[Global Histories]

A student journal

Impressum

Scope and purpose

In response to the increasing interest in the 'global' as a field of inquiry, a perspective, and an approach, *Global Histories: a Student Journal* aims to offer a platform for debate, discussion, and intellectual exchange for a new generation of scholars with diverse research interests. Global history can provide an opportunity to move beyond disciplinary boundaries and methodological centrisms, both in time and space. As students of global history at Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, our interest lies not in prescribing what global history is and what it is not, but to encourage collaboration, cooperation, and discourse among students seeking to explore new intellectual frontiers.

Publication frequency

The journal is published twice yearly in spring and autumn. Please see the website for further details.

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Editorial Note

Dear Reader,

Thank you for taking interest in the sixth edition of *Global Histories: A Student Journal*. In this, our second issue of 2018, we have again assembled an array of impressive research articles that together give an insight into the manifold opportunities connected to global history as a historical approach pursued from a student perspective.

The eight research articles in this edition cover a wide scope of locations and languages, as well as temporalities. The explorations in the different articles reflect a strong concern with the dynamics of unlikely connectivities, yet move past the mere assessment of their historical relevance, but instead astutely investigate their structuring influences. The contributions show how global historical research perspectives succeed in scrutinizing and going beyond the—by now seemingly self-evident—premises that many perceive to be this fields' main contribution: the identification of webs of interlinkages and causations.

Taken together, we hope that the reader gains a concrete idea of the common threads that characterize our understanding and practice of global history in this project, despite the many different employed methodologies, concerns, or points of view in the published articles.

This edition again includes a number of book reviews surveying the latest research in a variety of global historical fields. The issue is completed by five insightful conference reviews, intended to encourage fellow students to use the chances of participating in, or organizing such events—as well as giving proof of the already delightfully high degree of existing activities. Lastly, two museum exhibition reviews give glimpses of how 'global histories' currently play out in European publics.

The first research article of this volume is Joseph A.B. Jackson-Eade's *The Slave-Interpreter System in the Fifteenth-Century Atlantic World*, which analyzes the structures shaping the linguistic mediation on which Iberian imperial expansion into the Atlantic Ocean had to rely. The article focuses on the specific case of captive go-betweens and underlying tensions that shaped their relationships with the Iberians.

In the second article of this edition, Burak Muhammet Nuri Gücin's *A Late Ottoman Expression of Modernity: Prince Said Halim Pasha's Enterprise of Muslim Political Agency*, the author explores the statesman's proposals for an Islamic political order that should meet the challenges that modernization posed to the Ottoman Empire. This body politic would, on the one hand, specifically, distinguish itself from the West, yet also incorporate its influences in political thinking.

Sara Legrandjacques' article, *Global Students? The International Mobility and Identity of Students from Colonial India and Indochina, 1880s–1945*, explores the connections between increasing student mobility and identity construction in colonized Asian countries. At the same time, these 'colonial students' were driven by individual professional and collective political goals or religious motives. Legrandjacques highlights the contradictory effects of their experiences.

Tobias Sæther and Lennart Visser's *Business in Uncertainty and War: Trust and Risk for Siemens in Harbin and Vladivostok, 1914–1923* reconsiders the existing historiography on the First World War as a rupture to early globalization. Their analysis shows how the war shaped the trajectory of the German corporation's activities in the Tsarist Russian Far East, but hardly marked its end. Instead, the war gave way to altered, decentered, but still intense global orientations.

In the fifth article, *'A New Head—A New Way of Living': The Sixties' New Man*, Daniel H. Marshall posits that young activists of the post-war generation developed the 'New Man' as a historical agent to negotiate the cataclysmic changes of the first half of the 20th century. This radical new subject dialectically rejected the past and embraced the possibilities of the future, while their contemporary capacities as agents for change seemed stifled by the politically powerful.

The sixth article of this edition is Chaeri Lee's *The High Dam at Aswan: History Building on the Precipice* that historicizes the narrativization of the Egyptian dam as a clash between tradition and modernity. The parallel scrutiny of the Egyptian state's and UNESCO's rhetoric in their public presentations of the project reveals striking similarities in their rationalizations, together facilitating institutional amnesia of the human costs incurred by the local Nubian communities.

The next article is Holle Ameriga Meding's *The Día de los Mártires—Spontaneous Demonstration, Heroic Myth, or Political Instrument? The 1964 Panamanian Flag Riots in the History of US-Panamanian Relations*. Meding recapitulates the far-reaching consequences that the Panama Canal meant to these relations, highlighting the tensions that erupted in the 1964 riots, and succinctly clarifies the complex processes of polarization emerging form this shared history.

Finally, the eighth article, *The Europeanization of the Italian Migration Regime: Historicizing its Prerequisites, Development, and Transfer from the 'Oil Shock' to the Mediterranean 'Migration Crisis'* by Mathias Hatleskog Tjønn, illuminates the processes that let the current state of affairs emerge. Tjønn presents today's regime as the result of complex, sometimes circular pressures but also as the surprising outcome of unforeseen circumstances of immigration to Europe.

In addition to the research articles, we have reviewed recently six published books of interest to global history students. Anne-Marie Harrison opens this section with an insightful reading of *Barracoon: The Story of the Last 'Black Cargo'*

by Zora Neal Hurston as an urgent source for the study of the US-American empire.

Her review is followed by Philipp Kandler's of *Sovereign Emergencies: Latin America and the Making of Global Human Rights Politics* by Patrick Kelly, another contribution to the growing body of literature revisiting the history of human rights.

Charlotte Sophie Kohrs' review of the multifaceted volume *Officially Indian: Symbols that Define the United States* by Cécile R. Ganteaume highlights the relevance of cultural references to Native Americans for the historical identity of the United States.

Heike Bauer's *The Hirschfeld Archives: Violence, Death, and Modern Queer Culture,* examining these negative, but formative experiences through the lens of the influential sexologist's work and his reception, is reviewed by Ben Miller.

Paul Sprute read Odd Arne Westad's *The Cold War: A World History*, praising it as an important alternative 'grand narrative' of the Cold War that underlines the repercussions of conflicts around the globe on the US-Soviet competition.

This section is closed by David Yee's review of Jocelyn Olcott's *International Women's Year: The Greatest Consciousness-Raising Event in History*, taking a conference in Beirut as lens to examining international diplomacy and social movements in a Cold War context.

We continue this fall edition of our journal with reports from the relevant student conferences having taken place in the field over the past months. In fact, it is highly encouraging to see student-organized and -run conferences disseminate as they offer unique opportunities for academic exchange to student researchers.

First of all, Marjolein de Raat reports from the first *Transcultural Studies Student Conference* organized by the student body of the homonymous M.A. program in at Universität Heidelberg, whose members have regularly contributed to our own student projects in the past.

Sandra Alsén and Charlotte Sophie Kohrs review this year's third edition of the highly successful *World History Student Conference* at King's College, London.

Alexandra Holmes offers an insight into a unique conference organized by members of the International Students of History Association: *HYPE*, the *History and Physics Experience* brought together students of both disciplines in Bologna to exchange their peculiar perspectives on the history of nuclearity.

Reeti Basu has reviewed the fourth edition of our very own *Global History Student Conference* where Joseph A.B. Jackson-Eade and Sara Legrandjacques already presented the research on which their articles in this edition of our journal are based.

Lastly, Lea Kröner has visited the *Global History Student Conference Istanbul* at Şehir Üniversitesi, reporting from another premiere in this year's series of student conferences.

We close this issue of our journal with two reviews of museum exhibitions that both inquire the importance of positionality in art. On the one hand, Anna Victoria Breidenbach refelcts on a central social category of belonging in her review of the exhibition *Motherland in Art* at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Krakow. Paul Sprute has reviewed the exhibition *Hello World: Revising a Collection* in Museum Hamburger Bahnhof of the Berlin State Museums that fathomed a more integrative and 'cosmopolitan' vision of exhibiting art than currently practiced.

Reflecting on the production of this issue of *Global Histories* over the past months, it was again very gratifying to have such a brilliant an dedicated editorial team contributing to this collaborative project and allowing us to publish this multifaceted edition, while also trying out certain changes in our editorial process. In particular, we have begun to explore recurring and more closely focused journal sections on public history and the methodologies of global history that will be part of future issues.

Over the more than justified praise for our editorial team we should not forget to thank everyone who submitted an article to this edition! Equally, we would like to thank all our published authors for the fruitful collaboration over the past months and sticking with us over possible rougher stretches of way. We also want to apologize for necessarily hard editorial choices that had to be made from time to time.

Looking ahead, this edition of our journal marks a transition as Alina Rodriguez is taking over from Paul Sprute as the editor-in-chief and head of the team organizing the annual Berlin Global History Student Conference. In the editorial team, we have no doubt that Alina will skillfully manage and further develop our student projects, together with our seasoned team members as well as many new students in the M.A. program in Global History here in Berlin.

Amazingly, our student projects already move on to their fifth year of existence in 2019, the call for papers for the first issue of *Global Histories*' next volume is currently open and we are surely looking forward to reviewing a multitude of engaging submissions from all walks of global historical life over the Christmas break.

Enjoy your read!

Your Editorial Team

Acknowledgements

Articles

The Slave-Interpreter System in the Fifteenth-Century Atlantic World

JOSEPH A.B. JACKSON-EADE

Joseph has recently completed his Master's Degree in 'Global Cultures' at the University of Bologna, Italy, after having studied History and Anthropology at University of Lyon II, France. His dissertation is focused on cross-cultural communication in the early phases of the Iberian expansion into the Atlantic and Indian Oceans during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. He has been seeking to understand how the Iberians gained access to interpreters, and which mechanisms determined the relationship between the colonizing Iberians and their interpreters.

This article analyzes the structures the Iberians developed to acquire linguistic mediators during their early imperial expansion into the Atlantic Ocean. It focuses on the specific case of slave-interpreters, indigenous captives that were taught European languages and used as guides and go-betweens during later expeditions to their homelands. Following the diffusion of the slave-interpreter system from the Canary Islands to West Africa and later to the American world, this article underlines the paramount importance of linguistic mediation within the broader Iberian imperial project. Slave-interpreters rapidly became key figures and indispensable for the Iberians' success. However, the Iberians's dependance on these interpreters was also the source of suspicion and wariness. This pushed the Iberian expeditions leaders to constantly re-think their access to linguistic mediators, and their interactions with them. Through an analysis of contemporary sources, this article chronologically follows the evolution of the slave-interpreter system in the Atlantic throughout the fifteenth century. It focuses on the underlying tensions that shaped, and changed the relationship between the Iberians and their slave-interpreters.

Introduction

Although the topic of cross-cultural interaction during the late medieval and early modern Iberian imperial expansion has been widely addressed by generations of historians, the role of oral translation, verbal communication, and the particular figure of the interpreter remains surprisingly peripheral within this historiography.[1]

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[1] Only a handful of monographs directly address the question of interpreters or go-betweens in the fifteenth and sixteenth century Atlantic world. See: Frances Karttunen, *Between Worlds: Interpreters, Guides and Survivors* (New Brunswick: Rudgers University Press, 1994); Icíar Alonso Araguas, *Intérpretes de Indias. La Mediación Lingüística y Cultural en los Viajes de Exploración y Conquista: Antillas, Caribe y Golfo de México (1492–1540)* (Ph.D. diss., Universidad de Salamanca, 2005); Alida C. Metcalf, *Go-Betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1500–1600* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005); Marcos Sarmiento Pérez, *Les Captifs qui Furent Interprètes. La Communication entre Européens, Aborigènes Canariens et Berbères durant la Conquête des Canaries et de l'Afrique du Nord (1341–1569),* trans. Marie Claire Durand Guizou and Jean-Marie Flores (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012). No equivalent research has yet been found for the West African context.

Indeed, when studying the contemporary sources, it appears that interpreters were almost always present during the Iberian[2] expeditions, despite remaining for the most part, anonymous figures whose presence was only implicitly mentioned. Interpreters were used throughout the Iberian imperial expansion and can be found in texts relative to all regions in which Europeans sought to establish a long-term presence; whether in Europe, America, Asia or Africa, linguistic mediators were called upon to facilitate cross-cultural communication, and thus were crucial actors in the establishment of the new, global-scale networks that emerged at the dusk of the medieval era.

When examining the typical interpreter of the early modern era, as a whole, one of the striking characteristics is the diversity of backgrounds and the variety of different profiles of these linguistic mediators. However, among this heterogeneous group of early interpreters, the repeated presence of slaves—whether men, women or children—makes this particular segment of the interpreter population stand out for a number of reasons. First, the slave-interpreters, and the rapidly expanding and complex system they were involved in, seems to have been one of the most widespread and prevalent ways of obtaining linguistic mediators present in almost all sources mentioning interpreters. Second, obtaining such figures was the result of a conscious endeavour by Iberian actors of the expansion, to whom the most efficient way of obtaining intelligence about territories yet to be seize dwas a central concern. By studying the slave-interpreter system and its evolution within a specific geographical and temporal framework, one can understand the reasoning that regulated the Iberians' access to the indispensable figure of the interpreter.

Although the slave-interpreter system can be found throughout the extensive Iberian imperial expansion, this paper will focus primarily on the Atlantic world during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The aim of the paper is therefore to understand how the infrastructures of the slave-interpreter system were first set up, and how they were modified and adapted according to the different contexts that resulted from the progressive integration of the Atlantic space. Following a presentation of the slave-interpreter system, this paper will focus on the evolution of this system throughout the fifteenth century along the coasts of the African and American continents. A comparative analysis of various fifteenth and early sixteenth century sources will reveal how the slave-interpreter system underwent a series of adaptations and critiques with the intention to further guarantee the

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[2] Throughout this paper, although the expeditions mentioned were mostly sponsored by Castilian or Portuguese authorities, I have chosen to use the term Iberian because I believe it translates better the multi-ethnicity of these expeditions. Indeed, as shown a little later (footnote no. 5), these early modern expeditions contained very diverse crews. In addition, because this paper focuses primarily on the linguistic background of the different individuals that came into contact during these expeditions, the political affiliation that tied these expeditions to the central powers of Castile and Portugal is secondary. Therefore, the choice of the term Iberian is here intended to underline the cultural and linguistic porosity within the Portuguese and Castilian expeditions.

efficiency of the Iberians' access to linguistic mediators. Progressing through the sources, it becomes clear that issues regarding the obtaining of interpreters remained a central concern for all these fifteenth century expeditions.

Presentation of the Slave-Interpreter System

In Russell's words, "[t]he slave-interpreter was […] a crucial figure of the fifteenth-century Portuguese maritime expansion."[3] The capturing of slaves was one of the main motives that motivated the first Portuguese and Spanish expeditions into the unknown waters of the Atlantic.[4] Subsequently, the training of these very slaves as interpreters, in order to enable communication between the Iberians and their West African counterparts, also became a common practice and is mentioned in many contemporary travel accounts and chronicles.[5] In this sense, the development of the slave-interpreter system was tightly related to the broader slave trade that burgeoned with Iberian penetration into the Atlantic in the early fifteenth century. Despite the pervasiveness of the practice, sources unfortunately do not provide a conclusive approximation of the number of slave-interpreters employed during this era.

The system was in theory quite simple: after capturing indigenous people of a territory that was yet to be further explored, the expeditions would bring these captives back to Iberia (or to the Iberian settlement they were staying in), baptize them, and get them to learn their language. Once these slaves could speak Castilian, Portuguese, or any other Romance language[6] sufficiently to make themselves

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[3] Russell*,* "Veni, Vidi, Vici: Some Fifteenth-century Eyewitness Accounts of Travel in the African Atlantic before 1492," in *Medieval Ethnographies: European Perceptions of the World Beyond*, ed. Joan-Pau Rubiés (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 127.

[4] Baily Diffie and George Winius, *Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, 1415–1580* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 74–79.

[5] See, for example: Eanes Gomes de Zurara, *Chronique de Guinée*, trans. Léon Bourdon, ed. Jacques Paviot (Paris: Chandeigne, 1994 [1453]); Alvise Ca'da Mosto, *Voyages en Afrique noire d'Alvise Ca'da Mosto (1455–1456)*, trans. and ed. Frédérique Verrier (Paris: Chandeigne, 2003).

[6] In many of the sources examined, the multi-ethnicity of the Iberian expeditions is evident. Indeed, although these expeditions were supervised by the Iberian crowns, usually Castile and Portugal, the crews comprised of men from all over the Mediterranean basin, and in some cases even outside of it. For example, the Castilian expedition that reached the Caribbean in 1492 was led by a Genoese admiral, counted members from all over the Iberian Peninsula, as well as at least one Irishman and one Englishman. See: Christopher Columbus, *The Voyages of Christopher Columbus: The Story of the Discovery of America, as Told by the Discoverer*, trans. Marc Navarrete (New York: United States Catholic Historical Society, 1892), 14. The multi-ethnic characteristic of these expeditions necessitated their members to agree upon a common language in order to communicate; however, it is difficult to tell in what language these crewmembers communicated. It is plausible that the *lingua franca* on these ships was the language of the majority of the men, such as Portuguese, Castilian, and other Iberian languages. Nevertheless, multilingualism was a characteristic of the Mediterranean world, and a range of Romance languages, loosely used, provided a common tongue to many of these men. See: Eric Dursteler, "Speaking in Tongues: Language and Communication in the Early Modern Mediterranean," *Past and Present* 217 (2012): 47–77. In addition, since the

understood, they were sent on a new expedition back to their respective homelands. There, they would be used as guides and interpreters, and act as go-betweens with the indigenous populations that they supposedly belonged to. Indeed, the Iberians were not always assured that their guide-interpreters would be welcomed by the societies to which they were being sent as scouts. For instance, Venetian merchant Alvise Ca'da Mosto explains how during his first voyage to Senegambia in 1455, the expedition's guide-interpreter was brutally torn to pieces by the people he had been sent to meet up with as he reached the shore. Shocked, Mosto questioned himself as to how they could "do such a thing to a person of their own race."[7] While this episode was probably meant to underline the violence and dangers inherent to such adventures, it also shows how many Iberian explorers either did not know much about, or care for, the precise origin of their interpreters. Interpreters were therefore sometimes confronted by a hostile population against which they had little means of defending themselves.

The first example of the establishment of the slave-interpreter system within the Iberian Atlantic expansion can be found in the Canary Islands. Although the interactions between Iberian expeditions and the inhabitants of the archipelago seem to have been relatively peaceful throughout most of the fourteenth century, a series of violent raids were initiated in 1393 by the Iberian merchants. This led to the first acquisition of Canarian slaves, and the subsequent establishment of a structured slave-interpreter system. Among this first generation of slaves were Afonso and Isabel from the island of Lanzarote, and Pedro from Gran Canaria. After having been baptized and spending nine years in Spain, they were recruited in 1402 by Jean de Béthencourt, a Norman captain in the service of the Castilian crown. They served as the interpreters of the first successful expedition in the conquest of Canary Islands.[8] According to Marcos Sarmientos Perez, a pioneering researcher on the role of indigenous interpreters in the Spanish conquest of the Canaries, "the kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula used the Canary Archipelago as a testing ground for their later conquests and colonization in the Americas."[9] However, before reaching the Western shores of the Atlantic, the Iberians built upon their experience in Occidental Africa to perfect the practice of using linguistic mediators.

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thirteenth century, a language known as 'Sapir' or 'Lingua Franca,' which survived until the nineteenth century (a dictionary was published in 1840), enabled people from all shores of the Mediterranean to linguistically interact. This pidgin language, based on a Romance structure, was profoundly influenced by its borrowings from Arabic, Greek, Turkish, and Slavonic. See: Jocelyn Dakhlia, "La Langue Franque Mediterranéenne," *Les Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques* 42 (2008): 133–147. It is therefore not excluded that in some cases, such as the Arabic slave that served on Antão Gonçalves' expedition to the Atlantic coasts of the Sahara in 1441, actors could rely on this language to communicate.

[7] Jeanne Hein, "Africans on the Searoute to India," *Terra Incognitae* 25, no. 1 (1993): 44.

[8] Marcos Sarmiento-Perez, "The Role of Interpreters in the Conquest and Acculturation of the Canary Archipelago," *Interpreting* 13, no. 2 (2011): 159–160.

[9] Sarmiento-Perez, "The Role of Interpreters," 172.

Developed in the Canary Islands during the early fifteenth century, the slave-interpreter system was once again called upon by Iberian expeditions, which were progressively reaching new territories south of Cape Bojador. Indeed, texts produced by European authors such as Portuguese chronicler Gomes Eanes de Zurara's *Chronicle of the Discovery of Guinea* reveal how the slave-interpreter system manifested itself in West Africa as the first contact between Europeans and Sub-Saharan Africans took place. In this work published in 1453, the author retraces the first two decades of the Portuguese expeditions to the coasts of West Africa. During Captains Nuño Tristão and Antão Gonçalves' first expedition to the region of the Rio do Oro in 1441, in present-day Western Sahara, the Portuguese fleet successfully captured a total of ten men, women, and children. These people were members of the Azenegue tribal society, and one of them, Adahu, was presented by Zurara as "holding the pre-eminence of nobility over the other [captives]."[10] In addition to this superior status, Adahu was the only captive able to speak Arabic, a language that was at the time well known and in some cases spoken by foreign communities in Portugal and in some cases Portuguese themselves.[11] This can be seen during that very expedition: among his men, Captain Tristão had an 'alarve'[12] under his orders. This Arabic speaker could therefore speak with Adahu and serve as interpreter for the Portuguese expedition's leaders.[13] With the presence of Arabic speakers such as Adahu along the hitherto unknown territories south of Cape Bojador, the Portuguese were guaranteed the presence of Arabic as a *medium* language between them and the societies of these coveted lands. Adahu and his fellow countrymen were brought back to Portugal, where he was presented to the court. There, he defended his case and argued for his liberation along with two other young men he presented as members of the Azenegue aristocracy. In exchange, he delivered to the Portuguese important information regarding inland trade routes. In addition, he assured to the Portuguese authorities that their liberation would guarantee them the acquisition of "five or six black Moors" each.[14]

The implications of such a deal were twofold. Firstly, ten slaves were worth more than three, both on the economic as well as the spiritual level: as put by Zurara himself, "it was better to save ten souls than three—for though they were black, yet had they souls like other [sic]."[15] Secondly, and more central for our present discussion, these "blacks could give news of land much further distant," especially since Adahu willingly proposed himself as interpreter for the

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[10] Zurara, *Chronique de Guinée*, 68.

[11] Ibid., 69–70.

[12] 'Alarve' is most probably an archaic form of the word 'Árabe.' It can therefore be assumed that this man was probably a slave captured on the Moroccan front, in which the Portuguese were engaged. See: Ibid., 293.

[13] Ibid., 67.

[14] Ibid., 76.

[15] Eanes Gomes de Zurara, *The Chronicle of the Discovery and Conquest of Guinea*, trans. Charles Raymond and Edgard Prestage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 55.

Portuguese, promising that "when he spoke about the traffic with the natives, he would find means to learn as much news as possible."[16] Eventually, in 1443, Captain Gonçalves returned to the Rio do Oro region, where Adahu had first been captured.[17] This time they were accompanied by an alfaqueque, an Iberian official that traditionally was used to negotiate ransom and the exchange of hostages on the Iberian frontier during the last centuries of the Reconquista.[18] In this context, calling upon an alfaqueque underlines how the progressive expansion along the unknown African continent was perceived more as a continuity in the long process of the Reconquista than an abrupt rupture with the past and the entry into a new era.[19] As they reached the coast, Adahu seized his chance to escape from the Portuguese, which would prove successful.[20] Although they were assured good quality communication thanks to the presence of two linguistic mediators—Adahu and the anonymous alfaqueque—the Portuguese did remain highly dependent upon external agents. There was therefore a paradoxical tension: on the one hand, the Iberians constrained to rely on mediators closely tied to foreign societies, manifest by their linguistic and cultural knowledge of them in order to establish complex communication with the societies of West Africa. On the other hand, this situation also contained the risk of these slave-interpreters taking advantage of their position and favouring their personal interests over that of their masters or employers.[21]

Adahu might not represent the *stricto sensu* definition of the slave-interpreter. Indeed, no information is given by Zurara regarding his proficiency in Portuguese by the end of his three-year stay, so it is impossible to tell if he could directly address the Portuguese in their own language. As a result, nothing is known of his capacity to serve as interpreter between the Portuguese captains and the Azenegue populations. However, this example does perfectly illustrate the fundamental

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[16] Zurara, *The Chronicle of the Discovery*, 55.

[17] Zurara, *Chronique de Guinée*, 76.

[18] James Brodman, "Municipal Ransoming Law on the Medieval Spanish Frontier," *Speculum* 60, no. 2 (1985): 324–330. The alfaqueques were professional interpreters and negotiators who acquired an increasingly influential role across the Iberian Reconquista frontier in the late medieval era. Coming from the Arabic word *al-fakkâk* meaning "redeemer", the function was given a legal framework during the thirteenth century in Castile, as part of the *Siete Partidas* legal corpus. The crown of Castile indeed created the *Alfaqueque Mayor* office, in charge of overseeing the Castilo-Nasrid cross-frontier relations, particularly regarding the ransoming and exchange of captives. These negotiators could easily pass from one side of the frontier to the other, and were legally protected to do so. Their function as negotiator implied that they were multi-lingual, in both Arabic and Romance languages, and had a good knowledge of the situation on each side of the frontier. In exchange for their services, and in case of a successful exchange, the alfaqueques were rewarded by rerceiving a commission from the total ransom.

[19] Kenneth Baxter Wolf, "The 'Moors' of West Africa and the Beginning of the Portuguese Slave Trade," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 24, no. 3 (1994): 449–469.

[20] Zurara, *Chronique de Guinée*, 76.

[21] Joseph Jackson-Eade, "The Role of Interpreters during the Early Portuguese Presence in East Africa," *Eastern African Literary and Cultural Studies* (2018): 1–25.

logics of the slave-interpreter system: the freshly captured individuals, once they could make themselves understood (in this case this was almost immediate because Adahu was fluent in Arabic), were questioned by the Portuguese authorities in order for them to obtain as much information as possible on the lands they had reached. Once this first step was accomplished, the captives were sent back to the lands in which they had been captured with the objective of using them as linguistic and cultural mediators in order to establish communication with the local populations. The final objective of this was to successfully reach more distant lands in which the process would start again.

A Rapid Structuration of the Slave-Interpreter System

Following the first contact between West African populations and Portuguese expeditions in the late 1430s and throughout the 1440s, the study of the contemporary sources reveals a 'rationalisation' of the slave-interpreter system. As he participated in two Portuguese expeditions to the Senegambia region in 1455 and 1456, the Venetian merchant Alvise Ca'da Mosto directly witnessed the slave-interpreter system in action and left a rich account as he returned to Portugal. In his account, Mosto explicitly explains the central role of the interpreters in the unfolding of expeditions, underlining the dependence of the Portuguese on these guides and mediators. In fact, he even explains that it was the absence of interpreters that brought his second expedition up the River Gambia to an end.[22] But what is new in Ca'da Mosto's account is that he gives more information on the relationship between the slave-interpreters and their superiors, as well as the everyday functioning of the system. By the time Ca'da Mosto sailed to West Africa, the slaves who eventually became interpreters were no longer seized during raids, but were actually acquired "legally" in the African slave markets.[23] Indeed, following the first expeditions to West Africa, the Portuguese authorities became increasingly concerned that the aggressive slave raids they were leading would compromise future trade arrangements and political alliances with their African counterparts. Consequently, as soon as 1448, a first attempt to limit the raids on the coast of West Africa by Portuguese expeditions was initiated by the crown.[24] Although Ca'da Mosto's testimony in no way proves that raiding had been entirely given up as a source in the acquisition of slaves, it does reveal that alternative means of obtaining enslaved populations were rapidly forming in the direct aftermath of first contact.

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[22] Russell, "Veni, Vidi, Vici," 126.
[23] Joan Fayer, "African Interpreters in the Atlantic Slave Trade," *Anthropological Linguistics* 45, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 281.
[24] Jeanne Hein, "Portuguese Communication with Africans on the Searoute to India," *Terra Icognitae* 25, no. 1 (1993): 45.

As presented by Ca'da Mosto, slave-interpreters appear to be central actors in the slave trade itself. The consequence of this is that they were given a specific position in the social ecosystem of these early expeditions: although they remained slaves, they could benefit from their linguistic skills and position as necessary go-betweens to experience a closer proximity to decision-making circles, and access to better living conditions than their peers. Indeed, their participation in the trade guaranteed them a rather privileged treatment. Their linguistic skills were highly sought-after, directly influencing their value in the slave market, which could be up to five times higher than 'regular' captives.[25] In addition, a market for the renting of the services of these slave-interpreters rapidly developed in West Africa.[26] In some cases, after sustained collaboration as brokers in the slave trade, slave-interpreters could actually obtain manumission, voluntary disenfranchisement by their masters, as a reward for their services.[27] Eventually, after their liberation, these interpreters could in turn become slave masters themselves.[28] In this way slave-interpreters could put the social and cultural capital that their bi-lingualism represented to good use and pursue upward social mobility.

From an early stage, the Portuguese crown sought to supervise and regulate the collection of interpreters and guides in order not to impede future interactions with West African authorities. As a consequence, obtaining slave-interpreters after the 1450s increasingly took part within the expanding legal slave trade. In addition to this evolution, regulations regarding the treatment of these interpreters were being implemented, inspired by the common practices that had been established during the first years of contact between Iberian and African traders and described by Ca'da Mosto.

The progressive re-structuring of the slave-interpreter system is the first indication of the general movement towards a rationalization of the position of interpreters inside the Iberian colonial expansion. By the beginning of the sixteenth

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[25] In the specific case of mid-fifteenth century Afro-Portuguese interactions, sources do not give any precise example of the particular actions of these slave-interpreters. However, other posterior texts do give rich accounts of such actions. In most cases, these are indirect testimonies, such as in chronicles. See: Bernal Diaz del Castillo, *The Conquest of New Spain*, trans. John Cohen (London: Penguin Books, 1963), specifically the cases of the Mayan-Nahuatl-Castilian tandem Doña Marina—or Malintzin—and Jeronimo de Aguilar. In these chronicles, interpreters are shown in a close proximity to the leading figures of these expeditions; they were often consulted, and sometimes even took the initiative of making decisions in the name of their masters. In one exceptional case, an anonymous account in the first person of an interpreter gives a rich insight into the intimate thoughts and impressions of an interpreter during a diplomatic mission. See: Anonymous, *Voyage dans les deltas du Gange et de l'Irraouaddy, 1521*, trans. and ed. Geneviève Bouchon and Luis F. F. R. Thomaz (Paris: Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, 1988).

[26] Hein, "Portuguese Communication," 45.

[27] Trevor Hall, *Before Middle Passage: Translated Portuguese Manuscripts of Atlantic Slave Trading from West Africa to Iberian Territories, 1513–1526* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 247.

[28] A. C. de C. M. Saunders, *A Social History of Black Slaves and Freedmen in Portugal, 1441–1555* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 62.

century, Iberian authorities went a step further in the control of their interpreters by creating government offices dedicated to the practice. For example, in the Canaries a new legal framework sanctioned the institutionalization of the process of obtaining slave-interpreters from the African mainland. With the establishment of the *concierto de lengua* (which Sarmiento Pérez translates as "language agreement") the guide-interpreter's activities were taken under state consideration. The intention here was primarily to give a more precise framework to the legal issues within the procurement, selling, and the manumission of slaves.[29] A similar evolution can be noted in the Portuguese context, where the *Lingoa do Estado* office was opened in Goa in 1510, only a decade after the Portuguese had reached the coasts of continental India.[30] Similar measures were later taken by Spanish authorities in America by 1529[31]

The Place of Linguistic Communication in Iberian Imperial Projects

Many of the authors involved in the early Iberian presence in West Africa were eager to underline the royal implication in the creation of the slave-interpreter system, and the crown's dedication to the matters of knowledge-gathering in relation to the process of their imperial expansion. Indeed, the more or less evident role of the royal authorities in the establishment and the promotion of the slave-interpreter system is a point these sources have in common. Describing the preparation of Captain Afonso Gonçalves Baldaia's first expedition to the unknown lands south of the much-dreaded Cape Bojador in 1536, Zurara attributes the following words to Dom Henrique himself, son of King João I and main architect of the early imperial Portuguese expansion, giving his last recommendations to his captain: "I order you to go as far as you can to try to take an interpreter from among these people. Surely you know that seizing someone through whom we can become familiar with this land would in no small way carry out my aspirations."[32] According to Zurara, this royal order was subsequently repeated many times, to Diogo Gomes de Sintra in 1438[33] and Lançarote de Freitas six year later.[34] A decade later, Alvise Ca'da Mosto speaks of almost identical recommendations given by Dom Henrique to the expedition in which he was participating and that was heading for the Gambia river region. The Infante had requested that the expedition collect information about West Africa's geography, political organization, and trade

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[29] Sarmiento-Perez, "The Role of Interpreters," 168.
[30] Jorge Flores, "Le 'Lingua' Cosmopolite: Le Monde Social des Interprètes Hindou de Goa au XVIIe siècle," in *Cosmopolitanism en Asie du Sud: Sources, Itinéraires, Langues (XVIe-XVIIIe siècles)*, ed. Corinne Lefèvre, Ines Zupanov, and Jorge Flores (Paris: Editions EHESS, 2015), 234.
[31] Alonso-Araguas, *Intérpretes da India*, 178.
[32] Hein, "Portuguese Communication," 42.
[33] Zurara, *Chronique de Guinée*, 292.
[34] Ibid., 83–84.

routes, by sailing up the river Gambia[35]. These different testimonies reveal the almost systematic mandate delivered to these early expeditions by the Portuguese authorities, underlining the latters' concern for the collecting of information about the West African world.

Both Ca'da Mosto and Zurara are clearly presenting the establishment of the slave-interpreter system as a top-down initiative. Dom Henrique, while still in the very first stages of his Atlantic expansion, seems to be fully aware of the importance of obtaining interpreters to rapidly establish oral communication and therefore develop trade and diplomatic relations with the societies and states the Portuguese were expecting to encounter along the African coast and interior. But this policy survived the death of the Infante in 1460, and an anonymous account of 1463 reads that a man was captured along the river Senegal because "this was commanded by the king of Portugal [João II (r.1460–1495)] that from the last land discovered they should take some to Portugal to learn the language."[36] In some cases, the crown even got personally involved in matters regarding interpreters. In 1477, a Guinean slave-interpreter by the name of João Garrido was freed by João II as a reward for his active participation in the development of the Luso-African trade.[37] Garrido's case is interesting because it underlines two aspects of the relationship interpreters had with the Iberian ruling authorities. On the one hand, it illustrates the importance of such figures in the eyes of the Crown, perceived as crucial actors in the successful unfolding of these early exploratory expeditions. On the other hand, it also shows us that the establishment of a legal framework exposed by Ca'da Mosto was not fully and efficiently implemented. Indeed, the fact that the king had to personally intervene shows that Garrido's solicitation of the lower layers of the Portuguese colonial administration had been fruitless. The intervention of the king possibly hides the previous abuses Garrido had been a victim of, in which none of the privileges his position as an interpreter should have guaranteed him, was respected.

The previous examples show the implication of the Portuguese crown in efficiently obtaining interpreters and informers during the early expeditions to West Africa. In both Zurara and Ca'da Mosto's accounts, the authors present Dom Henrique as an active promoter of the slave-interpreter system. Dom Henrique, in both sources, appears to place the possession of linguistic mediators to be of paramount importance in the successful evolution of the exploration expeditions he was sponsoring. Consequently, Zurara, Dom Henrique's official chronicler, portrays him as a fine strategist by placing linguistic mediation at the centre of Henrique's concerns. Indeed, by insisting on the rapid establishment of means of

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[35] Russell, "Veni, Vidi, Vici," 316–317.
[36] Hein, "Portuguese Communication," 45.
[37] Diogo Curto, "*Portuguese Colonial and Imperial Culture*," in *Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400–1800,* ed. Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Curto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 316–317.

communication, and by encouraging his expeditions to obtain informed guides and interpreters, Zurara constructs the image of a leader who, from an early stage, was already looking at facilitating diplomatic negotiations and alliances with newly encountered societies and territories. By stressing Dom Henrique's concern about obtaining interpreters, Zurara presented the Portuguese ruler in a positive light. By putting political and military strategy at the centre of Dom Henrique's orders, Zurara was able to avoid mentioning other motivations for the Portuguese to capture indigenous African populations; for example, the accumulation of wealth through the slave trade, or more symbolically the personal glory that was obtained by the participation into a successful expedition.

The Transfer of the Slave-Interpreter System to the American Continent.

As this study has examined, the slave-interpreter system rapidly became a prevalent practice employed by Iberian expeditions along the West African coast. By the mid-fifteenth century, the Spaniards and the Portuguese had developed an efficient system that enabled them to access the service of bilingual individuals that served as indispensable cultural mediators with their agents. This system flourished, despite practical concerns expressed by Russell, for "depending on conscripted slave-interpreters ought to have been a very ineffective way of securing trustworthy intelligence…for linguistic, conceptual and psychological reasons;"[38] nevertheless, the successive Iberian expeditions in the Atlantic continued to rely on such a system. Decades after the beginning of sustained contact between Iberians and the populations south of the Cape Bojador, Columbus' successful crossing of the Atlantic initiated a new phase in Iberia's early modern cross-cultural encounters. Focusing on Columbus' rich testimonies of his first expeditions to the Caribbean enables us to analyze the modalities in which the slave-interpreter system was transferred to the American world. Columbus is in fact a particularly interesting source of information regarding the slave-interpreter system because he actually visited West Africa during the 1480s.

As he reached the Caribbean Islands in October 1492, communication was apparently a central concern for the Genoese admiral. Throughout his journal of his first voyage, Columbus repeatedly refers to the Taino captives he had made, and his intentions regarding their future use in his mission to probe the newly found lands he had stumbled upon. On October 14th, 1492, two days after his arrival in the Caribbean, Columbus writes that he ordered that the seven Taino prisoners they had captured should return to Spain with Columbus so "that they might learn our language, and serve as interpreters."[39] When he eventually did

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[38] Russell, "Veni, Vedi, Vici," 327.
[39] Christopher Columbus, *The Voyages of Christopher Columbus: The Story of the Discovery of America, as Told by the Discoverer*, trans. Marc Navarrete (New York: United States Catholic Historical Society, 1892), 38–39.

return to Iberia in the spring of 1493, Columbus wrote a letter to the Spanish crown informing them of his discovery, in which he stated: "on my arrival at that sea [of Cuba], I had taken some Indians by force from the first island that I came to, in order that they might learn our language, and communicate to us what they knew respecting the country; which succeeded excellently, and was a great advantage to us, for in a short time, either by gestures and signs, or by word, we were enabled to understand each other."[40] Almost exactly a month after they had first set foot on the islands of the Caribbean, Columbus mentioned once again the capturing of indigenous people for the sake of obtaining future guides and interpreters. He writes that "[on Sunday, November 11th, 1492,] a canoe came to the ship with six young men, five of them came on board, whom I ordered to be detained, and have them with me."[41] With these examples, it is obvious that Columbus immediately sought to recreate the slave-interpreter system in these newly reached territories.

Following the example of Columbus, contemporary Iberian expedition leaders reproduced such a pattern. During the first expedition to Yucatán, led by Captain Francisco Hernandez de Córdoba in 1517, Bernal Díaz del Castillo, a young soldier who participated in the mission and who eventually wrote the famous *Historia Verdadera de la Conquista de la Nueva España*, gives us an explicit example how the slave-interpreter system functioned in America. The chronicler explains how in the coastal town of Champotón, two men were captured from among the indigenous population.[42] Brought back to Cuba and baptized as Julian and Melchor, they learned Spanish during their captivity and participated as interpreters in the following expedition to Yucatán led by Captain Grijalva (1518). The following year, Melchor once again returned to Yucatán as an interpreter, this time in the service of Cortés. However, by that time, "his companion [Julian] was dead."[43] Both Columbus and Cortés relied on the slave-interpreter system as they reached lands that they wished to further investigate, with the ultimate goal of establishing the hegemony of the Spanish crown. These examples therefore further confirm the success of this way of obtaining linguistic mediators during the process of imperial expansion. Tested in the Canaries and then in West Africa over the past century, the slave-interpreter system had proved sufficiently effective to be transferred to the opposite side of the Atlantic Ocean.

The Evolution of the Slave-Interpreter System

Columbus, Cortés, and many others relied on a system that had been tried and tested throughout the Iberian imperial expansion in the Atlantic since the closing

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[40] Columbus, *The Voyages*, 10.
[41] Ibid., 66.
[42] Bernal Diaz del Castillo, *The Conquest of New Spain*, trans. John Cohen (London: Penguin Books, 1963), 20.
[43] Ibid., 58.

years of the fourteenth century. However, the system was by no means rigid or strictly defined. On the contrary, comparing texts of different moments, such as Zurara [1453] and Columbus [1492] actually reveals that the slave-interpreter system was rearranged, adapted, and moulded according to specific contexts and past experiences. As he reached the region of the Rio del Sol in the Island of Cuba in November 1492, Columbus explicitly refers to his experience in West Africa. Having captured five young men, the admiral ordered his own men to go ashore and search the houses for more captives.[44] Eventually, seven women and three children were seized and brought to the ship.[45] Although the motivations of such an attitude could have been solely pecuniary, Columbus gives another explanation as to why he insisted on capturing entire families. According to the admiral, it was common that "when the Portuguese carried the natives from Guinea to Portugal for the purpose of learning their language [and then] returned with them to Guinea, [the natives] have gone among their own people and never appeared again."[46] This was apparently the case even though these captives had benefited from "the good treatment that [the Portuguese] had showed [sic] them, and the presents they had given them."[47] Here, Columbus presented the early slave-interpreter system as only partially achieved. The privileged treatment that these captives benefited from, underlined by Ca'da Mosto, seems to have not fully guaranteed the collaboration of these very captives.

The trustworthiness of the slave-interpreters was indeed a central concern for the Iberians. For instance, authors as far back as Zurara, had already addressed this problem. This can be seen in the following episode: in 1444, Captain Sintra was leading an expedition to the island of Naar, accompanied by a young indigenous boy who had been captured and trained as an interpreter during his stay in Portugal, to the point that "he spoke our language [Portuguese] very well."[48] According to the chronicler, as the expedition reached the island, the young boy escaped and rushed to warn the local inhabitants.[49] Trapped in an ambush, the expedition met a disastrous end from Zurara's perspective as Sintra and eight of his men were killed.[50] Knowing about such complications, Columbus in another passage of his journal actually expressed his doubts regarding the fidelity of his interpreters: commenting on his relationship with the captives that were on board, Columbus writes that "while the Indians I have on-board with me I very often understand to say one thing when they mean the opposite nor do I trust them too far as they have made various attempts to escape."[51]

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[44] Columbus, *The Voyages*, 66.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Zurara, *Chronique de Guinée*, 99.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid., 99–102.
[51] Columbus, *The Voyages*, 80.

To counter such issues, it appears through Columbus' comments that solutions had been developed on the African coasts, and that he intended to apply them to the new American context he was confronting. By capturing not only men, but also women and children, Columbus was indeed seeking to create a less stressful and more reassuring context for his indigenous captives destined to be sent to Europe. In his own words, the capturing of the seven women and three children was done "so that the Indians might bear their captivity better with their company."[52] Capturing entire families was seen as a way of watering down the shock of captivity, and even inciting the slave-interpreters to collaborate. Eventually, the early modern Europeans that set out to obtain new interpreters came to favour younger slave-interpreters, and in some cases, even children. This can be understood when focusing on the conditions of language learning itself, and the development of affective ties on the side of the interpreter; if done at a young age, extracting children from their cultural and linguistic background while still in their language-learning process rapidly produced bi-lingual individuals.[53] What is more, relying on children or teenagers presented other advantages influencing the relationship of the Iberians with their interpreters. Indeed, if uprooted from a young age from their home, these future interpreters would only have a limited insertion into the socio-political patterns of their society. This presented an immediate advantage for the Iberians: if captured as children, interpreters were less likely to have personal interests in serving one side or the other as they returned to their homeland, because they would not have had any particular position in the social and political hierarchy, and in any case, would not have been able to maintain it (or have it maintained for them) once they had been captured and sent to Europe. In fact, in some cases, it was believed that capturing their future interpreters at a young age would actually create a strong and long-lasting bond, and a certain loyalty towards their "masters," a central aspect the Iberians wished for in their relationship with their interpreters.[54]

Towards the Theoretical End of the Slave-Interpreter System

Following the first remark made by Columbus regarding the fidelity of the interpreters, the admiral went along in his analysis of the slave-interpreter system and proposed yet another solution. Columbus writes that "[O]thers have done differently, and by keeping their wives, have assured themselves of their possession. Besides, these women will be a great help to us in acquiring their

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[52] Columbus, *The Voyages*, 66.
[53] Mary Louise Pratt, "Language and Afterlives of Empire," *PMLA* 130, no. 2 (2015): 352.
[54] Marie Christine Gomez-Géraud, "La Figure de l'Interprète dans quelques Récits de Voyage Français à la Renaissance," in *Voyager à la renaissance,* ed. Jean Céard and Jean-Christophe Margolin (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1987), 322.

language."[55] Paradoxically, while this appears to bring yet another component to the slave-interpreter system, it also suggests the very end of this system by proposing an alternative. Indeed, what Columbus is saying here is that the female captives from these lands were taken as wives and concubines by the Europeans not only to resolve the issues regarding the lack of women in the Iberian camps, but also because they would enable a rapid learning of the local languages. By taking these women as concubines, the men who participated in these expeditions were greatly increasing their cultural confrontation to the indigenous practices and languages, an exposure that automatically produced a favourable context for the process of language learning. This is once again repeated by the admiral, as he writes that "I shall have this language learned by the people of my household [personas de mi Casa]."[56] In a very similar fashion, Amerigo Vespucci, who travelled to America around the same time as Columbus, also defended the idea of learning the languages of the people he encountered. In the letter he wrote in 1504 retracing all four of his voyages, the Florentine navigator mentioned that during his third expedition to America (1501–2) on behalf of Manuel I of Portugal, as his expedition sailed south of the Cape Saint Augustine in present-day Brazil, they "decided to take a couple of men from this place to teach us their language, and three volunteered to come with us to Portugal."[57]

In both these cases, the two Italian navigators did not encourage the continuation of the slave-interpreter system, but rather called for its end, while paradoxically resting on similar underlying logics of displacement and coercion of indigenous populations. The slave-interpreter system was based on the idea that the captives that were taken in Africa and the Caribbean would eventually learn to speak an Iberian idiom and serve as linguistic mediators. But in this new configuration presented by Vespucci and Columbus, the captives would not serve as interpreters (although nothing suggests that they would not eventually be used as so), but rather as teachers. Both Columbus and Vespucci saw their captives not as direct go-betweens, but instead as the owners of a valuable linguistic and cultural capital, which in the hands of European colonists could drastically improve the quality of communication and have a positive influence on European expansion in the region.

It is interesting to note here that Vespucci and Columbus' proposition regarding the learning of American languages directly by European expeditions differs quite drastically from the approach the Europeans in West Africa developed. This had much to do with the linguistic context on both sides of the Atlantic, and on respective regional particularities. By the time Columbus and Vespucci reached the Caribbean and the American mainland, Iberian expeditions had been reaching

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[55] Columbus, *The Voyages*, 66.
[56] Ibid., 80.
[57] Amerigo Vespucci, *Letters of the New World: Amerigo Vespucci's Discovery of America*, trans. David Jacobson and ed. Luciano Formisano (New York: Marsilio, 1992), 90.

coastal Sub-Saharan Africa for over half a century, and the slave trade was flourishing. Between 1441 and 1505, an estimated 140,000 to 170,000 African slaves had disembarked in Lisbon.[58] From there, they were transferred to the major Iberian port cities (Seville, Barcelona, Valencia) where they made up 5 to 10% of the population.[59] On arrival, the new cultural context in which these African slaves were immersed forced them to develop new linguistic skills, which they would have to use in order to communicate. Although proficiency in Romance languages depended on individual capacities in local contexts, the capacity to communicate in the language of the master was perceived as a fundamental stage in the process of integration. From this process, the African stereotypical figure progressively emerged, within which the African way of speaking Romance languages (*Fala de preto*) was one of the main identifying features.[60] Little by little, the literary figure of the Black African, easily identified by his or her stereotypical accent, spread across the entire Iberian Peninsula.[61] The development of such a stereotype, and the importance given to the black slave's capacity to communicate, suggest that a substantial part of the African population in the Iberian Peninsula was bilingual. Consequently, many Africans in Iberia could therefore serve as interpreters, whether in Africa, as part of the slave-interpreter system, or within the Iberian Peninsula itself, for example during trials.[62]

On the other hand, and although more research is needed on this specific topic, it appears as though Iberians within the Peninsula in contact with African slaves only very seldom learned their slaves' language. This was undoubtedly due to many different factors. For instance, because language learning was for the slave a sign of integration, the social pressure to improve linguistic skills in the other's language was much stronger for the slaves than for the free Iberians. By opposition, addressing Black Slaves in their own language might have been seen as a hindrance in the slaves' process of integration through language. However, other explanations can be found as to why Iberians did not learn the African languages in order to communicate with the Black Africans they encountered. A hint is given by Columbus himself, indeed, he regularly repeats throughout his journal that in the Caribbean he had just reached, "their language is the same

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[58] Joseph Clancy-Clements, *The Linguistic Legacy of Spanish and Portuguese: Colonial Expansion and Language Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 44; Russell-Wood, *Iberian Expansion*, 20.

[59] Jeremy Lawrence, "*Black Africans in Renaissance Spanish Literature*," in *Black Africans in Renaissance Europe,* ed. Kate Lowe and T. Earle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 70.

[60] Ibid., 72, 83. A. C. de C. M Saunders, *A Social History of Black Slaves and Freedmen in Portugal, 1441–1555* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 99–100.

[61] André Belo, "Language as a Second Skin: The Representation of Black Africans in Portuguese Theatre (Fifteenth to Early Seventeenth Century)," *Renaissance and Reformation* 36, no. 1 (Winter 2013).

[62] Debra Blumenthal, "'*La Casa de Negres*': Black African Solidarity in Late Medieval Valencia," in *Black Africans in Renaissance Europe*, ed. Kate Lowe and T. Earle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 253–255.

throughout all these countries,"[63] and a little later that "I noticed that there is but one language throughout these lands."[64] Referring to his past expeditions under Portuguese banners, he contrasts the Caribbean context with his past experiences in West Africa. Confronting the apparent linguistic homogeneity of the Caribbean around the Arawak languages, the admiral underlines that "this is not the case in Guinea, where there are a thousand different dialects, one tribe not understanding the other."[65] In other words, even if they had had the intention to master West African languages, the Iberians were in any case confronted with the issue of the linguistic fragmentation in the region. It was impossible, and even useless, to attempt learning West African languages because of their sheer diversity.[66] However, reaching the Caribbean offered a seemingly different linguistic context to that of West Africa: the apparent linguistic uniformity in the Caribbean made the effort of learning the language more attractive because it guaranteed the capacity to communicate over wide-ranging territories. As they reached the Americas, the relationship the Iberians had regarding linguistic communication with the newly encountered populations evolved. It now became realistic—and even profitable— for men such as Columbus and Vespucci to imagine themselves learning the language of the "other."

However, a second interpretation of this attitude of Columbus towards the process of language learning can be made. By learning the language himself, Columbus assures his interlocutors—the crown of Castilia—that he will use this new skill to gather knowledge about the local peoples and lands and rapidly obtain the conversion of the indigenous populations. However, this also represented a more personal interest for Columbus. By getting his household, therefore himself and his potential successors, to learn the language, he was also implicitly preparing his family to become the privileged interlocutor between the Crown and the 'Indians' by mastering of Castilian as well as Arawak languages. Although this role as legitimate intermediary was already mentioned in the Capitulation of Sante Fe,[67] the fact of actually knowing the languages of both sides of the Atlantic was a means for Columbus of strengthening his household's position as political mediators between both continents. Columbus, in his letters to the Spanish crown, repeatedly underlines the terms of the contract that had been negotiated between him and his interlocutors. Therefore, after the first step which consisted in actually 'discovering' lands, the second logical phase in the stabilization of his authority

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[63] Columbus, *The Voyages*, 66.
[64] Ibid., 81.
[65] Ibid., 66.
[66] John Thornton, *African and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800,* 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), x–xiv.
[67] The Capitulations of Santa Fe were the result of an intense process of lobbying by Columbus in the Spanish court, during the preparation phase of his first voyage. In them, and although they were never officially ratified, Columbus was guaranteed the title of 'admiral of the Ocean Sea' as well as Governor General and Viceroy of the lands that he would potentially discover.

was to rapidly and permanently take control of the communication with the Crown. By learning the language, Columbus was aiming at making himself and his household the indispensable intermediary through which the Iberian authorities would have to transit for the administration of their newly conquered territories. Columbus's aspirations however did not materialize. His long-lasting trial and equally long-lasting removal from the American affairs without a doubt put a curb on his ambitious plan, and the journals of his fourth and final expedition to the Caribbean suggest that he was not able to directly speak with any of his American interlocutors.

The inevitable consequence of Columbus's aim to become fluent in Arawak languages was of course the erasure of the need of slave-interpreters. Iberians would master both languages, and in this way, further extend their control over the conquered lands. Ultimately, diminishing the role of the slave-interpreter became the logical solution to the problem that this position posed regarding the loyalty and trustworthiness of the linguistic mediators the Iberians relied on. However, the later expeditions to the Caribbean and later the American mainland show that in practice, the abolition of the dependence on slave-interpreters was unrealistic. Throughout the first half of the sixteenth century, Iberian expeditions were constrained to systematically rely on indigenous mediators. This was the case for Cortés, who first relied on a captive named Melchior, before later bringing Malintzin—more famously known as *la Malinche*—into his service.[68] Similarly, Pedro Cieza de León, in his chronicle of the conquest of Peru by Pizarro, shows how the conquistador still strongly relied on indigenous collaborators, such as Felipillo and Martinillo.[69] Columbus's example does not therefore announce an inevitable and linear evolution of the interpreter-master relationship in which indigenous slave-interpreters were to rapidly disappear. Rather, it illustrates how the admiral had identified the problematic issues regarding trust and loyalty inherent to the slave-interpreter system: the Iberians had to fully rely on captives, potentially impeding their imperial aspirations. With his project to firmly take control of the linguistic mediation with the Caribbean societies he encountered, Columbus was attempting to propose alternative solutions to these issues.

Conclusion

This brief analysis of the presence of the slave-interpreter system during the first recorded Atlantic Iberian expeditions reveals how important the role of these individuals was in the process of Iberian imperial expansion. In the space of a few decades, and the development of the ties linking the Iberian Peninsula to

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[68] Diaz del Castillo, *The Conquest*, 85–87.
[69] Both la Malinche and Felipillo remain highly symbolic and controversial figures in their respective national cultures, and are in some cases used as insults synonymous with traitor or liar, underlining their role as duplicitous and untrustworthy figures.

the insular and continental areas of the Atlantic world, the Iberians mechanically increased their access to interpreters and mediators. Indeed, migrations (whether forced or not) improved the Iberian knowledge of the new worlds they were progressively reaching, as they accumulated exponentially increasing amounts of information regarding these territories and the people that inhabited them. In this process, access to linguistic mediators played an important role, as it enabled the establishment of relatively long-term relations. This seemingly ineffective system, as Russell has underlined it, in which conquerors were relying on indigenous intermediaries, became a widespread practice and enabled the Portuguese and Spaniards to collect precious intelligence.[70]

However, the slave-interpreter system was not a fixed and rigid structure. Comparing a variety of fifteenth century sources, it rapidly appears that the slave-interpreter system experienced important changes and adaptations throughout its application in the Atlantic context. A rapid 'rationalization' of the system in Guinea and an impulse from the Portuguese authorities who sought to further extend their control over the process of obtaining of the interpreters set the premises of a further institutionalization at the turn of the sixteenth century. The slave-interpreter system was encouraged by the ruling authorities as it progressively became an unavoidable feature of early Iberian expansion in the Atlantic. However, the Crown's intervention in these processes did not put an end to the evolution of the system. One of the fundamental issues was the loyalty of the captives that were to become interpreters. One central difficulty was the obtaining of an equilibrium between the effective captivity of these individuals, the coercion this condition implied and their will to actively collaborate with their very gaoler. One result of these tensions was a new approach to the issues of language and empire hinted at by Columbus and Vespucci: while throughout the fifteenth century Iberian expeditions had the slave-interpreter system as their main source in the obtaining of linguistic mediators in the West African context, new solutions were proposed at the end of the century. Although the place of slaves remained central in the process of obtaining linguistic mediators, both Vespucci and Columbus called for a new approach in which American and African indigenous captives would serve not directly as interpreters, but rather would pass down their linguistic knowledge to their European interlocutors.

