer to a "European" political ideology as well as a concrete historical phenomenon—Italian Fascism. Although he never conceptualised clear delineations between ideology and concrete regime, the latter might be best understood as a specific form and manifestation of the first. While 'fascism' as an ideology, thus, was never clearly elaborated in its semantic extension, Bose did not use the term as a category to describe any political movement outside of Europe.[86] Already in 1928, he depicted the Italian dictatorship as an inspiring example for the Indian youth.[87] In 1934, Bose talked about "Fascism" as part of a world-historical dialectic:

> Whether one believes in the Hegelian or in the Bergsonian or any other theory of evolution—in no case need we think that creation is at an end. Considering everything, one is inclined to hold that the next phase in world history will produce a synthesis between Communism and Fascism. And will it be a surprise if that synthesis will be produced in India? […] The Indian awakening is organically connected to awakenings in other parts of the world.[88]

He had already invoked such notions of a "synthesis of what Modern Europe calls Socialism and Fascism in 1930," and thus repeatedly situated fascism next to the roots of his political rhetoric by directly linking it to a dialectical nationalism and nationalist internationalism.[89] This conceptual bridge between "Communism" and "Fascism" later culminated in the idea of *samyavada* that connected nationalism with state-planned industrialisation.[90] Building on this scheme of inherent national developments after visiting Rome, Bose praised the example of Italian

[84] Subhas Chandra Bose, "The Ramgarth Address at the All-India Anti-Compromise Conference from the 19 March 1940," in *The Alternative Leadership,* ed. Bose and Bose, 83–88.
[85] Subhas Chandra Bose, "This War and its Significance: Broadcast of the 24th June 1943," in *Chalo Delhi*, ed. Bose and Bose, 29–33.
[86] Subhas Chandra, Bose, "The Mayoral Address, Calcutta Corporation meeting, 27th November 1930," in *Netaji: Collected Works 6*, ed. Bose, 128.
[87] Subhas Chandra Bose, "Speech at the third Session of the All-India Youth Congress from the 25 December 1928," in *Netaji: Collected Works 5*, ed. Bose and Bose, 271–272.
[88] Bose, *The Indian Struggle*, 351.
[89] Bose, "The Mayoral Address," 128.
[90] Bose, *Indian Struggle*, 352.

youth mobilisation and the party apparatus of the Fascist dictatorship for building the core of an "uplift of the nation."[91]

His ambivalent relationship to 'National Socialism,' whose explicit representations were quite rare compared with that of fascism, manifested itself in critiques of Anti-Indian racism and a pro-British foreign policy. While he still searched for diplomatic cooperation with the *Auswärtiges Amt* and the *Außenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP* during the 1930s, his critiques culminated in a statement published in 1936.

> During the last weeks my mind has been greatly disturbed by the insulting remarks made by the German Fuhrer [sic] about the Indian people […] It is quite clear that Germany determined to curry favour with England by insulting India. I have no objection if Germans desire to lick the boots of the Britishers, but if they think that in the year 1936 this insult will be quietly pocketed by us, they are hardly mistaken.[92]

Two years later, in his first presidential address in 1938, Bose on the contrary highlighted the *Reichsarbeitsdienst* as institutional example for forging national unity and discipline, thus linking it to his notions of national development and discipline:

> There is a bigger problem of mobilizing this phenomenal mass energy and enthusiasm and direct them along proper lines. But have we got a well-disciplined Volunteer corps for this purpose? Have we got a cadre of officers for our national service? Do we provide any training for our budding leaders, for our promising young workers? […] An institution like the Labour Service Corps of the Nazis deserves careful study and […] may prove beneficial to India.[93]

The representational logics first changed during the Italian attack on Abyssinia and were fundamentally altered during the World War. The Fascist offensive was widely discussed and sharply condemned in India as it evoked anti-colonial solidarity. The imperialist motives of the Italian advance could hardly be ignored, making it a discursive impossibility for Congress politicians to defend it.[94] Bose's commentary on the conflict, which was published in the *Modern Review* in 1935, depicted the "Italian penetration of Abyssinia" as imperialist politics, while at the same time pointing to a purely British responsibility at the conflict's roots. He described the geopolitical pressure exercised by the British Government as perverting Italy's national development, i.e. causing the expansion. Furthermore,

[91] Bose, "Italy," 290.
[92] Subhas Chandra Bose, "Meeting the Press: Situation in India, India and Germany, League of Nations, March 1936," in *Netaji: Collected Works 8*, ed. Sisir Kumar Bose, 345.
[93] Bose, "Haripura Adress," 24.
[94] Framke, *Delhi – Rom – Berlin*, 249–256.

British influence was made responsible for the failure of the Italian-Abyssinian peace treaty of 1928. The Italian foreign policy, therefore, would not point to a Fascist responsibility—which was not even mentioned at all—but to the flaws of the systemic European imperialism and British interests.[95]

Bose thus stopped idealising Italy, yet spared the dictatorship any direct critique. He, moreover, only once distanced himself from his idea of a fascist-communist synthesis in India in an interview in 1938, clarifying that he had talked about 'Fascism' before "its imperialist expedition".[96] The source value of this often cited comment is highly questionable, as it originates from an interview with the party journal of the Communist Party of Great Britain, the *Daily Worker*. Bose did not participate in discourses of the Independence Movement, but addressed a British, genuinely antifascist readership.

After the beginning of the World War, which he interpreted as a disintegration of imperialism, the grammar of systemic anti-imperialism with its binary scheme of 'imperialism v. anti-imperialism' took over in his political language. In his broadcast from Berlin in 1941 he framed the Japanese conquest of Singapore as a sign of the "end of the iniquitous regime which it has symbolised and the dawn of a new era of Indian history." As such, the supposed collapse of the British Empire, "the most diabolical enemy of freedom and the most formidable obstacle to progress,"[97] signalled the death struggle of world imperialism, which defended itself against a global progressive front:

> In the present Armageddon, there is desperate attempt, on the one side, to maintain the status quo that has sprung out of the Treaty of Versailles, and similar treaties of the past—while on the other, there is the determination to destroy the old order and usher in a new one. [...] Let us, therefore, rejoice that under the simultaneous blow of the Tripartite Powers, our eternal foe is fast crumbling down. Let us rejoice over the rapid victorious advance of the Japanese forces in the Far East. Let us rejoice that the old order was set up at Versailles is crashing before our very eyes.[98]

Italian 'Fascism' and German 'National Socialism' were no longer represented by their individual names, but from then onwards dissolved in Bose's binary grammar of anti-imperialism. Japan's political characteristics were, thereby, not only absent, but also logically irrelevant for Bose's binary description, as its rhetorical importance derived only from an allegedly adversary position towards the imagined global imperialist paradigm. While Bose had never linked Japanese

[95] Bose, "The Secret of Abyssinia and its Lessons."
[96] Bose, "On Congress and the Constitution, Fascism and Communism," 2.
[97] Subhas Chandra Bose, "The Fall of Singapore: Broadcast from the 19th February 1941," in *Azad Hind*, ed. Bose and Bose, 67.
[98] Subhas Chandra Bose, "India has no Enemy Outside Her Own Frontiers: Broadcast from the 19th March 1942," in ibid., 78.

politics to Germany or Japan before the war, the three Axis powers were now conceptually amalgamated and represented by a general notion of "the Tripartite Powers" as claimed enemies of imperialism. The Axis powers thus would be "the best friends and greatest allies that the Indian people now have for her struggle for freedom,"[99] carrying "for India freedom and justice, happiness and prosperity" as they would destroy the imperialist historical paradigm.[100] Although he again advocated the idea of a communist-fascist synthesis as late as 1944 in a speech in Tokyo,[101] the old reference frames of national development and discipline were in general integrated into the binary grammar of systemic anti-imperialism.

Conclusion

Despite his critiques of Nazi foreign policy and Anti-Indian racism, Bose reframed developments in Germany and Italy—as well as an abstract dialectical notion of fascism—in the nationalist patterns of his pre-existing political language. He thereby made use of the semantics of Congress politics and his dialectical understanding of history to depict 'Fascism' and 'National Socialism' as examples of universal (nationalist) developments. Bose, thus, could generate symbolic capital by using allegedly universal criteria of national comparison such as youth mobilisation and national discipline that merged into a vague concept of national development or "national struggle." He creatively connected these to his visions of political economy and depicted planned industrialisation as a deeply nationalist endeavour. He thus eclectically integrated 'Fascism' and 'National Socialism' in the pre-existent political languages of the Independence movement. In a Skinnerian sense, this sheds lights on the foundations of his symbolic capital in the eclectic illocutionary modifications of multiple political languages, while it also points to the structuring importance of the social field of Congress politics.

In the wake of the Italian expansion and the beginning of the World War, he made use of another pre-existent discursive pattern, (anti-)imperialism, to provide a systemically conceptualised analysis of world politics to fit into his political strategies. Bose thus created a systemic and binary vision of international relations and, later, global warfare. 'Fascism''s and 'National Socialism''s historical agencies, therefore, culminated in an anti-imperialist concept of "the Tripartite Powers."

The illocutionary dimensions of these appropriation processes, and thus the production of symbolic capital in political communication, point to interesting conclusions. Not only did Bose's references from early on enable him to generate political power because they allowed him to set his political projects apart from

[99] Bose, "This War and its Significance," in *Netaji: Collected Works* 12, ed. Bose and Bose, 32.
[100] Bose, India has no Enemy Outside Her Own Frontiers," 79.
[101] "Boses speech at Tokio University," *The Oracle* 1 (1983), 3–14, quoted in Hayes, *Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany*, 146.

Gandhi and the Congress "moderates," even providing institutional legitimations for the Forward Bloc, INA and *Azad Hind* government. They did so by being means of producing structured visions of the global and globality. In particular, the references to fascism provided a global frame to Bose's political language, which was strengthened by his endorsement of teleological historical dialectics. With these rhetorical practices that highlighted the global and historical necessity of his actions, he could provide legitimacy for his radical stance towards the World War and, later on, even his open collaboration with the Axis powers in front of his Indian audience. While doing so, Bose's mobilisations of these concepts were always connected to the geographic space of South-Asian politics, because he discursively operated in the social field of Congress politics, the more fluid social structures of wartime anti-colonial resistance, and the semantic rules that governed them. These, of course, were at their roots intertwined with the space(s) of British colonial rule.

Regarding wider questions of global historical methodology, it thus proves insightful to point to the role that social fields play by providing the semantic framework for appropriations of global concepts. To first uncover social fields might conclusively prove to be a methodical key for reconstructing the semantics and audiences of verbal appropriation and, ultimately, the circulation of ideas in general.[102]

Finally, this small case study highlights a peculiarity of globalising processes of political languages. Once concepts develop to widely accepted configurative points in imagining political globality, as 'Fascism' and 'National Socialism' did, they hold the potential to produce a specific form of symbolic capital. As they embody semantics of globality, they might be utilised by actors in local spaces to construct supposedly global ideological frames for their political ideas and practices.

I would like to thank Julia Hauser, Marcel Glaser, and Varsha Patel for their helpful reamarks on earlier versions of this article. I am also deeply indepted to the Global Histories editing team and their great efforts to promote the ideas of young scholars in and beyond this journal.

[102] See also: Andrew Satori, "Global Intellectual History and the History of Political Economy," in *Global Intellectual History*, ed. Andrew Satori and Samuel Moyn, 110–133. Andrew Satori argued for a similar, more stable social framework for analysing the circulation of ideas. My point might also be read as a similar endeavour, without the classical Marxist stressing of the primacy of the relations of production. Rather historians may productively use social fields, their capital types, and semantics as a framework.

Photo by Sanchez Cruz. Photo Courtesy of DeGolyer Library, Southern Methodist University.

‘The Small Family Lives Better’: Population Policy, Development, and Global-local Encounters in Mexico (1974–1978)

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This article looks at the implementation and debate surrounding the first comprehensive population policy in Mexico in 1974. Scholars have increasingly focused on the role of external actors for the operation and diffusion of discourses concerning population growth in local contexts. This article sheds new light on such debate by shifting the attention to how Mexican scholars, experts, politicians, and state officials appropriated, debated, and finally intervened in Mexican families with the intention of reducing population growth. Drawing from published documentary material it shows how the fears inspired by a perceived ‘unregulated procreation’ of Mexican families stemmed from a strong social focus on economic growth, as well as the historically specific political vision and academic discourse of ‘modernization.’ In doing that, the article highlights the ways in which self-narratives, localized visions of desired social orders, and gendered assumptions concerning rural populations and lower classes shaped the appropriation of population and ‘modernization’ thought.

> What is true, is that the reductions in fertility rates [...] are associated with modernization.[1]—Victor Luis Urquidi, 1968

In late October of 1975, a state-sponsored advertisement aired on the Mexican radio and television broadcasting services for the first time. In it, a four-membered family delivered a simple but assertive message: “the small family lives better.”[2]

[1] Víctor Luis Urquidi, “Política de Población en México: La Necesidad de Planear a Muy Largo Plazo,” in *Obras Escogidas De Víctor L. Urquidi: Ensayos Sobre Población Y Sociedad*, ed. Francisco Alba (Ciudad de México: Colegio De México, 2010), 239.

[2] *Comisión Nacional de la Familia* (CONAPO), “La Familia Pequeña Vive Mejor,” 27 March 2014, http://www.conapo.gob.mx/es/CONAPO/27_de_marzo_El_Consejo_Nacional_de_Poblacion_cumple_40_anos?page=2.

For a country where the average family consisted of nine members, the idea that smaller families could be linked with a set of 'better' living conditions was both foreign and novel.[3] For Mexican demographers, politicians and state officials 'traditional' families were instead deemed sites of unregulated procreation. In their view, large families expressed the absence of planning and with it negated the hope that a certain future could be realized by acting on the present in a way that was deemed rational and controlled. From the beginning of the 1970s, and in accordance with a dynamic global scheme of population thought and discourse, large families became sites of heated contestation amongst Mexican experts and politicians, and later objects of state intervention. Such debates were profoundly shaped by the idea that the 'unregulated procreation' of Mexican families could hamper the goals of economic growth and national development.[4] However, the calling into question of matters of human reproduction, and its connection with sustained economic growth, as well as the subsequent actions taken by the Mexican government to regulate reproduction are not solely to be read as expressions of immediate material aspirations. Rather, they are expressions of a historically specific political vision and academic discourse: 'modernization.' That is, the desire to orient social organizations towards an industrial mode of production and a centralized bureaucratic state. Notions of 'modernization' sought to reorient human activity towards wage labor as a means of attaining individual and collective well-being.[5] It is precisely this set of debates, assumptions, and visions around the dictum that small families live better that underlies the first comprehensive effort to reduce, plan, and manage population growth in Mexico throughout the 1970s.[6]

[3] Secretaria de Industria y Comercio-Dirección General de Estadística, *IX Censo General de Población y Vivienda 1970: Resumen General* (Mexico: Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1970), 32–44.

[4] Victor Luis Urquidi, "El Crecimiento Demográfico y el Desarrollo Económico Latinoamericano," *Demografía y Sociedad* 1, no. 1 (1967): 3.

[5] Here I draw from the Mexican demographer's Victor L. Urquidi understanding of *Modernization* as both a process and an end in itself. The full discussion can be found in Victor L. Urquidi, "Política de Población en México: La Necesidad de Planear a muy Largo Plazo," in *Población y Desarrollo Social* (Mexico City: Asociación Mexicana de Economía Política [AMEP], 1976), 301–318. For recent detailed accounts on 'modernization' and modernization theory as historical and cultural constructs, see: Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015) and Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

[6] It is important to indicate here that this was not the first time that population control programmes were introduced to Mexico. Already in the 1920s, with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, Margaret Sanger conducted a number of 'public sanitation' campaigns in the Yucatán Peninsula where contraceptives were distributed amongst creole and indigenous women alike. See: Patience Alexandra Schell, *Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003); Margaret Sanger, *La Regulación de la Natalidad. La Brújula del Hogar. Métodos Científicos para Evitar la Concepción* (Mérida: Los Mayas,1922).

Approved in 1974, the *Ley General de Población* had two long-term objectives: the reduction and regulation of population growth by educating Mexican citizens about birth control and planned parenthood.[7] Such policy objectives were less related to the creation of better living conditions for people, as the aforementioned campaign claimed, and more connected to the perceived need "to maximize the human and natural resources in the country."[8]

With the establishment of a population policy in Mexico, it is possible to delineate a moment of rupture in governmental practices. This is the moment when reproduction became the site of state intervention and 'rational' centralized planning. Effects of this moment were, for example, the state-official establishment of an ideal number of children per woman,[9] the assumption that this number of births profoundly affected life and its potentiality,[10] or the articulation of desired familiar structures based on models such as the family of four.[11] Furthermore, Mexican politicians, state officials, and experts were convinced that they had found the instruments to realize economic growth through the regulation of human reproduction and in the reduction of population altogether.[12] Finally, the attitudes towards

[7] Diario Oficial de la Federación, *Ley General de Población* (Mexico: Congreso de la Unión de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1974), art. 1. In 1977, the recently established National Commission for Family (CONAPO) launched the first nationwide sexual education program (*Programa Nacional de Educación Sexual*) with the explicit intention of educating and informing beneficiaries of the public health services about the "process of human reproduction." On this subject, see: Matthew Gutmann, "Planning Men Out of Family Planning," in *Fixing Men: Sex, Birth Control and AIDS in Mexico*, ed. Matthew Gutmann (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 100–129.

[8] Ibid., art. 3, indent I–III.

[9] Already in 1978, the Mexican left-wing newspaper *Proceso* reports of a 'successful' "reduction in fertility rates from 35% in 1974 to 28% in 1978, and it is now sought to reach 25% by 1982." It is important to highlight the form in which media, experts, and politicians referred to the question of human reproduction in terms of quantifications, which not only conceals the complexity, labour, meanings, and social relations embedded in the process which leads to a child being born. It also allows to reify the latter process akin to something that can be 'managed,' 'molded,' and indeed 'reduced.' See:, Federico Gómez Pombo, "Dudas de que la Familia Pequeña Vive Mejor," *Proceso*, 10 February 1978, https://www.proceso.com.mx/125395/dudas-de-que-la-familia-pequena-viva-mejor.

[10] Mexican demographer Francisco Alba reflected on the reasons behind the implementation of the population policy in 1974 saying that "the accelerated rhythm of population growth was on the verge of barricading economic growth, no one thought that [population growth] could be an obstacle for the development process." See. Francisco Alba, *La población de México: Evolución y Dilemas* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1979), 146.

[11] Although the literature in this subject is vast, these are two salient examples on the making of nuclear and conjugal families as idealized modes of social organization in North American contexts throughout the late nineteenth century onwards: Marie Justine Fritz, *House or Home: Nuclear Family Construction and Federal Housing Policy Development* (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 2010); Nancy Christie and Michael Gauvreau, *Mapping the Margins: The Family and Social Discipline in Canada, 1700–1975* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004).

[12] On the conflation between changes in forms of governing and the regulation of bodies and biological life in Mexico, see: Alexandra Minna Stern, "Responsible Mothers and Normal Children: Eugenics, Nationalism, and Welfare in Post-revolutionary Mexico, 1920–1940," *Historical Sociology* 12, no. 4 (1999): 369–397; Patience A. Schell, "Nationalizing Children Through Schools and Hygiene: Porfirian and Revolutionary Mexico City," *The Americas* 60,

population policies throughout the 1970s can be read as connected to larger shifts in the practices of government: The *Ley General de Población* of 1974 posited the aggregate of human bodies living in a demarcated territory as a resource to be managed and adjusted according to certain abstractions, knowledges, and interests established by the state.[13] This moment was also indicative of the thrust of Mexican academic and political élites who saw an opportunity to change the Mexican society through population-planning and reproductive interventions.[14] For them, the urgency of regulating population growth stemmed from the desire to achieve the institutional and material conditions that resembled the social configuration of states that were seen as 'developed and modern.'[15] These goals were embedded in a vision of 'modernization.' The interpretation of the past in terms of a progression from 'traditional' to 'modern' led scholars to mistake certain contingencies for necessity:[16] They identified ruptures, for example in the emergence of industrial production as expressions of a linear progression referred to as 'modernization.'[17] Historians agree that the tenets, normative aspirations, and narratives of 'modernization' were not limited to academic environments, but were also in circulation amongst political actors and their institutions outside of (but still influenced by) the United States in the context of the Cold War. Here, the ideological visions established by 'modernization' theory had real and lasting effects. In the case of Mexico, the question of population policy, and specifically the importance of reducing the size of families, was pursued by actors who had appropriated the visions and teleologies of 'modernization.'

Taken together, the changes in state praxis and élite discourses associated with population in Mexico are evidence of a deeper rupture in the modes of political thinking and framing dynamics throughout the 1950s and 1970s. Regulating individual behavior, enabling collective corporeal discipline, and modifying the 'quality of populations' became a matter of concern for local actors, namely state administrators and experts, as well as global actors and international institutions alike.[18] This multilayered connection became more pronounced with the emer-

no. 4 (2004): 559-587; Alexandra Minna Stern, "The Hour of Eugenics in Veracruz, Mexico: Radical Politics, Public Health, and Latin America's Only Sterilization Law," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 91, no. 3 (2011): 432–443.

[13] Michel Foucault, "Lesson 1: January 11, 1978," in *Security, Territory, and Population: Lessons at the College of France. 1978–79* (New York: Palgrave/Picador, 2007),. 1–27.

[14] Arturo Escobar, "Planning," in *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, ed. Wolfgang Sachs (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1992), 132–145.

[15] Víctor Luis Urquidi, "Los Recursos Humanos en el Mundo en Desarrollo: Una Perspectiva," in *Obras Escogidas De Víctor L. Urquidi: Ensayos Sobre Población Y Sociedad*, ed. Francisco Alba (Colegio De México, 2010), 25–50.

[16] Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*. New Studies in American Intellectual and Cultural History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 2–6.

[17] Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 2–14.

[18] Regula Argast, Corinna Unger, and Alexandra Widmer, "Twentieth Century Population Thinking," in *Twentieth Century Population Thinking: A Critical Reader of Primary Sources, he*

gence of 'development' aid projects as concretion of 'modernization' theories in the Western hemisphere after 1960.[19] For example, the emergence of the 'Demographic Transition Theory,' the establishment of the United Nations Population Fund, the International Planned Parenthood Federation and the Rockefeller Foundation, as well as the implementation of different population policies across the 'Global South' highlight these processes.[20] Importantly, historians have begun to recognize that 'population' in this context was not only a concept used to express the aggregate of individuals living in a territorially demarcated space, but was also a site where Cold War contentions and divisions, struggles of decolonization, and underlying racial discourses were merged.[21]

Recent scholarship in the history of population control and family planning has increasingly highlighted the involvement of transnational organizations, often sponsored by the United States, advocating for population control in the 'Third World.'[22] In the context of the Cold War, family planning programs became one of the tools by which spheres of influence were articulated in non-western countries. Nevertheless, such measures were rarely a one-way street, they were often contested and resisted equally by states, civil society organizations and religious groups who regarded such measures as forms of foreign interventions.[23] Works focusing on Latin America have aimed at conveying the intricate significance and multilayered scope of the population policies introduced between the late 1950s and the early 1990s: Through the language of family planning, they inscribed notions about motherhood, gender, and the role of women into programs of 'national development.' Jadwiga Pieper-Mooney shows, for example, how birth control programs in Santiago de Chile's poor neighborhoods placed the reproductive

Population Knowledge Network, ed. (London: Routledge, 2016), 1–16.