The study of interpreters necessarily implies a broader questioning about the presence and the role of cultural brokers during the early colonial encounters. Although the realities of the interactions have been increasingly addressed in recent historiography, much remains to be studied in order to better understand the ways in which men and women from around the world, sharing radically

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[70] Russell, "Veni, Vidi, Vici," 127; Anthony Disney, "Portuguese Expansion, 1400–1800: Encounters, Negotiations and Interactions," in *Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400–1800*, ed. Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Curto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 291.

different backgrounds, interacted during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In the particular case of interpreters and multi-lingual intermediaries, practically nothing is known about the processes of language learning that these individuals experienced. Such knowledge, in turn, would shed light on the broader cultural adaptation and transformation that these interpreters underwent at a personal level. From this perspective, the key role that a biographical and micro-historical approach could play in understanding the role played by linguistic go-betweens in the early colonial encounters becomes obvious and should be encouraged.

Said Halim Pasha as Grand Vizier. Carl Pietzner. 1915.
Courtesy of: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek.

A Late Ottoman Expression of Modernity: Prince Said Halim Pasha's Enterprise of Muslim Political Agency

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The intellectual and statesman Said Halim Pasha left his marks on the establishment of constitutional monarchy in Ottoman Empire. Yet, he was not content with this new political regime, but in pursuit of a political order more capable of resolving the problems of society that he perceived as arising from Western influences. The consolidation of Islam formed the normative basis of his thinking. Said Halim wrote theoretical texts discussing the scientific and social duties that he gathered from his religious beliefs and his sociological analysis. Importantly, Halim did not stress religious doctrines and precedence in his views. Instead, his political visions prioritized Muslim society as a religious-political community over classical subjects of Islamic religious studies like the caliphate and the study of Islamic jurisprudence. Said Halim's envisioned polity would incorporate Western influences but limit them to the material level. Those influences should only help to reestablish the qualities of an Islamic rule that had been temporarily lost in the age of Imperialism. Despite his analysis of fundamental differences between civilizations, Said Halim's thinking opened up new transitivities and permeabilities; he appropriated political notions of representation and accountability and transferred them to an Islamic context of political authority without resorting to the usual Islamic references. Within the scope of this paper, Said Halim's intellectual geography and its dynamics are discussed by following his political career's turning points, as well as exploring the intellectual subjects and socio-political phenomena that shaped his deliberations.

Introduction

An essayist and high-ranking bureaucrat, Prince Said Halim Pasha wrote theoretical treatises about his views on constitutional monarchy, bigotry, crises in Islam, as well as the social, political, and intellectual problems that he saw in the Ottoman Empire between 1909 and 1922. This period witnessed the establishment of a parliamentary regime, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Turkish national movement in Anatolia leading to the establishment of a new nation-state. His works were translated into Turkish from French, as

Said Halim was not proficient at writing in Turkish. At a time when the Turkish government was accused of pursuing a secularist policy of ethnically national-ist Turkification, Said Halim suggested Islam as the basis of a suitable political structure.

As an intellectual and statesman who left his marks on the establishment of con-stitutional monarchy, Said Halim was not content with the new structure. Halim suggested a political regime that would be more capable of resolving the problems for society that he saw as arising from Westernization in a mimetic style. The consolidation of Islam as the basis of political norms underlay his visions. Yet, Said Halim did not directly address his times' political debates in his writings, but rather penned theoretical texts detached from historical example that proved his monotheism but also spoke of his perceptions of scientific and social duties. Said Halim derived these duties from his sociological analysis but without substantial inquisition of religious doctrines and precedence. His political visions prioritized Muslim society as a religious-political community rather than focusing on con-ventional subjects of Islamic studies like the caliphate and jurisprudence. In this paper, Said Halim's intellectual geography and its dynamics are discussed by fol-lowing his political career's turning points as well as the intellectual subjects and socio-political phenomena that he contemplated.

A Brief Overview of Said Halim's Life

Said Halim was born in Cairo on January 28th, 1865. He was the grandson of Muhammad Ali Pasha, the founder of modern Egypt. Upon his father's expulsion from the line of succession to the *khedivate*, the Egyptian viceroyalty, his family left for Istanbul. The family settled in the seaside residence of Yeniköy where Said Halim and his brother Abbas Halim were taught Arabic, Persian, Turkish, French, and English. In 1880, the two brothers were sent to Geneva in Switzerland for their higher education. Upon their return to Istanbul in 1885, Abdul Hamid II el-evated the Halim brothers within Ottoman bureaucracy[1] in compliance with their high status and nobility to ensure their loyalty and to keep them in distance of the opposition.[2]

By 1888, Said Halim was a member of the State Council[3] and the *beylerbeyi* of Rumelia, the Governor-General of the European provinces.[4] Although a high-

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[1] Ahmet Şeyhun, "Said Halim Pasha (1865–1921)," in *Islamist Thinkers in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic*, ed. Ahmet Şeyhun (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 148.

[2] Ahmet Şeyhun, *Said Halim Pasha: An Ottoman Statesman and An Islamist Thinker (1865 –1921)* (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 2002), 75.

[3] The Şûrâ-yı Devlet, the State Council, was the highest judicial institution in the Ottoman Empire, operating between 1868 and 1922. Its foundation in 1868 had separated the judicial and legislative powers in the Ottoman Empire. It was tasked with resolving administrative disputes and drafting legislation, yet only of limited relevance in reality

[4] *Beylerbey*, literally meaning *the Lord of Lords*, was a high military commander. The Ottomans used this designation until the mid-19th century. In the initial periods of the empire, a *Bey-*

level bureaucrat, Said Halim was not content with the political atmosphere under Abdul Hamid's autocratic rule. He became neglectful of his bureaucratic duties and rather studied Islamic history and institutions but also closely followed contemporary events in other Muslim countries. These intellectual ventures were reported as undesirable by Abdul Hamid's informants in the so-called *jurnal* spy network and Said Halim was forced to leave Istanbul for Paris in 1905. Upon his arrival, he became an official member of *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a secret society established in 1889 by opponents of Abdul Hamid's autocracy, the *istibdat*,[5] and supporters of constitutional rule. The CUP was organized as an underground organization in the Balkans, with headquarters in Salonica, while it had other centers in European capitals, such as Paris and London, in which most of the political exiles resided. In the West, members of the CUP were usually called 'Young Turks,' whereas its members were known as *Unionists* within the Ottoman Empire.

Said Halim's residence in Paris did not last long and later he settled in Cairo where he was the biggest shareholder of the *Société Belgo-Eygptiénne de Ezbekié*[6] in the *de-facto* British protectorate and became an important financial supporter of the CUP. After the Young Turk Revolution succeeded in compelling Abdul Hamid II to reinitialize constitutional rule on July 24th, 1908,[7] Said Halim went back to Istanbul like many former exiles. He was elected mayor of Yeniköy for the political party of the CUP. In the following year Abdul Hamid II was ousted due to his suspected ties to a countercoup organized by a conservative military faction in April 1909, the March 31st Incident. Said Halim held several offices until 1911 when he was appointed to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His initial and crucial task in this office was to lead the peace negotiations to end the Italo-Turkish War over the Italian war of conquest in Libya. Peace talks with Italy failed and the conflict escalated into the Balkan Wars instead. The force of the attack by Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia compelled the Ottoman government to cede all of Libya and the Dodecanese to Italy. The Ottoman government's inclination to accept a peace treaty with harsh conditions including the secession of the former capital Adrianople led to a coup d'état of the CUP.

The bulk of the Unionists were relatively younger officials, intellectuals, and military officers, most of whom did not stem from privileged backgrounds. Yet, the organization preferred senior Pashas for high-ranking cabinet posts in order to

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lerbey was charged with the governance of a province like a viceroy. As the empire became more centralized in the 15th and 16th centuries, the title had become an honorary court rank.

[5] The reign of Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909): Abdul Hamid II was the 34th Sultan of the Ottoman Empire and the last Sultan/Caliph to practice effective control over the declining Ottoman Empire. Among Ottoman intellectuals, whose majority was close to the Young Turk Movement, his reign was referred to as *istibdat*, meaning a tyranny or autocracy.

[6] Ahmet Şeyhun, *Said Halim Pasha: An Ottoman Statesman*, 79–80.

[7] The first constitutional rule was terminated in 1878 by Abdul Hamid II due to the decisive defeat of the Ottoman Empire by the Russian Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, also leading to the dissolution of the parliament.

preserve the conventional image of good governance in the eyes of public opinion. The so-called *Grand Cabinet* led by Kamil Pasha was, for example, composed of three former grand viziers and therefore an example of this kind of government. Said Halim was among the organizers of the afore-mentioned coup d'état, and could remain on his government post.[8] Still, not him, but Djemal Pasha, Enver Pasha, and Talat Pasha were usually credited as the *de facto* rulers of the Ottoman Empire following the assassination of post-coup grand vizier Mahmud Shevket Pasha in June. While admitting the grip of the *Three Pashas* on the CUP and the state, it would be misleading to argue that the policies and mentalities of and within the CUP were monolithic. In fact, the CUP had sustained a broad platform: As the first political party, the CUP had brought together a wide range of Ottoman intellectuals and officials with different socio-political contentions and conservative, reformist, or radical ideals. The clash of different ideologies within the CUP was not surprising given the fact that its members were mainly bound together by the wish to avoid the dissolution of the empire and modernize its political organization as well as its technological means and to increase its wealth. In this intricate political state, the CUP leaders relied on competing ideological orientations opportunistically, namely Islamism, Turkism, and especially Ottomanism—the latter suggesting the inclusion of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects—according to the political circumstances of the time.[9]

Said Halim was appointed to the grand vizierate by the initiative of the CUP. Before his nomination to the office, he had played a key role as the head of diplomacy in recapturing Adrianople by entering peace talks with Greece and cleverly aggravating tensions between Bulgaria and its other Balkan allies in order to exploit them for the Ottoman Empire. As grand vizier, Said Halim was again the head of an important diplomatic campaign in the Armenian question when an international congress convened in Istanbul tho impose reforms on the Ottoman Empire.

Shortly before the First World War, on August 2nd, 1914, a German-Ottoman alliance treaty was signed in secrecy by Said Halim and German ambassador Hans von Wangenheim. Said Halim's position on this belligerent alliance was clear, he favored neutrality,[10] or at least sought to avoid an immediate entry into the war.[11] Historians usually agree that he was excluded by his cabinet members on the matter of entering the war when two German battleships made a surprise attack on

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[8] Ahmet Şeyhun, *Said Halim Pasha: An Ottoman Statesman*, 124.

[9] Cited in: Ahmet Şeyhun, *Said Halim Pasha: An Ottoman Statesman*, 105. See: Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 33–35; Sina Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat Terakki*, (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1987) 110–13.

[10] Ahmet Şeyhun, "Said Halim (1865–1921)," 150.

[11] Ahmet Şeyhun, *Said Halim Pasha: An Ottoman Statesman*, 163.

Odessa under the Ottoman banner.[12] Halim was reportedly only in favor of signing a military alliance with Germany in order to dissuade Russian aggression.[13] Upon his entry into war, Said Halim was considering to resign, for Enver Pasha's grip on power was intensifying and undermining his office since the alliance made with Germany.[14] Yet as the signee of the alliance treaty and the grand vizier, he upheld Ottoman belligerence in various occasions.[15] During his time as the head of government, the Armenian populations were forcefully deported from the eastern border with the Russian Empire to southern regions of the empire, escalating into large scale massacres and genocide. As the grand vizier, Said Halim had endorsed the deportation bill proposed by Talat Bey in the assembly on May 26, 1915, still he categorically denied broader responsibility in post-war interrogations.[16]

Said Halim's premiership ended due to Sharif Hussein's uprising in June 1916: the Arab Revolt has been considered as fatal to Said Halim's career as his conciliatory prestige did not seem to have any balancing effect anymore, notably in conditions of ever-intensifying warfare. With the secession of large provinces with predominantly Arab speaking Muslim populations, the revolt did not only cast doubts on Islamism's political viability for the future of the empire, but also paved the way for Said Halim's resignation in February 1917.[17] After the armistice signed in October 1918, he was arrested by British authorities occupying Istanbul in March 1919 to be prosecuted for the war crimes committed against Ottoman Armenians. Said Halim was exiled to Malta with a large group of Ottoman officials, but later released before the investigation concluded due to lacking proof of criminal acts and the pressure of the new national assembly in Ankara against occupation. A great part of the exiles returned to Turkey, while Said Halim stayed abroad. It seems most likely that Halim was a persona non grata for the British forces fearing the political effects of his return. Said Halim eventually settled in Rome where he was shot dead by an Armenian militant on December 5, 1921.

His Works and Ideas: Criticizing Ottoman Modernization

Said Halim Pasha's works were written originally in French and published in Istanbul and various European capitals between 1910 and 1921.[18] His first known work, published in Paris, is titled *Le fanatisme musulman*, and was only available in Istanbul from 1917 under the title *Ta'assup,* "Fanaticism." "Said Halim Pasha

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[12] Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 106.

[13] M. Hanefi Bostan, *Bir İslamcı Düşünür*, 51.

[14] Mustafa Aksakal, *Ottoman Road to War*, 106.

[15] Ibid., 196.

[16] Ahmet Şeyhun, "Said Halim (1865–1921)," 151.

[17] Guida Michelangelo, "II. Meşrutiyet dönemindeki İslamcılık düşüncesi ve buna bir örnek teşkil etmesi açısından Said Halim Paşa (Said Halim Pasha and Islamist Thought in the Second Constitutional Era)," *Civilacademy Journal of Social Sciences* 6, no. 2 (2008): 109–117.

[18] Ahmet Şeyhun, *Said Halim Pasha: An Ottoman Statesman*, 11.

switched the terms of the discussion to the relationship between Islam and big-
otry," contests Guida Michelangelo,[19] as he condemned Imperialist Europe for its
fanaticism. Said Halim, focusing on the encounters of Muslims and Europeans,
traced back European imperialism's self-proclaimed "civilizing mission" to the
history of the Crusades bringing destruction in the name of Christianity. Halim
identified a continuing hatred, that brought ever more destruction, with advance-
ments of military technologies. Lastly, Said Halim suggested that Muslim society
was decadent and identified the main cause of this decadence in the lack of a resis-
tant political organization which supposedly invited the invasion and subjugation
by imperial powers taking advantage of that weakness.

La Crise Politique's actual date of publication in Paris has not been clarified;
however, it is known that this work was divided into two articles for its publica-
tion in Istanbul. The first part *Mukallidliklerimiz*, "Our Imitations," was produced
in 1910, while constitutional rule was established in Turkey for a second time.
Said Halim alerted his readers to the fact that the mere imitation of the social and
political institutions of the West would not only be difficult but, furthermore, not
agree with Ottoman circumstances. The second article, *Meşrutiyet*, "Constitution-
alism," was published in 1911 as a pamphlet of 31 pages. This work presents a
critical evaluation of the Turkish Constitution first promulgated in 1876, which
was suspended by Sultan Abdul Hamid II between 1877 and 1908, and discusses
political events associated with the Hamidian period.

Said Halim viewed Western society as the coming-together of different social
and political classes. The continuing struggles between these classes within the
Western civilization stood in contrast to the Islamic counterpart, according to
Halim, which relied on Muslim solidarity and lacked the rigid social boundaries
that could hurt the harmony of society. In this sense, the second promulgation of
the Ottoman Constitution seemed futile to Halim:

> We had aspired that the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 would have the power to
> change the political and economic circumstances of our society. These would have
> made us forget our internal struggles and would have united and merged all of us
> as an Ottoman family only contemplating the Ottoman homeland's fame and great-
> ness.[20]

Said Halim evaluated that the rule of the CUP did not present any improvement
to the political situation in the country. Rather, it seemed to introduce a new set
of conflicts to the Ottoman Empire, namely between the different political groups
in parliament. For Said Halim, the blind acceptance and import of seemingly in-

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[19] Michelangelo Guida, "The Life and Political Ideas of Grand Vezir Said Halim Pasha," İslâm
    Araştırmaları Dergisi, iss. 18 (2007): 110.
[20] Said Halim Paşa, *Buhranlarımız (Our Crises and Collective Works)*, ed. M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ
    (Tercüman Gazetesi, 1973), 51.

compatible constitutional charters from France led to new devils as they were supposedly not compatible with the existing laws or sustainable with the Ottoman society.

Said Halim published *Buhrân-i İctimaîmiz*, "Our Social Crisis," in 1916 accusing members of the Ottoman society of not being true to their own history. Said Halim criticized Ottoman intellectuals' Western style festivities and Francophilia despite sharing these traits. Halim saw their role of providing a model to Ottoman society as unfulfilled and lamented lacking respect in society for intellectuals. To Said Halim, Islam was a religion tasking the faithful with social duties and their fulfilment in agreement with a believer's conscience seemed essential to make cultural progress possible like Muslims had apparently shown to the world in the centuries before.

On this basis of social duties rooted in Islam, Halim saw equality as the principle to be accomplished under the condition of the fulfillment of these duties. Liberty was equally perceived by Halim as entitled according to the fulfilment of social and moral duties. Although he operated in the language of 'liberty' and 'equality' of the Western canon, Said Halim showed principal doubts to demand these rights.[21] He was not a supporter of the abolition of elitist or 'superior' classes. Rather, Halim regarded social inequality as a reality to be accepted, but still engaged with the perspectives of different social classes or disenfranchised groups. Speaking of the example of women's rights, he expressed his skepticism about the authenticity of the women's demands and instead suggested that their true motives lay in the desire for fashionable possessions and taking part in a new and attracting social life. In contrast, Said Halim talked about the women's rights struggle in Europe in a rather serious manner that he did not reserve for his society; he observed an authentic demand of European women to have a political voice.[22] He did not perceive himself to be in the position to criticize or question the possible gains or perils in consequence of this demand. Yet his thinking prioritizing authenticity versus mimicry preferred this transformation to take place in an evolutionary manner. In contrast, the women's rights issue in the Ottoman Empire was perceived by Halim as an artificial subject that could not be an aspect of Ottoman social evolution.

His *Essai sur les causes de la decadence des peuples musulmanes*, "An Essay on the Causes of the Decline of the Muslim Societies," appears to have been published in Paris in 1918 and furthers Said Halim's ideas on the present and future of Islamic societies. In this pamphlet, in addition to his emphasis on the laws governing society, Said Halim presents his analysis of the question of progress and decadence with regards to the role of religion:

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[21] Tanıl Bora, *Cereyanlar Türkiye'de Siyasî İdeolojiler (Movements: Political Ideologies in Turkey)* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017), 437.

[22] Paşa, *Buhranlarımız,* 135–149.

However, the problem of underdevelopment has nothing to do with religion itself but needs to be viewed as a sociological phenomenon. This paradigm is valid for the Muslim world as well as for the West. Religions are molded by the diverse customs and cultural characteristics of their lands. Just as historical and social developments in Christendom engendered Catholicism and later Protestantism, similar developments gave birth to the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam. Furthermore, within the same religious denomination one can detect different characteristics: different schools adapted themselves to various local realities and developed distinct characteristics.[23]

In April 1919, the following pamphlet *İslamlaşmak* "To Islamize," was serialized into four issues in Turkish in Mehmed Akif's weekly Islamist journal *Sebilürreşat*.[24] Besides, Said Halim was now fully credited as the author of his work. In his previous works, initially published in French, 'Mehmed' had been his pen name. This work also is the most recognized among Islamist circles in Turkey. Said Halim defined the process of Islamization as the full application of "the principles of Islam pertaining to belief, morality, living, and politics after they have been interpreted in a suitable manner in accordance with the needs of contemporary history and geography."[25]

Said Halim's last work, *Islam'da Teşkîlât-ı Siyâsiyye*, "The Political Organization in Islam," was originally published in French in 1921 and republished a year later and only weeks after the demise of Said Halim in the journal *Orient et Occident* under the title "*Notes pour servir à la réforme de la société musulmane.*"[26] Contents of this essay form the most well-known and widely circulated ideas around Said Halim, not the least as it was also translated into English in 1927,[27] and it gives a concise overview of Said Halim Pasha's ideas. Within the scope of this paper, this last essay is the departure point to evaluate Said Halim's crucial enterprise to preserve Islam at the very basis of the political order and the modernizing state as the new nation-state emerged.

Considering Said Halim's biography against the background of his times, he was an Ottoman thinker who refrained from acknowledging ethnic and geographical limitations within the Empire. His thinking was preoccupied with a blurred and not precisely defined notion of Islam that did not clarify if it included only the Ottomans or all Muslims. In an era of rising nationalisms, in which the CUP viewed Islamism as a set of means to look for moral support, Said Halim's voice

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[23] Translation quoted from: Şeyhun, "Said Halim (1865–1921)," 154–155. For the original, see: Paşa, *Buhranlarımız*, 174–76.

[24] Syed Tanvir Wasti, "Said Halim Pasha: Philosopher Prince," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 1 (2008): 95.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ahmet Şeyhun, "Said Halim Pasha," 11.

[27] Prince Said Halim Pasha, "The Reform of Muslim Society," *Islamic Studies* 47, no. 3 (2008): 379–404.

was heard.[28] The diversification of political ideologies accompanying the decline of the Empire did not necessarily mean the erasure of Islam from nationalist thought. In this period, in which ideologies intertwined, Said Halim's emphatic voice promoted the defense of Islam as the very center of political organization.

Said Halim and Islamism as the Basis for Progress

The advocacy of tradition, namely the emphasis on core Islamic values for social and political administration was not just a mere ensemble of values for Said Halim. Instead, a Muslim ideal type based on his perception of Muslim sensibility was suggested by him. In his thinking about political order, Said Halim was preoccupied with inventing a tradition, yet without acknowledging his attempt himself. Within his modernist-revivalist framework,[29] Halim did not problematize modernity in contrast to a juxtaposed tradition, but he was rather problematizing the manner of modernization.

Generally, Said Halim presented a 'desired' political system in accordance with his view of Islamic knowledge. Still, it appears as a contradiction that he lacked any clear references to existing theological literature and chose to ignore both the religious affairs and contemporary political events of his time. On that matter, it can be plausibly argued that Said Halim's thoughts were focused beyond the observable temporality of current events.[30] In effect, the mystified ends promoted by Said Halim appear clearly to the reader—in contrast to the means that should make it possible to arrive at these ends.

A second contradiction can be seen in Said Halim's use of French, his educational language to write his essays. Although he is reported to have known Arabic, English, Persian, and Turkish as well, this choice can be explained by the possible motive to address contemporary intellectuals and use an international platform to express his take on Islam.

Different from his political adventures, no major ruptures can be identified in Halim's ideological thinking. Said Halim consistently advocated the revival of Islamic principles in both political order and social life by making his views on differentials between Islam and the West known. These principles are, however, not further explored or developed but rather presumed. In his view, the modernization process starting with the first promulgation of constitutional monarchy in 1876 was doomed to fail because of the unknown regulations it brought along and its leaders' indifference to the Ottoman nation's conditions and needs. On this critical basis, Said Halim argued for a reversal to adhering to Islam's fundamental

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[28] Liu Zhongmin, Shu Meng, "Nationalist Thoughts and Islam in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 11, no. 2 (2017): 14–26.

[29] Ahmet Şeyhun, *Said Halim Pasha: An Ottoman Statesman*, 10.

[30] Asım Öz, "Fark Düşünürü ve İslâmcılık Üzerine Dolaylı Açılımlar," *TYB AKADEMİ Dil Edebiyat ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 1, no. 3 (2011): 152.

values and limiting the imports from Europe to material goods. To elaborate this contention of socio-cultural meaningful difference between societies, Said Halim often regarded *hommes* as subject to congenital dispositions which he named *lois naturelles sociales* in accordance with *lois naturelles*. Within this closed-circuit consideration of the social, men would achieve *bonheur*, *égalité*, *liberté*, and *solidarité* by following these natural social laws. Despite employing enlightenment concepts, the author skips over the meaning of his use of them and his European inspirations.

Said Halim mostly reported as a faithful Muslim emerging from the Islamism movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and placing great importance on the revelation of the will of God through his prophet. According to Said Halim, human happiness depended on the condition of the sovereignty of that Sharia because it gave "*le principe de la vraie égalité, de la vraie liberté et avec lui, le principe de la vraie solidarité humaine.*"[31] As mentioned above, Said Halim understood natural and social laws to be governing society; he positioned Islam and the *société musulmane* at the highest level of his social ideal by reinterpreting the contentions of Muslim theologians and the religious claim itself that Islam was the ultimate religion revealing the will of God and therefore representing the stage of moral perfection. Despite his 'occidentalist' inferences about the West through stereotypes, Said Halim did not specify what defined the West to him. Instead he used the West as a negative macro-category, a counter-explicative to elaborate his view what the Islamic meant. This category of the West was employed as an explanatory ensemble of foreign and disruptive elements to make sense of what he presented as the *société musulmane* and to answer the question what he perceived as Islamic or not.

Said Halim applied sociologism within Turkish thought next to his Islamist thought,[32] as he insisted on certain social laws governing society, but also lacked reference to other disciplines of the humanities. *Islamisme* as a self-referential concept rendered the best projections of an ideal social order possible in his argumentation. In line with his sociologism, he was not primarily interested in systemically explaining or in representing social laws of the West in contrast to the search of 'Eastern' intellectuals for their own national culture. His societal ideal rather targeted the *société musulmane* and the political order that Muslims should establish. His criticism of the West was restrained to the disruptions brought to Muslim society, starting from the Crusades and having intensified with modernity. For the purpose of actualizing the ideal social order revealed by the prophet, he put the revival of Islamic principles into the center of his reformist view. However, his take on reform was different from the meaning of renovation. Despite the conceptual novelties and inspirations that he drew from European political thought,

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[31] Said Halim, "Réforme," 19.
[32] Tanıl Bora, *Cereyanlar*, 416.

Said Halim insisted on the return to an Islamic political order. Paradoxically, Said Halim was quite silent about the actual contents of Islamic principles and the fundamentals of his desired political order. His writing did not reference any religious source, the only concrete connection being a *hadith*[33] about the usefulness of schooling oneself in science.[34] As the author of the most detailed research about Said Halim,[35] Ahmet Şeyhun, points out how Halim did not mention and was not connected to a school of jurisprudence in Islam, a sect, an imam, a caliph, or a canonist: "Instead, he spoke in the terms of a head of state and his electors."[36] Apart from Said Halim's own constitutional thinking, as his specifications of the duties of Muslims, he was silent about the contents of Islam, *Islamisme* in his words, with the notable exception of the hypothetical notions of equality, liberty, and solidarity. He rather lacked the historical context and periodization that might have served him to explain how Islamic principles were institutionalized, reproduced, or interrupted. His evident criticisms were instead limited to the Hamidian regime's arbitral rule and the Young Turk Revolution's Westernist tendencies. Said Halim's distance to the West came together with his persistent discussion of what Muslim society should do and avoid in accordance with his ideas of natural laws governing society. At this juncture, Said Halim solicitously attempted to position Sharia as not discordant to these laws but rather as manifestation of them:

> Sharia is indeed of divine essence, and besides it is without any supernatural character unlike it is so often presented (…) In fact, the Sharia is a divine code, composed of perfectly natural laws.[37]

This divine truth requiring respect and submission derived from its perpetual feasibility for societies, naturally leading to social happiness, according to Said Halim. Thus, Halim's *Islamisme* signified an ideal state of mind of Muslims in their individual and social lives.

To make his point of Islam's preponderance more lucid, it would be possible to refer to the Hobbesian term of the 'state of nature' which would include all pre-Islamic past, as well as the Western civilization in Said Halim's categorization. This undesirable state of deficiency, tyranny, inequality, and injustice could only be overcome by submitting to the law of Sharia. The submission to the sole authority of God and his divine code, instead of the monarch or parliament suggested by Hobbes, would provide the termination of the natural state and the perfection of the social body. Not mentioning Hobbes, Said Halim criticized the basis

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[33] The Arabic word, حديث, deriving from the root of the word *news,* is used to signify Muhammad's sayings and deeds.
[34] Said Halim, "Réforme," 23.
[35] Şeyhun, Ahmet, "An Ottoman Statesman and An Islamist Thinker (1865–1921)" (PhD diss., McGill University Montreal, 2002), 316.
[36] Şeyhun, *Said Halim Pasha: An Ottoman Statesman,* 252
[37] Halim, "Réforme," 21.

of national sovereignty and the Western perception of authority for being a sheer conceptualizing of force relations.[38]

All in all, the advocacy of Islam as the central reference point for social welfare and good governance would eventually make it compulsory to preserve and sustain the best and perfect body composed of dutiful Muslims according to Said Halim. Distancing all that was pre-Islamic and non-Islamic this body should be brought together in compliance with the social duties of Muslims. Guaranteeing this body would of course be a question of the political system and its organization that Said Halim concluded as the relation of the head of state and his electors.

On Differential Aspects and the Muslim Body Politic

In the contextual finality of well-being, the teleological end of happiness and social solidarity designated by submitting to Sharia, Said Halim highlighted a capital incompatibility through a priority designated by modernity; *souveraineté nationale* which introduced "*le principe de la souveraineté de la volonté nationale, omnipotente et irresponsable.*"[39] Given the fact that nationalism movements were detrimental to the integrity and future of empires, Said Halim's hesitation as an imperial official who had risen to the political leadership seems quite expectable. Moreover, deeper reservations against westernizing reforms and—of course—nationalism resided in Said Halim's thinking on social gains provided by Islam.

Said Halim seems to have had an attitude which Hasan Aksakal calls "occidentalist anger"[40] in his treatise on the manifestations of counter-enlightenment among Ottoman intellectuals. It means the rigid refusal to implement reforms and the consolidation of this refusal by attributing decadence to the Western civilization. Aksakal deals with the cultural contexts in which Ottoman intellectuals emerged and explains that this background was detrimental towards political and social reforms inspired by European examples. Its conservative and negativist tendencies were complemented by an unwillingness to be self-critical.[41] This coincides with the indifference of Ottoman intellectuals to the possible ideological roots of the growing Western imperial power imposed on the rest of the world. Aksakal considers the charming patriot poet Namık Kemal as one of the first figures in the Ottoman Empire highlighting Islamism in popular imagination. Kemal was in complete accordance with the Islamic epistemology, while his vision of

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[38] Halim, "Réforme," 24–27.
[39] Ibid., 24.
[40] Hasan Aksakal, "Karşı-Aydınlanma ve Osmanlı Düşüncesi: Nâmık Kemal Üzerinden Bir Değerlendirme," in *Türk Muhafazakârlığı: Terennüm, Tereddüt, Tahakküm* (Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2017), 91.
[41] Aksakal, "Karşı Aydınlanma," 77–78.

constitutional regimes and political representation found its source in Rousseau's theories, an "Islamized theory of Rousseau" according to Hasan Aksakal.[42]

Said Halim's theoretical inspirations from both Islamic and European sources were not clarified by himself and it is not possible to trace them fully through his implicit references, yet there are certain similarities with his contemporary Islamists Cemaleddin Efganî, Muhammed Abduh, and Rashid Rida. Their principal inspiration stemmed from Ibn Taymiyyah, a scholar of the late 13th century. His central reasoning was that the prophet's message and its meaning had been misunderstood by Muslims. Following that claim, Said Halim and other Islamist thinkers resorted to the idea that the perceived decadence of Muslim society was primarily due to the Muslims' failure to remain aware of the influences of pre-Islamic cultures on Islamic societies. The continuation of this influence supposedly led to the loss of the prosperity and welfare that Islam might have provided. It therefore had to be the aim to purify Islam of any corruptive elements and emphasize the central role of the Sharia. This distaste for the pre-Islamic was present in Said Halim's thinking; moreover, this argument was linked to the comparison to the corruptive elements brought from the West. Halim turned against the logic promoting the belief that the West, its principles, examples, and 'soul' should be imitated.

Halim argued that Islam already provided the moral, social, and political norms in harmony with human nature and that Islam should therefore regulate lives and destinies until the end of the world.[43] This assertion of a perfectionist precocity sought to invalidate the need to Westernize in a mimetic way, and pursue nationalistic ideals. Only the scientific field was accepted by Halim as a realm of continued orientation towards the West. Imports of knowledge from the natural sciences were deemed necessary while inspirations from cultural and moral theories were precluded.[44] Halim had already sought to invalidate intellectual dependencies or links in social thinking, but also tried to undermine the opinion that Islamic societies should reap benefits from the West: He suggested that the Muslim societies only claimed back what had originated with them. Here, he pointed to another precocity of Islamic scientific culture sustained by Islam's promotion of observation and reasoning with the aim of confirming and justifying truths revealed by the prophet.[45] Said Halim, following his point, did not conceptualize a continuity based on the history of science; he rather pointed to the differences and conflicts deriving from different theories of knowledge. For example, he denied the virtue of rationalism in Islam and for Islamic cultures of science as Islam already encom-

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[42] Aksakal, "Karşı Aydınlanma," 82–86.

[43] Halim, *Buhranlarımız*, 196.

[44] Recep Şentürk, "Intellectual Dependency: Late Ottoman Intellectuals between *fiqh* and Social Science," *Die Welt des Islams—Islam and Societal Norms: Approaches to Modern Muslim Intellectual History* 47, no. 3/4 (2007): 313–316.

[45] Pacha, "Réforme," 22.

passed it as well as scientific experimentalism, in Halim's view.[46] Before discussing the political order and its gravity as the locus of reforms, Said Halim therefore presented a narrow window of exchange with the West while conceptualizing a charming Islamic social body which only needed to regain certain achievements and which was capable of spreading its preponderances to the world.

For Said Halim, the essential dilemma from which Muslim societies suffered, were the futile attempts to modernize due to false conceptions regarding their problems. Halim degraded the modernization experience of the Ottoman Empire since the early 19th century. He condemned all of this process as futile and a mere act of translation from the French without concern for social circumstances and the prevailing values within society. His integral criticism sought to prioritize principles that created the basis of science, equality, liberty, and social happiness expostulating the political order for overlooking or ignoring the transformations that had occurred in the social structure and educational system in the Ottoman Empire. For example, the social basis of the Turkish National Movement and its cadres stemmed from the modernizing changes in the educational system implemented by Abdul Hamid II, having been considerably influenced by doctrines of national sovereignty that became influential in the Second Constitutional Era (from 1908 to 1920).[47] Yet, despite being a member and general secretary of the CUP since 1912, Said Halim was categorically against national sovereignty; his definition of an Islamic political system was in contrast with this principle. This was due to the fact that the CUP and its political party were realizing a political consensus around national sovereignty as Turkey's first widely open political formation and party in which Islamists, Turkish nationalists, and Westernists managed to form an alliance to preserve the Empire and actualize their notion of the will of the people.

Still, Said Halim's presence and the high positions that he had occupied seem inconsistent with his political criticisms displayed in his writings. Yet, his political presence was met with genuine sympathy since his sentence to exile in Paris by Abdul Hamid II.[48] In fact, his views serving as the "methodical defense of Islam as the basis of state"[49] should not be considered as a marginal, non-mainstream ideology within the CUP due to the emergence of the Turkish nation state in years to come. When Turkish nationalism was newly intensifying as the most promising political current in the fading Empire following the loss of territories in the Balkans during the years of 1912 and 1913, the residuum of the empire still included

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[46] Pacha, "Réforme," 22–24.
[47] Ahmet Kuyaş, "II. Meşrutiyet, Türk Devrimi Tarihi ve Bugünkü Türkiye (Second Constitutional Era, History of the Turkish Revolution and Today's Turkey)," *Doğu Batı Düşünce Dergisi*, iss.45 (2008): 61.
[48] Şeyhun, "Said Halim (1865–1921)," 148.
[49] Hasan Kayalı, "Islam in the Thought and Politics of Two Late Ottoman Intellectuals: Mehmed Akif and Said Halim," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 19 (2001): 309. Quoted in: Guida Michelangelo, "Grand Vezir Said Halim Pasha," 104.

modern day Iraq, Syria and the Hejaz. Historian Behlül Özkan reminds us that the CUP had to act very thriftily to ensure the loyalty of the Arab subjects in the empire; Said Halim's appointment to grand vizierate demonstrates this accounting that Islamism was a preferred choice within the Ottoman political system and for the CUP.[50] Said Halim was assessed to ameliorate the relationship of Arab intellectuals with the Empire and to undermine Arab separatism in the near future.[51]

Furthermore, Said Halim's evident advocacy for the election of the head of state by adult suffrage[52] and his position in favor of a constitutional regime made him a plausible and relevant personality who could reasonably ascend within the CUP, apart from his noble rank and social background. As a member of the high elite who had studied at university in Switzerland, Said Halim had an attractive, modern tone in writing and expressing his thoughts. Even though he had many opponents to his stance and Islamist ideas, he had the ability to enter and conduct a dialogue with his opponents. Although it is not possible to observe him engaged in dialectical polemics in his writings, it would be important to note that Said Halim employed 'secular discourse' with only limited religious contents and references.[53] Guida Michelangelo remarks that this secular discourse was rather common among Islamists since their majority was not composed of religious scholars and canonists but raised in the modern educational institutions of the Empire, representing a new type of Ottoman intellectuals.[54]

Said Halim, for example, had a traditional stance and traditional concepts in mind as he disdained revolutionary ideas and attempts. Still his ideas were not completely traditionalist as he offered new contents and did not simply reproduce classical statements. In this context, the reception and interpretation of the constitutional and parliamentary regime was of paramount importance to Islamists, including religious scholars, who did not necessarily find these new principles incompatible with the Islamic sense of authority. The course of the emergence of the Pan-Islamist movement starting from the 1870s also demonstrates in retrospect that its early representatives were mainly modernists and not resisting the idea of reform as reactionaries. Cemil Aydin, historian of Middle Eastern and Modern Asian history, notes that these representatives were in fact committed to modernizing reforms inspired by European examples in order to secure their Empire's status as an equal member of the new international system.[55] Also, Aydin makes the differentiation that the Muslim intellectuals only started to conceptualize a

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[50] Behlül Özkan, "From Imperial to National Vatan," in *From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan*, ed. Behlül Özkan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 72.
[51] Özkan, "From Imperial to National Vatan," 73.
[52] Said Halim, "Les Institutions," 33.
[53] Guida, "Grand Vezir Said Halim Pasha," 102.
[54] Ibid., 103.
[55] Cemil Aydın, "Beyond Civilization: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Asianism and the Revolt against the West," *Journal of Modern European History* 4, no. 2, (2006): 204–205.

new concept of Islamic civilization when this project of equal international status through reforms collapsed due to the growing imperialism of European countries:

> Before the 1870s, Muslim reformists had assumed that the Muslim world shared the same cultural legacy as modern Europe (namely, Hellenism and monotheism), and thus believed that they had strong innate capacities for progress and civilization along European lines.[56]

Modernist projections were therefore challenged by the emergence of reactionary and more conservative schools of thought prioritizing the preservation and later expansion of Muslim political sovereignty against Western aggression. Yet, it is reasonable to position Said Halim in the modernist line of thought despite his choice of not acknowledging the nature of his ideals and arguably conservative tendencies.

With regards to Said Halim's criticism of the failures of the Western political system and its adaptation in the Ottoman Empire, in his skepticism towards the principle of popular sovereignty, he expostulates the assertion of national representation and the democratization of society perceiving them as turbulent and detrimental to the social body.[57] In his view, the particularistic pursuit of specific interests by political groups led to a lacking realization of the interests of the society as a whole. A system that attributed too much political power to these interest groups was therefore doomed to cause new social crises.

Said Halim reflected that Islam advocated egalitarianism, solidarity, and social justice, whereas Western political principles merely advocated the defense of personal and group interests.[58] The politico-religious body was idealized by Said Halim as a state of unity beyond social classes in which all members of society shared the same aspirations and ideas. He took a perfected social solidarity for granted in Muslim society, in which conflicts between different social classes would be prevented. According to his design, the political structure should consist of an assembly and head of state but not include a second chamber of parliament. As a member of the Ottoman senate, modelled after European higher houses of parliament, before his exile to Malta, Said Halim was critical about this second chamber's contribution to the political order as it often seemed to mostly serve as an interest forum of nobles. Thus, it did not seem to serve a valid purpose in the regime that he imagined as the assembly would already be composed of honest and competent members.[59] His vision for the assembly included a reduced role for political parties, probably inspired by his own CUP's turbulent parliamentary activity and violent struggle with its opponents. This elected assembly's main func-

[56] Aydın, "Beyond Civilization," 209.
[57] Pacha, "Réforme," 39–43.
[58] Şeyhun, "Said Halim Pasha," 254–55.
[59] Pacha, "Réforme," 50–51.

tion would be to monitor and supervise the head of state elected by adult suffrage. The assembly's supervision of the head of the state, supported by its legislative power, would be guided by its evaluation of society's interest in conformity with the good application of the imperatives of Sharia.

It is worth noting that Said Halim did not articulate a well-defined and functionally positioned room for the *ulema*, the religious scholars and officials, within his desired regime. He did not have a favorable view of these religious dignitaries' activities that seemed overly scholastic to him and were not sufficiently contributing to society's needs in his opinion. Yet, it is not possible to know whether Said Halim sought to entirely exclude them from the political structure. While he was making these deliberations, the Ottoman cabinet abolished the office of the *Shayh al-Islam*, the Chief Religious Official. All judicial power had already been transferred from Sharia courts to the Ministry of Justice, the General Directorate for Religious Foundations moved to a new ministry, and lastly, the religious schools were to be supervised by the Ministry of Education.[60] Even though Said Halim had not been a supporter of this secularization during his premiership, it complied with new political realities and was not seen as a radical change anymore.

With regards to these new political times, it would be crucial to remember the conflicts between members of the Great National Assembly[61] in Ankara that conducted the military campaigns under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, who would found the modern Turkish nation-state in later years. That assembly was probably the socio-politically most polyphonic parliament in modern Turkish history, it was divided between supporters of Mustafa Kemal, suspected to have radical and modernist visions for a nation-state, and a more conservative faction. With the end of the war in September 1922 with the Turkish victory over a Greek invasion, discussions about the adequate political regime arose due to the fact that a new constitution seemed difficult to develop and the capital Istanbul with the Sultan and Caliph was under British domination. Following the abolition of the Sultanate through the simple amendment of an existing law in November 1922, the former Sultan Mehmed VI left the country and his heir apparent, Abdülmecid, was elected by the assembly in Ankara as the new Caliph. The question who should be the head of state remained initially unresolved, while Mustafa Kemal was the chairman of the assembly bringing his overwhelming wartime prestige and legitimacy to the role. Until the proclamation of the republic on October 29th, 1923 and the abolition of the Caliphate on March 3rd, 1924, grievances about Mustafa Kemal's

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[60] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, 1998), 415–16.

[61] The Great National Assembly of Turkey was founded in Ankara on April 23, 1920 in the midst of the National Movement. The parliament is the unicameral Turkish legislature. Mustafa Kemal, his colleagues, and other members gathered outside parliament to establish a new state out of the Empire.

leadership and policies led to a push to establish the Caliph as the neutral head of state.[62]

Said Halim's demise before the new nation-state fully emerged means that any evaluation of his stance towards these developments has to rely on scattered and preliminary documentation. Accounts of witnesses during his exile in Malta suggest, however, that he was genuinely hopeful for the national struggle led by Mustafa Kemal.[63] His last work, examined in this paper, started with the celebration of the "awakenings" in the Muslim world that would free itself from the foreign yoke.[64]

One would not be mistaken to assume that Said Halim would have prioritized Turkey in his design of a Muslim political order.[65] Another key feature of his political visions is that it does not discuss conventional concepts of Islamic government like the caliphate and the *fiqh*, Islamic jurisprudence, elaborated by other Islamists and classical thinkers. The political regime defined by Said Halim rather was a new sort of government that should be conceptualized as a Muslim republic composed of new administrative and bureaucratic elements. His standards for a Muslim political order with legitimacy differed considerably from the mainstream institutions and legal entities preferred by Islamist circles in that time when republicanism was not yet a universally settled type of government.

Said Halim's failure to avert the Empire's participation in the First World War marked not only the start of the disintegration of the last multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Muslim empire, but also the failure of Said Halim's brand of Pan-Islamism, an ideology that he defended against the growing current of nationalism in the Muslim countries.[66] Said Halim did not live long enough to see the end of the institutional sources and symbols of Islamism with the abolition of the caliphate.

Today, Said Halim is considered as an original thinker with very limited effect and it took almost 40 years after his death for his works to be reproduced in Turkey.[67] He is rather unknown in comparison to other Islamists sharing similar orientations like Namık Kemal and Mehmet Akif who wrote, like Halim, for the same journal, *Sebilürreşat*. Additionally, the new political climate in the Turkish Republic narrowed the possible range of proposing Islamic characteristics for the

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[62] Kuyaş, Ahmet, "Le Califat Illusoire qui Cache La République: La Fin de la Monarchie Constitutionnelle en Turquie," in *De Samarcande à Istanbul: Étapes Orientales*," ed. Véronique Schiltz (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2015), 363–384.

[63] Bostan, *Bir İslamcı Düşünür,* 96.

[64] Pacha, "Réforme," 22.

[65] There are also other opinions stating that Said Halim was more inclined in his last days to affiliate himself with the Egyptian nationalist movement led by Saad Zaglul—and that he was even thought to be a candidate to the throne of Eygpt by the movement. See: Hanefi Bostan, *Bir İslamcı Düşünür*, 94.

[66] Şeyhun, *Said Halim Pasha: An Ottoman Statesman*, 268.

[67] Guida, "Grand Vezir Said Halim Pasha," 104. Quoted from: Dogan Ertugrul, "Ismail Kara: Türkiye'de Yalnız Islamcılık Düsüncesinin Tam Bir Antolojisi Var," *Nehir* 8 (1994): 65.

new state. At this juncture, Said Halim's regenerative or arguably modernist vision of a new political-religious body had little appeal and his impact remains to fall behind of statements of Turkish political and social thought.

In Lieu of a Conclusion: New Possibilities and Shortcomings

Islamism can be considered as a political claim and thus the assertion of the need to self-defense in the conditions of the modern world. In this reflexive sense, it can be regarded as a new breed of *kalam*, the Islamic hermeneutics and science of language, seeking to defend Islam in the modern world.[68]

A traditionalist advocates a past which would not possibly have a future, while a modernist attempts to build a future overcoming its past. It is possible to summarize Said Halim's traditionalism as the persistent faith in God's law and the magnificent social body designed by it. Said Halim recurrently highlighted the differences between the West and the Islamic and he systematically rejected the new institutions' impact within Ottoman history. Yet, his political thinking aimed to put an *élan-vital*[69] into practice which would ultimately solve the administrative and political shortcomings generated by the false practices of Westernization identified by him. In Said Halim's thinking, the notion of cultural modernity was totally identified with the Western political, social, and cultural identity without leaving any room to think about the localization of new cultural practices. The Muslims' agency to develop new strategies seemed instead merely reserved to the political order.

The concept of semi-modernity[70] describes this mindset as the employment of the material gains of modernity in the pursuit of an Islamic political order.[71] In Said Halim's writing, this semi-modernity could be observed within two motives: The first would be the described need for (re)Islamization to have a creative dynamic force emerge, while the second would be the assumption that the aims were technical while the customary culture was to be preserved. Said Halim's political body was paradoxically a new agency and enterprise of political culture that was already Islamic without its history to be interrupted. Said Halim, despite his analysis of fundamental differences between civilizations based on closed cycle

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[68] Bora, *Cereyanlar*, 415.

[69] Wasti, "Said Halim Pasha," 99.

[70] The concept of semi-modernity, coined by political scientist Bassam Tibi in 1995, is used to define the Islamic fundamentalists' take on modernity in the 1990s. According to Tibi, Islam (of all religions) is exceptional in Muslim fundamentalists' thinking for its favorable attitude towards science and technology. This view does not assess religious beliefs as contrary to human reason in contradiction to European Enlightenment. Tibi further notes that Islam is also the desired framework for politics and society as the very source of all science for those fundamentalists. This is not a rejection of modernity as a whole, but the employment of the achievements of modernity in order to establish an Islamic political order.

[71] Bassam Tibi, "Islamic Dream of Semi-modernity," *India International Centre Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (1995): 79–87.

essentialisms, opened up new areas of transcendencies and permeabilities; he appropriated formations of the political body, representations, as well as accountabilities, into Islamic conceptions of authority and politics without resorting to the reference to any caliph, person, or precedence from Islamic history.

Said Halim presented a political dynamism endemic to the Muslim society. The subject of dogmatic adherence to prevailing cultural values within the society still presents the challenge of asking critical questions about epistemological differences and breaks in Turkish political culture and the intellectual world. In the example of Said Halim's body politic, it is possible to observe a modernist discourse already observed with Hobbes' *Leviathan*[72] of the 17th century; this work shows similiarities helping to interpret Said Halim. This should not be taken as a modernist criticism of a society's evolution, but rather as a commentary on the Turkish intellectual world which was not able to accommodate alterations; In his famous work on cultural schizophrenia in traditional societies, Daryush Shayegan defined this failure to accommodate the self by virtue of the fact that these new ideas were merely taken as imported. This is because the conscience seemed indifferent to the genealogy of new ideas while, in return, their own world of cultural references was subjected to be reified by themselves.[73]

In this respect of indifference, the notion of counter-Enlightenment associated with the late Ottoman intellectual world again offers a useful theoretical instrument in the case of Said Halim. Aksakal defines this reductionist argument as the unwillingness to be self-critical, clearly represented in Said Halim's construction of a predetermined Islamic society and political regime. Said Halim's constant explanations of the reasons why and how Islamic society could build a better political and social body in comparison to Western counterparts was rooted in his assumptions that true happiness, welfare, solidarity, democracy, and scientific culture always resided within Islam. Said Halim's inferences were never meant to initiate a deeper insight about Enlightenment. His idealizing and blurred view of Islamic society was suited as long as it could be associated with social acquisitions of Said Halim's modernist concepts. Instead of grounding his positions historically, Said Halim proposed a glorified conception that was politically assertive, yet detrimental to its epistemic consistency. An epistemological rupture is prevalent through the lens of this problematization which offers workable theoretical means to comprehend and analyze the neologies and shortcomings in Said Halim's work.

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[72] It is worth remembering that a translation of Hobbes' famous work into Turkish was only realized in 1993.

[73] Daryush Shayegan, *Yaralı Bilinç: Geleneksel Toplumlarda Kültürel Şizofreni (Le Regard Mutilé)*, trans. Haldun Bayrı (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1991), 68.

Barbour Scholars and Fellows, 1928–29. Ann Arbor: Rentschler's Studio. Courtesy of: Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan: HS1352.

Global Students? The International Mobility and Identity of Students from Colonial India and Indochina, 1880s–1945

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This article explores the connections between student mobility and identity construction in colonial Asia from the 1880s to the end of the Second World War. It focuses on the international experiences of students from British India and French Indochina, underscoring differences and commonalities between these two colonial populations and thus, challenging the definition of 'colonial student.' Members of both groups went abroad to complete their educational training. While only a handful of Indians had moved to foreign territories in the last decades of the nineteenth century, international mobility picked up pace from the turn of the twentieth century on. These international students were driven by different motives that reflected individual and collective goals at the same time: getting a degree to secure a professional and social position was as important as being part of anticolonial and nationalist movements. Additionally, some of them were looking for a religious education. Belonging to a specific community—whether colonial, national, or religious—influenced student flows, and identities were in turn shaped by the experiences the students made abroad. Student unions, for example, tried on the one hand to gather students of the same origin while they also aimed to create a cosmopolitan community in some instances. However, connections with the homeland and the community of origin did not vanish during foreign sojourns.

Introduction

In 1921, the yearly *Report on the Work of the Indian Students' Department* noted a "large increase of enquiries regarding education and technical training in Japan and America."[1] Created in 1909 as part of the India Office in London, this department was initially in charge of supervising Indian students in Britain. However, its members were also aware of the development of student migration transcending the imperial borders. They consequently widened their field of investigation in the early 1920s, using British representatives abroad to gather pieces of information.

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[1] British Library (BL), India Office Records (IOR), record Q/10/1/4, *Report on the Work of the Indian Students' Department, October 31ˢᵗ 1921*.

A few years earlier, a similar assessment had already been made by French officials in Indochina. In 1917, the official correspondence of Governor General Albert Sarraut mentioned the establishment of associations by the Indochinese elite to send young men "to foreign countries, where the Western knowledge was taught."[2] He hoped that the opening of a university in Hanoi, the capital of French Indochina, would divert these flows towards the colony.

These two examples illustrate both the agency of students from India and Indochina, able to choose places of study outside the empire they belonged to, and an entanglement of scales, connecting the colonies, their metropoles and foreign lands. Student mobility from colonial Asia actually started to develop during the second half of the nineteenth century. These flows were first directed towards colonial metropoles, either the United Kingdom[3] or France,[4] and travel outside of the metropole remained exceptional until the dawn of the following century. However, some foreign institutions welcomed a few Indians, but no Indochinese, as early as the 1880s: Nishikanta Chattopadhyah was a student in Germany around 1883 while the first Indian student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) enrolled in 1882. Three years later, Anandi Gopal Joshi became one of the first female physicians in India after having graduated from the Women's Medical College of Pennsylvania.[5]

Imperial migration continued to increase at the turn of the twentieth century,[6] but this phenomenon also became more international. It included territories out-

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[2] Archives nationales d'outre-mer (ANOM), Gouvernement général de l'Indochine (GGI), file 26 916, *Création d'une direction de l'enseignement supérieur*: "Minute du gouverneur général de l'Indochine, 1917."

[3] Students came from the British presidencies and the princely states. A report by the National Indian Association (NIA) mentioned more than 700 Indian students in the UK during the twenty years preceding 1885. In 1900, another report estimated that 336 men and 31 women from India were studying in that country. See: NIA reports quoted by Sumita Mukherjee, *Nationalism, Education and Migrant Identities: The England-returned* (London: Routledge, 2010), 16.

[4] A handful of Indochinese enrolled at French metropolitan schools for vocational and higher education, including the so-called "*grandes écoles*" and "*écoles supérieures*" during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Some of these institutions were located in Algeria, recently turned into a French *département*.

[5] Some exceptional cases can be mentioned on the Indian side: Ross Bassett, *The Technological Indian* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 69; Simonti Sen, *Travels to Europe: Self and Other in Bengali Travel Narratives, 1870–1910* (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2005), 192; Caroline Healey Dall, *The Life of Dr. Anandabai Joshee, a Kinswoman of the Pundita Ramabal* (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1888).