[19] Matthew J. Connelly. *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Populatio*n (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); Nancy Birdsall, Allen C. Kelley, and Steven W. Sinding. *Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth and Poverty in the Developing World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Regula Agast, Corinna Unger, Corinna, and Alexandra Widmer, "Twentieth Century Population Thinking: An Introduction," in *Twentieth Century Population Thinking*, 1–16; Maria Dörnemann and Teresa Huhle, "Population Problems in Modernization and Development: Positions and Practices," in ibid., 150–180.

[20] 'Demographic Transition Theory' correlates the lowering of mortality and birth rates with the transition from pre-industrial to industrial national economies. John C. Caldwell, "Toward A Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory," *Population and Development Review* 2, no. 3 (1976): 321–366.

[21] Axel C. Hüntleman, "Statistics, Nationhood, and the State," in *A World of Populations: Transnational Perspectives on Demography in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Heinrich Hartmann and Corinna R. Unger (New York: Berghahn, 2016).

[22] See: Alison Bashford, *Global Population: History, Geopolitics, and Life on Earth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).

[23] See for example: John Sharpless, "World Population Growth, Family Planning, and American Foreign Policy," *Journal of Policy History* 7, no. 1, 1995, 72–102; Adam M. Silva, "Modern Mothers for Third World Nations: Population Control, Western Medical Imperialism, and Cold War Politics in Haiti," *Social History of Medicine* 27, no. 2 (2014): 260–280. Aya Homei and Yu-Ling Huang, "Population Control in Cold War Asia: An Introduction," *East Asian Science, Technology and Society* 10, no. 4 (2016): 343–353.

lives of women at the center of economic and development plans, ignoring local women's voices and their experiences of motherhood.[24] Similarly, Raúl Necochea López explores the effects of population control and planning in Peru:[25] In his account, governmental interventions, which are rooted in the commitment of the bureaucracy to operationalize modernization theories, are posited as both gendered and racially biased as white Catholic women were idealized whereas the programs were inspired by a belief that *mestizos* had to be sexually tamed, disciplined, and educated according to López' source findings.[26]

With this in mind, it becomes clear that the debates, discourses and the knowledge that influenced the introduction of population policy in Mexico should be read as connected to a global scheme of exchanges and circulations in population thought. This account focuses on local configurations and dynamics to produce a narrative of how these notions were appropriated and operationalized by Mexican scholars, politicians and experts. In doing so, it is possible to construct an account of a global-local encounter. By engaging with certain demographic theories which correlated population with economic growth and their participation in international conferences on population policy, Mexican politicians and demographers showed their engagement with a global debate on population thought while they localized their experiences through policy implementation. In doing so, they also expressed an adapted understanding of 'modernization' that suited the Mexican conditions and linked the Mexican population to economic growth. However, unlike the aforementioned accounts of population policies in Latin America, neither the debates nor the implementation surrounding the policy in Mexico were first and foremost pursued by foreign actors but rather by Mexican actors themselves. This aspect is relevant as it stresses how global-local encounters do not necessarily remain unmitigated but that these encounters entail constant negotiations, appropriations and mediations across different scales instead. This account approaches the visions, debates and the implementation underlying the *Ley General de Población* on a local scale to discuss wider global dynamics. It does so with the intention of showing how self-narratives, localized visions of desired social orders, and gendered assumptions concerning rural populations and lower classes shaped the appropriation of population and 'modernization' thought.

To that end, the first section discusses the emergence of 'overpopulation' as an assumed problem for policy makers and scholars. This is done in the light of what local politicians described as the 'Mexican Miracle' of steady economic growth in the decades before. The second section of the paper aims to highlight the dis-

[24] Jadwiga Pieper-Mooney, *The Politics of Motherhood* (Pittsburgh: University of Pennsylvania Pres, 2009).
[25] Raúl Necochea López, *A History of Family Planning in Twentieth-century Peru* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014.).
[26] *Mestizos* are often defined as mixed populations whose ancestry includes Spanish and Amerindian populations. Ibid., 25–29.

cursive and rhetorical instruments used by Mexican officials, legislators, scholars and experts to promote the introduction of a comprehensive population policy in 1974. This section also discusses how officials working at CONAPO reported and described the implementation of this policy. The attention here is geared towards the question how localized power configurations supported the implementation of this policy.

The Miracle of Development, the Burden of People.

Almost forty years after the revolutionary struggle which led to the disintegration of the last remnants of Mexico's Liberal Republic, legislators and government officials—all of them members of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) which had been in power since 1929—congratulated themselves for the relative political and economic stability in the country.[27] From their perspective, this was a direct effect of channeling state resources to produce "a social revolution in Mexico."[28] Between the 1930s and 1970s, Mexican society experienced far-reaching state-lead transformations. This process can be read, following the lexicon of the specialized literature, as a 'state building process': From the consolidation of a central authority, by way of violent suppression of local *caciques*,[29] to the establishment of state-led institutions to carry out political programs.[30] National educational programs were established in order to conduct missions in rural and indigenous communities with the intention of spreading Spanish as the official language.[31] Public health institutions were designed and consolidated in order to serve both economically disadvantaged groups, as well as civil servants. Oil production and industrial enterprises became the spearheads of state-fostered and state-owned industrialization. Discursively, this process was described by state officials as the assertion of the revolutionary ideals to produce a sense of social justice in the country: If peasants and workers had driven the revolutionary struggle forward to express their grievances and claims, then the post-revolutionary polity

[27] Héctor Aguilar Camín, "De la Estabilidad al Cambio," in *Historia General México*, ed. Daniel Cosío Villegas et al. (México: El Colegio de México, 2000), 133–150.
[28] Adolfo López Mateos, "Sexto Informe de Gobierno," 1 September 1964.
[29] Leaders of indigenous groups. See: Michael C., Meyer and William H Beezley, *The Oxford History of Mexico* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Luis Javier Garrido, *El Partido De La Revolución Institucionalizada (medio Siglo De Poder Político En México): La Formación Del Nuevo Estado (1928–1945)* (México: Siglo XXI, 2005); Douglas Wertz Richmond and Sam W. Haynes, *The Mexican Revolution Conflict and Consolidation, 1910–1940* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2013).
[30] Richard Tardanico, "Revolutionary Nationalism and State Building in Mexico, 1917–1924," *Politics & Society* 10, no. 1 (1980).
[31] Fernando Solana Morales, Raúl Cardiel Reyes, Raúl Bolaños, ed., *Historia de la Educación Pública en México* (Coed. Secretaría de Educación Pública y Fondo de Cultura Económica México, 1997).

found its source of legitimacy in the realization of such claims.[32] Hence, it became common for reforms, plans, and almost every action within the political arena to be framed as an ongoing revolutionary effort to produce wide-ranging transformations in society—including large scale land and labor reforms, the consolidation of national education programs, and the establishment of a public health system.[33]

Towards the 1960s, a new form of describing such interventions emerged that was less concerned with the notion of social justice than in the previous decades and instead committed to claims of national development. This shift can be linked with what the United Nations' called the 'Development Decade'; a coordinated effort to overcome mass poverty through investment, notably in infrastructure, and knowledge transfers.[34] In 1962, the first national development plan was presented by the administration of Adolfo López Mateos that established concrete goals based in the abstraction of economic growth, as well as social development.[35] These plans to justify the government's policies became an extensive discourse through which state interventions were justified over the next decade. Most importantly, government interventions were generally presented as a means to produce economic growth that was not presented as a means in itself, but an instrument by which the 'improvement of living standards' were to be realized.[36] All kinds of economic initiatives, from the collection of data on natural resources and the processing of resources in their respective industries, to the development of tourism at the coasts were rhetorically included in that program.

The change in the objectives and discursive formulation of state interventions was reinforced by changes in the social composition of state agencies and institutions. When middle and high-level positions became increasingly occupied by individuals with a technical expertise,[37] those expert administrators became vocal supporters of the change and actively engaged in what they perceived as the

[32] Ryan Alexander, "Mexican Politics, Economy, and Society, 1946–1982," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History*, ed. William H. Beezly (Oxford: Oxford University Press ,2016): 1–20.

[33] Edmundo O'Gorman, *La Revolución Mexicana a 50 Años*, quoted in: Guillermo Hurtado, "Historia y ontología en México: 50 años de revolución," *Estudios Históricos Modernos y Contemporáneos de México*, n. 39, 2010.

[34] United Nations Children's Fund, "The 1960s: Decade of Development," https://www.unicef.org/sowc96/1960s.html.

[35] Oficina de la Presidencia de la República Mexicana, "Planeación del Desarrollo Económico y Social de México," (1962), http://revistas.bancomext.gob.mx/rce/magazines/491/2/RCE_2.pdf?

[36] Ibid.

[37] This rupture, or transition, was already illustrated throughout the 1970s amongst political observers, scholars and development experts alike. See for example: Roderic Ai Camp, "The Middle-Level Technocrat in Mexico," *The Journal of Development Areas* 6, no. 4 (1972): 571–582; Merilee S. Grindle, "Power, Expertise and the 'Tecnico': Suggestions from a Mexican Case Study," *The Journal of Politics* 39, no. 2 (1977); Miguel Centeno Castillo, *Democracy Within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992).

'rational planning' of society.[38] These interventions that shaped Mexico's government were based in quasi-technical understandings of social realities, which required the obscuring of complex human relations. Borrowing from Sugata Bose's distinction between normative idioms and means-enhancing instruments of development, it is possible to argue that such instruments became a dominant force in the practices of officials and politicians in the 1960s.[39]

In this context, Rafael Izquierdo and Antonio Ortiz Mena, two economists working for the Mexican Secretary of Finance and Public Credit throughout the 1960s and for the Inter-American Development Bank in the 1970s, famously coined the term *desarrollo estabilizador*, "stabilizing development," to describe the character of these new forms of intervention in society.[40] *Desarrollo estabilizador* not only included a set of practices through which the Mexican government sought to create a balance between labor and capital that could render faster economic growth but also achieve broader social transformation.[41] Furthermore, the imaginations of transforming Mexico were not limited to the material conditions and the modes of organizing economic production, they also sought to mold individual practices. For example, this line of discourse favored the creation of a society of 'voluntary wage savers' and 'highly productive employees' as important milestones in the overall transformation that the *Desarrollo estabilizador* promised.[42] While the notion of social justice never fully disappeared from the political discourse, legislators spoke increasingly rarely of revolutionary ideals of justice for workers and peasants, but rather in terms of specific teleologies of change based in technical representations of reality. These teleologies posited productivity and economic growth as primary foci of state praxis and interest as well as the only instruments to 'improve living conditions' for Mexico's lower classes.[43]

The shifting character of government interventions, as well as their objectives, reflects the sustained ascension of the economy and the notion of economic growth in the political practice. Matthias Schmelzer argues that the economic growth paradigm, the idea that national economies should continuously and progressively

[38] On technical representations of realities and the emergence of technical-oriented modes of governing, see: James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*: *How Certain Schemes to Improve Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 9–53; James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 25–74.

[39] Sugata Bose, "Instruments and Idioms of Colonial and National Development," *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall M. Packard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 45–61.

[40] Rafael Izquierdo, *La Política Hacendaria del Desarrollo Estabilizador 1954–1970* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995).

[41] Carlos Tello, "Desarrollo Estabilizador: 1962–1980," in *Estado y desarrollo económico: México 1920–2006*, ed. Carlos Tello (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2014) 362.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Gladys McCormick, *The Logic of Compromise: Authoritarianism, Betrayal, and Revolution in Rural Mexico, 1935–1965* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016).

expand themselves, became a common policy objective in the second part of the twentieth century.[44] In Mexico, this shift is connected with a moment in which the rates of industrial output and national income 'grew' at unprecedented rates. This 'Mexican Miracle' encompasses the years between 1954 and 1976 in which "the real output grew at an average rate of 6.7 percent."[45] President López Mateos declared economic growth the chief objective of his administration in 1961 and thereby established a certain political rationality that prevailed throughout his administration and praised instrumental and technical interventions as means to nurture, protect, and accelerate 'growth.'[46] The bonanza of these years shaped the imagination of politicians and specialized circles who constructed it as integral part of the long teleology of 'modernization.' Drawing from W. W. Rostow's formulation that societies and states were in a natural evolutive progression towards 'maturity'[47]—which would include certain aspects such as industrialization, exponential economic growth, mass consumption, and 'democratic' decision making processes—Mexico was seen to be on its way to 'catch up' with Western states as long as growth rates of the *desarrollo estabilizador* remained on course.[48]

It is precisely in this context of the uncontested preeminence of the 'economic growth' paradigm that population growth increasingly became a matter of concern for politicians, economists, and demographers alike. As soon as 1955, Julio Durán Ochoa declared in his book *Población* that the ongoing trend in population growth amounting to 3.0 % per year was a major source of threat for the social and economic order.[49] The striking assessment of Durán Ochoa lies in the underlying assumption that the practice of governing is that of regulating the reproduction of

[44] Matthias Schmelzer, "Paradigm in the Making," in Matthias Schmelzer, *The Hegemony of Growth: The OECD and the Making of the Economic Growth Paradigm* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 34–74.

[45] Edward F. Buffie and Allen Sangines Krause, "Mexico 1958–86: From Stabilizing Development to the Debt Crisis," in *Developing Country Debt and the World Economy*, ed. Jeffrey Sachs, (Washington D.C.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989), 141–158.

[46] Oficina de la Presidencia de la República Mexicana, "Adolfo López Mateos: Primer Informe de Gobierno: 1961," *Informes Presidenciales, Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de la Unión, Servicio de Investigación y Referencia Especializada Subdirección* (2006), 41–43.

[47] W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 1–5. This is not the place to articulate a full-length discussion of what came to be known as 'modernization theory,' it should be sufficient to note here that Rostow sought to construct a linear teleological model to explain what he referred to as 'Modern History since 1700.' Such a model posited that changes in economic production and their relations with the cultural, political and social aspects were to be read as stages of growth and ultimately 'modernization.' Coincidentally, these changes and processions were first 'found' in what he defined as the 'West,' and were used as normative measurements of the 'evolution of all societies.'

[48] For a more detailed critique, contextualization, and analysis of the construction of 'modern' teleologies and narratives amongst Mexican politicians, social scientists, and other groups, see: Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov, *Fragments of a Golden Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico Since 1940* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001): 3–23.

[49] Julio Durán Ochoa, *Población* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1950), 23–25; quoted in: Manuel Ordorica, *Una mirada al futuro demográfico de México* (México: El Colegio de México/Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2006) 15.

people as a mode of 'facilitating' and 'protecting' economic growth. This reasoning resonated again in 1958 when Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover published a study that would become influential and compared fertility rates in India and Mexico in order to conceptualize the "link between population growth and stages of economic development."[50] In so doing, demographic trends, which included reproductive and mortality rates as well as spatial distribution of populations, were seen as an axis to predict and indicate variations in economic change and growth. The authors asserted that "the reduction in death rates may be ascribed partly to greater regularity in food supplies, to the establishment of greater law and order, and to other fairly direct consequences of economic change."[51]

Their observation of a correlation between population increase and economic growth was rather simplistic—but still had a profound impact in India and Mexico, the two countries used for the original and a subsequent study.[52] More importantly, the authors concluded that both countries would benefit economically from reducing their populations in the generations to come.[53] Such conclusions were based in a set of underlying assumptions linked to the visions of 'modernization.' First, it was perceived that both countries were experiencing a transition towards 'modern economic and social orders' designated as industrialization as described above. In the realm of the social, modernization theory assumed that more women would eventually partake in organized and 'productive' labor outside their homes.[54] Second, modernization theory of Coale's and Hoover's coinage puts forth the image that 'resources and labor' were distributed rationally and naturally across society. Their argumentative strategy suggests that an increase in population endangers such balance. In both cases, the usage of abstract quantifications such as 'labour'

[50] Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries: A Case Study of India's Prospects* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 1–6. This book was translated into Spanish in 1965 by a Mexico-City based publishing house and became an authoritative voice amongst Mexican demographers including Victor L. Urquidi. See: Ansley J. Coale, and Edgar M. Hoover, *Crecimiento de la Población y Desarrollo Económico* (Mexico City: Limusa Wiley, 1965).

[51] Coale and Hoover, *Population Growth*, 10.

[52] On the implementation of population planning and control in India throughout the 1970s, see: Matthew Connelly, "Population Control in India: Prologue to the Emergency Period," *Population and Development Review* 32, no 4. (2006): 629–667; Oscar Harkavy, *Curbing Population Growth: An Insider's Perspective on the Population Movement* (New York: Plenum Press, 1995); Anrudh K. Jain, "The Impact of Development and Population Policies on Fertility in India," *Population and Development Review* 16, no. 6 (1985): 181–198.

[53] Coale and Hoover, *Population Growth,* 18–21. This conclusion was repeated 20 years after the original assessment in: Ansley J. Coale, "Population Growth and Economic Development: The Case of Mexico," *Foreign Affairs* 56, no. 2 (1978) 415–429.

[54] Coale and Hoover, *Population Growth,* 11. On the notion of 'modernity' and the role of women 'becoming productive agents' see: Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). For a timely critique of the underlying assumption of modernity, and their distinct American dimension, see: Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 15, no. 2 (1973): 199–226.

and 'resources' naturalizes the social and political order in which human activity takes place and where natural resources and material conditions come into existence. Finally, the authors assume that the states would dedicate more resources to capital investments if less resources would be required to ensure the wellbeing of their populations. This last point is of particular importance given the first assumption which stressed that the states in question were in the 'natural progression' of 'modernization.' Hence, the pursuit of such a path acquired more significance than other possible aspects. Taken together, these conclusions presented by the study as well as the assumptions which it articulates unveil a distinct threat for 'developing' countries: Unregulated reproduction would impair the prospects of industrialization and economic growth.[55]

Against this background, Mexican economists and demographers sought to accurately establish, if not predict, fertility and population growth rates in the following decade.[56] Importantly, the main concern was to articulate changes in life, death, and reproduction patterns as factors within a framework of economic development. The projections made by these experts led to an 'uncomfortable prediction' of the future: If the Mexican population kept growing at 3.3% annually, its rate of 1960, the state would have to dedicate ever more resources to provide education and health, thus "altering the balance" between labor and resources despite the strong economic growth.[57] More importantly, this would also bar the state from capital investments to maintain the industrialization process. The experts seem to conclude that people, their bodies and their sexual practices stood in the way of Mexican momentum. Unsurprisingly, Mexican demographers and politicians increasingly saw the urgent need to regulate and reduce population growth.[58]

Population Policy, Family Planning and National Development

The national census of 1960 estimated a total of 34,923,160 people living in Mexico.[59] The Mexican population had increased by 34.9% in the ten years before.[60] In a country whose population had barely risen between 1930 and 1950,

[55] Ibid., 418–420.
[56] See for example: Raúl Benítez Zenteno and Gustavo Cabrera Acevedo, "La Población Futura de México: Total, Urbana y Rural," *Revista Mexican de Sociología* 27, no. 3. (1968). Raúl Alvarado Ruiz, *Mexico: Proyección de la población total 1960–2000 y de la población económicamente activa, 1960–1985* (CELADE/CEPAL, 1969). Louis Ducoff, *Los Recursos Humanos en Centroamérica, Panamá y México. Sus relaciones con algunos aspectos del desarrollo económico* (UN Technical Assistants Program for Population, 1960).
[57] Victor Luis Urquidi, "El Desarrollo Económico y el Crecimiento de la Población," *Demografía y Economía* 3, no. 1 (1969): 102–103.
[58] Víctor Manuel García Guerrero, *Proyecciones y Políticas de Población en México* (México: El Colegio de México, 2014).
[59] Instituto Nacional de Geografía y Estadística (INEGI), *VIII Censo Nacional de Población: 1960* (Mexico: 1960) 12.
[60] Ibid., 8.

such a trend surprised authorities and technical experts alike. Indeed, both politicians and other observers throughout 1960s saw this growth as an expression of the economic bonanza.[61] As late as 1969, President Díaz Ordaz referred to this dynamic as an effect of the wide array of transformations produced by the 'Mexican Miracle.'[62] Nonetheless, the local and external actors who approached reality from an ideological vision centering on 'modernization' read these changes as problematic and stressed the importance of population controls.

Despite the local and global changes in population and development thought, Mexican decision-makers only engaged with the conflation between population and economic growth quite late and showed different degrees of acceptance. For example, while the burgeoning efforts to predict, envision and form an estimate of population growth in Mexico was primarily conducted by demographers at public institutions, it was not completed until 1966 when the *Dirección General de Estadística*, the General Directorate of Statistics, began to conduct its own population growth projections.[63] In fact, these reports, which estimated the population of Mexico to reach 74 million by 1980, did not produce a pronounced change in policy on the national level.[64] The first official mention of overpopulation and the danger it posed to economic growth appeared in 1970 during President Luis Echeverría Álvarez's inauguration speech:

> Today, Mexico faces challenges whose nature and magnitude were not foreseen at the beginning of this century. Since the end the revolution, the population has triplicated. The problems are increasingly acute due to the demand of employment, education, and higher living standards. [65]

With these remarks, President Luis Echeverría began a long journey which would find its end in a policy aiming at the regulation of sexual and reproductive practices of Mexicans. This change can be integrated into the emergence of broader concerns as specific transnational networks and institutions warned of the danger of "global overpopulation."[66]

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[61] Ariel Rodríguez Kuri, *Población y Sociedad. México (1960–2000)* (Madrid: Taurus, 2016), 75.

[62] Oficina de la Presidencia de la República, "Gustavo Díaz Ordaz: Sexto Informe de Gobierno 1969," *Informes Presidenciales, Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de la Unión, Servicio de Investigación y Referencia Especializada Subdirección* (2006), 10.

[63] Víctor Manuel García Guerrero, *Proyecciones y Políticas de Población en México* (México: El Colegio de México, 2014), 56.

[64] Ochoa, *Población*, 23–25.

[65] Oficina de la Presidencia de la República, "Luis Echeverría Álvarez: Toma de Protesta, 1970" *Informes Presidenciales, Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de la Unión, Servicio de Investigación y Referencia Especializada Subdirección* (2006), 10.

[66] By pointing out the notion of "global overpopulation," I seek to highlight how different global actors, from the United Nations Population Fund to the International Planned Parenthood Federation, operating in what Matthew Connelly defined as the "Population Control

The signal of the president was rapidly taken up by a group of Malthusian-educated demographers at *El Colegio de México* (COLMEX). The head of the COLMEX Department of Demographic Studies, Victor Luis Urquidi, became one of the most vocal proponents of a regulatory population policy in Mexico. Urquidi argued that unregulated population growth would produce difficult realities in Mexico and endanger its economic prospects.[67] In 1972, COLMEX organized a symposium to discuss the relations between the importance of reducing fertility rates and the aims of social modernization as well economic growth. The opening speech, delivered by Urquidi himself, gives an impression of his view on the most salient indicators of 'underdevelopment' in Mexico:

> 60% of the population still lives in rural areas; only 30% of people in these areas are economically active [...]. There are a number of setbacks in education, health services, and well-being, [...] all of these conditions produce low incentives to reduce fertility rates.[68]

Urquidi gives a distinct perspective of demographic trends: His analysis sought to assert that there was a conflation between people who were economically inactive, the less educated, rural population and their higher fertility rates, which was reflected in the size of families. The urban, economically active, and educated population had lower fertility rates, and thus smaller families.[69] Thereby, the question of unregulated population growth was shifted and focalized. Instead of referring to all of the population, it became a question concerning the 'rural economically 'less active' population.[70]

President Luis Écheverría argued in a similar way when presenting his population policy later in 1974. In the annual address to the Congress of the Union, the president stressed that rationalizing, organizing, and managing population growth were crucial steps in enabling a better life for the 'poor.'[71] Family planning was

Movement," raised a wide array of concerns regarding fertility, poverty, access to resources, and the degradation of the environment. Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 1–12.

[67] Victor Luis Urquidi, "Política de Población en México: La Necesidad de Planear a muy Largo Plazo," in *Población y Desarrollo Social*, ed. Asociación Mexicana de la Población (Mexico City: Academia Mexicana de Economía Política, 1976).

[68] Victor Luis Urquidi, "Simposio de Planeación Familiar," *Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos,* 6, no. 13 (1972), 410.

[69] Ibid., 413.

[70] The argument that 'unregulated reproduction' concerned primarily poor countries and that population policies were to be oriented towards them was already in circulation amongst different actors and in it became particularly relevant for the Rockefeller Foundation towards the 1960s, as evidenced by John D. Rockefeller in the conference "A New Look on the Population Crisis" in April 1960. See: John D. Rockefeller, "3rd on a Citizen's Perspective on Population," *Population and Development Review* 38, no. 4 (2012): 729–734.

[71] Luis Echeverría Álvarez, "Cuarto Informe de Gobierno del Presidente Constitucional de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Luis Echeverría Álvarez 1° de septiembre de 1974," in *Informes Presidenciales*, ed. Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de la Unión, Servicio de Investigación y Referencia Especializada Subdirección (2006), 174–189. For the complete transcript,

not presented as a tool of population control but as a necessary intervention in order to facilitate the development of the Mexican economy and to accelerate the 'modernization' and 'development' of the social order.[72] As such, the reduction of fertility rates and lowering of population growth was articulated as an efficient, socially as well as economically oriented family planning program as it would later be centralized in the population policy of 1974.[73]

Later the same year, President Echeverría advanced such a perspective on population and the economic development of Mexico in a speech delivered at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at Santiago de Chile. He said, "the pace of population growth must be reduced because it is convenient for our countries."[74] In doing so, developing countries would not only advance their own economic development but would also assert their right for self-determination as President Echeverría argued.[75] While the solutions to this so-called 'problem' of population growth were often linked to American-led efforts in 'underdeveloped' countries, they were also understood as channels of self-determined national economic and social development.[76]

Mexican officials from different government branches became increasingly engaged with the question of population after 1972. Dr. David Fragoso Lizalde of the Ministry for Health and Hygiene addressed the growing debate concerning family planning by launching a national program to "create awareness amongst parents regarding the great danger and responsibility of bringing a child to this world."[77] This campaign did not define any clear measures on how such 'awareness' would be attained, nor on its underlying intentions. However, it does underscore a gradual shift towards the aim of creating state-planned strategies of human reproduction in the light of national development. Furthermore, the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Carrillo Flores, presided over the World Population Conference at Bucharest in 1974. There, the official position of Mexico with regards to family planning was phrased in terms of an urgent national necessity "given the human aspirations towards a better quality of life and a faster social

see: Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de las Estados Unidos Mexicanos. XLIX Legislatura, Año II periodo ordinario, Tomo II, número 3 domingo 1° de septiembre de 1974.

[72] Ibid., 410–411.

[73] Diario Oficial de la Federación, *Ley General de Población* (Mexico: Congreso de la Unión de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1974), art. 3, indent. V.

[74] "Unctad: Discurso Del Licenciado Luis Echeverría Álvarez, Presidente Constitucional De Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Ante La Tercera Conferencia, Santiago De Chile, 19 De Abril De 1972." *El Trimestre Económico* 39, no. 155 (3) (1972): 665–73.

[75] Ibid., 672.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Quoted in: Miguel Mora Bravo, *Programa de Planificación Familiar: La Génesis de un Cambio* (México Comisión Nacional de Población: 2016), 100.

and economic development, and because of the interrelation between demographic conditions and economic development needs."[78]

The intervention presupposed that the introduction of a family planning policy was legitimized at an international level because of its economic benefits in a context of 'development and modernization.' The significance of this moment cannot be underestimated. On the one hand, it brought back to the foreground the form in which local actors engaged with the global scheme of population thought by their assumption of a leading role at an international conference. In doing so, the Mexican delegation promoted its perception of the need to regulate populations, yet only in the terms discussed in the first section of this article, namely that 'unregulated procreation' would bar countries from fulfilling economic goals.[79]

The line of thought presented at the Bucharest Conference shaped President Luis Echeverría's argumentation in his speech to the Congress of Union in the same year: "We would make a severe mistake if we do not become conscious of the gravity of population growth and the necessity for political action that it creates for the people and our government."[80]

In fact, Mexican officials would largely reject the idea that the adopted policy constituted a form of population control. Both at home and abroad, officials and the President himself repeatedly asserted that because there were no clear objective other than reducing fertility and population growth overall, this measure was non-invasive. The stated intention was not to coerce people to use contraceptives or to conduct large-scale sterilization campaigns, but rather to address general necessities of development and growth.[81] At its very core, the law of 1974 had three distinct objectives: first, to regulate the size, distribution, and growth of population in order to adjust demographic trends to the goals of the national economic development plan and social 'modernization'; second, to conduct national family planning programs with the intention of achieving a 'rational regulation' of population growth; and third, to instrumentalize public resources and institutions, from public health to education, in order to intervene, albeit 'respectfully,' in demographic trends.[82]

When finally introduced in 1974, the population policy clearly expressed and reflected the shifts, appropriations, and discourses presented so far for it draw sub-

[78] United Nations Population Fund, *Plan de Acción* (Bucharest: Conferencia Mundial de Población, 1974).

[79] United Nations, *Report of the United Nations World Population Conference* (New York, 1975); The Signatories of the World Population Conference of 1975, "Principles and Objectives of the Plan," in *Plan of Action*, http://www.population-security.org/27-APP1.html.

[80] Oficina de la Presidencia de la República, "Luis Echeverría Álvarez. Tercer Informe de Gobierno," *Informes Presidenciales, Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de la Unión, Servicio de Investigación y Referencia Especializada Subdirección* (2006), 32.

[81] H. Cámara de Senadores, *Diario de los Debate*s (Mexico: Congreso de la Unión de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 16 October 1973).

[82] Diario Oficial de la Federación, *Ley General de Población* (Mexico: Congreso de la Unión de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1974), art. 3, indent V.

stantially from the demographic estimations conducted both by Urquidi, and other demographers at *El Colegio de México*, as well as from the Coale and Hoover study.[83] Furthermore, the intervention in practices of reproduction, particularly of those who were seen as either 'poor' or economically 'less active,' was presented as a 'technical' measure of 'social adjustment to the needs of maintaining economic growth rates.'

Luis Mario Moya Palencia became the first President of the National Commission for Population in 1974. This institution was created in order to coordinate the effective implementation of the population policy on both the government and social levels.[84] Already in his inaugural speech, Palencia unveiled his distinct personal zeal stating that, "the unregulated population growth rates have been reflected in the urban centers in overcrowding, pollution, insalubrity, insufficient public services and social tensions." [85] Again, he presented these social realities as 'technical' problems which were tied to the relationship between space, resources and people. While the first two had been traditionally managed by the state, with the introduction of the *Ley General de Población* it was now feasible to manage the distribution and size of population in order to avoid and revert developments perceived as 'undesirable' and supposedly 'caused' by an unregulated population. It was also clear that the problems associated to overpopulation were not weighed equally, but rather as an expression of 'urban and rural poverty.' These emphases reflect the intimate links between population thought and 'modernization' teleologies presented above. 'Urban poverty' was constructed as an effect of the process of internal migration into Mexican cities, which was at the same time triggered by industrialization and wealth concentration in urban centers.[86]

Hence, it is possible to argue that from the very beginning the objectives of the population policy was to target those less favored by the 'Mexican Miracle' whose role in a 'economically productive' society was unclear. The aims established by the CONAPO itself exemplify the focalized concerns with population growth: "A population policy cannot exist without a full understanding of the rural sociodemographic conditions that will allow to articulate programs according to the needs of this environment."[87] The aim was to orient the reach of population and sexual education programs to those who were seen as in need of it. When it came

[83] Víctor Luis Urquidi, "Política de Población en México: La Necesidad de Planear a Muy Largo Plazo," in *Obras Escogidas De Víctor L. Urquidi,* 239.
[84] Diario Oficial de la Federación, *Ley General de Población* (Mexico: Congreso de la Unión de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1974), art. 6.
[85] "Discurso Del Secretario De Gobernación Lic. Mario Moya Palencia, Al Instalarse El Consejo Nacional De Población, El 27 De Mayo De 1974," *Demografía Y Economía* 8, no. 2 (1974), 263.
[86] Diane E. Davis, *Urban Leviathan: Mexico City in the Twentieth Century* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994): 174–218.
[87] CONAPO quoted in Carlos Welti-Chanes, "El Consejo Nacional de Población a 40 años de la Institucionalización de una Política Explícita de Población en México," *Papeles de Población* 20, no. 18 (2014), 33.

to the implementation of the population policy. it is no surprise that the very first beneficiaries of the family planning programs were those social groups affiliated with the National Institute for Social Security IMSS, namely industry workers and peasants.[88]

As shown before, rural communities often concerned demographers and state officials for they were thought to have unregulated practices of reproduction and therefore higher fertility rates. These communities, their sexual practices, and their family structures therefore became important sites of intervention precisely because they did not seem to fit into the self-narratives produced by the 'Mexican Miracle' of a country in transition towards 'social modernization and economic development.'[89] Instead, they carried the seemingly unmistakable sign of unregulated reproduction of underdevelopment.

Concluding Remarks

This paper sought to argue that the introduction of the population policy in Mexico obeyed the assumed need to maintain and foster economic growth in the country. By the end of the 1960s, Mexican scholars and politicians saw a threat to those goals in the 'unregulated' growth of population as well as sign of 'underdevelopment' in need of intervention. If 'development' or 'modernization' were imposed categories of a global discourse to describe the economic and social conditions of what 'developing' countries should strive for, Mexican élites appropriated this notion and signified it in terms of population growth, fertility rates, and the size of families in their relationship to economic growth. As they saw higher rates of economic growth as the only way to overcome the problems associated with 'underdevelopment'—from poverty to the lack of education—population growth was constructed as a central risk for 'national development.' As states in developing stages eventually dedicated fewer resources to the well-being of their citizens and more into their economies, the reduction of population growth became a perceived necessity to fulfill the goals of development.

These conflations were rooted in both local and global shifts in population and development thought that also underscore the ascent of economic growth as an end in itself for development agendas. Finally, these efforts are based in a self-constructed Mexican desire to become a 'modern' country. The notion that it was feasible to alter the social orders of Mexico was an expression of such desires. In this context, the role of the Mexican population policy was to fabricate a social order akin to those of a 'modern developed nation,' a society of smaller families.

[88] Viviane B. de Márquez, "La Política de Planificación Familiar en México: Un Proceso Institucionalizado?" *Revista Mexican de Sociología* 46, no. 2 (1984), 290.
[89] Victor Luis Urquidi, "México en la Encrucijada. La Perspectiva del País," *Letras Libres,* issue 8 (1977).

I would like to thank Dr. Hubertus Büschel, Deborah Bremmer, and Tancrede Pages for their support and remarks during my research and writing process. My gratitude also goes to the two peer reviewers for their insights, suggestions and corrections. All the following mistakes and pitfalls are naturally mine.



PROCLAMA.

LUIS AURY, *Comandante en Gefe de las Floridas*, &c.

POR quanto á consequëncia de la Eleccion que se celebró en esta Ciudad el 19 y 20 de Noviembre del corriente año de 1817 resultaron nombrados para Representantes del pueblo, con el objeto de formar y constituir el Gobierno provisorio de la República, Pedro GUAL, Vicente PAZOS, Mr. MURDEN, Luis COMTE, Coronel IRWIN, Mr. LAVIGNAC, Coronel FORBES, Miguel MABRITY y el Doctor CHAPELLE, convoco por las presentes á los expresados Representantes para que se reunan, y den principio á sus sesiones el dia primero de Diciembre del presente año, debiendo á la apertura de dichas sesiones prestar juramento de desempeñar fiel, é imparcialmente el encargo á que los ha destinado la voluntad de los Habitantes libres de las Floridas. Dado en la Ciudad de Fernandina, Isla de Amelia á 27 de Noviembre de 1817, 1 de la Independencia.

Firmado **LUIS AURY.**

F. MALIGOT, Impresor del GOBIERNO.

Election Results in the Republic of the Floridas. 1817.
Wikimedia Commons.

The Amelia Framers, 1817: Farce as a Historiographical Model

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In 1817, a group of privateers attempted to establish an independent nation-state on an island just below the southern U.S. border. At that time, the Monroe administration was in negotiations for East Florida, the region to which the island belonged. The administration decided to invade the island and provisionally restore Spanish sovereignty so that it could legally purchase East Florida without further complications. This study argues for the utility of narrativizing this event as a farce. Previous historical accounts have deemphasized its farcical elements, and as a result have failed to articulate the discrepancy between performances and intentions on each side of the conflict. To recognize this discrepancy allows us to recognize how the privateers consciously manipulated the notion of nation-statehood to serve their particular ends. To the extent this manipulation was successful, the Monroe administration was forced to actively evade the legal uncertainties surrounding their decision to invade.

Introduction

It was a dispute between an apparently real and an apparently fictive nation-state. Spain, for the most part, watched from the sidelines. The dispute concerned the capture of Amelia Island and its port town, Fernandina, at the northeastern corner of what was then Spanish East Florida. The captors remained in control for roughly six months, from June to December 1817. John Quincy Adams, then U.S. Secretary of State, summarized the event as follows:

> Possession [of Amelia Island] was first taken early in the course of last summer, by a party, under the command of a British subject named [Gregor MacGregor], *pretending* authority from Venezuela. He was succeeded by persons...*pretending* authority from some *pretended* Government of Florida; and they are now by the last accounts…contesting the command of the place with a Frenchmen [Louis-Michel Aury] having under him a body of Blacks from St. Domingo, and *pretending* au-

> thority from a Government of Mexico. In the mean time the place from its immediate vicinity to the United States, has become a receptacle for fugitive negroes, [and] for every species of illicit traffic…. President [Monroe] after observing the feeble and ineffectual effort made by the Spanish Government of Florida, to recover possession of the Island...has determined to break up this nest of foreign Adventurers, with *pretended* South American commissions, but among whom not a single South American name has yet appeared. Should you find that any of the Revolutionary Governments with whom you may communicate have *really* authorized any of these foreign Adventurers to take possession of those places, you will explain to them that this measure could not be submitted to or acquiesced in by the United States; because...Amelia Island is too insignificant in itself and too important by its local position in reference to the United States, to be left by them in the possession of such persons [italics added].[1]

The summary comes from Adams's instructions to a Special Commission of U.S. diplomats about to leave for the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, based in Buenos Aires, to determine whether it deserved recognition as an independent country. Up to this point, the U.S. had maintained official neutrality between the peninsular Spanish government and the creole insurgencies in South and Central America. The immediate context of the Commission was the ongoing negotiation between the U.S. and Spain over the remaining Spanish territories in North America (East and West Florida; Texas). Recognition of the United Provinces—a decision that might be re-applied across the continent—was held out as a bargaining chip against Spain in order to expedite the cession of the Floridas.[2]

Adams's instructions are dated November 21, 1817, roughly a month before the United States military occupied Amelia Island, holding it "in protective custody" on behalf of the Spanish regime with the expectation that Spain would cede the island, along with the rest of East Florida, to the U.S. upon the finalization of a treaty.[3] Between the date of Adams's note and the invasion, the Amelia party had drafted a "Constitution and Frame of Government" for the "Republic of the Floridas" and run elections for public office.[4] They asserted that Spanish sovereignty over the region was defunct, and thereby imperiled a clean territorial transfer from

[1] William Ray Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations, Vol. I* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925), Document 44, 21 November 1817.

[2] In addition to this short-term angle, David Meirion Jones has argued that the Monroe administration was seriously weighing the possibility of a pan-hemispheric alliance. David Meirion Jones, *A Luminous Constellation Pointing the Way? The Connectivity of Rioplatense & US Union and State-Formation, 1815–1820* (MA diss., University of York, 2013).

[3] Charles H. Bowman, "Vicente Pazos and the Amelia Island Affair, 1817," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 53, no. 3 (1975): 295.

[4] For an in-depth summary see: David Head, *Privateers of the Americas: Spanish American Privateering from the United States in the Early Republic* (Athens: London University of Georgia Press, 2015), 107–122.

Spain to the U.S. By ordering the special commissioners to stamp out any political relationships with the "pretended government" in Fernandina, Adams preempted objections to a U.S. intervention. Despite his efforts, a debate over its legality embroiled Congress, as well as the press, for months after the invasion. Congress, with some misgivings, ultimately affirmed the President's decision. The cession of the Floridas to the U.S. followed in 1819 after prolonged negotiations with Spain, during which time the U.S. military committed further unpermitted incursions beyond the Spanish Floridian border.[5]

I quote and contextualize Adams's letter for two reasons: first, to provide the official U.S. narrative of the Amelia Island Affair, with its emphasis on the volatility of operations on Amelia as well as its inhabitants' mixed nationalities and race; and second, to draw attention to the word "pretend," which appears, in a single paragraph, five times. The forcefulness of this repetition, in my reading, is necessitated by its contradiction in the penultimate statement ("Should you find that any of the Revolutionary Governments...have *really* authorized any of these foreign Adventurers..." etc.) In effect, if we combine these statements, we see that the commissioner's instructions are to convey the following: *Whether or not you authorized the Amelia party, the authorization is a fake*—which, in the context of the Commission itself, carries the explicit warning that—*if you did, your government will likewise be judged a fake.*[6] Adams then ties it back into a justification for invading the island: "Amelia Island is too insignificant in itself and too important by its local position in reference to the United States," etc. In other words, *beyond any external reference, Amelia Island has no political existence to be violated—and the U.S. is its only reference of ontological certainty.*

Political figures in and outside the U.S. opposed this line of thinking and protested the decision to invade. Some commentators (then and since) have emphasized the pretexts for a U.S. invasion, and others the fraudulence of the Amelia insurgents' demands. This paper demonstrates how the narrative form of farce, by stressing how these pretenses functioned reciprocally, can function for a historical telling of the Affair, and how doing so reveals meanings neglected in previous accounts. Beneath the surface of the conflict lies an insight into the nature of national statehood: the difficulty of theoretically distinguishing a genuine from a forgery. This insight was utilized by the so-called "Adventurers," who wagered on the acceptance of a conceptually sound (if perceptibly ludicrous) argument:

[5] Other incursions by the U.S. leading up to the Treaty (before, during and after the Amelia Affair) were related to the anti-Seminole campaigns. Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 30; Adam Wasserman, *A People's History of Florida, 1513–1876: How Africans, Seminoles, Women, and Lower Class Whites Shaped the Sunshine State* (USA: self-publishing, 2009), 158–90.

[6] Adams spells out the threat in the next paragraph: "the licentious abuse of [South American] flags by these freebooters...has [a]...tendency to deter other countries from recognizing them as regular Governments." He expands the threat by stating that, if they do not disavow the Amelia excursion, the U.S. will claim "indemnity for all losses and damages" that have resulted from it. Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, Document 44.

we are a sovereign nation because we have the necessary documents. The U.S. executive, in turn, evaded this argument and invaded the island.

The discrepancy between the leaders' dramatics and their unspoken pragmatism supplies the comic tension of the farce. Monroe and Adams loudly insisted that the U.S. military was defending international law and order while quietly securing a clean purchase of the territory. The Amelia Framers, cloaking themselves in the construct of sovereignty, refused to acknowledge their own lack of substance as a nation and own short-term interests in the territory. Maintaining this tension in the historical telling allows for an inclusion of two critical narratives that are hard to reconcile: anti-Amelian and anti-U.S. Any trace of a tragic telling (i.e. that the expansionist U.S. government dismantled a genuine republican project) must confront the simulatory aspect of the Republic of the Floridas. Conversely, if one ridicules the emptiness of the Amelian claim to nationality, one must also contend with the soundness of their legal argument—and thus the political-legal construct of the nation-state itself.

The next section elaborates on the notion of emplotment and shows how farce, as a mode of emplotment, can reveal the Amelia Affair's inner workings. It gives a review of the existing historiography, which has tended to refute the self-consciousness of the historical actors, and thus, the farcical duality of their intentions and performances. I then introduce what Benedict Anderson calls the "modular" aspect of early nation-building projects, and how this problematized the notion of legitimate statehood. This provides a framework for understanding the basic plan of the Amelia Framers, as well as the rationale of Monroe and Adams. Section three summarizes the legal arguments for and against the U.S. invasion—the surface-level performances of the farce. Section four contextualizes this legal defense within the procession of "modular" nation-building projects of the era and region, providing the backdrop against which the legal arguments appear farcical. Section five shows how the emplotment of the Amelia Affair as a farce—prefigured in some contemporary accounts—conveys an unsolved contradiction between the emergent legal paradigm upon which "modular" states are built and a realistic[7] assessment of how political power operates transnationally.

Historiographical Review and Theoretical Framework

Hayden White asserts that all historical explanations derive, if somewhat obscurely, from literary structures, and can be categorized into various modes of emplotment (romance, comedy, tragedy, etc.) Historians, he argues, rely on these modes to make their work intelligible. Emplotment is not simply forming a chronology of incidents; it is understood as the synthesis of heterogeneous evidence

[7] I use 'realistic' and 'realism' in this essay to denote a commonly shared perception of reality or common sense that does not bear the burden of proof on a legal or philosophic basis.

in order to make it meaningful, i.e. followable at the sequential, explanatory, and interpretive levels. White favored Ricoeur's extension of emplotment to include traces of the historical actors' own consciousness—that is, a narrative link to the event itself. People narrate their own actions in real-time in order to make sense of their consequences; their actions are "in effect lived narrativizations."[8] To emplot the Amelia Affair is more than the "displacement of the facts onto the ground of literary fictions." It is a point of entry for making sense of what happened.