[6] In 1907, a British report estimated that 700 Indians were studying in England at that time whereas tens of Indochinese students joined France, sometimes supervised by patronage committees. For this report see: Lee-Warner Committee, "Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for India in 1907 to inquire into the Position of Indian Students in the United Kingdom," in *Report of the Committee on Indian Students* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office for the India Office, 1922), 74; Sara Legrandjacques, "De pérégrinations en fondations. Circulations étudiantes et formation de l'enseignement supérieur en Indochine," *Actes du colloque «Universités et grandes écoles. Mobilités et circulations internationales étudiantes et scientifiques d'hier à aujourd'hui»* (Nancy: to be published).

side of the British and French empires. Japan attracted dozens of Indians and hundreds of Vietnamese in the 1900s.[7] The former also went to institutions in North America and continental Europe, especially Germany.[8]

These trends intensified in the interwar years. Regional mobility was still developing. Indian students continued to reach Japan while the Vietnamese deserted the archipelago's schools until WWII. Some of them chose to enrol at Chinese schools. Moreover, the USSR became a new educational hub. In Moscow, some schools were dedicated to foreign students, including the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, also known as Stalin School.

However, scholars have overlooked this global dimension of colonial education so far. Whilst some of them have already examined academic mobility from colonial Asia, their studies are generally restricted to sojourns in the metropoles and focus on only one empire.[9] In the late twentieth century, historians emphasised the political dimension of student migration. Daniel Hémery[10] and Scott McConnell[11] respectively associated flows of students from Indochina with the development of left-wing ideologies amongst the Vietnamese diaspora, in which the students played a major part. More recently, academics have distanced themselves from this political focus, paving the way for a broader thinking on identities. David Pomfret highlighted the impact of travels on the shaping of the Vietnamese youth. Shompa Lahiri drew attention to "the grappling of two cultures and the discourses through which they constructed each other,"[12] comparing British and Indian identity during their metropolitan encounter. Sumita Mukherjee zoomed in on the fashioning of Indian students' identities during their stays in Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,[13] while Elleke Boehmer drew a more general picture of Indian arrivals in the metropole as her study does not only focus on students but encompasses every category of migrants.[14] In addition to its political dimension, mobility has recently been considered through its individual, social, intellectual, cultural and religious aspects.

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[7] "Chroniques," *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient*, 1906, 3–53.

[8] See for instance BL, IOR, L/PJ/6/1847, file 2128, *University Education in Germany and Facilities available for Indian Students; Enquiries, Printed Reports from Governments*.

[9] Mukherjee, *Nationalism, Education and Migrant Identity*; Trinh Van Thao, *L'école française en Indochine* (Paris: Khartala, 1993); David M. Pomfret, "'Colonial Circulation': Vietnamese Youth, Travel, and Empire," in *Transnational Histories of Youth in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Richard Ivan Jobs and David M. Pomfret (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 115–143.

[10] Daniel Hémery, "Du patriotisme au marxisme: l'immigration vietnamienne en France de 1926 à 1930," *Le Mouvement social* 16, iss. 90 (1975): 3–54.

[11] Scott McConnell, *Leftward Journey: The Education of Vietnamese Students in France, 1919–1939* (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 1989).

[12] Shompa Lahiri, *Indians in Britain: Anglo-Indian Encounters, Race and Identities, 1880–1930* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), XI.

[13] Mukherjee, *Nationalism, Education, and Migrant Identities*, 30.

[14] Elleke Boehmer, *Indian Arrivals, 1870–1915: Networks of British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

Based on these observations, this article aims to globalize historical investigations on student mobility from colonial Asia by examining its connections with identity. How did identity shape student mobility while being fostered by these academic flows? It consequently explores the international dimension of academic migration, focusing on host countries outside of the British and French empires from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. It also breaks down scientific barriers between these two empires, comparing experiences from their two main Asian colonies, India and Indochina. The British "Jewel in the Crown" and the French "Pearl of the Orient," as these territories were sometimes named during the colonial period,[15] were also the greatest suppliers of mobile students from colonial Asia. Indochina was integrated into the international flows of students mainly through its Vietnamese population, while Laotians and Cambodians hardly crossed the imperial boundaries. Only a few Buddhist students traveled to neighbouring lands, especially Siam, to complete a religious training, following paths preceding the colonial conquest.[16] So far, none of them have been found in more distant lands, including Japan, the US, and the USSR.[17] This comparative study of Indian and Indochinese trajectories therefore challenges the definition of the "colonial student" by underscoring differences but also commonalities between these two colonial populations.

Last but not least, this article takes a look at the multiplicity of actors involved in international student mobility, including national and anticolonial activists as well as student unions. By considering these external actors, it draws attention to the shaping of identities transcending the students themselves, based on national, regional or even political senses of belonging.

Using archive material from Europe and Asia, student journals and memoirs, this papers first examines the motives fostering student mobility at a global level. It then observes how identities were negotiated during stays abroad, underscoring the complex shaping of student identities.

From Individual to Global Motives?

A quick overview of student mobility from India and Indochina uncovers its global dimension that spans at least three different continents, but also shows the differences between the Indian and Vietnamese routes. At first glance, the

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[15] On these names, see for instance: Ching Selao, *Le roman vietnamien francophone. Orientalisme, occidentalisme et hybridité* (Montréal: Presses Universitaires de Montréal, 2010), 45–103.

[16] Ann-Ruth Hansen, *How to Behave: Buddhism and Modernity in Colonial Cambodia, 1860–1930* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007).

[17] On the development of student mobility from Cambodia and Laos towards the US during the second half of the twentieth century, see: Meyer Weilberg, *Asian American Education: Historical Background and Current Realities* (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1997), 156–204.

students' imperial belonging seems to influence their educational trajectory. The common use of English oiled the wheels of Indian student mobility towards the US. This was not possible for many Vietnamese students, most of whom could only master French. Between 1920 and 1945 only one of them studied at a US university.[18] The Catalogues of Columbia University, including information on the university officials and students, mention two Indochinese students in 1925,[19] but a thorough look into the university's directories show that they were actually members of the Chinese diaspora in Indochina, sometimes benefiting from an English education outside of the colony, in cities such as Hong Kong.[20]

However, if the necessity to learn the local language could pose a big hindrance for studying abroad, as mentioned in a letter from an Indian student complaining about having wasted six months to learn Japanese,[21] it did not prevent students from moving towards foreign lands. The language issue is not a sufficient factor to explain the shaping of international mobility. Other motives fostered student circulation. Individual goals were one of the main motives to study abroad, but national and anticolonial purposes played a role as well. Students were part of wider communities, based on political or religious features.

A Matter of Professional Status

Students from India and Indochina left their homeland for higher or technical training as some courses were often unavailable in their countries. This phenomenon started in India as early as the 1840s, when Dwarkanath Tagore, a member of the Bengali elite, sent four Indians to London to complete their medical and surgical training after having successfully taken the Calcutta Medical College examinations.[22] The first *école supérieure* in Indochina, specialized in medical teaching, opened in 1902. Before that date, a few students from wealthy families had joined metropolitan faculties and schools.[23]

The later opening of universities and higher education institutions did not put an end to this pattern of movement. Despite the establishment of higher and technical education in India, from the 1850s, and in Indochina, from the 1900s, facilities for further studies remained incomplete. Schools were progressively established in

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[18] "Statistical Summary by Countries of Foreign Students in the Colleges and Universities of the US for 1939–40," in *The Unofficial Ambassadors* (New York: Committee on Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students, 1941), 26.

[19] Columbia University Archives (CUA), *Columbia Annual Report* 1925, 350.

[20] About the education of the Chinese diaspora, see: Tracy C. Barrett, *The Chinese Diaspora in South-East Asia: The Overseas Chinese in Indo-China* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012).

[21] Bassett, *The Technological Indian*, 69.

[22] Michael H. Fischer, *Counterflows to Colonialism: Indian Travelers and Settlers in Britain (1600–1857)* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004), 369; Cécile Deer, *L'empire britannique et l'instruction en Inde (1780–1854)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005), 142.

[23] Pascale Bezançon, *Une colonisation éducatrice? L'expérience indochinoise (1860–1945)* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002), 40; ANOM, GGI, file 23758, *Au sujet du boursier de la Cochinchine Nguyên Khac Cân à l'école de médecine d'Alger, 1888–1889.*

Indochina in the interwar years, slowly extending the educational supply. In 1925 an art school was established, followed by a law school six years later.[24] In India, a 1904 report on technical education regretted the lack of practical teaching in the colony.[25] Some specific educational opportunities remained only available outside of the colonial land. In the early 1900s, Rathindranath Tagore's travel to America was motivated by his will to take agricultural courses, since no course on this topic existed in Bengal at that time.[26] In Japan, most of the Vietnamese students enrolled in military courses, which were not available in French Indochina.[27]

This lack of educational facilities at home contributed to the tendency of Indians and Indochinese to seek their opportunities at foreign institutions outside their respective empires. Additionally, going abroad became a way to bypass the limits of metropolitan training, especially for Indians. In 1921, the Indian Students' Department in London underscored the tendency of Indian students to go to Japan and the US, exposing that "the American manufacturers and business men are more generous in their provision of facilities for Indian students than are English manufacturers and business men."[28] This statement referred to difficulties encountered by Indian students to find apprenticeships in the UK to complete their technical training. According to reports and testimonies on that matter, they suffered from racial prejudice and fear of industrial espionage and competition. The educational trajectory of Keshav Malhar Bhat illustrates these difficulties. Born in 1855 in Poona, he decided to pursue his studies abroad in the early 1880s. He first went to England but was unable to secure a position as an apprentice in a manufacturing firm in the colonial metropolis, despite reference letters from some Bombay merchants. British manufacturers feared that he was "spy prying into the secrets of industries."[29] He consequently left England for the US, arrived in Boston in July 1882 and became the first Indian student enrolling at the MIT.

International mobility was therefore necessary to reach specific careers. Studies abroad had to secure a professional position that could have an impact on the student's future social and economic status. The Indian experiences clearly reveal that these individual motives existed. This was not as clear in the case of the Vietnamese.

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[24] For a global description of higher education in Indochina, see: Hoàng Văn Tuấn, "L'enseignement supérieur en Indochine, 1902–1945" (Ph.D. diss., Université de Versailles Saint Quentin-en-Yvelines, 2006).

[25] BL, IOR, file V/27/865/1, *Technical Education in India, 1886–1904*.

[26] Rathindranath Tagore, *On the Edges of Time* (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1958), 75.

[27] Phan Bội Châu, *Overturned Chariot: The Autobiography of Phan-Bội-Châu*, trans. Vinh Sinh and Nicolas Wickenden (Honolulu: SHAPS Library of Translations, 1999), 90.

[28] BL, IOR, record Q/10/1/4, *Report on the Work of the Indian Students' Department, October 31st 1921*.

[29] Bassett, *The Technological Indian*, 38.

Global Students, National Purposes

Travelling abroad was not only motivated by individual purposes pertaining to professional career and social status. The development of nationalist and anti-colonial movements in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries also influenced student circulation. The Indian case highlights the connection between the mobility of students and the economic as well as industrial development of their homelands when a more aggressive and radical anticolonialism motivated some Vietnamese to study abroad.

Members of nationalist movements in India started to urge for the industrialization of their country from the last third of the nineteenth century. Besides promoting the opening of Indian firms, they used speeches and newspapers to advocate the development of industrial and technical training. In 1884, an editorial entitled "the need of an industrial school" was published to that end in *Kesari*, a Marathi newspaper created by one of the Indian Independence Movement leaders, Tilak.[30] In addition to local training, the Indian nationalists also examined training opportunities offered by foreign institutions. In the late 1870s, the nationalist institution *Poona Sawajanik Sabha* organized a campaign to send some Indian volunteers abroad to get technical training but failed to gather enough funding.[31] About 25 years later, the Association for the Advancement of Scientific and Industrial Education of Indians (AASIEI), created in Calcutta, shared similar objectives. It was planning to create scholarships "to enable properly qualified students to visit Europe, America, Japan, or other foreign countries for studying arts and industries."[32] The AASIEI opened laboratories in India and supported the creation of industrial firms. Here, mobile students took part in a national plan to measure India up to industrialized countries. They also embodied concrete connections between India and foreign territories by going abroad and their exchange with non-Indian populations. During an introduction meeting of the association in May 1904, the Indian nationalist Bipin Chandra Pal summed up the students' role by exposing the association's will to send six students to New York for a year. There, "they would learn all the industries of the place and then return to teach the people the same."[33] There were eventually seventeen students to leave India in 1905 and ninety in 1907,[34] joining different territories around the globe, even though precise figures about their destinations are lacking.

This national, even nationalist, dimension of international mobility did not disappear in the following years. The historian Ross Bassett has recently studied the

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[30] Bassett, *The Technological Indian*, 35.
[31] Ibid., 38.
[32] W. Reginald Wheeler, Henry H. King, Alexander B. Davidson (ed.), *The Foreign Student in America: A Study by the Commission of Survey of Foreign Students in the USA, Under the Auspices of the Friendly Relations Committees of the YMCA and the YWCA* (New York: Association Press, 1925), 108.
[33] Bassett, *The Technological Indian*, 66.
[34] Ibid.

use of student mobility by nationalists related to Gandhi.[35] The Indian diaspora later got involved in this phenomenon, especially in the US. Established in 1942 by Gobindram J. Watumull, a Sindhi merchant residing in Los Angeles, the Watumull Foundation aimed "to promote cultural and economic cooperation between India and the United States" and "to aid in the cause of increasing India's national efficiency."[36] Some scholarships were consequently created for Indian students "to enable them to prosecute higher studies in America and thereafter to return to India to do constructive work for the country."[37]

Anticolonial Identities

Emerging under British rule, these nationalist tendencies were influenced by anticolonialism. Promoters of industrial training took part in the Swadeshi movement, based on the revival of local production and the boycott of British goods. In addition, studying outside of the British Empire can be considered as a way to boycott British education and so, to escape from British subjugation. Some Indian leaders underscored this anticolonial dimension in the early 1900s, when international departures started to grow. In 1907, Harnam Singh Chima published a paper entitled "Why India Sends Students to America?" describing the anticolonial role of this journey: "We came here to imbibe free thoughts from free people and teach the same when we go back to our country and to get rid of the tyranny of the rule of the universal oppressor (the British)."[38]

However, in the case of the Vietnamese, this anticolonial mobility was based on the acquisition of military skills. Indeed, the dawn of Vietnamese student mobility at a global scale matched the launch of *Đông Du*, the "Going East" movement, led by the Vietnamese nationalist Phan Bội Châu. Advised by Japanese politicians and Chinese reformists during a trip to Japan, Phan believed that a modern training different from colonial education was useful to learn how to get rid of the French in Indochina. He organized a network connecting the three provinces of Vietnam—Cochinchina, Tonkin, and Annam—with Japan, using Hong Kong as a stopover. After a slow start, with only three students leaving Vietnam in Winter 1905–1906, Đông Du arrivals reached their apex in 1908 with 200 students, according to Phan's memoirs.[39] Figures remain controversial amongst historians as no official student list is available. After having learnt Japanese in special schools, most of the Đông Du members enrolled at military schools but also in industrial and medical classes. Colonial authorities in Indochina were concerned about this

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[35] Bassett, *The Technological Indian*, 79–105.
[36] National Archives of India (NAI), Proceedings of the Home Department for the Year 1945, file n°3-11-FE/45, *Note from the Intelligence Bureau: The Watumull Foundation*.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Maia Ramnath, *Haj to Utopia: How the Ghadar Movement Charted Global Radicalism and Attempted to Overthrow the British Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 22.
[39] Phan, *Overturned Chariot*, 92.

openly anti-French movement. They negotiated with the Japanese government and implemented repressive measures from 1906 that eventually forced Phan to dissolve its organization in September 1908. Going abroad was synonym to rejecting colonial subjugation and the students taking part in Đông Du therefore defined themselves as anti-colonialists.

This political use of mobility lasted for at least three decades. A limited but still non-neglectable number of former Đông Du members did not come back to Indochina. Some fled to China after the 1908 dissolution, pursuing their studies there, while others stayed in Japan.[40] Chinese military academies and universities progressively replaced training in Japan. Once again, no precise figures are available, but the development of nationalist schools by the Kuomintang in the interwar years is quite well documented in French sources. In 1926, French officials estimated that about a hundred Vietnamese students enrolled at the Whampoa military academy, located on an island ten kilometres away from Canton.[41] They received a practical military training, becoming cadets of the Whampoa army. Even if they aimed to learn how to struggle against colonial powers, their enrolment at Chinese schools exceeded their own national purposes. Vietnamese cadets participated in Chinese conflicts, fighting local warlords and their cliques trying to increase their political domination within the Beiyang government in the 1920s.[42] At the same time, they did not completely integrate with Chinese students, being grouped in a Vietnamese section and benefiting from "Indochinese teachers."[43]

Anticolonialism and nationalism directed Vietnamese students towards foreign lands. Their choices were rooted in their sense of belonging to a national community that had to be freed from colonial subjugation. It also included them in a wider community, sharing the same political ideals. In the interwar years, communism fostered similar flows, both from Indochina and India. Communist schools in Moscow admitted foreign students. The Moscow University of the Toilers of the East was inaugurated in 1921. Its classes were first reserved for ethnic minorities from the USSR but started to admit foreign students from Asia and Africa as early as 1922.[44] The school's aim was to train communist activists to act as representatives in their homelands. In most cases, the students' nationalist feelings did not simply give way to internationalism during their time at communist cadre schools. For them internationalism and anticolonial nationalism were rather two sides of the same coin.

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[40] Phan, *Overturned Chariot*, 97–108.
[41] ANOM, Service de liaison avec les origines des territoires de la France d'outre-mer (SLOT-FOM), record III, file 10, *École spéciale internationale de Canton*.
[42] Sophie Quinn-Judge, *Ho Chi Minh: The Missing Years 1919–1941* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 82.
[43] ANOM, SLOTFOM, record III, file 10, *École spéciale internationale de Canton*.
[44] Céline Marangé, *Le communisme vietnamien* (Paris: Les Presses de Sciences Po, 2012).

Students on a Mission

Migration experiences helped to define and develop the students' political identities. Taking courses imbued with ideology, some of them were integrated into political communities transcending colonial and imperial borders. But these new belongings did not erase their connections with their homeland. Living under colonial rule influenced their decision to sign up for political training and many students who wanted to escape from the colonial stranglehold saw their relief in some anticolonial and anti-imperial ideologies, especially communism, as a way to get rid of the colonizers. Moreover, once graduated, some of them became representatives of this internationalist community and began to spread their ideas amongst their communities of origin. In early 1933, a former Vietnamese student at the Stalin school, Trần Văn Giàu, was sent to Cochinchina to rebuild the Indochinese Communist Party after having helped in drafting a new action programme in 1932.[45]

In India, religious goals also fostered international mobility, due to the influence of Christian missions in the colony. Christian higher education developed during the nineteenth century and colleges supervised by missionaries were affiliated with Indian universities as early as their establishment in 1857.[46] Thus, being a student in India could be associated with a confessional identity, even though these colleges generally admitted non-Christian students too. Societies, including the Young Men and Young Women Christian Association (YMCA/YWCA), were involved in "student work",[47] i.e. activities related to education and youth through the establishment of colleges and student hostels for instance. They used contacts with these students in turn to expand their international networks. Stefan Hübner has studied the role of the YMCA training college in Springfield, Massachusetts. The institution was created to train foreign students to hold leadership positions in their homeland's missions. In 1924, two Indian students joined it and the admission of an additional one was decided.[48] The students' faith could alter their international academic curricula. Religious belongings also drove some Cambodian students abroad, on a smaller scale. Ann-Ruth Hansen thereby examined the trajectories of monk-students completing their Buddhist training in Siam.[49]

Multiple factors and motives fostered international student mobility from India and Indochina. They were connected with and challenged different aspects of the

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[45] Quinn-Judge, *Ho Chi Minh*, 198.

[46] Commission on Christian Higher Education in India, *Report of the Commission on Christian Higher Education in India: An Enquiry into the Place of the Christian College in Modern India* (London: Oxford University Press–Humphrey Milford, 1931), 62–65.

[47] M.D. David, *The YMCA and the Making of Modern India: A Centenary History* (New Delhi, National Council of YMCAs of India–Bharat Yuvak Bhavan, 1922), 63–85, 174.

[48] Stefan Hübner, "Muscular Christian Exchanges: Asian Sport Experts and the International YMCA Training School (1910s–1930s)," in *Global Exchanges: Scholarships and Transnational Circulations in the Modern World*, ed. Ludovic Tournès and Giles Scott-Smith (New York: Berghahn, 2018), 102.

[49] Hansen, *How to Behave*, 83–87.

students' identity, whether it was professional, national, political, or religious. These different motives could intertwine. If some Indian students following a practical training in the US were willing to participate in the development of India, their academic sojourns were also a way to secure a professional position in their homeland through specific degrees. Here, their national identity intertwined with their individual status. The trajectory of Nguyễn Thế Vinh, a Vietnamese student, also underscores a similar entanglement. In 1925, he left France where he had obtained a business degree to enroll at Moscow Stalin School. He then aimed to learn more about communist theory and practice by moving to the USSR. However, once back in Indochina, he stressed his business skills and tended to minimize his links with communist activists in order to avoid colonial repression.[50] Nguyễn Thế Vinh is a good example of how mobility produced complex and negotiated identities that consisted of multiple layers.

If their departures did not completely disconnect them from their homeland, going abroad still implied a physical separation. Thus, identities were questioned during the stay abroad, charting the complexity of the students' belongings.

Negotiating Identities Abroad

Studies abroad disrupted the students' ways of life as the population of their host countries had different manners and customs compared to their homelands. Adapting themselves to a new environment, students on the move also had to negotiate their status and place amongst the academic community. Student unions consequently became another main locus for the (re)definition of identities. However, their existing identities could hamper integration and global contacts.

Threatened Identities?

Mobile students discovered new worlds outside of the colonial land. As they entered a new academic environment, they also needed to adapt their new everyday lives. In the late nineteenth century, this change was feared by specific groups. In India, members of the Hindu community sometimes contested student mobility. Their opposition was linked to their belonging to a specific caste, the Brahmin, and based on sea-travelling restrictions according to the Dharma Sutra.[51] Moreover, prejudices concerning the impossibility to respect religious duties also stimulated hostility towards academic migration. Some Hindu students, including Gandhi in the 1880s, were expelled from their castes before their departures to England.[52] However, these restrictions softened at the turn of the twentieth century and no similar example was found concerning international mobility. In the

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[50] ANOM, SLOTFOM, record III, file 44, *Déclarations de Nguyễn Thế Vinh recueillies par la Direction de la Sûreté générale indochinoise.*
[51] Boehmer, *Indian Arrivals, 1870–1915*, 36–41.
[52] Mukherjee, *Nationalism, Education, and Migrant Identities*, 30.

interwar years, when Devchand Parekh asked his son-in-law studying at MIT to send weekly health reports, he was worried about his welfare rather than about his religious identity.[53] Focusing on students in Boston, Bassett details how Indian students in the US attempted to adapt their habits to a new environment, shopping at grocery stores selling spices and organizing Indian dinners.[54]

Complex Unions

Although Indian experiences in the US underscore daily life negotiations, students abroad also integrated into new academic worlds. Indians and Vietnamese took part in student life, joining and, sometimes, creating student unions. These organizations could thereby be reserved for specific groups of students, whether it be colonial or regional, or based on a general and more cosmopolitan definition of the student community. Examining student unions highlights the complexity of students' identities during their foreign sojourns. They were used by external actors, generally the union's founders and leadership, to build or strengthen a nationalistic, regional or international community. These different layers of belonging were especially noticeable on the Indian side when nationalistic purposes continued to be prioritised by Vietnamese.

Indian arrivals to the US increased during the first decade of the twentieth century and the first Indian student union, the Hindustanee Association of America, was formed in Chicago circa 1912. At first glance, this association, reserved for Indians, aimed to separate them from other communities in the US:

> The objects of the Hindusthan Association of America are as follows:
> (a) Solely to further the educational interests of the Hindusthanee students, present or prospective.
> (b) To seek help and co-operation from people at home and abroad.
> (c) To extend similar scope of work, if possible, to other people of Hindusthan.[55]

Facilitating the students' stay abroad, the association also aimed to expand its goals to the wider diaspora. It transcended regional and religious differences amongst the Indian population to cultivate a collective sense of Hindusthanee identity. In his presidential speech at the second annual convention in December 1913, Sudhindra Bhose highlighted this common belonging, stating that members "all worked through the year, each at his post, not as Hindus and Mohamedans or as Parsis and Maharattas, but as—what is their greatest privilege to be—sons

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[53] Bassett, *The Technological Indian*, 112.
[54] Ibid., 133.
[55] "Our Objects," *The Hindustanee Student: A Quarterly Review of Education* (January 1914): 1.

and daughters of our mother Hindusthan."[56] He also emphasized the shaping of a global Indian student community:

> The third object of this society, it seems to me, is to promote mutual interest and cultivate mutual friendship by extending our activities among the Hindusthanee students in this country and elsewhere…We are hopefully looking forward to the day when all the organizations of the Hindusthanee Student Union the world over will be united in one grand federation, probably to be known as the World's Hindusthanee Student Union. With that object in mind, your president [of the Hindustanee Association] carried on considerable correspondence with the various Indian students' organizations in England, Europe, and Japan.[57]

However, a closer look into the association's activities reveals that this focus on national identity did not mean that Indians were isolated. Bhose stressed the necessity of "close and intimate relations between the United States and Hindusthan"[58] and support also came from non-Indian members. Honorary membership included American personalities, mostly from the academic world. In 1914, G. Stanley Hall, president of Clark University, praised the Hindustanee Association of America as "the union of the East and the West"[59] in a note published in the association's journal, *The Hindustanee student*. This quarterly review included a great variety of articles and news dealing with India and Indian students in the US and elsewhere but also with more global information about the US or other communities. In 1914, the "News Notes" section consequently included a few lines on Chinese engineers.[60]

This fashioning of a common Indian identity did not prevent the students to join non-Indian unions. In 1915, four Indians spoke during a Californian meeting of the Asiatic Students' Alliance, "organized for the promotion of friendly feelings amongst the students of Asia to this country,"[61] alongside two Japanese, one Chinese, one Persian and one Filipino. This continental sense of belonging was sometimes reinforced by the bestowing of scholarships upon Asian students, including Indians. In 1931, some of them enrolled at the University of Michigan as owners of a Barbour fellowship.[62] The fellows were designated as "Oriental students,"[63] also coming from Korea, Japan, China, and the Philippines. They were all women "preparing for medical service among their people"[64] once back in their homeland.

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[56] "The Second Annual Convention News," *The Hindustanee Student* (January 1914): 22.
[57] Ibid., 22–23.
[58] Ibid., 22.
[59] "Note to the General Secretary, Hindustanee Association," *The Hindustanee Student* (January 1914): front cover.
[60] "Table of Contents," *The Hindustanee Student* (January 1914): 5.
[61] "Notes," *The Hindustanee Student* (November 1915): 12.
[62] *The Unofficial Ambassadors*, 16.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.

Last but not least, some Indians joined cosmopolitan clubs, mixing with local and foreign students. Rathindranath Tagore's experience at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) underscores this involvement in global initiatives. He was one of the founders of the UIUC cosmopolitan club in 1906–1907. It aimed to "cultivate social and intellectual relationships between persons of different nationalities through a variety of activities and services."[65] The founding committee included the three Indians enrolled at UIUC at that time, some American students and a Russian.[66]

The intertwining of different layers of identity characterized the involvement of Indian students in unions at the international level. In contrast, the Vietnamese experience was both more restricted and tied to nationalist issues. Only one Vietnamese student association existed in Japan during the first decade of the twentieth century. This *Việt Nam Cống Hiến Hội*—the constitutional association of Vietnam—was first and foremost political, aiming to unite young men undertaking educational training in Japan. It was not founded by the students themselves but by anticolonial leaders involved in Đông Du. Divided into four departments —economy, discipline, foreign relations, secretary—, it was aiming to oversee every aspect of these anticolonial sojourns. It stressed political rather than academic issues, offering the students a space for political activities and discussions without French monitoring.[67] Although the *Việt Nam Cống Hiến Hội* fashioned a Vietnamese anticolonial community, commonalities with the Hindusthanee association can still be found through the elaboration of a common identity, transcending the regional ones. The association and, more generally, Đông Du, brought together members of the three Vietnamese provinces, Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina, when the colonial situation tended to separate them.[68]

A hybrid situation defined Soviet student unions admitting foreign students. A communist club was associated with the Stalin School. However, students joining it were sorted according to their nationalities.[69] Created by the school's administration, this union categorized the students according to their national belonging. However, in the school itself, students were also separated into specific divisions, from "A" to "D". Division A was bringing "Indochinese, North Africans, Arabs from Syria, Chinese, Japanese, American negroes and Hindus"[70] together, tran-

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[65] Breana McCracken, "Cosmopolitan Club Postcards," Student Life and Culture Archives, University of Illinois, accessed June 27, 2018, https://archives.library.illinois.edu/slc/cosmopolitan-club-postcards/.

[66] Teresa Brawner Bevis, Christopher J. Lucas, *International Students in American Colleges and Universities: A History* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007)*,* 79.

[67] Chizuru Namba, *Français et Japonais en Indochine (1940–1945). Colonisation, propagande et rivalité culturelle* (Paris: Khartala, 2012), 18.

[68] Phan, *Overturned Chariot*, 140.

[69] ANOM, SLOTFOM, record III, file 44, *Déclarations de Nguyễn Thế Vinh recueillies par la Direction de la Sûreté générale indochinoise.*

[70] ANOM, SLOTFOM, record III, file 44, *École communiste en URSS.*

scending a national categorization. Here, identity was defined in multiple ways by external actors rather than the students themselves.

Discriminated Identities

The study of student unions welcoming Indians and/or Indochinese emphasizes the difficulty for historians to draw a global picture of these mobile students and their senses of belonging. Even though the used material shows the great diversity of identities, it is of course difficult to tell from it how the students might have thought of themselves in reality.

Moreover, students sometimes experienced discrimination during their sojourns outside the colonies. Racial prejudice in the metropoles was often denounced by Indians, some of them living outside of the British empire. In 1914, *the Hindustanee Student* published an editorial entitled "Oxford and Cambridge bar Hindusthanee Students."[71] But being a colonial student at times complicated the proceedings of the studies at the international level as well. After his return to India from MIT, Keshav Malhar Bhat explained to his compatriots that "housekeepers seemed afraid of the color of Indians."[72] In the 1920s, a testimony from Mr C. for a study by the commission on foreign students in the United States alluded to racial and color prejudice.[73] The committee's report also included the case of an "East-Indian woman…rejected at some twenty-odd boarding houses in one… student centers because of her color" when "another student of the same nationality when refused a lodging place among a group of white women exclaimed: 'I do not mind living with colored girls; fortunately, I have not the Christian's race prejudice'."[74] Racial prejudices did not disappear with the crossing of imperial boundaries and had an impact on the students' experiences away from their homelands. It draws attention to the complexity of attributions to identities, defined and used by the students themselves but also by external actors influencing their migrating trajectories.

Conclusion

A great diversity of actors remained involved in the international migration process during the Second World War. Colonial governments at times encouraged the departure of students and non-governmental individuals and organisations bestowed some scholarships, including the aforementioned Watumull foundation's grant.[75] While the war marked a period of decreasing university enrolments in

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[71] "Table of Contents," *The Hindustanee Student* (January 1914): 5.
[72] Bassett, *The Technological Indian*, 38.
[73] Wheeler, King, and Davidson (ed.), *The Foreign Student in America,* 111.
[74] Ibid., XXIII.
[75] For instance, the government general for Indochina cooperated with Tokyo to organize the departure of some Vietnamese students for Japan. Namba, *Français et Japonais en Indochine*, 227.

the colonial metropoles, international mobility from India and Indochina did not vanish during the early 1940s. This continuity confirms that this mobility played a role in the shaping of higher and technical education in India and Indochina during the nineteenth and twentieth century. By studying abroad, the students first tried to secure a social and professional position and so, to shape their individual identities through educational training. These goals were not a colonial specificity but were shared with most of the students enrolled in higher or technical classes. Some countries and institutions were regionally or internationally renowned and attracted Indians and/or Vietnamese amongst other foreign scholars. This search for a fruitful future could entail complex trajectories, connecting colonial, imperial and international places. Moreover, belonging to a specific community shaped these trajectories: some Christian or Buddhist students were involved in religious training when language skills, generally related to the colonial belonging, influenced the choice of the place of study.

Furthermore, student migration was also a matter of politics with its roots in the colonial situation. Sojourns in foreign countries were a way to escape from colonial subjugation, despite some limited attempts of control by the imperial authorities and their potential collaborators, like Japan during the repression of Đông Du. Students on the move were able to express their political and anticolonial views more freely and through this, to develop distinct political identities. In the case of Indian and Vietnamese students, international experiences often led to the development of a national consciousness. This national sensibility was either fostered by the students themselves, for instance, through the creation of national student unions like the Hindustanee Association of America, or by external actors, including political leaders like Phan Bội Châu. Acquiring specific knowledge was sometimes part of a national strategy, shaping both individual and collective identities.

Last but not least, these patriotic—or even nationalist—feelings did not prevent the development of wider relations. Classrooms, associations, student hostels were some of the places where students of varied origins could meet one another. Students from colonial Asia sometimes laid the foundations of regional and global student communities, based on common academic, political, or religious values, bypassing, but not erasing, their colonial and national belongings.

International mobility consequently reveals multiple and often intertwined layers of identities. However, each experience of mobility differed from one another and materials used in this paper did not allow to probe the students' feelings and thoughts. A global perspective must therefore not lead to an excessive simplification but can reveal the complexity and interconnectivity of academic circulation. 'Collective' material needs to be examined alongside individual testimonies. On a similar basis, the comparison between Indian and Indochinese experiences draws attention to the diversity hidden under the idea of 'colonial student,' unveiling

multiple trajectories despite a similar development of student mobility on an international level.

SIEMENS POSTER FROM THE 1920S: A FITTING ALLEGORY FOR SIEMENS'S
AIMS IN HARBIN AND VLADIVOSTOK. WIKIMEDIA COMMONS.

Business in Uncertainty and War: Trust and Risk for Siemens in Harbin and Vladivostok, 1914–1923

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The view that a long period of globalization ended when World War I broke out in 1914 has long prevailed in economic history. This view, however, has recently been contested and it has been argued that 1914 rather marks the beginning of a globalization of new and different processes. We contribute to this globalization-deglobalization debate with a study of Siemens's technical bureaus in Vladivostok and Harbin between 1914 and 1923, when the bureaus lost contact with Siemens in Germany and were left alone to tackle the difficulties and insecurity caused by World War I and the Russian Civil War. In spite of the new and radically different political situation in East Asia, Siemens did not decrease its long-term commitment to business and its fine-meshed network of branches and divisions there. Instead of decreasing its transnational activities, Siemens adjusted to the increased Japanese and decreased Russian influence in East Asia. Siemens's persisting commitment to business in the region was all the more important as the company had ambitions of restoring the global role it held prior to 1914 whilst at the same time suffering from restricted access to many of its most important markets in the West in the aftermath of World War I. In East Asia, Siemens pursued a conservative entrepreneurial ideology in which trust between its different branches and the need for information about the local situation played a decisive role. When trustworthy business partners had been found and a more predictable business environment was in place, business could continue as usual.

Introduction

> We hereby notify that the Bureau in Harbin has been closed and all traffic with the bureau is halted until further notice.[1]

On January 22nd, 1915, Siemens's corporate headquarters in *Siemensstadt,* Berlin, sent a general dispatch to all its branches, stating that the technical bureau (TB) in the Russian-influenced city of Harbin in China had been shut down because Russia was fighting Germany in World War I (WWI).[2] Although this was not unexpected, the shutdown of the technical bureau implied a great change in the status quo for Siemens, which had built up a network of branches in East Asia integrated into company structures in Germany.

Both WWI and the ensuing Russian Civil War are thoroughly studied parts of history. Studies of WWI have often focused on the war's origins, but social, economic, and cultural factors have come under increasing scrutiny as well.[3] All these factors overlap within corporate history. Among corporate historians, there has been an increasing interest in companies during WWI and the Russian Civil War, including German companies such as Siemens and the sizable German trading firm Kunst & Albers in Vladivostok.[4] However, there are no studies that analyze the role of German companies behind battle lines in the transnational Russian-Chinese-Japanese context in the both uncertain and formative period from 1914 to 1923.

In this paper, we research profound issues such as risk and trust that the Siemens network had to deal with in East Asia in the face of WWI and the Russian

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[1] We would like to thank Robert Kindler and Martin Lutz for their supervision, valuable feedback, and showing us the ropes in the Siemens Archives. Furthermore, we are thankful to Sebastian Conrad for pointing us to the idea of using the globalization-deglobalization debate as a lens. Finally, we want to thank the reviewers and editors of Global Histories for making this publication possible. Mitteilung No. 45, Siemensstadt, January 22, 1915, Siemens Corporate Archives, Siemens Archiv Akte (SAA) 68 La 498: 229.

[2] The technical bureaus represented Siemens's links to the markets in which the company was active. See: Harm G Schröter, "The German Question, the Unification of Europe, and the European Market Strategies of Germany's Chemical and Electrical Industries, 1900-1990," in *Business History Review* 67 (Autumn 1993): 377.

[3] For an overview of WWI, see the second and third volume of: *The Cambridge History of the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). For historiography, see: Donald R. Kelly, *Frontiers of History: Historical Inquiry in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); For the Russian Civil War, see: David Bullock, *The Russian Civil War 1918–22* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008); and: Evan Mawdsley, *The Russian Civil War* (New York: Pegasus Books, 2007).

[4] Martin Lutz, *Siemens im Sowjetgeschäft. Eine Institutionengeschichte der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen 1917–1933* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011); Lothar Deeg, *Kunst & Albers. Die Kaufhauskönige von Wladiwostok: Aufstieg und Untergang eines deutschen Handelshauses jenseits von Sibirien* (Essen: Klartext, 2012).

Civil War.[5] To this end, we use the globalization-deglobalization debate as a lens for an analysis particularly centered at Siemens's technical bureaus in Vladivostok and Harbin.[6] Throughout WWI and the early 1920s, East Asia was characterized by war, social unrest, revolution, and changing power constellations within and across its empires. These factors heavily influenced and limited the freedom of action for a company like Siemens. Although the international system of Europe was shattered by WWI, a new—albeit unstable—state system was established on its ruins. Such a framework never came into being in East Asia. There, the unsettled situation made well-founded decisions extremely difficult, and even the mere exercise of gathering information a considerable challenge. Simultaneously, the unstable geopolitical environment in East Asia represented new opportunities and configurations. Hence, the dynamics within Siemens's network cannot be understood properly without accounting for the unstable and difficult political and economic circumstances in East Asia at the time.

After briefly touching upon the globalization-deglobalization debate, we provide an introduction to Siemens in Russia and East Asia. Then, we analyze the communication between Siemens's technical bureaus in Harbin and Vladivostok and other parts of the company's network in East Asia and Germany and examine how Siemens dealt with the 'new world' in East Asia in which it found itself. We argue that Siemens pursued a conservative entrepreneurship in East Asia, in which trust between its different branches and the need for information about the local and regional situation played a decisive role. A lack of these key factors in East Asia during the researched period impeded efficient decision-making until trust had been restored, regional power relations reconfigured, and territorial questions settled.

The Interwar Period: Globalization or Deglobalization?

A major discussion in economic history is the development of economies around the world from the outbreak of WWI onwards, as a time of increasing

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[5] The Russian Far East is sometimes included in definitions of Northeast Asia only. In this study, however, we include the Russian Far East in the term East Asia. Correspondence between the Siemens headquarters in Berlin and its branches in East Asia are at the core of this study. As no sources dealing with the technical bureaus in Harbin and Vladivostok are transmitted for the years 1915–1920, it is only possible to reconstruct important parts of what happened during this time based on what was written after 1920. This source material is quite extensive, but does not include the technical bureaus' correspondence with third parties such as customers and suppliers. Furthermore, we do also have correspondence from Siemens China and Siemens Japan, to which we can compare the material from the technical bureaus in Harbin and Vladivostok. The archival materials used are memoranda, dispatches, and different letters stored at the Siemens Historical Institute archive in Berlin. The sources are all in folder 68 La 498, counting 273 pages.

[6] See: Antoni Estevadeordal, Brian Frantz, and Alan M. Taylor, "The Rise and Fall of World Trade, 1870–1939," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118, no. 2 (May 2003): 359–407; Knut Borchardt, *Globalisierung in historischer Perspektive* (Munich: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2001).

international trade apparently was superseded by a time of more limited border-crossing trade and a phase of deglobalization. The commonality in this literature is the thesis that global integration slowed significantly after 1914.[7]

According to the economists Antoni Estevadeordal, Brian Frantz, and Alan Taylor, international trade rose from an average of 11% of worldwide average GDP in 1870, to 19% by 1900, and 22% in 1913, before it decreased to 15% in 1929 and 9% by 1938.[8] They argue that the appearance of the gold standard and decrease in transportation costs were the main driving forces behind the rise in international trade up to 1913, and that the increase in transportation costs and dissolution of the gold standard drove back international trade in the interwar period.[9] In *The End of Globalization,* Harold James sees the "collapse of globalism" resulting not only from economic factors such as the collapse of capital flows and trade, but also from a decrease in international migration and policies as well as institutions hindering globalization.[10] According to Borchardt, World War I stopped the globalization process and the Great Depression made what had always been a controversial process less attractive.[11]

This deglobalization thesis, however, has recently come under scrutiny. Sönke Kunkel and Christoph Meyer argue that a period of deglobalization between World War I and World War II is a myth, and that the interwar period was much more than just a transition-phase between two wars.[12] They suggest that the period was a phase of experimentation in which 'problems…, processes, and practices of the twentieth century were sparked, tested, rejected or invented.'[13] Although the international trade levels were low in the interwar period compared to the peak in 1913, the level of globalization may not be assessed solely by using trade statistics. The international and often global spread of inputs, ideas, innovations, and expressions in the cultural, political, and economic fields suggest a period char-

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[7] Harold James, *The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor, "The Rise and Fall of World Trade"; Borchardt, *Globalisierung*; Barry Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and The Great Depression, 1919–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); A. G. Kenwood and A. L. Lougheed, *The Growth of the International Economy, 1820–2000*, 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 1999); Ronald Findlay, and Kevin H. O'Rourke, "Commodity Market Integration, 1500–2000," in *Globalization in Historical Perspective*, ed. Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor, and Jeffrey G. Williamson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Charles Kindleberger, "Commercial Policy Between the Wars," in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe,* vol. 8, ed. Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[8] Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor, "The Rise and Fall of World Trade," 395.

[9] Ibid., 373–96.

[10] James, *The End of Globalization*.

[11] Borchardt, *Globalisierung,* 5.

[12] Sönke Kunkel and Christoph Meyer, "Dimensionen des Aufbruchs: Die 1920er und 1930er Jahre in globaler Perspektive," in *Aufbruch ins postkoloniale Zeitalter: Globalisierung und die außereuropäische Welt in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren*, ed. Kunkel and Meyer (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2012), 8–9.

[13] Kunkel and Meyer, "Dimensionen des Aufbruchs," 8.

acterized by new global opportunities and configurations as well as a desire and attempts to globalize problem-solving processes.[14] Hence, to describe the interwar period as a period of deglobalization based on mere trade volume implies too narrow a definition of what global integration is.

Siemens in Russia and East Asia

Siemens began its operations in Russia in 1849, and over the next decades the company expanded to become the largest one in the Russian electrical industry. The Russian state proved to be an important employer and customer for Siemens, especially in the company's formative years from the beginning of the 1850s.[15] At the end of the nineteenth century, German firms accounted for more than 50% of the total investments in manufacturing in the Russian electrical industry and Siemens was the largest company in that sector in Russia until World War I.[16]

Although Siemens had been exporting to East Asia since the 1870s, its first branch office in the region was opened only in 1892, in Tokyo.[17] This Japanese Agency was followed by several technical bureaus in China after the turn of the century and the establishment of an umbrella organization for the whole China division, *Siemens China Co. GmbH,* in 1914.[18] Due to the steady increase in the number of overseas technical bureaus and the desire to maintain as much contact as possible between those overseas representations and *Siemensstadt*, Siemens established a head office in Berlin for coordinating operations overseas, the *Central-Verwaltung Übersee* (CVU).[19] Within the CVU, *Abteilung Übersee* was responsible for coordinating Siemens's operations in China, in which TB Harbin also played a role.[20]

Interestingly, Siemens's technical bureau at Harbin was not a part of Siemens China, but instead belonged to Siemens's Russian division, *Russische Elektrotechnische Werke. Siemens & Halske AG*. The city of Harbin had been founded by

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[14] Alys Eve Weimbaum et al., eds., *The Modern Girl Around the World: Consumption, Modernity, and Globalization* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Gordon Pirie, *Air Empire: British Imperial Aviation 1919–39* (Manchester: Manchester University Pres, 2009); Iris Borowy, *Coming to Terms with World Health: The League of Nations Health Organization 1921–1946* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009); Marc Frey, "Experten, Stiftungen und Politik. Zur Genese des globalen Diskurses über Bevölkerung seit 1945," *Zeithistorische Studien* 4, no. 1/2 (2007): 137–59; Tomoko Akami, "Between the State and Global Civil Society: Non-Official Experts and their Network in the Asia-Pacific 1925–1945," *Global Networks* 2, no. 1 (2002): 65–81.

[15] Martin Lutz, *Carl von Siemens: Ein Leben zwischen Familie und Weltfirma* (Munich: C.H. Beck Verlag, 2013), 96–97.

[16] Jonathan Coopersmith, *The Electrification of Russia 1880–1926* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1992), 38.

[17] Mathias Mutz, "'Der Sohn, der durch das West-Tor kam.' Siemens und die wirtschaftliche Internationalisierung Chinas vor 1949," *Jahrbuch für außereuropäische Geschichte* 15, no. 1 (2005): 8, 28.

[18] Ibid., 5.

[19] Ibid., 28–29.

[20] Ibid., 28.

Russians in 1899, its Russian population was sizable and the Russian government had built and owned the railway line through the city, the only railway connecting Vladivostok to the rest of Russia prior to 1916.[21] The Russian influence in Manchuria had been strong, but was weakened in the aftermath of the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, when Russian railroad and economic rights had been transferred to Japan.[22]

Due to the presence of Russians in Harbin and Manchuria and Siemens's strong foothold in Russia, it made some sense that TB Harbin, just like TB Vladivostok further to the East, belonged to Siemens's Russian division. Yet, as Siemens also wanted to be able to do business with Chinese and Japanese customers in the region, TB Harbin had been instructed and structured to represent the Japanese and Chinese divisions vis à vis Japanese and Chinese customers in the area as well.[23] This is a strong indication of the strategic importance of Harbin for Siemens in East Asia.

The East Asian market was attractive for companies like Siemens, but also a competitive one, with other players in the electrical industry including British Marconi, Metropolitan Vickers, General Electric, and Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing. Typically, different companies competed to establish monopolies in specific regions. Siemens had a strong belief in the potential of the Chinese market, and its expansion there seems to have been fueled by a desire to assert more control over the Chinese market and gain more knowledge about it.[24] Siemens's rather underdeveloped position on the Chinese market was in great contrast to its prominent position on the Russian market, where it had already developed into a dominant and well-connected actor. Siemens's experience of doing business in Russia might also be a reason why Harbin, with its large Russian population, played such an important role in the Siemens network in North and East Asia. TB Harbin's role, and to a lesser extent that of TB Vladivostok, as Siemens's key to East Asia was challenged as WWI broke out and communications with the rest of the Siemens-network were impeded.

The outbreak of WWI drastically weakened Siemens's position within the Russian and global electrical industry. While the German electrical industry had been the largest in the world at the outbreak of WWI, producing 35% of the total global output of electro-fabricates, the figures had decreased to 23% in 1925. By then, the USA dominated the sector with a production amounting to almost half of the total global output.[25] The companies in the German electrical industry were not prepared in any way when war broke out in 1914, and the shortage of raw materi-

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[21] John J. Stephan, *The Russian Far East: A History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 109.

[22] Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 546.

[23] Sankt Petersburg to Harbin, December 15, 1913, SAA 68 La 498, 268–269.

[24] Mutz, "Der Sohn," 10.

[25] Wilfried Feldenkirchen, *Siemens 1918–1945* (München, Piper Verlag, 1995), 47, 118.

als proved particularly challenging. For Siemens, a limited but continued export of goods mainly to neutral countries and deliveries to the German military proved important during the war.[26] Nonetheless, Siemens and other companies with large investments in foreign countries had to denote great losses because of WWI.[27]

With the beginning of WWI Siemens's Russian division had to be reorganized into a Russian joint-stock company to continue business in Russia.[28] In October 1914, Harbin reported to *Siemensstadt* that: 'as you might know, all German companies in Russia have been closed down, their property confiscated and employees arrested.'[29] For TB Harbin and TB Vladivostok, this implied that their business could only continue after Siemens's Russian branch had been restructured into a Russian stock company. The need to prove itself as a Russian company was present both vis à vis the public authorities and the creditors, who required reassurance that the company was actually Russian in order to maintain the flow of capital.[30] Siemens agreed to put the majority of the Russian division's shares into the hands of known partners and employees with Russian citizenship, hoping that this would stop further interference from Russian authorities.[31] During WWI and the Russian Civil War, the technical bureaus in Harbin and Vladivostok were run on the accounts of their directors and employees. In sum, the outbreak of WWI marked the beginning of a difficult period for Siemens in East Asia, and its technical bureaus in Vladivostok and Harbin struggled to maintain contacts and allocate resources.

Siemens in between the 'Rise and Fall of Great Powers'[32] in East Asia 1914– 1923: Trust Issues, Information Procurement, and Decision-making.

Restructuring to Siemens Japan

During the First World War, the Russian government restricted and monitored communications with its German adversary. In a letter from October 1914, TB Harbin explained to the Siemens headquarters in Berlin that all postal correspondence was being monitored by Russian authorities.[33] If Russian authorities were to find a letter addressed to Berlin, or sent by Berlin, TB Harbin would risk having its properties confiscated.[34] TB Harbin therefore requested Berlin not to send

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[26] Feldenkirchen, *Siemens 1918–1945*, 47–49.

[27] Ibid., 386.

[28] Harbin to Siemensstadt, October 21, 1914, SAA 68 La 498, 238–239.

[29] Ibid., 237.

[30] Ibid., 237–238.

[31] Lutz, *Siemens im Sowjetgeschäft*, 90.

[32] The wording in the title is taken from: Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2007).

[33] Harbin to Siemensstadt, October 21, 1914, SAA 68 La 498, 238.

[34] Ibid.

correspondence to Harbin directly, but via Tianjin in China. Furthermore, letters should be 'translated into English or French, everywhere the word "Berlin" should be replaced with "London,"' and in general the correspondence should be made to look as if it had originated in London, and not Berlin.[35] In the beginning of 1915, however, communications with Siemens in Germany were terminated entirely.

When communication was reopened in February 1920, after five years without any contact, Mr. Heimann,[36] who was unknown to *Siemensstadt*, claimed to be in charge of TB Harbin. He argued that the war had prevented communication, but that the managers and employees had managed to keep the technical bureau running by relying on imported goods from particularly Japanese and American firms. TB Harbin wanted to re-establish connections with the Siemens network and operate as a branch once more. In order to do so, TB Harbin requested goods and assured *Siemensstadt* that the market was viable for Siemens since the Japanese products were of lesser quality. Furthermore, the Russians and Chinese boycotted Japanese products due to Japan's intention to expand into Siberia.[37] In a later letter, TB Harbin reminded Siemens in Berlin that the competition with the Japanese was fierce, and that it required goods in order to successfully compete against them.[38]

However, as Siemens in Berlin did not know whether the Bolsheviks exercised any control over the technical bureaus, it questioned its trustworthiness. Moreover, *Siemensstadt* also needed to form an opinion on the economic viability of doing business in the region. The Bolsheviks initially had relatively little power in the workers councils that were formed in the Russian Far East after the February Revolution of 1917.[39] Despite seizing control in several towns and cities, over the Trans-Siberian Railway, and proclaiming the entire Russian Far East under Bolshevik control, it was the Socialist Revolutionary Party, and not the Bolsheviks, who enjoyed the strongest popular support in the rural areas of the Russian Far East in 1917 and 1918.[40]

At the Second All-Russian Soviet Congress in November 1917, a decree was ratified that abolished private property and established "worker control" in the industrial sector.[41] In June 1918, Siemens's Russian division was nationalized by the Bolsheviks, which started a lengthy conflict with Siemens over its subsidiary companies in the Soviet Union.[42] Simultaneously, the brief Bolshevik rule in Vladivostok and its surroundings following the October Revolution fell as the

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[35] Harbin to Siemensstadt, October 21, 1914, SAA 68 La 498, 238.
[36] The Siemens employees are only referred to as Mr. + surname in Siemens's internal correspondence.
[37] Harbin to Siemensstadt, February 10, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 220–222.
[38] Harbin to Siemensstadt, March 23, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 217.
[39] Geoffrey Hosking, *A History of The Soviet Union, 1917–1991* (London: Fontana Press, 1992), 46.
[40] Stephan, *Russian Far East*, 114–115, 118.
[41] Lutz, *Siemens im Sowjetgeschäft*, 93.
[42] Lutz, *Siemens im Sowjetgeschäft*, 18.

region was filled up with expeditionary forces of the various interventionists.[43] As the city of Harbin did not come under Bolshevik control, none of the two technical bureaus were immediately affected by the nationalization of the Russian Siemens division. Nevertheless, in the face of leftist rallies and still persistent Bolshevik ambitions, Siemens must have been cautious of everything that pointed toward Bolshevik involvement.[44]

A sought-after opportunity to look into the situation in Harbin and Vladivostok presented itself when Mr. Seuffert, a German army captain, offered to report to Siemens on the situation on the ground during a travel to Siberia.[45] Despite working on shipping goods to Harbin, CVU expressed in a memorandum to the board at Siemens that caution was required. CVU in Berlin also found it suspicious that TB Harbin had changed its company name from German to English. Later it was explained that this had been done to build relations with British and American suppliers. Besides Mr. Seuffert, Siemens would send its own investigator Mr. Ehrhardt in an attempt to answer the unanswered questions.[46] Until the trust issue was settled, Siemens decided to treat TB Harbin as a customer rather than fully integrate it into the Siemens structure.[47] Yet, a degree of trust was restored after Mr. Ehrhardt wrote to the CVU in October 1920 that Mr. Heimann had made a solid impression.[48] After this, Siemens could start considering more seriously the future role of TB Harbin and supplying it with the needed materials and manufactured products.

After the issue of trust came the issue of information procurement. Siemens needed to get a clear picture of how the technical bureaus in Harbin and Vladivostok actually operated within the Siemens structures, and how the conditions were on the ground in Manchuria and Southeast Russia. Until WWI, TB Harbin had nominally been part of Siemens's Russian division, but had been directly supplied and accounted for by Siemens in Berlin. TB Vladivostok, on the other hand, had been fully part of Russian *Siemens-Schuckert Werke*, headquartered in Sankt Petersburg.[49] The Russian Civil War, however, had cut TB Vladivostok off from Siemens in Sankt Petersburg and when communications were reopened, it was temporarily being directed through Siemens's overseas department in Germany.[50]

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[43] Stephan, *Russian Far East*, 126, 129, 132.
[44] Ibid., 126.
[45] München to Siemensstadt, April 8, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 216; Siemensstadt to Hamburg, April 22, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 210–211.
[46] Aktennotiz, Siemensstadt (Central-Verwaltung Übersee), May 17, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 195–198.
[47] Siemensstadt to Tokyo, Shanghai, September 14, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 169.
[48] Shanghai to Siemensstadt (CVU), October 11, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 163–164.
[49] Sankt Petersburg was renamed Petrograd after the outbreak of WWI in 1914 and then again Leningrad after Lenin's death in 1924 . For the sake of convenience, we use the name Sankt Petersburg in this paper.
[50] Abteilung Ost to Abteilung Übersee, May 8, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 203–204.