Farce denotes a form of satire in which the contradiction of a character's words or actions against their context is raised to such a tenor of exaggeration that no self-conscious individual could recognize them as anything but fraudulent—yet the character continues to speak and act as if this were not the case.[9] By emplotting in this format, I assert that historical figures involved were conscious of playing roles, of committing forgeries, of a discrepancy between their actions and the surface level of their public explanations. The implication of this beyond the Affair itself—which I return to in the conclusion—is that contemporary politicians did not merely think within '*the* nation' as a pre-understood thing. When they claimed a nationality, they were playing with, constructing, and exploiting the meaning of 'nation.'

As it specifically pertains to the debate around the Amelia government's legitimacy, my theoretical line is reinforced by the observation that materiality, or physical bodies in space and time, were no more important than the abstractions in play, such as the legal recognition of sovereignty and land speculation. The U.S. and Amelia governments were in effect competing speculators on the Floridian territory, engaged in a narrative battle over sovereignty. This battle occurred

[8] Riceour argues for a "metaphysics of narrativity" based upon the interrelation of "ordinary representations of time...as that 'in' which events take place," and "historicality," the apparent capacity for events to be repetitive. "The narrative function provides a transition from within-time-ness to historicality, and it does this by revealing what must be called the 'plot-like' nature of temporality itself." White called this "the strongest claim for the adequacy of narrative to realize the aims of historical studies made by any recent theorist of historiography." Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 50–54.

[9] White mentions Marx's essay on the 1848 Revolution in France as an example of history emplotted as farce. Marx designates it as a farce in that the language and ideals of the authentic (thus tragic) 1789 Revolution were cynically reused half a century later as a front to disavow the original revolutionary project. There is a two-tiered resonance between Marx's description of the *1848 Brumaire* and James Monroe's description of the declaration of independence of the Republic of the Floridas as a fabrication "where the venerable forms, by which a free people constitute a frame of government for themselves, are prostituted by a horde of foreign freebooters for purposes of plunder." The second tier is that the Amelia Framers accused Monroe himself, leader of an (ostensibly) authentic revolution 40 years prior, of leading a conquest in the cloak of liberal values. Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," as discussed in Hayden White, "Interpretation in History," in *Postmodernism: Critical Concepts. Vol. III: Humanities and Social Sciences*, ed. Victor E. Taylor and Charles E. Winsquist (London: Routledge, 1998), 218. Monroe is quoted from Vanessa Mongey, *Cosmopolitan Republics and Itinerant Patriots: The Gulf of Mexico in the Age of Revolutions (1780s–1830s)* (Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2011), 245.

in real-time, both in the press and privately, shaping events as they unfolded. Earl Weeks contends that "the very legitimacy of Aury's nascent patriot government at Amelia Island was what constituted the threat to the United States, by creating another obstacle to the acquisition of the Floridas."[10] I would revise Weeks' argument to emphasize that the legitimacy of the Republic of the Floridas[11] *in the abstract* constituted the threat, whereas the counter-perception that nothing concrete existed to support this abstraction served as an implicit authorization for U.S. military response. The threat, though real, was cornered in symbolism.

Among previous historical emplotments of the Affair, there has been a fatal preoccupation with the question of Aury and MacGregor's sincerity—perhaps working to diffuse the underlying ambiguity around the nation-state that I wish to emphasize. Most historians make a comment as to whether the leaders were acting for the genuine cause of republicanism *or* for personal profit.[12] T. Frederick Davis, for instance, who wrote the first academic study of the Amelia Affair in 1928, asserts that while MacGregor's proclamations were sincere, Aury's were not.[13] This focus on character, even where it does not reproduce the Monroe administration's propaganda, provides no usable evidence towards the fundamental questions of political legitimacy at play. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that privateering operations, while profiting individuals, were simultaneously understood as essential to the South American Republican insurgencies from a military standpoint.[14] In this study, every statement and action shall be read as a means to a particular end. The declaration of the Republic of the Floridas was a means to create a legally-sanctioned, temporary port of trade, privateering, and war-supplies to support the South American independence movements and to make money doing so.[15] The designation of the republic as a fraud was a means to justify the invasion of Amelia Island while legitimating the U.S.'s own claim to the territory.

[10] William Earl Weeks, *John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 64.

[11] The use of "Aury's government," instead of the formal title, implicitly discredits the formal existence of the government and reduces the government synecdochally to Aury, as if it were his personal project. Likewise, the general use of scare-quotes around "Republic," "constitution," and "legislature," are uncritical acknowledgements of the ambiguity between authentic and counterfeit nationhood.

[12] Bowman quotes (and implicitly concurs with) a contemporary observer of Aury's crew: "All came ostensibly 'to aid the cause of the patriots of South America, but their real motive is, no doubt, to prey upon whom they can.'" In conclusion, Bowman writes: "[Pazos'] faith in republicanism for the Floridas proved to be misplaced." Bowman, "Vicente Pazos," 283, 295.

[13] This point is reiterated in Frank Owsley and Gene A. Smith, *Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800–1821* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2014), 137. Head reaches the same conclusion, *Privateers of the Americas*, 144–46.

[14] Rafe Blaufarb, "The Western Question: The Geopolitics of Latin American Independence," *The American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (2007): 753, 758.

[15] "J. Skinner to John Quincy Adams, 30 July 1817" from Gregor MacGregor and J. Skinner, "Letters Relating to Macgregor's Attempted Conquest of East Florida, 1817," *The Florida Historical Society Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (1926): 56–57.

Klaus, in his study of financial frauds in the 19th century, writes that "fraudsters were often the most attuned to the social processes through which trust was built."[16] Instead of condemning MacGregor or Aury for being "fraudsters" or ridiculing them for being sincere, but ineffectual, the point is to understand how they analysed and acted upon shifting standards of political legitimacy. David Head writes, for example, that "[MacGregor's] vision looked noble, but the reality was different."[17] Here is a double mistake: first in judging MacGregor's sincerity; second in creating a false division between "reality" and "vision." Vanessa Mongey shows how the "vision" behind the Republic of the Floridas actually *sprang from* the emerging political realities. Mongey focuses on the "foundational fiction" of statehood as it arose in the late 18th century, and the attempts of "itinerant patriots" such as MacGregor and Aury to utilize it.[18] She risks falling into the sincerity-trap, too, when she compares the Amelia constitution to a "state fantasy," a phrase borrowed from Sybille Fisher's study of the early constitutions of Haiti. To reapply this term from the context of the Haitian revolution, with its idealistic aspirations, to the Republic of the Floridas, with its conspicuous utilitarianism, seems incongruous.[19] Nonetheless, by turning our attention to the sheer repetitiveness of Amelia-like projects (including the reappearance of many participants), Mongey has advanced the theoretical analysis of the Amelia Affair the furthest.[20]

Mongey's shift in emphasis towards repetition owes a lot to Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, which describes nationhood as "modular": a conceptual blueprint "capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains."[21] Anderson turns specifically to "the large cluster of new political entities that sprang up in the Western hemisphere between 1776 and 1838, all of which self-consciously defined themselves as nations, and…as (non-dynastic) republics[,]… the first such states to emerge on the world stage, and therefore inevitably…the first real models of what such states should 'look like'…." Anderson situates these national projects within the context of industrial print-capitalism, and specifically the spread of the novel and

[16] For a summary of MacGregor's "Poyais Scheme," see: Ian Robert Klaus, *Virtue is Dead: A History of Trust* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 97–130.
[17] Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 107.
[18] Mongey, *Cosmopolitan Republics*, 94.
[19] Mongey's work sets out to redeem the cosmopolitan vision of "itinerant patriots" as an alternative trajectory for nationalism that has vanished from historical writing. I do not dispute the main thrust of her work—only that the Amelia Island project, specifically, was not aimed *directly* at the fulfillment of any Republican ideal. Sybille Fischer, *Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).
[20] The most complete reconstruction of the Amelia Affair (without a theoretical drive) is Heckard's 2006 dissertation. This includes (what appears to be) the only detailed account of the prolonged congressional debates in 1818. Jennifer Heckard, *The Crossroads of Empire: The 1817 Liberation and Occupation of Amelia Island, East Florida* (PhD diss., University of Connecticut, 2006).
[21] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 4.

newspaper as mass-produced commodities.[22] The possession of a printing press (in addition to the physical occupation of the island) enabled the Amelia government to declare its own existence with apparent firmness.

And yet, in reference to all attempts at nation-building in this period and region, Anderson notes a distinct "social thinness," a lack of the features that tend to substantiate nationality: linguistic distinctiveness, social inclusiveness, and a national myth extending into the indefinite past.[23] The first manifestations of national statehood were accompanied by a persistent ambiguity about *what a nation is*, even as 'the nation' served to justify the existence of 'the state' with increasing firmness. "By the second decade of the nineteenth century, if not earlier," Anderson writes, "a 'model' of 'the' independent national state was available for pirating."[24] This did not mean, however, that varying levels of "social thinness" were imperceptible to people of the period. The visible extremity of "piratical self-consciousness" behind the government on Amelia Island lent the Affair its irony: the module of the national state was arguably fulfilled even though none of its citizens were viewed as possessing Floridian nationality—any depth of community to tie them together or to the land.

The Special Commission to Buenos Aires and the Amelia Affair were two instances of a relatively new state (the U.S.) deciding upon the inclusion of relatively newer states (the United Provinces and the Republic of the Floridas) into a shared model of national statehood—defining and solidifying its own national legitimacy by judging the legitimacy of neighbors. The emergent paradigm of national horizontality—of New World nations existing in parallel to the Old World regimes and to each other, fundamentally comparable in their nation-ness[25]—was what the Amelia Framers attempted to shield themselves with. However, the persistently recognized *verticality* of international relationships and state-legitimacy (based largely on military, economic, and demographic power) implied a realistic incomparability between the U.S., the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, and the Republic of the Floridas, on three respective tiers. In light of this verticality, and furthermore the seeming eventuality of the U.S. gaining possession of East Florida, the dispute has an air of inconsequentiality. This, along with the general flagrance of political double-dealing, lays the groundwork for the Amelia Affair as farce.

Debate on the Legality of the U.S. Invasion

I will begin with the surface level of the farce: the lines of legal argumentation given both by the Amelia Framers and the Monroe administration—respectively,

[22] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 34–35.
[23] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 46–49.
[24] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 81.
[25] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 192.

the argument for Floridian national sovereignty and the distractive counter-argument around racial unrest and illegal operations on the border.

Vicente Pazos, a journalist and lawyer from Peru, laid out the legal argument against the United States occupation of Amelia Island. Pedro Gual, then diplomat and later president of Venezuela, served as the personal connection to substantiate Pazos' argument that the new republic was the result of a genuine *patriot* revolution, within the context of the South American wars of independence.[26] Directly after the U.S. occupation, Pazos traveled to Washington to demand reparations from the U.S. for its unlawful seizure of neutral territory beyond its borders.[27] His "Exposition," (presented first to the President, then to Congress) attempts to show how the Republic was founded upon the same legal groundwork as the United States. Pazos makes this comparison both in terms of history (the fight against a colonial oppressor[28]) and political values (their "Constitution and Frame of Government" was based quite explicitly on the United States' own.)[29] He writes, "The establishment of Amelia was a school, where the patriots would have been taught to imitate the heroic conduct held out by this nation [the U.S.] forty years ago." *We modeled ourselves in your image, and you have forsaken us.*

Pazos cites the law of nations, the legal standard (at least nominally) assented to by European and American governments, to argue that, "Either Spain, or the republics of the south, possess the right of invading the other's territory...without any neutral power having the right to question them."[30] He presents the original commission to invade Florida given to MacGregor in March, three months prior to his invasion, by three South and Central American diplomats. Given this authorization, and the unbroken transfers of authority from MacGregor to Aury (in September) and Aury to a civil government (in November), the U.S. was legally bound to treat them as one party of a civil war, and—given their success—a sovereign, neutral state.[31]

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[26] It is plausible that Adams, who claims above that "not a single South American name has yet appeared" in relation to the Amelia government, had not yet been informed of Pazos and Gual's arrival in Fernandina on October 4th, 1817. Bowman, "Vicente Pazos," 281.

[27] Bowman, "Vicente Pazos," 295.

[28] See, for example, Pazos' laudatory references to George Washington, as well as Benjamin Franklin, who was known to have commissioned privateers during the War of Independence. Vicente Pazos Kanki, *The Exposition, Remonstrance and Protest of Don Vincente Pazos: Commissioner on Behalf of the Republican Agents Established at Amelia Island…* (Philadelphia: [publisher not identified], 1818) 25–27.

[29] Aside from citing Hamilton's Federalist Paper No. 70 directly, the framework included three branches, military subservience to civil authority, and freedom of speech and conscience. Bowman, "Vicente Pazos," 289.

[30] At that time Emer de Vattel's 1758 "The Law of Nations…" was the definitive source. In a civil war, according to Vattel, arbitration by a neutral government must be consented to from both sides. J. C. A. Stagg, "James Madison and George Mathews: The East Florida Revolution of 1812 Reconsidered," *Diplomatic History* 30, no. 1 (2006): 30; Kanki, *The Exposition*, 19.

[31] There was a brief interlude where neither man was present on the island, which is referred to in the initial summary by Adams. After some contention, the rule of Aury was accepted with

The primary issue at hand, he writes, is the violation of national sovereignty: "The [US invasion], whether on the boundary or the center, would be called criminal. If the limits of public, as well as private properties, were not held alike sacred, the frontiers of a country might soon thus extend themselves to the extremities of the world…."[32] Unlawful "extension" is precisely what Pazos identifies as the goal of U.S. policy: to take the territory for itself. Even if they were in negotiations with the Spanish for the Floridas, he writes, "They cannot...have lost what did not actually belong to them."[33]

Senator Henry Clay was Pazos' most vocal advocate in Congress. In addition to criticizing executive overreach (Monroe had ordered the invasion without congressional approval), Clay shared Pazos' view that the U.S. was covertly helping the Spanish under the guise of neutrality. He pushed for official recognition of the southern republics (whom he saw as natural ideological and geographic allies) and tied the issue directly to the question of the Republic of the Floridas, which (as a sovereign body) had the right to commission privateers.[34] Sympathizers in the press, part of the anti-Spanish "propaganda machine" operating in Baltimore and Philadelphia,[35] lambasted the U.S. invasion for months.[36] Many reiterated Aury's own claim, on the brink of surrender in December, that, "The only law you [President Monroe] can adduce in your favor is that of force, which is always repugnant to Republican Governments and to the principles of a just and impartial nation."[37]

Technically, the strongest counter Monroe could offer was to question the authenticity of MacGregor's original commissions from March 1817. But Monroe had still not received confirmation of Bolivar's stance, and considering that the U.S. had already threatened potential sponsors of the Amelia expedition, his disavowal in late 1818 cannot be accepted at face value.[38] Rather, as a red herring, Clay's main opponent on the floor sounded the alarm of a "bad neighborhood of free, armed blacks" on the southern border, an argument that particularly held sway among southern representatives.[39] There is little indication that Aury was opposed to slavery—much to the contrary. But reports had circulated in the press

apparent unanimity. Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 105.

[32] Kanki*, The Exposition,* 21.

[33] Kanki*, The Exposition,* 18–19.

[34] Heckard, *The Crossroads of Empire,* 226–27.

[35] See: Laura Bornholdt, *Baltimore as a Port of Propaganda for Spanish American Independence, 1810–1823* (PhD diss., Yale University, 1945), 254–64.

[36] Heckard, *The Crossroads of Empire,* 220–23.

[37] *American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive of the Congress of the United States, Class I, Vol. 4*, ed. Walter Lowry and Walter S. Franklin (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), 140.

[38] Two of the three commissions (from Pedro Gual and Lino de Clemente) could be traced by chain of command back to Bolivar. The United Provinces of Rio de La Plata had already decommissioned Martin Thompson, the third signer, in 1817. Heckard, *The Crossroads of Empire*, 245; Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* Document 73.

[39] This was Representative Alexander Smyth of Virginia. Heckard, *The Crossroads of Empire,* 228–29.

that Amelia Island served as a gateway for fugitive slaves, and in reverse, for smuggled imports. Furthermore, Aury's crew included Haitians who "insisted upon equal rights and privileges with the whites"—a fact that Adams himself emphasized in a series of anonymous newspaper editorials leading up to the invasion.[40] Aury had anticipated these claims early on. One of his first executive actions was to outlaw the passage of fugitive slaves; but this gesture went unnoticed.[41]

The first justification was a well grounded yet narrow appeal to law (in respect to smuggling) and an erroneous appeal to racial order. The second was an outright admission that the U.S. wanted the territory for itself. Ultimately, few representatives were willing to undermine negotiations with the Spanish for Florida. Neither justification directly addressed the question of what constitutes sovereignty. The congressional debate was a reminder that no impartial venue existed to judge the sovereignty of states, and that the U.S. government could—according to its own convenience—decide to serve as such a venue, as it had in sending a commission to Rio de la Plata, or not.

In the final analysis there is little to indicate that any branch of the U.S. government strongly considered recognizing the Republic of the Floridas as a sovereign state. Chief Justice John Marshall, hearing a piracy case in 1818, declared all privateering commissions made by Aury to be null based upon the "de facto" nonexistence of a Mexican insurgency.[42] Monroe and Adams were determined to invade the island months before, by October at the latest.[43] Few in Congress backed up Clay in his defense of the Republic. By 1818, repeated U.S. military incursions into the region had reinforced the expectation that U.S. possession was inevitable. The 1817 occupation of Amelia Island was in fact the second instance on the same island, under similar circumstances, within only five years.[44] Campaigns against Seminole and free black settlements in Spanish territory had stepped up since 1816.[45] Between late 1817 and early 1818, King Ferdinand VII and the Spanish governor of East Florida rapidly issued land grants totaling roughly 780,000 acres "as land speculation anticipating the American takeover."[46]

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[40] Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 107. On the generally ambiguous stance of "itinerant patriots" towards race, see: Mongey, *Cosmopolitan Republics*, 186–239. For quotes from Adams's anonymous editorials, see. Heckard, *The Crossroads of Empire,* 172–75.

[41] Bowman, "Vicente Pazos," 288.

[42] James Brown Scott, *Prize Cases Decided in the United States Supreme Court 1789–1918, Vol. 2* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), 1080–85.

[43] Bowman, "Vicente Pazos," 292.

[44] For a discussion of the 1812 filibustering mission in East Florida and its ties to the Madison administration, see: Stagg, "James Madison and George Mathews," 23–55.

[45] See Wasserman on the destruction of the Negro Fort: Wasserman, *A People's History of Florida*, 158–65.

[46] Paul E. Hoffman, *Florida's Frontiers: A History of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 270–74.

The refusal to recognize the Republic of the Floridas may have appeared an eventuality to most people, but this very appearance helped evade the technical basis of Pazos' argument. The fact that the Amelia government could exhibit documentary evidence of its constitutional framework, repeated victories over Spanish forces,[47] successful democratic elections, and at least one credible commission[48] from a native party engaged in civil war with its European colonizer were comparable to the facts which substantiated the U.S. government's own domestic sovereignty. Beyond that, the U.S. claim to East Florida, whether or not Congress authorized military intervention,[49] derived from spoliation claims against the Spanish Crown that were extrinsically linked to the specific territory—and arguably invalid in the first place.[50]

The Republic of the Floridas as a Modular Nation-State

To accept Pazos' argument at face value, however, would be to ignore its place in a rapid succession of "ephemeral states"[51] in the region. Florida itself had seen at least six short-lived separatist republican experiments since the mid-1790s.[52] This context underlies the general perception of the Republic of the Floridas as yet another forgery. The defense of the Republic was not thrown together to legally substantiate a pre-existing political or demographic reality. Rather, the semblance of reality (being there in the flesh; printing documents) was a hasty effort to manifest a pre-existing legal model—to speculate upon an inchoate political order where abstraction, or documentary verification, was the primary form of legal substance.

To tell the story of the Republic of the Floridas from beginning to end (June 29th – December 23rd 1817) is insufficient. The Republic is a point of fleeting intersection between "modular" careers leading towards and away from the contemporary independence movements of South and Central America. Pazos, after the Amelia Affair, went on to live in the U.S. for some years lobbying for South American recognition. Pedro Gual, born in Caracas, was involved in the Venezuelan insurgency since early on. After his time in the United States as an agent of Bolivar,

[47] In addition to the original capture of Fernandina in June, they withstood a Spanish attempt to retake the Island in September (immediately after MacGregor left). Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 105.

[48] Manning, *Document 73*: January 28, 1819.

[49] Monroe defended the invasion with the No Transfer Resolution of 1811, a secret law passed by Congress to assure that no foreign power would seize Florida from Spain, denying its potential cession to the U.S. According to Pazos' argument, however, the Republic of the Floridas was not the result of a foreign invasion, but an insurrection. Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 112.

[50] Stagg, "James Madison and George Mathews," 32–33.

[51] Term borrowed from William Bryk, "The Ephemera of Fictional States," *Cabinet Magazine*, Issue 18, (2005).

[52] Notable examples include the Trans-Ocenee Republic and the Free State of Muscogee. For an overview of political projects in the period, see: Hoffman, *Florida's Frontiers*, 247–63.

and then as a politician on Fernandina, he served as a minister for Gran Columbia and negotiated the first bilateral agreement between the U.S. and any Latin American polity (ratified in 1824).[53] MacGregor and Aury came to prominence as officers under Bolivar in the early-to-mid teens. Thus the Venezuelan Republic could be called the original module of all three careers. MacGregor's first attempt at leading a sovereign state was on Amelia Island. Aury, who arrived at Fernandina at the urging of Gual (then residing in Philadelphia) had at that point already formed a government at Galveston, Texas. After the project in Florida—which he attempted to resurrect in 1818—MacGregor established a government in Portobello and attempted unsuccessfully to extend control to the rest of Panama. After his time on Amelia Island, Aury established another independent republic on the Island of Providence.[54]

Each project followed a remarkably similar template. Mongey identifies its origins in the print-discourse of the 1790s, in which "programs or road maps [were published] that indicated how the revolution was going to unfold and how the post-revolutionary state was going to come into existence."[55] The influence of this discourse is reflected in both Aury's and Macgregor's proclamations and constitutions, which referenced or borrowed language from the U.S., French, and Venezuelan revolutions.[56] Each successive project expanded on the articulation of modular institutions. At Galveston, Aury had set up a customs collector, judges and clerks for civil, criminal, and maritime courts, a marshal, and a notary public.[57] On Amelia, MacGregor established a post office and a police force, consulted with a mayor and board of aldermen to make laws, including curfew for slaves, and issued naturalization papers for anyone that wanted to become a citizen.[58]

Each of the new republics had its own press; this was seen as an immediate priority upon landing.[59] The ability to print documents allowed the Amelia Framers to communicate in the same medium as any other political authorities. It permitted the publication of official acts, proclamations, and constitutions, of currency, of advertisements for various forms of investment,[60] and of legal authorizations, such as privateering commissions or titles to private property, including land. In a

[53] The "Anderson-Gual Treaty." Alvaro Mendez, *Colombian Agency and the Making of US Foreign Policy: Intervention by Invitation* (Milton: Taylor and Francis, 2017), 45.
[54] See; "Roads out of Fernandina," in Heckard, *The Crossroads of Empire,* 233–64.
[55] Mongey, *Cosmopolitan Republics*, 79.
[56] Mongey, *Cosmopolitan Republics*, 100–4. Bowman claims that Aury was "quite illiterate," and that Gual and Pazos drafted his proclamations at Amelia—a fact worth further investigation, and relevant to the notion of an emergent hemispheric discourse. Bowman, "Vicente Pazos," 282.
[57] Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 95.
[58] Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 104.
[59] On the role of the portable printing press and the small class of itinerant printers, see: Mongey, *Cosmopolitan Republics*, 109–14.
[60] Vicente Pazos founded a Spanish-language newspaper on Amelia Island (the second ever printed in Florida) with the intention of drawing support from across Latin America. No known copies exist. Bowman, "Vicente Pazos," 291.

sense, the printing of a constitution was the main defensive act of the Republic of the Floridas. It was drafted in December as Aury prepared for a U.S. invasion, and was used as the mainstay of Pazos' legal argumentation.[61] In his analysis of the privateering establishment at Galveston, which Aury declared a province of Mexico, Head notes that "Mexican commissions looked just like the commissions of other nations," allowing the open, legal importation of goods seized from Spanish vessels into the United States. Maritime courts thus had the capacity to "cleanse" goods.[62] All these practices lie in the field of indeterminacy between authentic and forged statehood: the validity of the documents derived from a political authority, yet the legitimacy of this authority derived circularly from the practices of a state-in-operation.

The ephemeral states noted above can be viewed on a spectrum of solidness. As Anderson notes, even Gran Colombia and the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata were ultimately short-lived, with no long-lasting basis for nationality.[63] On the other end of the spectrum was an absurd scenario wherein the simulation of statehood was not supplemented by any "original" reality whatsoever.[64] In 1822, a group of "itinerant patriots" headed for Puerto Rico (including Baptis Irvine, who helped as a propagandist for the Republic of the Floridas in New York)[65] was detained in Curacao before even arriving. On board, they had proclamations, a declaration of independence, and a constitutional draft already printed.[66] In this case, the legal defense literally preceded the establishment of the state.

Despite the absurdity of this inversion, the Amelia Framers had a reason to trust in the power of the model itself (once it had achieved a minimum of implementation). First of all, given enough time, the mutual reinforcement of legitimacy and practical operations outlined above may have progressed to a point where the Amelian nation-state leaned away from forgery, towards authenticity. Furthermore, the United States' own plan to incorporate the territory could similarly be described as the extension of a political-legal model over land that, despite being contiguous geographically, bore no greater sign of U.S. nationality than Amelian. It was only due to its tremendous power advantage that the Monroe administration could skirt the issue of sovereignty altogether, create a counter-narrative about border chaos to justify an invasion, and then acquire sovereignty through a purchase as opposed to an act of political self-determination.

[61] Heckard, *The Crossroads of Empire,* 178.
[62] See: Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 97–98. Likewise, Pazos submitted evidence that all goods passing from Amelia Island to the U.S. had been deposited at the St. Mary's custom house. Kanki, *The Exposition,* 22.
[63] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 53.
[64] I owe the notion of models supplanting an 'original reality' to Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983).
[65] Bowman, "Vicente Pazos," 280.
[66] Mongey, *Cosmopolitan Republics*, 106.

The Amelia Island Affair as Farce

The "modular" reality of the Republic of the Floridas, to whatever extent it was materialized, remained in constant tension with its perceived lack of substance. Likewise, the Monroe administration's stated justification for invading Amelia Island remained in tension with its underlying rationale. There is evidence of some contemporary recognition of these discrepancies in several depictions of the affair in the U.S. press, some of which even used the word "farce."[67] To take one example, the *Aurora General Advertiser* of Philadelphia, in a series of editorials sympathetic to the Amelia Framers, published a piece in 1818 satirically portraying the moment when Bankhead, the U.S. commander, meets Aury to accept his surrender. Bankhead comments:

> 'Florida ought to be no object to you commodore Aury, who have the immense and inviting bodies of the finest lands in the universe, from Cape Horn to Mexico.' We can imagine how Aury must have laughed at the information—and though he did not say, he might have said—and pray Mr. Proconsul, do you not think the land between the St. Croix and St. Marys, of which you are already in possession, might have afforded you elbow room?[68]

Aury's retort (which he does not say) calls the U.S. out for its hidden expansionist agenda. The land between St. Croix (today the U.S. Virgin Islands) and the St. Mary's river (then the southern border of the U.S.) encompasses the entire Caribbean. Why is it that Aury cannot acknowledge it explicitly? Either because, in such a vulnerable position, he is afraid of being punished for his impertinence, or because recognizing the pretense of U.S. intervention would reveal that nothing stands in the way of what it has "already in possession." In other words, Aury must keep the discussion on the level of pretenses, where his position is commensurate with—potentially even superior to—that of the U.S. To openly admit the concealed relations of the Affair would be to sacrifice his ability for a *serious* defense of Floridian sovereignty. This necessity for concealment supplies the farce with its comic tension.

There is strong evidence that Adams himself—but only privately—saw the claims of the Amelia Framers as funny. After the congressional neutrality-debates in early 1818, Adams wrote to his brother, referring to the Amelia Framers: "Surely to compare these heroes and Legislators with Sancho...is doing injustice to the moderation of the squire of the valiant knight of La Mancha. In all this tragic

[67] For example, in response to Aury's Nov. 16 proclamation of the opening of elections and constitutional committee, "a resident of St. Marys wrote to the southern papers deriding the 'farsical proclamation' and mocked its republican pretenses." From the *Charleston Courier*, quoted in Heckard, *The Crossroads of Empire,* 150.

[68] Heckard, *The Crossroads of Empire*, 174–75.

Comedy of passions for South America, which is [illegible] in our Country[,] there is an underplot, as yet but partially disclosed."[69] Adams here draws a comparison between Don Quixote (the sham knight) and Sancho Panzo (his squire) to the governments of South America and the Amelia "Legislators," respectively. Adams furthermore commends Sancho for his "moderation": he, at least, acknowledged his limited role as a squire, whereas the Amelia government fancied *itself* a knight (that is, an independent nation). The letter suggests that in Adams's eyes, the new republics based in Venezuela, Argentina, and elsewhere had an air of comedy—not in that they were illegitimate *per se*, but that they would never be able to reach their ideal as the U.S. had (of becoming accepted among the community of nations). If the South American republics were themselves comical—while maintaining an authentic, "tragic" element—then their outgrowth, the Republic of the Floridas, was doubly so.

Besides the fact that they controlled only a miniscule portion of the land they laid claim to (both East and West Florida, hence "the Floridas," territory for which they had already begun issuing land grants),[70] two basic characteristics lent the Republic of the Floridas its hue of illegitimacy. First, the leaders and citizens lacked any credible form of nativity or bond to the land, and secondly, the romanticized, universal form of republican sovereignty was applied in a conspicuously utilitarian manner.

One of the crucial passages of Pazos' *Exposition*, written without any context or explanation, responds obliquely to the first point: "[T]he diversity of people which composes an army, has never altered its *national character*: as long as they acknowledge the same power, they form but one body; as individuals of different origin, united under the same laws, form but one nation."[71] On the level of statehood, here conflated with nationality, Pazos' contention is airtight: states exist based upon a contract among citizens, irrespective of their birthplace. But the conspicuous fact that those residing in East Florida before the arrival of MacGregor were not in charge, and that the "heterogeneous set" under MacGregor and (later) Aury's command hailed from North America, Europe, and to a lesser extent Central America and the Caribbean, undergirded the impression of a "nest of foreign Adventurers" the U.S. had promoted.[72] There was no apparent naturalness to the claim of patriotism or nationality coming from a group of foreign invaders, newly arrived.

Any romantic (and thus tragic) conception of an independent Republic of the Floridas cannot withstand the plain fact—acknowledged by most historians, and some sympathetic commentators of the day—that the Amelia Framers had only a temporary purpose in mind for the territory. John Skinner, the postmaster of Balti-

[69] Heckard, *The Crossroads of Empire,* 231.
[70] Bowman, "Vicente Pazos," 282.
[71] Kanki, *The Exposition*, 26.
[72] For example, see Adams's letter to the Special Commissioners. Manning, Document 44.

more, was in close communication with MacGregor while he was still touring the U.S. He wrote to John Adams, a month after the Spanish lost control of Amelia Island, to inform him of MacGregor's aims:

> ...he should immediately call on the inhabitants by proclamation to designate... some of their most respectable fellow citizens to form a constitution on the model of some of the adjoining States.... [He] would encourage the existing disposition of the People in that Section to confederate with the United States…. [I]n the meantime he would endeavor to hold them as the most eligible depot to collect and organize the supplies necessary to the establishment of South American independence. In connection with that great object he was inclined to view the temporary possession of the Floridas as under a provisional government as of the highest importance and utility.[73]

Skinner also emphasized the plan's utility for the United States. Since the invasion derived from a South American authority, Spain and Britain (Spain's ally at the time, and the primary threat of military retaliation in Florida) could not find the U.S. culpable for violating neutrality in taking possession of the land. A slightly different trajectory was later imagined by Gual, Pazos, and Aury. According to their plan, the Floridas would remain a dependency of Mexico until they became independent, "recognized as part of confederation of South America, but such recognition did not preclude the right of the people to join the confederation of the north, should the US desire to annex the territory."[74] This strategy is incongruous with the lofty argument put forward by Pazos, built upon the idea that national borders and self-determination are "sacred," political ends-unto-themselves.

The conception of the Republic of the Floridas resembles Blaufarb's suggestion of a "borderland variant on Latin American Independence...in which annexation rather than self-determination provided a way out of the Spanish monarchy."[75] Peculiar to the Amelian variant, however, was the factoring-in of a transitional period of self-determination that would precede annexation *in order to serve an external purpose.* For those sharing in this knowledge, part of the appearance of a farce (the lack of tragic consequences) was that the U.S. Executive and the Amelia Framers had no fundamental conflict of interests. In fact, their basic indistinguishability was the basis of the Spanish interpretation of events. Onis charged the U.S. with simulating the entire occupation from beginning to end in order to facilitate their ultimate annexation of the region. The obvious evidence, from Onis's perspective, was that the primary manpower and funds for MacGregor's expedition were drawn (privately) from the U.S.[76]

[73] MacGregor and Skinner, "Letters Relating to Macgregor's Attempted Conquest," 57.
[74] Bowman, "Vicente Pazos," 286.
[75] Blaufarb, "The Western Question," 750.
[76] Heckard, *The Crossroads of Empire*, 170.

In a way, though there is evidence against the Spanish allegation of collusion,[77] their general perception is confirmed by the fact that both the Amelia Framers and the Monroe administration were both (if not together) working towards the same goal: the absorption of East Florida into the United States. The leadership in Fernandina simply tried to cut itself—and its allies—into the deal. Meanwhile, Washington possessed the final decision-making authority in that its military was incomparably larger, and that no other foreign powers could be expected to intervene on behalf of the Amelia government. Both of its options were in effect simulations of national sovereignty. The state on Amelia Island did not control East Florida; nor did the Spanish. The Amelia Framers' plan was to simulate national sovereignty over the Floridas in order to transfer the territory to the United States. In choosing to occupy and hold Amelia indefinitely, the U.S. simulated Spanish control over the territory so that it could credibly buy it from them later on.

The farce is grounded in the perception that, one way or another, the entire debate was inconsequential to the outcome for Florida. Yet the necessity of counter-balancing that perception in the historical telling, of maintaining its dramatic tension with the surface of legal posturing, is that the legal questions at play were indeed consequential. The hidden pragmatism of both the Amelia Framers and the U.S. Executive might suggest the emptiness of national sovereignty as a political-legal construct, yet this emptiness had to remain hidden precisely in that both sides relied upon it. In other words, there was no desire to leave the legal construct behind, because the construct itself wielded considerable power. In the telling of the event, there is no escaping this paradox.

Conclusion

The conflict between the U.S. and the government on Amelia Island can be emplotted as a farce, a category of satire in which the contradiction of a character's words or actions against their context is intensified to an absurd extreme. The emplotment builds upon the farcical elements of contemporary accounts, which alternatively classified the Republic of the Floridas as an outpost of pirates pretending to be a sovereign nation, or the U.S. government as a group of land-grabbers pretending to defend international law and order. The realistic observation in tension with each party's posturing was that abstract legal relationships were ultimately subservient to concrete relations of force. Eventual U.S. possession of the territory was seen as a given. The legal arguments thrown together on either side were only simulations to facilitate this possession: either the simulation of independent sovereignty on the part of the Amelia group, or the simulation of continuous Spanish sovereignty on the part of the U.S.

[77] U.S. officials, suspecting a privateering operation, stopped a vital shipment of supplies from N.Y. to Amelia after its successful seizure in June. Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 103.

By identifying the Affair as a farce, I do not mean to prompt the facile conclusion that international politics was just a charade. Anderson, for instance, describes another theorist of nationalism as "so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretenses that he assimilates 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation'. In this way he implies that true communities exist, which can be advantageously juxtaposed to nations."[78] On one level, there is a sound equivalence between the United States and the Republic of the Floridas as legal fictions. But the urge to laugh at this equivalence should not be ignored: it suggests an opposing truth about how international politics works, which likewise cannot be accepted as the whole truth.

The Amelia Framers walked along the edge of this contradiction, and the driving intention of this study is to grapple with their self-awareness. If we attribute them self-awareness, we must also recognize that they were not mental prisoners to any fixed notion of nationality. Mongey writes generally of itinerant patriots that "[t]hey did not think in terms of transition from English, French, Spanish subjects into US-American, Haitian, or Mexican citizens; they barely thought in 'national' terms; rather, they thought of themselves as members of the same republican community—regardless of their place of birth or residence—who were fighting to create a republic that conformed to their political ideals."[79]

What is missing from Mongey's summary is precisely the slander that she works to overcome, namely that itinerant patriots were a bunch of pirates and adventurers. The piratical portrayal of Aury and MacGregor has its grain of truth. MacGregor himself went on to establish "Poyais" in 1820, which Klaus calls the "quintessential fraud of Britain's first modern investment bubble."[80] MacGregor sold land titles and government bonds for a "potential colony" (advertised as already existent and thriving) in an uninhabited area in modern-day Honduras. Settlers, carrying detailed instructions from MacGregor to establish "bureaucracy, property rights, taxation and fiat currency," arrived from England to find the area deserted.[81] A massive opportunity arose from reconsidering and toying with the concept of the nation-state precisely when a new model of political legitimacy came into currency. To seize this opportunity was to open up an ethical no-man's land, and the beneficiaries walked many paths within it.

[78] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6.
[79] Mongey, *Cosmopolitan Republics*, 4.
[80] Klaus, *Virtue is Dead*, 98.
[81] Klaus, *Virtue is Dead*, 120.

Book Reviews

The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values

By Steven Jensen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. 313, Paperback £22.99, ISBN: 978-1107531079

REVIEWED BY PHILIPP KANDLER

Since Samuel Moyn's *The Last Utopia* (2010),[1] the "breakthrough of human rights" has been a major point of debate in the fairly recent and still growing historiography on human rights. It is also the starting point for *The Making of International Human Rights* by Steven Jensen, a researcher at the Danish Institute for Human Rights. Whereas the main debate about the "breakthrough" has centred either on the 1940s or the 1970s, Jensen declares the 1960s a "forgotten decade" of human rights (p.6). His main argument is that the debates that took place in the UN—mainly on racial or religious discrimination—"established human rights as a field of international politics and international law" (pp.11–12). This became a foundation for human rights activism in the 1970s. Jensen pursues two aims: to include the 1960s into the historiography on human rights and to highlight the contributions made by a number of states from the Global South, especially Jamaica and Liberia.

Jensen starts with an overview of the development of human rights in the UN up to the 1960s. The author subscribes to the standard argument that human rights were for the first time discussed on an international level during the Second World War and became part of international conventions through the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the breakdown of Great Power cooperation with the onset of the Cold War put an end to this development. The second chapter marks the transition from the contextual to the analytical part, giving an overview on how Soviet support for decolonization—specifically in the form of a (human) right to self-determination—brought human rights back into debates in the UN.

Chapters three to six are central for Jensen's analysis. Each one focuses on one aspect that was important for human rights debates in the 1960s. Chapter three traces the role of Jamaica in the re-emergence of human rights debates in the UN using material from the country's archives. Jensen shows how the newly independent country became a major proponent for human rights in the UN with Jamaican representatives drawing on their own experiences from their struggle for independence. The remaining three chapters describe in detail the debates within the UN concerning the Conventions on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and of All Forms of Religious Intolerance as well as the prepa-

[1] Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).

rations made for the International Year of Human Rights in 1968. According to Jensen, the forms of human rights violations addressed in these two conventions were the "Achilles' heels" of the Great Powers (p.138). Even though only one of the Conventions was successfully agreed upon, these debates changed the "legal imagination" related to international human rights law in important ways (p.12). Additionally, they paved the way for the International Human Rights Covenants of 1966 and placed the USSR and the USA in the spotlight of international human rights criticism. Despite having been declared the International Year of Human Rights, 1968 marked the end of this process as many countries from the Global South became disenchanted with the UN following the Six-Day War which caused the promotion of human rights norms to subside.

The last two chapters focus on how these foundations were used by Western actors from the 1970s onwards. Chapter seven explores the effects that the advances in the "legal imagination" regarding human rights had on the Helsinki Conference (CSCE) in the early 1970s. Jensen argues that the establishment of a connection between religious discrimination and human rights in the UN opened the door for the inclusion of this issue in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The last chapter is more of an epilogue, where the author traces the development of the UN human rights regime from the mid-1970s, when the process was reinvigorated by investigations into human rights violations in South America and the ratification of the Helsinki Final Act, up to the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. The different case studies are only loosely connected, however, and the chapter contains factual errors, e.g. on who led the Chilean *Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia* (it was Manuel Contreras and not Osvaldo Romo who was one of its most infamous torturers). Since the chapter is not essential for Jensen's argument, it would have been better if he had stopped with the events in 1975.

The rupture in his argument that the last chapter represents might be a result of the fact that Jensen does not define what he means when he talks about human rights. Mostly, he is concerned with the evolution of the legal human rights regime in the UN. However, when he discusses the appropriation of human rights by dissidents in Eastern Europe and Western NGOs in the mid 1970s, his point is much more about human rights as a political language. Obviously, there are connections between human rights as an international legal regime and as a political language, however the author does not delve into them, but rather jumps from one to the other, as if they were the same.

Jensen has written a well researched and solid book. The main problem, however, is that several of the author's grand promises remain unfulfilled. The author claims in the introduction that he uses archival material from 10 countries (p.15). This is factually true; however, he fails to mention that half of them belong to international organizations and therefore do not provide the perspective of national actors. More problematically, the book falls short of fulfilling the promise for

"groundbreaking research," that "fundamentally reinterprets the history of international human rights," made in the abstract (p.i). Without doubt, Jensen succeeds in showing how human rights norms were evoked during the debates on racial and religious discrimination and does it in unprecedented detail. However, the argument in itself is not as new as he claims it to be as it can already be found in Roland Burke's[2] and Jan Eckel's[3] works, among others. Crucially, Jensen is not able to convincingly show that these references to human rights were not made for political reasons by the majority of UN member states; Jamaica and Liberia not being the rule but rather isolated exceptions. In this sense, it is probably not a coincidence that the Convention against Racial Discrimination—where stakes were high for African countries—came about, whereas the one against Religious Discrimination appeared only much later and in a weaker form. In his zeal to uncover contributions by non-western states to the UN-human rights regime—and therefore refute relativist arguments—Jensen is too readily willing to accept political rhetoric as proof for motives.

Nonetheless, Jensen addresses two important issues—and omissions—in the present historiography on human rights. The first one is when the "breakthrough of human rights" happened. Jensen's study shows that the answer depends on how we interpret this "breakthrough." Even if we follow Moyn, and define it as references to human rights in public debates, Jensen shows that a foundation had to already be in present in order for the "breakthrough" to take place. Unfortunately, the author still insists on the idea of a single "breakthrough" by locating it in the 1960s. The second point addressed by Jensen is the role played by states from the Global South. Up to now, most scholarship on human rights has focused on Western state and non-state actors. Jensen does a good job of showing that non-Western countries were not merely reacting to human rights norms diffused and imposed on them by Western states. Even though a couple of countries from the Global South lobbying for human rights principles was not crucial for the international conventions to come about, it provided an important catalyst and helped frame the debate in terms of human rights. Jensen's focus on these often overlooked actors and their role in framing the international human rights debates is the strongest point of the book. Our understanding of this process is far from complete and Jensen offers an important perspective from Jamaica, and several other states from the Global South, including archival material at least from the first one. That the changes in the "legal imagination" that took place in the 1960s would allow for the inclusion of a paragraph on religious discrimination in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, is an example of unintended consequences, but also of an important connection that Jensen uncovers. In this sense, instead of making grand claims which

[2] Roland Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).
[3] Jan Eckel, *Die Ambivalenz des Guten. Menschenrechte in der internationalen Politik seit den 1940ern* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014).

are difficult to sustain, the author should have stressed the important, though less "groundbreaking" findings that he contributes to the debate on when, how, and thanks to whom human rights became a central part of international debates.

More Argentine Than You: Arabic-Speaking Immigrants in Argentina

By Steven Hyland Jr., Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2017. Pp. 304, Hardback $65.00, ISBN: 978-0826358776

REVIEWED BY PEDER ØSTEBØ

For banner-wavering global historians, there are few topics more enticing than migration. Mobility, and especially the transcendence of the borders that traditionally served as the frames of historical narratives, along with the certainty of cultural encounters, has been an endearing research topic for the approach. While global history has provided a fruitful counter-narrative to a traditional 'assimilationist' model of migration experiences, the discourse of 'encounters' and transcendence' is not unproblematic. A surging general critique of global history's failure to address contradictions and complexities within the processes its proponents describe, summarized thoughtfully by Princeton professor Jeremy Adelman, demonstrates the danger of global history spinning into irrelevancy if these problems are not tackled.[1] There is, then, a pressing need for narratives showing complexities and admitting that integration and disintegration are often intertwined. This challenge is perhaps especially acute in narratives of mobility and migration, as the gap between popular discourse and academic discourse is wide when dealing with the topic.

How could such a narrative read like? Steven Hyland Jr., associate professor at Wingate University, might provide a model for how this scholarly exercise might look in his first monograph, *More Argentine Than You: Arabic-Speaking Immigrants in Argentina.* By examining what is widely reckoned to be one of the great success stories of transatlantic migration, he demonstrates that such 'encounters' as the one between new residents of the Argentine periphery and the 'mainstream' Argentine *populus* are complex, marked by widely different, and often contradictory, tendencies. The background story of the formation of an Arab-Argentine community in Argentina, from arrival in the early 20th century to the verge of a watershed moment of Arab-Argentine political participation in the first Peronist decade (1945–55) thus provides the reader with a balanced insight into migrant community formation and participation.