The unsettled situation still made information gathering and well-founded deci-
sions very difficult. CVU in Berlin sent a letter to Siemens China in May 1920, re-
questing information about the political ambitions of the Japanese regarding Man-
churia and whether Harbin was under Bolshevik or Japanese influence.[51] CVU
once again asked for advice in a memorandum from June 1920, this time sent to
Siemens Tokyo, Shanghai, and Beijing. The prognosis was that Japan would cre-
ate a Siberian buffer state between Soviet Russia and East Asia and bring whole
Manchuria under its control.

The unpredictable geopolitical situation—especially the increased Japanese in-
fluence at the expense of Russian influence—gave rise to the question as to how
Siemens should restructure its organization. Siemens welcomed the establishment
of the Far Eastern Republic, which it considered a buffer state between Soviet
Russia and East Asia. Yet, due to the strengthened Japanese influence in the area,
it was proposed to transfer the control of the technical bureaus in Harbin and
Vladivostok to Siemens Tokyo:

> Without doubt it is only a question of time before Vladivostok and the whole Pri-
> morye area lay under Japanese influence and share destiny with Korea (annexed in
> 1910).[52]

Siemensstadt's perception of the strengthened Japanese influence was not un-
founded, as Japan increased its political power in China and the Russian Far East
during WWI and the Russian Civil War. The European great powers' preoccu-
pation with Europe during WWI opened up possibilities for Japan to expand in
China. That Japan attempted to utilize these possibilities for increased influence
in China became particularly evident with the Twenty-One Demands of 1915.
Furthermore, Japan's measures to enforce its will on China and acquire rights in
the Shantung province and Manchuria also included provoking general unrest in
China and the establishment of an independence movement in Manchuria.[53]

The 1917 revolutions in Russia and the subsequent Russian Civil War made it
evident to Japan that Russia would not be able to challenge its ambitions in Man-
churia in the nearest future. In fact, Japan saw possibilities for territorial gain in
Russia and was ready to make the Bolshevik struggle for power in the Russian
Far East a long and difficult one.[54] Chances for territorial gain in the Russian Far
East and fear that WWI would spread to East Asia led Japan to contribute with the
largest expeditionary force in the Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War.[55]

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[51] Siemensstadt (CVU) to Shanghai, May 18, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 190–191.
[52] Siemensstadt (CVU) to Tokyo, June 3, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 187.
[53] Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria*, 1904–1932 (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 2001), 197.
[54] Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932*, 186, 229.
[55] Matsusaka, *Japanese Manchuria*, 200.

One of the engineers of Siemens Vladivostok, Mr. Milgard, had told Siemens Tokyo that the situation in Vladivostok was still very uncertain, but that it was only thanks to the Japanese occupation that the Bolsheviks were not rampaging through the streets and that peace and order were maintained.[56]

Due to their great investment in the Allied Intervention and the importance of Harbin as the main railroad junction in the region, the Japanese were not expected to leave the region anytime soon. Siemens Tokyo estimated the sum of Japan's expenses to be around 1 billion yen (about 500 million US-dollar in 1920).[57] On the one hand, Siemens appreciated that Japan temporarily functioned as a guarantee for private property and order in the face of the perceived Bolshevik threat. On the other hand, however, Japanese expansionism and changing power constellations in the region were a great challenge for Siemens's business.

Japan's strengthened economic power in China and the Russian Far East during the course of WWI and the Russian Civil War cemented the country's position as an Asian great power. In fact, its total share of inter-Asian trade rose from 23% to 30% between 1913 and 1928.[58] What makes this newly won economic dominance even more notable is that it developed at a time when several Asian countries experienced considerable economic growth. China, for example, experienced a similar upsurge despite its unstable political situation.[59] WWI had caused a withdrawal from East Asia by western governments and companies, and in their absence Japan succeeded in securing long-term rights to lease land and extraterritorial rights in China.[60] In addition, WWI sparked an increase in demand for war-related goods that gave an economic upsurge in the short run and sparked further industrialization in the long run.[61] For Siemens, this became particularly evident when Mitsubishi became its greatest local competitor.[62] But Siemens not only established the fact of increased Japanese economic and political influence in the region, it conveyed that it also had clear preferences about who controlled Manchuria:

> Unfortunately, we cannot hope that the Russian influence will be replaced by Chinese influence (because) Japan has managed to get (…) economic and possibly also political control over Northern Manchuria.[63]

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[56] Tokyo to Siemensstadt, July 1, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 178.
[57] Tokyo to Siemensstadt, July 15, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 175.
[58] Kaoru Sugihara, "Japan as the Engine of the Asian International Economy, 1880–1936," in *The Economic Development of Modern Japan, 1865–1945*. vol. I, ed. Steven Tollidy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001), 151.
[59] Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 496.
[60] Sugihara, "Japan as the Engine," 155; Matsusaka, *Japanese Manchuria*, 197.
[61] Sugihara, "Japan as the Engine," 155.
[62] Siemensstadt (CVU) to Tokyo, June 3, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 184.
[63] Siemensstadt (CVU) to Tokyo, June 3, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 187. Our translation from German.

This preference for Chinese over Japanese influence was most likely due to Siemens's fear that the stronger the Japanese influence was, the more dominant Japanese companies would become. By then, TB Harbin had already reported on how demanding the increased Japanese competition was in a letter asking for new investments to successfully compete with Japanese companies.[64]

The worries expressed by Siemens were not unfounded. As WWI drew out in length, it became evident for Japan that modern wars could last significantly longer than it had hitherto believed.[65] In consequent Japanese economic planning, China, and Manchuria in particular, received a special role to reach the goal of economic self-sufficiency for the resource-poor country.[66] In the absence of a strong Russia and with Germany, France, and Britain fully preoccupied with WWI, only a hostile Chinese-American coalition could hinder Japan's imperialist plans in China. The Japanese government's solution was to attempt to make the government in Peking friendly towards and dependent on itself. Hence, Japan provided loans and aid and bought rights for exploitation of natural resources from China as an alternative to the use of military power, which would provoke the Americans.[67] For the Japanese government, only full control over important Chinese raw materials and land sufficed to secure the country in a long war. In order for true autarky to be reached, non-Japanese foreign influence in China also had to end.[68]

Restructuring to Siemens China

Whereas crucial actors in Japan aimed at autarky for their country, German business actors were convinced that the end of WWI would also imply a return to a global economic system based on free markets.[69] This belief was shaken as it became evident that the Entente Powers would introduce tariffs and other measures to limit the amount of German goods on their markets in an attempt to control the economic development and strength of Germany.[70] Despite this and the challenge from the American electrical industry, Siemens and other firms in the German electrical industry did not consider adapting to a less prominent position abroad. Siemens believed in and planned for a future as a global player even if most markets in Western Europe at the time were closed to products from Germany, making markets elsewhere—including in East Asia—all the more important.[71]

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[64] Harbin to Siemensstadt, March 23, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 217.
[65] Matsusaka, *Japanese Manchuria*, 214.
[66] Ibid., 219–220.
[67] Ibid., 206–208.
[68] Ibid., 219–220.
[69] Peter Wulf, "Die Vorstellungen der deutschen Industrie zur Neuordnung der Wirtschaft nach dem 1. Weltkrieg," in *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte/Journal of Business History* 32, no. 1 (1987): 23.
[70] Ibid., 26; Schröter, "The German Question, the Unification of Europe, and the European Market Strategies," 382.
[71] Schröter, "The German Question, the Unification of Europe, and the European Market Strategies," 382.

After a visit to TB Harbin in October 1920, Mr. Ehrhardt proposed a new solution to the restructuring question: to re-allocate the technical bureaus in Harbin and Vladivostok to Siemens China. Ehrhardt also elaborated on the political situation in the region, providing Siemens with long desired information in order to plot its course of action. The city of Harbin, he reported, was under control of the Chinese military governor Chang Tso Ling, who ensured order in Manchuria.[72] Chang Tso Ling had tightened his grip on power in Northeastern China by 1916, but needed Japanese aid and represented an opening for the Japanese to secure their influence in Manchuria without having to turn to military force.[73] The Russian consulate in Harbin, Ehrhardt explained, had been closed down and the city was subordinated to Chinese law.[74] The Russian ruble, moreover, had collapsed and the Japanese yen was the main currency in the city, pointing to the strengthened Japanese influence in the region.[75] During the time of war, the bureaus had been forced to purchase materials from China, Japan, the United States, England, and others.[76] But the changing list of clients brought by the rapidly changing circumstances was also a potential difficulty. An important source of income for TB Harbin had come from the commission for the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), but now a possible French takeover of the CER could exclude TB Harbin in favor of French companies.[77]

The situation in the city of Vladivostok was more critical, Ehrhardt reported. The Entente Powers had retreated, and a 'very red' government had installed itself in the city. According to him, the policies of that government severely undermined business in the region, but he hoped that an East-Siberian buffer state under a different political leadership soon would be established.[78] The East-Siberian buffer state that Ehrhardt hoped for did see the light of day, but this Far Eastern Republic was not much more than an intermediary step for the Bolsheviks to gain a lasting foothold in the region and encourage the Japanese government to pull out their troops by calming its fears of Bolshevik expansion.[79] The establishment of a buffer state worked to a certain degree, as a mixture of wishful thinking and the fact that Japan had control over parts of the Russian Far East led some in the White Movement—and also Siemens—to underestimate the Bolshevik influence on the Far Eastern Republic.[80]

Siemens decided to follow up on Ehrhardt's suggestion to investigate the possibilities of reallocating the technical bureaus in Harbin and Vladivostok to Sie-

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[72] Shanghai to Siemensstadt (CVU), October 11, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 125.
[73] Matsusaka, *Japanese Manchuria*, 228–229.
[74] Shanghai to Siemensstadt (CVU), October 11, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 125.
[75] Ibid., 130.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid., 130–131.
[78] Ibid., 131.
[79] Dunscomb, *Japan's Siberian Intervention*, 120–21; Stephan, *Russian Far East*, 141.
[80] Stephan, *Russian Far East*, 146–47.

mens China.[81] Hence, despite the strong Japanese influence in Vladivostok and Harbin, both Ehrhardt and *Siemensstadt* must have believed that at least Harbin would remain *de jure* Chinese and that Siemens's technical bureau there should be part of Siemens China. At face value, it appears harder to explain the wish to reallocate TB Vladivostok to Siemens China. Yet, we might find an indication by considering the nature of Siemens's dealings with TB Vladivostok and TB Harbin since lines of communication were reopened in 1920. The focus had been at acquiring a sufficient amount of trust and knowledge of the situation on the ground. We might term the focus on such factors a conservative entrepreneurial ideology. We have seen how there was a struggle between Russia and Japan for influence on Chinese soil, and how Manchuria received a particularly important role in this struggle. By affiliating its technical bureau in Vladivostok with Siemens China, Siemens would choose what it believed to be the least damaging solution for business opportunities in the long run. In doing so, Siemens aimed at resuming business as usual without risking disadvantages after the territorial questions had been resolved in the future. For the restructuring to happen, Siemens decided that a liquidation of both technical bureaus was required, a juridical move that would separate both bureaus from Siemens Russia and impede possible future Soviet property claims. Yet, the uncertain political situation in Vladivostok prompted Siemens to have second thoughts about reallocating TB Vladivostok to Siemens China, and the matter was put on hold again. Instead, it was decided that TB Vladivostok was to be treated as a regular customer instead of an official Siemens branch.[82]

In a lengthy memorandum to *Siemensstadt* from December 1920, Siemens China explained that it conceived an affiliation of TB Harbin with Siemens China to be the best solution for now. The majority of the personnel at TB Harbin was made up of Russians who did not want anything to do with the Soviet government and expected a non-Bolshevik government to return to Russia soon.[83] Hence, their loyalty would not be an issue. Siemens China objected, however, to the annexation of TB Vladivostok. Siemens China regarded Vladivostok to be too far away from its base of operations and its connections with the Chinese market to be insufficient. In reality, Siemens China's reason for rejecting to take on responsibility for TB Vladivostok was much likely closer to its own statement referring to messages that business was as good as dead in the region because of the difficult political situation.[84] There was some merit to this position, and also the Japanese doubted the current viability of the region.[85] TB Vladivostok, on the other hand,

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[81] Shanghai to Vladivostok, October 13, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 143–144; Shanghai to Harbin October 23, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 140.

[82] Siemensstadt to Shanghai, November 4, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 153.

[83] Shanghai to Siemensstadt (CVU), December 10, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 107.

[84] Shanghai to Siemensstadt (CVU), December 10, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 110.

[85] Dunscomb, *Japan's Siberian Intervention*, 165.

reported that it expected a rapid return of business activity to the city because it was the only harbor city in the area. In the same letter, however, it was confessed that 'no good description can be given' of the political development.[86] Siemens in Berlin recognized the dismal economic situation in the region, referring to the German trading firm Kunst & Albers for their information. That TB Vladivostok provided such rosy prognosis of business opportunities despite being unable to describe the political development was possibly an attempt to be brought back into the fold and receive needed investments and goods. Due to the strong Japanese influence in the area, Siemens China even suggested to TB Vladivostok that it should be reallocated to Siemens Japan instead.[87] Yet, Siemens China did not present this idea to Siemens in Berlin or follow it up in other ways.

An internal discussion arose after Siemens in Berlin proposed that all communication from Harbin should henceforth go through Siemens China in Shanghai instead of directly to Berlin. A logical move if TB Harbin was to be reallocated to Siemens China. Yet, as can be read in a dispatch from January 1921, Mr. Mühlhardt, who directed TB Harbin, disagreed and proposed to maintain direct contact with Berlin because this would save valuable time.[88] More interestingly, Mühlhardt also complained that the commodity prices offered by Siemens China were always "much higher" than those offered by *Siemensstadt* and that Siemens China did not reply to requests as fast as *Siemensstadt*, if at all.[89] In sum, Siemens China's indecisiveness on the restructuring issue caused increasing frustration at TB Harbin.

The uncertainty regarding the restructuring issue hampered business for TB Harbin. Due to this uncertainty, TB Harbin could not make long-term promises to its British and American business relations, which caused an impasse.[90] A week later, it seemed that Siemens China had finally made up its mind and sent a circular letter in which it explained that it intended TB Harbin to be part of Siemens China retrospectively from January and onward, but that TB Harbin would be allowed to maintain direct communications with Berlin.[91] Later in February, Siemens in Berlin followed up on TB Harbin's complaint by reminding Siemens China that it had meant "mainly financial control" over TB Harbin after the restructuring, but that Siemens China would also be allowed to interfere in other dispositions of the bureau if deemed necessary.[92] The re-structuring issue appeared to be settled, but no legal documents were signed yet, therefore nothing was set in stone. This became apparent when a constant worry resurfaced; the Bolsheviks. In February 1921, Siemens Berlin expressed its concerns that technically, the former Siemens

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[86] Vladivostok to Shanghai, November 15, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 123–124.
[87] Shanghai to Vladivostok, February 3, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 103.
[88] Harbin to Shanghai & Siemensstadt, January 11, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 105.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Harbin to Shanghai, January 15, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 99–100.
[91] Rundschreiben, Shanghai, January 22, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 97.
[92] Siemensstadt to Shanghai, February 24, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 75–76.

Russia could still lay juridical claims to TB Harbin and Vladivostok.[93] The main issue was who the legal successor to the *Russian Siemens-Schuckert Werke* was. Siemens Berlin was not going to recognize the Bolshevik government as long as it was not forced to do so. Instead, Berlin left matters in the hands of Siemens China and stated that it would be convenient if TB Harbin was further reallocated to one of the Chinese branches that resided under Siemens China, in case the Bolsheviks laid claim to TB Harbin.[94]

Serious fear arose when Siemens China received a telegram from TB Vladivostok, which explained that a Bolshevik representative named Mr. Jost would be travelling to Harbin and possibly Vladivostok. His alleged intent was to buy electro-fabricates.[95] Siemens China sent a message to TB Harbin, with a copy to Berlin, which outlined the extent of the deals TB Harbin was allowed to make with Mr. Jost and that it would like to be informed on his position regarding the reallocation of TB Harbin to Siemens China.[96] Doing business with the Bolsheviks was fine in principal, but the possibility of a tug-of-war over ownership of TB Harbin was enough for Siemens China to back down before negotiations had even begun. Either way, this instance put the restructuring on hold once again. TB Harbin attempted to clarify the situation by explaining that Mr. Jost was in fact not a representative of the Bolshevik government at all. According to TB Harbin, the Chinese government would not recognize the Bolshevik Government as long as the Far Eastern Republic existed. Hence, there was no way the Bolshevik government would be able to claim rights of ownership of TB Harbin.[97] TB Harbin interpreted the discussion that arose as an attempt to once again delay the restructuring that had been floating in the air for about six months by then and argued that a further delay would cause damage to the Siemens brand name.[98]

As the restructuring case was still not settled in April 1921, TB Harbin presented an ultimatum. After having repeated its request for clarification 'for the tenth time,' it stated that it had to re-establish connections with American and Japanese suppliers to be able to facilitate customers.[99] Siemens in Berlin was surprised at this as it clearly thought the restructuring had already been completed. It asked for clarification for the delays and once again pressed Siemens China to fully take on responsibility for TB Harbin.[100] The attitude of TB Harbin is easy to understand, seeking stability and predictability to plan its business activities as thoroughly as possible. This wish for stability and predictability regarding its position within the Siemens network must have been especially important as the political and

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[93] Siemensstadt (CVU) to Shanghai, February 4, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 90.
[94] Ibid., 90–91.
[95] Vladivostok to Shanghai, March 5, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 37.
[96] Shanghai to Harbin, Berlin, March 21, 1921, SAA 69 La 498, 34.
[97] Harbin to Shanghai, March 28, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 30–31.
[98] Harbin to Shanghai, April 1921 (exact date unknown), SAA 68 La 498, 20.
[99] Harbin to Shanghai, Berlin, Tokyo, April 14, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 28.
[100] Siemensstadt (CVU) to Shanghai, April 20, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 25–26.

economic conditions were so unclear. The most pressing political question was who would secure the power in the city of Harbin itself and Manchuria in general in the long run.

The pressure from *Siemensstadt* to finally complete the restructuring of TB Harbin to Siemens China was probably not only due to sympathy with TB Harbin. From a business perspective, the logical choice was to allocate TB Harbin to the division with the most knowledge about China, Siemens China. Arguably, the ability to understand the situation on the ground is even more relevant under transformative circumstances like those in East Asia in the 1920s. As *Siemensstadt* had a hard time understanding and keeping up with the rapidly changing political situation in East Asia, it was all the more important to reallocate TB Harbin to Siemens China.[101]

However, Siemens China claimed that it would require technical control in addition to financial control to make business prosperous in Harbin. Siemens China hoped to have completed the re-structuration soon, "under the condition that Mr. Heimann (the director of TB Harbin) quit his stubbornness and try to fit into the organization of Siemens China."[102] Later, Siemens China wrote that the delays were Mr. Heimann's own fault, because he tried to gain too much on behalf of himself and his staff.[103] Siemens China being able to respond with such self-confidence despite clear messages from Berlin that TB Harbin should become a part of its organization suggests a large degree of autonomy in their decision-making, and that Siemens China wanted to take on responsibility for the technical bureaus in Harbin and Vladivostok only if it could do so on its own terms. This attitude is likely a relic from the First World War, when Siemens China—just like the technical bureaus in Vladivostok and Harbin—had to operate on its own and make ends meet by using foreign machines and fabricates.[104] Hence, WWI had decentralized the structure of Siemens in East Asia and especially its branches in China and Japan had managed to become successful without counseling from Berlin. When Siemens in Berlin wanted to re-exercise influence and control, it was met with some distrust, frustration, and demands on the side of Siemens China.

Siemens Japan also got into the fray when its director, Mr. Kessler, wrote to Siemens China that the delay in the restructuring issue was due the uncertain future of Siemens's Russian division. He explained that it was certain that the region east of Lake Baikal no longer acknowledged the Soviet government and was now part of the Far Eastern Republic. What is interesting with this remark is the underestimation or lack of knowledge of the Bolshevik influence in the Far Eastern Republic. For Kessler, another practical argument was that Siemens Japan or China was best suited to oversee the company's operations in East Asia. There-

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[101] Siemensstadt (CVU) to Shanghai, Peking, and Tokyo, June 3, 1920, SAA 68 La 498, 187.
[102] Shanghai to Siemensstadt (CVU), April 27, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 22–23.
[103] Shanghai to Tokyo, May 2, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 4–6.
[104] Mutz, "Der Sohn," 12.

fore, the restructuring should be completed immediately, and Kessler wanted it to be definitive from June and onwards.[105]

Around this time, it was evident that Japan was planning to withdraw its troops from the region. Therefore, reallocating the technical bureaus in Vladivostok and Harbin to Siemens Tokyo was no longer an option. The restructuring issues were temporarily settled with a circular letter to all Siemens branches from October 1921. Siemens explained that East-Siberia and Manchuria would be covered by the technical bureaus in Harbin and Vladivostok, as had been the case up until then. All traffic designated for the region should be addressed to Shanghai, which also settled the 'lines of communication'-question.[106] Siemens was still careful, however, not to involve itself too much with the bureaus, as the Russian Civil War was still ongoing and the political conditions in the area were still uncertain.

Towards the end of 1922, it became evident that the Whites could no longer sustain their effort to fight the Bolsheviks. Hence, their last troops left Eastern Siberia at the end of October that year, around the same time as the last Japanese forces withdrew from the region.[107] On November 14th, 1922, the government of the Far Eastern Republic issued an act in which it transferred its authority to a popular assembly that again transferred its power to the Bolshevik government on that very same day.[108] Consequently, the city of Vladivostok had come under Soviet control, leaving only TB Harbin to be rebranded as part of Siemens China.

The going back-and-forth with the allocation-question was caused by Siemens's conservative entrepreneurship, according to which a strong basis of trust and information was needed to make decisions. For Siemens in East Asia, the unanswered questions were: Who would dominate Manchuria, and by whom would Russia—in particular the Russian Far East—be governed? Before those questions had been answered, Siemens in Berlin adopted a wait-and-see attitude and refrained from taking a firm stand in the allocation-question. The commitment to business in the region, however, was never called into question. By 1923, a rebranded TB Harbin residing under Siemens China was reopened, the Bolsheviks had established themselves throughout Siberia and the former Russian Far East had been turned into a Soviet Far East without Japanese presence.[109]

Simultaneously, the Treaty of Rapallo (April 1922) turned Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia into partners and Lenin's project to speed up the electrification of the country turned the Bolshevik Government and Siemens into partners. After the territorial questions had been settled and the Russian Civil War had ended, Siemens China reestablished a full-fledged branch in Harbin. This was in

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[105] Tokyo to Shanghai, April 22, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 12.

[106] Rundschreiben nr. 6, Siemensstadt (CVU), October 7, 1921, SAA 68 La 498, 3.

[107] Canfield Smith, *Vladivostok under Red and White Rule: Revolution and Counterrevolution in the Russian Far East, 1920–1922* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), 164.

[108] Smith, *Vladivostok under Red and White Rule*, 165.

[109] Nachtrag 9 zur Mitteilung nr. 115 C.T.B., Siemensstadt, October 8, 1923, 2.

accordance with the conservative entrepreneurship that Siemens pursued in East Asia. When political and economic conditions had become more predictable and enough information could be provided, well-founded decisions could be made.

Conclusion

The radio silence and uncertainty that followed World War I and the Russian Civil War had profound consequences for Siemens's business in Vladivostok and Harbin and East Asia in general. With its conservative entrepreneurial ideology as a basis, Siemens was dependent on trust and well-founded information to make decisions. The fundament for such thought-through decisions was shattered when Siemens's fine-meshed network of branches, divisions, and the corporate head-quarter was thrown into disorder and the internal lines of communication were impeded following the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Siemens's first step after its network was reconnected around 1920 was to restore a level of trust in its own bureaus in Vladivostok and Harbin, as trust was crucial to secure the credibility of information and decide on the extent to which very limited monetary resources should be allocated to these technical bureaus. Although a steadily growing basis of trust was laid, the unsettled situation in Manchuria and the Russian Far East in this period as well as different experiences during the time of radio silence hindered the Siemens-network from running smoothly until regional power relations had been reconfigured and territorial questions settled. As long as the local and regional situation remained unclarified and unpredictable, tactical and strategic decisions were hardly possible to make and the self-interests of divisions and branches were allowed to temporarily paralyze decision-making. For Siemens, however, being precautious and conservative was more important than making fast decisions.

The temporarily reduced trade relations could give the impression that deglobalization in fact occurred. Yet, such a conclusion is premature because a definition of globalization must include not only trade numbers, but also the level of commitment to global networks in which organizations, institutions, and people interact. Although the level of trust within the Siemens network decreased and fresh investments were put on hold and replaced by a wait-and-see attitude and precaution during the period of crisis, Siemens's long-term commitment to business in the region did not decrease. The regional divisions, the coordinating apparatus in Germany, and regional branches operated as usual and Siemens actively tried to gather information in order to understand the new geopolitical situation in the area. Siemens's internal correspondence suggests that the difficult period for the company in East Asia was characterized by analysis of and adjustments to the decreased Russian and increased Japanese influence. Much of the correspondence between Siemens's branches in East Asia and Germany dealt with how to handle

the increased competition from Japanese companies. Siemens, both in East Asia and in Germany, conveyed that it was always a question of how—and not if—this strengthened position of Japanese companies in the region should be accommodated.

The persisting commitment to business in the region was all the more important as Siemens had ambitions of becoming an important world player again whilst at the same time suffering from restricted access to many of its most important markets in the West in the aftermath of World War I. As the commitment to human and material capital and business in general was still in place, business activities could be normalized as soon as trustworthy partners and a safer and more predictable business environment was again in place. Preparing itself for a free world market to reappear under more stable political conditions and at the same time striving to regain its position as a world player in such a free market, this was not a period of deglobalization for Siemens in East Asia.

Juan Gris. Portrait of Pablo Picasso. 1912. The Art Institute of Chicago.

'A New Head—A New Way of Living': The Sixties' New Man

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The first half of the twentieth century witnessed mass public mobilisations in the Western world on a scale never seen before or since. As the West, and more specifically the United States, lurched from First World War to economic depression and then back into another global conflict, society was changed irrevocably. This study posits that, in response to the new world forged in the first half of the twentieth century and enabled by the unique post-war socio-political context, young activists developed a new historical agent to negotiate this changing world, a 'new man' for the Sixties. This radical new subjecthood, 'a new head—a new way of living' as U.S. academic Charles Reich put it, was the product of a dialectical process, an acknowledgement and rejection of the past combined with a wholehearted embrace of the future and all its possibilities. This new man, previously unremarked upon in Sixties historiography, is a conceptual tool that allows us to see the different, and at times paradoxically interrelated characteristics of the Counterculture, all of which express its proponents' hunger for newness and their desire to claim agency in a world where the capacity to bring change seemed to have been stifled by those in power. It was a conscious rejection of both the privations previously suffered by their parents, and a rejection of the comfortable lives of conformity that had been preordained for them.

Introduction

'Welcome to the first manifestation of the Brave New World' declared Buddha, former marine drill instructor and now master of ceremonies at 'The First Human Be-In' at Golden Gate Park in January 1967.[1] Buddha's audience was a large gathering of hippies, students, radicals and bohemians, a microcosm of the larger conglomeration of social groups that came to be known as the 1960s Counterculture. Despite the heterogeneity and disparate worldviews of those assembled,

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[1] Peter Braunstein, "Forever Young: Insurgent Youth and the Sixties Culture of Rejuvenation," in *Imagine Nation: the American Counterculture of the 1960s and '70s*, ed. Peter Braunstein and Michael William Doyle (New York: Routledge, 2002), 251.

what bound them together and allows for their designation under a single moniker was their commitment to change and the shared belief that the old order was in its death throes. But if the Counterculture's various prophets and ideologues had correctly diagnosed the birth pangs of a new world as the Sixties dawned, then who would be its inhabitants? From where would they come? And what would they look like? I propose that, like the fascists and the Soviets and even the great modernists, Marx and Nietzsche, before them, the Counterculturalists articulated what we might call a 'new man' to occupy this 'Brave New World.' Clearly, the new man concept has had a long and, at times, inauspicious history, and yet the Counterculturalists re-animated and reformed the idea of a radical new consciousness to envision a new man of their own, an idealized agent that would inhabit the utopia they foresaw. Like the Counterculture itself, which was a patchwork of groups and ideas, their new man incorporated disparate and often paradoxical intellectual traditions and ideologies, drawing inspiration from across time and space.

If we delve into sources from the 1960's, we see that the term 'new man' was actively adopted and applied by contemporary actors. It was perhaps Frantz Fanon that wielded the term most enduringly when in *The Wretched of the Earth* he urged 'comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man.'[2] Fellow 'Third World' revolutionary, Che Guevara, claimed in 1965 that 'in this period… we can see the new man and woman being born.'[3] Seemingly a million miles from Fanon and Guevara, U.S academic Charles Reich was also calling for 'a new head—a new way of living—a new man.'[4] This preoccupation with a new man, a radical new subjecthood, pervades what was known in the U.S. as 'the Movement' (the contemporary term for the Counterculture) but for brevity's sake, rather than simply parading the sheer quantity of allusions (for there were many more), we must extrapolate who the Sixties new man was, what were his ideal attributes and what can this reveal to us about the Sixties more generally, both in the U.S. and around the world.

Throughout this study I shall refer to the Counterculture, the Movement or even the Sixties generation, and it should be noted that I use these terms interchangeably to designate the same loose coalition of groups that rebelled against the norms of mainstream society during this period. I use these terms as umbrella ones to encompass an array of different groups that perhaps would not have been enamoured with the idea of being banded together, from the doctrinaire politicos of the New Left to the more culturally exploratory groups that have become known as hippies. My intention is not to offend or distort with this catch-all phi-

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[2] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 255.
[3] Che Guevara, "Socialism and Man in Cuba" (1965), Marxists International Archive, accessed September 21, 2017, https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1965/03/man-socialism.htm.
[4] Charles A. Reich, *The Greening of America* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 5–6.

losophy, and certainly it is crucial to bear in mind that the Counterculture could encompass a huge spectrum of often contradictory worldviews, but I hope to show that there were certain identifiable characteristics that most or all of these groups displayed, hence the utility of the Sixties new man concept. Patrick Manning has shown how disparate social groups can 'periodically link up with each other so as to create aggregated social movements, occasionally with worldwide impact.' Manning applies his theory to the push for democracy at the end of the twentieth century but the same can be said of the Counterculture of the 1960s: we see an aggregated movement bound together by shared grievances and what Manning calls 'symbolic communication.'[5]

I limit the scope of my study to the American context but proffer the tentative hypothesis that the new man phenomenon is one that can be applied across Western Europe, in the multiple locales where youth led protest erupted, fueled by a shared repository of grievances, from the Vietnam War to the vestiges of authoritarianism, that allow scholars to speak of a transnational 1960s movement. It would, however, take a far larger study to prove such a theory and so I will demonstrate what I perceive to be the pertinent attributes of the new man with recourse only to the U.S. and then rely upon others to ground the theory in diverse locales. Two historians of imperialism, Christoph Kamissek and Jonas Kreienbaum, have recently utilised the metaphor of an 'imperial cloud' to demonstrate how varying imperial powers tapped in to a common repertory of discourse and technique to legitimize and implement colonial rule in vastly different contexts.[6] My suspicion is that a similar phenomenon was at play during the Sixties as actors from around the world took knowledge from the same 'cloud', drawing from this common stock to define a new historical consciousness and defining how to become a new man in the Sixties.

I want to situate this study within a broader historiographical framework and enumerate what the (re)discovery of a new man means for Sixties historiography. There is an increasing tendency and vogue, particularly in the U.S. context, to deprive the Counterculture of its radicalism and view the Movement as merely another way station in the road to neoliberal capitalist hegemony.[7] The Counterculture and consumption were certainly inextricably linked and yet to see the new man and the Sixties more generally as just a generation 'acting out' or simply as rabid consumers is a reductive and dismissive analysis. The Sixties new man was conceived of precisely as a reaction to an all-consuming structuralism that

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[5] Patrick Manning, "Linking Social Movement Networks, 1989–1992," in *Social Movements and World-System Transformation*, ed. Jackie Smith, Michael Goodhart, Patrick Manning, and John Markoff (New York: Routledge, 2016), 61.

[6] Christoph Kamissek and Jonas Kreienbaum, "An Imperial Cloud? Conceptualising Interimperial Connections and Transimperial Knowledge," *Journal of Modern European History* 14, no. 2 (2016): 164–82.

[7] See, for example: Thomas Frank, *The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture and the Rise of Hip Consumerism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

defined the first half of the Twentieth Century: the Baby Boomers had seen the depravations their parents had suffered in Two World Wars and a global economic depression, and how this had rent autonomy from their hands, compelling them to sacrifice all at the altar of public duty. We might commemorate them now as 'the greatest generation,'[8] but in the eyes of those that grew to maturity in the aftermath of the Second World War, their parents and grandparents had been driftwood on the tides of history, overwhelmed and powerless to the greater forces at work; forces like authoritarianism that appeared to have survived the conflagrations of the first half of the twentieth century. The Sixties generation and the new consciousness that I call the Sixties new man was a conscious rejection of this fate, a declaration of right to assert agency within broader political, social and economic structures. It was a new man as subject, 'as a living being capable of response, judgement and action in and on the world'.[9]

To my knowledge there has been no such study conducted to date. There have been innumerable monographs that look backwards from the precipice of the Sixties. My emphasis, however, is on the new, the novelty of the era, the fixation with creating a different way of living. In the sense that this study breaks new ground and gives a name to that which was previously anonymous it will at times frustrate and perhaps even pose more questions than answers; it is something of a heuristic endeavour, intentioned to provoke and be elaborated upon. I see this study as part of what I might term a 'new historiography' of the Sixties, elaborated primarily by a post-Sixties generation of scholars who have moved away from phenomenological accounts of the era, focusing on 'big' events and leaders within a national context, towards a more global, interconnected study of the period.[10]

Part One: Taxonomy and Origins

(Un-)Gendering the New Man

Thus far, the term 'new man' has been blithely used with apparent disregard for its gendered implications, and yet this belies an initial reluctance to employ the term at all within this study, due to the implicit gender bias and assumptions that such a term evokes. The hope at the outset of this project was that perhaps it would be appropriate to speak of a 'new human' rather than a 'new man,' however such hopes were quickly dashed when faced with the reality of a movement that, as Tim Hodgdon puts it 'offers historians' the opportunity to study the foun-

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[8] A framing that owes much to: Tom Brokaw, *The Greatest Generation* (New York: Random House, 1998).

[9] Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (London: Verso, 1983), 27.

[10] For a comprehensive account of the development of Sixties historiography, see: Simon Hall, "Framing the American 1960s: A Historiographical Review," *European Journal of American Culture* 31, no. 1 (2012): 5–23.

dational gender assumptions of American society at that time closest to our own when men articulated their sexual politics absent the kind of circumspection that radical-feminist criticism now inspires in some circles.'[11]

It is fitting that Che Guevara should loom so large in the Sixties imagination and perhaps exemplify the new man as it was then conceived, for it is the fantasy of the gun toting rebel that encapsulates the machismo that came to characterise the Movement, along with boyish fantasies of masculine rebellion. Mark Rudd, one of the founders of the Weathermen attested to this, saying 'I wanted to be a hero, like Che. A male, liberating hero, unafraid to die, because in my death I would inspire the people to greater sacrifice and victory…Violence is how men prove themselves.'[12] The Counterculture enshrined an assumptive pre-eminence for men within the Movement and it is evident that gender constructs remained essentialist, heteronormative and hierarchical.[13] While they may have challenged patriarchal power and upset certain gender assumption (e.g. the correct hair length for men), the Counterculture certainly did not challenge patriarchy.

In the context of this study then, contemporary conceptions of who constituted a historical subject were as reactionary as they had ever been: men were seen as the prime movers of history, the ones that could affect change and thus it was assumed that men would be the progenitors of a new consciousness.[14] It soon became clear that due to the contemporary perception that men were the protagonists of history, the clear marginalization of women in the Movement, as well as the contemporary usage of the term, that 'new man' is the appropriate moniker to apply to the phenomenon that I have identified and am describing in this study, as to use a term with which contemporaries would not have been familiar simply feels like too much of an imposition. The problem of course with such an acknowledgement is that this study can simply reproduce the assumptions of the historical subjects on whom it focuses, 'parroting' them by implicitly (if unintentionally) reinforcing the silent assumption of man as universal, for as Judith A. Allen has observed, in relations of dominance, 'the dominant group remains unmarked, transparent, unscrutinized.'[15] There has been much excellent recent scholarship on the history of masculinities but unfortunately, the 1960s has yet to be the recipient of the kind of 'holistic' gender history study that the period requires, a history that builds on twenty years of women's history scholarship, analyzing masculinity as part of

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[11] Tim Hodgdon, *Manhood in the Age of Aquarius: Masculinity in Two Countercultural Communities, 1965–83* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), xxxi.

[12] Mark Rudd, "The Male Cult of Martyrdom: Saying Adios to Che" (2010), War Resisters' League, accessed September 22, 2017, https://www.warresisters.org/win/win-spring-2010/male-cult-martyrdom-saying-adios-che.

[13] Gretchen Lemke-Santangelo, *Daughters of Aquarius: Women of the Sixties Counterculture* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 2.

[14] Sara M. Evans, *Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left* (New York: Vintage, 1979).

[15] Judith A. Allen, "Men Interminably in Crisis? Historians on Masculinity, Sexual Boundaries, and Manhood," *Radical History Review* 28 (2002): 192.

larger gender and cultural processes.'[16] At times during this study I will point to moments at which gender has played a particularly crucial role in the formation of the Sixties new man, points at which perceptions of masculinity or femininity have been instrumental in defining what the new man would look like. Unfortunately, however, it is beyond the remit of this study to provide the kind of integrative gender history account that scholars like Gail Bederman have called for, just as it would be impossible within this study to offer a comprehensive analysis of race or class within the formation of the new man.

'Suburbia is where the Sixties Came From': The Roots of the New Man[17]

In the concluding chapter of an edited volume on the protests of 1968, Charles Maier proffers a pithy reworking of the infamous Situationist epithet, proposing that '*sous les pavés la passé*,' translating as 'under the paving stones, the past.'[18] For Maier, only through an understanding of the Fifties can we comprehend the convulsions that would erupt a decade later, and while this seems an obvious point to make it is a particularly relevant observation in the context of this study. For while, as I emphasised earlier, the Counterculture had a futurist orientation, the Sixties new man was very much the product of a dialectical process, a process that was as much an acknowledgement and rejection of the past as it was a whole-hearted embrace of the future.

The notion of a new man is by no means new, although it is a uniquely modern phenomenon. Marshall Berman, the Marxist philosopher and humanist, characterised the modern experience as 'to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world —and, at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are.'[19] From the eighteenth century onwards, thinkers and ideologues have sought to forge a man fit for these times. Writing in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, Marx saw a world in which 'all fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air.'[20] Marx though, never the pessimist that he is perceived to be, prescribed that 'the new-fangled forces of society want only to be mastered by new-fangled men,' the men, of course, of the working class. A quarter of a

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[16] Gail Bederman, "Review of Kim Townsend's *Manhood at Harvard* (1996)," *Journal of American History* 84 (1997): 680.

[17] Taken from an interview with: Charles Reich, "The Greening of America turns 40" (2010), *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation*, accessed September 22, 2017, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/the-greening-of-america-turns-40-1.913853.

[18] In its original form the Situationist slogan went '*Sous les pavés la plage*' translating as 'under the paving stones, the beach.' See: Charles S. Maier, "Conclusion: 1968, Did It Matter?" in *Promises of 1968: Crisis, Illusion, and Utopia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011), 423.

[19] Berman, *All That Is Solid,* 15.

[20] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (London: Penguin, 2002).

century later, Nietzsche, heir to a Godless world, saw a society bereft of values and morality but, like Marx, saw only an abundance of opportunities, for into this nihilistic abyss would step Nietzsche's *übermensch*, the 'man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow.'[21]

Fifty years later with Europe in ruins after the Great War, and Marx and Nietzsche's new men conspicuous by their absence, an updated conception of the idealised modern subject was forged. Borrowing heavily from their nineteenth century predecessors but maiming and distorting their concepts to legitimate a hideous new vision, an emergent fascist ideology spread through Europe. It is with this movement, along with their totalitarian counterpoint in the East, the Soviets, that the very notion of a new man shall forever be associated, irrevocably tarnished by the affiliation with ideologies that produced World War II, the *Gulags* and Auschwitz.[22] Under the auspices of totalitarianism, the new man was shorn of Nietzschean individualism and sublimated all to the needs of the collective, yet gone was the benevolence and humanity of Marx's communitarianism. It is under this etymological burden that the very mention of a new man labours and yet like these earlier incarnations, the Sixties new man must be interpreted as another attempt to impose meaning on the modern condition and a world in which 'all that is solid melts into air.' What distinguishes the Sixties new man from earlier manifestations of the concept, however, is the unique combination of '*la passé*' that Maier referred to and the inimitable intellectual and social milieu of the Sixties.

Young Americans were thrust into a world defined by the Cold War binary of 'Free versus Unfree' and the Manichean logic that accompanied such a dichotomy. In the eyes of the Baby Boomers however the delineating line between the two worlds was becoming increasingly indistinguishable: Cold War propaganda proclaimed the suburbs as the apotheosis of American freedom, and yet how did the 'hypnotized consumership' of Fordist society or the social and political repression of McCarthyism represent freedom?[23] Such concerns were also visible in wider society: take for instance a critical discussion of the white collar suburban man in a high-profile *Life* magazine article entitled 'The New American Domesticated Male' or William Whyte's sociological study *The Organization Man,* in which one participant jokes that suburbia is 'a Russia, only with money.'[24]

This fear of the stultifying effect of conformity led to what Timothy Melley has termed 'agency panic,'[25] the belief in Cold War America that powerful yet invis-

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[21] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (London: Penguin, 2003).

[22] Arnd Bauerkämper, "Der Neue Mensch," Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, accessed September 14, 2017, http://docupedia.de/zg/Bauerkaemper_neue_mensch_v1_de_2017.

[23] Leerom Medovoi, *Rebels: Youth and the Cold War Origins of Identity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 20.

[24] William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), 310.

[25] Timothy Melley, "Agency Panic and the Culture of Conspiracy," in *Conspiracy Nation: The Politics of Paranoia in Postwar America*, ed. Peter Knight (New York: New York University Books, 2002), 57–81.

ible new structures were coming to determine the individual's every action. When considered alongside Soviet ideology, it seemed that each society represented a side of the same coin: ostensibly adversarial and yet paradoxically mutually reinforcing. These were the conditions that facilitated the rise of a new, independent consciousness within the Counterculture, a new way between the grand visions of capitalism and communism. Increasingly, there was as Jean-Francois Lyotard would put it in his 1979 diagnosis of 'The Postmodern Condition,' an 'incredulity towards meta-narratives' amongst the post-war generation, for it was these meta-narratives with their political avatars (nationalism manifested through fascism for instance) that had led to the horrors of two world wars.[26] Now, confronted with two more hegemonic meta-narratives, the Sixties generation sought to forge a new ideal society and new man to inhabit this utopia, one that was neither overtly capitalistic or communistic. Thus conceptualized, the new man can be perceived as a rejection of the world according to Yalta: the neat compartmentalization of the globe into certain spheres of power and influence, and on a human level, the compartmentalization of life into whatever path these respective ideologies preordained.

Here it is worth noting the highly gendered subtexts that undergird these discourses of 'agency panic', embedded cultural scripts that equate social control with femininity, emasculating and violating 'the borders of the autonomous self'.[27] These fears over the feminizing effects of social control are indicative of what has been conceptualized (both contemporaneously and retrospectively) as a broader postwar crisis of masculinity, as evinced by an article by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (later President Kennedy's court historian) hysterically titled 'The Crisis of American Masculinity.'[28] We would do well to remember what critics of histories of masculinity have rightly observed, that since the inception of this sub discipline of gender history, it seems masculinity has been in a perpetual state of crisis: 'it is a wonder they ever got out of bed in the morning,' as Toby L. Ditz wryly observed.[29]

'Agency panic' and fear of alienation were given form and articulated by contemporary ideologues who became icons of the Movement. The cynicism, detachment and pessimism that would come to characterise Lyotard's postmodern consciousness were a decidedly post-Sixties phenomenon, and by contrast, the Counterculture was saturated in romanticism, optimism and a genuine belief that they could create change; that if first they remade *the self* (the new man) then this would precipitate wider social change. In this epistemological optimism they were very much indebted to the nineteenth century intellectual tradition, from

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[26] Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
[27] Melley, "Agency Panic," 32–37.
[28] Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "The Crisis of American Masculinity," *Esquire* 50, no. 5 (1958): 65.
[29] Toby L. Ditz, "The New Men's History and the Peculiar Absence of Gendered Power: Some Remedies from Early American Gender History," *Gender & History* 16, no. 1 (2004): 6.

Marx and Nietzsche, to the likes of Baudelaire and Kierkegaard, who acknowledged modernity's complexities and contradictions but asserted modern man's ability to forge himself anew in this chaos. During the Sixties this didactic, 'self-help' tradition was maintained by the likes of Jean Paul Sartre and, perhaps most famously, Herbert Marcuse, whose theories were both seed and sustenance of the new man. Existentialism, for instance, *en vogue* on U.S college campuses during the Sixties, offered a self-oriented philosophy that resonated with a generation's desire for autonomy and individuality, exemplified by Sartre's assertion that 'in fashioning myself I fashion man'.[30] Marcuse on the other hand provided a surgical analysis of 'advanced industrial society,' re-casting non-integrated radicals and the marginalized as the agents of change, for only they remained immune to the 'stick and carrot' enticements of welfarist capitalism, a coercive mechanism Marcuse termed 'repressive tolerance.'[31]

Having established the existence of a new man, and where he came from, let us now turn our attention to what he looked like or rather, what his defining attributes were.

Part Two: Characteristics

Anti-Authoritarianism

I referred earlier to what Jean-Francois Lyotard called an 'incredulity towards meta-narratives' amongst the post-war generation, a rejection of any attempt to legitimate authority through an appeal to universal truths or values. Lyotard's thesis epitomised the refutation of authoritarianism of any form amongst Counterculturalists, a stance that would become an integral component of the new man's worldview. A blind submission to illegitimate authority had plunged the world into the most devastating war in history, and now, with the world on the brink of a nuclear conflagration, it appeared the same authoritarian structures were responsible. The USSR was an overtly totalitarian state, but young Americans recognised the same structures at work in the technocratic U.S. state, evident in both the draconian repression at home and in the thinly veiled neo-imperialism overseas.

In response, the Counterculturalists rejected any imposition on their individual freedom and any top down attempts at social manipulation, a clear reaction against the mass mobilizations of the previous half century. Take for instance the reluctance to strategize on the future of the Counterculture for fear that such a strategy would amount to little more than 'psychedelic fascism.' In early 1967, a meeting

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[30] Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism" (1946), accessed September 22, 2017, Marxists International Archive, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm.

[31] Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, ed. Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 95–137.

of various Countercultural luminaries that became known as the Houseboat Summit was convened to consider the direction of the Movement. As a gesture of their impeccable hippie credentials, Allen Ginsberg, Timothy Leary and Alan Watts, who clearly dominated proceedings magnanimously declined to be termed 'leaders,' opting instead for '*foci* of energy.' They quickly decided that the Counterculture must resist any form of institutionalization for, as Watts put it 'whenever the insights one gains from mystical vision become politically active, they always create their own opposite. They create a parody… When we try to force a vision upon the world, and say that everybody ought to have this, and it's good for you, then a parody of it is set up.'[32] They feared that through organizing or adopting any form of hierarchy they would emulate those that they opposed, and in doing so would become the next manipulative power structure.

While such formulations might seem a tad excessive now and perhaps even self-indulgent, it stemmed from a pervasive distrust of any form of authoritarianism. This willingness to discard the culture of authoritarianism even extended to an oedipal like readiness to sacrifice leaders (or '*foci* of energy') that had the temerity to become popular: Stokely Carmichael was dismissed as head of the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee as his stature surpassed the heights of decency; Herbert Marcuse fell out of favour in the latter part of the Sixties as he too was deemed to have become overly popularised (the Washington Post referred to him as the 'godfather of student revolt');[33] and even Timothy Leary was effectively excommunicated by the Movement in the latter part of the decade.[34]

Clearly, the discrepancy between theory and practice is gaping. In spite of rhetoric to the contrary, the Movement was obsessed by icons from Che Guevara to Bonnie and Clyde, and whether or not one fell victim to their iconoclasm appears entirely indiscriminate. Additionally, the Movement was more than effective in institutionalizing certain hierarchies that suited, for instance in their maintenance of gender hierarchies. Where this pathological anti-authoritarianism proved most counter-productive however, was the fact that without organization the Movement would be forever unable to create the changes it longed for: essentially, without organisation they were condemned to self-imposed inefficacy.

While this idealistic anti-authoritarianism might have been self-destructive for the Movement, it is evident that these ideas had a huge impact on wider society, even influencing the evolution of capitalism, for instance in the way that the anti-hierarchical structure has come to define post-industrial giants like Google and

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[32] Braunstein, "Forever Young," 258–59.

[33] Marvin Menniken, "Herbert Marcuse: Media and the Making of a Cultural Icon," in *The Global 1960s: Convention, Contest, and Counterculture*, ed. Tamara Chaplin et al. (New York, Routledge, 2017), 274.

[34] See for instance this Diggers' caricature of Leary: "Uncle Tim$ Children" (1967), *The Diggers Archive,* accessed September 23, 2017, http://www.diggers.org/comco/ccpaps2b.html#cc030.

Apple, many of whose founders have their roots in the Counterculture.[35] I shall return to this briefly in the concluding section of this study but what is important to note for now is that the formation of a new man was very much conceived of as a bottom up process, it was a process that started with the self, empowering the individual to change themselves.

'The "Me" Generation; or Individualism

Voltaire famously observed that if society did not have God, then it would be necessary to invent Him. Nietzsche declared over a century later that God was now dead. Who then, could step into the chasm left by God's demise in the modern age? What could modern society 'invent' to fill the void? Communists advocated the deification of the collective—an army of new, obedient men and women governed by an authoritarian, omnipotent and omniscient ruler(s). The Sixties generation though had disavowed any such subjugation to authoritarianism and the collective, and so came to worship at a different altar: the altar of 'me.'

In a characteristically satirical piece written in 1976, Tom Wolfe lampooned what he called the 'Me Generation,' the narcissistic Baby Boomers who had disregarded the social responsibilities of their forebears in favour of an atomised individualism that required 'self-realization' and 'self-fulfilment.'[36] Although written in the mid Seventies, the phenomenon that Wolfe describes had its origins in the Countercultural vanguard, crystallizing a decade later in the U.S. mainstream. This countercultural vanguard were the Sixties new men, those that perceived themselves first and foremost as individuals, each one a Nietzschean *übermensch*, man transcendent almost to the point of deification.

This radical individualism seems unremarkable in our own age, but it really was a dramatic shift in consciousness, a new way of perceiving oneself in relation to the world, and remains one of the most contested legacies bequeathed to us by the Sixties. For the Counterculturalists themselves, it was seen as a conscious cognitive process, one that would create a radical new subject and facilitate a revolution in every sphere of life.

Orthodox Marxism states industrial society is divided into two, the base and the superstructure, with the base, comprised of the means of production, determining the composition of the superstructure. According to this analysis, culture becomes epiphenomenal, directed only by the economic base.[37] In one of their numerous digressions form the beliefs of the Old Left, the Counterculturalists inverted this paradigm and espoused that to change society, including its economic

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[35] For a study of how capitalism incorporates critiques to evolve, see for instance: Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (London: Verso, 2007).

[36] Tom Wolfe, "The 'Me' Decade and the Third Great Awakening," *New York Magazine*, August 23, 1976, http://nymag.com/news/features/45938/.

[37] Karl Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" (1859), Marxists International Archive, accessed September 23, 2017, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm.

mores, they must first change its culture, and that this could only be achieved by first perfecting the self. Thus, reformation of the self becomes the first link in the chain for revolution, concentrating power, responsibility and authority in the individual. There may have been many points of departure between the cultural and political wings of the Counterculture, but even the politicos of the New Left were complicit in this belief that 'men have unrealized potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity. It is this potential that we regard as crucial and to which we appeal, not to the human potentiality for violence, unreason, and submission to authority.'[38]

Charles Maier, in his pursuit of the underlying causation for the global '68, has argued that the individualism of the Sixties was a reaction to the mass public mobilizations of the period from 1933 to 1963. Maier argues that a generation from the 1930s witnessed 'the approach of war, then the privations of war, then the intense confrontations of the Cold War' and that 'by the 1960's it was time for the young public in both [East and West] camps to press for an agenda of expressiveness and self-realization rather than an agenda of discipline.'[39] The individualism of the new man was then moulded by this desire to assert agency in a world that had for perhaps the last fifty years extracted an incredible price from its citizens. They would not simply be eroded and defined by the tides of history, they would be the rocks upon which the tides broke.

'The Personal is Political'[40]

We might be mistaken for assuming that the rise of the individual and the rejection of any form of collectivism or public mobilization (draft dodging, for instance) would necessarily produce a political apathy amongst the Sixties cohort, a retreat of the new man into splendid isolation. Heavily influenced by the burgeoning feminist movement, what in fact transpired was a radical reimagining of *what* actually constituted politics, and, moreover, *where* one could put these politics into practice. The Countercultural subject explicitly opened up a whole new space for political contestation, as the private sphere was transmogrified into an arena every bit as politicized as the public one. Of course, the 'Separate Spheres' fantasy was long ago debunked by gender historians, and yet we must consider that this reappraisal was only formulated after changes to the historical profession in the late 1960s and beyond. Thus, the notion that the boundaries between private/personal life and public/political were fallacious was radical and seditious, enfranchising a demographic that was previously regarded as irrelevant or apoliti-

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[38] Students for a Democratic Society, "Port Huron Statement" (1962), The Sixties Project, accessed September 21, 2017, http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Resources/Primary/Manifestos/SDS_Port_Huron.html.

[39] Maier, "Conclusion," 428.

[40] This phrase originated from the Second-Wave Feminist movement, see: Carol Hanisch, "The Personal is Political" (1969), accessed July 29, 2018, http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.html.

cal. Suddenly, by this interpretation, communes became sites of a radical political utopianism or the street theatre and soup kitchens of the Diggers represented an attack on the foundational tenets of free market capitalism.

The personal as political was essentially a rejection of 'politics as usual,' a refusal to participate in the state-endorsed modes of protest and political engagement. The Counterculturalists had seen the Civil Rights Movement co-opted and placated by the political establishment, offered legislative placebos that did little to remedy the lives of African-Americans, leading eventually to inner city riots and the rise of the Black Power movement. As Tuli Kupferberg, co-founder of The Fugs, put it in an essay entitled the 'Politics of Love', 'the society corrupts even those who would overthrow it'.[41] Thus, the resolution was to 'turn your backs on it, fuck it,' as Ken Kesey succinctly put it at an anti-Vietnam rally;[42] their lives became their politics, not merely what they did inside the ballot box once every four years. The assumption became that the new man would live out the life for which he was fighting: a kind of 'lifestyle radicalism' as Timothy Brown put it.[43] Hence, we deliberately see the most acutely private areas of life becoming arenas of publicized political ostentation. Consider for instance, the slogan often seen at anti-Vietnam protests, 'Girls Say Yes to Guys Who Say No,' with the explicit linkage between a woman's choice of sexual partner and her political views. The new man was profoundly individualistic but this by no means precluded political engagement; indeed, in many respects it produced a more overtly politicised consciousness by extending engagement to every conscious decision and act.