During the epoch known as the "age of mass migration" (1850–1914) few other countries had a higher ratio of residents born abroad than Argentina. By the eve of World War I, half of the country's 8 million residents had either migrated to the South American nation themselves or were children of migrants. Although the

[1] Jeremy Adelman, "What is global history now?," *Aeon*, March 2, 2017, https://aeon.co/essays/is-global-history-still-possible-or-has-it-had-its-moment.

majority of the country's new residents came from homelands linguistically and culturally similar to the nations of the Southern cone, the migratory patterns were far more diverse than traditional narratives presuppose. The image of a prosperous 'America,' in which the booming agricultural economy of Argentina was one of the main attractions, also appealed to migrants from East Asia, and from the three massive, but decaying empires of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. Up to 1914, over a hundred thousand people from the area often referred to as 'Greater Syria' (comprising the contemporary states of Syria, Lebanon, the historical lands of Palestine, and parts of Turkey and Iraq), had found their way to Argentine ports.

Although not missing entirely from the scholarly picture, the experiences of the Arab-speaking migrants in Latin America have only in recent years been studied with the vigor and depth they deserve, given the sheer number of migrants residing in the region and their eventual impact on the society which they came to be a part of. More thorough and nuanced analyses of other migration groups, such as those originating from Spain and Italy, has coexisted with a popular narrative of Arab immigration to Argentina as a success story, largely centered around the accumulation of material wealth in the Arab-speaking communities, and a historical notion of Arab-speaking immigrants as bearers of a *espíritu emprendedor* (entrepreneurial spirit). As a contrast to this, Hyland Jr. strives to describe the process of migration and integration as one of complexity, which involves a constant "process of negotiation, influenced by economic cycles, interpersonal networks, time of arrival, place of birth, religious identity, nationalist ideologies, local conditions, and politics of the old country" (p.2).

One of Hyland Jr.'s many achievements is the capacity to dwell on this complexity in all stages of the migratory process. In chapter 1, he provides an in-depth account of the political and social transformations of Greater Syria, then a province of the Ottoman Empire, and the conditions of those who would become part of the migratory exodus. Through an impressive collection of both official data and sources from private archives, Hyland Jr. avoids the traps of push-pull models of migration, in which oversimplification have prevented scholars from recognizing migration as a complex social praxis. By following the trajectory of one young man, Nissim Teubal, from Aleppo, he presents a narrative where global, national, regional, communal, and individual developments intertwine. Cultural changes contributed a legitimization to migration as a possibility; political reform and eventual turmoil lay the ground for a watershed moment for migration in the years after the turn of the century. Perhaps most importantly, the creating and expansion of informational networks facilitated not only an opportunity structure, but also the ideational drive towards the 'new world.'

In the following three chapters (2, 3, and 4), Hyland Jr. describes the initial settlement of Arab-speaking migrants in Argentina. His focus throughout the

book lies on the northwestern province of Tucumán, a part of the country with relatively high immigration from the Ottoman empire, but with a low overall immigration compared to the country as a whole. Although touching upon regional, national and transnational influences in the formation of the community, the in-depth analysis of one province gives the reader a detailed insight into the initial relationship between the new residents and the politico-administrative apparatus. Although Hyland Jr. provides considerable evidence of exclusion and discrimination in this period, he argues that previous studies on this phase have overlooked signs of accommodation: While arrest rates for Arab-speaking immigrants were far higher than for other immigrant groups, Hyland Jr. offers a well-founded review of evidence suggesting that many interacted frequently within the administrative and judicial system to solve both intra- and intercommunal issues (p.60).

The narrative of simultaneous discrimination and accommodation provides a background for a second factor which shaped the trajectory of both individual migrants to and the community in Tucumán. Hyland Jr. holds that both time of arrival, available resources upon arrival and the initial line of work created not a united community, but an economically stratified one. As an engine of the Argentine sugar industry, Tucumán's residents felt both the blessings and curses of an existence contingent on one single, and historically volatile, commodity. This is an important qualifier, as it points to one of the factors contributing to the fragmentation of what was to become the Arab-Argentine community: class stratification. Although the migrants from Greater Syria were diverse in terms of religion and cultural customs, Hyland Jr. holds that class reconfiguration became defining for which place the individual migrant came to find him- or herself in, both in the ethnic community and in the society at large:

> … class identities were most important in forging a sense of community among each other. Put differently, a wealthy Maronite Catholic merchant from Mount Lebanon had more in common with a successful Alawite Muslim shop owner from Latakia than with a Maronite day laborer (p.6).

The economic narrative is closely connected to a final overarching process of the Arab-speaking integration: the constant negotiation and renegotiating of the communal self. It is in exploring this process that Hyland Jr.'s mastery of the Arabic language truly bears fruit. In a thorough reading of the debate on identity after the Young Turk rebellion, the collapse of the Ottoman empire, and the eventual establishment of the French mandate of Syria and Lebanon, Hyland Jr. is able to create a narrative in which transnational intellectual debates and local, economic conditions are defining for what was to become the 'Syrian-Lebanese colony' (*colonia siriolibanesa*). The members of this 'colony' managed to carve out a position for themselves as the representatives for the migrant group, even though

influence through this group was reserved for the merchant elite. However, this process was delayed, and at times impeded, by strong disagreements of identity, of ideology, in terms of ideological approaches to the 'homeland,' and by interpersonal feuds.

In the final three chapters, Hyland Jr. explores the development of the community in the interwar period, focusing on the institutionalization of the community through entities such as the Syrian-Lebanese Society (chapter 5), the role of women in the community and their influence on social policy and charity (chapter 6), and finally, the increasingly important role of the community in political affairs, first of the communities in which they resided, then on a regional level (chapter 7). As historical research on immigrant communities tends to be male-centered, the author's treatment on women's roles in the community is a breath of fresh air, although their role in the economy is not as carefully treated in the previous chapters. Another drawback is that the narrative of economic stratification is not implemented in the chapters on participation. For example, the monograph builds on little research into Arab-speaking migrants in labor movements, with a few notable exemptions in the early stage of the organization in the 1910s. The lack of elaboration on the topic may be a question of the availability of sources. Nevertheless, every author should let the limitations of his source material be known to the readers, especially when dealing with historical entities claiming or seeking group representativity, as is the case of the formation of the Arab-Argentine community.

It is in the chapters on political participation that the pros and cons of a regional case study, instead of a comparative study, are truly revealed. Hyland Jr. notes that in several neighboring provinces, such as Santiago del Estero, the participation rates were higher at an earlier point in time (p.193–4). The author does not, however, elaborate on these differences and their causes, a discussion that would have enriched the material. This point could be extended to other Argentine provinces, where Arab-Argentines eventually would dominate regional politics. During the first decade of Peronism (1945–55), and up until today, Arab-Argentines have been highly influential in the political affairs of the Argentine interior, especially in the provinces of Catamarca, La Rioja, and Neuquén. Which dynamics were in play in the years preceding the political breakthrough of Arab-Argentines, and why did it seem to affect different provinces in a very different way?

More than a criticism of the research in itself, this should be read as a plea to scholars to reflect on their choices in the research process, and to share those with the reader. The research on Arab-Argentines in Latin America is still in its infancy, as is the state of research on many other stories of mobility and migration. Case studies will provide students and scholars with an essential understanding of the multiethnic landscape of the region. In this regard, *More Argentine Than You* stands out as an innovative, nuanced, detailed, and well-researched example. The

processes Steven Hyland Jr. describes, especially through the narrative of fluctuating ethno-national identities, should be of relevance to any scholar or student of migration processes, as are the discussions of socio-economic fragmentation. And, as mentioned in the beginning, the book can provide proponents of the global historical approach with both inspiration and a methodology for approaching research objects of migration looking for the complex patterns, rather than narratives were contradicting patterns and tendencies of disintegration are ignored.

Luxury in Global Perspective: Objects and Practices, 1600–2000

Edited by Bernd-Stefan Grewe and Karin Hofmeester, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Pp. 322, £90.00, ISBN 978-1107108325

REVIEWED BY DARIA TASHKINOVA

The new addition to the long-running Cambridge University Press series 'Studies in Comparative World History,' *Luxury in Global Perspective: Objects and Practices, 1600-2000* is an ambitious project led by Bernd-Stefan Grewe and Karin Hofmeester. This volume consists of an impressive collection of articles. Each builds its own detailed case study and supports the opening statement of the book: "Luxury is a global phenomenon."

Global history is not a new approach when it comes to the history of things. In fact, histories of commodities have been among the most successful usages of global history, as historical entanglements and interconnections are best shown through the exchange of goods. The editors adopt J. Schneider's approach of focusing on relationships between luxuries and essentials rather than on their distinctions, and push it further. Hofmeester and Grewe use global history as a lens to look at consumption and 'show how luxury functioned in various settings and how local variations in taste could influence global economic interactions' (p.2). Hofmeester and Grewe aim to kill two birds with one stone. Firstly, their goal is to enrich global history by looking at global production, exchange, consumption of luxury goods, and services. Secondly, they aspire to enrich the historical conception of luxury by avoiding Eurocentrism and focusing on more than the exclusivity of luxury goods and practices of their consumption.

Each of the articles in the volume represents a convincing case study in support of the editors' claims. The most compelling articles rest comfortably in the middle of the book. In Chapter 5, Giorgio Riello disputes the existing distinctions between luxury and commodity, using Indian cotton cloth as an example. Through creating his own typology of luxury in the Early Modern era, Riello is able to explain how cotton cloths could gain major global success not just as a regular commodity, but as a luxury good as well. His triadic notion of luxury provides the necessary methodological framework to make a masterful case. Chapter 6 by Silvia Ruschak is an answer to the editors' call for writing a history of luxury that is more than just a story of unique items from exotic places to be consumed by the European and American public. Ruschak demonstrates the possibility of a different narrative: she shows how wax prints, originally produced in the Netherlands, became a luxury item in modern day Ghana. In Chapter 7, Karin Pallaver examines one of the oldest misconceptions in colonial history. She investigates the exchange of glass beads, accepted by many societies around the world for

the purchase of precious commodities and territory: a practice that was deemed 'primitive' and 'naïve' by European colonists. Pallaver vividly illustrates how different commodities have different value in different societies, and how something that was worthless for Europeans had major economic value in East African societies. Much like Ruschak, Pallaver, challenges the traditional way of studying luxury commodities, which portrays Europeans as the consumers and Africans or Asians as the producers of exoticism. Instead, she focuses primarily on consumer practices in Africa and traces the commodity chain of glass beads from the production site in Venice to consumers in the trade markets of East Africa.

Covering a wide range of themes across various geographic regions, the articles of this volume raise questions and emphasize issues that are rarely studied in the context of luxury. For example, Chapter 4 examines the meanings of luxury in different cultures and raises an intriguing question: "to what extent is luxury a specifically European category, only transferrable to other cultures?" (p.114) This volume shows that the social practices linked to commodities and objects presented a wide scope of issues within social groups or cultural contexts. The issues raised in the volume might also ultimately lead to a re-examination of the concept of luxury in the European context. Moreover, the volume manages to show that the history of luxury is not merely a story of shiny precious objects or exclusive practices, but has the potential to shed new light on class structures, gender politics and labour history. The editors masterfully build their case on how a global history approach to the history of luxury can be beneficial to a wider scope of disciplines and scholarship. The introduction and the concluding remarks to this volume are a great example of a circular story where all the arguments align with each other and serve one purpose.

Despite its obvious strengths and well-deserved praise, the book is not immune to some critical observations. One, for instance, is a somewhat chaotic nature of positioning articles within the volume. The introduction briefly mentions the deliberate choice for a decentralized structure in order to reaffirm the editors' commitment to write a decentered global history of luxury. Unlike most traditional studies on luxury, this volume has a very broad geographical and chronological scope. It is not limited to a particular time period, region, or type of commodity. However, this decentered approach does not help to create a coherent narrative and framework. On the contrary, it leaves the reader more confused than they hoped to be. This tactic could have worked better in a single volume by one author. In this case, the conflicting writing styles and disconnected cases did not fit well with each other.

Another critical note concerns Eurocentrism. The editors discuss at length their views on Eurocentrism and how the authors of the volume successfully avoid the trappings of Eurocentric narratives, so frequent in previous studies on luxury in history. What then comes as a surprise is the overwhelmingly European 'cast' of authors in the volume. Since the collected articles discuss luxuries in Asia and

Africa, one would expect for at least some of the contributors to be of Asian or African descent. The choice for a European group of contributors, though stellar historians, does not particularly support the primary claim of the book to write a non-Eurocentric history of luxury. Giving a voice to researchers outside of the Western academic world could have given a major advantage to this volume. However, despite breaking some Eurocentric boundaries, the volume has left others untouched. Hopefully, future research will take history of luxury even further.

'Luxury is a global phenomenon'—that was the main thesis of this volume. Grewe and Hofmeester bring together convincing case studies of particular luxurious objects and practices throughout history to create a unifying narrative of global luxury. The articles in the volume trace the commodity chains that have emerged all over the world around such luxury products as diamonds, gold, ivory, or porcelain. They allow the reader to explore the items' unique local stories within the universal desire for luxury. While it leaves the door open for further improvements, this volume is a marvelous example of how decentered history can debunk Eurocentric assumptions and bring fresh ideas into the discussion.

Reaktion Books' Edible Series, Edited by Andrew F. Smith

Rice: A Global History

By Renee Marton, London: Reaktion Books, 2014. Pp. 144, Hardback £10.99, ISBN: 978-1780233505

Herring: A Global History

By Kathy Hunt, London: Reaktion Books, 2017. Pp. 144, Hardback £10.99, ISBN: 978-1780238319

REVIEWED BY MAXIMILIAN VOGEL

What does a student of global history do when they are not studying? No matter what you do, at some point you will have to eat. If you are fortunate to possess some basic survival skills you might just cook up some rice, pasta, potatoes or another source of carbohydrates not yet consumed by a hungry flatmate and drown it in sauce, most probably tomato. If not, you still won't have to starve, because, by studying at a university, you are most probably living in one of the world's quickly gentrifying cities, with countless varieties of fast food on offer, be it pizza, curry or sushi. Perhaps you only have enough money for a Döner Kebab around the corner. The choice of food is, of course, a personal one but almost every kind of food you opt for has a history that can be described as "global." That food is perhaps *the* global commodity and therefore matters for global history writing is, of course, not a new insight. Aliments have almost always been a major topic for historians: every child knows the story of the protest of Parisian women against skyrocketing bread prices at the beginning of the French Revolution; Marxist scholars have always shown a special interest in the modes of production of food, and since the 1980s, food history has developed into a field of research in its own right. Still, the fact that we are surrounded by food that is 'global' by nature is a fact that is easy to forget or ignore. Since a certain degree of specialization is necessary for any career as a historian, one is already busy enough trying to carve out a niche that there is often little time or energy left over to dig deeper into the history of food.

However, there is a solution to this problem, because, since 2008, there exists an entry into the field of food history that might constitute an alternative to heavy academic tomes, namely the 'Edible Series,' published by Reaktion Books. Though the books are not themselves edible, the series currently consists of 59 books, each dealing with a specific food of global relevance. The series covers everything from ice cream to caviar, from truffles to seaweed. While the series' title suggests as much, it is nevertheless important to note that the series does not claim to meet the normal standards of academic publications; instead, the series attempts to address the history of globally consumed foodstuffs in a way that is

not only informative but also entertaining. Thus, most of the authors of the series are not scholars but rather have a wider range of professional backgrounds that are in one way or another linked to food.

The two specific volumes reviewed here have been written by Renee Marton, a former chef who examines the history of rice, and Kathy Hunt, a journalist and food writer who presents the history of herring. Both have undertaken extensive research into the relevant literature of their respective topics and have cultivated an informative yet light-hearted literary style. As with all the books in the series, their works do not exceed 150 pages in length, making them a short introduction into the topic rather than a comprehensive work of reference.

In "Rice," Marton gives a quick overview of the biology of the plant, its origins, varieties and production and then shows how rice was made into a global commodity, becoming indisputably the most important food plant today. She then tries to capture the varying roles that rice plays as a daily foodstuff in different countries around the world. Marton gives the reader a glimpse of how the cultivation and preparation of rice has deeply influenced cultures worldwide. The long history of rice farming and its central importance for the nutrition of two thirds of the world's population has resulted in a rich variety of festivals, myths, and legends around rice. These last two chapters of her work are the most interesting and it is here that "Rice" comes closest to a kind of cultural history of rice. Unfortunately, her description remains here rather superficial, and she is overambitious in her attempt to capture the immense diversity of cultural practices associated with rice. It would have been more useful to examine one example in detail.

Whereas the global importance of rice is probably well known amongst most readers, the same cannot be said for herring. The fact that herring—salted, pickled or canned—is not currently considered to be one of the more sexy foods perhaps hides its importance for world nutrition. Kathy Hunt skillfully poses this argument to anybody who does not live close to the sea and may thus be unaware of the importance of herring. She begins her history in medieval Europe, when herring was a central commodity of the Hanseatic League. The possibility of preserving herring through salting and its richness in fat and nutrients made herring an important staple food and thus a trade good in Europe from early on. However, it was the invention of canning that helped herring achieve global importance. The fish could now be traded over long distances and its natural abundance made it a cheap alternative to meat for the working class. Due to its importance it is no wonder that herring has also been a source of conflicts throughout history—most prominently at the so-called 'Battle of the Herrings' between England and France in 1429.

While both authors enliven their books with anecdotes and with a love for details of the numerous kinds of preparation of rice or herring respectively, Hunt focuses much more on economic history and its social implications. An example

for this is the well-written chapter on the preservation of herring, a task that seems to have always been in the hands of women. While she graphically describes the hard work of 'gutting' and salting fishes, she also acknowledges the opportunities to gain a certain economic independence that this work constituted for many women. Hunt thereby connects food history to the fields of gender history and the history of labor. Her conclusions are more carefully balanced and show a level of complexity that Marton often lacks in her work on rice. While Marton gives rather descriptive information, Hunt is able to link her book to relevant historical debates without making it inaccessible to non-academics.

Even with a small sample of two books, it is evident that the quality of the volumes varies throughout the series. Even though all books contain a bibliography and an index, it would be unfair to apply standard academic criteria to them since they do not claim to be academic publications. This also becomes clear by looking at the appendix, which always includes a selection of cooking recipes, thereby perfectly linking the theoretical with the practical. The target audience for these books is not the academic scholar but rather a wider readership ranging from foodies to laypersons interested in history. This is not to say that these books are without value for global historians. They not only provide informative entertainment but can also serve as an initial overview for the history of certain foodstuffs that can either be used as a starting point for further readings or as additional background knowledge. The variety of different foods covered by the series is also merit-worthy in itself. In any case the books are an entertaining read and their beautiful layout makes them a great collectible for anyone interested in both history and food.

Asia's Reckoning: The Struggle for Global Dominance

By Richard McGregor, London: Allen Lane, 2017. Pp. 416, Paperback £20.00, ISBN: 978-0241248089

REVIEWED BY SAM WISZNIEWSKI

While current international news headlines may be dominated by Russian election-meddling, war-ravaged Syria, and a nuclear North Korea, Richard McGregor's recent book proposes yet another global issue for our times: the three-way relationship between the United States, China, and Japan. McGregor's selection is not random. These nations represent a powerful trio, respectively occupying the first, second, and third spots in the global GDP rankings, and accounting for 45% of the world economy.[1]

This economic picture looms large alongside the figures of Barack Obama, Shinzō Abe, Xi Jinping, and Donald Trump, in an introduction and afterword heavily laden with McGregor's concerns for the present, most notably the fate of the "Pax Americana" that has reigned in the Pacific since 1945. (p. 15) The book's presentism is nonetheless rooted in a careful account of the past, as the first seven chapters draw from an impressive range of archival resources to historicize the three-way relationship from the aftermath of the Second World War to the turn of the 21st century. The remaining eight chapters deal with the last 17 years, and feel more like the work of a journalist than a historian, mostly relying on interviews and newspaper excerpts rather than archival sources.

McGregor's tri-polar model is an important intervention, moving away from more familiar bi-polar conceptions of global power. It nuances conceptions of the world history of the Cold War dominated at one end by the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, and at the other end by the rivalry between the United States and China. By refracting these two relationships through the prism of Japan—a buttress against the Soviets, a foyle for China, and a historically complicated, independent geopolitical power in its own right—both the present and the past are reframed in useful ways.

McGregor's concurrent attention to present and past is a strength throughout his narrative, allowing him to chart subtle continuities amid sweeping changes, and vice versa. For example he suggests that there are strategic echoes of earlier rivalries in the current US-China relationship, noting that key actors like Jeff Bader, National Security Advisor under the Obama administration and important policymaker on China, actually honed their skills and perspectives in a Bush administration far more preoccupied with a rising Japan in the early 1990s (pp.125–126). McGregor also traces the family histories of current political leaders, in particular

[1] "World Economic Development Indicators Database," World Bank, February 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/worlds-biggest-economies-in-2017/.

highlighting how Shinzō Abe's grandfather Nobusuke Kishi was implicated in anti-Chinese war crimes as Munitions Minister during World War II; a historical inheritance that is not forgotten—or forgiven—in China (p.31).

Indeed, the importance of history is a theme that permeates throughout the book. McGregor pays close attention to the contested legacy of World War II, and the acrimonious "history wars" between China and Japan over war reparations, the number of people killed in the Nanjing Massacre, and the definition of war criminals. This acrimony infects the highest level of diplomacy, with visits to the war memorial at Yasukuni by Japanese leaders from Nakasone in the 1980s to Koizumi in the 2000s becoming a "litmus test" that invariably triggers incensed responses from the Beijing Politburo (p.97). Crucially, McGregor demonstrates how these disagreements over history seriously impinge on economic and geopolitical relations, derailing moments of possible cooperation and raising the temperature of other tensions, notably around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu island chain (pp.267–288).

The "history wars" also serve to illustrate another pervasive theme in the book that necessarily complicates an understanding of global power relations, namely the interplay between domestic and international politics. To illustrate this, McGregor details accounts of powerful domestic factors in Japan, notably the Veterans' lobby, which pressures leaders to visit the controversial Yasukuni shrine, and Chinese populist, anti-Japanese sentiments, which are often aggravated by the media and escalate into mass protest (pp.291–311). Both of these domestic factors serve to narrow the space for diplomatic maneuver on the international stage. Regarding the United States, McGregor notes how Trump's play to a disgruntled domestic audience resulted in the trashing of the TPP trade deal in 2018, sending one of the strongest geopolitical shockwaves through the Pacific "since Nixon went to China" (p.344). This attention to the domestic sphere is important, and while McGregor's account is pitched at a more general readership, it echoes recent trends among academics studying geopolitics in the Pacific.[2]

McGregor's attention to the domestic sphere and the role of history sheds important light on the limitations of state power and diplomatic agency, but ultimately the diplomatic sphere remains paramount. McGregor does not pursue more novel approaches to international relations that have proven fruitful elsewhere, such as in Andrew McKevitt's *Consuming Japan*, which focusses on consumer

[2] For an example of such trends, see: Nguyễn Hùng Son and C. J. Jenner, "Domestic Politics: The Overlooked Undercurrent in the South China Sea," in *The South China Sea: A Crucible of Regional Cooperation or Conflict-making Sovereignty Claims?* ed. C. J. Jenner and Tran Truong Thuy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 133–148. Son and Jenner's book focuses on sub-national and domestic actors, and their influence on international relations in the contested space of the South China Sea.

goods and culture, and the agency of actors and processes not usually considered to be influential on international relations.[3]

Moving beyond approaches and content, the very structure of McGregor's proposed three-way relationship is not without its limits. Its focus on the Pacific means rising powers like India go unnoticed, as does China's westward thrust through the Belt and Road Initiative. And within the Pacific, regional powers like Vietnam and even Russia only have peripheral roles to play. However, these gaps should invite and challenge scholars to add their own nuance and pose new questions. What might a similar three-way approach to the American, Russian, and Chinese relationship over the same time period look like? McGregor's book remains rich with detail and useful thematic takeaways, and the proposed three-way relationship remains valuable for its critical challenge to more familiar bipolar models. While obviously not achieving coverage of all actors and influences in a global international system, the model reminds us that apparently two-dimensional relationships are often affected—indeed reshaped entirely—by that which at first might seem only peripheral.