'Bring the War Home': Transnationalism

Though I limit my focus to the American context in this paper, it is evident that contemporaries were far less myopic in their outlook, preferring instead to think of themselves as transnational actors, explicitly articulating their solidarity with analogous protestors around the globe. In this sense they perceived of themselves as members of a broader network, a transnational 'aggregated social movement,' to refer again to Manning's concept, one in which the local context interplayed with a global one. Throughout the Sixties we see the intertwining of the national with the transnational: students in Germany protesting the visit of the Iranian Shah because of human rights abuses at home; Herbert Humphrey, U.S. Vice President and symbol of American imperialism, subjected to student hostility upon arrival in Tunis; the spontaneous outpouring of grief on every continent when Guevara

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[41] Tuli Kupferberg, "The Politics of Love," *East Village Other,* May 1967, 4–5.
[42] Tom Wolfe, *The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968), 222.
[43] Timothy S. Brown, "'1968' East and West: Divided Germany as a Case Study in Transnational History," *American Historical Review* 114, no. 1 (2009): 80.

was executed in Bolivia.[44] Though events were local in nature, contemporaries saw them as far greater in significance and implication.

Thanks to developments in media and technology, icons of the Movement could transgress national borders with impunity—Carmichael in Havana; Hayden and Fonda in Hanoi; Dutschke in Detroit—and so whether physically or simply rhetorically, the new man became transnational in his outlook, frequently linking his own plight to that of fellow revolutionaries abroad. Jerry Rubin, founder of the Yippes raged that 'cops patrol the hippie areas the way they patrol black communities, the way American soldiers patrol Vietnamese villages.'[45] We might recoil at such equations of 1960s San Francisco with occupied Vietnamese villages, but we would do well to resist moralising and instead note that such allusions illustrate the contemporary perception that each local struggle was part of a wider transnational one. As such this became a powerful mobilizing myth, allowing activists to draw upon a communal repertory of theory, symbolism and methods; a 'cloud', to utilize the metaphor proposed by Christoph Kamissek and Jonas Kreienbaum, into which global actors could contribute to and withdraw from, thereby reinforcing a global imagined community.[46]

'High Styles Come from Low Places': A Marginalized Vanguard[47]

If we were to consider the holiest tenets of Marxism then surely, prominent amongst them would be an irrevocable faith in the revolutionary potential of the working classes. These were the harbingers of change that Marx idolized in his writing and, naturally, it was an idealized, almost preternatural, form of the worker that represented the Soviet new man in the Eastern bloc. By the 1960s however, faith in the transformative propensities of the increasingly prosperous industrial working class was beginning to wane. Frantz Fanon in his indictment of Western imperialism sneered that European workers 'believe, too, that they are part of the prodigious adventure of the European spirit.'[48]

It became increasingly evident that workers in Western society were unlikely to explode into spontaneous revolution, and thus it became necessary to christen a new revolutionary vanguard. Fanon located his *agent provocateurs* in the decolonizing world, and Herbert Marcuse agreed. The Frankfurt School philosopher argued that the vanguard could now only come from 'the substratum of outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colours, the unem-

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[44] Jeremy Prestholdt, "Resurrecting Che: Radicalism, the Transnational Imagination, and the Politics of Heroes," *Journal of Global History* 7, no. 3 (2012), 506–26.
[45] Braunstein, "Forever Young," 269.
[46] Kammisek and Kreienbaum, "Imperial Cloud," 164–82.
[47]Tom Wolfe, *The Kandy-Kolored Tangerine-Flake Streamline Baby* (New York: Farar, Straus and Giroux, 1965), 212.
[48] Fanon, *Wretched,* 253.

ployed and the unemployable'.[49] These marginalized groups could come from the American ghettoes or the Third World, the point was that they were un-co-opted and immune to the hypnotising but incapacitating seductions of advanced industrial society.

Armed with these theories and suitably assuaged of their middle-class guilt, the young Counterculturalists came to see themselves as the agents of change, prophets of an approaching age. Thus, to be perceived as marginal became an integral feature of the new man's make up. If you didn't have the good fortune of coming from the Third World then this meant somehow showcasing your scorn and disregard for societies' mores, be that through a rejection of monogamy or the choice of drugs one imbibed. The grand irony of all this was that, in spite of their valorisation of the revolutionary potential of the Third World, Counterculturalists failed to make any real connections with the most marginalized within their own society, namely minority communities or the impoverished. This led to the uneasy dynamic whereby groups like the Diggers would venerate and emulate African-American or Native Americans from afar, ultimately caricaturing their cultures and producing a kind of appreciation that was disturbingly reminiscent of modernist discourses of primitivism.[50] Additionally, while a desire to spring from the margins might have been born of a noble logic, it was ultimately flawed. For to remain marginal one could never attain true power. Thus, as the new man clung to the periphery, his idealised marginality was to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

'Foco': Action-Oriented

Heavily influenced by the two previous phenomena I have referred to, the final feature of the new radical consciousness that I have termed the Sixties New Man was a profound belief that as an agent of change, the new man must be 'action-oriented.'

Inspired by the revolutionary vigour and dynamism of the decolonizing forces of the Third World, the new man spurned conventional modes of protest, for to protest through state sanctioned channels only conferred legitimacy on the system that one sought to undermine. The Old Left had become so entwined with the political order, directing it's anger down long-established channels, that it could no longer be considered a true revolutionary force, and was condemned to an eternity of navel-gazing and procrastination. They looked instead to Guevara's insurgents

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[49] Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: The Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 256–57.

[50] For the epitome of the veneration of African Americans, see the canonical countercultural text: Norman Mailer, "The White Negro: Superficial Reflections on the Hipster," *Dissent* 4, no. 3 (1957): 276–93. Ralph Ellison called Mailer's essay "the same old primitivism crap in a new package." See: Louis Menand, "It Took a Village," *The New Yorker*, January 5, 2009. For an insightful discussion of the objectification of Native Americans and African Americans by The Diggers and hippies more generally, see: Tim Hodgdon, *Manhood in the Age of Aquarius: Masculinity in Two Countercultural Communities, 1965–83* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2008).

or the Viet Cong as inspiration, admiring their willingness to act rather than bicker internally and patiently wait for the 'revolutionary moment' to present itself. This approach was articulated most clearly in the *foco* theory developed by Guevara and Regis Debray that urged activists to take the initiative: 'It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist' declared Guevara, 'the insurrection can create them.' Ultimately, he reminded his contemporaries around the globe, 'the duty of the revolutionary is to make revolution.'[51]

It was to visible icons like Guevara and Fanon, men on the frontline of the global struggle that Counterculturalists increasingly looked, and it was these men that defined the ideal image of the new man. In a 1969 interview, Abbie Hoffman, co-founder of the Yippies, made the distinction between those that theorised and those that acted: 'Men like Marcuse… I respect them but I don't love them…they have a way of looking at society that might be correct… But dammit, I don't love them; they are not participating in the struggle, and they are not going to build a new society.'[52] Clearly, we see a hierarchy being established in which action is granted predominance over all else. In the eyes of some, action naturally equated to violence and as the Sixties progressed growing factionalization saw groups like the Weathermen and the Symbionese Liberation Army force 'action orientation' to its extreme, and increasingly utilise violence as their medium for change. As disparate as it always was, it was this disintegration of the Counterculture that saw the end of the Sixties new man, as a changing socio-economic and political climate made an alignment of all the characteristics detailed above a virtual impossibility.

Conclusion

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of 1968 and has brought with it a host of retrospectives, nostalgia enterprises and commercial ventures that attempt to extract some kind of meaning, truth or profit from the Sixties and its legacy. In this atmosphere of heady nostalgia, and with regard to this study, we might be prompted to wistfully ask, what became of our Sixties new man? Does he wander in our midst? An anti-authoritarian-individualistic-transnational-marginalized-action-oriented *übermensch?* Or did he retreat into an excess of his foundational characteristics—pickled in his own resplendent isolation; compulsively self-marginalizing; violently unpredictable? Clearly, the utopia that the Counterculture perceived as imminent never materialized and so the new man that they envisioned as its natural inhabitant was never given the conditions in which to blossom, a mighty seed scattered on barren land.

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[51] Prestholdt, "Che," 506–526.
[52] Menniken, *Marcuse*, 287.

Rather than simply disappear though, I would suggest that, like the Counterculture itself, the legacy of the new man had far reaching implications, diffusing into wider society and shaping much of the world around us today. In a compelling study, Paul Berman has argued that the '68 generation have come to exert a significant influence on contemporary politics, with their emphasis on personal freedom and human rights.[53] I would echo this by pointing to figures with roots in the Counterculture who have come to define our post-modernity, particularly those affiliated with the SiliconValley tech industries. Jerry Rubin, for instance, gave up fermenting revolution to become an entrepreneur and businessman, amassing a small fortune in the process, yet maintaining his Countercultural worldview. Steve Jobs on the other hand is infamous for the fresh approach that he brought to the tech industry, much of which was forged in the Counterculture. Although, we can't claim him as one of the Baby Boomer generation, Mark Zuckerberg's now notorious incitement to 'move fast and break things' sounds like it could have spilled directly from the mouth of our Sixties new man.

We should not allow this modern resonance however to obscure the fact that the new man was a highly racialized and gendered subjectivity, one that only extended agency to certain actors and so represented only a highly exclusionary universalism. In spite of this and perhaps even because of this, I would argue that many of the characteristics enshrined by the new man have come to be regarded as ideals and even norms amongst the millennial generation. Theorists like Eve Boltanski and Luc Chiapello have shown the links between the Sixties and the reformation of capitalism and I would place the new man at the core of this process.[54] Take for instance that we now think nothing of the radical individualism of modern society or the way companies have adopted the anti-hierarchical structures of the Counterculture. Though it may have led only to capitalism's development rather than its destruction, I would argue that the Sixties new man was highly successful in one of his main objectives, the attempt to assert agency within a complex, changing world, although perceptions of *who* was able to exercise agency remained and remain as narrow as ever.

[53] Paul Berman, *Power and the Idealists: Or, the Passion of Joschka Fischer and Its Aftermath* (New York, WW Norton & Company, 2007).
[54] Boltanski and Chiapello, *Capitalism,* 57–99.

THE FACE OF RAMSES II IS LIFTED INTO PLACE AT THE SITE OF REASSEMBLAGE OF THE GREAT TEMPLE OF ABU SIMBEL IN ASWAN, 1967. PHOTO COURTESY OF: FORSKNING & FRAMSTEG. WIKIMEDIA COMMONS.

The High Dam at Aswan: History Building on the Precipice

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Chaeri Lee is a student in the Global History Master's program in Berlin, with a regional spe-cialisation in the Islamic World. For her undergraduate honor's thesis at New York University Abu Dhabi, she wrote on the topic of the politics and aesthetics of Iranian coffeehouse paint-ings. She is interested in the visual culture of Iran and the Middle East at large, and in the in-vestigation of the layers of symbolism that are shared across, and claimed by, various political, intellectual, and artistic spectrums.

This paper seeks to show the historical roots of the narrativisation of the High Dam at Aswan as a clash between tradition and modernity. It investigates rhetori-cal tactics employed in official publications of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) which enshrined the construction of the High Dam within a triumphalist historicist teleology. UNESCO was the mediating force in Aswan that was entrusted with a "salvage mission," which was unprecedented in scale and scope: documenting and protecting the Ancient Egyptian artifacts and monuments in the region, endangered by the construction of the High Dam. A parallel scrutiny of UNESCO's rhetoric and actions during the time period from its first appeals for financial support to the international community in 1960, to the official end of the salvage mission in 1980, reveals striking similarities in the ways in which UNESCO rationalized the construction of the High Dam and the U.A.R.'s rationale of national modernization. The government and UNESCO facilitated institutional amnesia of the human costs incurred by the Nubian communities that lived in the homes submerged under Lake Nasser in the pursuit of aggrandizing political agendas. The paper makes use of pri-mary sources such as the U.A.R.'s Yearbooks, official speeches made by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and writings and speeches of crucial officiating members of UNESCO.

Introduction

In the summer of 1956, Egypt's reluctance to adopt an explicitly pro-Western rhetoric and its growing relationship with the Soviet Union finally came to a head after months of tense deliberations. At this time U.S. policy makers decried the "fallacy of hoping to play off the West against the U.S.S.R," and on July 9th, the Eisenhower administration rescinded its offer to fund the construction of the High Dam at Aswan.[1] Later, historiography revealed more subtle and complicated in-ternal constraints that the new revolutionary regime in Egypt faced which deter-

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[1] Silvia Borzutzky and David Berger, "Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don't: The Eisen-hower Administration and the Aswan Dam," *Middle East Journal* 64, no. 1 (2010): 84–102.

mined the directionality of its foreign policy. The High Dam was a keystone in the Revolutionary Government's agenda of structural development for the nation as it would enable agricultural expansion and industrialisation throughout the nation. On an intraregional level, the regime was cementing its position in the Arab-Israeli conflict as a stronghold of Pan-Arab nationalism, as well as asserting its leadership in the non-aligned movement.[23] These political stakes would boil over into the subsequent crisis surrounding the nationalisation of the Suez Canal on July 26th when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) asserted that the dam would be built using revenues from the Canal in order to avoid foreign domination over Egypt's economy.[4]

Prior to the United States' withdrawal of economic support, the Soviet Union approached the Egyptian government with a more generous offer which would be reiterated, and finally accepted, in 1958.[5] In 1959, at an event commemorating the start of the work on the High Dam at Aswan, three years after the Suez Canal crisis, Umm Kulthum performed for the first and only time her song "The Story of the Dam."[6] Umm Kulthum, known as "The Voice of Egypt," was instrumental in bolstering popular support for the Egyptian government's projects as a public figure with immense cultural and political influence in the Arab world.[7] In "The Story of the Dam" Umm Kulthum extols the wealth that the High Dam would bring to the people. She celebrates her close friend and the socialist leader of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), Gamal Abdel Nasser, for having created miracles through his determination. In her song, the High Dam not only represents a technological dream turning into a reality, but also embodies the will of Gamal Abdel Nasser to bend the "South" and the "North" to a pivotal point in the Earth's story despite more literal setbacks in procuring funding from a certain Western "friend." In the "Story of the Dam," Nasser speaks metaphorically through the voice of Umm Kulthum to the audience: "I am a builder and I feel strong by Allah and the truth, and rightly reclaim the [Suez] canal." The song emphatically states

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[2] Hussein M. Fahim, *Dams, People and Development: The Aswan High Dam Case* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 25.

[3] Fahim, *Dams, People and Development*, 13.

[4] James E. Dougherty, "The Aswan Decision in Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly* 74, no. 1 (1959): 40–41, https://doi.org/10.2307/2145939.

[5] Karel Holbik and Edward Drachman, "Egypt as Recipient of Soviet Aid, 1955–1970," *Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft / Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 127, no. 1 (1971): 137–65, 150; Borzutzky and Berger, "Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don't," 97.

[6] 'Isa Mitri, "November 26th 1959 Cairo University *Story of the Dam*", Sama3y Web forum, June 2005, http://www.sama3y.net/forum/showthread.php?t=17909. "The Story of the Dam" was composed by poet Aziz Abazah.

[7] Virgina L. Danielson, "Umm Kulthūm," in *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Umm-Kulthum-Egyptian-musician. Umm Kulthum is also said to have been involved in fundraising efforts for the UNESCO mission to save the Nubian monuments by giving a concert near the Pyramids, as noted in: Paul Betts, "The Warden of World Heritage: UNESCO and the Rescue of the Nubian Monuments," *Past & Present* 226, suppl. 10 (January 2015): 112, https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtu017.

that what Nasser proclaims physically manifests right before one's eyes. "History" watches what the "lion," i.e. Gamal, will do next. The building of the High Dam is the building of History, the active construction of an epoch. The High Dam stands between a past era of struggles and a bountiful future.

This triumphalist narrative of the High Dam contrasts deeply with the story of the Nubian community's displacement, one that has until the present day failed to gain full acknowledgement or reparation.[8] The High Dam flooded the Nubian villages, which were located along the Nile Valley between the region of Aswan, Egypt and the Dal Cataract in northern Sudan. Despite certain benefits gained on levels of health and education, the community's relocation to insufficiently and hastily designed habitats, the last of which occurred in 1964, caused breakdowns of social organisation that resulted in immense psychological stress.[9]

This paper seeks to show the historical roots of the narrativisation of the dam's construction as a clash between tradition and modernity.[10] It investigates rhetorical tactics employed in government sponsored publications on the High Dam which enshrined its construction within a historicist teleology. One great example of this are the Yearbooks of the U.A.R. which were published annually by the Information Department in the Ministry of National Guidance to provide a detailed informational overview of the social, cultural, political, and economic developments of the past year. The Yearbooks and other government publications facilitated an institutional amnesia of the human costs incurred by the Nubians whose homes and communities would be submerged by the newly formed Lake Nasser.

UNESCO was called in to mediate in Aswan and was entrusted with a "salvage" mission. The mission's unprecedented scale and scope included documenting and protecting the ancient Egyptian artefacts and monuments in the Nubia region which were endangered by the construction of the High Dam. UNESCO used this campaign to its strategic advantage to cement its internationalist institutional identity. A parallel scrutiny of UNESCO's rhetoric and actions during the time period from its first appeals for financial support to the international community in 1960, to the official end of the "salvage" mission in 1980, and official U.A.R. rhetoric reveals striking similarities. UNESCO justified the legitimacy of a shared world heritage, and the U.A.R. rationalised the developmental pathway

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[8] "Egypt: Dismiss Charges, Uphold Constitutional Obligations towards Nubians," Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, March 12, 2018, https://cihrs.org/egypt-dismiss-charges-uphold-constitutional-obligations-towards-nubians/?lang=en. In September 2017, 32 Nubian activists were arrested during a peaceful march on Nubian Unity Day, demanding Egypt's Constitution to uphold legal obligations as set forth by Article 236 to "recognize the Nubian right to return to their homelands in the south of Egypt…within ten years."

[9] Fahim, *Dams, People and Development,* 76.

[10] Betts, "The Warden of World Heritage." The effects of this narrativisation can be seen in scholarly literature. Historian Paul Betts, for example, in an article published in 2015 asserted without clarification that "[t]he conflict between old and new became even more pronounced in the wake of the Egyptian Revolution in 1952" (103).

of national modernisation; both parties preferred sweeping narratives focusing on the good of an intangible collective.

In the first two thirds of the paper, I give a broad overview of the ideological and political rationale underlying the grandiose meta-narratives of the construction of the High Dam and the UNESCO "salvage" mission: the Dam as a passage way leading the region, and the nation at large, from a past rurality to a future urban modernity, and the rehabilitation of a ruined past in a new internationalist present. First, I examine Nasser's politics in the context of the newly established United Arab Republic, to show how the Aswan Dam was part of a master design of modernisation and Arab nationalism. Second, I look at several key participants in the UNESCO "salvage" mission to Aswan to demonstrate how UNESCO rhetorically aided in the U.A.R.'s image-making around the dam. Third, I bring the above two contexts together, by discussing how the Nubian communities were represented empirically and emotionally, and how these representations in turn affected the Nubian communities' self-perception and historical identity. Finally, this paper suggests where one can find the stories of the Nubian community, hidden as they are, under "temples" and "crops."[11]

Gamel Abdel Nasser, the United Arab Republic and the High Dam at Aswan

On July 23rd, 1952 an army coup helmed by the Free Officers dethroned King Farouk I, establishing a Revolutionary Command Council composed of 11 officers, one of whom was Gamel Abdel Nasser, future Prime Minister and later President of the U.A.R. In *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past*, a work surveying trends in historiography in 20th century Egypt, Yoav Di-Capua argues that in post-monarchic Egypt the focus was on constructing a new image of the state by using historiography to demonstrate the historicity of the present moment.[12] To this end, the pre-revolutionary era was treated as both a blank slate and a convenient yardstick, always complementary, to measure current achievements.[13]

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[11] International Council of Museums, "ICOM news: Bulletin d'information du Conseil international des musées—International Campaign for the Preservation of the Monuments of Nubia; An Appeal Launched on 8 March 1960 by the Director-General of Unesco," February 1960, 7. The at-the-time Director, Vittorino Veronese, stated in his appeal that "[i]t is not easy to choose between a heritage of the past and the present well-being of a people, living in need in the shadow of history's most splendid legacies; it is not easy to choose between temples and crops."

[12] Yoav Di-Capua, "Controlling History: The 1960s," in *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History Writing in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2009), 282–310, https://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520257337. In Chapters 7 and 8 of his monograph on 20th century historiography in Egypt, Di-Capua discusses the impact of "state-manufactured historical meaning" on the intellectual networks and institutions at this time (272). He emphasises that "the operational basis of pluralistic historiography" was undermined by the regime's tactic of limiting the normal circulation of information and ideas (264).

[13] Di-Capua, "Controlling History," 286–287.

The expansion of government control over the media as well as cultural programming was fundamental to an orchestrated amnesia towards the monarchic past as well as events pre-1954.[14] The Information Department was created in 1952 to safeguard the discourse in the information battle against imperialism and Zionism, whether in official circles, press offices abroad, national newspapers and news agencies, or broadcasting and television.[15] The Department described itself as the "frank spokesman of the Government," and its Yearbooks aimed to provide "first-hand information."[16] Ideologically, the Yearbooks embodied Nasser's agenda and the government's party line. Close readings of the U.A.R. Yearbooks from 1959—the first anniversary of the U.A.R.—to 1965 provide a plethora of examples demonstrating a rhetoric of institutional erasure of the plight of the Nubian communities through a calculated ignorance and apathy. The Yearbooks contrast the new government's initiatives and achievements in the construction of the High Dam with the incapability of the previous regime. The first edition of the Yearbook (1959) propounds "When the Revolution took over, the economic conditions of the country were in a state of chaos bordering on total collapse…So an entirely new policy had to be laid down."[17] In particular, great emphasis is placed on the industrialisation of the country to "liberate its economy from the grasp of larger foreign powers," through control over its natural resources.[18] The 1965 Yearbook states that "the idea of building the High Dam was long contemplated and dreamt of by many people, yet nobody dared to do anything about it seriously until October 8th , 1952 when the Egyptian Revolution decided to study the project in preparation for its implementation."[19] In fact, attempts to harness the Nile river began with the construction of the first dam at Aswan in 1889; the dam was first expanded in 1912, and again in 1933.[20]

It is important to contextualise the decision to build the High Dam in a broader spatial, temporal, and post-colonial milieu to avoid presenting a purely authori-

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[14] Di-Capua, "Controlling History," 261. In 1954, the first President of the newly formed republic, Muhammed Naguib, was deposed. Capua notes that immediately following Naguib's deposition, Nasser and Salih Salim, one of the Free Officers, hurried to the radio building in Cairo to erase tape recordings of Naguib's speeches, or any containing a mention of his name. This physical erasure followed a precedent set after the Revolution in 1952, wherein films, books, statues, and poems from the monarchic past were eliminated.

[15] United Arab Republic/Maslahat al-Isti'lamat, 1959, *U.A.R. Yearbook* (Cairo: Information Department, 1959), 505.

[16] Ibid., 506.

[17] Ibid., 83.

[18] Ibid., 21.

[19] United Arab Republic/Maslahat al-Isti'lamat, 1965, *U.A.R. Yearbook* (Cairo: Information Department, 1965), 87. The pre-revolutionary past is often coded in terms of a "dream," which then allows for the codification of the present as an era of fulfilment of dreams. In the 1960 Yearbook, the start of construction work on the High Dam project is described as a "dream come true." United Arab Republic/Maslahat al-Isti'lamat, 1960, *U.A.R. Yearbook* (Cairo: Information Department, 1960), 660.

[20] Fekri A. Hassan, "The Aswan High Dam and the International Rescue Nubia Campaign," *The African Archaeological Review* 24, no. 3/4 (2007), 75.

tarian history. Historian Ahmad Shokr notes that looking at the construction of the High Dam through a "Third World," post-war economic framework shows Nasser's policies grew out of "preexisting knowledges, institutions, and practices in domains as varied as social sciences, economic policy, and state building."[21] Of particular interest amongst the elements informing decision-making at the national level is development discourse, "[surviving] the demise of colonialism and [retaining] a strong appeal among national elites and newly independent governments in the post-colonial period, as it did to their colonial predecessors."[22] The global discourse on development helps explain the U.A.R.'s preoccupation with proving itself primarily through numbers and statistics.

The Nasserist regime's balancing act between the national and international stakes involved in the construction of the High Dam demonstrates how, as anthropologist Seteney Shami notes, the role of the state adapts to international pressures and trends. The state's position within the international system results in "an interactive process that continuously informs decision-making on the national and local levels."[23] This interactive process is sensitive to new forms of knowledge, such as in the case of collective population displacement, which had increased globally at this time.

Collective population displacement is defined simply as a process that involves the dislocation and/or settlement of people from their normal habitat by a superior force.[24] Shami places collective population displacement within a regional comparative framework, and argues that often in the 1970s and 80s, population displacement in the Third World context was seen as a catalyst to change a traditional society to a modernised one.[25] The application of modernisation theory as the main explanatory concept was later critiqued by scholars, especially anthropologists and ethnologists, who conducted individualised case studies into the human costs of displacement from development projects.[26] The theoretical positions adopted in the academic and scientific studies affected the state's policy-making as well as the recipients' short-term and long term responses.

Shami cites a government publication from 1964 that posits "the experience of displacing the people of the Nubia and the process of their resettlement is a model

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[21] Ahmad Shokr, "Hydropolitics, Economy, and the Aswan High Dam in Mid-Century Egypt," *The Arab Studies Journal* 17, no. 1 (2009): 10. This article provides a great survey of how one can take a longue-durée approach to water politics on the Nile River, and changes in thinking about rivers and river development in the post-revolutionary years in Egypt.

[22] Ibid., 13.

[23] Seteney Shami, "The Social Implications of Population Displacement and Resettlement: An Overview with a Focus on the Arab Middle East," *The International Migration Review* 27, no. 1 (1993): 10.

[24] Ibid., 4.

[25] Ibid., 6.

[26] Ibid., 20. Much literature on the Nubian displacement stems from a project conducted by the Social Research Center of the American University in Cairo between 1961 and 1965, entitled the "Ethnographic Survey of Egyptian Nubia."

for the successful experiments upon which a socialist society prides itself."[27] The Nubian communities' displacement from the banks of the Nile River was framed within expressions of self-sufficiency and progress. In the 1965 Yearbook, under the section heading "Building New Nubia," the Nubians' displacement is given a positive spin as "emigration." The Yearbook states:

> The Nubian community which lived for centuries behind a thick wall of isolation has been fated to embark upon the largest emigration operation in the twentieth century. Until the end of June, 1964, 50 thousand inhabitants had emigrated from the land of Nubia to the reclaimed territories in Kom Ombo, 400 kilometres away from their native land. To resettle them comfortably, the State built 33 new villages comprising over 16 thousand housing units, in addition to an administrative capital and public utilities.[28]

The text argues that this "emigration is an inevitable stage that the Nubian community must pass through to join the ranks of modernised society, from isolation to integration." The Yearbook employs numbers such as the number of pounds used in house building expenditures, indemnities, and the number of reclaimed *feddans* to demonstrate the successful nature of the Nubians' resettlement, and expresses satisfaction that "landless inhabitants have now been provided for the first time."[29]

The High Dam figures in the government of the U.A.R.'s projection outwards to the international community, and it was also an important component of its projection inwards. As Di-Capua states, "Nasserism had a constant need for public demonstration of its achievement…how it actually made history happen."[30] In scale, the High Dam was the grandest form of public demonstration of the Nasserist regime's ability to overcome financial difficulties, and therefore a symbol of success.

Brochures published by the Department of Information in Cairo frequently stress the gargantuan nature of the High Dam, and some scholars state that it was often described as "Nasser's pyramid."[31] Tom Little, a journalist stationed in Egypt at the time of the Dam's construction, writes in his book first published in 1965 that the Aswan Dam later became known as a modern-day 'Pyramid.' Little remarks upon a "mad ambition to out-pharaoh the pharaohs with a structure to equal all the pyramids put together."[32] Little mentions that "a notice board at the edge of the plateau overlooking the river marked the axis of the dam and declared

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[27] Shami, "The Social Implications of Population Displacement and Resettlement, 21–22.
[28] United Arab Republic/Maslahat al-Istiʻlamat, 1965, 96.
[29] Ibid., 98.
[30] Di-Capua, "Controlling History: The 1960s," 257.
[31] Betts, "The Warden of World Heritage," 103.
[32] Tom Little, *The High Dam at Aswan: The Subjugation of the Nile* (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1965): 38.

it would be the modern pyramid."[33] The High Dam's technological impressiveness was thus attributed to the prestige of its patron, Nasser, and the two became inextricably linked in the popular imaginary.

Little describes the "call to the dam" as being elevated to a patriotic duty, and notes that there was a sense of mission amongst the workers. The 1959 Yearbook includes a segment from Nasser's speech in Damascus on 24 February 1958: "These are epoch-marking days in our history…we shall all work with determination and solidarity to establish the foundations of the United Arab Republic on the principles of integrity, dignity, fraternity and love." These foundations were to be based foremost on a "complete faith in pan-Arabism," which is described as having an "unfailing power […] independent of race, blood or colour to mould its citizens into genuine Arabs." The U.A.R. Yearbooks show that patriotism was to be of a specifically "Arab" nature and the High Dam was shaped in the image of the unity of the people of the Nile River (with no mention of Sudan, or the other upstream nations that shared the Nile with Egypt).[34]

In a speech addressed to the "Brothers of the People of Aswan," during a trip to Aswan on July 18th, 1954 before construction work began on the Dam, Nasser promises that if the Nubian communities practice patience, the first province and city to benefit from the Dam will be Aswan. In his peroration, Nasser stresses that there must be an equilateral adherence to the objectives of the revolution, and employs the rhetorical tactic of contrasting the present with the injustices of the "abhorrent past." He emphasises the indivisibility of the "homeland" and that there is no difference between the north of this homeland and its south.[35] While framed as a patriotic call to the "objectives of the revolution," Nasser's nationalism exemplifies a hostile attitude towards the diversity of the Nubian communities, and belies a lack of understanding or accommodation of their sociocultural location between the Egyptian and Sudanese borders. The deleterious effect of this rhetoric coupled with UNESCO's involvement in the region will be elaborated upon in the last part of the paper.

UNESCO's Definition of World Heritage

This section is primarily dedicated to dissecting UNESCO's status and prestige as an international heritage organisation, and to questioning the implications of its international campaign in Aswan. Was UNESCO's project in Aswan "an effort to move archaeology (and indeed civilisation itself) beyond the sphere of imperial-

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[33] Little, *The High Dam at Aswan,* 93.
[34] United Arab Republic/Maslahat al-Isti'lamat, 1959, 5.
[35] Gamal Abdel Nasser, "Speech of the President Gamal Abdel Nasser during his Trip to Aswan" (Aswan, 1954), Nasser.org, http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=191&lang=ar.

ism and nationalism once and for all," as historian Paul Betts argues?[36] In fact, the value of world heritage is mandated to transcend national boundaries, but those critical of UNESCO's rhetoric argue that such categorisations work to promote cultural nationalism. Cultural nationalism is defined broadly as an ideology that "assigns to each nation a special claim to cultural objects associated with its people or territory."[37] UNESCO's designation of a heritage site, whether tangible or intangible, results in a national guardianship. The sites become emblematic of a modern state's cultural origins, revealing a problematic presentism.

Under the guise of an altruistic mission for 'mankind,' UNESCO's archaeological campaign provided an "aesthetic justification" for intervening in a country, and aided the process of "incubating" political value in the cultural landscape.[38] Architectural historian Lucia Allais thus describes Nubia during UNESCO's twenty-year long "occupation" as a "microcosm of international order."[39] The Nubian desert was transformed into an "international archaeological laboratory," in which new frameworks of cultural authenticity and cultural exchange were established through the reassemblage of historic Nubia.[40]

At the opening ceremonies of the International Campaign to Salvage the Monuments of Nubia held on March 8th, 1960, the French statesman Andre Malraux addressed the Director General: "Your appeal is historic, not because it proposes to save the temples of Nubia, but because through it the first world civilisation publicly proclaims the world's art as its indivisible heritage."[41] As Malraux aptly implies in his address, UNESCO's mission in Aswan was significant precisely for its semantic categorisation of ancient sites as the unified heritage of a world civilisation.[42] UNESCO's campaign made the concept of 'world heritage' current in diplomatic culture which led to other campaigns in Italy, Pakistan, and Indonesia.[43] In particular, the salvaging of the Temple of Abu Simbel in historical Nubia became the ultimate "success story" that would establish UNESCO as the "gold standard" in heritage "salvage" missions.[44]

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[36] Betts, "The Warden of World Heritage," 112.
[37] Elizabeth Betsy Keough, "Heritage in Peril: A Critique of UNESCO's World Heritage Program," *Washington University Global Studies Law Review* 10, no. 3 (January 2011): 605.
[38] Lucia Allais, "The Design of the Nubian Desert: Monuments, Mobility, and the Space of Global Culture," in *Governing by Design: Architecture, Economy, and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Timothy Hyde (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012). 198.
[39] Ibid., 191.
[40] Ibid., 189.
[41] André Malraux, "A Text by André Malraux," *The UNESCO Courier*, September 1997, 4.
[42] Betts, "The Warden of World Heritage," 111.
[43] Hassan, "The Aswan High Dam and the International Rescue Nubia Campaign," 89.
[44] Keough, "Heritage in Peril," 595. The Abu Simbel mission started motions to draft a treaty in the period 1969–1972, which resulted in the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. For a good and succinct overview of the legislative and organisational framework of UNESCO, founded in 1945, see Keough, "Heritage in Peril," 593–598.

In his address to UNESCO Director General Veronese, Malraux lavished grand compliments on the campaign, and spoke metaphorically to the Nile River:

> But see, old river, whose floods allowed astrologers to fix the most ancient date in history, men are coming now, from all parts of the world, who will carry these giants far away from your life-giving, destructive waters…there is only one action over which indifferent stars and unchanging, murmurous rivers have no sway: it is the action of a man who snatches something from death.[45]

Malraux implies that the ultimate control over the Nile river is wielded by UNESCO, who will steal away the archaeological 'giants' of history from under the nose of destruction and death. The imagery of impending doom as expressed through the rhetoric of mankind's cultural heritage in peril, should be analysed in the context of the post-war international order. UNESCO was an institution that budded from post-wartime reconstruction efforts, and its internationalist campaign in Aswan was strategically used as the starting point for a fresh new chapter in world history, one which Malraux calls "the antithesis of the kind of gigantic exhibitionism by which great modern states try to outbid each other."[46] In his address, Malraux cast the mission in a de-politicised light, and positioned UNESCO on an ethical high-ground, neutral in international politics.

The reconstruction and "gifting" of several of the removed temples from Aswan belies such a postcolonial self-positioning. The reconstruction of the temples themselves was considered by some from an archaeological standpoint of gaining new knowledge, to be scientifically meaningless as these sites had been photographed and measured in detail.[47] The reconstruction served primarily as a demonstration of power—cultural, political, and economic power—in the recipient countries of these removed temples. Out of several groups of temples either moved to nearby sites or to national museums in Aswan and Khartoum, five temples were shipped to Western museums such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City, as a gesture of 'thanks' for their financial and technical assistance in the campaign.[48] Allais sharply defines these gifted temples, called "grants-in-return," as "postcolonial successors of relocated imperial obelisks and exported colonial objects."[49] The value of these temples abroad lay not in their inherent archaeological significance or as connecting links of human civilisation, but in their re-constitution on site as a monumental expression of placing the present Western self in the direct lineage of these ancient civilisational monoliths.

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[45] Malraux, "A Text by André Malraux," 5.
[46] Ibid., 6.
[47] Betts, "The Warden of World Heritage," 118.
[48] Allais, "The Design of the Nubian Desert," 179.
[49] Ibid., 200.

On March 10th, 1980, in a ceremony commemorating the end of the UNESCO mission which took place between the colonnades of the Isis temple, Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, the Director General of UNESCO, is said to have compared the mobilisation of resources to salvage the monuments in Aswan, to those generated by the ancient Egyptian sovereigns to build the temples.[50] Invisible in UNESCO's historicist logic are the Nubian communities who played active, if not the most heeded, parts in and alongside the deconstruction of these monuments. UNESCO aided in the institutional amnesia of the Nubian communities' cultural needs, by diverting attention from people to monuments and statues. As Malreaux unironically predicted, the UNESCO campaign was "the first attempt to deploy, in a rescue operation, on behalf of statues, the immense resources usually harnessed for the service of men."[51] The parallelism and complicity of UNESCO's mission in Aswan to the Nasserist regime's construction of the greatest dam in history will be explored in the next and last section of this paper.

The Nubian Communities

The Nubian communities underwent relocation on four different occasions in the 20th century, as their fates were invariably and topographically tied to the development schemes centered around the Aswan Dam. An estimated 100,000 Nubians were relocated in the construction of the High Dam in 1963, and although the majority moved to the "New Nubia" furnished by the Egyptian government, many emigrated to Egyptian cities.[52] The processes of moving people and of moving monuments share many elements, such as periods of intense scrutiny and study, deconstruction, and reconstitution/rehabilitation in a new environment. In this last section, the paper seeks to bring together all the threads of the earlier discussions on the individual agendas of U.A.R. and UNESCO, and assesses their impact on the self-identity of the Nubian communities.

Hassan Dafalla, District Commissioner in Wadi Halfa, Sudan, during the Salvage Campaign of the sixties, describes the situation before the construction of the High Dam:

> "Since ancient times the Nubians had clung to their narrow strip of fertile land along the banks of the Nile and perpetuated life in it…They loved the Nile which was their sole life-giver."[53]

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[50] Allais, "The Design of the Nubian Desert," 180.
[51] Malraux, "A Text by André Malraux," 6.
[52] Hassan, "The Aswan High Dam," 85.
[53] Maria Costanza de Simone, "Nubia and Nubians: The 'Museumizations' of a Culture" (Ph.D. diss., Universiteit Leiden, 2014), 36, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/23598.

Dafalla's account of the Nubians' contentment with the conditions of their past lives stands in contrast to what was presented in official discourse as a resource-deprived isolation from urban modernity.

Betts reasons that "Nubia played host to a dramatic clash between progress and preservation that attracted worldwide media coverage."[54] I disagree with his face value acceptance of this binary as it makes the Nubian communities' experiences even more invisible in a heroic dilemma between progress and preservation. Rather than a natural opposition between the Egyptian government and UNESCO, this "dramatic clash" was consciously and meticulously wrought through a strategic alliance. UNESCO would care for the monuments, out of an apolitical commitment to a cultural world heritage, and the government would care for the livelihood of the people. In this painted image, the Nubians recede into the background as one-dimensional, happy benefactors of national and international interests.

At the time of the UNESCO mission, critics and the Nubians expressed a bitter reaction to the decision to protect temples instead of people; an archaeologist working in Sudan recounts the Nubians' awareness that "statues" had a higher preservation value than the communities themselves, something which communities expressed in surveys even before relocation had begun.[55] In his article, Betts admits in passing that "the evacuation of the Nubian peoples themselves…[is one] dimension of the project [that] is not so well integrated into UNESCO's broader success story of relocating the monuments, and remained relatively invisible."[56] The trauma experienced by the Nubian communities following their displacement is not found in the official records of UNESCO's campaign, nor in governmental narratives that extol benefits to be gained from the dam at the national and regional level.[57]

Longitudinal studies carried out between 1964 and 1982 by social research projects record "widespread indicators of chronic social and psychological breakdown."[58] The Nubians in Sudan, for example, were forced to relocate to the eastern region of Sudan and dispersed across different settlements.[59] An expert of Nubian literature, Christine Gilmore argues that in the Egyptian context, the Nubians' "perceived racial characteristics" in addition to their cultural distinctiveness act as a further "othering" mechanism.[60] Nubians are perceived as the "Other" in ways that do not allow them to locate themselves squarely within the

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[54] Betts, "The Warden of World Heritage," 101.
[55] Ibid., 120.
[56] Ibid., 119.
[57] Christine Gilmore, "'A Minor Literature in a Major Voice': Narrating Nubian Identity in Contemporary Egypt," *Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics* 35 (2015): 56.
[58] Hassan, "The Aswan High Dam," 55.
[59] Gilmore, "A Minor Literature in a Major Voice," 85. And importantly, as Fekri clarifies, "the Nubians as all other peoples, do not belong to a 'race.' They consist of populations characterised by cultural traditions, with various claims to Old Nubian, Arab and Balkan ancestry." Hassan, "The Aswan High Dam," 84.
[60] Gilmore, "A Minor Literature in a Major Voice," 53.

ideological framework of "Egyptianness," and as a result, are subject to intense racism and other forms of discrimination, spurred on by the institutional amnesia perpetuated in Egypt and internationally.[61]

In a doctoral thesis that surveys how the UNESCO mission at Aswan impacted the flow and positionality of Nubian artefacts in various collections in Egypt, Sudan, and the world at large, Maria Costanza de Simone coins the term "museumisation of Nubia" to denote a process that took place over several eras. First, the European orientalists who laid the foundations of museum work in Egypt fused together Nubian and Egyptian history, crafting an inseparable civilisational narrative."[62] De Simone maintains that this treatment of Nubia as a mere appendix to Egyptian history was carried over from colonial biases of 19th and early 20th century Egyptology to the time of UNESCO's mission.[63] With UNESCO's mission in Aswan came the founding of 'Nubiology,' and the rapid re-definition of artefacts worldwide previously known as "Ancient Egyptian" to "Nubian." [64] Despite this, there has been a dearth of writing on modern Nubians' culture as the campaign had reinforced a stagnant image of Nubia as an ancient archaeological culture.[65]

The parameters of cultural nationalism set forth by UNESCO are affirmed and used by the modern state. For example, the "Declaration by the Government of the United Arab Republic concerning the international action to be taken to safeguard the monuments and sites of ancient Nubia" specifies that objects that are "uniquely representative of Egyptian civilisation" must stay in the Egyptian national collection. Monuments and artifacts present a convenient and spectacular physical link between the "past" and "present," one the Egyptian government utilised when it claimed Egyptian sovereignty over Nubian monuments, and culture.[66] Such claims of sovereignty presupposes a hereditary and exclusive relationship between the artifacts and the modern nation, with museums and other institutional forces ultimately directing attention away from uncontrollable human narratives.[67] For example, the Nubia Museum, the first dedicated museum of Nubian civilisation, opened in Aswan on November 23rd, 1997.[68] De Simone critiques the location of the museum in Aswan and thus its proximity to archaeologi-

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[61] Gilmore, "A Minor Literature in a Major Voice," 54.

[62] Costanza de Simone, "Wadi Halfa Museum: A Rescue Mechanism for the Nubian Intangible Heritage," *Égypte/Monde Arabe* 17 (December 2009), 88, https://doi.org/10.4000/ema.2913.

[63] De Simone, "Nubia and Nubians." In her thesis, De Simone notes that even in Ancient Egyptians' portrayals of the Nubians, "Nubia was the 'daughter' of the god Hapy (the Nile) as was Egypt…Egypt is always linked to the Nile and Nubia invariably to the desert: the one fertile, the other barren and dead" (46).

[64] Ibid., 54.

[65] Gilmore, "A Minor Literature in a Major Voice," 53. Nubian literature stands to correct the discrepancies in the meta-narratives surrounding their communities' displacement, and have been fighting to express a broader conception of Egyptian identity.

[66] Betts, "The Warden of World Heritage," 113.

[67] Conseil international des musées, "ICOM news—Bulletin d'information," 10.

[68] De Simone, "Nubia and Nubians," 7.

cal sites, and not in the resettlement sites. The government's objective with the Nubia Museum could only be to attract non-local and international tourism in the area.[69] The Nubia Museum, constructed on the archaeological knowledge gained from the UNESCO mission in Aswan, became the government's ethnographic "show-window" and fundamentally failed to invite community participation and integration or to provide emotional compensation for displaced community members.

In the past decade, Nubian activists have been vigorously disputing the unfilled promises made by past and previous governments. Maja Janmyr's study of contemporary Nubian efforts to gain the right to return to their ancestral lands argues that mobilisation of Nubian activism has increased significantly since 2005, aided in large part by increased media attention to Nubian issues, concurrent social revolutionary movements, and the establishment of various legal agencies.[70] As discussed earlier, Nasser's rhetoric rested on a framework of development. Through her interviews with both members of older generations of Nubians and youth activists, Janmyr notes an internationalisation of this developmental narrative of a necessary sacrifice for the nation's sake.[71] Development is thus to this day an integral part of discursive battles for the right to return. A major breakthrough occurred in 2014 when the Nubian activism led to the inclusion of Article 236 in the Egyptian Constitution which guaranteed the right of return within ten years as well as the local population's participation and consultation in the development of these areas.[72] In 2018, many doubts have been raised surrounding the Egyptian government's commitment to honouring Nubians' right of return, and more than 5000 families have yet to be compensated for their confiscated homes.[73]

Conclusion

Egyptian painter Tahia Halim was invited in 1965 to visit Nubia, to make a record of the Nubian community before the scheduled flood. Halim's painting, *Farhat Al Nuba*, The Happiness of Nuba,[74] depicts Nasser on a boat, conferring a bushel of wheat to a boat full of soon to be displaced Nubians. The bushel of wheat could symbolise the promise of wealth and social welfare to be generated

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[69] De Simone, "Nubia and Nubians," 89.
[70] Maja Janmyr, "Nubians in Contemporary Egypt: Mobilizing Return to Ancestral Lands," *Middle East Critique* 25, no. 2 (April 2016): 127–46, https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2016.1148859.
[71] Janmyr, "Nubians in Contemporary Egypt," 141.
[72] Ibid., 142.
[73] Rana Mamdouh, "Upper Egypt Development Law Shifts Attention from Nubians' Constitutional Right to Return," *Mada Masr*, trans. Salma Khalifah, accessed September 9, 2018, https://www.madamasr.com/en/2018/06/06/feature/politics/upper-egypt-development-law-shifts-attention-from-nubians-constitutional-right-to-return/.
[74] Tahia Halim (1919–2003), *Farhat Al Nuba (The Happiness of Nuba)*, 1965, oil and gold leaf on canvas, https://www.christies.com/lotfinder/lot_details.aspx?intObjectID=5882097.

by the agricultural expansion, enabled by the High Dam at Aswan. At first glance, the painting suggests a serene and joyful event celebrating the future prosperity of the Nubians. Upon a closer look, one senses an eeriness in the homogeneous white attire of the participants, and there is a compositional emphasis on the ritual that is being performed.[75] The orderliness of the boat on the left is juxtaposed with the tumult of the thousands of Nubians waving small replicas of the flag of the U.A.R.

The submergence of 50,000 Nubian homes on the Nile River banks was framed by many Egyptians as "a past sacrificed for the national promise of modernity generated by the dam."[76] This emphasis on sacrifice recalls the annual flooding of the Nile ceremony—*Wafaa al-Nil*—which has symbolic roots in a Pharaonic tradition in which people would conduct ritual sacrifice for a good year of harvest. The High Dam at Aswan stopped the flow of time on the Nile River by controlling and containing its seasonal flooding and direct link to the Mediterranean Sea, making ritual sacrifice technologically obsolete while requiring a much greater sacrifice involving an entire ethno-cultural community.

In an edited volume on environmental histories of the Middle East and North Africa, Nancy Y. Reynolds argues that in the U.A.R., mastery over nature was equated in state-sponsored discourse with new life and youth. Hundreds of university youths would volunteer at the construction site in Aswan during their vacations in 1963.[77] The High Dam symbolised a promise of the vivacity it would bring to people's livelihoods, of once again bountiful resources grown from the blue water of the harnessed and domesticated Nile River. The use of the dam as a tool for historical periodisation was so strong and successful that colloquially, the phrase "after the dam" refers to Nasser's promise of Egyptian development.[78]

The stories of the Nubian community in Aswan were ultimately buried under the torrents of a new kind of historiography, co-authored by UNESCO and the Egyptian government, inundating the Nubian landscape. These national and international bodies were actively "building" history, but the Nubian communities were the ones to take the real jump of faith from the precipice.

In closing, there are several related topics that were beyond the scope of this paper, but which would have greatly enriched my investigation and would benefit from extended research: a *longue durée* perspective of hydropolitics between Egypt and Sudan, and a cultural comparative history of how the Aswan dam fig-

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[75] The white attire resembling the galabeyya in this portrayal of Gamal Abdel Nasser is unique considering that Abdel Nasser is often depicted or photographed in either military regalia or in a Western-style suit.

[76] Nancy Y. Reynolds, "Building the Past: Rockscapes and the Aswan High Dam in Egypt," in *Water on Sand: Environmental Histories of the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Alan Mikhail (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 188.

[77] Nancy Y. Reynolds, "City of the High Dam: Aswan and the Promise of Postcolonialism in Egypt," *City & Society* 29, no. 1 (April 2017): 213–35, https://doi.org/10.1111/ciso.12119.

[78] Ibid., 215.

ures in the Egyptian and Sudanese popular imagination are two examples.[79] The Nile River and the hydropolitics of dam construction remain central to regional politics, as current conflicts over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) demonstrate. Today, many Nubians are fighting for the right of return, to reclaim a piece of land on the shores of Lake Nasser, and many others are fighting against the threat of destructive reservoir projects to come.[80]

[79] Hassan, "The Aswan High Dam," 83. For example, Fekri notes that there were "concerns for the relative negligence of the southern sector of the reservoir in favor of the Egyptian sector with its monumental temples and antiquities." Fekri also mentions that UNESCO established an 'Honorary Committee of Patrons' under the chairmanship of King Gustav VI Adolf of Sweden, and the committee members included Queen Elizabeth of Belgium, Queen Frederika of Greece, Princess Grace of Monaco, Princess (later Queen) Margrethe of Denmark, Prince Mikasa of Japan, Eleanor Roosevelt, Dag Hammarskjöld, André Malraux and Julian Huxley; there was also the mission of Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan to President Kennedy. It would be fascinating to follow each one of these members and look at their individual interests and symbolic power gained from participating in this committee.
[80] De Simone, "Wadi Halfa Museum," 37.

Mural Painting Depicting the Flag Riots of 1964. Panama City, 2015. Photo Courtesy of: Holle Ameriga Meding

The *Día de los Mártires*—Spontaneous Demonstration, Heroic Myth, or Political Instrument? The 1964 Panamanian Flag Riots in the History of US-Panamanian Relations

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On the 15th of August, 1914, the Panama Canal opened. Panama became a global center for commercial shipping, with the Canal as its economic lifeline. However, the economic upswing was accompanied by a loss of state sovereignty: Panama slipped from a colonial embrace into an imperial one, becoming increasingly dependent on the United States' 'dollar diplomacy' and the establishment of US corporations, such as the United Fruit Company. This led to tensions between Panama and the US. Additionally, the fact that the US administered the Panama Canal became a thorn in the side of the Panamanian government. Tensions exploded in 1964 after a dispute over raising the Panamanian flag manifested into the so-called flag riots of 1964. The Panamanian government had ordered that the flag of Panama was to stay raised in the Canal Zone next to the US flag to symbolically represent Panama's rights. But the students of the US-American Balboa High School refused and raised only the flag of the US, prompting 200 Panamanians to cross the Canal Zone border to raise the Panamanian flag. The situation escalated: the US military intervened and the riots resulted in more than 20 deaths and 300 injuries. This incident shows how even a comparatively benign event, like hoisting a flag in a high school, can have far-reaching consequences. It also demonstrates that the shared history of the region had lead both sides to be extremely polarized.

Introduction

The 15th of August, 2014, marked the 100th anniversary of the opening of the Panama Canal. The Canal was a milestone in the history of Panama and connected the country to world trade, but it also divided it in half. The geographically favorable location benefited the development of the isthmus into a transit area and with the construction of the Canal the interests of the United States (US) were inseparably interwoven with Panamanian history.

This paper reviews the tensions caused by the construction of the Panama Canal and the associated Panama Canal Zone. The conflict began over the lawful administration of the Panama Canal Zone and sovereignty over the Canal. The Canal and the Zone were administered by the US, but sovereignty rights were not clearly defined in the Canal treaty (*Hay-Bunau-Varilla-Treaty*). Finally, in the early 1960s, the Panamanian government ensured that the flag of Panama would remain raised in the Canal Zone next to the US flag to symbolically represent Panama's rights. However, there was resistance. On January 9th, 1964, students from the US-American Balboa High School marched up and raised the flag of the United States. In response to this provocation, a spontaneous demonstration was formed by students from various Panamanian institutions of education. About 200 people crossed the border of the Canal Zone to raise the Panamanian flag; escalating the situation. The US military fired on unarmed men and in the following three days over 300 were wounded; 24 Panamanians and 6 US soldiers were killed. The so called *Día de los Mártires* (Martyrs' Day) is still anchored in the collective memory of the Panamanians. As one of Panama's national holidays hundreds of Panamanians still celebrate it every year and visit the Monument of the Martyrs of January 9th.

To what extent can the *Día de los Mártires* be interpreted as a spontaneous demonstration in which students from various Panamanian institutes came together and demonstrated against the raising of the US flag at Balboa High School without prior planning? What role do schools and flag rituals play in this context? How were the flag riots presented in the media and how were they used politically? Was the mysthification of the heroic epic a political instrument or rather an exaggerated journalistic representation of the actual events? This paper examines these questions on the basis of a comparison of various newspaper reports, such as the *Revista Lotería*, *El Panamá América,* and *La Estrella de Panamá,* as well as a report by an international legal commission established to clarify the events from January 9th to 11th. This analysis integrates the history of relations between the US and Panama with regards to previous tensions between the two states, as well as the history of the economic partnership. The paper reviews the establishment of ideas and representations depicting the US in Panamanian society and politics, especially in respect to the construction of the Panama Canal and Zone.

The US-Americanization of Panama: From the Mallarino-Bidlack-Treaty to the Riots of 1958

The spread of anti-US sentiment in Panama preceded Panama's declaration of independence from Colombia in 1903 and the simultaneous signing of the Canal

treaty with the US. This resentment was born from daily contact with entrepreneurs, workers, and travelers from the US.[1]

When gold was found in California in 1848, thousands of Americans set out for the West.[2] The *Mallarino-Bidlack-Treaty*, which Colombia concluded with the United States on December 12th, 1846, gave the US full transit rights on the isthmus, as well as rights for future canal construction. In exchange, the US would protect Colombia from threats, pay a rent and guarantee Panama's stay in Colombia. Masses of US-Americans passed through the country and Panama prospered as a transit and trade zone.[3] As a result, US-American influence in Panama grew, the dollar competed with the Peso and the English language became increasingly relevant in social and political affairs.[4] In 1855, the construction of a railway that crossed the isthmus was completed. The railway changed the basic economic structure of the region permanently. Regional markets developed rapidly and a commercial bourgeoisie flourished. At the same time, foreigners, such as Asian contract workers, US employees of the railway company and entrepreneurs came to the country.[5] However, the Panamanian government was not prepared for such a large wave of immigrants. The cities grew rapidly and due to a lack of urban planning, hygiene problems rose, illnesses spread and the crime rate increased.

Like other neighboring states, Panama was far from being a part of the United States; rather, the US presence generated increasing reluctance among the country's population.[6] Disputes and violent clashes took place, "where Wild West lawlessness mingled with big-business ruthlessness."[7] On April 15th, 1856, the US-American Jack Oliver accepted a piece of watermelon from a Panamanian merchant, but refused to pay for it and finally drew his weapon, provoking angry reactions of a local mob.[8] The Panamanians' anger erupted and the crowd stormed the port and railway district. About 15 US-Americans and two Panamanians died in the riots.[9] The US reacted vigorously, 160 soldiers invaded Panama and the first ever armed intervention on the isthmus took place. The phenomenon of the watermelon riots proved to become characteristic for the US-Panamanian dynamics in

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[1] Alan L. McPherson, *Yankee No! Antiamericanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 79.

[2] Holger M. Meding, *Panama: Staat und Nation im Wandel: 1903–1941* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2002), 62.

[3] Ibid.

[4] McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 79.

[5] Meding, *Panama: Staat und Nation im Wandel*, 63.

[6] McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 79.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Chong M. Moises, *Historia de Panamá* (Chitré: Ministerio de Educación—Dirección Nacional de Cultura, 1970), 163.

the twentieth century.[10] Before the declaration of independence on November 3rd, 1903, the United States intervened fourteen times in Panama.[11]

When the French project of a trans-isthmic canal—similar to the Suez Canal—failed, the US tried to conclude canal contracts with Colombia.[12] However, Colombia did not want a canal under US sovereignty and did not agree to the draft contract. The separatist tendencies, which had already become apparent in Panama shortly after joining the Republic of Great Colombia in 1821, reached a climax. The US under President Theodore Roosevelt supported the rebellion movement of the ruling elite on the isthmus and on November 3rd, 1903 Panama proclaimed its independence. About two weeks later, on November 18th, 1903, the Canal Treaty was ratified. In the treaty it was stated, among other things, that Panama left the Canal area to the US for a one-off redemption of 10 million US dollars and an annual lease of about 250,000 US dollars and granted them the rights to build a canal.[13] In 1904, Article 139 of the Panamanian constitution stated that the US reserved the right to intervene "to reestablish public peace and constitutional order" which effectively turned Panama into a protectorate.[14] To protect its lucrative business, the United States established the Canal Zone and increased its military presence. By the end of World War I, there were 14 US bases and 7,400 US soldiers on the isthmus.[15]

On August 15th, 1914, the Panama Canal opened. Panama, thus, became a global center for commercial shipping and the Canal became its economic lifeline. However, the economic upswing was accompanied by a loss of state sovereignty and Panama slipped from a colonial embrace into an imperial one, becoming increasingly dependent in the wake of the US dollar diplomacy and the establishment of US corporations, such as the United Fruit Company.[16] Around the 16 km wide strip of land along the Panama Canal, the US government and Canal authorities built a high steel mesh fence, delineating the Panama Canal Zone from Panama. The US treated the Canal Zone almost like a US colony in the heart of Panama; they introduced a racial segregation system, which led to a strong delineation between US-American and West Indian workers in regards to unequal conditions in hospitals, leisure facilities, eating places, and wages.[17] Therefore, two lifestyles

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[10] McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 81.

[11] Michael L. Conniff, *Panama and the USA: The Forced Alliance* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2001), 34.

[12] Meding, *Panama. Staat und Nation im Wandel*, 51.

[13] Ibid., 74.

[14] McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 81.

[15] Sharon Erickson Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 60.

[16] McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 81. For the border disputes between Panama and Costa Rica over the Pacific region of Coto, in which the USA intervened as intermediary and decided in Costa Rica's favour, see: Meding, *Panama. Staat und Nation im Wandel*, 225.

[17] John Lindsay-Poland, *Emperors in the Jungle: The Hidden History of The U.S. in Panama* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 3; Rüdiger Zoller, *Panama: 100 Jahre Unabhängigkeit* (Erlangen: Zentralinstitut für Regionalforschung, 2004), 214.

were created that were constantly reinforced at the wire fence in Panama City. This fence symbolized the tensions between the North American middle class and "the hungry South American have-nots."[18]

The first sustainable movement against US influence emerged in the 1920s, a few years after the opening of the Canal. The *Acción Comunal*, a previously non-parliamentary social movement of mostly young doctors, lawyers, engineers, and smaller businessmen, called for a break with the country's oligarchical structures and demonstrated against continued US-American dominance.[19] The Panamanian youth were called upon to remedy this evil.[20] *Acción Comunal* was also strongly oriented towards young men of the middle class who wanted to break with the traditional "liberal power ideology of the ruling class" (*liberalismo oligárquico*) and the "triumph of the English language and US values" (*sajonismo*).[21] Soon, however, the party experienced increasing right-wing pressure and a fascist ideology became prevalent. Until 1931, the *Acción Comunal* was a fully-fledged political party triumphing over the traditional elites. Especially through popular indoctrination in newspapers, demonstrations, and speeches with slogans like "*Panamá para los panameños,*"[22] "*Habla español y cuenta en balboas*"[23] and "*Patriotismo, Acción, Equidad y Disciplina*"[24] the party experienced an enormous upswing.[25]

Acción Comunal Chairman, Arnulfo Arias, consistently criticized the US and gave anti-US-Americanism great cultural resonance. Just one day after his inauguration, he explained that Panama, in the event of "bad will" on the part of the US, could very well have the opportunity to harm the interests of the US and make concessions to other "powerful countries that have the power to defend Panama."[26] The nationalistic concept of *Panameñismo* was then, among other notions, propagated by the Panamanian government and, as expected, anti-US resentments gained popularity.

Newspapers advocated anglophobic attitudes more often and while Arias took the political lead in the 1940s and 1950s, an increasingly critical US movement was formed among Panamanian students and pupils. As in many Latin American countries, Panamanian students were strongly politicized and those who could

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[18] Own translation. Original: "dem hungrigen südamerikanischen Habenichts"; Alfred Schüler "Molotow-Cocktails aus Hollywood," *Der Spiegel*, January 22, 1964, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46162815.html.

[19] Meding, *Panama: Staat und Nation im Wandel*, 163.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Own translation. Original: "liberale[..] Machtideologie der herrschenden Klasse [...] Siegeszug der englischen Sprache und den US-amerikanischen Wertvorstellungen," ibid.

[22] "Panama for Panamanians, El golpe va," *La Estrella de Panamá*, August 22, 2011.

[23] Own translation: "Speak Spanish and count in balboas"; W. F. Robinson, "Arnulfo Arias y Acción Communal," *La Prensa*, June 9, 2013, http://www.prensa.com/Arnulfo-Arias-Accion-Comunal_0_3680632066.html.

[24] Own translation: "Patriotism, Action, Equity, and Discipline"; Orlando J. Pérez, *Political Culture in Panama: Democracy after Invasion* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 26.

[25] Michael L. Conniff, *Panama and the USA*, 186.

[26] Meding, *Panama: Staat und Nation im Wandel*, 194.

not yet vote "spilled out into the streets at a moment's notice (even if, as one confessed, they might occasionally go on an anti-US strike just so they could skip classes and study for exams)."[27] In 1947, the students achieved unprecedented legitimacy with rallies and demonstrations that ultimately forced the National Assembly to reject the extension on the lease of US bases in Panama.[28]

The schools became a central place of anti-US resentment and nationalist thought. Through a central education program instigated by the 1940s educational reforms of President Anulfo Arias,[29] uniform communication of behaviors, culture and stocks of knowledge emerged, together favoring anti-US-Americanism.[30] Teachers were now trained in the country, whereas they had usually studied abroad before or were themselves foreigners.[31] This gave the new generation of teachers a stronger connection to the Panamanian culture. In addition, a general literacy program was implemented in Panama. Under President Chiari, who pursued this educational program as well, 1,300 schools were built in Panama between 1960 and 1964.[32] This should make it possible to convey the basics of a Panamanian identity, the *panameñidad*, in school lessons, for example through the flag representing the nation, in fact as the "embodiment of a nation."[33]

In 1949, a law was passed that regulated the size, shape, and also the guidelines for raising and lowering of the flag.[34] The Constitution of Panama refers to this law in Article 6 with regard to national symbols. With the rise of nationalism, the Panamanian flag was increasingly staged on public occasions by government institutions. The raising and greeting of the flag had been established by the government at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the schools, children came together every day and sang the anthem before the flag. A common national identity was created in the central forecourts and inner courtyards of the schools, a united mass in which an individual student became part of the nation.[35] During the raising, the oath of allegiance to the Panamanian flag was given, demonstrating the significance of the Panamanian flag for the nation-state and its deliberate

[27] McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 85.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Krob and Davis, "El Día de los Mártires," 62.

[30] Nicolás Arata and Verónica Oelsner, "Staat macht Schule, Schule macht Nation: Ein Gespräch mit Inés Dussel," in *Was Macht Schule? Schule als gestalteter Raum: Fallbeispiele aus Argentinien,* ed. Ute Clement and Verónica Oelsner (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2016), 80.

[31] Peter M. Sánchez, *Panama Lost? U.S. Hegemony, Democracy, and the Canal* (Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 2007), 98.

[32] Krob and Davis, "El Día de los Mártires," 62.

[33] Tim Marshall, *A Flag Worth Dying for: The Power and Politics of National Symbols* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017), 8.

[34] Panamanian Law no. 24, 15.12.1949.

[35] "Símbolos Patrios de la República de Panamá," Collaboration of the National Authority for Government Innovation in Honor of the Nation, last modified October 2010, http://www.innovacion.gob.pa/descargas/SimbolosPatrios_vOct2010.pdf.

establishment by Arnulfo Arias—under whom the 1949 law was enacted—and President Chiari, who continued this policy.[36]

The meeting of pupils and students in the schools must also be taken into account. There was an increase in networking, in the development of group identities and, ultimately, a politicization took place as a result of the amended curriculum. Students organized internal school protests and wrote articles criticizing the US.[37]

The flag was also the symbol of the nation for the US-American zone's population, especially for the students at whose high schools the US flag was raised. US-Americans established their own lifestyle in the Zone, strongly oriented towards the US: In the Canal Zone, high schools followed the US-American curriculum, they had their own American football teams and observed US holidays. From their perspective, the Zone was a part of the US and therefore the US flag should be hoisted as a representation of their nation.[38] Consequently, nationalist ideas were propagated and continued by the population in Panama and the Zone. Since both societies lived so close to one another—and yet did not live together—this distinction became fundamental, also in relation to the flag issue.

Simultaneous with the rise of nationalism in Panama and the politicization of students, there was a crisis on the international stage. Egyptian nationalist leader, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, initiated the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956, as a result of which the US government feared similar developments in Panama. President Eisenhower himself told Charles Wilson, his Secretary of Defense, "[we] must be exceedingly careful that the future years do not bring about for us, in Panama, the situation that Britain has to face in Suez."[39]

This in turn was reflected in the schools: Especially in student groups the successful nationalization of the Suez Canal was discussed.[40] Thus the General Secretary of the *Federación de Estudiantes de Panamá* declared in a speech in February 1964:

> El caso del Egipto es para nosotros aleccionador. Revela cómo un país pobrísimo, en virtud de la decisión de sus hijos y del patriotismo colectivo, logró recuperar su principal recurso económico para aplicarlo en beneficio de su propio progreso.[41]

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[36] Ruperto H. Chue, *Bandera panameña,* 23.

[37] Krob and Davis, "El Día de los Mártires," 61.

[38] Ibid., 60.

[39] Eisenhower to Wilson, quoted in: Foreign Relations of the United States Series, 1955–1957, no. 7: 281. See: John Major, *Prize Possession: The United States Government and the Panama Canal, 1903–1979* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 329.

[40] Melanie G. Krob and Stephanie Enseñat Davis, "El Día de los Mártires: High-School Student Revolution and the Emergence of Panamanian National Identity," *The Latin Americanist* 58 (2014): 57.

[41] Own Translation: "The case of Egypt is sobering for us. It reveals how a very poor country, by virtue of the decision of its children and collective patriotism, managed to recover its main economic resource to apply it for the benefit of its own progress." Victor Ávila*, Panamá: Luchas sociales y afirmación nacional* (Panama City: CELA, 1998), 88. See: Krob and Davis, "El Día de los Mártires," 57.

The Suez Crisis and the rising tensions with Panama challenged the US government and President Eisenhower stated in a meeting on November 27th, 1956, that the Panamanian flag should be flown "in some ceremonial spot along with the American flag."[42] However, this was not considered sufficient by the Panamanian government. Popular hostilities against US control of the Canal intensified by the First and Second World War, and the increased US presence in Panama led to an outbreak of these movements in the spring of 1958, when Panamanian students invaded the Canal Zone and raised the Panamanian flag. Although it was supposed to be a peaceful demonstration, the National Guard and US soldiers intervened; one student was killed and 120 injured.[43] The relations between the two governments were heavily strained. In addition, the success of the Cuban Revolution had such a radiance as a 'liberation' from the Batista government, which had been supported by the United States, that anti-imperialist discourses emerged in the Panamanian public. This was reflected in student debates, newspapers and the founding of associations.[44] These anti-imperialist discourses were a formative phenomenon on a global level for this epoch. In Latin America, they were mainly directed against US interventions in Central America, the Caribbean, and northern South America.[45] While Marxist-Leninist leaning regimes established themselves in the guise of liberation movements—as in Cuba—the US often supported right-wing authoritarian regimes or military dictatorships in Central and South America under the guise of 'freedom.' In these discourses, the US became stereotyped as an exploitative state power that was only interested in concluding the most lucrative deals possible with governments.[46]

Indeed, in the context of the Cold War, the US government suspected the rise of nationalism and communist ideas in Latin America and since Panama had become a world center of trade, particular attention was paid to securing US-American power here. On the one hand, there was an increase in military presence in the Zone to secure the area, on the other hand, there were attempts to curb anti-US-American sentiments and appease Panamanian society.[47] However, most of the political rapprochements failed and the relationship between the US and Panama remained tense, thereby, giving the flag issue more relevance.

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[42] Foreign Relations of the United States Series, 1958–1960, no. 5: MS, 719.00/11-27559. DDRS, 1982, 1379. BD, 1046, 1047. See: John Major, *Prize Possession,* 332.
[43] Erickson Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions*, 60.
[44] Krob and Davis, "El Día de los Mártires," 61–62.
[45] Stefan Rinke, *Lateinamerika* (Darmstadt: Theiss, 2015), 232.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid., 58–59.

The Flag Riots

Political Agreement on the Flag Issue

On September 7th, 1960, President Eisenhower granted Panama nominal sovereignty rights and decided that the Panamanian flag should be hoisted alongside the US flags in the Canal Zone. The government of the US considered it a pro forma political act. It was "a gesture of friendship," said an employee of the US Office for Inter-American Affairs. [48] "[It] does not affect our rights in any way in the zone," Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann appeased the fears of US citizens, who were concerned that this was the first step toward Panama regaining sovereignty over the Canal Zone.[49]

The first flag was raised near the Panamanian parliament building on 21 September 1960, and a storm of protests, "which ha[d] erupted into violence, anger and distortions," rose in both the United States and in the Canal Zone.[50] The US responded with complaints and public pressure. The matter dragged on and it was not until January 10th, 1963, that the government of John F. Kennedy finally agreed to raise the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone.[51] Robert Fleming, governor of the Canal Zone, could only plan to hoist the flag after the last complaint was dismissed in 1963. Since the cost of building multiple additional flagpoles appeared excessive, the governor announced on December 30th, that the Panamanian alongside the US flag was to be raised only in 17 locations in the Canal Zone; for all other public places, including schools, the US flag was removed and the flagpoles remained empty.[52] Previously, US flags had been omnipresent in the Canal Zone and the reduction to only 17 flags was a drastic change. While the governor justified these changes in terms of cost, the Panamanians suspected the reduction of the US flags hid the true intention of showing as few Panamanian flags as possible.[53]

> Por razones que desconocemos, las autoridades de la Zona del Canal demoraron cerca de un año en intentar dar pleno cumplimiento al acuerdo sobre las banderas. Más aún, con el fin de desplegar el menor número posible de banderas panameñas en la Zona, procedieron, en violación del acuerdo, a remover arbitrariamente varias

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[48] "Defends Ike's Order to Fly the Panaman Flag," *Chicago Tribune*, September 19, 1960, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1960/09/19/page/44/article/defends-ikes-order-to-fly-panama-flag, 8.
[49] Ibid.
[50] "Canal Zone Storm Held Full of Lies: International Strife," *Chicago Tribune*, January 17, 1960, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1960/01/17/page/249/article/cross-of-hate-once-luck-charm#text, 7.
[51] David N. Farnsworth and James W. McKenney, *U.S.-Panama Relation 1903–1978: A Study in Linkage Politics*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 136.
[52] Ibid., 137.
[53] Ibid.

astas de sitios donde tradicionalmente había sido izada la bandera norteamericana; tales como frente a la residencia del Gobernador y frente al edificio de la Capitanía del Puerto.[54]

The article published in the *Revista Lotería*, a popular Panamanian magazine, by the *Departamento Cultural de la Dirección de Desarrollo Social y Cultural*, the Cultural Department of the Directorate for Social and Cultural Development, is clearly nationalistic.[55] In terms of propaganda, the article implies that the Canal Zone authorities had no reason to not raise the Panamanian flags as early as 1963, when the United States government agreed to this demand. As mentioned above, however, there were very good reasons for this, such as the various court proceedings. The removal of the US flags was described as a violation of the agreements of January 7th, 1963 and an ostentatious insult to Panamanian national pride. Yet, the removal of the US flags was not a violation of the treaty, which only stipulated that wherever the US flag was hoisted, the Panamanian flag had to be hoisted as well.

Problems of the Implementation of the Flag Ordinance

There were clear problems in the implementation of Governor Fleming's flag ordinance. There was general displeasure in the Zone regarding the suspension of the US-flags. The removal of the flags was particularly noticeable in schools. On January 2nd, 1964, for example, the students of Balboa High School in Panama City prepared a petition to President Johnson protesting the flag decree. The petition was circulated the next day and had won more than 400 signatures after sunset.[56]

On January 7th, the students of Balboa High School went so far as to raise the flag of the United States in front of their school without raising Panama's flag alongside it.[57] Already in the previous days, the school children had strongly complained about the removal of the flag in front of their school.[58] The US-American

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[54] Own translation: "For reasons unknown to us, it took the authorities of the Canal Zone nearly a year to attempt to fully support the flag agreement. Moreover, in order to deploy as few Panamanian flags as possible in the Zone, they proceeded, in violation of the agreement, to arbitrarily remove several flagpoles from sites where the US flag had traditionally been hoisted, such as in front of the governor's residence and the port captain's building." "Narración de los Sucesos de Enero de 1964," *Revista Lotería*, Spring 1964, http://panamapoesia.com/9enero01.php.

[55] Luisa Sánchez, "Manual de Procedimientos de la Revista Cultural," *Revista Lotería*, June 2003, http://www.lnb.gob.pa/sitio/transparencia/Procedimiento%20de%20la%20Revista%20Cultural%20Loter%C3%ADa.pdf.

[56] William J. Jorden, *Panama Odysee*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 34.

[57] A.D. Belinfante, Petrén Gustaf, and Vakil Navroz, *International Commission of Jurists: Reports on the Events in Panama January 9–12* (Geneva, 1964), 14.

[58] Conversation between General Taylor and General O'Meara on January 10, 1964. "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation," Foreign Relations of the United States Series, 1964–1968, vol. 31 (August 2004): 367, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d367. Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Panama II, Part B, January–

teenagers had been spurred by their parents to avoid the two-flag order, it became a real sport among them.[59] "Someone needs to defend the flag[,] and better the students than the adults in this case," a mother supposedly said to her daughter when asked if she could assist her friends in guarding the flagpole at Balboa High School on January 7th ,1964. To apologize for her absence at school that day, the mother wrote in her message "Vicki was sick today, as all GOOD Americans should be."[60]

Aggravation of Events

As soon as the news of the events at Balboa High School spread, a wave of anger and indignation broke out in Panama City:

> Profunda indignación ha causado en todos los círculos de la ciudad capital la actitud asumida por los estudiantes zoneítas de impedir que la bandera panameña sea izada, junto con la estadounidense, frente a las escuelas de la Zona del Canal.[61]

Throughout January 9th, the students of Balboa High School stood guard around the flagpole to prevent the police or teachers from taking the flag down. Their parents provided them with sandwiches, drinks, blankets and moral support. Local community groups, such as the Elks Club and Veterans of Foreign Wars, also supported the students.[62] At 5 p.m. a group of 200 students from the *Instituto Nacional de Panamá* entered the Canal Zone and marched towards Balboa High School. According to the article in the Panamanian magazine *Revista Lotería*, the students immediately visited the local authorities of the US and obtained permission from them to raise the flag of Panama in front of Balboa High School and sing their national anthem there.[63] A report by an international legal commission, later set up to investigate the following events of January 9th to 11th and described as "the most balanced narrative of the riots,"[64] states that the students had entered the Zone without permission from their school, nor from the Canal Zone authorities, to hold such a demonstration. Yet, both reports emphasize the peacefulness

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February 1964. No classification marking. Taylor was in Washington; O'Meara was in Panama.

[59] Schüler, "Molotow-Cocktails aus Hollywood."

[60] Ibid.

[61] Own translation: "The behavior shown by the students of the Zone to prevent the Panamanian flag from being hoisted, alongside the US flag, in front of the schools of the Canal Zone caused a deep outcry in all circles of the capital." "Dijeron Estudiantes Zoneítas: La Bandera Panameña No," *Portada del diario Crítica*, January 9, 1964, http://panamapoesia. com/9eneroCritica09.php.

[62] Eric Jackson, "The Martyrs of 1964," last modified May 4, 2009, http://www.czbrats.com/ Jackson/martyrs/martyrs.htm.

[63] "Los Pasos del Agresor," *Revista Lotería*, October 1971. Published in: Natalia Ruiz Pino and Juan Mantilla, *Los sucesesos del 9 de enero de 1964* (Panama City: Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, 1999), 63.

[64] Belinfante, Gustaf, and Navroz, *International Commission of Jurists*, 15.

of the demonstration: "It is beyond doubt that the march of the students, dressed in uniform, into the Canal commenced in a peaceful and orderly manner."[65]

At 5:30 p.m., the students were stopped at the Zone administration building by Captain Gaddis Wall, head of the Balboa district Canal Zone police. Guillermo Guevara Pas, a chairman of the Panamanian students of the *Instituto Nacional de Panamá*, is said to have explained to the police captain that the students only wanted to symbolically represent Panama by showing the Panamanian flag at the flagpole of Balboa High School and singing their national anthem. Wall refused to let them approach the flagpole further. Instead he suggested sending a delegation of five students to the flagpole to show their flag and sing the national anthem. He guaranteed the students full police protection and assured them not to worry about their safety. After some discussion among the students, they agreed. Four students holding the flag and one carrying the banner approached Balboa High School, followed by a sixth with a poster demanding Panama's sole sovereignty over the Canal. The group was accompanied by police.[66]

The students were booed at first, but they were not deterred and continued to the flagpole. The report of the *Revista Lotería* states that the crowd of US-American students threw themselves at the Panamanian flag bearers and tried to snatch the flag from them:

> [L]uego la multitud se lanza sobre ellos, tratan de arrebatarles la bandera y, al no conseguirlo, la desgarran y la pisotean [...]. Cuando los institutores tratan de defenderse con puños y punta-piés, los agentes de Policía de la Zona los repelen a toletazos. Con lágrimas de impotencia, los institutores se retiran hasta dónde están sus compañeros, perseguidos por los estudiantes zoneítas.[67]

In this section of the text, the Panamanian students are portrayed as victims, who were attacked by US-American students and only wanted to return to their comrades. The scene is described in hyperbolic and emotional phrases.

The report of the Legal Commission gives a detailed account of the events: When the six students reached the flagpole, they argued that the Panamanian flag should have been raised next to the US flag, which was forbidden by Zone policeman Wall. In the meantime, about 400 to 500 US students and adults gathered in front of the school surrounding the Panamanian students.[68] The student groups roared down each other singing the country hymns. It was nationalism that met

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[65] Belinfante, Gustaf, and Navroz, *International Commission of Jurists*, 16.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Own translation: "Then the crowd pounced on them, trying to take the flag away and, failing to do so, they tear it apart and stamp on it [...]. As [the Panamanian pupils] try to defend themselves with fists and foot kicks, the local police officers hit back. With tears of helplessness, the [pupils] fight their way through to their companions, persecuted by the students of the Canal Zone." "Los Pasos del Agresor," 63.
[68] Belinfante, Gustaf, and Navroz, *International Commission of Jurists*, 17.

nationalism. The Panamanians felt attacked by the disrespect of the US students, screams became pushes and the situation became more and more acute.[69] Wall decided to stop the demonstration of the Panamanian students and asked them to withdraw, but they insisted on showing their flag and singing their anthem. They accused Wall of not keeping his word and refused to retreat. Wall then instructed the police officers, who had accompanied the delegation of the six students to have their truncheons ready and drive the six students back to the main group. US-American students mingled with the police and a crowd of people formed around the six Panamanian students.[70] The US students tried to snatch the flag from the Panamanians and in this scuffle it was torn apart.[71] In this context, "[s]ome of the policemen seem to have used their batons in a more aggressive manner against the retreating Panamanian students."[72] When the other Panamanian students saw their classmates surrounded by the US-Americans and driven back from school grounds, they started screaming and throwing stones at the police. Several US patrol cars came to support and drove after the police. The 200 Panamanian students now began to withdraw more quickly.[73]

Violent Incidents in Panama City

The aborted demonstration caused panic and anger among the Panamanian students.[74] The 200 Panamanians are said to have been followed by US-American students, parents, and the police of the Canal Zone. Outraged by the perceived insult to their national flag, they threw stones at the US-American citizens of the Zone who pursued them. The first injuries occurred, as the *Revista Lotería* report states,[75] while the Panamanian students left considerable damage in the Canal Zone: they threw rubbish bins into the streets, probably to stop the police cars and smashed windows and street lamps.[76]

Even before the Panamanian students reached the border, news spread "like wildfire through the City of Panama," as a witness put it, and a mob formed and grew very quickly. Within half an hour several thousand people stood along the border, from Balboa Road to Ancon station.[77]

The report of the *Revista Lotería* says:

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[69] McPherson, "Courts of World Opinion," 87.
[70] Belinfante, Gustaf, and Navroz, *International Commission of Jurists*,18.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] "Los Pasos del Agresor," 64.
[76] Belinfante, Gustaf, and Navroz, *International Commission of Jurists*, 15.
[77] "Flag Riot in Canal Zone. 6 Die, 91 Hurt—Panama Recalls Envoy," *Chicago Tribune*, January 10, 1964, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1964/01/10/page/1/article/flag-riot-in-canal-zone#text.

> La avalancha de gente es tan poderosa, a pesar de no llevar armas, que la Policía de
> la Zona del Canal es doblegada por el número y pide la ayuda del Ejército de los
> Estados Unidos acantonado en la Zona del Canal.[78]

But the Panamanians themselves attacked US-Americans with molotov cock-
tails, stones, and sticks. The article goes on to state that dozens of students had
been killed by the Canal Zone Police by 7:00 a.m. However, the *Revista Lotería*
report did not mention any background information: Near Ancon station, a group
of Panamanians began to stop cars passing by, turn them over, and set them on
fire. A small group of policemen tried to control the situation and keep the mob
away from residential areas. First, they attempted to drive back the Panamanians
with tear gas. As the situation got worse, however, the sergeant ordered the police
group to use their pistols. He requested that the officers should only shoot over the
heads of the crowd and on the ground in front of the mob, but some of the shots
"seems to have been directed into the crowd."[79]

Considering the size of the mob and the small police force available in the
Canal Zone, Lieutenant Governor Parker, acting Governor of the Zone, called
General O'Meara, the commanding officer of United States troops. He demanded
military support from the US forces in the Canal Zone, which they received. The
article of *Revista Lotería* portrays an image of insensitive US-Americans shooting
into the unarmed crowd with excessive violence:

> Las fuerzas armadas de la Zona del Canal entran en acción con armas pesadas y de
> largo alcance. Fusiles, ametralladoras y tanques se extienden a lo largo de todo el
> sector limítrofe y disparan incesantemente contra la multitud indefensa. El número
> de heridos y de muertos crece incesantemente y muchos se desangran durante horas
> antes de que puedan ser recogidos bajo las ráfagas de las ametralladoras estadoun-
> idenses, que disparan incluso contra las ambulancias que portan la bandera de la
> Cruz Roja.[80]

Concurrently, the nature of the conflict changed, when weapons were used on
the Panamanian side as well and a firefight erupted between Panamanian and US-
Americans.[81] The shootings continued into the early hours of the morning and

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[78] Own translation: "The avalanche of people is so powerful, despite not carrying weapons, that
the Canal Zone Police are overwhelmed by the number and call for the help of the United
States Army stationed in the Canal Zone." "Los Pasos del Agresor," 64.
[79] Belinfante, Gustaf, and Navroz, *International Commission of Jurists*, 22.
[80] Own translation: "The armed forces of the Canal Zone take action with heavy and long-range
armaments. Rifles, machine guns and tanks are spread throughout the border area and they
fire incessantly at the defenseless crowd. The number of wounded and dead people grows
steadily and many bleed for hours before they can be picked up under the bursts of US-
American machine guns who fire even at ambulances carrying the Red Cross flag." "Los
Pasos del Agresor," 64.
[81] McPherson, "Courts of World Opinion," 88.

throughout the day there were sporadic clashes between the United States Army and the Panamanian masses. The number of dead reached thirteen and the number of injured amounted to more than three hundred.[82]

Until that time, there was no evidence that the authorities of the Panamanian Republic had done anything to appease the situation or otherwise control the crowd. In fact, the opposite happened: "Indeed, on the contrary, from the materials made available, it would appear that statements made through the radio and the television were of an inflammatory nature." [83]

The situation finally calmed down between January, 10th and 11th, but it was not until January 13th, that the *Guardia Nacional* intervened, disbanded the crowds and tried to restore order.[84] In the riots 6 US-Americans and 24 Panamanians had died.[85]

Political Consequences

The public description of the events in Panama quickly evolved to become a heroic saga.[86] Within a few hours in the media—especially through radio messages—the riots were presented as "*la gesta patriótica,*" in which unarmed Panamanians were attacked by the population of the Canal Zone.[87] *El Panamá-América*, a populist, US-critical magazine, published a radical article condemning the immense violence of the US "*contra niños, adolescentes, jóvenes y viejos, hombres y mujeres, sin más arma que su patriotism.*"[88]

But President Chiari took the strongest political stance possible: He broke off political relations with the United States on the first night of the flag riots and asked the staff of the Embassy of Panama in Washington to return to Panama as soon as possible.[89] Never before had Panama broken off diplomatic relations with the US, although some interventions by the United States had meant far greater interference in Panamanian sovereignty than the flag riots.

Just a day after the violence in Panama City, President Chiari invited several student leaders to the presidential palace and had photos taken of himself with them and the torn flag of Panama.[90] In public speeches and interviews he demand-

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[82] "Los Pasos del Agresor," 65.

[83] Belinfante, Gustaf, and Navroz, *International Commission of Jurists*, 21.

[84] Belinfante, Gustaf, and Navroz, *International Commission of Jurists*, .28.

[85] Ibid., 21.

[86] McPherson, "Courts of World Opinion," 89.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Own translation: "against children, adolescents, young and old, men and women, with no other weapon than their patriotism," Robert T. Buckman, *Latin America: The World Today Series* (Harpers Ferry: Stryker-Post-Publications, 1997), 326; "Cancelación Definitiva del Tratado de 1903," *El Panamá América*, January 10, 1964, http://panamapoesia. com/9eneroPanamaAmerica10.php.

[89] McPherson, "Courts of World Opinion," 90.

[90] Ibid. See for the published photos of Chiari with the students and the torn flag: *Los sucesos del 9 de enero de 1964: Antecedentes históricos* (Panama City: Autoridad del Canal, 1999),

ed the amendment of the 1903 Canal contract and emphasized that "*la sangre de los mártires que han perecido hoy, no será derramada en vano.*"[91]

Through this action Chiari fostered a symbolic proximity between himself and the Panamanian citizens. He followed the national consensus by strongly criticizing the United States' approach and judging the intervention of the US military as a violent display of US power. By breaking off relations with the US, he assured himself the loyalty of the Panamanian people. This symbolic political move offered Chiari not just the support of the public, but also leverage in domestic and foreign affairs.

FIGURE 1: "The solidarity increases the value of the individual." Caricature by Alfonso Pincho, in *Educación Cívica*, ed. Diamantina de Calzadilla and Etna de Martínez (Panama City, 1965).

The *Día de los Mártires* became an integral part of popular education. The Ministry of Education of Panama published a new textbook for the Panamanian high school students entitled *Educación Cívica*, Civic Education, in which the flag riots were glorified as a heroic myth and the US-Americans were presented as unscrupulous murderers. The caricature above is from this book, showing an indifferent soldier shooting at an unarmed Panamanian adolescent in front of a crowd of students with a machine gun. In contrast to the statements made in these

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http://panamapoesia.com/9enero.htm.

[91] Own translation: "the blood of the martyrs who had perished today would not be shed for nothing"; Roberto Chiari, Speech, January 10, 1964. See: Michael L. Conniff, *Panama and the USA,* 120.

account, Panamanians, as well as US forces fired at each other, while there is no proof that the US military used machine guns.[92] There were several such cartoons published in various Panamanian newspapers.[93] Panamanians who wrote about the flag riots portrayed them as a heroic epic, with virtually no exception.[94]

The Panamanian flag riots also came into the focus of international governments and the conflict was also taken up in the international press. The German news magazine *Der Spiegel* reported on January 22nd, 1964, that the Panamanians had been incited by communist agitators "sent by Castro."[95] Furthermore, Western intelligence agencies regarded the flag riots in Panama as a communist-inspired movement.[96]

A second international consequence played out on the field of decolonization. The Panamanian government referred to anti-colonial movements by staging the flag riots as an anti-imperial struggle. In the context of these global debates, the US government was confronted with enormous criticism "for continuing to hold colonial possessions."[97]

The moral staging of Panama's national destiny had an impact. The Panama Canal transmission was characterized as Washington's penance for massacring unarmed Panamanians and became the central image of public discourse in Panama. A 'Memorandum of Unrest' declared that the violence was "extraordinarily positive for the Panamanian nation."[98] On December 18th, 1964, less than a year after the riots, President Johnson promised the United States would not permanently manage the Canal, as the 1903 treaty had posited. Johnson's testimony proved to be an important breakthrough. In 1977, negotiations eventually culminated in the signing of treaties in which President Jimmy Carter promised to hand over the Canal to Panama by December 31st,1999.[99]

Conclusion

Relations between the United States and Panama from the mid-19th century up until the Canal was handed over in 1999 were characterized by constant economic dependence. Since the 1840s, the US had been present in Panama as a major power and protected its transnational interests there; sometimes diplomatically,

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[92] Roberto Chiari, Speech.

[93] McPherson, "From 'Punks' to Geopoliticans," 416–17. See for more articles and caricatures: *Los sucesos del 9 de enero de 1964*.

[94] McPherson, "Courts of World Opinion," 84.

[95] Schüler, "Molotowcocktails aus Hollywod."

[96] Henry Raymont, *Troubled Neighbors: The Story of US-Latin American Relations, from FDR to the Present* (New York: Century Foundation, 2005), "Lyndon Baines Johnson," 4.

[97] A. J. Christopher, "Decolonisation without Independence," *GeoJournal* 56, no. 3 (2002): 218; John Major, *Prize Possession*, 327.

[98] Adolfo Ahumada, "9 de Enero. Testimonio y Significado," (Panama City: Lotería Nacional de Beneficiencia, 1999); McPherson, "Courts of World Opinion," 84.

[99] McPherson, "Courts of World Opinion", 84.

sometimes by intervention. Since 1903 they were contractually bound to Panama and faced growing resistance from the local population and government.

In this tense story, the 1964 flag riots were a climax, they became a milestone and prompted the reassessment of relations between Panama and the United States. An attempt was made to find a new modus vivendi and at the end of the rocky road stood the *Cartas-Torijos-Contracts*, which assured the handover of the Canal to Panama at the turn of the millennium. Chiari's approach in the crisis can generally be regarded as quite successful. Cutting diplomatic ties with the US led to an enormous improvement in the government's image, and thus Chiari secured popular consensus on the domestic political side and brought success with regard to foreign affairs. In this context, the reference to the flag riots was later used as a political instrument.

Thus, the political pressure that Panama built up was mostly due to its government's rhetorical ability to shore up nationalism and unity on the one hand and, on the other hand, to present US-Panamanian relations as an anti-colonial struggle, even if this narrative did not fit the actual events. Thereby, it was commemorated as a dimension of the Latin American wars of independence, the *Thousand Day's War*, and the ultimate proclamation of independence from Colombia. The dispute boiled down to symbols. The flag stood for the nation of Panama and its claim to the Canal. This reduced the conflict to a symbolic level, which made it easier for the government to control its course.

On the international stage, too, the flag riots were portrayed by the Panamanian government and the media as an anti-colonial struggle. Within the framework of the global anti-imperialist movements, Panama also received international attention and the US hegemony at the isthmus was often criticized in newspapers, as well as by Latin American and European governments. This put the US under pressure and forced the US government to perpetually justify their basic policies in Panama. In the country itself, the struggle for sovereignty over the Canal was staged as a third independence in newspapers such as the *Revista Lotería*, *El Panamá-América*, and *La Estrella de Panamá* and the students were propagated as martyrs who courageously stood in the way of the US Army to fight for a free Panama. Consequently, the flag riots were stylized as a heroic myth.

However, this presentation did not correspond with actual events. One can rather speak of the radicalization of a spontaneous demonstration, since the Panamanian—and also US-American—students, although predominantly driven by national pride, did not seem to intend to become martyrs for Panama's freedom. In addition, the presentation of US-Americans as the enemy in the Panamanian newspapers was enriched with hyperbolic phrases and illustrated with simplified caricatures. The report of the International Commission of Jurists also concluded that excessive force had not been exercised by the US armed forces, although they had reacted vigorously.

The Panamanian government intentionally propagated an aggressive image of the US and political activism in newspapers and schools. They tried to put their own people up against the United States to exert political pressure. Often this was done on a symbolic level, which is why the question of flags is of great importance in this context. Pupils and students became a political mouthpiece for the government. With the *Acción Comunal* joining the government, critical US attitudes had become common amongst schools and at rallies. One strategy was to mobilize the population through indoctrination. The upswing of the *Acción Comunal* and the *Panameñismo* changed the climate of opinion in Panama and increasingly Anglophobic attitudes became a popular consensus. An attempt was made to get the public to believe that the Canal belonged to Panama or at least that the nation should be on an equal footing with the United States. This was actually brought to the population via schools, festivities, and parades. As shown in the essay*, the *Revista Lotería*, published directly by the *Departamento Cultural de la Dirección de Desarrollo Social y Cultural*, became a propaganda outlet. Even before January 9th, 1964, there were many US-critical articles published, that demanded the Canal to be handed over to Panama. In the course of the unrests of 1964, these attitudes became increasingly radical and took on a life of their own. The result of this policy were the flag riots, in which the government did not have to intervene, nor did it have to trigger them at all. But the preparations—namely the polarization of US-critical attitudes—were initiated in the past by the *Acción Comunal* and Arnulfo Arias.

During the flag riots, schools had become places of mobilization, and the pupils had become geopolitical actors. The flag march of the Panamanian students into the Canal Zone was therefore a collective staging and representation of the Panamanian identity. It proved the affiliation of the Canal to Panama. At the same time, the US Zone population wanted to see its own flag flying in the Zone. The Zone was built in the image of US cities and daily life, especially in schools, was adapted to US standards. The tensions between the Zone's population and the Panamanians built up on a symbolic level. When during the riots in 1964, the Panamanian flag, which was not even allowed to touch the ground by law, was torn in a scuffle with the US-American students, an outcry went through Panamanian society. The national symbol had been dishonored. It came to the climax of the flag disputes, which represented the dispute over the jurisdiction and affiliation of the Canal and the Zone, and to a duel of nationalisms.

After the riots, the events were edited by the media and the Panamanian government. Through their glorification as a heroic myth and by cutting ties with the United States, the flag riots were used politically. An emotional consensus was created in which newspapers and government pulled together and the question of flags, which actually had more of a symbolic value, became a political discourse about the sovereignty of the Panama Canal. Thus, the flag riots, which had turned

from a spontaneous demonstration of students into a popular uprising, became the *Día de los Mártires.*

"Gate to Lampedusa—Gate to Europe." Monument to Migrants Lost at Sea by Mimmo Paladino. Photo courtesy of: Vito Manzari, 2014. Wikimedia Commons.

The 'Europeanization' of the Italian Migration Regime: Historicizing its Prerequisites, Development, and Transfer, from the 'Oil Shock' to the Mediterranean 'Migration Crisis'

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After the 2015 'Migration Crisis' a focus on securitizing Schengen area borders and externalizing migration control has dominated deliberations between the countries of the European Union, as well as EU dealings with bordering nation states. Italy sits at the geographical and political crossroads of this situation, and its migration regime has gradually come to shape the EU's handling of Mediterranean migration. Paradoxically, this regime entails a willingness to flout rule of law and human rights precedents upheld by European institutions themselves. This article brings together scholarly work from a variety of disciplines to historicize the prerequisites, development, and transfer of Italian migration management methods from national to supranational levels. The article traces increasing European integration and a hardening of external borders towards a Global South, through the aftermath of the 1973 'Oil Crisis', the formation of the Schengen Area based on French and West German demands for a stricter migration policy, domestic Italian political developments in the 1990s, and an externalizing of border control in the 2000s. The study argues that these developments are a result of complex and sometimes circular situations of pressure and coercion but also surprising outcomes based on circumstances of immigration to Europe that no party had foreseen.

Introduction

This paper deals with what I contend has been a gradual 'Europeanization' of Italy's migration regime and related methods intended to control, manage, and stem the increasing number of migrants arriving by way of the Mediterranean and hailing from Northern Africa and beyond.[1] My aim will be to historicize this process and illustrate that its roots and reasons stretch back at least to the 'Oil Shock'

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[1] I would like to note that all translations from sources originally in Italian used in this paper are my own. The responsibility for any errors or omissions remains solely mine.

of 1973, which brought a new urgency to European relations with Maghreb and Arab countries. This tumultuous relationship would set the stage for deliberations of what later became the Schengen Agreement, which in turn brought both increasing European integration and a hardening of external borders toward a Global South, which is now seemingly considered expendable. It is important to note that throughout this paper I will use the term Europeanization in a slightly altered fashion from what is customary. As described by International Relations scholar Ulrich Sedelmeier, it most often "refers to the impact of the European Union (EU) on nation states…across policies, politics and polities."[2] Instead, I lean towards the interpretation of political and social scientist Lucia Quaglia who posits a bottom-up reading of Europeanization. Namely, she asserts that it can also be considered a sort of nationalization of European concerns where one country's (in this case Italy's) prerogatives becomes paramount to the EU as a whole.[3]

I view the current Italian migration regime as willing to walk a legal tightrope with what can be called acceptable from a rule of law and human rights perspective, which was set down in the institutional and legal framework of the European Convention of Human Rights. This was built up in the aftermath of the Second World War and itself predates European integration. A prime example of such behavior includes engaging in so-called *refoulement* of refugees at sea through forcibly returning them to North African coasts.[4] The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) strongly condemned *refoulement* in 2012 at the resolution of the *Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy* case. Italy has also made several bilateral agreements intended to secure the return of migrants to third-party countries such as Libya—a nation that is not even participatory in the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and which is currently torn between several factions. These factions are fighting a prolonged civil war in the aftermath of the toppling of autocrat Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.[5]

It is important for me to underline, however, that I am not setting out to paint a picture of Italy as the rogue 'bad actor' with undue influence in this story. Not only did Italy face immigration at unprecedented levels in the time period I am investigating, it also attempted to save many lives at risk in the Mediterranean when others were slow to act. All the while, its European Union counterparts, at least

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[2] Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Europeanization," in *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*, ed. Erik Jones, Anand Menon, and Stephen Weatherill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 825.

[3] Lucia Quaglia, "The Role of Italy in the European Union: Between Continuity and Change," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 9, no. 2 (August 2007): 134.

[4] A French term meaning expulsion of potential asylum seekers to a country were they risk persecution, which is forbidden under article 33 of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention.

[5] Paula García Andrade, "Initiatives of EU Member States in Managing Mixed Flows in the Mediterranean and the EU Distribution of Competences," in *The Common European Asylum System and Human Rights: Enhancing Protection in Times of Emergencies*, ed. Claudio Matera and Amanda Taylor (Den Haag: CLEER Working Papers, 2014), 52.

initially, seemingly wrung their hands and hid behind the stringent stipulations of the Dublin Regulation, which dictates that asylum can only be requested in the member state where the applicant first entered. Also worth noting is that Italian civil society, the media and the political sphere frequently questioned the validity of governmental approaches to handling the migration influx, negating any simplistic reading of an uncontested regime acting on a uniform national mandate. Rather, it is my view that the transfer of Italian migration management methods from national to supranational levels is the result of complex and sometimes circular situations of pressure and coercion, with alternating flows of power politics and surprising outcomes based on circumstances of immigration to Europe that no party had planned for.[6]

As far as the current state of research is concerned, there has already been quite a lot of scholarly work done on the topics of Schengen, Italo-Libyan relations, EU migration regimes in the Mediterranean, the Oil Shock, and Europeanization, by academics in a variety of disciplines. This paper aims to aid in the discussion by connecting previous scholarship and providing a long-term perspective that historicizes the processes taking place. Historians such as Elena Calandri, Giuliano Garavini, Massimiliano Trentin, and others have identified the Oil Shock as a watershed moment not just for the economy worldwide and North–South relations, but also for having shaped the European Community (EC)–Mediterranean interaction in the decades after 1973. In this paper I take that a step further and show how the reverberations of that event set the stage for the Schengen Agreement. Political scientist Simone Paoli has made a convincing argument in claiming that this agreement had as its primary objective the protection of the European core states from undesired immigration from the Global South through a reinforced externalization of control and securitization of borders, not simply the opening of restrictions internally on the continent to speed up travel and commerce.[7]

The findings brought to light in Paoli's incisive article would be further enriched by connecting them to developments on the domestic political scene that took place within Italy following the Schengen area elaborations. These changing circumstances led to more criticism of both the EU and migration. Quaglia coined this the rise of a 'Euro-realist' political paradigm.[8] Sociologist Sara Casella Co-

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[6] Roger Cohen, "Opinion—Europe's Migration Impasse," *The New York Times*, November 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/opinion/europes-migration-impasse.html; Deborah Ball and Giovanni Legorano, "Migrant Surge Exposes EU's Policy Discord," *Wall Street Journal*, March 11, 2015, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1661907999/abstract/B6174A997A1342A8PQ/1; Chiara Saraceno, "Le frontiere interne," *La Repubblica*, June 9, 2015, https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/06/09/le-frontiere-interne32.html?ref=search.

[7] Securitization of border 'controls involves an overriding focus on threat assessment and prevention in all management of people moving across national boundaries. Simone Paoli, "The Schengen Agreements and Their Impact on Euro-Mediterranean Relations: The Case of Italy and the Maghreb," *Journal of European Integration History* 21, no. 1 (2015): 131.

[8] Quaglia, "The Role of Italy in the European Union," 134.

lombeau adds that the European core Paoli refers to was reinvented in a new form specifically centered in the major continental European powers, to the detriment of surrounding countries on the European periphery. In addition, she claims this re-foundation of a new political core also affirmed the position of a much older center of power, namely the nation state.[9] This stands in contrast to other scholarly work that only sees a continuous erosion of the nation state in this time period, with nationalist politics losing importance in the face of increased European integration.[10] I find that to be too quick a conclusion to draw and instead view national political priorities as having been reinvented in new ways. When certain governments of the EC, such as in France and Germany, struggled to adopt a more restrictive immigration policy on the national level due to unexpected and persistent resistance from parliamentary opposition, civil society, and political forces domestically, they instead turned to the supranational level to reinvigorate their legislative push.[11] The border externalization process mentioned above did not necessarily stop at the Italian borders, as historians Alessandro Triulzi and Antonio Morone illustrate. Italy developed its own stringent migration regime, initially in reaction to and later supported by the EU. The goal then was to push the boundaries further beyond the Mediterranean Sea itself and into North African countries like Libya, where the shapes this externalization took was in turn informed by the colonial experience Italy had previously had in the very same region.[12]

My analysis centers on the development of a specific Italian migration regime and its subsequent Europeanizing through many phases of contributing events, implementation, and development, each of which will constitute a section of my paper. The first section runs from the Oil Shock of 1973 until the rapid oil price decline in the mid-1980s, where I supply the background for why a build-down of borders in the EC in tandem with a hardening of external control became politically expedient. The time period from approximately 1984 to 1990 makes up the second section and deals with the foundation and initial implementation of Schengen, where a French and West German desire to shore up sovereignty, externalize border control, and ease the flow of commodities and citizens came at the expense of more peripheral countries, chief among them Italy. The third stage

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[9] Sara Casella Colombeau, "Policing the Internal Schengen Borders—Managing the Double Bind between Free Movement and Migration Control," *Policing and Society* 27, no. 5 (2017): 480.

[10] Giuliano Garavini, "The Colonies Strike Back: The Impact of the Third World on Western Europe, 1968–1975," *Contemporary European History* 16, no. 03 (August 2007): 318.

[11] Paoli, "The Schengen Agreements and Their Impact on Euro-Mediterranean Relations," 129.

[12] Alessandro Triulzi, "'Like a Plate of Spaghetti': Migrant Narratives from the Libya-Lampedusa Route," in *Long Journeys: African Migrants on the Road*, ed. Alessandro Triulzi and Robert Lawrence McKenzie, vol. 8 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 4; Antonio M. Morone, "Policies, Practices, and Representations Regarding Sub-Saharan Migrants in Libya: From the Partnership with Italy to the Post-Qadhafi Era," in *EurAfrican Borders and Migration Management—Political Cultures, Contested Spaces, and Ordinary Lives*, ed. Paolo Gaibazzi, Alice Bellagamba, and Stephan Dünnwald (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 130.

has its beginnings in the early 1990s, when a general collapse of the post-war Italian domestic political paradigm opened up the possibility for new political forces to enter the national stage. Political parties such as Forza Italia with Silvio Berlusconi at the helm and Lega Nord led by Umberto Bossi, both occasionally capitalized on fears of immigration and showed the initial signs of willingness to risk international condemnation through *refoulement* of unwanted refugees and economic migrants.[13] This section ends and the fourth one begins with the 2008 Italy–Libya *Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation*, signed into law by Libya's autocratic leader Muammar Gaddafi and Silvio Berlusconi, who at this point was acting as Italy's Prime Minister for the third time. The treaty traded an increase in Libyan border control and a clampdown on illegal migration in return for Italian financial aid and investment.[14] Fresh off the heels of this treaty came the eruption of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, a pivotal point that brought several thousand Tunisian refugees to Italy. Italian dissatisfaction with being saddled with sole responsibility to process and perhaps absorb these migrants, as stipulated in the Dublin Regulation, led the country to give some of these newcomers temporary residency permits allowing for free travel within Schengen. When a small minority boarded trains towards France (along with human rights activists accompanying them), the reaction of French authorities threatened Schengen cooperation, further secured French national borders within a nominally borderless area, and ultimately increased Europe-wide acceptance of Italian approaches and demands. The final and fifth section will detail how the unfurling of events from the previous section were in a sense repeated on a larger stage in the lead-up to the often-termed Mediterranean 'Migration Crisis' in 2015.[15] EU-member states proved willing to support, engage with, and ultimately almost entirely adopt Italian ways of dealing with the crisis of tens of thousands of people escaping poverty and war. What had originally been Italian programs came under the EU operational umbrella and externalization of European borders took its first tentative moves beyond the Mediterranean and into African countries.

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[13] Quaglia, "The Role of Italy in the European Union," 134.

[14] Chiara De Cesari, "The Paradoxes of Colonial Reparation: Foreclosing Memory and the 2008 Italy–Libya Friendship Treaty," *Memory Studies* 5, no. 3 (July 2012): 317.

[15] See for example: Ferruccio Pastore, "The next Big European Project? The Migration and Asylum Crisis: A Vital Challenge for the EU," (Research Report, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2015), 4; Marco Scipioni, "Failing Forward in EU Migration Policy? EU Integration after the 2015 Asylum and Migration Crisis," *Journal of European Public Policy* 25, no. 9 (September 2018): 1357–75; Åsne Kalland Aarstad, "The Duty to Assist and Its Disincentives: The Shipping Industry and the Mediterranean Migration Crisis," *Mediterranean Politics* 20, no. 3 (September 2015): 413–19.

After the Oil Shock—Inward European Focus rather than Mediterranean Engagement, 1973–1986

Before beginning to detail the differing opinions among European nations on the value and ways of handling immigration that took place in relation to Schengen from 1984 and onwards, it is important to discuss why this discrepancy in attitudes existed in the first place, as well as present the historic preconditions that led to inward-looking European integration as a politically viable option. Following the postwar boom years of European growth from the early to mid-1950s onwards, all of the member states of the EC apart from Italy experienced mass immigration. In large part, this was due to guest labor programs instituted to attract workers both from within Europe and outside of the continent, seemingly constituting efficient transfers of 'idle hands' from poorer countries in the Global South, putting them to work in the more affluent Global North. However, in the late-1960s and early-1970s this immigration started carrying grave political, social, and economic liabilities.[16]

Behind this migratory pressure lay the fact that poverty in the former colonized countries was not only still prevalent, but actually growing despite rising production and trade after independence. This was partially because the raw materials they primarily exported had steadily declined in value since the Second World War.[17] The Oil Shock of 1973 is often summed up as OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) and its allies punishing the US and European nations supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur war with Egypt, through a targeted oil sales embargo and price hike. It can, however, also be read as an attempt by the Global South to address the decline in raw material prices (including the price of oil) and to improve their standing through economic activism, for a time uniting both oil producing countries and the other raw material-exporters of the developing world. This economic activism affected how European countries initially involved themselves politically with the Global South at their Mediterranean doorstep, only to ultimately disengage and instead focus on migration control and inward integration.

Coined as the high point of 'Third Worldism' in certain academic quarters, the oil price worldwide did indeed reach record levels, shocking a developed world that had grown dependent on affordable oil for its own economic post-war revival.[18] Ensuing financial reverberations forced most Western European countries to wind down immigration programs, with France and West Germany taking the

[16] Garavini, "The Colonies Strike Back," 306; Paoli, "The Schengen Agreements and Their Impact on Euro-Mediterranean Relations," 126.

[17] Giuliano Garavini, "Completing Decolonization: The 1973 'Oil Shock' and the Struggle for Economic Rights," *The International History Review* 33, no. 3 (September 2011): 476.

[18] Ibid., 483; Massimiliano Trentin, "Divergence in the Mediterranean: The Economic Relations Between the EC and the Arab Countries in the Long 1980s," *Journal of European Integration History* 21, no. 1 (2015): 91.

lead in clamping down on their demand for foreign labor.[19] This was complicated by the fact that labor migration turned out to be quite far from being a faucet one could simply turn on and off according to fluctuations of demand. European governments were left reeling, with new impetus to engage with the oil producing countries in the southern Mediterranean and the Arab world.