[3] Andrew C. McKevitt, *Consuming Japan: Popular Culture and the Globalizing of 1980s America* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017).

World War One in Southeast Asia: Colonialism and Anticolonialism in an Era of Global Conflict

By Heather Streets-Salter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, Pp. 246, Paperback £ 23.99, ISBN: 978-1316501092

REVIEWED BY KELVIN YUDIANTO

Most people identify World War I with trench warfare in Western Europe. Yet, in *World War One in Southeast Asia*, Heather Streets-Salter demonstrates that the war also unfolded in a region located thousands of mile away from Europe. As Streets-Salter describes, the book has three related empirical contributions. First, it adds to a growing body of works on the Great War whose research scope goes beyond the European fronts. Second, it examines an understudied front of the Great War. Finally, the book contributes to a recent historiography which argues that the war was truly a global phenomenon.

Streets-Salter's journey with the book project began unexpectedly in the French colonial archives of Aix-en-Provence. While researching late nineteenth-century linkages between British Malaya, French Indochina, and Dutch East Indies, Streets-Salter stumbled upon archival documents about the 1915 mutiny in Singapore, a British colony. She had never heard of this incident before. Further research on the mutiny supported Streets-Salter's initial hypothesis, namely, that the event could not be fully understood without considering its relation to global events and movements. Following the threads, Streets-Salter also discovered that the Singaporean event represents how World War I affected a broader segment of Southeast Asia.

While acknowledging that the Southeast Asian war front was not crucial in deciding the final outcome of World War I, Streets-Salter contends that by examining the Southeast Asian front, one could better understand the broader mechanism of World War I. This is possible because the Southeast Asian front was globally connected to other fronts. Many factors that played out on those other fronts unfolded in Southeast Asia—for instance, the Central Powers' global efforts to instigate rebellions in British India had operations in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the Great War would significantly shape the region even long after it ended, as in the case of war-posed security risks inducing colonial officers to strengthen their intelligence agencies. Such an effort was important for the British attempt to check communism and the Japanese expansion during the interwar years. The war also disrupted communication and economy across the region.

Streets-Salter also makes two methodological contributions through the book. First, she underscores the weakness of the metropole/colony framework commonly found in the history of empire and colonialism. This framework presup-

poses that colonies (e.g. British Malaya and French Indochina) and their respective metropoles (e.g. Britain and France) are "more or less discreet units" (p.6) and are crucial to understanding the workings of empires. Streets-Salter, however, posits that many colonial structures operated outside the metropole/colony nexus. She shows that colonial actors often interacted with actors or processes that existed outside colonial limits. In this way, Streets-Salter contributes to an emerging body of scholarship that views modern empires as "porous, interconnected, and frequently disrupted by transnational or global forces" (p.7).

Second, the book adds to a small body of scholarship demonstrating that it is possible to inculcate local details while writing about world history. Most works on world history typically examine structures and processes over huge areas or long periods of time, for instance, the Columbian Exchange and the Great Divergence. Yet, the broad geographic and temporal scopes of such works often render local subtleties as aggregates. Consequently, those subtleties are seldom discussed in the works. Streets-Salter demonstrates that this does not have to be the case. In the book, she shows how trans-regional forces such as the Ottoman-inspired pan-Islamism and the German-backed revolutionary nationalism interacted with local forces during the war in Southeast Asia.

The first two chapters examine the 1915 Singapore Mutiny. Streets-Salter dedicates a considerable amount of space on the incident because it "encapsulates so clearly the ways the World War I came to Southeast Asia" (p.17). Chapter 1 focuses on the causes of the mutiny from the standpoint of the mutineers—the 5th Indian infantry regiment. Streets-Salter mainly attributes the mutiny to two factors: German-Indian-Ottoman anti-Allied propaganda and the subversive actions of pro-German activists in Singapore. In turn, Chapter 2 explores how global processes that traversed the metropole/colony axis shaped official and civilian responses to the mutiny. Among others, Britain, France, Russia, and Japan coordinated a forceful response that effectively suppressed the mutiny only a few days after it started. This cooperation happened despite a history of strained relations between Britain and each of the other three powers.

Chapters 3–6 examine the substantial importance that both the Allies and the Central Powers bestowed upon the neutral territories of Southeast Asia. These chapters show that those territories "were not simply curious sideshows" in how the war unfolded in the region because they provided strategic locations from which the Central Powers could attack nearby Allied colonies (p.89). Although several important works have examined the Central Powers' attempts to instigate rebellion in Allied colonies, these works have mainly focused on North America, Central Asia, or on the German-Ottoman relationship, but have largely ignored or glossed over Southeast Asia. Taken together, then, these chapters "explore [a] mostly uncharted historiographical terrain" within the literature on World War I (p.89).

Both Chapter 3 and 4 discuss how war dynamics impacted the neutral Dutch East Indies, and vice versa. Chapter 3 discusses how the war disrupted the economy and communication networks of the Dutch colony of East Indies. It also explores how the Dutch, resolved to abide by its neutrality stance and not be dragged to war by the belligerents, tried its best to accommodate the interests of both the Allies and Germany. Chapter 4 examines German attempts to send arms from the United States to revolutionaries in India through ships that passed by the East Indies. It also recounts how British officials successfully built connections with two German double agents, who in turn provided crucial information that led to the arrests of four men who had links with the German-Indian anti-Allied conspiracy.

Chapter 5 explores how the war unfolded in Siam. Streets-Salter illustrates that as a neutral territory surrounded by British India, British Malaya, and French Indochina on its three sides, Siam was another suitable hub for the Central Powers to plot and conduct subversions against the Allies. Finally, Chapter 6 mainly explores how Germany supported China-based Vietnamese revolutionaries to cause disturbances in neighboring French Indochina.

Streets-Salter's book contributes to the Southeast Asian historiography in a few ways. First, it demonstrates the relevance of the Great War to the history of Southeast Asia. The Great War itself is a subfield of modern Southeast Asian history that has been explored little. Second, the book adds to a growing body of works showing that different parts of Southeast Asia were connected with one another and with parts of the globe other than their respective colonial metropoles. These works challenge the prevailing nation-centric framework found in the historiography of Southeast Asia. Those works which do address Southeast Asia's transnational history tend to only explore the early modern period. Streets-Salter's work, however, contributes to the historiography of twentieth-century Southeast Asia—a subfield where state-centric analysis still dominates.

One limitation of the book was the general omission of the Philippines from the discussion, despite descriptions throughout the book describing the territory as a way station for several U.S. ships transporting weapons and anti-Allied propaganda materials for the conspirators. A closer examination of the Philippines would actually provide a relevant backdrop to other parts of Southeast Asia—especially Siam and the Dutch East Indies—since as a U.S. colony it remained neutral until early 1917.

Overall, the book is an important addition to preexisting scholarship. Besides contributing to a growing body of works examining the global dimension of the Great War, it also contributes to an emerging body of scholarship that explores the interconnectivity of Southeast Asia. By analyzing how the war unfolded in the region, the book also analyzes an area of modern Southeast Asian history that has been less explored. In addition, the book represents a way of writing that challenges the dominant frameworks of colonial and world history respectively. Writ-

ing a monograph that navigates different historical genres is certainly demanding. However, Streets-Salter makes it look easy. The book is easily read and is, therefore, suitable for both undergraduate and graduate students. It is also a must-read for historians of both World War I and Southeast Asia.

Conference Reviews

Empires—Towards a Global History
University of Delhi, December 2017

REVIEWED BY TCA ACHINTYA

TCA Achintya is pursuing a M.Phil. at the Department of History at the University of Delhi. He obtained his B.A. with Honours and M.A. in History from the same institution. Focusing on Modern Indian History, his research looks at the inter-connected political history of Britain and India in the 19th century, using the prism of legislation on India and parliamentary politics. His work also seeks to contextualize these historical patterns within global historical trends. His other interests include a fascination with mythology and ancient history, not just that of India, but of many other ancient faith systems and cultures, such as Rome and Persia. He also engages with issues of modern laws and their application in both contemporary and historical contexts.

The Department of History at the University of Delhi, in collaboration with the Weatherhead Initiative on Global History at Harvard University (WIGH) and WIGH's Global History Network organized an International Conference on the theme "Empires—Towards a Global History" at Delhi, on 3rd–5th December 2017.

The underlying idea of the conference was to utilize the concept of 'Empires' to develop a better understanding of the framework of global history. Building on the enduring influence of empires on the world, the conference sought to break new ground in research by bringing together academics from a wide set of contexts and research domains to think and develop new perspectives and ideas on systematic global history studies, often through the prism of empires.

The sessional break up allowed the gathered audience and scholars to constantly shift gazes and perspectives. With the concept and construct of 'Empire' at the heart of the formulations, the conference proceedings aimed at manipulating the subject of study through differing perspectives. Each theme allowed for a different formulation of 'Empire,' and in the process, gave varying insights into the constructs and formulations of global history as a subject. The sessional themes allowed for an interesting variety of perspectives. Thus, the discussions on commodities and technologies gave eagle eye views on empires as institutions, allowing for scholars to dwell on the external body of empires. In contrast, looking at peripheries, frontiers and crossings, along with travel and the margins of empire, gave sharper insights on trans-regional and trans-imperial connections and relations. Papers on 'Ideas in Movement' and 'Empire and Anti-Colonialism' switched focus entirely from construct to ideology, driving scholarly attention to the underlying principles at play in imperial structures and the meta-narratives that defined them. If commodities brought an eagle eye view to the discussion, papers on imperial urban centres dragged it right down to the street, bridging the

concepts of 'Local' and 'Global' and highlighting the complexities involved in studying empires, and in the process global history.

Some common underlying themes that threaded their way throughout the conference were the need to both expand outlooks but also to look inwards. It was agreed that global history should not result in a rush to over-generalize and over-analyse the wider connections, forgetting or ignoring the underlying principles and factors that constitute them. A global history that fails to appreciate the local can hardly be built on solid foundations and must tumble like a house of cards once it fails to reconcile its conclusions with the realities of the local.

The conference aimed to be more than just an exercise in academic discourse however. The idea of "Towards a Global History" meant for the organizers a desire to not just explore the intellectual value of global history but also to understand and study global history in practice, while attempting as well to bridge the gaps between the popular and the academic. Global history, locked in an ivory tower of discourse without outreach, was for many of the organizing members a somewhat unpalatable concept. These issues, and the problems and conceptualization of global history, were flagged in the opening session. The conference organizers also hosted a public lecture by noted academic and Indian Parliamentarian, Professor Sugata Bose of Harvard University on "Changing Meanings of Sovereignty and Borders." Open to the public, and attended by a wide audience of scholars, students and the lay public, the lecture embodied the concept of public outreach that the conference believes should be a critical component of academic discourse.

Global history in practice, rather than as a topic of discussion, was also an important consideration at the conference. Organizers, in addition to hosting panels with paper presentations, also sought to embody the physicality of history and of the learning process. Heritage walks across three sites in Delhi were led by graduate students from the M.Phil. Program of the History Department at the University of Delhi. The walks covered the Ancient Ashoka Pillar in North Delhi, the Lodi Gardens—the resting site of the Last Emperors of the Delhi Sultanate—and the Mutiny Memorial, the colonial commemoration of the Great Revolt of 1857, and an enduring site of contestation and competing narratives. Each great period of history, Ancient, Medieval and Modern, was thus represented in these walks, with each site presentation bringing out the connections and continuities that bound these sites to the world at large. The global character of Delhi, and its status as an imperial site and centre, a city studied at the local, national, imperial and global level, helped participants to focus on the intricacies of history in practice, while doubling up as an enjoyable physical activity far removed from the intellectual rough and tumble inside the classroom.

Breaking with traditional academic procedures and practices, the final sessions of the event sought to be more unstructured, so as to allow free-form discus-

sion. The penultimate session, "Reflections on Global History," had no presented papers. Instead, senior scholars Professor Sven Beckert of Harvard University, Professor Mamadou Fall of Universite Chiekh Anta Diop, Senegal and Matthias van Rossum of the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam gave their views on what global history is and should be. The speakers here utilized the session to discuss research practices, the pressures of the modern political world, the growing pulls and pushes of movements such as nationalism on academic discourse, and the problems of navigating these pressures to engage with global history, even as different groups seek to harness the concept or attack it for their own purposes.

In contrast, the final session "Teaching Global History" shifted the gaze to the pedagogical side of academia. The aim of the session was to shift attention to the other burden of duty, apart from research, that academics must fulfil: teaching, the transmission of knowledge and training of future scholars and students in global history. The session was designed as an open one, with no set plan or dialogue to structure discussions. Teachers and senior faculty spoke to their experiences and problems in the teaching of global history and the challenges of bringing the subject to students while being careful not to overburden them; in turn, students of different levels used the forum to highlight their concerns about accessing global records and histories in a time of growing fear of migrants and outsiders, but also raising questions and seeking answers on how to practice global history, and differentiate it from the usual national or local focus of the university.

The conference thus sought to break ground in multiple new directions. It was not merely an arena where academics presented their research conclusions and works in progress, but was also a site of debate, exploration and learning where both eminent senior academics and young students and scholars were engaged in different intellectual and academic enterprises, letting each participant engage with the proceedings. It sought to break the conference paradigm of presentation and questions, looking to expand into new territories, and making academic exploration a more democratic and globalized process, involving physical exploration, public interaction and unstructured open discussions on the concerns of the different stakeholders of academia. Many conference attendees resolved to try and implement the model of the 'Empires Conference of Delhi' as a model for future events at their own institutions.

As an event, the conference was a one-off at the University of Delhi, though part of a wider series of events being organized by the Global History Network of universities hosted by the Weatherhead Initiative on Global History (WIGH) at Harvard. The conferences take place in different countries on an annual basis and represent a valuable site for students and younger academics to engage with a diverse audience and network of peers working the field of global history. This iteration also allowed local graduate students to present papers alongside schol-

ars selected through a global open call for papers, thus exposing students to the experience of presenting alongside their more senior colleagues. Future events of WIGH will almost certainly therefore represent a continuing valuable space in which to deliberate and study the field of global history.

Annual Conference of the International Students of History Association (ISHA)

Maribor, April 2018

REVIEWED BY ERIC JESWEIN AND TAMARA PATAKI

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Tamara Pataki is a M.A. student of History at the Freie Universität Berlin, where she also completed her B.A. degree of History and Political Science. She is the secretary of the International Board of ISHA and an active member of the organization since 2015. She is interested in historical methodology and political history, especially in the political systems and transformations of Central and Eastern European states.

This year's Annual Conference of ISHA, the International Students of History Association, on "Modernization of History" was a special one, as it was jointly organized by two sections across the border from each other. The conference was held in Maribor, Slovenia, but major contributions were made by the ISHA section of Graz, Austria and their respective universities. This April we gathered to join the debate on "Digital Humanities," a broadly defined field, which encompasses both object and method of historical research, to discuss emerging ways of research and presenting historical material. The conference was a representation of the blurring field of Digital Humanities, as it covered a wide range of approaches and topics. This reached from discussing 'new' media, such as YouTube, to interdisciplinary research methods, such as combining geographical data and historical research in a new form.

Apart from the opening keynote lecture, and the final discussion, the participants mostly exchanged their ideas in smaller groups. The keynote lecture opened the seminar with a presentation on historical films and their conveyance of history which led to debate on movies as an educational tool and source for historical research. We mainly debated upon which methodology films can be evaluated and, to be frank, if historical exactitude is the most pressing concern and goal of historical film making. The debate on entertainment media providing a matching or competing depiction of history continued in smaller groups. Participants discussed the role of YouTube, Internet blogs, and computer games in altering the views of the past. Other workshops took a different approach on "Digital Humanities" by looking at their integration in traditional places of historical representation and asked questions on how new technologies can be applied in, for example, museums or in schools. A very different discussion opened the effects of digita-

lization on enhancing interdisciplinary cooperation in a workshop on "Maps" as sources. This workshop was a result of cooperation with EGEA, the European Geography Association, and two Geography students provided input and moderated the discussions on ways and biases of projecting geo-information on a flat surface of a paper. Similarly, another workshop discussed the role of informatics and computing in evaluating historical sources.

These very different issues were channeled together in a final discussion, where all workshops presented their ideas so that we could create a general picture of the "Digital Humanities," which remains a vague buzz-word. Instead of going into a broader discussion on the definition of the term, we tried to tackle the field by reflecting on the debates other scholars opened before us. This was probably not the best approach possible, as these discussions are often hampered by mainly going back into debates on definitions, such as what 'digital' even means and what tools and methods it contains. We have seen that computing technologies can successfully be integrated into concepts of museums or teaching in schools, but argued, whether new methodologies can lead to entirely new research questions or 'only' offer some new ways of answering them.

Unfortunately, the concept of the conference did not allow much space for plenary discussions. Most debates stayed among the small groups, which meant that we could not reflect much on general outcomes. This is arguably a structural weakness of ISHA conferences. The conferences offer mostly a place for small group work and a lively debate on a small scale, but often fall short on synthesizing the individual workshops into a larger whole. Another issue was that apart from the workshops the academic program of the conference was rather slim, ISHA conferences usually accompany workshops with other formats, such as roundtable discussions and more lectures and plenary debates, but this year's annual conference came short on these. It should also be remarked, that the annual conference is a place for ISHA to debate its internal affairs and elect its new officials for the coming term. The general assembly is always the place to continue the ongoing discussion in ISHA about how to raise the academic standards of its events making the organization (the largest of its kind in Europe) still accessible for students of all countries and academic levels. Here we debated the role of ISHA as a representative body for students of history in Europe and how we could make the organization and its work more visible.

In summary, the 2018 Annual Conference of ISHA proved to be an event of fruitful discussions. We explored possibilities and directions of the emerging field "Digital Humanities," but only reached a conclusion about its nature as a supportive matter for historical research and also leading to new research questions. The conference itself was a the first of its kind as it was co-hosted by two ISHA sections and proved a high level of international cooperation from the students of ISHA. Still, there was room for more discussion, especially on the larger scale,

and the variety of events was not as strong as other seminars and conferences of the organization.

Repensando y Renovando el Derecho Internacional dentro, desde, y sobre la América Latina

Universidad de los Andes, Universidad Externado de Colombia, & Universidad del Rosario (Bogotá, Colombia), September 2017

REVIEWED BY DANIEL R. QUIROGA-VILLAMARÍN

Daniel R. Quiroga-Villamarín is currently an undergraduate student of Law—and the academic coordinator of the LL.M. in International Law—at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá. Soon, he will pursue a M.A. in International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. He is mainly interested in the theory and history of international law, with a special concern for the movement of legal concepts through both time and space. His most recent publication traced the forgotten Latin American contributions to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the nascent United Nations Organization.

From the 26th to the 28th of September, the international symposium "Rethinking and Renewing the Study of International Law in/from/about Latin America" convened in Bogotá, Colombia. This event, co-organized by three leading Colombian research universities, aimed to provide critical insights for students, practitioners and scholars who are concerned with the relationship between the Latin American region and international law. Each day had a different topic; the first (held at *Los Andes*) revolved around international law and imperialism, and neo/post-colonialism. The second (*Rosario)* delved into current historical and historiographical debates regarding Latin America and international law. Finally, the third day (*Externado*) centered around critical perspectives regarding pedagogy and teaching international law. With nearly 80 panelists, three keynote speakers, two book launches, the launch of a special edition of a law review, and hundreds of participants, this event represents the most salient example of a growing interest for critical and historical approaches to international law in the region.

At first glance, it may be surprising to find that the keynote addresses on a conference on Latin America were delivered by nationals of Finland, Sri Lanka, and Australia. This, however, may be easily explained by the trajectory of Professors Martti Koskenniemi, Antony Anghie, and Anne Orford. The importance of their past research for contemporary critical and historical approaches to international law is hardly overstated.[1] Each day, the keynote speakers had the opportunity to discuss the three thematic approaches of the conference—imperialism, history,

[1] For example see*:* Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Anne Orford, *International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

and pedagogy—with professors of the host universities. These discussions were followed by open Q&A sessions in which students and practitioners participated. Simultaneous interpretation during the event facilitated the interaction between the international professors and the audience.

On the first day of the symposium, the morning session was reserved for discussions of the way imperialism historically shaped modern international law, and how—in many cases—colonialism persists in the both theory and practice of international law. Professor Anghie eloquently argued how international law was a product of the colonial encounter rather than a lone creation of European actors.[2] In a similar vein, professor Koskenniemi claimed that the professionalization of international law in the 19th century was closely tied to the Victorian liberal internationalist project and its 'civilizing mission.'[3] In turn, professor Orford claimed that international law depended on the segregation of the 'civilized peoples' from the *others*, in a way she currently saw in operation against the aboriginal peoples of Australia.[4] These lively discussions were followed by the launch of the book *Imperialism and International Law*, published by *Los Andes* the year before. In the book, three of the leading texts regarding imperialism and international law were translated from English into Spanish to facilitate their reading by an ever-growing audience of Colombian and Latin American students and scholars.[5]

On the next day, the morning session addressed the growing historical interest, and the corresponding variety of historiographical discussions, regarding the relationship between Latin America and International Law. Orford argued that adopting a strict contextualist methodology—following the approach of the Cambridge School—could impair the critical impulse of the recent "turn to history" in international law.[6] Anghie stated that the historical dynamics of international law could help us to understand its present application, citing the International Criminal Court as an interesting example.[7] Finally, Koskenniemi concluded by claiming that we must study the lawyers behind international law as people with

[2] See also: Antony Anghie, "Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law," *Harvard International Law Journal* 49, no. 1 (1999): 1–71.

[3] Martti Koskenniemi, "International Law and Empire—Aspects and Approaches," in *International Law and Empire: Historical Explorations*, ed. Martti Koskenniemi, Walter Rech, and Manuel Jiménez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[4] Anne Orford, ed., *International Law and Its Others* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[5] René Urueña, Liliana Obregón, and Luis Eslava, "Imperialismo(s) y Derecho(s) Internacional(Es): Ayer y Hoy," in *Imperalismo y Derecho Internacional*, ed. Martti Koskenniemi, Antony Anghie, and Anne Orford (Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, 2016), 11–94.