Many motives have been attributed to these overtures, ranging from genuine social responsibility and a rising consciousness of historic wrongdoing by the colonial and imperial powers, to more realist-driven desires of oil security and a concern for what instability on the southern edge of the Mediterranean might mean for migration pressure to Europe.[20] The EC's Global Mediterranean Policy had in fact already been inaugurated in 1972, but was quickly followed in 1974 by the Euro-Arab Dialogue, both meant to engage with Mediterranean and Arab countries in the surrounding regions of the EC. Little, however, was achieved in the time before a second Oil Shock came with the Iranian revolution of 1979. Prices again skyrocketed, but the fallout this time was different. As soon as 1982 oil prices started declining before falling steeply in 1985–86, Third World economic activism fell apart and the Global South was left with rising national debt and a growing trade deficit with the developed nations. In the meantime neo-liberalist doctrine had become dominant in the US as well as in key European countries, meaning free-market fiscal policy prescriptions were now the solution offered by the Global North, rather than political engagement coupled with development cooperation.[21]

Arguments for why this was the preferred route taken by the European developed nations differ. Historian Massimiliano Trentin sees EC engagement, trade, and investment with the Mediterranean countries as always closely following the oil price, depending on what would ensure European prominence in the region. Other scholars, such as Giuliano Garavini and Elisabetta Bini, point to a renewed European turn towards strengthening its relationship with the USA and its interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East region playing a part in this decision.[22] The picture is undoubtedly complex, but for the purposes of this article I see it as having made European countries such as France and West Germany feel it politically expedient not only to wind down their immigration programs, but also start a process of cajoling other EC member states into aligning their migration policies to their own.[23] The Mediterranean became less a destination for investment

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[19] Colombeau, "Policing the Internal Schengen Borders," 484.

[20] Elena Calandri and Simone Paoli, "Europe and the Mediterranean in the Long 1980s," *Journal of European Integration History* 21, no. 1 (2015): 6; Garavini, "The Colonies Strike Back," 309.

[21] Calandri and Paoli, "Europe and the Mediterranean," 11; Trentin, "Divergence in the Mediterranean.," 89.

[22] Elisabetta Bini, "A Transatlantic Shock: Italy's Energy Policies between the Mediterranean and the EEC, 1967–1974," *Historical Social Research* 39, no. 4 (2014): 158; Garavini, "The Colonies Strike Back," 319; Trentin, "Divergence in the Mediterranean," 89.

[23] Colombeau, "Policing the Internal Schengen Borders," 484.

and trade, and more an area delegated to securitization and risk-management of a more direct kind.

French and German Migration Concerns Leads to European Integration on Un-equal Terms, 1984–1990

The Schengen Acquis has undoubtedly contributed to a broadening of horizons for EU citizens both work- and leisure-wise, as well as expanded markets for business and helped growth in trade between the member nations. But it has hardly been the unmitigated success story certain academic quarters claim it to be, nor does it ensure equal treatment for those wanting access to it, be they countries or individuals. Indeed, at the heart of Schengen lie a series of exclusionary processes that have had wide-ranging consequences in the decades since it came into being. [24] In the mid-1980s, Italy (alongside other countries on the periphery of the EC such as Greece) were knowingly kept out of the initial talks to form a borderless area. At first this area encompassed France, West Germany, and the Benelux countries, but it was later brought into the wider EC policy field and turned into the foundations of Schengen. [25] France's President François Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced the Saarbrücken Accord in July 1984, meant to ease the crossing of both people and commodities through the lessening of their bilateral border controls, harmonizing legislation, and externalizing security checks to their frontiers with adjacent nations. Italy's Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti shortly thereafter signaled his country's strong interest in negotiating a similar agreement with France. His French counterpart quickly declined the Italian request however, as France had a series of misgivings towards Italian immigration policy and fears of what opening its borders to Italy could entail.

The French government considered Italy's system of controls far too lax and believed that up to 800,000 undocumented migrants then residing in Italy would cross the Alps as soon as any restrictions were lifted. Claims such as this seem to die hard, as we will see them oft repeated throughout the at times strained Franco-Italian relationship over their shared border. Interestingly enough, persistent stereotyping of Southern Europeans as work-shy and always looking to leech off of their thrifty northern neighbors also had a bit-part to play in the French rejection. This is exemplified in Foreign Ministry deliberations and documents noting that "abolition of border controls with Italy might encourage an influx of inactive and

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[24] See: Dane Davis and Thomas Gift, "The Positive Effects of the Schengen Agreement on European Trade," *The World Economy* 37, no. 11 (November 2014): 1541–57; Cristina Elena Popa, "The Challenges of the Schengen Area," *Expert Journal of Economics* 4, no. 3 (2016): 96, http://economics.expertjournals.com/23597704-410/.

[25] Emmanuel Comte, "Migration and Regional Interdependence in the Mediterranean, from the Early 1980s to the Mid 1990s," *Journal of European Integration History* 21, no. 1 (2015): 116.

unemployed Italian persons," as Simone Paoli has uncovered.[26] The total order of French demands for Italy to be allowed into the Schengen deliberations were quite extensive and included: broad border policing cooperation, a drastic tightening of immigration policy, a harmonization of visa requirements (including demanding visas from countries just across the Mediterranean, hitherto exempted by Italy), and chiefly, a readmission agreement between the two countries, governing any migrants caught illegally or denied admission into France.

The Italian Prime Minister at the time, Bettino Craxi, was convinced that the EC would do well to adopt a more generous stance in its immigration policies, in tune with moral responsibilities and political interests in the Mediterranean. Not coincidentally, this was along the line of thinking of his own government, which argued for a continued visa exemption of several Third World countries, many of them Mediterranean, as part of a strategy meant to strengthen political ties and intended to improve the economies of countries around the Mediterranean basin. Tightening of access to the EC through enhanced visa restrictions would contravene any such strategy. Craxi was, in fact, so concerned that in the Florence summit with Mitterand on June 14th 1985, he insisted on making two points of Franco-Italian disagreement the main issues. The first were the visa-requirements mentioned above and the second was demands for stricter Italian border policing.[27] Mitterand for his part, was quite adamant that the ultimate aim of a common EC migration policy should be restrictive in order to protect France in particular and Europe in general, from undesired immigration from the Global South. For him, this meant Italy needed to better enforce regulations against illegal migration across the border into France, particularly migrants coming from the Mediterranean region. The disagreement seemingly proved too deep to resolve, and all talks came to a sudden end in the early months of 1986.[28]

Ultimately, Italy did cave in to demands and went on to become a full-fledged party to the Schengen Acquis, conforming its immigration legislation to the stricter regulations already adopted by the other parties to the agreement. The reasons for this about-turn had their origins partially in the domestic political reality of Italy, where the fall of the Craxi cabinet in April 1987 gave impetus to political forces within the country that felt it too costly to stay on the margins of Schengen, and the rest of continental Europe.[29] The other countries party to Schengen

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[26] See for example: Stephen Brown, "Letta Tells Germans That 'Lazy Italians' Cliché Helps Populists," *Reuters*, November 14, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-italy-lazy/letta-tells-germans-that-lazy-italians-cliche-helps-populists-idUSBRE9AD16H20131114; Roger Cohen, "Opinion—A Cheer for Italy's Awful New Government," *The New York Times*, June 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/opinion/italy-government-league-five-star-movement.html; Paoli, "The Schengen Agreements and Their Impact on Euro-Mediterranean Relations," 132–33.

[27] In fact, the very same day the Schengen Agreement was signed.

[28] Paoli, "The Schengen Agreements and Their Impact on Euro-Mediterranean Relations," 134–35.

[29] Calandri and Paoli, "Europe and the Mediterranean," 12.

quickly accepted the Italian turnaround, seeing it as a necessary externalization of border control, convenient from both an economic and political standpoint.[30]

Still, there were prominent dissenting voices within Italian politics, such as then-Vice President of the Council of Ministers Claudio Martelli, who attacked the core of the Schengen Agreement.[31] He went on to introduce a bill in 1989 that was intended to reform and distance Italian immigration policy from what the Schengen members had opted for, in a clarion call meant to dissuade Italy from following the French example. But this was not to be; instead other national politicians in Italy counter-positioned themselves to ride a growing wave of popular concern with immigration as the new decade approached. Derisive terms used by Italy's Northern neighbors to describe its migration policies and border control, such as being the 'soft underbelly' and 'open door' of Europe, were adopted in critique of what was claimed to be the liberal approach, as exemplified by politicians like Martelli. In the end, Martelli himself was pressured to abandon his original stance and in March 1990, with an almost baffling turnaround, he went as far as proposing Italy deploy its army to patrol the coast. By the end of that same year, all the significant reforms required by the five original signatories as a precondition for Italy's accession to the Schengen system were adopted and the country signed both the Saarbrücken Accord and the Schengen Agreement itself on November 27th, 1990.[32] From there, the controls were implemented swiftly—already the year after as many as ten out of twelve EC member states now required visas for citizens of all Arab states.[33]

A Migration Regime Takes Shape Domestically, 1990–2008

The politics of Italy in the 1990s, with its seismic shifts and the birth of what has been called the Second Italian Republic, is a wide topic to wade into.[34] It brought the rise of a new political paradigm in the wake of the complete reshuffling of Italian political life, which Quaglia dubbed the 'Euro-realist' paradigm. The first instances of *refoulement* at sea with the fall of next-door communist Albania and an increase in externalization of migration control through foreign diplomacy, in combination made up the beginnings of a new migration agenda for Italy.[35]

The fracturing of the hitherto main governing parties DC (Christian Democrats) and the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) came in the wake of domestic turmoil after the

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[30] Paoli, "The Schengen Agreements and Their Impact on Euro-Mediterranean Relations," 139–40.

[31] Vice President of the Council of Ministers is the second highest post in the Italian government.

[32] Comte, "Migration and Regional Interdependence in the Mediterranean," 118; Paoli, "The Schengen Agreements and Their Impact on Euro-Mediterranean Relations," 141, 143, 145.

[33] Comte, "Migration and Regional Interdependence in the Mediterranean," 117.

[34] For the sake of brevity and scope I will necessarily have to stay focused on the aspects directly related to my paper.

[35] Quaglia, "The Role of Italy in the European Union," 134.

Tangentopoli scandal and *Mani Pulite* investigations into corruption and Mafia links within the established political class.[36] This domestic political turmoil, as well as the general international upheavals following the collapse of the USSR set the scene for a structural reworking of Italy's dealings with both the EU (that the EC became following 1993's implementation of the Maastrich Treaty) and Italian migration policy. A common view of the former has been that Italy seemingly lacked a clear and focused strategy in its dealings with the European Union. However, Quaglia posits that up until this time period the Europe-oriented parts of Italy's political class imposed change through lifting issues to the supranational level, inducing the desired domestic reform by way of European and international fora.

With the mid-1990s election win for Berlusconi's Forza Italia, a new incipient foreign policy emerged that was less willing to put European integration above all else. This new Euro-realist political paradigm viewed international and European influence on Italy's political agenda with suspicion, made wider use of bilateral relations to further its own foreign policy, and sought to define and defend Italian 'national interests' more vigorously. This last point aimed to curry favor with public opinion and seemingly 'stand up' to the EU. Stemming Mediterranean migration figured high among those national interests. Migration had gradually risen on the agenda for the past decade among both the political elite and general population, with Italy moving from being a transit post on the journey to a destination country in and of itself for large masses of migrants.[37] A landmark event that shaped this impression came in the Summer of 1991 when the Italian-built ship *Vlora* crammed with as many as 20,000 people escaping chaotic post-communist Albania anchored in the Southern Italian port city of Bari, bringing with it fears of increasing immigration of destitute and foreign people. The Italian government turned these migrants away, the first documented cases of illegal Italian *refoulement* in violation of the Refugee Convention.[38]

As the 1990s came to a close, Italy sought closer border policing cooperation with countries along the Southern coasts of the Mediterranean, chief among them Libya.[39] Libya's autocratic leader Gaddafi quite willingly collaborated with the Italian search for an externalization of border and migration policing. After spending much of the 1980s and 1990s as an international pariah, Libya was gradually brought back into the orbit of the European countries. Italy had kept a mostly

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[36] Sometimes translated as Bribesville, *Tangentopoli* was a term popularized in Italian media to describe the widespread corruption in post-war Italian politics. *Mani Pulite* was the nationwide judicial investigation into this systemic corruption, at one point involving indictments of more than half of all Italian parliamentarians.

[37] Paoli, "The Schengen Agreements and Their Impact on Euro-Mediterranean Relations," 139.

[38] Alessandro Triulzi, "Empowering Migrants' Voices and Agency in Postcolonial Italy," *Critical Interventions* 10, no. 1 (2016): 5.

[39] Morone, "Policies, Practices, and Representations Regarding Sub-Saharan Migrants in Libya," 138.

cordial diplomatic relationship with Libya since the 1969 coup, while still main-taining its political distance. At the same time, Italy remained heavily involved in oil and gas exploration and production on Libyan territory through the energy extraction giant ENI (*Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi*), in which the Italian state to this day holds a golden share of 30.303%.[40] An important development in 2008 encompassed both the increased Europeanization of Italy's migration agenda and exemplified a sign of the nation's new Euro-realist foreign policy: Italy first pres-sured the EU to lift its ban on commercial relations with Libya before Berlus-coni himself travelled there, meeting Gaddafi in Benghazi to sign the *Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation* between the two governments. This in-cluded an apology and promises of colonial reparation.[41] According to historian Antonio Morone, allowing for joint Italo-Libyan coast guard patrols, the 2008 Treaty quickly led to a much more organized pushback of migrants landing in Italy than the more scattered efforts had previously seen.[42] Historian Alessandro Triulzi, called it "systematic *refoulement*" of all northbound migrant boats across the Mediterranean. The Italian Minister of Interior Roberto Maroni went as far as praising these harsh tactics, jointly developed by Italy and Libya, as a "model for the whole of Europe."[43]

Domestic changes in Italy's politics in the period described, in combination with the already more stringent migration approach the country had been forced to adopt, led Italy down a potentially controversial path. Libya became Italy's ad-junct in the process of externalizing and securing its own Mediterranean border, and in turn that of the European Union.[44] Describing this Triulzi does not mince words, stating that the former colony was "…acting as a *gendarme* for the old metropolis."[45] Through *refoulement* and the beginnings of a system of holding camps for illegal migrants, these borders were in the process of being relocated from the south of Italy beyond the coastal waters of Libya and into Libyan ter-ritory proper.[46] The next section details how this burgeoning migration manage-ment system would cope with its biggest challenge to date, and in turn how Italy's Northern neighbors would relate to it.

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[40] A company share giving the right of decisive vote.
[41] The intention and veracity of this apology is disputed and a topic worthy of discussion else-where, but for the purposes of this paper there are several other points that merit attention. For more on this controversy, see: De Cesari, "The Paradoxes of Colonial Reparation"; Tri-ulzi, "'Like a Plate of Spaghetti,'" 215.
[42] Morone, "Policies, Practices, and Representations Regarding Sub-Saharan Migrants in Lib-ya," 139.
[43] Triulzi, "'Like a Plate of Spaghetti,'" 215.
[44] Morone, "Policies, Practices, and Representations Regarding Sub-Saharan Migrants in Lib-ya," 129.
[45] Triulzi, "Empowering Migrants' Voices and Agency," 4.
[46] Morone, "Policies, Practices, and Representations Regarding Sub-Saharan Migrants in Lib-ya," 139–40.

Italian Migration Management Gains Acceptance on a Wider Stage, 2008–2011

With the coming of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, change was underfoot in the Maghreb and beyond. Over the course of the year, tens of thousands of migrants left the chaos of political and social unrest in Northern Africa, heading towards Italy. The Italian migration officials issued temporary residence permits to a number of these refugees of Tunisian descent, which gave them the right of free movement within the Schengen zone. This did not particularly endear Italy to its neighboring Schengen member states, least of all to France.[47] Disregarding the permission papers given to them by Italy and reintroducing internal border checks under the pretense that these migrants constituted a threat to its national security, the French immigration authorities adopted a firm stance in their handling of what was only a few hundred Tunisian refugees and accompanying activists arriving by train at the Ventimiglia/Menton border.[48] Fueled by the now firmly entrenched Euro-realist political paradigm, as well as the more combative stance of the third Berlusconi-government with foreign minister Franco Frattini, Italy strongly protested this reaction. Not only did an assertive Italy feel threatened by the increase in migration (regardless of whether the threat was as serious as portrayed politically), it also demanded support from its Schengen neighbors and was not afraid to prove the point. The two countries were at loggerheads. France continued to defy the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which ruled the reintroduction of internal border controls to be illegal and instigated on dubious grounds. After all, the low number of Tunisians seeking entry could not be reasonably said to threaten the national integrity of France. The Schengen Border Codes of 2006 did, indeed, allow for temporary internal controls on extraordinary grounds, but that was not intended to mean the exclusion of a small group of citizens of a specific nationality.[49] Also worth noting is the fact that Italy had already issued thousands of temporary permits the very same year, and that this in turn constituted only a small fraction of the annual total numbers of these permits issued across the EU.[50] The situation threatened the stability of the Schengen System as a whole. When putting the numbers in context, France's reintroduction of internal border checks seems unnecessarily dramatic. Several scholars have pointed out that looking at the overall migration figures at stake and disregarding glaring media headlines from both France and Italy relating to illegal arrivals, the immigration situation in 2011 had not fundamentally changed since the preceding year.[51] Furthermore,

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[47] Lauren McClure, "Suspending Schengen: Exceptions to the Schengen Agreement and the Legality of France's Decision to Close Its Borders with Italy," *Loyola University Chicago International Law Review* 9, no. 2 (2012): 327.

[48] Colombeau, "Policing the Internal Schengen Borders," 489–90.

[49] See: Regulation No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the European Council of 15 March 2006, (L 105) 1–32, "Crossing Internal Borders," article 20.

[50] McClure, "Suspending Schengen," 334–35, 341.

[51] Colombeau, "Policing the Internal Schengen Borders," 484.

of the people that did arrive illicitly, the vast majority did so by overstaying their authorized travel period on tourist visas, compared to a mere 12% arriving by boat across the Mediterranean as these North Africans had.[52]

My contention is that the French government's reaction and its subsequent endangerment of the Schengen System as a whole, came after Italy instrumentalized its refugee situation by giving out the temporary permits and tested the waters, so to speak, to find out what the reaction would be. This was done in order to raise the Schengen member states' awareness of Italy's predicament and open up a supranational transfer of its national approach to tackling the influx of refugees; thus, grafting it onto existing EU border externalization. France had already been a committed supporter of the EU's border control agency Frontex and considered the expelling of a high annual number of illegal migrants (40,000 alone in 2011) as a laudable accomplishment.[53] Now Frontex would get directly involved in the Mediterranean through launching operation *Hermes,* at Italy's request, to help manage the migration flow. This signaled a new commitment to externalizing borders and co-opting the Italian migration agenda. Even as the Gaddafi regime fell in 2011, Italy still persisted in its attempts to move the border controls further from its territory, now with new agreements in place with the Libyan National Transit Council. Here again there are historical antecedents, as France and Italy had already previously probed the possibility of outsourcing asylum processing to third-party countries like Libya, making sure the refugees with illegitimate claims would not set foot on European soil after being refused asylum.[54]

In summation, the Franco-Italian conflict over migration at Ventimiglia/Menton was seemingly intransigent and in a sense left unresolved with both parties appealing for a reform of Schengen that has yet to come. I contend that this event also signaled a milestone in the EU adoption and support for a migration agenda previously foisted upon Italy.[55] France could no longer as easily deport its migration problems to Italy as it had done before. Rather, the 2011 incident served as a hard-won realization that the two countries now apparently both stood to gain in their shared desire to externalize and further securitize border control. In the final section we move closer to the end of my proposed timeline of examined events: the Mediterranean 'Migration Crisis' of 2015.

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[52] Triulzi, "Like a Plate of Spaghetti," 214.

[53] Active since 2005 and headquartered in Poland, Frontex is responsible for patrolling the borders of the Schengen area. McClure, "Suspending Schengen," 344.

[54] Andrade, "Initiatives of EU Member States in Managing Mixed Flows in the Mediterranean," 52, 55, 57.

[55] McClure, "Suspending Schengen," 345.

The Old Colonial Hand Takes the Lead in Border Externalization, 2012–2015

Italy has long been active diplomatically and economically in the Mediterranean region, but in the past century it also asserted power through colonial domination. As briefly mentioned before, the question of apologizing to Libya for that period came into play in 2008. It is certainly notable that no other former colonial power has yet apologized for past wrongdoing or promised reparations like that year's *Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation* between Italy and Libya ostensibly did. However, the apology can be read in many ways.[56] I return to the perspective of Morone when he posits that it was quite simply a case of *realpolitik*. Behind the excuses for Italy's past behavior, their shared history served as political capital. It benefited both the Libyan regime in its desire for international acknowledgement and economic development, and the Italian government in their search to externalize borders even further through *refoulement* and outsourcing migration management to its former colony.[57] Despite the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) condemnation of the Italo-Libyan bilateral agreement of interception and return of migrants at sea in the July 2012 *Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy* legal judgment, in the years leading up to 2015 it would seem the *de facto* pushback policy persisted, now with additional EU-wide financial and operational backing.[58] An example of this would be the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) of 2013, where the EU promised to help equip and train Libyan police forces with the view to aid in the control and slowdown of the movement of refugees towards Europe.[59]

As shown earlier in this paper, Italy had previously been on the receiving end of policy-change coercion and political pressure to adapt its migration policy according to other nations' priorities. Towards the end of the time period examined, both the seriousness of the migrant situation and Italy's growing assertiveness and sense of its own agency, meant that it could now push for and succeed in transferring national maritime operations, like the 2013 rescue mission *Mare Nostrum*, from its own jurisdiction (and financial responsibility) to the Frontex-sponsored operation *Triton* that took place over the following year. No longer was Italy expected to receive deported illegal migrants from France and left to handle the situation alone. The restrictive migration policies that became widespread in Western and Central Europe in the 1980s had come full circle, driven by an 'emergency'

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[56] The treaty exchanged an increase in Libyan border control coupled with a clampdown on illegal migration in return for Italian financial aid, increased investment, an apology for violence committed during Italian colonial control and a promise of reparations.

[57] Morone, "Policies, Practices, and Representations Regarding Sub-Saharan Migrants in Libya," 141.

[58] Andrade, "Initiatives of EU Member States in Managing Mixed Flows in the Mediterranean," 52.

[59] Antonio M. Morone, "Il processo di Khartoum: l'Italia e l'Europa contro le migrazioni," *ISPI Analysis* 5, iss. 286 (June 2015): 2.

narrative meant to stem public anxiety and had picked up the particulars of a developing Italian migration management agenda on the way.[60]

Not to say that there were not also more deep and wrenching arguments over how to cope with the increasing number of migrants, who were arriving by way of the Mediterranean, and the declining European appetite for foreigners, as political scientist Jonathon Moses put it.[61] Italy did not get full and unconditional support. The yet-to-be solved Dublin Regulation debacle is a prime example of continued strife.[62] But in other ways, it can be said that the old colonial hand of Italy was indeed given more room to operate based on its past experience and continuous engagement in the area, leading diplomatic efforts to externalize EU-border controls into unchartered territory further south. The strategies involved built upon the already established Mediterranean model that Italy spearheaded with Libya. They were now expanded to mean an offer of political and diplomatic recognition from the EU as a whole in exchange for several third-party African countries taking over vanguard border control duties for the Union.[63] My analysis differs from that of scholars such as Emanuela Paoletti, who claims that Italy has been the one primarily making concessions and compromises to appease Libya and therefore weakening rather than strengthening its position vis-à-vis its former colony in the process.[64] It is true that both sides had their own agency in the relationship and Libya was by no means a blank slate onto which Italy could project power and policy. That being said, the continuity displayed over decades in Italian externalization attempts despite both resistance from European legal institutions and regime-change in Libya, make it likely that Italian political leadership held it up as a successful strategy, not a loss of face. While the press and public opinion stayed focused on the growing dimensions of human tragedy already long visible in the Mediterranean by 2015, Italian and EU diplomacy were spending significant efforts and political capital on constructing the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, taking potential border externalization well into the African continent and "improving national capacity building in the field of migration management" in the region.[65] It must be said that there is a strong contradiction, even hypocrisy,

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[60] Emanuela Paoletti, "Power Relations and International Migration: The Case of Italy and Libya," *Political Studies* 59, no. 2 (June 2011): 283–84.

[61] Jonathon W. Moses, "The Shadow of Schengen," in *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*, ed. Erik Jones, Anand Menon, and Stephen Weatherill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 5.

[62] Here I am referring to the EU asylum processing regulation which dictates that asylum can only be requested in the member state where the applicant first entered. With the increase in Mediterranean migration this has repeatedly pitted countries like Greece, Italy, and occasionally Spain against their fellow member states.

[63] Morone, "Policies, Practices, and Representations Regarding Sub-Saharan Migrants in Libya," 145.

[64] Paoletti, "Power Relations and International Migration," 270–73.

[65] Colloquially known as the Khartoum Process. Morone, "Il processo di Khartoum," 4; Morone, "Policies, Practices, and Representations Regarding Sub-Saharan Migrants in Libya," 145.

at the heart of this Italo-European Union policy. The overarching goal of stemming migration and combatting people smugglers to ensure more humane treatment of refugees *en route*, means halting thousands of people escaping humanitarian crises or political persecution through supporting local authoritarian regimes who are themselves in large part responsible for the dire national situations.[66]

Conclusion

I have shown that the exclusionary processes and strong desires to regiment and strengthen border controls that lay at the center of Schengen-deliberations in 1984-85, were themselves made politically palatable amidst the background of changing Euro-Mediterranean relations in the wake of the Oil Shock which happened over a decade earlier. Through coercion and applied pressure, the Schengen System resulted in a complete change of Italy's migration agenda and approach. Italy's immigration situation and attitudes towards migrants then underwent further changes after domestic developments in the 1990s, becoming considerably less *laissez-faire*, more restrictive, and inclined towards *refoulement* as an acceptable practice. A growing Italian assertiveness and an emphasis on politically useful national interests above all else in relation to its migration agenda, forced the relationship with France over migrants to a high level of conflict in 2011. Ultimately this was resolved by increased EU acceptance and adoption of Italy's prerogatives and methods in the Mediterranean. Approaching 2015 this externalization continued into Africa, where Italy, the EU, and regimes in third-party African countries were all willing to flaunt their disregard for human rights in an attempt to slow down the movement of people towards Europe. A migration management agenda had in a sense travelled in a circular motion, beginning with European pressure put on Italy and ending with the Europeanization of an Italian regime infused with traits taken from its bilateral dealings and Mediterranean history, now poised to be externalized well beyond continental limits.

But why this imperative to put border security above all else in the heated exchange happening over migration policies? Historian Charles Maier has posited that this inclusion and exclusion is really about identity, rather than a simple case of economic rationale in deciding access to material wealth between those on the inside and those on the outside of borders.[67] Views of migrants as a threat to Europe's own national identities are hence linked with much older ideas of 'otherness' about the people who were once colonial subjects.[68] This otherness

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[66] Morone, "Il processo di Khartoum," 7.

[67] Charles S. Maier, "'Being There': Place, Territory, and Identity," in *Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances*, ed. Seyla Benhabib, Ian Shapiro, and Danilo Petranović (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 78.

[68] Morone, "Policies, Practices, and Representations Regarding Sub-Saharan Migrants in Libya," 141.

also includes stripping these migrants of their agency and freedom of movement and reducing them from autonomous subjects in their own story to mere objects susceptible to outside influence and control.[69] At the same time, the jarring truth is that the 'othering' and use of exclusionary tactics does not curtail the migrant's double usefulness as both an external threat and simultaneous subaltern working class.[70] This is not limited to official migrant labor quota-schemes however, as several academics have pointed out throughout the time period described, informal economies on both sides of the Mediterranean benefited from access to low-cost workers, particularly in the agricultural sector.[71]

I concur with Maier's assertion that borders and the challenges, as well as the benefits associated with them, are here to stay.[72] But that should not preclude more common-sense migration policies taking the place of current knee-jerk reactions, which have potentially dangerous consequences and come in the face of a migration movement that in all likelihood will not substantially diminish anytime soon. Indeed, as Paoletti puts it, "the more states and supranational bodies do to restrict and manage migration, the less successful they seem to be."[73] Perhaps the solution then is not to pile added restrictions on top of previous ones, but to develop a more sensible migration practice overall. Yes, there is a major migration issue to be faced, but openness to long-term solutions rather than close-mindedness in the short-term, surely offers more safety for all involved.[74] If not, then what purpose does upholding a vaunted legal framework for the protection of international human rights serve, if they are to be valid for a select few within our borders while adoptable on a voluntary basis outside the confines of the European Union?

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[69] Alessandro Triulzi, "Empowering Migrants' Voices and Agency," 12.

[70] Maier, "'Being There': Place, Territory, and Identity," 80.

[71] Comte, "Migration and Regional Interdependence in the Mediterranean," 112–13; Triulzi, "'Like a Plate of Spaghetti,'" 220.

[72] Charles S. Maier, "Does Europe Need a Frontier? From Territorial to Redistributional Community," in *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union*, ed. Jan Zielonka (London: Routledge, 2002), 18.

[73] Paoletti, "Power Relations and International Migration," 269.

[74] Antonio M. Morone, "La Libia, crocevia migratorio. Nuove e vecchie dinamiche dal 2011 al 2014," in *I rifugiati e l'Europa: tra crisi internazionali e corridoi d'accesso*, ed. Luca Ciabarri (Milano: Edizioni Libreria Cortina, 2015), 62–63.

Book Reviews

Barracoon: The Story of the Last 'Black Cargo'
By Zora Neal Hurston, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2018. Pp. 208, Paperback $25, ISBN: 978-0062748201

REVIEWED BY ANNE-MARIE HARRISON

Barracoon embodies the power of oral history. It lives and it breathes beyond the last moments of its author and its protagonist. It is human testimony to the unending horrors of American empire. With *Barracoon*, novelist and anthropologist Zora Neale Hurston sought to give voice to the enslaved. "All these words from the seller, but not one word from the sold," (location 303)[1] she wrote. Fifty-eight years after Hurston's death, the world can finally honor her work and the life of Oluale Kossola, named Cudjo Lewis by his enslavers. Over the course of three months in late 1927, the then 86-year old Kossola shared his past with Hurston at his home in Plateau, Alabama, where he had lived since emancipation. He was the last known living African brought over on the last American slave ship, the *Clotilda.* It is a devastating story, not because it is a slave story, but rather because, mostly, it isn't. "Barracoon" is the word for the temporary barracks used to confine enslaved people; *Barracoon* is the story of how American slavery forged an enduring system of institutionalized inequality and violence. It is the story of how imperial power permeates across time and space, down to the most remote actor. The barracoons didn't go away, they just got bigger.

By 1931 Hurston had completed the book, but faced numerous barriers to publication. According to a recent *New York Times* article, Hurston's piece in the *Journal of Negro History* titled "Cudjo's Own Story of the Last African Slaver" drew criticism from her contemporaries. She had "borrowed" from Emma Langdon Roche's "Historic Sketches of the South," without proper attribution, they accused.[2] African American literature and Africana Studies scholar Deborah Plant and novelist Alice Walker wrote in the 2018 book's introduction how publishers also took issue with *Barracoon*'s tone, although they omit the plagiarism charge. At the time, Plant explains, publishers refused the book's unique monologic style. Kossola's vernacular had to go; readers would never be unable to understand his language, it simply wasn't marketable. Hurston would not publish without Kossola's voice. Now it exists as an accessible, powerful artifact of history, just as Hurston intended.

In *Barracoon*, Kossola speaks for himself. The man is front and center in a narrative that could have been picked apart and restructured for prosaic ease, flat-

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[1] All references to *Barracoon: The Story of the Last Slave* refer to Amazon Kindle locations. location.

[2] Alexandra Alter, "A Work by Zora Neale Hurston Will Finally Be Published," *New York Times*, May 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/books/zora-neale-hurston-new-book.html.

tened and refashioned for an arguably mostly-white audience. In addition to using her spellings of his vernacular, Hurston bookends Kossola's retellings with her own: on one of the days Hurston comes to Kossola's door, he's is not in the mood to talk to her, he'd rather garden. On another, he's tickled when she brings a watermelon for them to share. An outsider description of a slave experience, or one by a historian far removed, can feel woefully overdone, insufficient, or both. Hurston trusted Kossola to tell his truth—besides the reflexive interstitial scenes, Hurston is entirely absent—to be the bearer of knowledge and history. Kossola trusted Hurston to speak in his voice. This is Hurston's remarkable accomplishment with *Barracoon*: she did not allow for his humanity to be erased, not with the publishers who sought to whiten his words, nor with her choice of narrative style. Kossola survived enslavement, but he is not just a static number of the slave trade. He is Cudjo Lewis, he is Oluale Kossola. He is an agent of history and his life is now immortal.

Yet, for a story about a survivor of the slave trade, *Barracoon* is markedly thin on details of Kossola's enslavement. Be it because Kossola was enslaved for a comparatively short time (five and a half years) or that the horrors of his life outside of enslavement dominated his memory, his rendering of slavery comes off as almost mild—he even describes one slaver Cap'n Jim as "a good man" (l.929) despite acknowledging that he was no longer free. Kossola most vividly elaborates on life before the plantation and life after. When Kossola was violently kidnapped in 1860 from Bantè, his home in modern-day Benin (l.142), he was on the precipice of manhood. It was a trauma he never overcame: "My eyes dey stop cryin' but de tears runnee down inside me all de time" (l.807). After being freed, Kossola helped found Africatown (now Plateau), married, and fathered six children. But his path was strewn with sorrow. Five sons and one daughter, all dead long before Kossola met Hurston. After their last son died, Kossola's wife left. What began as a hopeful new life as a free man devolved into a life of tragedy: disease, racist murders, train accidents, and mystery.

To read Kossola's testimony is to feel emotionally eviscerated. But is it surprising? Kossola and his family were ostracized, brutalized, and at the most benign level, discriminated against for being African—even in a town of black Americans whose parents had done the same transatlantic journey. To them, the new neighbors with their strange language and manners were "savage" (l.1052). Whether in 1927 or 2018, the institutionalized effects of slavery are inescapable. Murder by police officers, mass incarceration, latent and blatant racism, lack of accessible healthcare, education, legal defense—the list goes on. When Kossola was kidnapped in 1860, the importation of new enslaved people had been illegal for more than half a century. His story was never supposed to end in the death of his six children; Kossola was supposed to marry a pretty girl from his village, one of the ones with gold bracelets on their arms (l.751).*Barracoon* is not a hopeful story,

it is not a story of redemption or one with a neat and tidy ending. *Barracoon* is a testament to the enduring legacy of a horrific, bloodthirsty system, and one which serves as the foundation of American empire.

Sovereign Emergencies: Latin America and the Making of Global Human Rights Politics
By Patrick Kelly, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Pp. 318, Paperback £21.99, ISBN: 978-1316615119

REVIEWED BY PHILIPP KANDLER

Human rights have been for quite some time an important factor in international politics and a research interest especially for political and legal scholars. Historians, however, have only since the 2000s dedicated themselves to a more detailed analysis of this concept and its history. A main debating point has been the question of the "breakthrough" of human rights—the moment when it gained international importance. But only recently have scholars started to focus on the concrete historical conditions and trajectories that accompanied this process and to paint a more nuanced picture of the "breakthrough moment," or rather moments. This is especially true for accounts that do not concentrate primarily on Western countries. An important step towards closing this gap is the new book by Patrick Kelly. In *Sovereign Emergencies*, Kelly examines how human rights violations by South American dictatorships in Brazil (1964–1985), Chile (1973–1990) and Argentina (1976–1983) contributed to the emergence and expansion of transnational human rights activism and changing interpretations of this concept. Kelly illustrates that these South American narratives form a crucial part of the often cited "breakthrough" of human rights in the 1970s.

In seven chapters, Kelly shows how the interactions between a range of actors from Western countries and Latin America led to the formation of transnational networks that spanned these regions. Further to this, these networks succeeded in putting pressure on the dictatorships in South America and ultimately led to a variance of local human rights vernaculars. These actors included emergent organizations for the protection of human rights under dictatorship, exiles from the regimes, more political, leftist and often anti-imperial solidarity groups in western countries, and transnationally working, but western-based human rights organizations such as Amnesty International. Kelly's three case studies stand—maybe at times too ideally—each for one phase in this process. The Brazilian case was "one of the first workshops of human rights practice" (p.29). Exiles and their supporters in the Global North started experimenting with human rights language and campaigning, but had only limited repercussions in western public opinion (chapter 1). The Chilean one was the "breakthrough moment" when human rights became a widely used language by different activist groups from the Americas and Western Europe (chapter 2). And the Argentine case stands for the adaptation of human rights language to a context, where the distinction between "good" and "evil" was less clear cut. This complexity arises because the enforced disappearances made

invisible the human rights violations that had led to outrage in the cases of Brazil and Chile (chapter 6). Intermediate chapters deal with the consequences of these changes for other actors: for groups of activists, that were not genuinely human rights activists, but came to use their language such as religious and solidarity groups or the Ford Foundation (chapter 3); for the human rights systems in UN and OAS up to the mid-1970s (chapter 4) and the late 1970s, as well as for the Carter-administration in the USA (chapter 7) and for the "breakthrough" of human rights activism in the USA (chapter 5). In the epilogue, Kelly makes some observations on the widening of the definition of human rights after the collapse of the South American dictatorships from the mid-1980s onwards. Here he argues that discriminated groups and movements—feminists, LGBT and indigenous people—took advantage of the significance of the human rights discourse in Latin America to insert their own demands for recognition.

Kelly draws on material from an impressive number of archives in Latin America (the countries of his three case studies and Mexico), the USA, and Western Europe, especially from the United Kingdom. This allows him to give a rich account of the complexities of the networks of activists in Latin America and the Global North, their various usages of human rights language and what they meant (and what not) when they evoked human rights norms. However, there is one conspicuous gap in his source material. Kelly refrains from using material from the dictatorships themselves. Whereas this might not have been a problem if the author had stuck strictly to the activist side, it does affect his study, when he comments on the dictatorships' reaction to the activism. By limiting himself to published material and secondary literature, he does little more than repeat—the little—that can already be found elsewhere in said literature. He does not even take into consideration material that is available online such as the protocols of the juntas in Buenos Aires and Santiago or declassified documents from the Argentine Foreign Ministry. From my own research I can say, that Argentine and Chilean foreign propaganda was more complex and there were more actors involved. It is, to be sure, not part of Kelly's main argument. Since he brings the topic up, however, and dedicates quite some space to it, he misses the opportunity to bring a new perspective to this topic.

In presenting his material, Kelly opts for following the actors instead of a strict bottom-up or top-down approach. In terms of storytelling, this definitely pays off. For each organization, he starts by narrating an episode out of the lives of central actors. It is the focus on personal biographies and interactions that allows Kelly not only to connect his three case studies to North America and Western Europe, but also to each other and to Mexico, one of the hot spots for exiles from South America. However, there are also two problems with his approach. First, it counters partially his effort to tell the story of human rights activism from a Global South perspective, since the actors he introduces are often from the Global North.

A second problem is that of accurate representation. Since Kelly is rather on the narrative than on the analytical side of history writing, the reader is repeatedly left wondering if the personal trajectory he just read about is rather exceptional or typical of a certain type of organization or activism. In his chapter on human rights activism in the USA, for example, Kelly spends considerable space on a solidarity group called Community Action on Latin America (CALA), introducing the section with a brief sketch of the motives of one of its first directors, Al Gedick, who he has interviewed. Though the author hints at one point that there were other solidarity groups (p.173), he does not name even one. It is therefore unclear if CALA stands in representation of them or was in some way special.

However, those should be considered only as minor shortcomings in an overall well-researched and written book. There are especially three contributions that stand out. The first one is about questioning the central place the USA occupies in human rights history. Existing scholarship, and especially works from the US, has extensively or even exclusively focused on specific presidential terms. This is probably a consequence of Samuel Moyn's influential, but empirically doubtful tying of the "breakthrough" of human rights to the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as president in 1977.[1] Kelly, however, following a cue by Mark Bradley,[2] who argues that the US was actually a latecomer to human rights in the 1970s, shows that it was in other regions, especially Latin America, where human rights was first used widely as language and basis for activism to protect individuals from repressive regimes. Actors in the US rather responded to this development and jumped on the bandwagon. In any case, this process had already gained force well before 1977.

The strongest point of Kelly's work, however, is his careful distinction and nuanced analysis of the different facets of human rights as a historical concept. Instead of insisting on a general and rather unspecific "breakthrough," he shows that there were especially two aspects that came to the fore in the 1970s: human rights activism and human rights language.

Human rights activism experienced a boost due to a number of structural developments—affordable long-distance travel, improved long-range communication, the cooling down of Cold War tensions during *détente*—that made the world (or at least Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere) more interconnected and contributed to a feeling of interdependence. But for Kelly, the crucial change was the re-orientation of the Left in North America and Western Europe, away from revolution and towards a more depoliticized notion of "sovereign emergencies" (p.273), an argument that resembles Moyn's idea of human rights as "last utopia." In contrast to Moyn, however, Kelly does not shy away from tackling the

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[1] Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).

[2] Mark Bradley, *The World Reimagined: Americans and Humans Rights in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

complex relation between human rights activists, pronouncedly non-political in their approach, though not the implication of their work; solidarity activists, often motivated by an anti-imperial agenda, with a more political vision; and actors from Latin America, themselves falling in different, often overlapping categories of victims, exiles, and members of emergent human rights organizations. These groups definitely had a common interest in denouncing human rights violations by the South American dictatorships. This led to alliances, common networks and sharing of information. Of special importance were interactions with actors from Latin America who provided information and first hand-accounts, which helped create "testimonial truth" (p.121) as a valid and powerful basis for human rights violations, a term Kelly borrows from Steve Stern.[3] At the same time different opinions on aims and methods separated the different groups within the activist field. Solidarity groups criticized the purely moral position of human rights organizations such as Amnesty International or the Washington Office on Latin America and aimed at exposing the—often thought as imperial—roots of repression. The latter in turn saw their explicit apolitical stance endangered by too overt political demands. How these tensions played out can only be shown by a detailed analysis of the empirical material, something Kelly does convincingly.

The second major facet of human rights history Kelly addresses is the plurality in content and usages of a language of human rights. Those were closely related with the different types of activism. Though this insight is not completely new—on a general level this point has been made by Jan Eckel[4] and the aforementioned Mark Bradley—Kelly does an excellent job in showing concretely how it played out in human rights activism for the victims of repression in South America. The scale ranged from a full-hearted embrace of the human rights idea by human rights activists, i.e. from Amnesty International, over a more strategic appropriation by solidarity activists; to outright rejection by groups from the far left that criticized its lack of revolutionary potential. For each group, the idea of "human rights" was distinct. Instead of one interpretation, there were multiple, each depending on local and political context. Even if the idea of a homogeneous Latin American concept of human rights, which Kelly is set to disprove (p.14), is a bit of a strawman, the point of division is still extremely important. A second aspect of the human rights language is chronological. Kelly not only claims that its usage increased over time, but actually shows how the actors came to appropriate it. Unfortunately, he does not question the point found widely in the existing literature, that the confusion in the usage of the expressions "human rights" and "rights of man" is exemplary of the confusion over the concept of "human rights" itself in an early stage. This might be true in English, however, it is far from clear if this

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[3] Steve Stern, *Battling for Hearts and Minds: Memory Struggles in Pinochet's Chile, 1973–1988* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

[4] Jan Eckel, *Die Ambivalenz des Guten. Menschenrechte in der internationalen Politik seit den 1940ern* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014).

can be transferred directly into Spanish. It would have been worthwhile to ponder a moment on the question if "derechos del hombre" had the same deep connection to the revolutionary era's ideas on natural rights claimed from a state as did the "rights of man."

This point, however, as well as earlier occasional criticism, should not be taken as an argument against Kelly's work as a whole. It should be rather seen as a hint that there is still a lot of work to be done: accounts that trace the relationships between the human rights organizations in the Global South and North on an institutional instead of a personal level; the reaction of the South American dictatorships to the emergent human rights activism; and also questions of intellectual history such as the commonalities and differences of the term "human rights"—and "rights of man"—in different languages or the history of the term in Latin America before 1970. Kelly has managed to write a convincing and detailed account not only about transnational human rights activism in the Americas and Western Europe, but has also made an important contribution to the still recent historiography on human rights more generally. The author has achieved this by pointing out the importance for detail, nuance, and clarity when dealing with the different aspects of human rights and its "breakthrough" in the 1970s.

Officially Indian: Symbols that Define the United States
By Cécile R. Ganteaume, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017. Pp. 192, Paperback $28.00, ISBN: 978-1517903305

REVIEWED BY CHARLOTTE SOPHIE KOHRS

In our childhood, many of us on both sides of the Atlantic have surely played cowboys and Indians or come into contact with stereotypical depictions of "the American Indian" in cartoons or elsewhere in popular culture. This was before we, as individuals, became aware of the implications of the game, and before we as a culture started to question the tropes of these childhood images and their harmful implications. "Playing Indian"[1] has a longstanding tradition on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. In the United States, however, it takes on a more complex, even sinister connotation. As pointed out in the foreword to *Officially Indian: Symbols that define the United States*, playing Indian wasn't always mere child's play. When the revolutionaries of the Boston Tea Party dressed up as Natives to boycott British imports, they were "playing Indian" (p.12). Their reason for it was not to simply disguise themselves, to avoid being recognized, but rather to appropriate certain cultural expressions and values of Native people, weaponizing for their ideological benefit an already established trope connected to American Indians.

Cécile Ganteaume is an associate curator at the National Museum of the American Indian (NMAI) in Washington D.C. who previously worked at the Museum of the American Indian in New York. Both are part of the Smithsonian Institute, and thus a staple of the national self-representation of the United States. In Washington she most recently co-curated a new major exhibition for the NMAI. *Officially Indian* is her first book. And, although not directly connected to an exhibition, it could easily be read as a catalogue to an imagined museum for the interaction of Indigenous and settler cultures and the creation of American identity. It holds more than forty short essays, each analyzing an object or image that stands in for some critical aspect of more than four hundred years of interaction between white and Native people.

Since the days the first Europeans set foot in the 'New World,' Indigenous identity and culture have been a matter of great fascination. However, European and,

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[1] For further reference see: Philip J. Deloria, *Playing Indian,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). And, maybe even more interestingly: Monika Siebert, *Indians Playing Indian: Multiculturalism and Contemporary Indigenous Art in North America* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2015). Siebert explores how the popular image of the American Indian impacts American Natives and their communities, today. While Indigenous communities struggle to achieve more political sovereignty, the traditional image of the American Indian, which was formed for and by the white gaze and which portrays them as a dead or dying race, can complicate these efforts.

later, American efforts to understand Indigenous people have not always been successful (or genuine). This eventually led to a popularization of a number of misconceptions about Indigenous life. The American Indian over the centuries thus became more of an allegory and less of a reality in American discourse: a stand-in for personal liberty and independence from the tyranny of government, a truly free spirit. The game of Playing Indian is only one such—although, in a way maybe the most long-standing—expression of popular conception of the American Indian which ignores the complex and checkered history the United States have with their native population. In *Officially Indian*, Cécile R. Ganteaume recounts how, despite the repeated attempts of the United States to eradicate Native peoples within its territories, the image of the American Indian became a recurring means for establishing a unifying American identity. Paradoxically, the more American Indians became hunted and dis-possessed the more the image of the American Indian became a symbol for values the United States promised and projected outwards. In the theft of the freedom of its native people, it forged the image of the "freest" nation on earth.

Ganteaume makes clear that she does not want to analyze all American Indian depictions in American popular culture; rather, she attempts to investigate in particular, how the image of the Native American has been used to form the greater national identity of the United States. She uses each object as a sign post on the way to American self-discovery, focusing on the expressed and implied messages behind each representation. Special attention is paid to all objects that are created or commissioned by or for the United States government: coins, stamps, and paintings feature just as prominently as army helicopters—the AH-64, also known as the Apache (p.144)—or national monuments, to prove that the use of the American Indian was intentionally and institutionally employed to create the identity of the United States.

In addition to Ganteaume's work, *Officially Indian* offers a foreword by Colin G. Calloway and an afterword by Paul Chaat Smith. Both are noteworthy scholars of Native American Studies, Calloway currently teaching at the University of Dartmouth, Smith a founding associate curator at the National Museum of the American Indian (NMAI) for over a decade. In his introduction Calloway recounts the troubled relationship among American settler culture, American Indian tribes, and American images and fantasies of the American Indian. Smith situates Ganteaume's work in the context of present-day America, a society that seems more and more fractured, no longer united by a simple democratic ideal, but which can still assemble around a fictive American Indian as a symbol of American freedom (p.165).

Usually we perceive the American national narrative to be in opposition to, and exclusionary toward, American Indians. But Cécile Ganteaume shows that it is in fact impossible to imagine the United States without imagining the American

Indian. And while, on the surface, the United States seemed determined to exclude Native people from state society, the image of the American Indian became a prominent means for the depiction of American liberty and strength. *Officially Indian* makes us understand how Native people can at the same time be omnipresent in the production of American national identity and also perceived as a dead or vanishing race. In this way, *Officially Indian* helps us understand how the abstraction of a culture through the white gaze becomes a tool of intellectual genocide across the centuries.

By limiting her essays to only one to three pages each, Ganteaume attempts to give a concise overview of a visual history of the American Identity. Even though the book presents the objects in chronological order, discussing them in their order of appearance in the American context, the book invites browsing, since each essay can be read independently of the others. Many individual motifs can be traced this way through the centuries, from the times of early colonialism in North America to the most recent representations. In her essays concerning the earliest history of European and Native people, Ganteaume does not merely concentrate on British colonial settlers but includes Dutch, French, Portuguese, German, and Spanish voices. By uniting such a wide range of artefacts in this volume, her work should not just attract scholars of American Indian history, it should also find students who are interested in reading a short but insightful introduction to the history of the United States as well as those looking for a history of the importance of symbols and ideas in the construction of national identity.

The Hirschfeld Archives: Violence, Death, and Modern Queer Culture

By Heike Bauer, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2017. Paperback $34.95, Pp. 236, ISBN: 978-1439914335

REVIEWED BY BEN MILLER

Just over 100 years ago, in a Berlin torn by war and electrified by revolution, Magnus Hirschfeld founded the *Institut für Sexualwissenschaft* in a villa just north of the Tiergarten. Hirschfeld was already, in the words of Dagmar Herzog, "one of the most important early advocates for the scientific study of sexuality as well as the development of a sexual morality based on self-determination and consent."[1] As early as 1899, Hirschfeld's Scientific-Humanitarian Committee was advocating for the decriminalization of sodomy and for a view of what we would now call gender identity and sexual expression as being based on a series of "intermediate steps" (*Zwischenstufen)* between fully opposite-sex-attracted man and fully opposite-sex-attracted woman; by 1904 they were sponsoring concerts, cultural events, and literary publications on homosexual and transvestite themes.[2] The Institute was Hirschfeld's *magnum opus*, a fifty-room complex under the rubric of "knowledge leading to justice," in two adjoining villas that housed patient clinics, a residence, an enormous library containing books on the history of sexual variation in humans and other animals, and an auditorium for readings and events.[3] Few records exist from the space—the library was scattered and the documentary archive burned in Opernplatz, in one of the infamous and iconic Nazi book burnings—but it was one of the first nodes in an international network of spaces producing, developing, harboring, and arguing for the rights of same-sex-loving and gender non-conforming sexual minorities[4].

The globality of this network has only recently begun to enter historical scholarship. Transnational or border-crossing histories of sexuality, starting with Foucault, have tended to be written on a macro scale. Recently, Merry Wiesner has argued for the productive possibility of mixing global history's emphasis on connection and embeddedness with gender history's tendency to make "categories of difference ever more complex." Her call for "telescopes" has been taken up more readily, however, than her call for "microscopes."[5] Peter Drucker's recent intervention into this field, to use just one example of a telescopic global sexual history, presents three evolving same-sex-loving identity formations, envisioned as aris-

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[1] Dagmar Herzog, *Sexuality in Europe: A Twentieth-century History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 52.

[2] Robert Beachy, *Gay Berlin: Birthplace of a Modern Identity* (New York: Knopf, 2015),106.

[3] Ibid., 161.

[4] Ibid., 242.

[5] Merry E. Wiesner, "World History and the History of Women, Gender, and Sexuality," *Journal of World History* 18, no. 1 (2007): 54–55, 79, doi:10.1353/jwh.2007.0008.

ing from material relations of production and exchange and alongside attendant systems of racialization.[6] Scott Spector has recently called for a turn to "intensive archeologies of particular relations at particular moments;"[7] Helmut Puff, in the same collection, promotes a new kind of history of sexuality "promiscuously open to strategic intellectual alliances,"[8] with chronologies that emphasize continuity and evolution over breaks and ruptures. Jennifer Evans, writing on queering German history, urges the use of a "queer methodology" that "emphasizes overlap, contingency, competing forces and complexity."[9]

There are, however, as historian Ellen Fleischmann writes, "inherent complexities and challenges in attempting to write a history of cross-cultural interaction among groups perceived in their time to be marginal players in the encounter."[10] Heike Bauer, currently Professor of Modern Literature and Cultural History at Birkbeck in London, addresses these complexities admirably in *The Hirschfeld Archives: Violence, Death, and Modern Queer Culture*. Her monograph analyzes the influence of colonial and gendered brutality and violence on the early homosexual rights movement in Germany, specifically the circle of activists around Magnus Hirschfeld and his Institute for Sexual Science.[11] The book closely reads his archives and writings, arguing that homosexuals were both "victims" of homophobic and gendered attacks and implicated in activism "imbricated in [the] everyday racism and colonial violence" of late Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany. Consequently, Bauer demonstrates how "the emergence of homosexual rights discourse around 1900 was framed—and remains haunted—by not only antiqueer attacks but also colonial violence, racial oppression, and the unequal distribution of power within a society that denied full citizenship on grounds of gender" (p.2).

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[6] Peter Drucker, *Warped: Gay Normality and Queer Anti-Capitalism* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016), 8.

[7] Scott Spector, Helmut Puff, and Dagmar Herzog, *After the History of Sexuality: German Genealogies with and beyond Foucault* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 2.

[8] Ibid., 17.

[9] Jennifer Evans, "Introduction: Why Queer German History?" *German History* 34, no. 3 (2016): 371, doi:10.1093/gerhis/ghw034.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Readers seeking biographical or intellectual-historical analyses of Hirschfeld and his place within the broader Weimar movement for homosexual emancipation should see: Robert Beachy, *Gay Berlin: Birthplace of a Modern Identity* (New York: Knopf, 2015); Ralf Dose, *Magnus Hirschfeld: The Origins of the Gay Liberation Movement* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2014); Dagmar Herzog, *Sexuality in Europe: A Twentieth-Century History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Laurie Marhoefer, *Sex and the Weimar Republic: German Homosexual Emancipation and the Rise of the Nazis* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015); Robert Deam Tobin, *Peripheral Desires: The German Discovery of Sex* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Clayton John Whisnant, *Queer Identities and Politics in Germany: A History*, 1880–1945 (New York City: Harrington Park Press, 2016). Of particular interest due to its inauguration of the more critical school of interpretation of Hirschfeld and his work, but sadly only available in German, is: Andreas Seeck, A. *Durch Wissenschaft zur Gerechtigkeit? Textsammlung zur Kritischen Rezeption des Schaffens von Magnus Hirschfeld* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2003). Elena Mancini's biography of Hirschfeld, published in 2010 by Palgrave MacMillan, is to be avoided due to its many inaccuracies.

While some have suggested that global or transnational approaches to histories flatten subaltern voices and reproduce colonial violence, Bauer's approach is one of "spending time with ordinary victims whose lives have barely left an imprint in the historical archive" (p.2). While Bauer is a scholar of literature and German studies, her work has deep historical and archival implications, and demonstrates how global historians can center small voices while revealing the global networks of accumulation, exchange, and violence in which all histories are embedded. She "indexes…recent feminist, queer, transgender, and critical race scholarship on archives and archiving" (p.4) to center subaltern voices and to "reveal some of the fragile threads that held together queer lives…but also form part of a larger web of oppression" (p.12) that representational identity politics cannot unravel. It has been wryly noted that any history of Europe in the 19th or 20th century must necessarily be global, or ignore the deadly histories of racecraft and colonization that shaped (through collaboration, complicity, and resistance) virtually every aspect of European life during that period.

Two fundamental analytical concepts structure Bauer's analysis: the "queer angel of history" and the idea of "queer oblivion." The angel is a figure "conjured" by Bauer "to capture the complexities of the queer past…the paradoxical disjuncture between the sociopolitical gains that have improved queer lives collectively and the experiences of violence that nevertheless continue to mark the felt realities of queerness over time" (p.9). The allusion to Walter Benjamin and Paul Klee is intentional—and extends to a Klee angel serving as the book's cover—but unlike Benjamin's angel, which flies away from a receding past, Bauer's queer angel has a correspondingly queered relationship to time and progress, "pulled hither and thither…both part of and witness to shattering historical experience" (p.9). This angel, suggesting a stance of interpretation informed by slow theory and thick description, can help correct the "queer oblivion" (p.10) Bauer suggests resides deep within archives and narratives of queer progress and rights activism. Hirschfeld was, in Bauer's words, "apparent[ly] oblivious" (p.10) to many forms of gendered, racial, and colonial injustice. While straight histories are often oblivious of queerness itself, queer histories tend to be oblivious to the question of whose suffering and narrative is or was apprehensible to their presumed audience of modern queers. "Archival practices," Bauer reminds us, "are bound up with fundamental questions about power, resistance, and the legitimization or erasure of certain lives and practices" (p.4). Close reading is necessary to conjure useful suppositions from these troubled sources. Jennifer Evans has recently argued that "different methods of reading and engaging sources are needed to … write queer social formations and desire back into history."[12] Bauer extends this methodologi-

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[12] Jennifer Evans, "Sound, Listening and the Queer Art of History," *Rethinking History* 22, no. 1 (2018): 26-8, doi:10.1080/13642529.2017.1422584.

cal step to include an account of the violence and oblivions of those recovered social formations.

Following its theoretical introduction, the book is divided into five chapters. The first explores the colonial context of the emergence of homosexual rights activism. Articles published by Hirschfeld and colleagues in widely-circulated journals relied on a primitivist appropriation of Indigenous sexual forms through a stages-of-man theory of anthropology that aimed to divide the world into the civilized West and an otherized, backwards realm. This space could then be imagined as uninhabited and ripe for colonial domination and exploitation under a rubric of 'development,' with indigenous "nature people" (*Naturvölker*) standing below the "culture people" of Asian and Middle Eastern empires (*Kulturvölker)* and Western European civilization above all (p.25). Crucially, Bauer explores the influence of colonial realities and ideologies on the production of ideas, not simply stopping at naming and blaming endemic racism. An exploration of death and suicide in homosexual culture follows; Bauer links narratives of and statistics about today's queer death and suicide to stories of the self-harm and self-mutilation of Hirschfeld's subjects. The archive of his notes and recollections blame cultural "shockwaves" (p.39) for these deaths and make "visible the social norms that prompted many women and men to end their life because of the sense that their homosexual feelings and desires fundamentally denied their existence"(p.56).

The third chapter examines Hirschfeld's writings about spousal and child abuse, aiming to narrow the gap between histories of sexuality and histories of sexual violence. Seeking to overcome "problematic" language associating predation on children with homosexuality (this writer would go further than Bauer and refer to this association as the queer equivalent of blood libel), Bauer reads the limits of Hirschfeld's empathy in case notes and reactions to developments in family law in the Soviet Union (p.63). This brief mention of Communism points to one of the book's key weaknesses—its lack of sustained engagement with class and the reproductive labor central to a materialist understanding of the history of sexuality. The fourth chapter offers one of Bauer's most daring theoretical moves. In order to account for the archive's full impact, Bauer examines both the homosexual and transgender self-archiving of Hirschfeld's Institute for Science and the effect that the collection had on its Nazi destroyers. Lastly, the book's conclusion examines Hirschfeld's world tour and exile which Bauer uses to explore "the lingering influence of long histories of oppression even on those who overtly claim to reject racism and sexism" (p.124).

All histories of same-sex-loving people ghost the margins of archives. The prevailing tendency is to write, as described by Arunjali Arondekar in 2005, triumphalist histories in which queer experiences are recovered and presented to audiences seeking simply to find themselves in the past. This, in the context of colonialism, will not do. Bauer's achievement is to take up Arondekar's call to

"emerge not against the grain of archival work but from within it"[13] to reimagine what Hirschfeld's archive can be in the context of its colonial entanglements and to view the structural violence aimed at and committed by its erstwhile protagonists.

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[13] Anjali Arondekar, "Without a Trace: Sexuality and the Colonial Archive," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 14, no. 1/2 (January 2005): 12.

The Cold War: A World History
By Odd Arne Westad, London: Allen Lane, 2017. Pp. 710, Paperback £10.99, ISBN: 978-0141979915

REVIEWED BY PAUL SPRUTE

Now out as an affordable paperback, it is high time for this journal to review Odd Arne Westad's contribution to the 'grand narratives' of the Cold War. After all, the Norwegian historian, now the S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations at Harvard University after a long stint at the London School of Economics, has authored the definitive study on the globalized nature of the Cold War, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* of 2006.[1] His work contributed more to the reevaluation of the Cold War as a truly global force and power system than any other in the field, and opened it up to most different research perspectives, not the least inspiring studies published in this journal.[2] It is thanks to Westad that John Lewis Gaddis's famous dictum describing the Cold War as *The Long Peace* now seems rather odd.[3] Instead, current research stresses how many, often violent conflicts and dynamics of political rule in the Third World were enabled and perpetuated by cold war ideologies, logics, and supplies, but also had major repercussions on the wider course of the Cold War that are still felt to this day.

Westad's latest work of a compact 700 pages stays true to these primary concerns, yet goes further by integrating the findings of his different case studies on *The Global Cold War* into the grand panorama of a conclusive historical master narrative, "World Making" as his introductory chapter is aptly called. Westad describes the Cold War as the last great international system, "in the sense that the world's leading powers all based their foreign policies on some relationship to it" (p.1). Yet, the author also acknowledges that the Cold War "influenced most things, [but] it did not decide everything" (p.627), pointing to diversities and hybridities beside the Cold War, namely in decolonization.

Westad's main argument is that the Cold War was born from the global transformations of the late nineteenth century and was buried as a result of tremendously rapid changes a hundred years later. As an acute global rivalry emerging from both World Wars, the Cold War was overtaken by new divides in the 1970s

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[1] Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[2] Hannes Schweikardt, "Interpreting the 'Thaw' from the 'Third World': The Guyanese Writer Jan Carew on Modernization and Trauma in the Early 1960s Soviet Union," *Global Histories* 3, no. 1 (April 2017): 19–38; Immanuel Harisch, "Bartering Coffee, Cocoa and W50 Trucks: The Trade Relationships of the GDR, Angola and São Tomé in a Comparative Perspective," *Global Histories* 3, no. 2 (October 2017): 43–60.

[3] John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

and 1980s. While economic, social, and technological transformations had caused the Cold War's durability, they eventually made it obsolete. Especially the Soviet Union could not uphold its promise of social and economic improvements and engage in futile wars at the same time, as it ultimately had not found a political, economic, or social system that was fit for its purpose.

In Westad's view, the Cold War's significance lies in this slow defeat of the Leninist left, as well as the advent of US hegemony and the many violent changes in the Third World. These processes of change were complemented by the coming into existence of a multitude of new states as an important context. Westad points to nationalism as an enduring force and substantial challenge to the universalist ideologies of communism and US capitalist freedom. Importantly, Westad shows how those ideologies, and indeed all parties in the Cold War were rooted in competing but related concepts of modernity which had originated in the age of European expansion and centralized the primacy over nature, mechanization, and the nation. This basic observation provokes the author to debate a whole set of commonalities between the United States and Russia. According to the author, "a sense of destiny [played] essential roles in Russian and American expansionism," and both were "engaged in projects to globalize Europe" from its fringes (p.15). Westad further highlights how both (Soviet) Russia and the United States acted as global anti-systemic powers, challenging the European status quo from different directions.

As the result of the end of the Cold War, US power was solidified, and Communism defeated. Yet, Westad also stresses the central importance of the rise of Asia and China's peculiar path in particular, "the democratic consensus that had become institutionalized in the European Union," as well as the political and social polarization in Latin America as central feats and outcomes of the Cold War (p.17). Illuminatingly, Westad emphasizes how the ideological Cold War disappeared only in part as the US side hardly changed: In consequence, he argues that the United States still finds itself in a 'permanent Cold War' against all its opponents due to its "absolute historical purpose" (p.619). Reflecting on the persistence and ubiquity of the Cold War, Westad points out that the "many ills of this world" are one key to its understanding: "As injustice and oppression became more visible, people—and especially young people—felt the need to remedy these ills … Cold War ideologies offered immediate solutions to complex problems" (p.628). The devastation and cynicism evoked by the Cold War showed how such sense of mission got perverted for the sake of power, influence, and control, Westad concludes.

The author develops these findings over the course of 22 chapters roughly aligning in a chronological order and focusing on the developments in specific regions or individual relations between Cold War actors. A particularly insightful chapter deals with "The Cold War and India," the 'dark horse' of Cold War studies as the

author has suggested elsewhere,[4] in which Westad has integrated more primary research than in any other part of the book. The Indian case file is especially interesting as the Indian state constituted itself in explicit opposition to both ideological and political centers of the Cold War, yet ultimately had to reckon with it as the central fact of the international sphere. The Indian case also highlights to the reader how the politics of development surges in the Cold War context, an aspect that David Engerman has stressed recently[5] and that Westad could have spelled out even stronger and more systematically.

One of Westad's great strengths is his ability to condense complex chains of events into readable and engaging prose. He ably zooms in and out between macro and micro perspectives to make the lived experience of the Cold War palpable for the reader, notably by weaving testimonies from ordinary people into his narrative. His clear and sober style of writing, interrupted by the occasional quip and the rare reference to personal experience, is easy to follow, giving all the more space to the many different histories Westad has to share.

In conclusion, *The Cold War: A World History* is a compulsory read for anyone engaged in their very own world-making for the second half of the past century up to today. Notably, Westad has never shied away from engaging with the present moment from a historical perspective to enlighten the reader about "The World the Cold War Made," as the concluding chapter is entitled. In fact, there is little reason to criticize *The Cold War* on its own terms. Yet, the interested reader should be aware that Westad is going for the straightforward narrative and no feats of postmodern legerdemains can be expected. While Westad addresses questions how wider social living environments were impacted by the Cold War, including references to the influence of culture and arts, he ultimately remains bound to the hard facts of international history.

One could have hoped for a more decisive reexamination of the Cold War from its margins, engaging in even more depth with the possibilities and restrictions that the global Cold War meant to Third World actors. Yet, such detours might have diluted the central aim to suggest a grander narrative of the age of the global Cold War and may be left to another crop of case studies. Here, it is reassuring that Westad has incorporated some of the criticism levelled against him in the past, notably in the case of the Cuban intervention in Angola, as he attributes the Cubans with considerably more agency in this work (pp.482–484) than in *The Global Cold War*.[6] Future works will surely continue to use Westad's writing as a

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[4] Odd Arne Westad and Michael Cox, "The Cold War: A World History," London School of Economics: Public Lecture Podacst, January 9, 2018, http://www.lse.ac.uk/lse-player?id=3961.

[5] David C. Engerman, *The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).

[6] See: Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 207–249; For the criticism levelled against Westad and alternative perspectives, see: Piero Gleijeses, "The View from Havana: Lessons from Cuba's African Journey, 1959–1976," in *In from the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War*, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (Durham: Duke University Press,

starting point and central reference in order to further and occasionally rebalance it—the maximal impact a historian may hope for.

2008), 112–133; Christine Hatzky, *Cubans in Angola: South-South Cooperation and Transfer of Knowledge, 1976–1991* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015), 181–188.

International Women's Year: The Greatest Consciousness-Raising Event in History
By Jocelyn Olcott, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 352, Hardcover £25.49, ISBN: 978-0195327687

REVIEWED BY DAVID YEE

Jocelyn Olcott's *International Women's Year* presents a global history of feminism through a detailed and captivating account of the United Nations' 1975 International Women's Year Conference. The conference represented a watershed moment, when 6,000 people from around the world descended upon Mexico City to focus on the status of women over the course of two raucous weeks. Olcott delves into the internal debates, public demonstrations, and tribunal sessions of the conference to explore the relationship between feminism and geopolitics in a period shaped by the Cold War, decolonization, and powerful social movements.

The most intriguing aspect of *International Women's Year* is also its riskiest: can a two-week conference on women's rights serve as the basis for a book of 352 pages? Olcott addresses this challenge through an unconventional approach that diverges from the broad timelines and grand narratives typically favored among Cold War and international relations scholars. Instead, the author unravels a meticulous and illuminating narrative out of the knotty contradictions that confronted activists in their attempt to reach common ground in Mexico City. This approach in itself is highly original. The reader is thus left with a snapshot in time; a transitional moment when the failures of state-led modernization began to give rise to what would be called neoliberalism—described in this work as "…a growing faith that market forces would resolve all social and political ills" (p.228). Already the subject of numerous studies*, International Women's Year*'s main contribution to our understanding of this transition can be found in the concrete examples of activists who increasingly gravitated towards NGOs, and in the examination of the historical context that gave rise to both civil society organizations and neoliberal policies.[1] Olcott is able to capture this moment by seamlessly weaving the perspectives of state officials with grassroots activists, allowing the reader to view a singular event from multiple angles.

The book is divided into three main "acts," each of which is intercut with multiple "scenes" from the conference. The first act focuses on the origins of International Women's Year and how the conference in Mexico City came to be its defining moment. This section allots a longer time frame to survey the key individuals

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[1] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Aihwa Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), and Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).

(Elizabeth Reid, Julie Dahlitz, Luis Echeverría) and organizations (the WIDF, local NGO committees, UN councils) that were brought together in organizing the Mexico City gatherings. For Olcott, "International Women's Year was born of the Cold War" (p.19); with a rival conference slated for East Berlin the same year, and the growing militancy of Third World leaders in the United Nations, U.S. diplomats saw an international conference as a major opportunity to upstage the Eastern bloc and their non-aligned allies.

Act II brings the reader into the midst of the conference, transitioning back-and-forth between the official government conference and the alternative NGO tribune. Here, the Cold War tensions that gave rise to the Mexico City conference continue to receive attention, yet at times feels overstated in light of the more dominant dynamics at play among attendees. Most notably, the divisions (both real and perceived) between activists from the First and Third World became the central feature of the conference. In broad terms, groups such as NOW and United Women stressed the importance of rights, universal cosmopolitanism, and tended to elevate the plight of women over other sectors of society, while groups such as the Coalition of Latin American Women and Women Against Imperialism viewed women's oppression as a condition that was inextricably bound up with the economic structures of capitalism and neo-colonialism. Through exhaustive research delving into local Mexican newspapers, conference documents, and the personal collections of conference participants, Olcott is able to decipher and distinguish when these differences were exaggerated and when they were indeed real.

The final act offers a synthesis of International Women's Year that reinterprets its legacy in two important respects. First, Olcott views the disunity and conflict on display at the conference as a productive tension that ultimately forged a springboard for several transnational feminist networks and alliances. This contradicts the general summation of the conference as failure, unable to produce tangible results due to the unwillingness of white feminists to listen and learn from Third World activists like Domitila Barrios de Chungara. Secondly, the author moves beyond the minutiae of meeting minutes and plenary sessions to identify and highlight the importance of the conference as a historic juncture in the development of NGOs, feminist publications, microcredit networks, and subsequent international conferences on women's issues. However, as a history of global feminism, the book would have benefitted from an analysis of the conference's legacy in light of another crucial development in the 1970s: the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the general recrudescence of religious fundamentalism. One is left to wonder what was the relationship between International Women's Year and the Islamic world, particularly its subsequent impact on a region at the center of several crucial struggles over women's rights and equality.

In sum, *International Women's Year* is an extraordinary contribution to the study of transnational feminism. Olcott paints a vivid picture of a pivotal moment that is both compelling and illuminating, achieving a balance between local and global

scales in an exemplary fashion. The book's concise and accessible prose makes it a must-read for anyone interested in feminist or gender studies, while the various conceptual bridges it constructs across several fields should make it of particular interest to scholars working on the Non-Aligned Movement, NGO organizations, and the Cold War.

Conference Reviews

Transcultural Studies Student Conference
Universität Heidelberg, April 2018

REVIEWED BY MARJOLEIN DE RAAT

On April 27th, 2018, I was a panellist at the first *Transcultural Studies Student Conference* held at Heidelberg University.

The conference organizers had accepted papers from a wide range of disciplines and perspectives, from social studies and anthropology to history and material culture. The overlying theme was the theory and practice of transculturation. This was a student conference, and the presenters were all MA students, recent graduates, or PhD students.

Transcultural Studies is a programme offered by Heidelberg University, but the theory it covers is not yet well known in other universities. For many of the panellists, including myself, this was the first time they applied the term "transculturation" to their research. Others, mainly the ones affiliated with Heidelberg University, already had years of experience using the terms and concepts of transculturation. This caused a slight unevenness in the discussions—many of the issues that were novel and relevant for some, were old news for others. Still, the different ideas about the definition of transculturalism made for a fruitful discussion.

The day started with a keynote address by Monica Juneja, professor of Global Art History at Heidelberg University, about the theory of transculturalism and how it can help when researching cultural conflicts. After the keynote lecture, the program continued with four panels and a final discussion. Because of the broad range of disciplines of the participants, it was sometimes hard to see how the subjects of the panels could fall under the same category. The themes of the four panels were *Religion and Art*, *Mobility and Placemaking*, *Knowledge in Practice*, and *Identities and Narratives*.

The papers presented in the first panel, *Religion and Art*, all fit the theme of the panel well. They all had to do with religion and visual culture. The main item that all presenters addressed was how certain visual elements get repurposed in new contexts, where they acquire very different (religious) meanings. The question arose whether the original identity is the "real" one and the new interpretation an appropriation, or whether it should not be regarded in such terms. Another issue that this panel covered is whether an item that shows a mixture of artistic styles, and retains elements of its influences, can be seen as a new style in itself.

The second panel, *Mobility and Placemaking*, also consisted of papers that fit the panel's theme very well. The main item in this panel was replacement and diaspora, and how to deal with heritage in a new environment. The issue of how migrating people shape their identity came up both in generations-old diasporic communities, as well as recent refugees. A problem that all panellists addressed

is the difficulty of writing about groups of people without "otherizing" or "essentializing" them when you are discussing their cultural identity. Each panellist had their own ideas and methods for that, but a definite answer could not be given by any of them.

The third panel, *Knowledge in Application*, was less consistent. It was hard to find a common theme in the papers. They seemed like they didn't fit in with any other panel and were thus swept together under a vague title. Since the papers dealt with architecture, photography, mosaics, and ceramics, I felt like they would've fit better in the *Art* category. However, their topics did not deal so much with the visual qualities, but more with the way cultures are represented. The concept of orientalism came up in commercial and political contexts. Most of the issues that the panellists brought up had already been covered in the first panel (mixing of visual styles) or the second (representation and "othering"). By this time, the conference started to feel quite long and full for just one day.

However, the last panel *Identities and Narratives*, proved to be filled with interesting and engaging topics and managed to revive the audience. The panellists switched the perspective slightly by not talking about how cultures are presented by others, but about how people define themselves. Whether that involved funk music in Brazil, religious practices of minorities and nationalist discourse in China, or BDSM communities in Europe, all presenters discussed the way identities get shaped and constantly re-defined under the influence of internationalisation. In that regard, it was a nice supplement to the second panel, which dealt with similar themes.

After the four panels, the conference concluded with a general discussion. Here the difficulty in trying to align all these different disciplines and perspectives became most apparent. The approach of a cultural anthropologist is very different from that of a historian or an art student. Many participants disagreed about research methods and the interpretation of theory. Others also had a problem with the use of the term orientalism, claiming that that term was coined for a specific phenomenon and could not be freely applied to other situations. Most participants agreed that in many cases, questions of representations and identity are more nuanced than what orientalism can cover.

Throughout the conference, the problem of terminology was consistent. This was, in many cases, caused by unfamiliarity with the concept of transculturation and the associated vocabulary. Some people did not like the word "transcultural" and preferred "hybrid" or "mixture," while others deem those terms unfitting and condescending.

One of the main questions about transculturalism, that I also shared, is where the line gets drawn. Transculturalism does not see cultures as singular or essential, with exchange only taking place at clearly defined borders, but rather as blurry, fluid, constantly re-negotiated, and dependent on the perspective of the viewer.

However, as one participant put it, this does not mean we should think of cultures as one big soup in which differences do not exist at all. The balance is hard to find, especially for those that were only just introduced to the concept. For the "newcomers" the debate about transculturalism was interesting and beneficial to their understanding of the concept, but it seemed little more than a repetition of old arguments for those who had dealt with the theme more often already.

Another problem that was discussed was the question of the academic perspective. By talking about other cultures, are we not doing precisely what we criticize? No other consensus was reached other than the conclusion that scholars cannot do more than try their best. At some point in the discussion, the organisation was criticized for not inviting a diverse enough group of panellists, and for being eurocentric. Other participants quickly defended the organisation, pointing out that most of the panellists were women, and a wide range of countries and backgrounds were represented. The organization gave a very practical explanation, namely that on one side they were dependent on the papers they received, and on the other side, the budget of the conference simply did not allow the covering of travel expenses for people from outside of Europe. Therefore, it was inevitable that most of the presenters were European scholars, providing a European perspective.

I personally did not share the opinion that the conference was eurocentric. Instead, one thing I personally noticed was the emphasis on Asia. Although the conference was about transculturality as a global phenomenon, I felt like the majority of the papers dealt with Asia (mainly Japan, India, and China). This may be explained by the fact that the host faculty of Heidelberg University is called "Asia and Europe in a Global Context". Perhaps I am biased because my own research focuses on Asia as well, ; in any case, I did not mind this at all, but I can imagine participants with a very different research topic might have felt a bit out of place.

In conclusion, I thought the conference provided an opportunity to get acquainted with concepts and research methods with which I would have otherwise not easily have come in contact. I found most of the papers interesting and well-researched, although there was some overlap and repetition in the themes. Despite some differences of opinions, in general, the participants were genuinely interested in each other's papers. Because the panellists all came from very different disciplines and have different approaches to the theory and practice, it was sometimes hard to understand or connect with each other's research. Nevertheless, I was impressed by the engagement and interest, both from the audience and the panellists.

World History Student Conference
King's College London, May 2018

REVIEWED BY SANDRA ALSÉN AND CHARLOTTE SOPHIE KOHRS

The World History Student Conference, held on May 5th, 2018, was the third conference of its kind, organized by students from the World History and Cultures M.A. program at King's College in London. This year they had invited sixteen panelists to their central London Strand campus to discuss various aspects of *Activism, Identity and Conflict*, the theme of this year's conference. The day-long program included six panels in three sessions, with two panels running parallel to each other during each session. The panels covered a wide range of topics from *Memorialising the Past*, and *Commodities*, to the history of *Transnational Movements*.

The day began with a focus on one of the overarching themes of the conference, *Activism*, as Dr. Sarah Irving described how participating in political protests and social movements had sparked her interest in the study of activism from a historical perspective. Dr. Irving's keynote drew on her dual experiences as an activist and historian, and highlighted some of the challenges facing historians of activism and social movements. For example, she pointed out some discrepancies between her own recollections of political protests and narrations of the same events in the newspapers and other media that are often used as sources by historians.

Most interestingly, Dr. Irving's keynote emphasized the far-reaching implications—both positive and negative—that academic research and writing can have for activists and social movements. Academic interest in a specific movement can alter public perceptions of the political causes it champions and the writings of historians are often understood as having implications for current-day political debates and conflicts. Histories of activism call into question the image of historical research as far removed from contemporary politics. Dr. Irving therefore urged conference participants to consider the social and political implications of their research and the potential for historians to also become activists.

This discussion continued during the panel on *Transnational Movements*, during which the panelists presented examples of activism from many corners of the world and the paper titled *International Labour History of Disabled Workers: The Case of the International Labour Organisation* provided an interesting parallel to Dr. Irving's reflections on her dual roles of both researching and participating in activism. The author of the paper had conducted her research as part of an ongoing project initiated by the International Labour Organisation and spoke to the challenges and possibilities presented to her as a historian employed by the organization that she was researching.

But while almost all papers presented in the various panels offered considerable food for thought, many participants—panelists included—were disappointed by the lack of engagement with the individual topics and panelists during the panel sessions. Due to the time restraints of a one-day conference, after the ten minutes allotted to each paper presentation, there was often only enough time remaining to ask one question of each panelist. As a consequence, there was no way to spark a discussion that might have put the papers presented in better context with each other or the conference as a whole. And even though all participants had the opportunity to mingle during the wine reception in the afternoon, a bit more time devoted to reflection on the links between the presented topics would have been much appreciated.

To balance this lack of discussion time during the panel sessions, the program had included a 40 minute Roundtable Discussion. Yet, during the Round Table the focus lay much more (and possibly rightfully, so) on the discussion of another theme of the conference: *Conflict*. While conflicts and war often play important roles in traditional diplomatic and international history, it was argued, world history and global history have a tendency to prioritize cooperation and connections over disintegration and conflict. Perhaps historians hoping to move away from the nation-state as the standarad unit of analysis risk losing sight of state-driven conflict and historical actors whose lives did not involve transnational entanglements.

Dr. Christine Mathias followed up on this thought in her closing remarks, wherein she argued that future historians will need to use a world history sensibility to write also about disintegration, immobility, and the people and ideas that remained in one place. A paper from another panel, *Black New York: Narratives in the Urban Landscape*, exemplifies how to integrate world history into the local—in this case urban history. This paper described how, in the urban landscape of New York, workers, passers-by; and tourists continuously come into contact with the public American memory of slavery. The paper evaluated the effectiveness of places of memory and memorials in educating the people who came into contact with them. The papers from this panel all dealt with the localized manifestation of global events and public history, and therefore might be a good intermediary on this issue.

As the course leader of a study program in World History, Dr. Mathias also reflected on the role world history could play in today's political climate. Without going so far as to encourage historian activism, she suggested that global perspectives on history could provide interesting counterpoints in a time of resurgent nationalism and critiques of globalization. An important task for historians going forward, she argued, was to diversify the voices contributing to historical research. The conference itself reflected this need for further diversification within the discipline as a significant number of the panelists came from the same institutions or similar academic traditions. Enriching historical research with more and

new perspectives should therefore be a priority going forward and the organization of international student conferences where diverse voices are engaged in conversation seems to us an excellent start. Perhaps political protests and social movements are not the only avenue open to historians wanting to effect change. By successfully hosting an international conference and many interesting conversations, the team behind this year's conference may well have engaged in their own version of historian activism.

HistorY and Physics Experience (HYPE)—Nuclear Physics and History
Bologna, May 2018

REVIEWED BY ALEXANDRA HOLMES

Although the International Students of History Association (ISHA) run many seminars and workshops across Europe each year, HYPE was billed as a new experimental inter-disciplinary collaboration between ISHA and the Italian Association of Physics Students (IAPS). Despite being from very different academic schools of thought, what could we learn from each other, and how could we productively engage across the science-humanities divide to enrich our own practices and knowledge bases?

The workshop, held between May 25th and 27th, 2018, opened on the Friday evening with two insightful talks crossing the history-physics divide. Opened by Prof. Ciferelli, Former President of the European Physical Society (EPS) and current President of the Italian Physical Society (SIF) and the Centro Fermi, and currently working with the ALICE collaboration at CERN, it was stimulating to have such a globally renowned academic giving her thoughts on the development of physics. Also, given the recent controversial comments by Professor Strumia of Pisa on sexism,[1] it was encouraging that the workshop was opened by such a notable woman, albeit the only female speaker over the weekend. Her keynote speech was followed by Prof. Pancaldi, Professor of the History of Science and Technology at Bologna, discussing the impact of Alessandro Volta as a historical figure and important physicist in the field of electricity, demonstrating how the two disciplines can intertwine productively.

The talks were followed by a dinner where participants could mingle and network, followed by a historical tour of Bologna cite centre given by a history student participant, where we also got to sample some of the delicious food and ice cream that Italy, and specifically Bologna, are so famous for. It was good to get to know some of the physics participants in advance of the workshops, especially as we all shared a room with one other fellow student.

On Saturday, the day began with the first set of two workshops. I participated in the "old sciences" roundtable, where historians and physicists discussed the lineage of physics—when can we begin to consider sciences as a separate subject from humanities, and how did historical figures conceptualise physics within and without the container of "natural science"? This naturally led on to the changing role religion has played within fields of learning, being both a source of inspiration in the search for knowledge, and sometimes a political hurdle for the dis-

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[1] Sophia Chen, "Physicists Condemn Sexism through 'Particles for Justice,'" *Wired*, October 5, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/physicists-condemn-sexism-through-particles-for-justice/.

semination of that knowledge. This led to an insightful and intelligent discussion, where people from both disciplines could usefully bring their own fields into play and both sides could learn from the other.

After a leisurely buffet lunch in the sunshine, the second set of panels began in the afternoon. I attended the workshop on pedagogy, where attendees brought both disciplinary expertise and personal experience to the table. It was enlightening to hear how people ended up choosing their disciplines and looking for connecting features as to why they had not taken other paths, including either history or physics. The role of individual teachers, either inspiring or off-putting, seemed for many to be key reasons why we ended up in our respective disciplines—while this is not exactly a new discovery, it can also often be overlooked when considering pedagogic methodology. Discussions were held on how to improve teaching methods for those who found, for example, maths difficult and therefore left the field of science early; or vice versa for humanities. The impact of different education systems were also compared, as well as the scope for teaching and learning globally, and the rise of new forms of outreach through online platforms such as Massive Online Open Courses were debated.

The end of the workshop was heralded by two final lectures which brought together many of the strands of discussion which had arisen during the day. We were honoured again by the calibre of the speakers who had agreed to talk to us. Prof. Maiani, former Director-General of CERN, is one of the most important particle physicists in the world, and discussed in some ways his own history, and how the world of fundamental physics has changed since his career began—a micro-history which encapsulates world-changing discoveries. Prof. Zoccoli, current Vice-President of the Italian National Institute of Nuclear Physics, and also working currently with the ATLAS collaboration with CERN similarly used his work to illustrate the entanglements between history and physics, going back in time to show how his current area of research was created through historical discoveries in physics, and the gradual accumulation of knowledge over time leading to exciting new future discoveries and their practical, as well as theoretical, importance.

Although the organising committee were hampered by the last minute cancellation of the dinner venue, they rallied magnificently and we all dined happily on pizza in the park, sharing the respective food and alcohol that we had bought from our home nations for ISHA's well-known 'Nations Night,' and good natured discussion over points which had arisen in various workshops were continued over beer, wine, and the ubiquitous Berliner Luft from the ISHA Berlin branch well into the night.

Although the workshop was now officially over, those who remained in Bologna were treated to a tour of Villa Griffone, where physicist Marconi conducted his experiments on wireless telegraphy in the late nineteenth century, a world-changing field appreciated in both physics and history. Finally, we all departed in

the late afternoon, full of new insights and an overall agreement as to the success of the collaboration and convinced that this was a fruitful approach that I hope will be attempted by more student organisations in future.

Participation in the conference required a €70 fee (+ €10 to join ISHA) that covered all food, accommodation and excursions from Friday evening until Sunday afternoon.

Global History Student Conference
Freie Universität Berlin, May 2018

REVIEWED BY REETI BASU

This was the fourth occasion that students from the Freie Universität's Global History Department have organised an international conference, bringing together aspiring historians from across the world. The conference in Berlin was hosted by the student body of the Global History Master's program. The participants of the conference were mainly young research scholars coming from a wide range of disciplinary backgrounds. The panels of the conference covered different topics and issues of interest for global historians and were also chaired by the students of the department. Before the final presentation at the conference, papers were already circulated among the panellists and comments were given by the chairs. These constructive discussions in advance created scope for dialogue amongst the panellists—something which is of utmost importance for any academic conference. Post-presentation discussions with the audience on the overarching themes of the panels or on individual papers were fruitful as well.

This conference has provided a platform for young scholars to discuss their papers in front of an international audience. This has been a valuable practice for aspiring historians on how to present the arguments of their research papers to a critically engaged audience. For future conferences, it will now be easier to know for the panellists, including myself, what to keep in mind while presenting research. This conference has certainly provided good experience for us future global historians. The international nature of the conference, as well as the wide variety of topics, put an emphasis upon how important it was for students to make their research understandable for the listener who is not an expert in the field. In this regard, most of the panellists were quite efficient in making their presentation comprehensive to the audience.

The conference began with a keynote speech on the topic of 'what is global history,' delivered by one of the senior professor of the department, Sebastian Conrad. Professor Conrad quite specifically defined the 'global' in global history. For the purposes of academic clarity, it is important to understand phenomena of 'globalisation' as well as the distinctive approaches of 'global history' and 'world history' and in what ways they differ. This conference tried to draw these distinctions and answer the ensuing questions as well as it could. People from different regions were able to contextualise their research within the global context. The themes of the panels ranged from ancient history to the contemporary world, showing that global history itself is not a constrained to the study of 'modern' phenomena. Scholars presented papers on the most different aspects of history, for example: art, literature and intellectual history to name but a few. Different

approaches of historical methodology were utilised by panellists to explore the varying nuances of global history.[1]

I presented in a panel addressing topics of the history of sexuality and labour relations in an imperial context. My co-panellists presented papers on the legality of the so-called 'white slave trade' in turn-of-the-century Europe; marriages between displaced women and prisoners of war in the post Second World War Soviet Union; and lastly on sexual repression in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in British schools. My own paper dealt with the relations between the perception of women's bodies and foreign soldiers in Bengal after the Second World War. While we presented papers on histories of differing contexts in different countries, we simultaneously were able to address the commonality between the issues, while not brushing over specificities.

The conference has rightly pointed out that human history is a shared subject and that the exploration of this interconnectivity is where the importance of global history lies. No country or nation state cannot extricate itself from global history. For instance, when one discusses ancient India's silk routes of long-distance trade, it is necessary to address the geopolitical background of these routes which connected not only people of various Asian countries, but other foreign countries as well. However, though we can apply this global focus to many cases, it is important to recognise that not every history can be global. Although the panels had been organised in a particular way to address the specificities of global history, some of the papers still struggled to produce 'global' elements in their argument. Only talking about the existence of global exchanges cannot be understood as global history, one needs to explore the contexts structuring these exchanges.

Although scholars from all backgrounds were invited, representatives from third world countries were a minority. However, as this conference provided travel funding for all its panellists from outside Berlin, it at least created an accessible platform for young scholars of many different backgrounds. The last session of the conference rightly pointed out how the question of the language of study has always been a barrier in global history. The irony is that, although we are talking about creating a space for global interaction, we could not free ourselves from English as the only medium of common communication in an international space. The dominance of English, that can be seen as the aftermath of colonialism, seems unavoidable in the present context. Yet, this fact poses the question as to whether it is possible to use any other language in such an event dedicated to studying global history? Ultimately, practicality must win out: The relevance of a common language is felt in a global platform like this conference, where the shared language allows for collective communication within such a diverse group.

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[1] For a full list of the panels at this year's conference, please refer to the program: The Fourth International Berlin Global History Student Conference, "Conference Program," accessed October 12, 2018, https://globalhistorystudentconference.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/final-conference-program.pdf.

Several participating scholars raised the question of how difficult it is to access primary sources of foreign countries. Notably, they expressed how it is oftentimes financially infeasible to travel to a foreign country to collect sources. Even if one is able to access the source material, language again may pose a problem. Discussions on the future of global history at the conference therefore suggested the need to create an easily accessible platform for sources of global history. One valid suggestion may entail the creation of a digital archive.

Post-conference chats continued these productive and provocative conversations on the present condition of global historical research, as well as its future. This kind of informal interaction gave insights into each other's research and methodological approaches as well.

The only real problem of the conference was that of time constraints, merely having two days for the conference one always had to choose between two simultaneous panels. That said, it would not have otherwise been possible to accommodate forty papers in ten panels. Of course, one must keep in mind the financial and organizational constraints of holding an international conference. However, it would have been preferable if the conference could have gone on for an additional day.

I would like to end my review by saying that this conference was truly 'global' in nature. One of the most enduring parts of the conference was the post-conference city walk we took in Berlin that explored the city's colonial history. Aside from the academic discussion, it was a pleasure to interact with these international scholars and enjoy such an interesting historical city. From both an academic as well as social perspective, the conference was quite meticulously organised and thoroughly enjoyable.

Global History Student Conference Istanbul
Şehir Üniversitesi, June 2018

REVIEWED BY LEA KRÖNER

This summer, a team of undergraduate students from the History Department of the Istanbul Şehir University organized their first Global History Student Conference. Along with similar conferences in Berlin and London, this conference in Istanbul represents one of the few opportunities for both undergraduate and graduate students interested in global history to meet and discuss their research. Following their motto "Less Borders, More History!," the conference brought together 22 participants from 17 different universities who presented their research between June 22nd and 24th, 2018.

Apart from the opening remarks by Professor Abdulhamit Kırmızı (Istanbul Şehir University), the conference also featured keynote speeches by Dr. Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins (Yale University) and Professor Jon Davidann (Hawai'i Pacific University). Steinmetz-Jenkins' speech drew attention to the relationship between modern and secular states and the regulation of religion. He examined the historical scope of the concept "religious freedom," arguing that it has to be understood as a "compromise" that became necessary only with the rise of totalitarian regimes in the 1930s but might have lost its relevance today. Davidann's speech compared Japanese and Ottoman ideas about modernization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Analyzing the works of leading Japanese and Ottoman intellectuals, Davidann also critically reflected on the limit of "Westernization" as a concept itself. The lively debates that followed both keynotes reflected the high quality of discussion throughout the conference.

The five panels of student presentations covered a wide array of topics, ranging from an analysis of Ilkhanid historiography in the 13th century Mongol Empire to a discussion of global Maoism in the 1970s. Presenters engaged with a variety of different sources that reflect the different approaches to global history: Mehmet Doğar (Middle East Technical University, Ankara) for instance analyzed cartoons in Turkish newspapers during the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, while Aleksandra Babikova (Higher School of Economics St. Petersburg) examined Black Sea travel guides. Many participants presented ongoing research projects and were therefore thankful for the friendly and constructive feedback, which helped them to further define and strengthen their main arguments.

Some of the panels revolved around clearly defined topics such as "Global Biographies" and "Diplomacy," whereas others seemed less coherent. Unfortunately, this made it more difficult for presenters and the audience to discuss broader issues and in some cases led to situations where the panel members were limited to answering questions regarding their individual research. While this is certainly

due to the large variety of topics in the field of global history, it might have been helpful if the papers had been circulated to the panel members in advance. For next year, the organizers could also consider sending abstracts out to allow the audience to draw links to broader methodological themes and larger theoretical debates and might improve the quality of discussion even further.

All panels were chaired by faculty members from different Istanbul universities. While it was great to see that professors and senior researchers from different fields took an interest in the Global History Student Conference, the chairing of panels might have been a valuable experience for the organizing team. However, the faculty members successfully restrained themselves from taking over discussion and thus avoided a hierarchical "classroom atmosphere." Some students also criticized the uneven gender representation in regard to chairs (and keynote speakers) as only one of the chairs, Professor Nicole Kançal-Ferrari (Istanbul Şehir University), was female.

The official part of the conference closed with a round table discussion on Saturday. The presenters and the organizing team had the opportunity to reflect on wider themes and questions raised throughout the conference. As in most global history conferences, the question of methodological Eurocentrism was also a key theme in Istanbul; participants underlined the necessity of using non-European sources in their work in order to arrive at a non-Eurocentric reading of the global past. Many student presenters also expressed their desire for more collaboration, particularly in regard to languages, and the digitalization of sources. Another subject of discussion was the question of the role and direction of global history in the next years as some students felt that the term and concept are still quite vague and remain open to a number of interpretations.

Alongside the inspiring academic involvement with global history, the conference also included a trip to the historical city center on the third and last day. A generous welcome dinner on the first day and frequent coffee breaks with delicious Turkish baklava provided additional opportunities for networking and further discussion. Overall, the Global History Student Conference at the Istanbul Şehir University was very well executed—especially when considering that this was their very first attempt at organizing a conference. The conference team around Fatma Aladağ did a great job and was always ready to help and answer questions. Students interested in the broad field of global history are highly encouraged to apply for next year's conference and take the chance to discuss their ideas and collect feedback in a very welcoming surrounding.

Małgorzata Markiewicz, "A Map," 2013. Courtesy of: The MOCAK Collection, R. Sosin.

Motherland in Art
Museum of Contemporary Art in Krakow, 2018

REVIEWED BY ANNA VICTORIA BREIDENBACH

"Motherland was a fortress where all spoke the same language, worshipped the local god and cherished tradition…Today, the entire world is our motherland. The motherland 'of old' will of course continue to be cherished, providing an expanded sense of self and inner identification […]." The description of the temporary exhibition of the Museum of Contemporary Art (MOCAK) in Krakow between April and September 2018 seems to answer one of the questions that exist regarding global history writing—to what extent is the individual connected to a certain region or a nation? To what extent is he or she, a global subject?

The exhibition "Motherland in Art," housed in one of Krakow's most renowned museums since its opening in 2010, displayed the works of 60 artists of various nationalities and origins, all depicting their feeling of a Motherland. The exhibition was part of the cultural program connected to the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Poland's independence in 2018. The wide variety of perceptions of Motherland put together under one sole exhibition necessitates a comparison, especially for those engaged in questions pertaining to global history.

Works of art are interesting sources for historical research. Differing from written sources which can be elaborate and vague, the artists have to simplify their message down to one point, as they have to give it a very concrete shape. On one hand, this concreteness makes the feeling of the Motherland exhibition quite easy to grasp; on the other hand, it presents a variety of individual views on Motherland. Given that a collection of individual perceptions always has to be the base of research for historians, comparing individual perceptions of Motherland could be a fruitful perspective of research. Which symbols are mainly used and referred to when expressing the feeling of Motherland in different contexts?

One of the exhibitions' main themes were flags. The majority of the artists used his or her nation's flag to deliver a message, such as Szabina Ösz-Varga from Hungary exhibiting photos of herself with the Hungarian flag wrapped around her naked body. Often the flag was used as the background of the work of the various artists. Flags obviously play an important part in the perception of one's Motherland. This opens up the question of a global cultural history of flags. One could study the history of each nation's adoption of a flag; or one could ask how the close association of a nation to its flag came to be. Through these questions, we could understand the global networks promoting and eventually resulting in the requirement of a flag as the most important national symbol.

The permanence of the motif of the flag also raises historical questions regarding the educational system. At which point in history were children taught to link

a nation to a flag? Education is fundamental to the perception of Motherland and an educational system can be historically assessed as a source for the phenomenon of 'othering.'

In contrast to this 'look from above' that repeated throughout the exhibition, streets and paths were also considered important. Deimantas Narkevicius from Lithuania displayed a video installation which documented his journey through the center of the country, simply filming the streets passing by. This sense of movement strongly opposes the otherwise often static views on the map in other works of art.

The 'mental mapping' that was felt through the whole exhibition drew attention to the connection between geography and history. It appeared as if being connected to a place resulted in an eagerness to learn about its history. Does all history need to be associated to a defined space? Being connected to a history, as being connected to a space, seems to be an important global human feature.

The second major theme of the exhibition was the association of Motherland with the use of stereotypes, recognizable artifacts, and famous characters. The exhibition displayed the interconnectedness of a group of people through a network of common symbols. The Motherland in this case means a passive connection to a history passed from generations in a specific cultural space. Klaus Staeck from Germany used posters on which he collects such symbols, giving them a slogan and therefore a new meaning. He used garden gnomes and paintings from Caspar David Friedrich as symbols of a common German culture.

This reference to a nation's stereotypes can hardly be regarded as a foundation for global history writing. More interesting for the transnational approach is how this focus on nations is being counterbalanced. Tim Parchikov from Moscow for example displayed in his work his city district, showing the beauty of a place in photographs that would not be seen as such by usual aesthetic standards. The localism that was strongly felt in several artistic works in contrast to nationalism is striking. Motherland can be the simple depiction of a house as a small unit of living. It can also be the communist architecture still surviving from the time of the Soviet Union.

Global networks were problematized in numerous examples throughout the exhibition. One example is Communism, as it affected the daily life for people throughout Eastern and Central Europe, extending beyond national boundaries. The exhibition in the MOCAK emphasized once more that the history of the Soviet Union is a global history.

Interconnectedness between nations—be it negative or positive—was an important theme of the exhibition. The perception of the countries associated with the Arab Spring as being interconnected with each other was displayed through two very vivid examples. In a work by Mounir Fatmi of Morocco, countries are represented as supersized Mikado-sticks, stacking up to form a huge game of Mi-

kado. Another installation by the same artist shows the same group of countries represented through flags hung on the wall next to each other. Those who got rid of their dictators are put on broomsticks, making them able not to hang, but to lean on the wall.

The continent of Europe as a Motherland was depicted by Malgorzata Markiewicz from Poland, displayed as the back-side of a carpet, with innumerable threads, making national distinction impossible. Another example in which the artists assess the tension between nations and supranational connections within Europe was the depiction of it as a matrix. Represented through the shape of their borders, countries appear barely connected, as they are set up in separate spaces and seem like loose puzzle pieces.

The exhibition shows that being a global subject means being rooted somewhere. When trying to depict their rootedness, artists often portray it with similar symbols like flags and border shapes. Nevertheless, the nation they belong to is not always considered their "Motherland." Its existence is not denied, but a feeling of regional belonging persists. Global historical phenomena, which affect the individual until today like Communism, the European Union, and the history of the Arab spring, were felt throughout the exhibition.

When walking through the exhibition, certain repetitive structures regarding the meaning of the Motherland to individuals were striking. The similarities between individual perceptions living in a globalized society are a product of the contemporary age. Still, the historical connections that heavily influence the present cannot be disregarded. It has to be emphasized that the exhibition displayed, above all, a global interconnectedness between people. And it encouraged the historian to look for the roots, the reasons and therefore the history of this interconnectedness.

Exhibition View "Agora," Hello World: Revising a Collection. Hamburger Bahnhof, Berlin, 2018. Courtesy of: Nationalgalerie—Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Thomas Bruns.

Hello World: Revising a Collection
Museum Hamburger Bahnhof of the Berlin State Museums, 2018

REVIEWED BY PAUL SPRUTE

Open between April and August of 2018, the exhibition "Hello World: Revising a Collection" in the museum Hamburger Bahnhof of the Berlin State Museums has served as a prestige project in the quest to turn the Berlin museums from national to "Global."[1] The exhibition found itself situated against the background of the ongoing debate surrounding the reconstruction of bygone Prussian glory in the *Berlin Stadtschloss*—the rebuilt city palace, set to serve as a shell for the Humboldt Forum of ethnographic museums. The Forum, wryly referred to in the *Tageszeitung* as a metonym for Berlin and Germany's collective neurosis,[2] has inspired opposition in civil society and from scholars such as Bénédicte Savoy and Jürgen Zimmerer, who criticize the 'colonial amnesia' obscuring the structural power disparities that underly its collections.[3]

"Hello World" thus had a difficult task, one overshadowed by other cultural debates that began long before it opened and seem unlikely to end anytime soon. What are the possibilities and the constraints of the State Museum's attempts at globality? Would this salutation just give lip service to diversity and interconnectedness or actually offer an analysis and critique of the epistemic and social structures that underly its creation?

Using the collection of the Berlin National Galleries "shaped by contingent political and cultural conditions…as a point of departure and frame of reference," the exhibition "explores the possibility of how a collection…might broaden its scope by combining non-Western artistic tendencies and a transcultural approach. What would the collection be like today had a more cosmopolitan understanding of art informed its beginnings?"[4]

The exhibition answered these questions in thirteen rooms that each had a specific temporal and local, but also thematic focus and were put forward by differ-

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[1] Kulturstiftung des Bundes, "Global Museum," 2018, https://www.kulturstiftung-des-bundes. de/en/programmes_projects/image_and_space/detail/global_museum-1.html.

[2] Esther Slevogt, "Neurose aus Beton," *Die Tageszeitung*, September 3, 2016, http://www.taz. de/!5332988/.

[3] Gero Schliess, "Is Berlin's Humboldt Forum Shying away from Colonial History?" *Deutsche Welle*, August 14, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/is-berlins-humboldt-forum-shying-away-from-colonial-history/a-40082234; Bénédicte Savoy, "The Restitution Revolution Begins," *The Art Newspaper*, February 16, 2018, https://www.theartnewspaper.com/comment/the-restitution-revolution-begins.

[4] Hamburger Bahnhof—Museum für Gegenwart—Berlin / Nationalgalerie: Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, "Hello World: Revision einer Sammlung / Revising a Collection," Exhibition Booklet, April 28, 2018–August 26, 2018, http://ww2.smb.museum/smb/media/exhibition/58028/Hello_World_Booklet_web.pdf, 9.

ent curators. All in all, more than 250 artists were featured in around 800 works of art, roughly half of them from the holdings of the National Gallery and further collections of the State Museums of Berlin, the other half on loan from other collections. In general, the exhibition contributed intriguing insights, included many impressive works of art and suggested a more historically and socially aware way to display them. Still, it consciously refrained from offering any ways forward beyond very slight modifications of the art world's status quo, instead taking refuge in a mystified and unmanageable multitude of connections, possible demarcations, and focal points.

The thirteen "chapters," or "multifaceted narratives" in the parlance of the exhibition booklet,[5] were grouped around the central "agora" in the former concourse of the train station Hamburger Bahnhof, as a "main assembly place [enabling] the urban community to both develop its identity and preserve order."[6] Behind their somewhat elusive titles these rooms, strung together with little hint of connection, put forward individual answers to the exhibition's challenge that varied in their intellectual persuasiveness and their artistic quality.

The 'African section,' "Colomental: The Violence of Intimate Stories," for example focused almost exclusively on the central historical fact of colonialism. The artworks exhibited included a video installation on the Congolese *sapeurs* and their mannerisms; pictures of the collection in the notorious *Koninklijk Museum voor Midden-Afrika* in Tervuren, Belgium; and an installation on the Berlin Conference of 1884, prominently showcasing pieces of the legal texts that were its result, as well as a picture of the former German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, who defiantly acknowledged the German 'extermination war' against Herero and Nama as a genocide in 2005. In this chapter, the exhibition was arguably at its weakest. Its awkward and self-centered choices argued, perhaps unwittingly, that art focusing on Africa may only debate colonialism, reiterating the discursive dependence on a European center that needs to speak for the continent. Three of the four prominently featured artists were German. It fell to Joël Andrianomearisoa, born in Antananarivo and working between Madagascar and Paris, to give a compelling and urgent comment on the relations between the colonial past and post-colonial present of both Europe and Africa. Andrianomearisoa overlaid images of the present with others taken in colonial times, pointing to the persistence of power discrepancies despite the world's many apparent transformations.

Other rooms were more refined in their presentations of the complex world relations that a revised National Gallery would incorporate. They benefited from deeper permanent collections, making it possible to draw varied and nuanced pic-

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[5] "Hello World," Exhibition Booklet, 9.
[6] Ibid., 11.

tures of exchange and mutual inspiration while still acknowledging the fundamental unevenness of those relations.

Osman Hamdy Bey, "Türkische Strassenszene," 1888, Oil on canvas. Courtesy of: Nationalgalerie—Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Andres Kilger.

A case in point is the painting "Türkische Straßenszene" by Osman Hamdy Bey. The painting depicts a colonial officer, accompanied by his family, haggling with street merchants over Persian-style carpets with the aid of an interpreter. Set in front of a stylized ancient structure, the scene was painted in Western naturalist style by the well-known Ottoman artist and state official. The painting exemplifies a colonial and orientalist gaze but also highlights in its gaze the commercial interests underlying its own production. It twists the expected narrative by pointing out the cluelessness and dependence of the colonial collector on his intermediaries, suggesting complicated relations of agency.

Other notable and convincing rooms were "Making Paradise: Places of Longing, from Paul Gauguin to Tita Salina," focused on the archipelagoes of the Pacific and Indian Ocean. Viewed as a primitivist paradise by European artists, these regions spoke back to those depictions, revealing the dynamics of inspiration and how styles and themes were mutually appropriated. The room "Arrival, Incision: Indian Modernism as Peripatetic Itinerary" skillfully interwove the biographies of artists (such as Rabindranath Tagore, and his nephew Gaganendranath) and their oeuvres over different forms of artistic expression, from painting to poetry, music, or film. The rooms "Sites of Sustainability: Pavilions, Manifestoes and Crypts" and "Portable Homelands: From Field to Factory" debated the roles of artists as

actors in the political and social spaces that they inhabit and shape in the varied settings of socialist Yugoslavia and post-socialist Armenia.

Yet video installations in "Portable Homelands," as well as in the room "Entangled Holdings: Arte Popular, Surrealism and Emotional Architecture" revealed the absence of a critique of the art market itself in other parts of the show. An installation in "Portable Homelands" on the Dilijan Art Summit presents it as a traveling circus of hypercapitalism that claims to be socially aware, quite literally disembowels social settings by turning the ruins of closed factories into art, and remains meaningless to the people living in those realities. The second installation showcases the perpetual incorporation of the world as a resource for globalized art in the case of the aborted Guggenheim project in Guadalajara, Mexico. These two exhibits could, and should, have been extended into a more fundamental debate on the dynamics shaping the current (re)production and representation of art that would have revealed today's hierarchizations and exclusions.

"Hello World" took up the entire space of the Hamburger Bahnhof, making it necessary to integrate the permanently displayed works into the concept of the exhibition. Yet, it showed that the simple addition of some 'contextual' artworks to the already exhibited pieces can ultimately not replace a more systematic approach. This unsatisfying practice was especially visible in the rooms "The Human Rights of the Eye: A Pictoral Atlas for the Marx Collection," where the museum's collection of Pop art was complemented by associative photo collages, and the room "Where Do We Come From? Adapting Sculptural Forms." Yet it is also currently practiced in other Berlin State Museums, such as the Bode Museum, where European ecclesiastical art is confronted with African sculptures in an exhibition titled "Beyond Compare."[7]

This kind of unsatisfying contextualization pointed to the show's fundamental lack of a central thesis. The space to make such a proposal, the former train station concourse at the center of the museum, was instead put forward as an "agora," a space for deliberation among equals. It is disappointing that this exhibition seeking to widen and even "deconstruct" the Western canon uncritically resorted to its very fundament in classical Athens. Its suggestion as a universally accessible, integrative space ignored the role of the "agora" as a site of the construction of hierarchies and practice of exclusion in Athenian democracy.

It would have surely been more fitting to use this central space to question the basic promise of the universal museum, a promise that this show ultimately devoted itself to upholding. The basic assumption that it makes sense to gather, work through, and showcase the knowledge of the world in Berlin's National Galleries was not up for debate. Nor were pressing questions about the ownership and repatriation of art, or sufficient focus on the normative and spatial divisions

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[7] Staatliche Museen zu Berlin: Preußischer Kulturbesitz, "Beyond Compare: Art from Africa in the Bode-Museum," 2017, https://www.smb.museum/en/exhibitions/detail/unvergleichlich-kunst-aus-afrika-im-bode-museum.html.

between works of 'art' exhibited in the National Galleries and 'anthropological' or 'ethnographic' works to be displayed in the Humboldt Forum from next year on.

Still, "Hello World: Revising a Collection" has contributed to progress in these wider discussions in Berlin by demonstrating the possibilities and limitations of rethinking such a major collection. It therefore was unfortunate that the exhibition closed after only four months, and it should be hoped that its perspectives and the provoked discussions significantly contribute to a changing museumscape in the city.