[6] Anne Orford, "The Past as Law or History? The Relevance of Imperialism for Modern International Law," in *International Law and New Approaches to the Third World: Between Repetition and Renewal*, ed. Mark Toufayan, Emanuelle Tourme-Jouannet, and Hélène Ruiz (Paris: Société de législation comparée, 2013).

[7] Antony Anghie and B.S Chimni, "Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts," *Chinese Journal of International Law* 2, no. 1 (2003): 77–103.

projects, in order to understand how the history of law is also a history of the legal profession.[8] Afterwards, the event continued with the book launch of the Argentinean scholar Juan Pablo Scarfi's *The Hidden History of International Law in the Americas*.[9]

Finally, on the third day, the discussion revolved around the special issue of the Law Review *Revista Derecho del Estado* (Externado). It focuses on education in international law and on the topic of imperialism.[10] This issue includes several essays produced by the REDIAL ('Rethinking the Education of International Public Law in Latin America') network of scholars. Born from a collaborative project grant given by the Institute for Global Law and Policy at Harvard Law School (IGLP), the REDIAL network aimed to promote reflection on the importance of critical and interdisciplinary teaching, as well as the study of international law in the region.[11] With this discussion, the conference attempted to relate theoretical critiques of international law with the practical experiences of teaching and learning international law and history in the classrooms.

In the afternoon, each day had several panels in which students and scholars—mostly from Latin America—had the opportunity to present their works in progress to their peers. The panels offered a wide variety of topics, including "Human Rights and Social Movements," "Indigenous Peoples and First Nations," "International Investment Law," "Education and International Law," and "Crime, Safety and Post-Conflict Governance."[12] The best papers will be selected and published in a collection of books edited by the three universities in tandem in 2018. A prevalent discussion in all of the panels was, how history could inform critical perspectives of international law. History could show the contingency of our current institutional arrangements and highlight the roads not taken. The study of the (global) history of law could inform projects of normative reform for its (also global) future.

As a panelist—and also an organizer—this event gave me a unique opportunity to reflect on the intersections between historical and sociological approaches for contemporary critical legal research. It offered a platform for scholars and students from the region to reflect on the new insights provided by cutting-edge work in the social sciences and the humanities (in particular historiographical methodologies) to enrich their understanding of the law. To (re)think and renew the study of international law from a Latin American perspective requires studying how the

[8] Wouter Werner, Marieke De Hoon, and Alexis Galán, eds., *The Law of International Lawyers: Reading Martti Koskenniemi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[9] Juan Pablo Scarfi, *The Hidden History of International Law in the Americas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[10] *Revista Derecho del Estado* 39, no. 1 (2017), http://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/issue/view/479.

[11] "IGLP Collaborative Research Grants," Institute for Global Law and Policy, http://iglp.law.harvard.edu/network-news/iglp-collaborative-research-grants/.

[12] For the full program see: https://www.uexternado.edu.co/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Programa.pdf.

region interacted with global phenomena (such as imperialism or colonialism), and the effects such interactions had on the way Latin America and international law were shaped thereafter.

This conference has not only offered a theoretical critique of imperialism as a historical experience, but also a practical statement for the future of international law. By fostering south-south cooperation between three leading universities in Colombia, and linking such efforts with colleagues around the region, this event was able to connect local students with global questions in ways that would have been impossible to imagine for a single university. We are convinced that this conference, which has united scholars and students from around the region, has achieved its purpose of promoting critical and interdisciplinary research into the past of international law as a way of (re)imagining the future of both international law and Latin America.

Geographies of World History Graduate Conference
University of Cambridge, September 2017

REVIEWED BY CHASE CALDWELL SMITH

Chase is a candidate for the M.St. in Global and Imperial History at the University of Oxford, where he holds a Clarendon Scholarship. He received his B.A. in History from the University of Cambridge. Chase studies processes of cultural encounter in the early modern Iberian empires, working at the intersection of the histories of race, gender, knowledge, and religion. His master's dissertation investigates texts and images produced by Manuel Godinho de Erédia, a Luso-Malay cartographer who worked in the Portuguese Estado da Índia in the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-centuries.

Conceptualised, developed, and executed by the conveners of the Cambridge World History Workshop (WHW), this conference on September 30th, 2017, set out to explore the possibilities of using geography in the writing of world history. James Wilson (University of Cambridge), one of the conference's conveners, highlighted the diversity of ways in which the presenters addressed this issue. Reflecting on the conference's journey from conceptualisation to completion, Wilson noted a disjuncture between the interpretation of geography put forward in the call for papers, and many of the interpretations ultimately offered by the speakers.

The conveners had asked for papers examining "geographical features, including oceans, islands, rivers, mountains and cities," which they claimed "are increasingly being used as productive lenses for analysing connections and disconnections across and within empires and states." For further examples, they pointed to recent scholarly interest in "geographical intersections, such as those between sea and land, coast and interior, and lowland and highland." In other words, the conference's original conceptualisation of geography laid emphasis on using tangible features in the landscape as "productive lenses" through which one could write history.

However, as Wilson indicated, only some of the papers used geography in the sense of a physical or built feature of the landscape, with many framing geography differently. Thus, at the heart of this conference was a debate over the multiple meanings of geography and a reflection on the opportunities and tensions of using these plural geographies in the writing of world history. A geographical focus, the conference suggested, may be one of the ways in which historians can break out of the confines of national and regional historiographies, forge new connections, and adopt cross-regional, transnational, or international approaches—some of the key aims of world history and global history. This review will focus on three ways in which the papers used plural approaches to geography to make such historical

interventions, and then offer a personal reflection on the conference experience itself.

First, a focus on physical or built features in the landscape enabled some speakers to move beyond the historical unit of the nation state. For instance, two speakers on one panel analysed international efforts to control and demarcate bodies of water. Shereen Sherif (Jawaharlal Nehru University) studied the consequences of border-making in the strait between Sri Lanka and India in the twentieth-century. By placing a maritime border at the heart of her analysis, she took a transnational approach that cut across this national boundary. From a related perspective, Annalise Higgins (University of Cambridge) examined international tensions over the Panama Canal in the twentieth century—tensions which arose because of the canal's ambiguous legal status as either (or perhaps both) man-made or natural. This geographic ambiguity complicated arguments for restricting or permitting the passage of ships from certain nations during wartime. These papers also invited comparisons with other borders and canals around the world, meaning that both papers were implicitly, if not always explicitly, comparative on a global scale.

Second, another paper departed from a primary focus on physical features in the landscape to investigate mental, imaginative geographies. Jonathan Dixon (University of Cambridge) examined visual and symbolic geographies on medieval and early modern European maps. By approaching geography from a mental, rather than physical perspective, Dixon showed how cartographers imagined and represented distant and little-understood lands for European audiences. In effect, Dixon's paper highlighted one way in which cartographic sources can be used to write world history, underscoring that trans-regional connections between ideas and places can occur on the surface of maps as well as in the tangible world.

Third, one paper not only concentrated on built or imagined landscapes but also used the tools of present-day historical geography in its analysis of these landscapes. Lance Pursey (University of Birmingham), whose paper examined the Liao polity of northeastern Asia, displayed a map of Liao places which he had constructed using Geographic Information Systems (GIS). He reflected on this tool's opportunities—notably the visualisation of spatial data—but also commented on its limits and the importance of his other source materials. In doing so, Pursey suggested one way in which historians might use the tools of academic geography to visualise previously unnoticed connections between places in the landscape, and thereby write history in innovative ways.

In sum, many of the papers stretched their conceptualisations of geography to approach it in a variety of ways—for instance, as a maritime legal reality, as a cartographic representation of distant lands, and as a discipline whose tools can be used to enhance the writing of history. This diversity was matched by the breadth of periods and regions studied—ranging from sixteenth-century Mexico to the twentieth-century Philippines—suggesting the relevance of geography to

the writing of history across many times and locations. By taking a thematic approach, the conference brought together scholars focusing on different historical fields and engaged them in a productive and wide-ranging conversation that was not restricted to any specific period or region. In this vein, an end-of-day roundtable discussion enabled both the speakers and conveners to reflect on wider themes and questions raised throughout the conference. This brought all the papers together, encouraging the participants to think about them jointly, rather than in isolation.

This was a conference designed for graduate students by graduate students, with the ten presenters ranging from master's level through Ph.D. candidacy. It was also encouraging to see undergraduates in the audience, meaning that participation was still open to younger students. The conference's small scale enabled an intimacy that would have been harder to find at a larger event. The atmosphere was convivial, and critiques and questions were delivered in a friendly and constructive way. The conference therefore operated as a kind of workshop, in which students felt free to gather feedback on work in progress. From a social perspective, frequent coffee-breaks, a generous lunch, and post-conference drinks provided abundant opportunities for networking and further discussion. As a first-time conference presenter, this conviviality, both scholarly and social, was very welcoming.

While the conference was superbly executed, my main critique would be the absence of a pre-conference circulation of papers. It may have been helpful to read through some of the other presenters' papers beforehand, and feasible to do so as there were only ten. However, this is a minor concern, as the discussions on the day were in the end rich and thought-provoking.

This conference was but one of many opportunities offered to graduate students by the Cambridge World History Workshop (WHW). As Chris Wilson (University of Cambridge), one of the current conveners, informed me, the WHW runs weekly sessions for graduate students to share and discuss their work. Their past events include a roundtable discussion on conducting research in overseas archives and a reading group on "Race, Gender, and Class in World History." Upcoming events include a discussion on global intellectual history and a graduate conference on the theme "Texts in Motion: Materiality, Mobility, and Archiving in World History." While many of these events are designed for Cambridge students, the WHW's conferences are open to students from around the world. "Geographies of World History" drew many of its participants from UK universities, but it also brought together students from as far afield as Jawaharlal Nehru University, Princeton University, and the University of Lisbon. In addition to providing these students with the opportunity to present in front of their peers, the conference enabled the Cambridge conveners themselves to develop skills related to conference organisation, including the seeking of funding, the selection of papers, and the chairing

of panels. Thus, the conference was an important early career experience for the conveners as well as for the participants.

While this may have been a small, one-day conference, it engaged with important issues, and perhaps raised more questions about the relationship between geography and world history than it answered. However, if anything can be concluded about geography and world history from attending this conference, it is that the relationship between them is productive, plural, and deserving of further exploration.

Constructing 'the Soviet'? Political Consciousness, Everyday Practices, New Identities

European University at St. Petersburg, April 2018

REVIEWED BY DARIA TASHKINOVA

Daria Tashkinova completed her undergraduate degree in Area Studies at Ural Federal University (Russia) in 2014, focusing on the history and politics of Eastern and Central Europe. The same year she started an M.A. in Global History at both Freie Universität and Humboldt Universität of Berlin. Her research interests include social and labour history of the late Soviet Union; transnational migrations; history of imperialism; gender and education history. She is currently writing her Master's Thesis about the job assignment system in the USSR.

The 12th annual conference "Constructing 'the Soviet'? Political Consciousness, Everyday Practices, New Identities" took place at the European University in St. Petersburg on the 20th and the 21st of April 2018. The conference, organised by several students of the European University, gave a chance to undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate scholars to present their research on notions of the 'Soviet.' This year's seven panels discussed the visual narratives of socialism; the artistic discourse in the USSR; the multiplicity of Soviet identity; science and scholarship in the Soviet Union; ideology and practices of labour; transformations of regime and ideology; and lastly childhood and upbringing under Soviet socialism. By drawing upon a wide array of actors, themes, sources, and approaches, the conference presented an interesting overview of current academic trends in research on the Soviet experience. The programme was not specific to one particular time frame: one could find presentations ranging from the early 1920s all the way to the last days of the Soviet Union and, in some cases, even beyond that into the period of post-communist Russia.

The conference was held in an unusual format I have not encountered before in my relatively modest academic career. After each presentation by the two to four participants in each panel, the chair and the audience asked them questions related to the theme of their research. This was followed by comments from either one of the professors at the European University, or a guest lecturer. The structure gave all of the panelists some time to discuss their presentations, as well as answering questions related to it. Therefore, nobody felt excluded or ignored as it can sometimes be the case in conferences with longer rounds of discussion. However, the following commentary by senior researchers and professors, though intended to be helpful, unfortunately created an uncomfortable 'classroom' atmosphere. Rather than providing constructive feedback and suggestions or uniting the papers of the panel into a single narrative, some professors criticized the presentations from a hierarchical position that made me personally feel a little uneasy. The professors'

presence during the post-presentation discussions sometimes led to a wave of harsh critique and pinpointing of individual mistakes. Although I do realize that students need guidance, advice and criticism from senior researchers to improve their work, in my personal opinion, a student conference is hardly the place for this sort of remarks. I do believe that student conferences are first and foremost places to share research interests, exchange ideas, and build networks among fellow students. The uneven nature of relationships between professors and students stripped the conference of a welcoming atmosphere. Instead it unfortunately felt more like presenting at a university seminar rather than at a conference of peers.

Two talks by guest lecturers closed both days of the conference. At the end of the first day, Birte Kohtz, a researcher at the German Historical Institute in Moscow, presented the early stages of her new research on the history of the unborn in the Soviet Union. She focuses on the medical perceptions of pregnancy and the fetus in the 1970s and 1980s. In light of the ongoing debate on abortion laws in the US, Ireland, Poland, and Russia this research is a timely and important matter, especially considering how supposedly 'progressive' the Soviet stance on reproductive rights was. On the second day, the closing lecture was given by Alexander Reznik, a European University graduate and researcher at the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg. In his speech, he attempted to deconstruct the 'cult' of Leon Trotsky. Reznik argued that Trotsky's was a case of a hybrid cult that was supposedly first created without Trotsky's consent and contrary to his will. Later, he argued that the 'anti-cult' surrounding Trotsky, having been created by monarchists during the Russian Civil War, was picked up by Stalinist propaganda after Trotsky's ouster.

Since the conference was held in two official languages, Russian and English, it allowed several international researchers, including myself, to participate and present their works in English. Moreover, some comments and the lecture by Birte Kohtz were also given in English. Despite my criticism on the format of the after-panel comments, I was incredibly honoured to be a part of the panel on Soviet labour practices which was commented upon by Alexandra Oberländer, a professor at the University of Bremen and a renowned specialist on the labour history of the late Soviet Union. Her comments, as well as remarks by fellow panelists gave me valuable recommendations and suggestions on how to improve my work.

The conference gave an interesting inside into the state of history as a discipline in modern Russia. During the course of the conference and especially while listening to the harsh comments given to some panelists, I was desperately trying to understand a certain discomfort I had about this conference's approach. Being a student in the Global History Master's program at the Freie Universität Berlin and therefore inside a 'Western' and 'Global' atmosphere of constant search for connections in the wider picture of historical events, it is very easy to forget about more regionalised ways of writing history. However, despite presenting some very exciting sources, more often than not, presenters in St. Petersburg limited them-

selves to describing their sources. I could not help wanting to hear more about what the panelists actually wanted to argue by using their sources. Unfortunately, the feeling persisted. Setting my experience at this conference and the differences between Western and Russian approaches to writing history in perspective, I noticed that the former teaches its students to focus on the discussion and their place in it. We spend more time debating with other scholars, while using sources to defend their or our own arguments. The Russian tradition, however, is more source-centred. In other words, scholars within this tradition create great examples of meticulous source analysis and description, which are incredibly valuable. But as someone who has been writing in the Western 'style' for the last four years, I was constantly frustrated by the lack of an argument and just kept wondering how much argumentative potential some of the presentations had, but never showed.

Despite certain points of criticism I have expressed above, participating in this conference was an important experience to me personally and to other participants. With the support of the European University and the German Historical Institute in Moscow, the conference provides a stage for young researchers who get the chance to present their work in one of the most respected institutions in Russia. The conference provides accommodation in St. Petersburg and financial support for those traveling from afar, making it easier for students to attend. Moreover, every year the conference organizers publish a volume with all the presentations. Thereby they give participants a chance to have publications under their names in the early stages of their careers.

The troubling political situation in which the European University has found itself for the last two years makes it impossible to predict if "Constructing 'the Soviet?'" is going to take place next year. By organizing this conference in spite of the shadow looming over the university's future, the students have shown true academic spirit. Personally, it was a great pleasure to participate.

Facade of the Weltmuseum Wien.
Photo Courtesy of Manfred Werner.

Weltmuseum Wien

REVIEWED BY ALINA RODRIGUEZ

Alina Rodriguez obtained her undergraduate degree in History from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. She is currently studying the M.A. in Global History at the Freie Universität and Humboldt-Universität.

The *Weltmuseum Wien* ('World Museum') is no longer the *Ethnologisches Museum*. It is located in the same building in Heldenplatz, as part of the Hofburg Imperial Palace complex. It still guards mostly the same collection and proudly displays the same famous pieces—like the Benin Bronzes or the Mesoamerican Feather Headdress. It is still part of the *KHM-Museumsverband*, which also comprises the *Kunsthistorisches Museum* and the *Theatermuseum*. So, besides the name, what else has changed?

To answer that question, we must first pay attention to the name. Apparently, 'ethnography' is no longer suited to discursively sustain public-funded exhibitions about the 'Others.' Ethnographic museums surged during the nineteenth century, conveying a narrative of Western exceptionality through its exhibitionary practices. It can be argued that other cultures similarly use comparison techniques to underline their uniqueness and/or superiority. Nevertheless, it is important to look at the particularities of every comparison technique. The nineteenth and early twentieth-century ethnology that backed the creation of ethnographic museums sustained its claims through the idea of a universal scientific discourse. This notion denied its own discursive standpoint and expressed itself as uniquely unbiased. On the other hand, as Annette B. Fromm has explained, ethnography's history as a discipline is tightly knitted to European colonial enterprises as collections were gathered by scientific expeditions, collecting travellers, military incursions or missionary activity. For a museum located in the heart of a former imperial capital, holding and displaying pieces acquired in colonial scenarios, ethnographic discourse cannot be resignified. It cannot be useful or legitimate anymore: in this context it can only be regarded as negligent and tainted.

Hence, in April 2013 the *Ethnologisches Museum* announced its rebranding: a new name, and a project to remodel and reorganise its vast collection. In 2014, it was completely closed for remodelling. Museography, as historiography, organises words, images, objects—throws light on some of them, keeps another in storage—in order to create inside a delimitated space—be it a textual or architectonic one—a functioning microcosmos, a particular world. Then, the *Weltmuseum* created its own.

"A world museum for a global city" and "It's all about the people" are the phrases of the revamped institution that opened its gates again in October 2017 after three years of remodelling and fifteen years of planning. These mottos are rather

vague. According to them, the museum presumably stands for the broad category of 'people in the world.' So, we must zoom out of the textual dimension and see the material—space disposition—changes to grasp the world built within the museum. The *Weltmuseum* has reduced its galleries from nineteen to fourteen, and its objects in display from almost 7000 to 3127. But the space disposition change was not only reduced on the quantitative side. The galleries are thematically and not regionally oriented, as was usually the custom in earlier Ethnographic museums. Out of the total fourteen, twelve galleries are dedicated more or less to a particular area—"*Geschichten aus Mesoamerika*," "*1873—Japan kommt nach Europa*," "*Benin und Äthiopien: Kunst, Macht, Widerstand*," are a few examples—and it is true that they do not reproduce the "Asia," "Africa," or other continental labels to indifferently group together otherwise unrelated cultures. But a new disposition also brings new challenges.

The "Histories of Mesoamerica" gallery contains the icon of the museum: the Feather Headdress, dated back to the 16th century. The vibration-proof vitrine enclosing the Headdress was built back in 2012 expressly for protecting the piece given its fragility and already damaged structure. Laying against a black background and carefully lit, it is impossible to pass by the headdress without being compelled to contemplate it. This is an exception. Even though the number of pieces displayed in the museum has been reduced, many of the vitrines in the Museum look cramped. It is perhaps what Rüdiger Schaper calls in his review of the museum "a presentation of the objects, that doesn't deny the tradition of the cabinets of curiosities," where marvellous and very diverse objects are all grouped together in the same type of uniform glass cases.

The ancient headdress shares the Mesoamerican gallery with other precious Pre-Hispanic objects, as well as with recently acquired pieces, such as images of the Virgin of Guadalupe used in contemporary Mexican Catholic practice. Here the museography links the Nahua conquered-people from the 16th century to the current Mexican Catholic worshippers, distancing itself from the museographic narratives that think of the 'Others' as static cultures without history. But Guadalupanism and the 'celebration' of Aztec ruling are closely tied to the official narrative of Mexicanity promoted by the Mexican state since the 1920s. Framing these two worlds under a singular path sounds too familiar to the nation-state discourse. The objects in the gallery—the Pre-Hispanic headdress, the colonial paintings, the contemporary handicrafts and images of the Virgin—drift across narratives of conquest, syncretism and nation-state, creating through the collection a *Weltmuseum*'s version of Mexican identity and aesthetics.

There are two galleries not displaying collections, but that are entirely theme-oriented: "*Welt in Bewegung*" is dedicated to migration; "*Im Schatten des Kolonialismus*" reflects on the *Weltmuseum* itself as it approaches the way in which objects arrived to the Hofburg—through the frame of colonisation and imperialism.

Both differentiate themselves from the other by not focusing on the museographic narrative via objects, but through text and images drawn in bright white panels and digital resources.

As the former director Steven Engelsman notes, the preparation for these particular halls showed that these topics—migration and colonialism—are *sui generis* and the challenge they pose should be approached in the future by a curator competent in tackling globalisation questions: a '*Globalisierungskurator*.' The postcolonial, borderless world proposed by the microcosmos of the *Weltmuseum* is then one sustained by the ubiquitous concept of globalisation—a contested word that no longer has a precise meaning.

Globalisation and *Welt*-discourse in the museum is beyond continental categories to order the world, but the exhibitions only deal with communities that do not usually belong in the narrative of the Western history canon. A canon that is for example clearly present in the *Kunsthistorisches Museum*: it travels from Ancient Egypt, to Classic Greece and Rome, followed by European Medieval Art and ends with the European Master's Paintings. So, the globalisation questions and concerns that arise from the world the *Weltmuseum* portrays are still linked to the problem of the 'Other.' It continues with an 'Us' (Europeans) and 'Them' (Everyone else) division. That is why the exhibitions maintain a 'cabinet of curiosities' aura and why it needs specific galleries to explicitly address the recently raised questions about repatriation or provenance. In exhibitions, form and substance should be integrated, and in this building the contradiction between both is tangible.

Through the galleries of 'Migration' and 'Colonialism' the spectator is asked to reflect on the different ways people relate to objects over time. The way we are shown is not the scientific-based discourse of ethnology anymore, it is the global studies discourse. The latter did not emanate from the natural sciences but from social sciences; it is not tainted with a history of racism as ethnography could be accused of. Nevertheless, it continues with a task of defining and constructing an 'Other.' If in its public uses, as with museums, it maintains the 'Us' and 'Them' binary construction, a deep change is still yet to come.

ISSN: 2366-780X